


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*South Atlantic, Brazil and the Cooperation between Semiperiphery
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ABOUT THE JOURNAL

AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the International Strategic Studies Doctoral Program (PPGEEI) of the Faculty of Economics (FCE) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and to the Brazilian Centre for International Relations and Strategic Studies (NERINT) – a research center of the Latin American Institute for Advanced Studies (ILEA/UFRGS). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing countries.

The journal publishes original articles and book reviews in English, Portuguese or Spanish about themes that lie in the vast area of Strategy and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and the South-South relations, their security issues, the economic, political and diplomatic development of emerging nations and their relations with the traditional powers. The journal's target audience consists of researchers, specialists and postgraduate students of International Relations.

The journal will try, through its publication policy, to ensure that each volume has at least one author from each of the great southern continents (Asia, Latin America, Africa), in order to stimulate the debate and the diffusion of the knowledge produced in these regions. All of the contributions will be subjected to a scientific review.

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Volume 2, Number 4 (Jul/Dec. 2013)

Editor's Note: Brazil, the weakest link of BRICS?.....	7
Brazilian perspectives on the convergence between SISBIN and ZOPACAS.....	11
<i>Sérgio Gonçalves de Amorim</i>	
The South Atlantic, Southern Africa and South America: cooperation and development.....	31
<i>Analúcia Danilevich Pereira</i>	
The South Atlantic: Brazil-Africa Relations in the field of security and defense.....	47
<i>Sérgio Luiz Cruz Aguilar</i>	
The Central Bank of Brazil as an agent of International Relations.....	69
<i>Mauro Salvo</i>	
Zero Hunger for the world – Brazil's global diffusion of its Zero Hunger Strategy.....	91
<i>Markus Fraundorfer</i>	
Triangular technical cooperation and the role of Inmetro.....	117
<i>Leonardo Pace Alves</i>	
Inside the BRIC: analysis of the semiperipheral character of Brazil, Russia, India and China.....	141
<i>Daniel Efrén Morales Ruvalcaba</i>	
Latin American foreign policy and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.....	175
<i>Elsa Llenderrozas</i>	
Middle Powers in the frame of global climate architecture: the hybridization of the North-South gap.....	197
<i>María del Pilar Bueno</i>	
Geography and maritime potential of China and Iran.....	221
<i>Sören Scholvin, Alexandr Burilkov</i>	
Partners.....	237
Submission Standards.....	241

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EDITOR'S NOTE:

Brazil, the weakest link of BRICS?

Many readers and contributors of AUSTRAL, from the most diverse countries, have been asking us: “what is happening in Brazil?” In fact, there is no economic crisis or conjunctural problems that could serve as an explanation for the recent demonstrations. After about a decade of intense international projection, economic growth and successful social policies, Brazil under Dilma’s presidency was hit in June 2013 by a wave of strange protests, characterized by contradictory motivations. The achievement accomplished by President Lula of making Brazil the host-country of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and Rio de Janeiro the host-city of 2016 Olympic Games seem subtly in risk. Brazil, as most countries, endures the chaos of megacities and urgently needs infrastructure updates, which would be propitiated by the World Cup and the Olympics.

It is correct that the government has been trying to stimulate the expenditure of C and D classes without jeopardizing A and B classes, and, in order to do that, it facilitates the acquisition of cars rather than the development and use of public transportation, which increases urban chaos. And, concerning this last aspect, it does not perform differently from the Military Regime or the Neoliberal Era of Fernando Collor de Mello and Fernando Henrique Cardoso. At the same time, it creates a culture of consumerism, with broadened rights and no correspondent duties or constructive and collective ideological motivations, just a cult of individualism.

The old Brazilian elite resents from the increasing concurrence of ascendant classes for an outdated infrastructure and a deficient service sector, which are increasingly insufficient. A population depoliticized by the physiologic alliances of a coalition government and the indifferenciation of party programs aggravate the situation. However, the scattered dissatisfaction *per se* is not able to produce such street rallies.

For more than two decades, national defense, internal security and intelligence sectors have been neglected, even by the present government, influenced by a post-modern perspective and (mis)guided by an agenda emanating from certain circles of great powers. In this sense, Dilma Rousseff administration demonstrates some discontinuity in relation to President Lula's, since it has a very technical profile on the one hand, and it is politically vacillating, on the other. Even its diplomacy evinces signs of regression, in a government dangerously vulnerable to and permeated by the political action of NGOs and public and private foreign foundations. Public policies are launched, fomenting social movements of ambiguous guidance, which turn themselves against the government that avails them itself. In a broad world crisis, protesters demand privileges that are disappearing even in the ancient and prosperous states of the North, without being disposed to make any efforts.

The social networks, technologically manageable and politically influenced by foreign actors, easily capture the disoriented and inexperienced demonstrators, characterized by a naive idealism. The old Brazilian conservatives and both internal and external *agents provocateurs* take action, as well as economic pressure groups in search for specific and obscure advantages and ultra-leftists organizations. The government then demonstrates unreadiness, reacting in a faltering and erratic way, further fueling the protests. Not by chance, the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brasília (Itamaraty) and public institutions were the main targets of vandalism.

As for the other BRICS, China keeps its path of development, sovereignty and stability, while Russia even displays a refurbished international political will, as in the Syrian case. India, on its turn, is naturally social and culturally unstable, and South Africa turns out blocked by the contradictory political pact that provided the end of juridical *Apartheid*. It has lost its leading role even in Africa, where Angola emerges as an important player. Respect to Brazil, the country seems to be losing its disposal to respond to challenges like the U.S. electronic espionage and the international incident of the Bolivian presidential carrier in Europe. A state that granted political asylum to Paraguayan right-wing dictators, to the Italian far-left militant Battisti (perpetrator of many murders) and to the confused episode involving the removal of the Bolivian senator Roger Pinto from the Brazilian embassy in La Paz, Brazil now demonstrates fear of doing so to Edward Snowden. The Roger

Pinto affair implied the dismissal of Chancellor Patriota and the admission of Ambassador Luiz Alberto Figueiredo. Major changes are not previewed, but Itamaraty must become more active and be more closely monitored by President Dilma.

In the same direction, Brazil vacillates regarding international selective criteria that weaken economic development in the energetic and infrastructural areas. A BRICS member geographically distant from the Eurasian core, Brazil struggles with identity problems. A nation historically and culturally recognized by the predominance of miscegenation, it surrenders to the pseudo-multiculturalism that ultimately defines it as “Western”, with minorities fragmenting the nation-building. Without that, there is no national project and consequently there cannot be an advance in economic-social sustained development. But what is at stake in the external arena is the realignment of Brazilian diplomacy and the estrangement from the other BRICS.

In the domestic arena, the focus is the 2014 elections, following the opposition defeat in important cities, like São Paulo. Therefore, amidst an apparent “Colored Revolution”, what is in dispute is not a Regime Change (the Brazilian political class is well articulated), but the erosion of President Dilma prestige, the revival of a weakened opposition and an alteration of the ruling coalition. Ironically, the name of President Lula reappears in opinion polls as the most preferred by the electorate for the next year’s election. There is no “corruption wave”, but a strife for the distribution of investment and public resources.

Therefore, thanks to the demonstrations, the government shall react to its excessive confidence and recover decision-making, which characterized the Lula administration. Economy, in spite of the limited growth, keeps its stability, prosperity and vitality up. This is a political crisis in a democratic regime in full vigor, which seems to be losing strength through the authorities’ reaction and the self-criticism of political parties. Brazil, unlike other South American nations, shunned the most negative aspects legated by the military regime and neoliberalism, and it also must overcome the present difficulties, in most part derived from the accelerated social transformations experienced during the past decade. In order to do that, Brazil nonetheless has to reconsider

certain aspects of its economic model and its political system, and also to set more strength to foreign policy.

* * *

By releasing its fourth edition, *AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* completes its second year of existence. In the present number, the issues covered are: the strategic dimension of the South Atlantic; BRICS; the new dimensions and actors of Brazilian foreign policy; the climate question in emerging countries; and also the Latin American integration. In this edition, the journal has already obtained its first qualification by the CAPES' Qualis and will also appear in new indexes. But the most important is that it is consolidating its links to other academic centers, especially from developing nations. We thank the support of the Advisory Board for Cooperation and International Relations – Governor of Rio Grande do Sul's Office, as well as the work of the Editor Assistant, Pedro Alt, and the translation team.

BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONVERGENCE OF SISBIN AND ZOPACAS

Sérgio Gonçalves de Amorim¹

Introduction

This communication aims to address Brazilian perspectives on the convergence between Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN, in Portuguese), a Brazilian State institutional arrangement in the national defense sector established in 1999, and the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS, in Portuguese), a multilateral negotiation mechanism approved by the United Nations (UN), in 1986, following the initiative of Brazilian diplomacy. This paper, therefore, aims at analyzing the convergence of a country's internal and external security and defense policies in a given regional context.

The ZOPACAS was created by a Brazilian initiative at the UN, which approved it in the context of the Cold War, the paradigm in force concerning decisions in International Politics at that time. Brazil was then initiating a democratization process, and the Zone of Peace and Cooperation was one of its new diplomatic initiatives.

As will be made explicit in this communication, SISBIN's creation in 1999 is part of the Brazilian State democratization and reform process, which in the same year created the Ministry of Defense (MD), bringing together the three military Forces under a single ministerial structure. Also in 1999, the Military House was abolished and replaced by the Institutional Security Cabinet of the

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Presidency of the Republic (GSIPR, in Portuguese) which encompasses the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN, in Portuguese), SISBIN's central body.

The White Paper on National Defense (LBDN, in Portuguese) (Brasil 2012), Brazil's MD document, published in 2012, mentions SISBIN and ZOPACAS, what justifies the present research as one of the ways in which scholars and the Brazilian society can know more about and further increase their participation in the country's international security and national defense public policies.

In this sense, the following sections seek to explain the relations between SISBIN and ZOPACAS in the Brazilian defense thought.

The low integration and effectiveness of ZOPACAS

In the context of the Cold War, Brazil successfully proposed, in 1986, the creation of ZOPACAS, bringing together South American and African countries, aiming at preventing the proliferation of nuclear and mass destruction weapons in the region, as well as military intervention from countries outside the South Atlantic zone.

The LBDN (*ibid.*, 36) offers the following presentation for the Zone of Peace and Cooperation:

"Founded in 1986 by the United Nations, ZOPACAS has currently 24 members – South Africa, Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uruguay. In diplomatic terms, ZOPACAS' enhancement is important for the country's defense".

Miyamoto (1987), evaluating ZOPACAS' foundation at that time, was skeptical in relation to its efficacy and effectiveness and presented the following reasons for his skepticism:

"[...] the possibility of achieving a real zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic will only become a reality when some points are met: at the internal level of the States, the supremacy of the civil over the military order; at the global level, the obedience to international conventions by the great powers, respecting the sovereignty of the countries in the area; at the regional level, the resolution of the

Malvinas Islands problem; the definite burial of expansionist military projects based on geopolitical theories; at the Western African side, the end of the apartheid in South Africa and the independence of Namibia with the withdrawal of South African troops from this country. When these aspirations become concrete realities, it will be possible to speak, without any fear, of regional integration, in lasting agreements of any kind, and in a zone of peace on both sides of the great Atlantic lake”.

In the twenty-six years since ZOPACAS’ creation there have been only seven multilateral meetings, which represented small steps towards the achievement of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic. The first meeting took place in Rio de Janeiro, in 1988, when its initial operation was established. The second was in Abuja, Nigeria, in 1990, when a new design for the ZOPACAS was discussed, especially in face of the end of the Cold War, when South Atlantic lost its relative importance, since the area was like a counterpoint to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) activities, which in turn also lost part of its reason for existence in such historical context. Currently, such trend is being revised, as it will be reflected on later.

The third meeting took place in Brasilia in 1994, when a new basis to justify ZOPACAS was once more discussed and the proposals included emphasizing economic cooperation, maritime environment and the region’s denuclearization. The fourth meeting was held in 1996, in Cape Town, South Africa, and the fifth meeting, in 1998, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, where a the cooperation agenda was further structured. However, it lacked an organizational infrastructure able to give ZOPACAS sustainability and effectiveness.

It would take almost a decade for the sixth meeting to take place and it was held in Luanda, Angola, in 2007, with the participation of all twenty-four member countries, which expressed the general will to revitalize the ZOPACAS. Nevertheless, it took almost seven years for the seventh meeting to take place in Montevideo, Uruguay (January 2013). In that meeting, it was discussed the political instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Guinea-Bissau. ZOPACAS’ inefficacy in situations like those was somehow ratified since it was suggested that other multilateral arrangements – African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community

of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) –took charge in promoting peace in the region.

Therefore, there is a multiplicity of multilateral mechanisms for international negotiation in Africa that can, to some extent, make innocuous the search for certain regional conflicts' solutions through these means.

In summary, according to Kornegay (2013, 89), since its creation, ZOPACAS' agenda may be summarized in the following points:

- Economic cooperation in eradicating poverty by creating partnerships for sustainable development, trade, investment and tourism;
- Crime prevention and combating drug trafficking, illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and transnational organized crime, including piracy;
- Peace, stability and security, including conflict prevention and peace-building within the Zone;
- Scientific research, environmental and marine issues;
- Cross-cutting issues and means of implementation;
- And the need for an implementation and follow-up mechanism.

Maintaining South Atlantic as a Zone of Peace at the present moment has been rather an attribute of the low economic, political and military interest in the region by the military powers, particularly those that make up NATO. However, recent discoveries of oil and other mineral resources in South Atlantic countries might change this scenario of relative peace.

“In summary, there is an Africa that is increasingly internationalized and definitely not marginal. It is at the center of a very strong competition of interests and stakeholders from all parts of the globe. If foreign direct investment grows consistently, coming from both large financial and productive firms, it is also true that these investments are driven by certain logic of Africa's territorial occupation by the great powers, multilateral institutions and influential global economic groups anchored in state foundations.” (Saraiva 2008).

Saraiva (2010) also argues that in the case of African States, the whole continent must overcome four historic challenges, namely: first, the “low rates of power alternation within the continent” that induce to “dubious regimes and governments, going through a very slow process of institutionalization”; second,

the “international drug trafficking penetration” associated with armed conflicts in the continent, making Africa a trafficking corridor of people and drugs; third, the social exclusion and poverty barriers, despite significant economic growth in recent decades; and, fourth, internal policies, at times supported by “humanitarian aid” that promotes more continuity than stimulates changes, making the African societies somehow “dependent” of external “solutions”, undermining their autonomy and effective independence.

Some of ZOPACAS’ strategic interests for Brazil are below analyzed.

Current Brazilian strategic interests in ZOPACAS

The low level of Brazilian participation within ZOPACAS can be justified in part by the economic perspective, since analyzing Brazilian policy towards Africa in the post-Cold War period, it is noted that “Africa’s participation in Brazilian trade flows decreased from 7.8% to 2.81% in exports and from 13.6% to 3% in imports” (Ribeiro 2010).

This partly justifies, at least from the economic perspective, a low adherence and effectiveness of ZOPACAS since its creation as part of the Brazilian diplomatic action. In Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government (1995-2002), Brazil also had not been interested in a more intense economic exchange with the African continent, as explained by Ribeiro (ibid): “despite the fact that several African countries registered, between 1993-2002, an overall rate growth of 3.7% against less than 1% in previous years, no substantial change is observed in the Brazilian diplomatic actions towards the region”.

According to Ribeiro (ibid), Brazilian economy growth rates in the 1990’s were lower than in the previous decade, what led to “the closure of Brazilian diplomatic offices abroad, and particularly in the African continent, signaling, on one hand, the weaknesses of the Union budget and, on the other, the foreign policy priorities”. This means that ZOPACAS was also not a priority in that period.

During the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Africa regained its importance for the Brazilian diplomacy, a reality manifested in the reopening of deactivated embassies, the inauguration of diplomatic missions across the continent and the opening of African diplomatic offices in Brazil (ibid). Thus, for Ribeiro (ibid), “both CLCP and ZOPACAS keep serving as a

potential locus of intersection between the various economic integration processes underway in the South Atlantic region”.

Therefore, it is prudent to take into account the words of former Brazilian ambassador Luiz A. P. Souto Maior, who noticed, in this analysis of “the World order and Brazil” (2003), that “transforming a little more than symbolic solidarity into effective participation in a concrete process of negotiations is extremely arduous”. This applies to both Brazil and other countries regarding the efforts to make the ZOPACAS more effective.

From the Brazilian perspective, the “Brazilian security agenda in relation to the African continent is still not significant. National foreign policy demonstrates a cautious positioning in relation to the deepening of military diplomacy and a more active participation in mediating African conflicts” (Migon and Santos 2012, 150). Both Migon and Santos suggest that in Brazil-Africa relations the “density of Brazilian presence is apparently associated with the political stability of the country considered, verifying that in most volatile areas this one is restricted to military presence and, even then, under the UN aegis” (ibid, 51). They complement their analysis stating that,

“The ‘option for Africa’ in the context of Brazilian foreign relations is something not yet fully institutionalized. In other words, there is a significant list of government actions, including actions of presidential diplomacy, without, however, such reality being effectively integrated into the national Politic and Strategy, in particular in the sector of S&P (security and protection), formally explicit.” (ibid, 151)

Therefore, despite its low efficiency, ZOPACAS may be important for the countries of the region as a multilateral forum for addressing regional issues with minimal interference from countries outside the South Atlantic, especially in a future scenario in which the developed countries decide to militarily intervene aiming to ensure access to markets, oil and mineral resources, as indicated by Lima (2011), who refers to a discussion within NATO to transform the entire Atlantic basin in an area under the organization’s influence. It is clear, therefore, that Brazilian initiatives in this regional scenario are not isolated, and that the actions of other major global players are taken into consideration in the Brazilian diplomatic calculus.

Costa (2012) demonstrates that there is an inflection point in Brazilian foreign policy which expands itself beyond South America towards the South Atlantic. In this sense, Brazil's projection to South Atlantic, particularly in the geopolitical perspective, represents a new strategic scenario that goes beyond South America regional integration (ibid).

“This expansion of its regional and strategic surroundings match the new scale of interests, opportunities and influence of a country that establishes itself as a global economic power and which has in the domain and exploration of maritime resources one of the most promising sources of wealth [...]. The main effects of this new position are the increase in scale and the diversification of final destinations to products, of technology and of Brazilian culture abroad, as well as greater visibility and strengthening of the country's position in the international scene, in the global governance bodies and in the most relevant global issues.” (ibid, 11)

For Costa (ibid), such amplification of Brazil's strategic surroundings occurred mainly due to its scientific and technological development, enabling a diplomatic action until now successful as far as the creation of the Blue Amazon is concerned. This corresponds to South Atlantic's waters on Brazilian possession.

“However, if in the research and diplomacy fields the country has advanced at a rapid pace, it is striking the fragility of the second pillar of its strategy of projection in the world and in particular in the South Atlantic, which is the specific field of security and defense issues and operational capabilities of the armed forces to exercise deterrence power.” (ibid, 20)

It is clear, therefore, that Brazil has a selective policy towards African countries and that its capacity for action in security and defense in the South Atlantic is limited.

Next, SISBIN's efficacy to meet the demands presented by these strategic relations between Brazil and Africa in the South Atlantic region is analyzed.

Intelligences (dis)articulations in Brazil

The LBDN, in the words of Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, is a “milestone

of transparency in defense related issues, through which our citizens will be able to know the State's actions in such area, as well as the country's challenges to improve its defense in the coming decades" (Brasil 2012, 7). Still in its LBDN's message, Dilma Rousseff classifies it as "another [positive] result of Brazil's democratic development" (ibid., 7), and adds that "defense will be increasingly present on the national agenda [...]. Its reading will indicate, above all, that Defense and Democracy form a virtuous circle in the new Brazil that we are building" (ibid., 7).

According to Brazil's Minister of Defense, Celso Amorim, the LBDN "adds itself to the National Defense Strategy and the National Defense Policy as clarifying document on defense activities in Brazil (ibid., 8), which should be hallmarks not only for relations between the Brazilian society and its Armed Forces, but equally between Brazil and other countries, inside and outside South America's region, aiming to provide political transparency in national and international military affairs".

It is important to remember that the basis of the Defense White Papers is the exercise of democracy within and outside the country, to the extent that in this document the national security's objectives are explicit. Due to this, it is important that all ZOPACAS countries present their Defense White Papers considering each country's specific and reciprocal objectives in the regional security and national defense context.

The Defense White Papers contextualize the strategic environment and presents an assessment about South Atlantic's reality in the Brazilian point of view, stressing that "*Brazil also devotes, together with its West African neighbors, special attention to the construction of a cooperative environment in South Atlantic under the auspices of South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS)*" (ibid., 35) [italics added].

On the other hand, the LBND points to the "*need to strengthen the mechanisms for dialogue between the MD and Itamaraty in the sense of approaching their intelligences and joint planning*" (ibid., 49) [italics added].

The MD has a complex structure of intelligence that involves the Armed Forces and its participation in the Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN) through the Defense Intelligence System (SINDE, in Portuguese), created through Normative Decree 295/MD of 3 June 2002 (Brasil 2012). In its turn, of SISBIN, the Law n° 9.833/1999 "integrates planning and execution

actions of intelligence activities in the country, with the purpose of providing the President subsidies on issues of national interest.”

The LBDN affirms in a footnote that the Board of Foreign Affairs and National Defense (CREDEN, in Portuguese) has “the duty of formulating public policies and guidelines for subjects related to the areas of Federal Government’s National Defense and foreign relations” (ibid., 77). The CREDEN is chaired by the Chief Minister of GSIPR, to which the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) is subordinated, with ABIN being SISBIN’s central organ. ABIN, Brazilian Intelligence’s central body, is subordinated to GSIPR, whose competences, according to Provisional Measure n° 1.911-10, from September 24, 1999 (Brasil 1999a), are below described:

Art. 6° The Office of Institutional Security of the Presidency has as its attributions:

- I – assist directly and immediately the President in the performance of her duties;
- II – prevent the occurrence and articulate the management of crisis, in the event of serious and imminent threat to institutional stability;
- III – perform personal consultation on military and security subjects;
- IV – coordinate activities of federal intelligence and information security;
- V – safeguard, assured the exercise of police power, the personal security of the Head of State, the Republic’s Vice-President and their families, the Presidency essential organs’ chiefs and of other authorities or persons when determined by the President of the Republic, as well as the safety of the presidential palaces and the President and Vice-President’s residences.

Amorim (2011), analyzing the law that created SISBIN/ABIN, points out that the Intelligence Activities (AI, in Portuguese) “in the country have prerogatives for classified actions, which on one hand is important to safeguard certain Brazilian strategic interests, but, on the other hand, may set precedents for illegal actions by the public agents in this process”, therefore, in such field of actions in any State, there will always be suspicion, both by part of national society as well as internationally. It is a field adjacent to war and diplomacy, in which totalitarian attitudes may be present and actions in illegality may be conducted under the pretext of State secret.

Analyzing the law, it is clear that the GSIPR guarantees the country’s institutional security and the leading figure of the Presidency, which seems to be too broad on one side, and on other, excessively specific for an organ with

ministerial status. This points to certain ambiguity of roles and a possible emptiness of its functions.

It may be the case that the preciousness concerning the safety of the personal figure of the head of state does not conciliate with the broader responsibilities on matters of national defense and international security, making GSIPR's duties ambiguous and overly wide, eventually emptying it in its attempt to be a "super-advisory and defense board of the Presidency". For these ambiguities, it might become ignored by the supreme head of Executive and, consequently, by other ministries, including the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.

If this occurs, GSIPR and ABIN, and consequently SISBIN, would lack effectiveness alongside government structures and in the eyes of the Brazilian State. Amorim (2011) points out that the Provisional Measure n° 1.911-10/1999 (*ibid.*), which is about the "creation of GSI/PR makes explicit a process of democratic opening and accommodation of military structures in the executive's exercise of power, and demarcates, in the scope of Law, its prerogatives of legal action".

It is worth noting the complex structures of government in the country, which are fragmented between different interest groups, shaping a governance field in which some groups may prevail in relation to others in the political leadership of the State and society.

Amorim (2012c) discusses the difficult state integration between GSIPR, ABIN and SISBIN, "which, in turn, is composed of representatives from the Staff ('Casa Civil' or 'Civil House'), GSI/PR, ABIN and ten other ministries considered by the legislation to have responsibilities related to the AI" (*ibid.*). In this way that the problem of integration under the State

"is somehow due to the complexity of the procedural organization of the Brazilian State's political power, fractionated in diverse organisms, each one holding a portion of this power, which is partly ballasted in privileged knowledge of certain exclusivity by the public officer in certain given issue. Not always such officer is willing to share this knowledge with other agents, public or private, because of bureaucratic power control in the hands of the state apparatus, or for other reasons, hindering secret services integration under the proper state power." (*ibid.*)

For Amorim (ibid.), the “decision-making process – the command itself – is complex, in a way that neither are there extreme authoritarianism of isolated groups or people, nor are there decisions without reflecting great interest groups”.

As a result, one must consider the different intelligence integration levels in SISBIN, *a fact in part recognized in the very LBDN in relation to intelligence activities of the MD and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which must be better articulated through SISBIN*, which in this case would be extensive to the other bodies comprising the System. It must also be considered SISBIN levels of integration with the government represented by the head of the Executive power and its powers in the scope of foreign affairs, defense and intelligence.

“It is perceived that, despite advances in each of the institutional and organizational dimensions analyzed, there is the need for a maturation still to be provided in the scope of AI in Brazil, in its inclusion in a Democratic State, in order to guarantee and secure the rights won by Brazilian society.” (Amorim 2012c)

On the domestic front, Brazil established in 1999 SISBIN as part of the Brazilian society’s democratization process, however, Amorim (ibid.) ponders that this society has difficulty to publicly discuss its intelligence services, either by lack of knowledge and/or prejudice:

“The absence of an intense public debate about AIs institutionalization in Brazil points to certain civil society, even from specific government sectors, disinterest in relation to the institutional security issue, sometimes feeding stigmas related to the AIs within the contemporary Brazilian State.”

The LBDN points out, albeit superficially, some of Brazilian public policies’ guidelines in defense and in the relations between SINDE/MD, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ intelligence service and SISBIN/ABIN/GSIPR established in Brazilian legislation, showing that the Brazilian State seeks transparency in its policies and actions in such strategic sectors. And in this sense it acts “bearing in mind the shield of constitutional guarantees underpinning the construction of Brazilian diplomacy insofar as there is a

structural paradox between the secret activities of the State and the freedom of individuals and organizations” (Amorim 2011).

After having showed the Intelligences’ integration difficulties in the Brazilian State, some considerations about SISBIN’s effectiveness in the South Atlantic context follow.

SISBIN in South Atlantic regional security context

Both initiatives of Brazilian society in its democratization process, the SISBIN internally and ZOPACAS externally, do not have, yet, an effective convergence where is considered Brazilian government’s legislation, policies and actions.

From the Brazilian perspective, convergence between SISBIN and ZOPACAS is complex: on one side, there is a diversity of countries comprising the Zone of Peace and specificities in the external and internal demands of each of these societies; and, on the other side, SISBIN is not yet properly an organ that reflects the country’s integrated action in the strategic intelligence area, especially bearing in mind the realm of International Relations.

To Brazil, there is also a demand for improvement in the internally exchange of strategic information through SISBIN, and, moreover, on the external level with the countries that compose ZOPACAS. From the Brazilian perspective, SISBIN and ZOPACAS, in a certain way, virtually do not communicate, failing to take advantage of mutual synergies in defense and security.

In the case of SISBIN, there are gaps that could be addressed through proactive and preventive actions in various areas that involve cooperation between AI of each ZOPACAS’ countries. On the other hand, saved the appropriate specificities, the legal architecture that underlies SISBIN could also serve as inspiration for other countries in the construction of democratic models for their own AIs, not only on the internal level, but also in the relations between ZOPACAS’ countries. However, procedural challenges of intelligence law would continue, which are the experiential aspects of each specific situation, where integration and effectiveness have not been achieved yet, as the Brazilian case demonstrates, both internally and externally.

Cooperation between SISBIN and other countries of ZOPACAS would allow appropriate treatment to the “new defense and security issues of the region”, within each country and between them, which involves mineral

resources (the main ones being the oil from Gulf of Guinea and the Brazilian pre-salt), the infrastructures of each country and the ones shared between them, the fight against transnational organized crime (drugs, arms and human trafficking, smuggling), conflicts involving migration, work and land ownership, socio-environmental conflicts, the very institutional security of each country, Science, Technology and Innovation, legislation and national and international politics for the Sea, among other relevant issues of the post-Cold War era.

However, it must be considered that in the context of national institutions and international relations of each country participating in the Zone of Peace, there is a diversity of interests in State Intelligence, and its relationship with civil society is also varied and complex, and somehow still does not reflect a perfect participatory democracy. This is an important constraint that hinders actions between these various secret services in ZOPACAS, pointing to a weakness in this level of integration on international security in South Atlantic.

To conciliate the needs of defense and security with the promotion of democracy – guaranteeing citizens’ fundamental rights internally, and respecting state sovereignty and the self-determination principle externally – has been a contemporary challenge to the States comprising the South Atlantic basin.

Internally to each one of the ZOPACAS’ countries there is always the risk of one type of Intelligence action serving projects of power, authoritarianism and violence, totally averse to both the democratic processes and the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts, which infringes the principles of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation.

It could also, at the limit, become a pretext for military action from countries within the South Atlantic basin, when not from countries outside the region, under the excuse of providing assurance to the institutional stability in a country where the AI has failed its purposes of being an instrument for democratic peace building.

It must be remembered that an outside intervention in the region would also break ZOPACAS’ foundations. Thus, if in only one country the AI do not keep the respect for democratic institutions and to other peoples’ sovereignty, such fact would raise constant suspicions not only in this nation, but, in the

case of ZOPACAS, also in all other South Atlantic basin's partners, bringing instability to regional peace.

Amorim (2012a) considers that espionage/counterespionage activities permeate human society in historical and anthropological perspectives, always raising suspicions, promoting betrayals and fears, and contributing to ethnocentric and xenophobic attitudes, what form a sort of cultural background, an ethos and pathos, which deserve an appropriate attention not always given in the power relations' field.

"This way, despite all the exaggeration that may be considered in the exercise of these types of activities, the societies that set them in motion were seeking what they believed to be the best for themselves, however contradictory and ambiguous might have been the forms of such attempts. In fact, violence has its ambiguities and contradictions, since it serves for the most different purposes, among an array of possibilities ranging from annihilation of a human group to its own structuration."

Human forces, integrative and destructive at the same time, which gain institutional, national, continental and global dimensions, and make themselves present in both peace and war, are part of the vitality of human relations and politics at various scales.

Amorim (2012b) analyzing some Brazilian prospects of democratic cooperation in regional security of SISBIN in the context of UNASUR argues that

"The Activities of Intelligence (AI) considered from a quite broad and generic point of view to an ethos and pathos closely related to the nature of power exercise and government in a society [...]. This point of view is a way to understand AI in each country, exercised in accordance with the strategic objectives established by their respective government and societies, which certainly reveal antagonistic positions between States, but also common interests, and, sometimes, constructs for peace and security in a certain region."

To move away from mutual distrust and to approach the cooperation SISBIN/ZOPACAS involves a shift in paradigm in relation to the very AIs' foundations, which in a classic context of International Relations would be an internal issue to each country, even though there might be repercussions at the

outside level from Intelligence actions of each State. This is also the case of the Armed Forces and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of each country, which are internal organs whose actions may also affect the International Security plan. Another mindset construction on the field of AI, in general and in the context of ZOPACAS in particular, would have a key role in conflict prevention and peace building in the region, especially if there is an articulation of interests between the participant countries around the political meanings of the suggested “new threats”.

An interesting initiative would be the organization of a university that considers issues relevant to the South Atlantic and ZOPACAS. NATO, for instance, has the NATO Defense College established in 1951, which is an institution dedicated to forming military. In ZOPACAS’ case, in contrast to NATO, an initiative in this direction would not be limited only to defense and formation of military but could also include education for civilians in issues relevant to the Zone of Peace and Cooperation, aiming at its further integration and efficacy.

In this sense, it is worth remembering that the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) has the Center for Defense Strategic Studies of the South American Defense Council (CEED/CDS, in Portuguese), as well as the South American Institute of Government in Health (ISAGS, in Portuguese).

Amorim (ibid.) even suggests as an “utopia, for example, the creation of a future south American agency of intelligence that could integrate supranational actions in the fight against drug and human trafficking and other transnational crimes”, the same proposition could fit in the context of South Atlantic countries through ZOPACAS, one “integrated intelligence agency of South Atlantic” which in itself would carry vectors of integration and, possibly, efficacy to the Zone of Peace, without its necessary militarization, as it is set out for the region.

This level of cooperation is utopic, according to Amorim (2012a), because “espionage/counterespionage activities relate themselves to the exercise of power and to the use or threat of use of violence, with a particularity which is of always having as framework the values of a particular human group in relation to others”, what obviously makes sensitive the collaboration in this context of social life. Hence the necessity for others paradigms and mindsets in

Intelligence, mainly aimed to regional cooperation, preventing violence and reducing mistrusts, what is desired by ZOPACAS.

The SISBIN/UNASUR context is analogous to SISBIN/ZOPACAS, thus it is possible to apply for both the conclusions presented by Amorim (2012b) that

“the Brazilian case points tasks to be fulfilled by the region’s countries in terms of AI integration and regulation in a Democratic State, and since it is one of the most advanced countries on this issue in South America [and South Atlantic], asymmetries in terms of AI become explicit between countries of UNASUR [and ZOPACAS], pointing to future challenges to democracy consolidation in the region.”

Initiatives of transparency and democracy in the context of ZOPACAS would intensify changes between member States and, therefore, its efficacy. Furthermore, in the Brazilian case, bringing greater integration, efficacy and alignment of regional security structures in South Atlantic, as advocated by the country’s public documents, would justify the use of public resources in Intelligence and Defense. This is a situation also desirable to the other countries of the region, evidently.

Finally, it is important to highlight a dimension not less important of politics convergence between SISBIN and ZOPACAS, from a Brazilian perspective. It is about the relations between international migration flows and institutional security systems of the country.

Amorim (2012d) considers that

“Brazil, in terms of migration policies, has still been marked by the economic and institutional security paradigms, despite the Brazilian State’s reform in relation to the intelligence services in the country [...] Nonetheless, this problem is not unique to Brazil, permeating all developed countries, making possible to state that such situation, in the moment, is emblematic and structural.”

ZOPACAS, as other multilateral mechanisms of international politics, includes not only the movement of goods, but also the flow of people. In the Brazilian case, it is necessary to overcome prejudices concerning the peoples of African origin and the poor, especially if it wants to advance regional security

and integration. This is not a simple task as it requires the transformation of mentalities that sometimes lies deep rooted in the Brazilian history and culture.

Conclusion

The creation of ZOPACAS in 1986 was a Brazilian initiative in the inception of its re-democratization process, still in the Cold War context, even if it would symbolically end only three years later, what immediately demanded the reformulation of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation's objectives. During its 27 years of existence, ZOPACAS is marked by low effectiveness and little interest from member countries.

Brazil, in particular, has not prioritized Africa in its foreign policy, and just recently, in Lula and Dilma governments, there have been new initiatives in relation to the African continent, indicating a growing strategic interest from Brazil, especially after the discovery of oil in deep waters of the South Atlantic.

Such Brazilian strategic interest in ZOPACAS is declared in its LBDN, which also recognizes the country's lack of efficiency concerning Intelligence structure for the region, mainly involving the SINDE and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' intelligence services, with information exchanges through SISBIN.

For its part, SISBIN is still an incomplete work of the Brazilian State and lacks effectiveness in its relation with the State itself and with the Brazilian society. The integration of intelligence products from the various secret services that comprise it is fragile regarding the construction, achievements and monitoring of public policies in the area of International Security and Defense.

On the other hand, in the short term, given the diversity of countries that form ZOPACAS and the plurality of interests involved, it is unlikely that regional cooperation within the intelligence sphere comes to be established between the member countries of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation, reinforcing the traditional mutual distrusts in this sector of international security.

More than international policies for an effective Peace that allows the pacific coexistence between the peoples of the Earth, what is necessary is the construction of new mentalities and, therefore, of a New Policy not guided by fear and mistrust.

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ABSTRACT

Brazil successfully proposed the creation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone in 1986, gathering countries of South America and Africa and aiming to stop the spreading of nuclear weapons within the region, along with its consequent militarization. In 1999, the Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN) was created as part of a process of democratization of Brazilian society. However, considering the respective historical and institutional contexts of these two initiatives, there is no effective convergence between them yet. On one side, there is a diversity of sometimes conflicting interests between countries part of ZOPACAS, with their societies' internal and external demands; on the other, the Brazilian perspective, SISBIN still does not reflect an integrated action of Brazil in the field of strategic intelligence outside the country's limits, especially in the South Atlantic.

KEYWORDS

SISBIN; ZOPACAS; Intelligence; South Atlantic; International Security.

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THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, SOUTHERN AFRICA AND SOUTH AMERICA: COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

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Introduction

The South Atlantic is responsible for linking South America to Africa, but it is, first, also a strategic space for political, technical and commercial exchanges between both continents. Historically considered a commercial region involving Europe, Latin America and Africa, the Atlantic Ocean resumes its geo-economic and geopolitical importance due to its great natural resources, as well as to the turnaround of geopolitics towards South. Though it has huge importance since the colonial era, it is since the 1970s' Oil Crisis that this ocean had its prominence re-dimensioned, boosting the debate on limited maritime borders, but mainly on the exploration of its natural resources. Moreover, the incapacity of the two current interoceanic waterways – Suez and Panama – in responding demands and receiving more important ships increased the pressures on the area. Besides the oil reserves and the ecosystems located in the Atlantic, there is a diversity of other resources that might benefit the economic development of the countries lying on both margins.

For Brazil, and mainly for its relations with the African continent, South Atlantic introduces itself as an extremely important axis. Some critics, in

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a superficial analysis, define the Brazilian strategy as paradoxical as far as the country supposedly is fomenting diplomatic efforts towards poorest countries, with little influence over the global geopolitical context and even lighter weight in the Brazilian commercial balance. However, it is necessary to evaluate some political and economic tendencies fastened by the deepening and enlargement of globalization. The fact that Brazil became a capital and technology exporter, besides being a traditional (and now competitive) exporter of primary products, services and manufactures, must be mentioned. Africa, in this sense, is one of the most adequate regions to attract the Brazilian investment, once it is one of the few natural frontiers still to be opened for the expansion of enterprises in sectors like the petroleum, gas and mining industries. On the other hand, the continent is the center of a global dispute over the access to increasingly scarce raw materials demanded by the traditional powers.

In this sense, and from the Brazilian point of view, the utilization of the South Atlantic does not only mean to make Africa (especially South Africa) a solid connection to Asia through the Indian Ocean. Besides the fact that the south of the African continent is becoming a logistic base, the South Atlantic (and also the Indian Ocean) emerges as a zone full of energy resources, with gas and oil deposits, like the pre-salt layer. Hence, the two margins of the Atlantic have been the stage of new discoveries and also important parts of the Indian Ocean. The reaffirmation of the sovereignty over the territorial waters, the maintenance of the oceanic security required for navigation and the blockade of any initiative of militarization of these maritime spaces through the action of extra regional powers are, therefore, needed.

In this perspective, as the economic importance of the South Atlantic increases, the international pressure on the region does proportionally the same. It is relevant to highlight that the enlargement of the British military investiture (with the support of the United States), on the occasion of the quarrel with Argentina over the Malvinas/Falklands Islands. In this sense, the guarantee of economic rights comes, for the countries of both margins, along with the counterparts of duties and responsibilities related to political, environmental and public safety issues, so that the effective control and the maintenance of the state sovereignty can be possible. Likewise, the projection of maritime regional power becomes necessary, both in terms of defense and promoting an engagement between the countries of the region facing the great

challenges and processes that make part of the South Atlantic strategic context. And still there is the urgency of controlling the maritime routes, but also the illegal activities of the Ocean, as well as the exploration of resources in international waters (Flemes and Costa Vaz 2011).

Thus, in order to evaluate the resumption of the importance of the South Atlantic in the 21st Century, it is necessary to assess the geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic dimensions.

In relation to the geo-economic importance

The South Atlantic, other than being a trade route and an important geo-economic space, is also a development pole. In this context, it is worth reminding that the South American projection, and especially the Brazilian, towards Africa and Asia are followed by the Chinese and Indian ones towards Africa and South America. South Atlantic emerges then as a platform to the creation of strategic partnerships between the countries lying on its coast and between these countries and the Asian States, proving to be decisive to the development of South-South Cooperation policies. Inside the dynamics of these political routes, the African continent is perceived as a converging point of the Southern coalitions.

It is worth to note that the South Atlantic comprehends four large archipelagos and islands of different importance and sizes, as well as different nationalities, with a wide coastal region that covers part of the American, African and Antarctic continents. The African coast extends from Guinea-Bissau to the Cape, with more than 7,800km, of which 1,200km set the Angolan and Namibian Deserts. This coast is compounded by sixteen countries, including six Mediterranean. Few are the natural harbor, and among them can be highlighted Freetown, in Sierra Leone; Boma, in the Republic of Congo; Libreville, in Gabon; Douala, in Cameroon; Luanda, in Angola; Walvis Bay, in Namibia; and Cape Town, in South Africa.

As to the American coast, it starts at the São Roque Cape, in Northeastern Brazil, and extends to the Tierra del Fuego Cape. Its extension is of 9,000km, of which 4,179km belong to Brazil, 330km to Uruguay and 4,500km to Argentina. The American coast has plenty of natural harbors, like Recife, Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, Paranaguá, Santos, Porto Alegre and Rio

Grande. Finally, the Antarctic Coast extends from the Antarctic Peninsula to the Maud Land (or Queen Maud's Land), opposite to Cape Town. This is one of the coastal regions with more difficult access to in the world, particularly in the Mar Weddell section. Due to the geostrategic separation between the Southern region of the Ocean and the Antarctica in two different subsystems, the latitude of 60°S was defined as the limit of the South Atlantic region. This way, the Ocean can be accessed through three ways – through the North Atlantic, the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean. This interconnectivity is one of the greatest factors that make the security cooperation and the maintenance of the area necessary as a pacific zone, which can be utilized as a development space.

However, it is essential to go beyond, once dealing with the resumption of the strategic importance of the South Atlantic and the Brazil-Africa relations makes to consider the meaning of the economic alliances as a fundamental component to the development of both margins of the ocean also import, as well as the meaning of Antarctica.

The fishing activity is of great importance for the coastal communities, being the practice that more lacks vigilance and control. The combat of predatory fishing, practiced by foreign ships with high technology and disrespectful to the environmental law, is necessary and, for now, ineffective, resulting in economic and social damages. According to the Brazilian Navy, though, the Brazilian Continental Shelf, and possibly the African too, detain huge amount of important minerals in the shape of polymetallic nodules (found in abundance in the Peruvian Basin), which contain metals of great economic value, besides monazitic sand, with significant uranium concentration.

Still, other than the new pre-salt Brazilian reserves, there are also reserves on the Argentinean Continental Shelf, as well as expressive offshore reserves of petroleum in the Gulf of Guinea, mainly in Nigeria, Angola, Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe. Still in the African Western Coast, Namibia possess vast deposits of gas, while South Africa of coal.

With the discovery and exploration of the pre-salt layer, the region gained even more economic importance and the need to regulate this activity, and also the other aforementioned ones, becomes a crucial measure for countries of both margins. Another factor that increments the geo-economic relevance of the ocean is the fact that it bathes the Antarctica, region considered a new

frontier for exploration. Certainly this area will be subject to further heavier international pressure in the near future.

In relation to the geopolitical importance

When thinking about the South Atlantic, one cannot set aside the highlight of the Brazilian position. Brazil possesses the longest coast and the biggest maritime shelf of the region. Therefore, the strategic interest in the region is evident. When evaluating the driving force that concretely influence the formulation of foreign policy and its impact on the International Relations, one cannot set aside the consideration of the geopolitical perspective. In this sense, the relations between Brazil and the African continent constitute one of the main axes and can be divided in five different periods, with different durations (Relatório Banco Mundial 2012). The first period comprehends the colonial domination phase, from the 16th Century until the beginning of the 19th Century. The exchanges between Brazil and Africa increased throughout the period. Not only slaves were traded through this route, but also goods, besides the interchange of ideas and abilities. In this regard, the social and economic exchanges marked the intercontinental relations. The second period, which started in 1822 with the Independence of Brazil, was marked by the marginalization of this relation. With the end of the slave trade and the increase of the European expansion into the African continent, Brazil started to prioritize its relations with South America, the United States and Europe, a pattern practiced until the 1950s. It is interesting to note that in 1822 the Brazilian population was of roughly 4 million people, half of them slaves born in the country or in Africa. The third period was characterized by the African decolonization processes, with emphasis on the 1960s – being 1960 the “African year” –, a phase marked by a new scenario also in Brazil. Despite the creation of new independent states in Africa, Brazil what was noticed was the distance of Brazil from these events (especially during the Kubitschek administration, 1956-61) due to its close ties with Portugal.

The loosening of these ties with Portugal guaranteed the beginning of a new phase of re-approximation to Africa, defining the fourth period, which extends from January, 1961 until half of the 1980s. This period, except for the first years that followed the 1964 coup d'état, watched the narrowing of

political and economic relations with the African continent. The end of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s were marked by the intense flux of goods and capital through the Atlantic, making this space an object to political definitions and commercial development. In this moment the inflexion point happened after 1975, when Brazil, during the Geisel government, recognized the MPLA's (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, initials in Portuguese) revolutionary government.

During the fifth period, which extends until the 21st Century, Africa became a priority in the Brazilian international agenda, with special attention given to the Lusophone countries, with which Brazil share historical ties, but not restricted to them. The African continent passed through quick changes after de democratization and resolution of conflicts processes, and Brazil has been demonstrating increasing interest in supporting and being part of the development of Africa. Lula administration reactivated the Brazilian interest in Africa and utilizes it as a base to broaden the global influence of the continent. From the creation of the IBSA Forum and the rapprochement mechanisms of BRICS, the established relations until now gained new dimension. And inside this context, the "new" global Brazil ends up matching the "new" reborn Africa. Through the cultural and historical approach to the continent, besides the language affinity with the Lusophone countries, Brazil establishes its relation with Africa adding an aspect that neither China nor India has in common with the African countries.

In relation to the geostrategic importance

Brazil has improved policies concerning the exchanges of military techniques with the African countries and India, creating a complex network of securitization that interconnects the three continents. Given the increasing geo-economic importance of the South Atlantic, the military exchanges between the two margins assume a relevant role in the relations between the three countries (Flemes and Costa Vaz 2011). It is worth underlining the joint exercise of Brazilian, Indian and South African troops in 2008, the IBSAMAR. This important multilateral event was almost unnoticed by the peoples of the involved countries. India and Brazil have strong Navies, with more than 50,000 ships. In comparison to the South African Navy, with smaller numbers, the other two countries can play the role of coordination in the future. South

Africa, on its part, has a long coastal area (it is a bioceanic country) and a limited naval capacity to monitor and protect it. This fact creates an opportunity for all the three navies to act in these areas. Moreover, the Good Hope Cape tends to be increasingly used as a trade route (it is worth reminding that the action of the Somali pirates transformed the Suez route into a very serious problem).

Concerning IBSA, the relation between India, Brazil and South Africa is very well consolidated, and this new reality, along with regional neighbors predisposed to multilateralism, can constitute a new distribution of power, representing – according to Kornegay (2011) – the “geopolitical and geo-economic reunification of Gondwana” (former mega-continent that united South America, Africa, India and Australia). From the trilateral perspective, the geostrategic logic of IBSA is clear – the objective is to create a maritime liaison between South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. The fact that three countries had gotten together at IBSAMAR sets out this proposal. What each country pretends from this logic depends on its individual and joint political will to form the geopolitical and strategic terms of the 21st Century (Kornegay 2011). The last IBSAMAR happened on September 13-27, 2010 and counted on the participation of eleven ships, besides helicopters from the three countries.

In spite of some limitations in terms of regional security – especially in the Indian and South African cases –, the relation between the IBSA members seems to strengthen the regional objectives of its parties. Furthermore, the three countries occupy a relevant international position, and the acronym might fortify this position, besides being a way to promote a new political orientation. IBSA emerges in a new crossroads of the world history in which there is a leadership vacuum in terms of global legitimacy and in the middle of an increasing energy and resources scarcity geopolitics. Therefore, IBSA could assume a role that would promote a new orientation for the geopolitics of energy favoring a new responsibility (ethical and pro-conservation) as the limestone of global governance.

The South Atlantic has particular importance for Brazil, especially due to recent (and increasing) interest of states like the United Kingdom, United States, Germany, France, Russia, China and Japan. The proximity to Antarctica (its privileged position between three oceans is regarded as of great

importance for the Brazilian navigation), besides its climatic effects over the territory, are fundamental aspects in the formulation of the Brazilian policy for the region. Once great part of the Brazilian foreign trade is made through the ocean, besides the strong fishing activities and the oil exploration in the South American continental shelf, the Brazilian Navy was induced to develop its navigation capacities in deep waters. The Brazilian need to boost the security in the region must be seen as one of the main objectives of the national security.

Historically, the proposal of a South Atlantic security organization was put on the agenda (again) in 1977 by the commander of the Uruguayan Navy. The organization that should be known as South Atlantic Treaty Organization (OTAS, initials in Portuguese) would follow the NATO model (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). The Brazilian government in that occasion refused the Uruguayan proposal, asserting that OTAS would lead to an arms race in the region, and the government also advocated that the Southern countries would not have the required capacity to face a possible “Soviet threat” without the North American support. The Brazilian retraction brought South Africa and Argentina closer, an alliance that would soon be dismantled due to the dispute over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands in 1982. South Africa started to foment a rapprochement with Bolivia, Paraguay and Chile so that the OTAS proposal could be put in practice. Through a huge irrigation project, along with the United Kingdom, Chile drew near South Africa. However, the idea of implementing the organization was gradually put aside because there were no conditions to its functioning according to the initial plan.

Nevertheless, Brazil would feel the need to guarantee the security of the region, and the revision of the original idea of OTAS was necessary. This new vision was more evident as long as the South Atlantic threats were kept in the context of the end of the Cold War. The problematic then has become to focus on how that mechanism could be implemented and what composition would it have. At the end of the 1980s, Brazil proposed the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS, initials in Portuguese) as the counterpart to OTAS. Due to its regional importance, Brazil was able to obtain the support of the coastal countries. However, South Africa and Namibia did not support the proposal because South Africa was isolated and Namibia was still ruled by the South Africans. The change of position came after the 50th United Nations General Assembly in 1986, when the Resolution A/RES/41/11 defined the South

Atlantic as a peace and cooperation zone (Khanyile 2003). The 2nd and 3rd articles of the resolution demanded the countries of the region to unite in order to maintain peace through the demilitarization of the area, the non-introduction of weapons of mass destruction and the non-nuclearization. It is interesting to point out that, when voted, the resolution received 124 votes in favor, eight abstentions (all from industrialized countries) and one vote against – from the U.S. The idea of South Atlantic demilitarization and denuclearization did not flatter the developed countries, which have clear interests on the natural resources of the region.

The 5th article of the resolution was of great relevance for South Africa as it fixed the end of the *apartheid* regime, besides the self-determination and the autonomy of Namibia. Moreover, it determined the cease of all aggressions among the States of the region and of the support to any resolution pro colonialism, racism and their consequences. Therefore, the resolution covered four problematic themes of the region – environment, socioeconomic development, peace and security, and the emancipation of South Africa and its neighbors.

The first ZOPACAS meeting happened in Rio de Janeiro, in 1988, later in Abuja, Nigeria, in 1990, and the third in Brasília, 1994. However, it should be stressed that the meeting in South Africa, in 1996, is considered unique for many reasons. With the “Bridging the South Atlantic” theme, the gathering emphasized the importance of the region for both margins. Many organizations supported the ZOPACAS activities, like, for example, the International Maritime Organization. Since 1994, Brazil is the biggest South African partner in South America, and one of the biggest in the Southern Hemisphere. In 1995, roughly 50% of the South African exports were directed to Brazil, same year that South Africa had a foreign trade surplus with Brazil. In this very year, the first career diplomat was indicated to be the ambassador in the African country, being Otto Maia the chosen one.

Another important moment happened when Nelson Mandela visited Brazil in 1998 and signed the Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultations on Issues of Common Interest. Other agreements concerning technical cooperation, double taxation, promotion and security of investments would follow. Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, visited Brazil in 2000, when

he also met leaders of Mercosur. Until the constitution of IBSA and the later realization of the joint military exercises of IBSAMAR, South Africa and Brazil had already been part of three exercises under the North American influence – the ATLASUR (that involved Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and South Africa, biannual event performed for the first time in 1993), UNITAS (that involved all the countries that took part in ATLASUR plus Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela and the United States) and the TRANSOCEANIC (Khanyile 2003). Unlike the others, TRANSOCEANIC is a transport control exercise, not involving ships. Yet, not only exercises sponsored by the U.S. were practiced. Bilateral initiatives, like the Brazilian Task Group, between South Africa and Brazil; an exercise between Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina; and another one between South Africa and Chile are also inserted in this context.

With the ascension of Lula, but already in the end of the Mbeki government, Brazil and South Africa increased their diplomatic and military interaction in the IBSA frame. Embedded in the positive perception concerning South-South Cooperation as a way to reach bigger political autonomy and international prominence, the politics of both countries converged, finding in BRICS and IBSA the path to intensify and improve the relations. With different emphasis, the two international mechanisms cover different objectives, but equally important for the foreign policy of both countries. While BRICS gives more importance to the reform of global governance and the financial system, IBSA, besides the idea of contributing for the construction of a new international architecture, also seeks to deep the mutual knowledge in specific areas, namely: Public Administration and Governance; Tributary and Customs Administration; Agriculture; Human Camps; Science and Technology; Commerce and Investments; Culture; Defense; Social Development; Education; Energy; Environment and Climatic Changes; Health; Informational Society; Transportation; Tourism; among others.

Through the IBSA Fund and the action of work groups, the three countries are improving the savoir-faire and the technical cooperation in a myriad of areas. It is also important to stress the work of IBSA Ocean. IBSA Ocean is a joint research group in the Antarctic continent. Already in its second meeting, four main acting areas and a goal plan were defined. The areas are: variability and climate changes (the construction of a joint database and the IBSA Earth System Model are planned); effects derived from climate changes

on ecosystems, carbon fluxes and biogeochemistry (including ecosystems lied on open seas and the coastline); effects of the global changes on life beings, biodiversity and management planning (from the proliferation of dangerous algae to fishing); and, at last, regional systems of oceanic observation. Though it lacks military involvement, it is of great relevance for the comprehension of the security space that the three countries are developing.

Final Considerations

It is important to underscore that, for Brazil, Africa is not only a connection to Asia. The South Atlantic has been operating as a place of discoveries of a myriad of natural resources, like the Brazilian pre-salt or the new oil deposits of the Angolan coast, in which Brazil is already investing and cooperating with the supply of technical resources for exploration. The affirmation of the sovereignty over territorial waters, the maintenance of security in the oceans for navigation and the blockade of any militarization initiative in these spaces by extra-regional powers are, thus, urgent. Still, it is essential to consider the North American need to control safer and cheaper oil deposits than the ones from Venezuela or the Middle East, besides the close military relation of the U.S. with South Africa – country that could be utilized for the entry in the African continent and, then, in the South Atlantic.

Despite the critiques, the development of the military capacities by the countries of the region is indispensable, at the same time that the emphasis on the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) must be stressed, especially facing the attempts to militarize the region, exemplified by the Malvinas case (Great Britain), the recreation of the Fourth Fleet (United States) and the AFRICOM (North American Africa Command), besides the North American insertion in South America through bases in the Colombian territory.

The great potential to transform South Atlantic into a security and energy supplier community as an option to the Euro-North American North Atlantic system is perceived by the Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil seeks leadership in the pursuit for this project, something that seems to be obtained through the Brazilian assertive policy of international projection. In this sense, South Africa possesses a central position in between the Indian and Atlantic

oceans, which, together with its strong economy, makes the oblivion of the country almost impossible when seeking the engagement with the continent.

It is interesting to highlight that the resolution of the African regional conflicts (for example, Angola and South Africa) boosted an “African Turn of the Tide”, allowing Brazil to act in the rapprochement with and between these countries. The expansion of this relation is important to increase the options inside SADC, which may generate a joint maritime security plan that will bring the region closer to Brazil and, thus, strengthen IBSA. While the South Atlantic does not have an institutionalized organization, like the case of IOR-ARC (Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation), the International Relations of the region must conduct to a new transatlantic maritime security architecture (Kornegay 2011). In this direction, the creation of the South American Defense Council, led by Brazil, must be taken into account.

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ABSTRACT

The South Atlantic is becoming a strategic space in terms of development. The maritime usage on both shores of the ocean allows the exploration and the use, as well as the conservation and the management, of the natural resources of the seabed and the subsoil. The guarantee of economic rights, with the counterpart of duties and responsibilities of political nature, environmental and of public security, reflects the possibility of control over an area rich in natural resources and that, at the same time, becomes vulnerable to international pressures of all kinds. The research objectives are: a) analyze the geo-economic importance of the ocean due to the increasing exploration of this space; b) analyze the new geopolitical reality, because the South Atlantic was converted into a strategic route of passage and development pole; and, c) analyze its geostrategic relevance by establishing a connection with Asia via Indian Ocean, highlighting the role of South Africa and IBSA.

KEYWORDS

South Atlantic; Geopolitics; Geoeconomics; Geostrategy.

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SOUTH ATLANTIC: BRAZIL-AFRICA RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE

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Introduction

While the South Atlantic conditioned the preparation and employment of naval forces in the context of defense of the Americas during the Cold War, today this area is presented to the country's foreign policy as a strategic priority and as a hub for Brazil's international insertion. Consequently, within the framework of the so-called South-South cooperation, which conformed in the 1970s and gained momentum in the post-Cold War, Brazil has been signing a series of agreements with African countries, especially those located on the western coast of the continent. In addition to the economic, political and technological areas, cooperation is also taking place in the field of security and defense.

This paper discusses the actions of South-South cooperation in the field of security and defense between the Brazilian government and the African countries, especially those in Atlantic Africa. Based on the literature on the subject and documentary sources, we begin with some considerations on the South Atlantic in the context of security and defense in the Cold War period. Then we will address the South-South cooperation and the agreements and projects implemented by Brazil with African countries in the post-Cold War era. In conclusion, we discuss the strategic dimensions of this cooperation in

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strengthening Brazil's political relations with these countries and the current reconfiguration of international relations.

The South Atlantic in the Cold War Context

During the Cold War the American continent lived under the strategy of containment as it was practiced by the United States, i.e. to stop the Soviet advance anywhere it manifested. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), in charge of making studies, issuing recommendations and preparing plans for common defense, raised three hypotheses for the defense of the continent: the so-called "revolutionary war"; the "limited war or consented military intervention, fostered by Eastern Grouping"; and the "armed attack of the Eastern Grouping to the Continent, under a general war"(Aguilar 2010, 81).

From them, the hypotheses of War that permeated the military planning of Latin American countries in the period derived from a regional conflict against a neighbor; internal, revolutionary war against leftists movements; and an extra continental war participating in the allied force led by the United States against the forces of the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union (Aguilar 2010, 82).

The third hypothesis of conflict was embedded in the logic of the global confrontation between the two superpowers, according to which the safety of the periphery would be guaranteed by one of them. The preparation for conventional warfare was secured for the Latin American military with through the training in U.S. military schools and the supply of low-cost war material from U.S. aid programs. As the South American forces have a key role in the defense of the South Atlantic and the Pacific, the U.S. conceived and sponsored several joint exercises with the navies of the continent.

Although the U.S. Navy had already conducted smaller exercises with other navies, such as Operation Neptune with the Argentine Navy, the first major joint maneuver with a South American navy was the UNITAS Operation, which started in 1959 and continues to operate until the present days (2010 Aguilar, 83).

In the late 1970s, with the possibility of increasing the presence of the Soviet Navy in the South Atlantic, the idea of creating a collective defense mechanism along the lines of the Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) emerged. This organization would include Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay

and South Africa. The presence of Paraguay in such project was also contemplated. However, the South Atlantic was a priority for Brazil because of its extensive coastline and maritime trade routes and the government did not perceive a threat that justified the creation of a so-called South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) (Aguilar 2010, 86).

The Brazilian Navy understood that 1) the Soviet naval presence would not be neutralized by the union of navies of such sizes in the area; 2) such presence would not threaten western maritime traffic; 3) the importance of the route passing the African coast derived from the oil, a route that in case of war would be vulnerable from its origin; 4) there would be political difficulties of composing such a mechanism with South Africa, which was at the time isolated politically as a result of the Apartheid regime. Moreover, if the intention of the proposal was to difficult the communist expansion in Africa, it would have faced the Brazilian refusal inasmuch as the country had at that time good political relations-with Angola and Mozambique. The conclusion was that such a treaty would not add much to the security of the countries involved; it would be ineffective because the naval force of those involved was not compatible with the area to be defended; and, finally, it could even be detrimental to Brazilian national interests in relation to Africa (Aguilar 2010, 86).

Besides UNITAS, other multilateral exercises were executed by American initiative, and they included the Expanded Sea, the Ocean Ventura and the Export Gold operations (Aguilar 2010, 152). It is worth noting that the Operation Oceanic in the early 1980s involved naval units from South America and South Africa (National Archives 1981a).

The IADB also prepared in the 1960s the Plan for Coordination of Inter-American Maritime Traffic which defined five sea areas – one of them covering the South Atlantic. As a result of this plan, the Maritime Area of the South Atlantic (AMAS) was established in 1967 with the purpose of serving as an instrument of coordination, training, and naval control of maritime traffic. AMAS comprised the maritime coast of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina and had a Coordinator – CAMAS – a function performed by officers of the three countries on a rotating basis. It also had a Joint Staff comprising officials of these countries and Paraguay, who was also part of the area. Several operations were performed by the United States, or on the initiative of the members of

AMAS, for communications training and dressage of organizations of naval control of maritime traffic (National Archives 1981b, 13).

Besides the exercises sponsored by the United States, in the late 1960s navies of Brazil and Argentina began joint operations such as Atlantis (exercises Joint Staff in surface warfare, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and electronics) which started to count with the participation of the Uruguayan navy. In the 1970s, the Argentine Navy created Operation Cimarrón with the Navy of Uruguay (Aguilar 2010, 153).

Because the South Atlantic was not at any time considered a priority area under the strategic or geopolitical point of view of the two antagonistic great powers, the Brazilian proposal of establishing a Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) was facilitated.

The resolution establishing the ZOPACAS was approved by the United Nations in October 1986 and this encompassed the three countries of the east coast of South America whose coastlines face the Atlantic (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay), and 21 countries of the west coast of Africa. Being a forum for collaboration and regional integration, member states began to hold regular meetings for discussion of common problems (Aguilar 2010, 159).

With the end of the Cold War, Brazilian foreign policy sought to adapt to the new global order and, in the words of Bueno and Cervo (2008), adopting an attitude of participation in the formulation and acceptance of the bases and rules of the international order, its general principles, systems and processes, i.e., a model that some authors have called "autonomy through participation." Brazilian diplomacy defined the multilateral space as the best scenario for the performance of the country in the process of adapting to the new order. In this context, South-South cooperation has conformed to one of the axes of Brazilian foreign policy, especially with African countries.

South-South Cooperation

In the contemporary international system, the North-South agenda dominated relations among States and, therefore, the discussions in the United Nations (UN). In the 1960s, however, the newly independent countries began to give more weight to the global forums and to participate in the various bodies of the UN. The creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in the Bandung conference, was an attempt of various countries to influence the global agenda

without being aligned with one of the two great powers of the Cold War period. In the 1970s, these countries sought to develop ties of solidarity among themselves in order to offset or diminish the historic dependence in relation to the old colonial powers, giving rise to the concept of South-South cooperation. Different from the traditional North-South relationship based on the technological backwardness of the latter, efforts were made towards the establishment of cooperation in an egalitarian basis and free of the constraints normally imposed by the North (Nogueira 2010, 1).

But most of these countries lacked strong political institutions, their economic development was low, the incipient and dependent foreign policies of former colonial powers was flagrant – not to mention the violent processes that many had to pass to achieve and consolidate their independence. This made cooperation to have a timid start. With the emergence and improvement of regional integration mechanisms and changes in both the global and the domestic contexts of most countries in the post-Cold War, cooperation began to intensify.

In the case of Brazil, cooperation with countries in the South gained priority in the foreign policy agenda of past governments as a form of international insertion. One of the forms of cooperation employed by Brazil is called "technical cooperation" which consists of technical support, not financial as in traditional cooperation, sending specialized bodies in certain sectors to empower segments of the population in areas of knowledge where there is a lack of technical resources.

The projects are developed by Brazilian institutions or executed in triangulation with other countries or international organizations in various fields such as agriculture, energy, food security, environment, justice, civil defense, combating gender violence, health, education, vocational training, among others. These projects are held by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) of Itamaraty (MRE, ABC 2011). The South-South cooperation is now the essence of ABC, beginning with African countries and extended to Central America, the Caribbean, Asia and, in particular, East Timor. In 2010, ABC was working on 240 projects and activities carried out in 58 developing countries (Nogueira 2010, 2).

In the case of development projects in Brazil, ABC firms partnerships with institutions that are benchmarks in their fields as Senai, SEBRAE, EMBRAPA, FIOCRUZ, among others, and covers financially missions abroad, while the institutions themselves remunerate their technicians available to the projects. The costs are therefore reduced (Nogueira 2010, 3).

Cooperation in triangulation involves other countries or institutions such as the World Bank. An example is the project of satellites development called CBERS, which began in China in the 1980s, which resulted in the construction of remote sensing satellites. The images obtained by these satellites are being shared with no costs with other countries. In 2008, Brazil and China released a project called "CBERS for Africa", with the goal of yielding images to African countries that could be used in areas such as public health, disaster prevention, environment and agriculture (Nogueira 2010, 3).

The South-South cooperation also occurs through forums for consultation and coordination as IBSA (India - Brazil - South Africa) which created a fund managed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), which funds projects to reduce poverty in several countries, including Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, Africa. The IBSA's projects targeted for economic development are based on the central idea of the connection between stability and development (IBSA 2012).

Cooperation is implemented also through multilateral mechanisms as the South America - Africa Summit, symbolizing cooperation efforts between blocks of countries wishing to deepen their political relationship and promote actions of social and economic development (Nogueira 2010 6). In this field the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) is included and its creation and development has made the countries of "Portuguese Africa" – Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe and Mozambique – to receive priority in the actions for cooperation promoted by the Brazilian government.

Thus, technical cooperation is currently one of the arms of Brazilian foreign policy, "based on the principles of solidarity and co-responsibility," nonprofits and detached from commercial interests, seeking to share Brazilian successes and best practices "in areas considered most relevant by the recipient countries"(Silveira 2002, 285).

Among the cooperation projects conducted by Brazil, several have been established in the field of security and defense with African countries, especially those of the Atlantic coast.

South Atlantic in the Post-Cold War Context

With the end of the Cold War, the role of the South Atlantic in the context of global security, as part of the defense architecture of the American continent, lost the meaning it had in the previous period. Several joint maneuvers continued to be held, sponsored by the U.S. or created on a bilateral or multilateral agreement between Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. However, they had more a character of building mutual trust than preparing to fight a common enemy.

The exercises between Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, facing the South Atlantic gained more strength from the 1990s. The navies of Argentina and Brazil created Operation Araex which included the use of naval aircraft and helicopters in sea wars, based on similar exercise conducted between the Uruguayan and Brazilian navies, called Uruex. Since 2002, the exercises started gathering the navies of the three countries. In 1997, Brazil and Argentina conducted Operation Temperex (anti-submarine and air clarification), the Brazilian aircraft carrier São Paulo leading the Argentine aircraft S-2 T². That same year, the three countries held a naval exercise, type war game, called Transamerica, concerning maritime traffic control from the simulation of a regional crisis in which it would be necessary to adopt measures for the protection of merchant ships traffic³. The three marine created also a trilateral war game of crisis management at the strategic operational level (Aguilar 2010, 303).

In the African continent, with the end of the Cold War, a series of conflicts fueled by the ideological struggle between the two superpowers lost their meaning and sources for funding stopped, allowing their resolution, as the cases of Angola and Mozambique. The end of the apartheid regime in South

² In a joint maneuver in 2002, for the first time the new Brazilian aircraft carrier was employed in waters of foreign jurisdiction with Argentines and Uruguayans vessels (Aguilar 2010, 299)

³ The exercise was expanded and added naval units from South Africa, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Ecuador, USA, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (SDM 1997).

Africa virtually opened the doors of the country to foreign relations and also helped it to strengthen its ties with Brazil.

In 1993, Argentina and South Africa created the exercise Atlasur, in the context of ZPCSA, focusing surface, anti-aircraft, anti-submarine and electronic warfare action. The countries also tested logistical support mobile procedures and improved interoperability between their naval and naval-air. In 1995, at the invitation of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay began to participate in the operation and Paraguayan officers were present as observers (Aguilar 2010, 299).

In Brazil, the National Defense Policy (NDP) adopted in 2005, incorporated the multidimensional concept of security, much discussed within the Organization of American States (OAS) during the 1990s, "covering the political, military, economic, social, environmental and other fields ", but it maintained the external defense as the primary duty of the Armed Forces. Among the strategic guidelines, it presented greater exchange with the armed forces of friendly nations, particularly those of South America and Africa, bordering the South Atlantic (Brazil. PR 2005).

The NDP also stated that Brazil would participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian actions in accordance with its national interests. This was confirmed by the government when it dispatched armed troops to UN peacekeeping missions in Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1990s. For these two countries, the Portuguese language and common history as Portuguese colonies, weighed in the decision of a higher share of the country in UN peacekeeping efforts. But also it indicated a greater role for African affairs in the Brazilian international agenda.

The National Defense Strategy (END) showed that one of the most pressing concerns of defense is in the South Atlantic. The identification and analysis of the main strengths and vulnerabilities led the END to determine the articulation of the armed forces "capable of taking into account the requirements of each operating environment, particularly the Amazon and South Atlantic" (MD, END 2008, 45). The END has determined that, in preparing the hypothesis of employment, Military Strategy of Defense should contemplate the use of the Armed Forces due to the threat of armed conflict in the South Atlantic. Consequently, the plans of equipment and articulation of the Armed Forces should "contemplate a proposal for a spatial distribution of

military and quantifying the necessary resources for effective service of the Hypotheses of Employment", in order to enable the increase of military presence in the strategic areas of the South Atlantic and of the Amazon region (MD, 2008, 49).

At the opening of the National Defense Strategy Seminar, in November 2012, the then Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, raised concern about tensions in the West African countries, such as in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, drug trafficking linked to terrorism and maritime piracy, in addition to the risk of bringing to the South Atlantic "military organizations with other purposes or aiming other enemies or adversaries." Amorim stated that "in Brazil's strategic surroundings, the primary focus of the logic of cooperation consists, on the one hand, in South America, concerning also Antarctica, and on the other hand, the South Atlantic, extending to the western edge of Africa" (Amorim 2012, 10).

Following the official discourse and the defense documents, several Brazilian government actions contemplated African countries. Cooperation agreements in the area of defense were signed with Cape Verde (MRE 1994b), in 1994, South Africa (MRE 2003), in 2003, Guinea-Bissau (MRE 2006), in 2006, Mozambique (MRE 2009b) and Namibia (MRE 2009a), in 2009, Nigeria (MRE 2010c), Senegal (MRE 2010d), Angola (MRE 2010a) and Equatorial Guinea (MRE 2010b), in 2010.

In general, they intended to promote cooperation in research and development; give logistics support in the acquisition of defense products and services; share knowledge and experiences in the field of operations, in the use of military equipment of domestic and foreign origin and in the compliance with international peacekeeping operations; share knowledge in science and technology to promote joint military training and education, joint military exercises, and the corresponding exchange of information; and collaborate on issues related to military equipment and systems. Cooperation would take place through visits of high-level delegations; meetings between defense institutions; exchange of instructors and students of military institutions, participation in theoretical and practical courses, internships, seminars, conferences, debates and symposia held in military entities as well as civil organizations of interest to the defense; visits of warships and military aircraft; cultural and sporting

events; trade facilitation initiatives related to materials and services associated with the area of defense; and development and implementation of programs and projects which can be applied to the technology of defense, with the possibility of participation of military and civil entities of strategic interest to the parties.

In 2004, under the auspices of the General Cooperation Agreement that was signed in 1981, Brazil and Mozambique conducted a complementary adjustment related to public safety. Cooperation in this field involved the coordination of strategies and exchange of information on national programs for the prevention and combating of crime; technical cooperation guided by the Brazilian experience of the implementation of the Unified Public Safety System; actions of personnel training, in particular capacitating teachers and teacher training, cooperation in the field of implementation of management systems of knowledge and information, of statistics, of applied research, and of diagnostics formulation of criminal justice and public safety; and studies aimed at modernizing the area of management of public safety institutions. The National Secretariat for Public Safety of the Brazilian Ministry of Justice was responsible for implementing the actions and the ABC as responsible for coordinating, monitoring and evaluating those actions (MRE 2004a).

In 2009, a Complementary Adjustment to the Basic Technical and Scientific Agreement existing between Brazil and Guinea-Bissau since 1978 provided for the implementation of a Training Centre of the security forces in that country, with the aim of contributing to the restructure and modernization of the sector of security and defense, leaving the Brazilian Federal Police responsible for the actions arising from the adjustment (MRE 2009c).

In 2010, one of the strategic partnerships signed with Angola was the public security and defense. The guidelines in this area, presented the encouragement to cooperation between the ministries of defense and public safety organs and the maintenance of "regular consultations on bilateral, regional and multilateral issues", including initiatives within the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic and "cooperation for the solution of conflicts in Africa and other regions, including peace building in post-conflict situations." In the field of technical, scientific and technological cooperation, the partnership contemplated actions for the development of human resources and joint research in the fields of shipbuilding, public security and defense. It also established a Bilateral High Level committee to "coordinate, monitor,

evaluate, guide and ensure the implementation of the partnership" (MRE 2010e).

Among the countries of the Atlantic coast of Africa, Namibia has established itself as the largest recipient of Brazilian cooperation in the field of security and defense. In 1994, the Naval Agreement signed between the two countries began the relationship between their navies in order to "create and fortify the Naval Wing of the Ministry of Defense of Namibia." All costs of transfer and stay in Brazil, as well as the Brazilian military who would stay in that country as liaison officers, were covered by the then Brazilian Navy Ministry (MRE 1994a). At that time positions were made available in the Brazilian naval schools for both officers and soldiers, and an initial internship was offered to 145 Namibians sailors in the Southeast Naval Patrol Grouping, in Rio de Janeiro (MB Md. 2011).

In 2001, Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government signed a new Naval Cooperation Agreement with the same goal as the one before. For him, the Brazilian Navy should assist in the organization of the Maritime Patrol Service of the country so that Namibia would be able to protect its interests in its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone, supply vessels and "assist in the planning and development of an appropriate infrastructure to berthing and logistical support for such vessels". The costs of training and evaluation conducted in Brazil were transferred to the Namibian government and the Brazilian Naval Mission in Namibia was established (MRE 2001).

The agreement led to a series of subsequent actions. In 2004, the Corvette Purus, which had been "retired", was transferred to Namibia being baptized in that country "NS Lt-Gen Dima Hamaambo". In the same year, it was agreed on the supply vessels built in Brazil and, in 2006, the Brazilian navy created Technical Support Groups and sent military to the Walvis Bay base. In 2009, the first patrol vessel built in Brazil was delivered, baptized "Brendan Sinbwaye" (Bastos 2011). Jobs for Namibians became available at the Naval Academy in the courses of Improvement Officers in Hydrographic and Officer Training of the Instruction Center Admiral Wandenkolk (CIAW), in specialization and training courses of sailors and soldiers (MD. MB 2011).

Actions also included cooperation for the creation of the Namibian Battalion Marines and the implementation of course for soldiers' training; the

development of the Ceremonial of the Navy; promotion of joint actions of instruction and military training, joint military exercises; and exchange of information and collaboration on issues related to systems, software and equipment, among others (MD. MB 2011).

In April 2010 the Naval Mission in Namibia had five officers and eleven soldiers and sub-officers (MD MB, 2011; Prado 2009). Earlier that year, the graduation of the first class of Namibian Marines Soldiers formed by the Navy of Brazil took place. The soldiers started to work in "Marine Corps Battalion", the future Marine Infantry Battalion of Namibia (Revista Forças Armadas 2011).

Under IBSA, in 2005, the conduction of joint operations called "IBSAMAR" began, bringing together the navies of Brazil, India and South Africa in the South African coast, between the cities of Cape Town and Simon's Town. (MD. MB 2011).

In 2006, as a result of the cooperation agreement of 2003, the air forces of Brazil and South Africa began to develop a project of missile air-air of short range, able to perform maneuvers to achieve targets during the flight and with an infrared sensing system, called A-Darter (Rangel, 2010, 48).

The military schools of formation of advanced studies of the Army began to receive students from the African countries, especially of the Portuguese speaking ones. In the Military Academy of Agulhas Negras, in 2011, of the 42 foreign cadets who were enrolled, 27 were from CPLP countries (ten of Angola, ten of Mozambique, two of Cape Verde, one of Guinea Bissau and four of Sao Tome and Principe). The School of Command and Joint Staff of the Army (ECEME) has a course aimed at officers of friendly nations (ONA), which receives an average of 11 students per year, including Africans. In 1999, it received one Angolan and in 2007 and 2011 officers from Nigeria⁴. With Gabon, cooperation in the area of higher education, included the formation of that country's military in the colleges of the Brazilian Navy and the two governments have shown interest in developing cooperation in the fields of

⁴ Information provided to the author by Agulhas Negras Military Academy's divisions of instruction and the School of Command and Joint Staff of the Army in 2011.

military training, training for combat operations in the tropical environment and the fight against bio-piracy (MRE 2004b).

In 2012 the Mauritanian Defense Minister visited Brazil and at the meeting with the Minister Celso Amorim they discussed the possibility of conducting joint exercises between the two navies (Murmel s.d). There are close contacts with Cape Verde for training in the naval area, air patrol and with the Army in the area of maintenance of order (Amorim 2012, 12).

In 2013, the Apa patrol vessel, built by the British company BAE Systems, in its journey from the port of Portsmouth in the UK to Brazil, participated in missions in Mauritania, Senegal, Angola and Namibia (Murmel s.d). The same had happened earlier in the maiden voyage of the ocean patrol ship Amazonas, which held joint exercises and narrowed ties with the navies of Cape Verde, Benin, Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe (Brazil, Amorim 2012, 12).

Within the scope of Air Force, the Air Force Academy (AFA) formed pilots from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau⁵ and the Brazilian government agreed to the selling of the light attack aircraft Super Tucano to Mauritania and Burkina Faso (Amorim 2012).

The Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) became a very active in international forums as far as discussions in the field of security and defense are concerned. Based on a legal document called CPLP Protocol of Cooperation in the Field of Defense, the Ministers of National Defense Meeting, the Meeting of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Center for Strategic Analysis (CAE, initials in Portuguese) were created, with the purpose of discussing the professionalization of the armed forces, ethics and the military profession⁶.

Under the auspices of CPLP, the Operation Feline was created, in October 2000. It is held annually on a rotating basis, with the participation of elements of the armies of each of the countries of the Community and with a Multinational Joint Staff. The operation is conceived in the theme of the

⁵ Information given by AFA to the author of this paper.

⁶ In 2010, the 12th Ministers of National Defense of CPLP Meeting was held in Brasilia, as well as the 3rd Center for Strategic Analysis of CPLP Seminar (Brasil, PR 2010; Brasil. MD 2006)

missions of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid (Brazil. EB s.d.).

Brazil established permanent military missions along with the Brazilian embassy in South Africa, Nigeria, Angola and Sao Tome and Principe, and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency supported it with scholarships for staff training in the area of security and defense through the so called "cooperation in knowledge "(FKA 2009).

ABC operationalized the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the defense ministries of Brazil and African countries to conduct courses and training in the three armed forces. There was also a provision for the establishment of a Police academy in Guinea-Bissau and the training of police officers to assist the country in the restructuring of the security forces on a regular basis (FKA 2009).

Conclusion

Brazil is part of the group of developed countries that have not yet reached the same social levels of the superpowers, but it has an economic capacity that may impact the international economic system. Those countries, the so-called “emergent”, have an importance and a regional leadership and aspire to a greater presence in global decision-making process (Aguilar 2012).

Brazilian self-perception as an emerging power began to conform itself in the late twentieth century, due to the situation of the country as one of the largest economies in the world, possessing the largest and most diversified industrial park in Latin America, the vast mineral and natural resources and advanced technology in some areas, in addition to the enormous capacity for food production.

Brazil sees the contemporary global order as a multipolar, asymmetrical structure, where the prevailing uncertainty and the possibility of multiple actors generate insecurity. In this context, the strengthening of multilateralism would be the best option for a country with the size of Brazil to transit in the system, to face the competitiveness of trade, to respond to the uncertainties caused by state and non-state actors that affect the safety and to reduce the asymmetry with the major powers.

The choice of multilateralism indicates the need to strengthen bilateral political relations and the conformation of groups with common interests such as IBSA and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Thus,

South-South cooperation has become part of the search for autonomy of Brazilian foreign policy, expressed in the diversification of partnerships and forums for action.

The search for autonomy was implemented in different ways by the Brazilian government since the democratization of the country, either by the increasing distance of the most powerful countries, adopted by the José Sarney's administration, either through more active participation in international institutions and the commitment to various treaties in the areas of human rights and the denial to nuclear proliferation – a hallmark of Fernando Henrique Cardoso's foreign policy (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2012). Under Lula's government, and currently in Dilma Rousseff's government, a diversification of partners was sought which led to the deepening of relations with emerging countries such as South Africa, China, India and Russia, and with African countries, especially the West Coast and the Portuguese language.

In the Brazilian perspective, the conformation of a more stable world begins with stability at the regional level. Thus, the creation and strengthening of arrangements in South America would guarantee peace in the subcontinent and, consequently, better development conditions for the region as a whole. In South America, the greatest examples of actions in this regard were the creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and its South American Council of Defense.

With no sworn enemies in its surroundings, the political and strategic options designed by the PDN and END elected South America, the South Atlantic, the western coast of Africa and Antarctica as areas of strategic interest. From the point of view of defense, the Amazon and South Atlantic are now the priority areas. In other words, they determined the priority of Brazilian politics for formatting a cooperative process in South America and the countries of the west coast of Africa.

The defense planning refers to the possibility of intervention of a great power, or coalition of powers, against which the country would face difficulties. Thus, regional arrangements around these areas would strengthen the deterrent power, giving a collective character to the need for defense. It is in this direction that UNASUR, the Organization of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty and ZOPACAS work.

Thus, the Brazilian position could be described as an attitude of preventive security, i.e., more based on an analysis of possible changes in the international context in the long term, and with the definition of a more favorable scenario to the country in the international system in the short term, than with the need for the immediate defense of the territory.

In the case of the South Atlantic, the priority is given on the grounds of the Brazilian perception of the necessity to protect the natural resources of the continental platform (which grew since the discovery of oil deposits in the Pre-Salt), and the Brazilian foreign trade conducted mainly through the Atlantic. This means guaranteeing the use of this space without constraints. As a result, the need for actions that go beyond the Brazilian territorial waters or areas of exclusive economic exploitation, reaching the Atlantic coast of Africa, emerged.

Thus, diversification of partnerships and strategic interest led to the deepening of relations and establishment of arrangements with the countries of the West African coast, in several areas, including defense and security, in order to consolidate peace zone in this area.

It is in this context that South-South cooperation takes place. In addition to the fields of trade, technological development, education and lending and financing for national reconstruction of States which have recently ended armed conflict, as the cases of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, among others, a number of agreements were signed in the field of security and defense.

At the same time there was a conjunction of interests of both parts between Brazil and Africa. For these, the priority given by Brazil to the deepening of relations, and resource availability arising from it, was fully absorbed. First, because programs, projects and resources for development are always welcome, especially for poorer countries or those with serious structural problems, some due to the processes of violence which occurred in the last decades. Second, that approach was facilitated by historical ties to former Portuguese colonies or because of the slave trade. Third, Brazil is seen and presented itself as a better option for the development of cooperation projects than the former metropolis. Fourth, the Brazilian cooperation represents an action that changes the axis of aid dependency, hitherto exclusively from the countries of the North to the ones in the South. Fifth, the concept of cooperation practiced by Brazil involves the transfer of knowledge and takes

into account the interests and priorities of the recipient countries, different from the "imposing cooperation" of North-South relations, where the 'donor' countries often indicate which projects they want to fund, in accordance with their own interests.

This parameter of knowledge transference remains in the projects and initiatives in the area of security with Latin America and Africa, regions where the concept applied is the one of ample security, integrating public policy and food or environmental security, for example.

As the relationship between Brazil and most African countries is asymmetric, cooperation adds little to the Brazilian military power, but adds greatly to the power of those who receive the benefits of the relationship. For example, the partnership of Brazil and Namibia does not mean an increase in Brazil's of military power, but has allowed the establishment of the Namibian Navy, including marines, and the significant increase in the ability to secure the sovereignty of the State. In these cases, cooperation, under the strict point of view of security and defense, resembles military assistance

Thus, the agreements indicate the use of the Brazilian power in favor of least developed countries in Africa. The availability of funds and resources to support the strengthening of the armed forces of some countries, indicate the prominence that the Brazilian governments, from the 1990s on, have given to the relations with that continent, especially the South Atlantic countries.

As it can be seen, there is no intention to create a large collective defense mechanism in the field of security and defense – one able to act as to guarantee the use, without constraints or threats, of the South Atlantic. The cooperation that is sought is one in which the African countries bordering the Atlantic can build military forces and public safety capable of ensuring internal peace (and, consequently, regional) peace. Brazil would be, therefore, contributing to a safer world and achieving a better articulation with various actors in the international system.

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ABSTRACT

South-South Cooperation has become one of the axis of the Brazilian Foreign Policy, especially when related to Africa. Besides the economic, political and technologic areas, among others, the Brazilian government created a series of cooperation agreements with many African countries in the field of security and defense. This paper analyses the objective and reach of the actions concerning South-South Cooperation between the government of Brazil and the African countries, especially the ones from Atlantic Africa, making use of a bibliography related to the subject and sources derived from the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Defense.

KEYWORDS

South Atlantic; Brazil; Foreign Policy; South-South; Africa.

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THE CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL AS AN AGENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Mauro Salvo¹

Introduction

The main reason for writing this article was a passage of Amado Cervo's book called "The International Challenge", which says that Central Bank's (CB) and Finance Ministry's technicians have taken the place of Itamaraty in international economic negotiations, referring to the dichotomy between political and technical treatment given to the issue of Brazilian external debt.

"The Nation and with it nationalism were removed of debt negotiations, once the Congress and the Chancellery had nothing to say. The political treatment that was reclaimed internally and hyped by the diplomacy in Latin American forums was fake. The conduction of negotiations were trusted to CB and Finance Ministry economists and was always in their hands, even because one could not give to such an important issue two different treatments." (Cervo 1994, 49)

Having the above assertion as the starting point I decided to test the hypothesis that the CB is an agent of international relations. To achieve this aim, the article interweaves historical facts and theoretical inferences. Initially it approaches how economic themes had their space enlarged in international relations after World War II and even more after the end of the Cold War, in detriment of national security themes. Besides that, many relevant economic themes in contemporary world scenario are attributions of the national central banks.

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Central banks have been increasingly working in an international context and not only on bilateral bases. Central banks that act independently tend to develop their own positions, besides having constructed a consistent and autonomous network of relations. In this case, independence means non-interference from other domestic institutions in the fulfillment of CB's aims and missions. In recent years new groups, forums and organs have been created, in which CB have been strongly present (i.e. G20 and the Financial Stability Committee).

What are the pertinent questions to central banks in the international scene? It is possible that questions related to apparently small technical issues could cloak a fundamental debate hitherto not formulated, or be revealed by it. Important subjects do not necessarily generate differences of opinion; therefore they should be negotiated in order to achieve a consistent consensus, not avoiding blocking solutions due to excessively rigid principles. However, central banks that act without political guiding principles face the risk of not keeping coherence concerning their expressed points of view or positions assumed. Even operating independently, central banks should maintain coherency with the national general position, including the positions of several ministries and decentralized government bodies.

The Brazilian legislation (mainly the Federal Constitution and Act 4595/64) attributes to the CB the functions of managing the foreign exchange policy and Brazil's financial relations with the outside world. More specifically its functions consist of keeping gold and foreign currency assets for operation in foreign exchange markets in order to contribute to the maintenance of the currency's parity and induce performances in the country's international transactions according with the guidelines of the economic policy. As well as acting regulating the exchange market, aiming at the Balance of Payments equilibrium, managing the foreign reserves of Brazil, following and controlling capital flows, negotiating with financial institutions and with foreign and international financial organs (the IMF – International Monetary Fund, the BIS - Bank for International Settlements, etc.) and managing international reciprocal credits agreements (RCA). When there are difficulties in the balance of payments, it is up to the CB to arrange for foreign contracts of regularization operations: the compensatory loans.

Nevertheless, this article intends to go beyond legal evidence. It is intended to demonstrate that democratization, globalization, consciousness about the need to increase transparency in financial, economic and political relations, and the growth of international cooperation strengthened both international and domestic institutions or increased the need of countries that aim at a global insertion, for the development of strong institutions, including the CB.

The article will not follow a single stream of thought, neither regarding economic theory nor international relations theory. It seeks to aggregate contributions from different ideological views that are could help to sustain a coherent position which approximates itself as much as possible of a conclusion.

From Realism we will use the idea that the international system is essentially “anarchic”, i.e., that there is no world government. In a wider sense, international relations are understood taking as the starting point the distribution of power among states. Despite the legal and formal equality, the distribution of unequal power indicates that the international relations arena presupposes a “power politics” (Griffiths 2004, 11).

Unlike Realists, Liberals consider international relations as a potential field for progress and advantageous changes. Liberals believe that even though there are difficulties in extending in international terms the restrictions given by the necessity of respect to the economic market and to the rules of law, the latter should be established to promote stability among states (Griffiths 2004, 83).

Critical theory thinkers show how international relations among states enable the injustices of the global capitalism system. The scholars who deal with the international organization study how the relationship among states is regulated by organizations and practices of cooperation (Griffiths 2004, 161, 255).

In the domestic scenario, the problems faced by Brazil in the last decades, adding the ones mentioned above, have contributed to put into evidence the role and the importance of such a strong institution like the CB. It is worth mentioning that the CB promoted adjustments to its way of operating throughout these years in order to stay in line with the challenges imposed by international and national circumstance.

One should notice that the increasing importance of the CB as an agent of the economic relations of Brazil with the outside world was made possible by two ways: both passively, as an outcome of the evolution of international relations, and actively, as a consequence of its action.

The Increasing Power of Economics in International Relations

The Marxist theory says that the economy is the engine of history. However, International Relations Theory until the beginning of the 20th century had focused its explications about the international system on the issue of national security and consequently on aspects related to war and peace. Nevertheless, with the end of the Cold War, the increase in globalization and the consolidation of democracy in many countries, the economic interests of the transnational companies, as well as the pursue of a better life quality by democratic governments, reinforced the intention of maintaining world peace and directing investments to the production of consumer goods instead of war-related goods.

What would be the world configuration if three of Realism central assumptions were inverted? The assumptions are that states are the only important actors, military strength is the main tool, and security is the dominant end. Inverting that, we can postulate a very different type of world politics:

- 1) States are not the only important actors – transnational actors that operate beyond borders are equally important;
- 2) Force is not the only significant instrument – economic manipulation and the utilization of international institutions are the most important instruments;
- 3) Security is not the dominant end – welfare is the dominant end (Nye Jr. 2002a, 233).

Joseph Nye Jr., in his book called “The Paradox of American Power”, dissertates about economic power in international relations. In the book, Nye Jr. defines power as the capability of obtaining the aimed results and, if necessary, changing others’ behavior in order to obtain them. The capability of obtaining the aimed results comes frequently associated with the possession of

certain resources, therefore is common to simplify the definition of power as the possession of a relatively high amount of resources as population, territory, natural resources, economic strength, military power and political stability (Nye Jr. 2002b, 30).

Traditionally, the test of a great power used to be its military strength. Nowadays, the foundations of power have moved away from military power and conquest. Economic power has become more important than it was in the past, not only due to the relative increase in the costs of power but also because the economic objectives started to receive more significance in the values of post-industrial societies (Nye Jr. 2002b, 35).

Both military and economic power are examples of the hard power of command that one can employ in order to induce others to change their position. Hard power relies on induction and threats, but there is an indirect way of exerting power. In world politics, it is possible that a country have the aimed results because others want to follow it, admiring its values, imitating its example, aspiring its levels of prosperity and freedom. In this sense, it is equally as important to establish the agenda in world politics and attract others as it is to force them to change by means of threat or actual use of military or economic weapons. To this aspect of power – to lead others into wanting what you want – Nye Jr. gives the name “soft power”. It coopts people instead of coercing them (Nye Jr. 2002b, 36).

Economic growth provides not only the energy of hard power as well as polishes the prestige and the self-confidence of the country, contributing to soft power (idem, 206). Sustained and non-accelerating inflation economic growth generates the resources that will be invested in hard power, as well as an attractive economic model, able to accrue our soft power. Productivity can increase thanks to new investments in instruments or new forms of organization (Nye Jr. 2002b, 209). Economic capabilities can not be separated from other state capabilities. States use economic means for military and political targets; and military and political means to achieve economic interests. (Waltz 2002, 133-134). In the same line of reasoning, Brzezinski says the economic skill and its translation into technological innovation can also be key criteria in power determination (Brzezinski 1998, 46).

Kindleberger (1970, 55-56) presented some concepts of economic power stressing that an economic approach to international politics should consider the economic aspects of national power. Then, he warns that economic power in international relations can exist without having been designed as ways to control other nations. Thus, it is important to distinguish economic strength and economic power. Economic strength is a medium that can be used or not as able to affect other countries; whereas economic power can be defined as the economic strength used to dominate or control. The ability to affect others decisions would be called influence and power would be the use of physical means to affect such decisions. Kindleberger presents its concept of domain as the condition of country A affect the decisions of B (one or several countries) without B affecting those of A.

In a world where the economy commands and the use of hard power is less and less accepted, grows the role of economic institutions and the consistency of their decisions. In the case of the CB, the recent years have confirmed the importance of an effective economic model. The persistence in the pursuit of macroeconomic stability (started with the creation of the Real Plan - 1993) and the management of the economic foreign policy have led Brazilian economy to an unprecedented condition. In these last fifteen years we controlled the inflationary process, accumulated international reserves, renegotiated the external debt, paid a portion of the debt with the IMF, reformed the financial system (PROER and PROES) and, thus, we won the confidence of the international financial market that was slowly recognizing the strength of Brazilian economy and increasing the inflow of funds into the country.

For the international market, the Central Bank of Brazil expanded its soft power, because it has proven its ability to deal with crises and to remain at the same level of monetary authorities of major economies. Internally, although it has improved its image, still faces resistance from some sectors, mainly by part of industry and the labor movement.

Governance without Government and Globalization

In two centuries of globalization, multinational corporations, nations, societies and economic regions have suffered and continue to be subject to changes inherent to the technological advances of more prosperous societies, but

certainly the prerogatives of the past of dependency theory will not serve as a method of analysis, as the globalization of this century there will be an increasingly interdependent relationship between developed and developing countries (Lozardo 2007, 35).

There are new dimensions in globalization, which are causing political and economic transformations, especially among emerging nations. Without this understanding, it becomes difficult to understand the direction of trade policies, of international direct investment, of the references of the global consumer, of the role of multinational corporations, of the challenges of entrepreneurs and governments of each nation. In this sense, the international institutions of the West, such as the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF, as well as regional institutions and central banks, will be adopting policies with the character of co-responsibility with respect to growth with economic openness, with co-responsibility of each government concerning public policy, administrative transparency and international investment policies aimed at the welfare of all, the reduction of discrepancies and the increase of income between countries and inside them (Lozardo 2007, 35).

Globalization means that there is a growing recognition of arenas whose impacts are global. It is these arenas that it is required a global collective action – and global governance systems are essential (Stiglitz 2002, 272).

There is no world government, responsible for the peoples of all countries and for overseeing the process of globalization. Instead, we have a system that could be called global governance without global government, in which a few institutions - the World Bank, IMF, WTO - and some participants - the ministries of finance (and central banks) and trade, closely linked to certain financial and commercial interests - dominate the scene. It is time to change some of the rules that govern the world economic order, giving less emphasis to ideologies and paying more attention to what really works, to think again about the way decisions are made at the international level - and in whose interest (Stiglitz 2002, 49).

The issue raised by Stiglitz in the previous paragraph introduces the problem of coordination in global actions, especially in an environment of economic interdependence. This issue has gained importance on the international agenda when international finance became the central theme of

international relations. When the main topic was national security, behaviors were more predictable, because we had fewer agents (primarily states), less variables and less interdependence. Although we also lived in an anarchic society, it was clearer leadership conditions, its allies and the threats, and there was a better chance to quantify gains and losses resulting from different agents movements. The coordination of the international system, although not formal, it was implied.

We continue in an anarchic society, however with the economy as the engine of international politics; other non-state actors, thus, have gained strength (companies, banks, emerging markets, NGOs, terrorist organizations etc.). Having more agents, there are more interests at stake, more variables, increases in difficulty of coordination, because the leadership role becomes diffuse, and decreases in predictability. Gains and losses (pay-offs) of interactions are unclear hindering the establishment of international cooperation.

Previously, the international game could be compared to a game of checkers with a single piece type (states) doing only one type of motion (defending the national interest). Currently the game more appropriate to describe international relations would be kings with many kinds of pieces (state and non-state actors) doing different movements (each in defense of their own interests).

Nowadays the foundation for international financial cooperation is weaker than in the 70s and 80s. If we are concerned with the stability of the IFS, it is important to understand what the weaknesses of its fundamentals are and why they happen. The pace of technological innovations in the world of finance has been greatly accelerated and the magnitude and importance has grown conspicuously in the economic field; nevertheless, the political capacity to adjust to these changes has been decreasing. The main problem of international finance is that it is driven by many hands (governments, international organizations and national authorities) (Strange 1999, 57).

In all these issues, the international political system, based on an outdated principle of sovereignty, is in a state of unfortunate delay regarding the global market economy, which has great power, but with little sense of social and moral responsibility (Strange 1999, 57-8).

In the book "Globalization", George Soros ponders on the advantages and disadvantages of globalization. To Soros, the international financial markets have built an unleveled playing field, which has become unsustainable in its current form (Soros 2003, 29).

There is no international equivalent to the political process that occurs within different states. As markets became global, the policy remained firmly rooted in State sovereignty. Although anachronistic, the concept of sovereignty remains the basis of support of international relations. We must accept it as a starting point for the creation of an open society (Soros, 2003, 50, 186).

So what is sovereignty? Say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will meet its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and, in doing that, limit their freedom, reaching commitments with them. States develop their own strategies, map their own paths, and make their own decisions about how to respond to any need or desires they develop. It is not more contradictory to say that sovereign states are always constrained, and, very often, very constrained, than to say that free individuals, very often, make decisions under the immense pressure of events (Waltz 2002, 136).

Reform in the International Financial System

In this section we consider only the reform of the international financial system, restricting what was treated in the previous section with respect to organizations such as the IMF and WB. However, one should not forget that the international economic and financial relations occur inside and outside these institutions, with or without governance or cooperation. Within this framework the CB has an important role. In the words of geographer Milton Santos: "Central Bank and Ministry of Finance are, in conjunction with the international financial institutions, the ones that guide major reforms now underway" (Santos 2001, 105).

José Antonio Ocampo in the book "La reforma del sistema financiero internacional: un debate en marcha" develops his arguments on the reform of the international financial system. The controversy that arises from the discussion on the reform of the international financial system lies in the possibility to challenge globally some of the domestic financial institutions, as

well as the effects of international financial regulation on national policies. At this point, the national central banks and the measurement of forces in order to ensure greater space in the global economy emerge (Ocampo 1999 31).

Regarding reform of the international financial system, Ocampo stressed that to be relevant this should have four basic assumptions. Firstly, it should be recognized that the problems of information that determine financial volatility are difficult to resolve, considering that they are more associated to the volatility of opinions and expectations than to imperfections of information flows. Second, the reform should rely on the use of national measures aimed at reducing volatility in order not to run the risk of adopting mechanisms that deepen the recessionary effects of financial crises. Thirdly, should seek articulation, while respecting the sovereignty of national policies and institutions. Finally, one should bear in mind that solutions are not neutral in terms of balance in international economic relations, a fact of particular importance for small developing countries (Ocampo 1999, 33-39).

There is almost a consensus that the increasing frequency of international financial crises demonstrates the existence of flaws in the institutions that regulate the increasingly sophisticated but unstable financial world. In short these institutions need to be more suited to financial globalization (Ocampo 1999, 31).

It would be unrealistic to advocate major changes in the current structure of the international financial system. The relative power of different countries may change over time, but the U.S. will not let go his position nor will other countries be able to rebel against this situation. The periphery countries certainly feel the pain inflicted by the system, but the option of leaving may be even more painful. The current financial architecture is undoubtedly imperfect, and its improvement would benefit all members including the United States. It should be promoted greater balance between crisis prevention and crisis intervention and between incentives to countries that adopt healthy policies and punishments for countries that do not do the homework (Soros 2003, 155-156).

Another issue to address is how and why the balance of power between the market economy and political authority granted to these states changed so much during the second half of the twentieth century. Usually, this change was defined with the imprecise term globalization and is still a topic of debate,

especially among specialists in international relations, international trade and international political economy. What are the key political relationships that can affect the international financial system, for better or for worse? It has changed in recent times? (Strange 1999, 58)

There are two reasons to regulate the behavior of operators and international financial markets: moderate and restrain greed and moderate and restrain fear. Or operators have greed and risk too much or are afraid of the risks taken in the past (Strange 1999, 163).

There are basically two schools of thought on what should be done to ensure greater stability and security in the international financial system. In general the idea prevalent in the Bank of International Settlements is that bankers and other financial players are sufficiently rational to moderate their own greed and master their fears, in a way that makes it possible to rely on the use of technical information and methods of risk assessment they have for self-control. The school more connected to the mainstream thought in the IMF believes in intergovernmental cooperation at the international level to reproduce the kind of regulatory mechanisms developed within states and previously used by them to regulate the banking and financial systems (Strange 1999, 163).

Once national regulators have been overcome by the forces of financial innovation and integration, which have gone out of their control, the center of attention shifts to the possibilities of establishing control systems internationally. Among other global problems, financial regulation is one of the most urgent and that is why international institutions like the IMF and the BIS have dealt with the issue for some years now (Strange 1999, 183).

Ethan Kapstein suggests that it could be created a two levels framework to govern international finance matching the national regulatory systems at a lower level with international cooperation in higher level through the IMF and BIS. Strange seems skeptical about the idea proposed by Kapstein, arguing that banks identify themselves with their states when they need support, but always avoid regulatory authorities when they have in mind some benefit. Financial innovation, deregulation and fierce competition between banks and other private companies have changed the delicate balance between national and interstate controls (Strange 1999, 203). However, the

positioning of Strange, before countering, seems to reinforce Kapstein's proposition, considering that since both are weakened there is little alternative but cooperation between the two levels.

Strange summarizes his ideas in five conclusions about global financial volatility. For the purpose of this work we cite only two. The first is that all activities in the real economy follow the mood of the financial markets. The second is that governments have less control over their economies and societies than they had 10, 20 or 30 years ago (Strange 1999, 207-8).

Two Level Games: internal versus external arena

Any theory of international relations lacks a definition of the level of analysis (States or regions or even the international system), along with a ontological definition of the theory (which is the structure of international relations?). The first question refers to who are the agents of international relations and, the second one, to the structure of international relations. After the definition of who and what, one must define the relationship between the agent and the structure.

The internal and external policies became inextricably connected by a fine line. The interactions of domestic political groups may prove useful in the practice of diplomacy. Governments take advantage of these interactions to fix concessions limits they can make under penalty of popular rejection. The internal interactions become instruments of foreign policy that negotiators use to mark their positions. In parallel, international negotiations are leverages of domestic politics. They serve to justify unpopular reforms (Landau 1996, 169-170).

Each state gets to decide on policies and actions in accordance with their own internal processes, but their decisions are shaped by the presence of other states as well as by its interactions with them (Waltz 2002, 95).

States, or those who work for them, try, in more or less sensible ways, to use the means available to achieve the intended purposes. Waltz recognizes that the international political theory must be complemented by a domestic policy theory. The internal political configuration offers the filter to the understanding of structural constraints and to the international action decisions (Waltz 2002, 164).

Robert Putnam (1988) points out that often the decisions of domestic policy are intertwined with international negotiations. Putnam also emphasizes that the policies of many international negotiations can be designed as a two-level game. Domestically, groups pursue their interests by pressing the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by building coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures while minimizing the consequences of external developments. Neither game can be ignored by central decision maker, as well as their countries remain interdependent, even if sovereign.

Putnam described the political leaders as situated between two tables: 1) international negotiation, both in crisis situations and outside them, 2) pressures from internal political forces.

The diplomatic path has to be adapted to what the other states will find it acceptable, but also to what the various domestic actors can be persuaded to accept.

Stiglitz makes defense of international cooperation and multilateralism stating that, internationally, the theory identifies why individual governments may fail to serve the global economic well-being, and how the global collective action – a joint action of various governments working together, usually through international institutions – would improve the situation (Stiglitz 2002, 243).

Pflatzgraff and Dougherty (2003) report that many authors present common elements regarding the mental pictures they use to analyze the international systems. Firstly, most of them showed interest in the factors that contribute to the stability or instability of the international system. Secondly, there is a common concern about the coping mechanisms that allow the system to remain in balance and stability. Thirdly, there is a common interest in assessing the impact on the system of the presence of units with different capacities to mobilize resources and to use advanced technology. Fourth, there are many authors who agree on the fact that forces that move within the national political units exert a great influence in the international system. Fifthly, these authors show interest, even as part of their interest in the nature of balance, in the international community's ability to contain and treat

effectively the disturbances that develop in its interior. This leads to a shared interest in the role of national and supranational actors as regulators of an international system characterized by dynamic change (Pfaltzgraff and Dougherty Jr. 2003, 154).

The dilemma of making decisions in two arenas – internal and external – is faced by the Central Bank when it regulates and supervises the banking and credit system, when it negotiates the external debt, when it manages international reserves, when it regulates and supervises the foreign exchange market, when it sets Brazilian interest rate. In all these decisions there is a pressure from the structure of the international financial system and from the demands of Brazilian society.

Domestic Institutional Reforms

A relevant debate, which can be analyzed from the two-level perspective, refers to the shape of domestic institutions. A country that does not choose isolationism should develop institutions that are in accordance not only with the means and the ends desired for their own country, but also be in line with what the country expects to obtain in the relations with the rest of the world. In other words, one cannot expect to take advantage of international relations if their domestic institutions are not prepared to do so.

Developing nations must themselves take responsibility for their own well-being. They can manage their budgets to live within their means, however meager they may be, and eliminate protectionist barriers that although can generate huge profits for a few, force consumers to pay higher prices. They can implement strict regulations to protect themselves both from foreign speculators and internal corporate misbehavior. More importantly, developing countries need effective governments, with strong and independent judiciary, democratic accountability, openness and transparency, as well as the ending corruption that chokes public sector effectiveness and private sector growth (Stiglitz 2002, 302).

Exactly which institutions will enter the package of "good governance" is something that varies from one to another recommendation, since we have failed to understand the relationship between certain institutions and economic development. In any case, this package of "good institutions" generally includes democracy, bureaucracy and judiciary clean and efficient, the strong protection

of property rights (private), including intellectual property, good corporate governance institutions, especially the requirements of disclosure and bankruptcy law, and financial institutions well developed (Chang 2003 124).

Not every society shares the view that the inclusion in an economically globalized world, integrated and interconnected, is the best way to accelerate the material progress of the nation. This insertion, particularly for developing countries, requires first, before the phase of integration into the global economy, the making of macro and microeconomic reforms to enact changes in the traditions of political and economic power of interest groups (Lozardo 2007, 42).

Sometimes, institutional development was delayed due to the interdependence of certain institutions in a way it was necessary that the related institutions developed themselves simultaneously (Chang 2003, 200).

Why the Central Bank has become an important actor in international relations

The international scenario of the last five decades both resulted and was resulted from of the solution of several conflicts in favor of a greater institutionalization. In general, conflicts such as democracy or power groups, transparency or fallacious discourse, technical or political solution, state or government, institutions or collusion, stability or growth were being decided in favor of the former. Thus, institutions that over time prioritized, or began to prioritized, technical, transparent and democratic solutions gained evidence. It was the case of the Central Bank.

Since it was created in 1964, the activities of the Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) were closely linked to Brazilian foreign policy and, thus, international relations. Briefly we can associate the creation of the Central Bank with the policy decision to develop the Brazilian economy and the need to break with the center-periphery relationship of international politics at the time.

In the economic field, the early 1960s was marked by a fall in investment and in the growth rate of the Brazilian income. It was practically a consensus at the time the need for institutional reforms that form a framework conducive to the resumption of investments. It was then released PAEG (Governmental Economic Plan of Action, acronym in Portuguese) whose main reforms were tax, monetary, financial and external sector.

Among the various measures adopted by PAEG stands out, for the purpose of this study, the reform of external sector that was designed to stimulate economic development, avoiding pressures on the balance of payments by improving foreign trade and attracting foreign capital. Concerning foreign trade, it was adopted a series of tax incentives for export and a crawling peg exchange rate system to maintain external competitiveness. As for the attraction of foreign capital, the plan sought a rapprochement with the U.S. foreign policy, called the Alliance for Progress². Then, it was performed the renegotiation of the foreign debt and was established a Guarantee Agreement (1965) for foreign capital. Connections with the international financial system were made by two mechanisms, both in charge of the Central Bank: the Law No. 4131, which gave direct access of companies to the international financial system, and Resolution No. 63, which allowed the commercial banks external funding and investment to domestic transfer. The latter meant the collage of the national and the international financial system and the beginning of the process of financial internationalization in Brazil (Gremaud 1999, 250-1).

During the Costa e Silva (1967-69) government, the Chancery made public that the purpose was to put diplomatic action in the service of development through making the most of opportunities. The external sector is strategic in terms of trade, capital and technology, but one should not have illusions. The postwar international order corresponds to a mechanism of numbness of the development efforts of the least developed nations and the distention indicates the distribution of power in spheres of influence under the rule of the two superpowers (Cervo 1994, 44).

Sovereignty and development were proclaimed as the essence of the diplomatic orientation. Capture the global environment, the Minister of Foreign Affairs noted the tension zone dislocation from the center to the periphery, the nuclear balance and the resulting removal of the risk of world war. In economy, he watched the opposition between the developed North and the

² The Alliance for Progress was the main foreign policy program of the United States in the early 1960s. It represented the confrontation of the communist 'danger' who had settled in Latin America with the Cuban Revolution in 1959. Given its geopolitical importance, Brazil was the Latin American priority country for the implementation of the program.

underdeveloped South, a segmentation whose process was concomitant to the dissolution of the bipolar universe of postwar. The material interest and welfare of the populations of the respective states were the criteria prevailing in world politics. Awareness of this fact led to the rejection of any unconditional alignments or systematic oppositions (Bueno 1994, 92).

The 1980s was marked by the debt crisis with so negative consequences for the Brazilian economy that became known as "the lost decade". One can highlight a basic fact that characterizes the end of the military period: the condition of great debtor country assumed by Brazil. Due to industrialized countries protectionism, the problems arising from the fall in prices of commodities in previous years, and, especially, the increase in interest rates, grew so daunting the foreign debt of the Third World in general and Brazil in particular, who had promoted its development in the last decade based on a massive inflow of foreign capital. In the 1970s, the overall Brazilian economy became dependent of its external sector, as hitherto not observed. The influx of capital (in the form of loans from private banks, national banks and international financial institutions and private direct investment) and the volume of exports and imports contributed to raise the GNP of Brazil to the eighth position among West countries, but provoked, led along with the oil crisis, the accumulation of a huge foreign debt. The last military government ruled out the use of probation and referred the matter through traditional routes and modes and separated from other creditors. Although advocated through multilateral diplomatic channels, the need for a political decision in the negotiations, the country's policy regarding this problem was transferred to the Ministries of Planning and Finance (Bueno 1994, 94).

In the 80s there were several episodes that required the action of CBB in the international arena. The debt crisis and the start of its renegotiation, the resurgence of inflation and deployment of various stabilization plans, the onset of globalization and the Basel I. The Central Banks that joined the agreement pledged to adopt the practices of financial regulation internationally accepted as the best. Although there is no power to force countries to join the agreement, or even to effectively practice the laid down principles, the signing and implementation of it actually gives the local financial system an implied warranty seal that helps the receiving of external resources.

In the 1990s the process of globalization expands with the end of the cold war, the agreement on debt, the cooling of inflation, Basel II. In the 2000s there were the adoption of the inflation targeting system, the combat of money laundering and the discussion about whether or not adopt capital controls. As can be seen the Central Bank has been active in economic issues of greatest importance both internally and externally (if it is possible to separate them this way).

The table below shows the evolution of some streams that show the growing internationalization of the Brazilian economy and therefore of the Central Bank of Brazil. These numbers on some occasions were impacted by the action of the Central Bank and on others they demanded its reaction as a regulator.

Table 1: Evolution of specific flows in the previous decades

Description of Flows	1980	1990	2000	2010
Exports of Goods	20,132.40	31,413.76	55,085.59	201,915.29
Imports of Goods	22,955.17	20,661.36	55,783.34	181,768.43
Commerce Flows	43,087.57	52,075.12	110,868.94	383,683.71
Direct Brazilian Investment	366,50	624,60	2,281.59	11,587.57
Direct Foreign Investment	1,910.20	988,80	32,779.24	48,506.49
Brazilian investment in portfolio	-----	106,60	1,695.72	4,783.92
Foreign investment in portfolio	350,80	578,87	8,650.78	67,794.86
International Reserves (stock)	6,913.00	9,973.00	33,011.00	288,575.00
Loans and financing - Entrance	12,049.00	2,797.20	15,925.96	34,556.11

Source: Central Bank of Brazil

In all data presented in the table above one may notice an exponential growth from the 90s. It can be inferred that such behavior is the result of the insertion of the Brazilian economy in a more international environment through institutional changes.

Final Thoughts

Considering the national states as the key actors in international relations, despite recognizing that they are no longer unique and exclusive, and being the Central Bank part of the State, one cannot deny the CB influence on Brazilian foreign policy.

In addition, the Central Bank acts in the external sphere, representing the country as a whole within international organizations, in business foreign companies, both financial and non-financial, and as a consultant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a voice and an influence in the decisions of the Brazilian state.

Therefore, it is difficult to refute the hypothesis that the Central Bank is an actor of Brazilian International Relations. Likewise, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to mention another institution that is more embedded in the country's foreign issues. Furthermore, there is no state institution active in the international arena that is disconnected from the reality of their country of origin, so it will always act on both the internal and the external levels. There can be merely domestic institutions, but it is hard to imagine an exclusively international institution.

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ABSTRACT

The paper has as its objective to characterize the Central Bank of Brazil as an agent of the International Relations and to state that its actions, both internal and external, have some political connotation due to the impossibility to disconnect the economic from the political. The paper intends to demonstrate that democratization, globalization and the awareness about the necessity to increase the transparency of the financial, economic, and political relations, besides the growth of the international cooperation, have strengthened both the international and domestic institutions or increased the urge for countries that wish to insert themselves globally to develop strong institutions, among them their respective central banks.

KEYWORDS

Central Bank; Economic Power; International Relations.

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ZERO HUNGER FOR THE WORLD – BRAZIL’S GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF ITS ZERO HUNGER STRATEGY

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Introduction

Brazil’s ex-president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) received a number of prestigious international awards² for his activities in the global fight against hunger and poverty, not least because of the impressive results of the Zero Hunger Strategy, launched by Lula da Silva in 2003, which achieved to considerably reduce the numbers of people living in poverty in Brazil.

A myriad of relevant actors in the global governance of food security, among them civil society organisations (CSOs) and international organisations, praised Brazil’s approach to fighting hunger and poverty. In 2009, ActionAid, one of the most influential CSOs worldwide in the fight against hunger and poverty, started its global HungerFREE campaign which included the introduction of a scorecard³ with the aim to monitor the performance of developing countries in the fight against hunger. Through these monitoring practices ActionAid confirmed that Brazil’s approach to fighting hunger, in the form of Lula da Silva’s Zero Hunger Strategy, was the most successful one in the developing world. Brazil was ranked first by ActionAid in both 2009 and

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² The most prestigious examples are the following: The FAO Agricola Medal (2005), UNESCO’s Felix Houphouët-Boigny Peace Prize (2009), WFP’s Global Champion in the Fight Against Hunger Award (2010) and the World Food Prize (2011).

³ The indicators of the scorecard include the following factors: (1) legal commitment to the right to food, (2) investment in agriculture, (3) social protection, and (4) the performance on hunger and child nutrition (ActionAid 2009, 5).

2010 (ActionAid 2009, 35; ActionAid 2010, 37). Oxfam's global "Grow" campaign against hunger and poverty, launched in 2011, was profoundly inspired by Lula da Silva's courageous leadership and the huge success of his Zero Hunger Strategy (Interview, 12 March 2013).

Today, the Zero Hunger Strategy is recognised as a model by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) or the World Food Programme (WFP) in the fight against hunger and poverty, and Brazil is engaged in globally diffusing the knowledge of the Zero Hunger Strategy throughout the developing world. In this article I will analyse the mechanisms which Brazil created to allow other governments and international organisations to learn from the experiences of the Zero Hunger Strategy.

At first, I will introduce the reader to the concept of nodal governance and explain how significant the creation of nodes can be for governments in exercising influence in the contemporary networks of global governance. Then, I will present four mechanisms which the Brazilian government created over the course of the last decade to spread the knowledge of its Zero Hunger Strategy. These are the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, the WFP Centre of Excellence Against Hunger, the IBSA Trust Fund and the FAO-Brazil Trust Fund. I will describe these four mechanisms as essential nodes in 1) Brazil's international strategy to fight hunger and poverty and 2) the global governance of food security by arguing that Brazil has been successful in diffusing the knowledge of its Zero Hunger Strategy through nodal governance.

The concept of nodal governance

Burris et al present the concept of nodal governance as an "elaboration of contemporary network theory" (Burris et al. 2005, 33). In global governance today, networks are more important than ever for governments to exercise influence. Ikenberry and Wright (2008) emphasise the fact that the "networked" condition of global governance and "[t]he complexity and multifaceted features of this open and institutionalized system provide multiple access points and pathways for integration" (2008, 11). This is why I will turn my attention to nodes as the most important components of these global networks. In the same vein, Castells underlined that "[a] network has no center, just nodes" (2004, 3) and specified:

“Nodes may be of varying relevance for the network. Nodes increase their importance for the network by absorbing more relevant information, and processing it more efficiently. The relative importance of a node does not stem from its specific features but from its ability to contribute to the network’s goals.” (Castells 2004, 3)

In this context, Hein, Burris and Shearing (2009) present the concept of nodal governance as a useful conceptual model, which “provides a framework for characterizing the distribution of power in dynamic systems of polycentric governance” (2009, 82). Nodes are sites within global governance which share the following four characteristics (Burris et al. 2005, 37-38):

- A way of thinking (mentalities) about the matters that the node has emerged to govern;
- A set of methods (technologies) for exerting influence over the course of events at issue;
- Resources to support the operation of the node and the exertion of influence; and
- A structure that enables the directed mobilization of resources, mentalities and technologies over time (institutions).

When bringing together different networks, the overall performance of a node may vary, depending on the number of actors which dispose of a specific amount of resources in order to engage in creating an institutional framework (2005, 38). In the same vein, several nodes together can establish a network which may result in the establishment of other (super-structural) nodes even stronger in exercising influence due to more resources and a stronger institutional framework at hand (2005, 38-39). In this sense, nodes vary in institutional strength, resources, methods and mentalities depending on the actions of their actors and the linkages with other nodes or networks (2005, 39).

Castells sums up the aspect of power involved in nodal co-ordination by emphasising that “a node is able to concentrate power in form of resources, discourses, institutions and methods which then may be used by one or more actors to achieve specific outcomes or to restrain other actors from achieving specific outcomes” (Castells 2004, 3).

Brazil's nodal creation efforts in the global fight against hunger and poverty

3.1) The International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG)

First steps of an international research centre on studying poverty

The Centre was officially launched in 2002 as the International Poverty Centre (IPC) in Rio de Janeiro - moved to Brasília in 2004 - and became the very first UN body with a global mandate on Brazilian soil as the result of a partnership between the Brazilian government and UNDP (MRE 2002; IPC-IG website).

The partnership was focused on a cooperation agreement between UNDP and IPEA (Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research), a think tank of the Brazilian government internationally recognised for its scientific studies on poverty and inequality (MRE 2002). As a consequence, the main objective of the Centre consisted in evaluating policies to fight poverty, establishing national poverty lines and finding ways of how to measure growth (Interview, 27 February 2013). The Centre's main task was purely technical in nature by providing scientific research and establishing knowledge networks on various ways of measuring poverty and growth (MRE 2002; Interview, 27 February 2013).

Three years later, however, the significance of the Centre changed with a research project, funded by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), on the impact of the Bolsa Familia programme on poverty and inequality in Brazil (IPC-IG 2008). One of the Centre's representatives involved in this study⁴ emphasised that the scientific evidence of the success of Bolsa Familia on reducing poverty and inequality attracted the attention of several international organisations including the World Bank, which at the beginning was critical of Bolsa Familia (Interview, 27 February 2013). The impressive scientific results led to a boost in the international recognition of the Centre and Brazil's Bolsa Familia programme which started a

⁴ See a summary of the study published in 2007: Veras Soares, Fábio, Perez Ribas, Rafael and Guerreiro Osório, Rafael (2007), "Evaluating the Impact of Brazil's *Bolsa Familia*: Cash Transfer Programmes in Comparative Perspective", *IPC Evaluation Note 1*, available at: <http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCEvaluationNote1.pdf> (accessed 28 February 2013).

process of involving the Centre in efforts to transfer the knowledge of Bolsa Família to other countries in Africa, exemplified by the Brazil-Africa Cooperation Programme on Social Development.

The Africa-Brazil Co-operation Programme on Social Development was officially launched in 2008 involving the Centre, the Brazilian Ministry of Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS) and the UK's DFID. The whole programme had evolved out of a former partnership between the MDS and the DFID aimed at familiarising six African countries (Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia) with Brazil's Bolsa Familia Programme (MDS 2008; IPC-IG 2008). When in this process the partnership helped Ghana to develop an own cash-transfer programme modelled on Brazil's Bolsa Familia programme the partnership was extended to become the Africa-Brazil Co-operation Programme to meet the demand from other African countries in developing cash-transfer programmes (IPC 2008).

The whole programme focused on the benefits of knowledge-sharing complemented by technical co-operation through the participation of Brazilian government representatives in regional experts meetings in Africa⁵, study tours to Brazil for African government representatives and distance-learning efforts to further familiarise the participating African countries with Brazil's experience in its Zero Hunger Strategy, in particular social protection schemes and cash-transfer programmes (MDS 2008; IPC-IG 2008).

The expansion of the Centre's responsibilities - South-South Learning

So far, the Centre's activities had merely been focused on low and middle-income countries from the developing world, Africa in particular. The new reputation of the Centre based on its own research strength, attracted the attention of the Brazilian government which, in 2009, signed a second Memorandum of Understanding with UNDP further expanding the responsibilities of the Centre. With its original name changed from International Poverty Centre (IPC) to International Policy Centre for Inclusive

⁵ The Centre was responsible for organising the participation of Brazilian government officials in the regional experts meetings (Interview, 27 February 2013).

Growth (IPC-IG) the new Memorandum of Understanding envisaged further developing the institutional structure of the Centre, expanding its topics and strengthening South-South learning, in particular with the other big emerging economies India, Russia and China (MoU 2009; Interview, 27 February 2013).

The actors linked to the Brazilian government include the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs at the Presidency of the Republic (SAE) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). At UNDP, the Poverty Group of UNDP's Bureau for Development Policy is responsible for the collaboration with the Brazilian institutions.⁶

In the area of South-South co-operation the Centre established an online collaborative platform called the South-South Learning on Social Protection Gateway to further facilitate policy dialogue and knowledge-sharing activities.⁷ This gateway links the Centre to a further group of partners including research centres, UN agencies, development agencies and communications platforms.⁸ In addition, the Centre built connections with the other emerging economies through the IBSA-Dialogue and the BRIC(S) summit⁹. In the context of IBSA, the Centre is closely linked to the IBSA Dialogue Forum where it is responsible for the organisation of the IBSA Academic Forum in Brazil, a special platform engaged in the exchange of knowledge and ideas between academics and scholars from the three participating countries India, Brazil and South Africa (IPC-IG 2010). The Centre organised the IBSA Academic Forum in 2010, when the IBSA Summit took place in Brasília (IPC-IG 2010). When the BRIC summit took place in Brasília in the same year, the Centre organised the BRIC think tank seminar¹⁰,

⁶ See the website of IPC-IG, available at:

<http://www.ipc-undp.org/pages/newsite/menu/about/introduction.jsp?active=0> (accessed 24 February 2013).

⁷ See <http://south-south.ipc-undp.org/about-us> (accessed 24 February 2013).

⁸ See <http://south-south.ipc-undp.org/partners>. (accessed 24 February 2013).

⁹ When the last summit took place in Brazil it was still known as the BRIC-summit excluding South Africa. Only in 2011, South Africa officially joined the Summit making it the BRICS-summit.

¹⁰ Each of the BRIC countries nominates one of its think tanks to organise the think tanks seminar as part of the BRIC summit. The Brazilian government nominated IPEA, and as such IPC-IG, as the responsible think tank for organising the seminar during the BRIC summit in Brazil (Interview, 27 February 2013).

a platform for knowledge-exchange among think tanks and scientists from the BRIC countries (CCTV 2010).¹¹ Over the last few years, the Centre has also been a partner of the institutional mechanism of the G20 developing countries, contributing with its research expertise on social protection and inclusive growth to the G20 development working groups (IPC-IG 2012a: 9).

The IPC-IG as a leading research centre on social policy in the global south

As emphasised in 2012 by then director Rathin Roy, the Centre aims to be the “leading thought centre on social policy related to the Global South” (IPC-IG 2012b: 7). The international success of the Centre began with its own research on the impact of the Bolsa Família programme, which turned the Centre into an international point of reference for knowledge-sharing on this programme (Interview, 27 February 2013).

By engaging in knowledge-sharing activities with African, Latin American and Asian countries, the Centre was able to familiarise low and middle-income countries from the developing world with Brazil’s success story of Bolsa Família. In this process, the Centre build up a strong research expertise and a global network on social protection and cash-transfer schemes with universities, research institutes, national governments, the Brazilian and international media, regional organisations in Africa such as the African Union and international organisations and agencies via its digital South-South Learning on Social Protection Gateway (IPC-IG 2012a; 2012b).

From 2009 onwards, the Centre has further extended this network through its involvement in the IBSA Academic Forum, the BRIC think-tank seminar and the G20 development working groups. Relying on its general function as a platform for knowledge-sharing on social protection schemes and cash-transfer programmes, and in this context the global dissemination of the success of Brazil’s Bolsa Família programme, the Centre has turned into an important instrument in Brazil’s global fight against hunger and poverty, as one representative emphasised:

¹¹ At that seminar, topics discussed included the role of the BRIC countries in global governance institutions, climate change and international trade (Portal Brasil 2010).

“We [the Centre] have been one of the elements. I wouldn’t claim to be the most important one, but we have worked [...] on a level of reaching people who would be less willing to buy the discourse if it had not been based on strong and robust academic research. So I think that is what makes IPC [the International Policy Centre] different from the others [institutes]. But at the same time, because we do this type of work, it makes us less visible for the politicians and for big politics.” (Interview, 27 February 2012)



Figure 1: The International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG)

The figure shows that the IPC has evolved into an international mechanism which established important links with several global governance mechanisms relevant for Brazil’s international hunger and poverty strategy. Ironically, the Brazilian government (in form of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) did not use the Centre as an instrument in strengthening or legitimising the government’s official discourse when the Centre was established. Only when the Centre became influential on its own as a research centre sought out by several

African and Latin American countries, did the government start to incorporate it in its international hunger and poverty strategy, renewing the cooperation agreement in 2009 and directing the research focus, apart from low and middle-income countries from the developing world, toward the other BRIC-countries.

3.2) The WFP Centre of Excellence against Hunger

The role of Brazil's National Fund for the Development of Education (FNDE)

The WFP Centre of Excellence was officially launched in November 2011 in Brasília following a co-operation agreement between the Brazilian government and the World Food Programme (WFP) (WFP 2013, 6). The Centre seeks to become a global reference point and knowledge platform on school feeding, nutrition and food security.

The current director of the Centre, Daniel Balaban, belonged to the key formulators of Brazil's Zero Hunger Strategy with Brazil's National Fund for the Development of Education (FNDE)¹² being responsible for the implementation of the School Feeding Programme (Interview, 01 March 2013). The main impetus for the establishment of the Centre originated from Balaban's experience as FNDE's president (2006-2011) and the successful implementation of the school feeding programme in Brazilian schools (Interview, 01 March 2013; FNDE 2012):

WFP's then executive-director Josette Sheeran embraced Balaban's idea and suggested he become president of the Centre due to his own experience at the heart of implementing Brazil's Zero Hunger Strategy (Interview, 01 March 2013). Josette Sheeran emphasised that the Centre was established in Brasília to benefit from Brazil's unique experiences and success as a global champion in the fight against hunger and poverty:

“As a world champion in the fight against hunger, Brazil has a wealth of experience that can be shared with governments eager to learn how they achieved that success

¹² FNDE is an autonomous agency linked to the Ministry of Education with the responsibility to improve the infrastructure of Brazil's education system. In this context, improving the quality of school meals is one of its manifold tasks.

and adapt it to their own countries” [...] “The Centre of Excellence will provide a unique South-South bridge to ending hunger. Brazil has taken the fight against hunger and malnutrition seriously and is now among those defeating hunger faster than any nation on earth. We will partner to leverage this success to other nations seeking to end hunger and malnutrition.” (WFP 2011)

The Centre's involvement in the developing world

Since the establishment of the Centre in late 2011, the focus has been on knowledge-sharing of the components of Brazil's successful school-feeding programme. So far, eighteen countries¹³ from all continents of the developing world have asked for advice from the Centre with many other countries in a long waiting line¹⁴ (Interview, 01 March 2013; WFP 2013). The Centre organises a two-week high-level meeting with members from the government of the interested country in Brasília. In the first week these members are exposed to representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministries involved in Brazil's school feeding programme such as the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger, the Ministry of Agrarian Development or the Ministry of Education. In the second week, the foreign officials are invited for a field-visit to talk to those actors directly involved in the Brazilian experience on the ground including small holders and representatives from the municipalities (Interview, 01 March 2013).

After these two weeks, the Centre invites the foreign mission to draft a Plan of Action including all those elements that they consider as relevant for their particular social context in their country. Balaban stressed that the Centre did not see itself in the position of pressuring anyone into accepting or copying Brazil's national success story even if the worldwide fascination with this success story might give the Centre the power to do so (Interview, 01 March 2013). For Balaban, the only conditionality on which the Centre accepts applications refers to the high involvement and clear engagement of the highest political levels of the country (Interview, 01 March 2013).

¹³ East-Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, Ghana, Laos, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Zambia, Bangladesh, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe (WFP 2013).

¹⁴ Among them countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, Tadjikistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines or Burkina Faso (Balaban 2012).

When the missions return to their respective countries, they submit the Action Plan to further discussions and adapt it according to their own needs. In the ensuing implementation process, the Centre provides further assistance via the respective WFP country office and Brazilian technical consultants from Brazilian universities and research institutes which serve as the Centre's local focal points on the ground (Interview, 01 March 2013). Apart from low and middle-income countries from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean involved so far, the Centre has also been cultivating brainstorming sessions and policy dialogue with the other continental emerging powers China, India and Russia.

Since 2012, the Centre has been involved in setting up a much more ambitious programme called Purchase from Africans for Africa (PAA) Programme which is based on Brazil's Food Acquisition Programme, another component of the Zero Hunger Strategy. In this programme the Centre aims to promote local food purchase and family agriculture in ten African countries to strengthen family agriculture and small holders in these countries (Souza and Klug 2012: 16). Five African countries – Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal – will benefit from humanitarian assistance, while a further five countries – Ghana, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ivory Coast – will receive technical assistance. The Centre will function as the main coordinator of the new programme involving the Brazilian Agency for Technical Cooperation (ABC) and the department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for humanitarian assistance (CGFome) in cooperation with the FAO and WFP's Purchase for Progress Programme (P4P)¹⁵ (Souza and Klug 2012, 16).

Balaban underlined that, as in the case of Brazil's own Zero Hunger Strategy, both programmes were closely interrelated and supposed to complement each other. The rationale lay in promoting family agriculture to strengthen the capacity of small holders to produce the agricultural products for the school meals (Interview, 01 March 2013).

¹⁵ WFP's P4P Programme, launched in 2008, consists of a diverse network of partnerships in 21 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America aimed at strengthening family agriculture (Souza and Klug 2012, 17).

The WFP Centre of Excellence Against Hunger as a new global governance mechanism

Due to the assistance provided by the Centre several African countries - Mozambique, Malawi, Mali and Rwanda - are already in the process of implementing school feeding programmes based on the Brazilian experience (WFP 2013, 16). The Centre has already established close links with key international organisations in the global governance of food security and, apart from being a crucial gateway node in Brazil's global fight against hunger and poverty the Centre is also on its way to becoming a significant global governance mechanism in food security.




Figure 2:¹⁶ The WFP Centre of Excellence Against Hunger

The key partners (\longleftrightarrow) of the WFP Centre of Excellence are WFP with its Country Offices (WFP COs), the UK's DFID and on the Brazilian side

¹⁶ Based on WFP 2013.

FNDE and ABC. Depending on the Centre's projects, other partners (↔) are involved such as the FAO or other Brazilian ministries and agencies of which the most relevant ones are the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger (MDS), the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) and the Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for humanitarian assistance (CGFome).

Its mission and rationale is fully based on Brazil's successful Zero Hunger Strategy, which made the Centre not only possible at the outset but also attractive to developing countries all over the world as a global platform to learn about the school-feeding programme and the food acquisition programme. Balaban put it in the following words:

"I think that this consolidated idea [Zero Hunger Strategy] created a merchandising with the result that Brazil became the centre [of attraction], not least because of the results] [...]. When they [other governments] look at the results, they want to understand the public policies behind." (Interview, 01 March 2013)¹⁷

And here, Balaban indirectly stressed the important role of the IPC-IG which in the first place published the successful results of the Zero Hunger Strategy and made the world aware of this impressive success story. Today, it is also the IPC-IG which publishes the possible impact and results of the programmes carried out by the WFP Centre.¹⁸ Even though no official relationship exists between these two Centres in Brasília, the WFP Centre may take advantage of the IPC-IG as an outlet for research-based publications on the development and success of its programmes and promote itself among the partners of the IPC-IG in the world (- - - ➤

3.3) The IBSA Trust Fund for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger

The IBSA Trust Fund was launched in 2004 following Lula da Silva's

¹⁷ Translation from the Portuguese by the author.

¹⁸ IPC-IG published a first analysis of the launch of the PAA Programme in 2012 in its key publication *Poverty in Focus* and is about to publish further analyses of the development of this programme in 2013 (Interview, 26 February 2013).

announcement at the 58th UN General Assembly Session in September 2003 to create a global fund to fight hunger and poverty (ABC 2012). The Fund emerged out of the IBSA Dialogue Forum, a South-South co-operation mechanism amongst the three countries, established in 2003 through the Brasília Declaration (IBSA 2010). The Fund¹⁹ unites India, Brazil and South Africa to reinforce the fight against hunger and poverty in the developing world and strengthen South-South co-operation in the areas of development.

Since the Fund is officially administered by UNDP, its institutional framework is located at the UN in New York. UNDP's Special Unit for South-South Co-operation acts both as the fund manager and as the board of director's secretariat. The Board of Directors, comprised of the respective UN ambassador of the three countries, acts as the Fund's executive body responsible for the strategic direction of the selected projects.

The Fund was regarded as so successful that it received the UN South-South Partnership Award in 2006 and the Millennium Development Goals Award for having significantly contributed to South-South co-operation and the Millennium Development Goals (IBSA 2010; MRE 2010). So far, 15 projects have been accepted by the Fund on a demand-driven basis of which 5 have already been completed, four recently approved and a further six are still ongoing (IBSA 2011).²⁰ The trust fund confronts hunger and poverty by having accepted local projects in a variety of thematic areas with agriculture, waste management and health care as the most important areas. Most of the projects are located in Africa (45.4%) and Latin America (22.3%), while the focus lies particularly on the least developed countries (73.7%) (IBSA 2011, 5)

3.4) The FAO-Brazil Trust Fund

In 2005, Lula da Silva together with the heads of state and government of the Central American Integration System (Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana – SICA) agreed to propose to the UN in New York and the FAO in Rome the launch of an initiative for a Latin America without hunger (SICA 2005). The FAO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean

¹⁹ See the official website at <http://tedc2.undp.org/IBSA/about/about.htm> (accessed 19 March 2013).

²⁰ For a detailed overview of the projects see IBSA 2011.

assumed the coordinating role of the initiative which has as its aim the eradication of hunger in Latin America and the Caribbean by 2025.²¹ This general objective is pursued by concentrating on capacity-building measures, raising the profile of the fight against hunger and the right to food on the agenda of governments and international organisations at national, regional and global levels, and monitoring the state of food security in Latin American countries supported by national governments, actors from the private sector and civil society (FAO 2007, 2).

In order to carry out the objectives set in the agenda of the initiative the FAO together with the Brazilian government - represented by the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA), the Ministry of External Relations (MRE), the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture (MPA) and the National School Development Fund (FNDE) – launched the FAO-Brazil Trust Fund in 2008, coordinated by the FAO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (Marco Estratégico n.d.).




Figure 3: The Brazil-FAO Trust Fund²²

²¹For more information see <http://www.rlc.fao.org/proyecto/iniciativa/iniciativa.htm> (accessed 05 March 2013).

²² Model developed with the help of the official website of the Brazil-FAO Cooperation Programme, available at: <http://www.rlc.fao.org/es/programabrasilfao/> (accessed 05 March 2013).

The whole fund is co-ordinated through the FAO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean in Santiago de Chile supported by a technical team of consultants and coordinators from the participating Brazilian Ministries (Marco Estratégico n.d., 6/7). The FAO Regional Office also receives support from the FAO Sub-regional Office for Central America in Panama as far as projects are concerned which are implemented in Central American countries and from the Liaison Officer for Brazil and Latin America at the FAO Headquarters in Rome (Marco Estratégico n.d., 7).

The projects of the fund are implemented in the four main areas of humanitarian assistance/emergency aid, school feeding, strengthening civil society, and strengthening / consolidating the aquaculture network in the Americas. Brazilian representatives from the participating Ministries (MDS, MDA, MPA) and agencies/departments (FNDE, ABC, CGFome) support both the FAO Regional Office and the implementation process of the projects. While representatives from the MRE/CGFome contribute to the short-term projects in emergency aid, representatives from the MPA (Ministry of Fishing and Agriculture) support projects on strengthening the Aquaculture Network in the Americas and representatives from the MDA (Ministry of Agrarian Development) support projects involving the strengthening of civil society. The projects in the areas of school feeding, strengthening civil society and Aquaculture are further supported financially by ABC, while the FNDE contributes with financial resources to the realisation of school feeding projects. Through the implementation of the projects the Brazilian representatives are further supported by the FAO representatives in the respective countries, officials from local governments, NGOs and regional organisations. Short-term projects of a humanitarian dimension have been carried out in several countries in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, while the medium-term projects have been concentrating on capacity-building, knowledge-sharing and policy-dialogue in Latin-American countries²³.

In 2009, the FAO established the initiative for a Latin America without hunger as the strategic framework for all the projects financed by the FAO in

²³ For a detailed account of these projects see <http://www.rlc.fao.org/es/programabrasilfao/proyectos/> (accessed 04 May 2013).

Latin America in the combat against hunger and poverty, linking the Brazil-FAO Trust Fund to the Spain-FAO Trust Fund, created in 2006 between Spain and the FAO in the area of food security, family agriculture and rural development.²⁴ In this sense, the initiative, called into life by Lula da Silva, turned into a bridge between the Brazil-FAO Trust Fund and other important actors and bodies in the FAO reinforcing the commitment demanded by Lula da Silva and Brazil's active role in the global fight against hunger and poverty.

In the projects on strengthening the dialogue among FAO, governments and civil society in Latin America²⁵, Brazil is involved through its Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA). Due to the importance of the issue to the civil society actors in the FAO Committee on World Food Security, the programme is linked to the agenda of the FAO Committee. The FAO-Spain Trust Fund is involved in contributing to capacity-building efforts of rural civil society organisations and in assisting in establishing public policies in family agriculture. The programme also cooperates with Mercosul's REAF (Reunião Especializada sobre Agricultura Familiar do Mercosul)²⁶, the Special Meeting on Family Agriculture of Mercosul's member countries.

The school-feeding programme for Latin American countries²⁷ has been heavily supported by FNDE and its then director Daniel Balaban. By involving all government actors from the highest level and a wide range of actors from the society (CSOs, research institutions, professors, educators, etc.) of the benefiting country the programme aims to share Brazil's knowledge and build a knowledge and information network.

²⁴ For more information on the Trust Fund between Spain and the FAO see <http://www.rlc.fao.org/fondo/> (accessed 04 May 2012).

²⁵ Benefiting countries are Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic (FAO 2012a).

²⁶ REAF was launched in 2004 by Brazil's Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Agrarian Development to serve the member states of Mercosul as a platform to further strengthen family agriculture in the Mercosul area. As one of the most recent results of these special meetings, the Mercosul countries established a fund in 2008 to finance projects and programmes on family agriculture. Within the framework of this fund Mercosul member states started a co-operation programme with FAO in early 2013 with the aim to further promote public policies on family agriculture in the Mercosul area (FAO 2013; MRE 2008; REAF 2008a and 2008b).

²⁷ Benefiting countries are Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and the Dominican Republic (FAO 2012b).

The WFP Centre of Excellence Against Hunger so far has no official relationship with the FAO-Brazil Programme. However, since the WFP Centre is automatically consulted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in all of Brazil's relations with other countries on school-feeding programmes (Interview, 01 March 2013), it contributes with its expertise to the school-feeding projects carried out under the umbrella of the FAO-Brazil Cooperation programme (---►).

In the third area, emergency aid, the department of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs CGFome has been actively involved in providing humanitarian assistance to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa²⁸ by contributing to the reconstruction of infrastructure (schools, hospitals, community centres, etc.) affected by catastrophes or cooperating for the purchase of food, water and other basic needs.

In the fourth area, Brazil's Ministry of Fishing and Agriculture (MPA) is engaged in contributing to the consolidation of an aquaculture network of the Americas. Apart from these four core areas, new Brazilian initiatives have resulted in further cooperation programmes with the FAO.

In a visit to Brasília in late 2012, the current FAO regional representative of Latin America and the Caribbean, Raúl Benítez, emphasised that the key rationale of the cooperation between the FAO and Brazil lay in sharing Brazil's successful experience in fighting hunger and poverty to help further develop other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (FAO 2012d). Neither Brazil nor the FAO, however, have the intention to simply copy Brazil's model. Hélder Muteia, the FAO representative to Brazil between 2010 and 2012, emphasised that the FAO aimed to learn from Brazil's experiences in order to adapt the different components of the Zero Hunger Strategy to realities which are very different from the Brazilian one (Savanachi 2010).

²⁸ Guatemala, Chile, Haiti, Congo, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Paraguay, Bolivia and Nicaragua (FAO 2012c).

Conclusion

Brazil has engaged in the global fight against hunger and poverty by building four key nodes in partnership with several international organisations (UNDP, WFP and FAO). On the one hand, the Brazilian government launched two Centres which have globally diffused Brazil's knowledge on different planes.

The International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth in its capacity as a research centre on poverty made other countries and organisations aware of the impressive results of various programmes of Brazil's Zero Hunger Strategy and contributed to legitimising this model based on serious and competent research. The IPC-IG has established a vast network in the developing world with national governments, research institutions and regional and international organisations.

The WFP Centre of Excellence Against Hunger represents a node that focuses on spreading the knowledge of specific programmes of the Zero Hunger Strategy which are by now the School Feeding Programme and the Food Acquisition Programme. Together with FAO, WFP and other donor institutions the Centre sees its differential in the area of technical cooperation efforts by directly engaging governments from developing countries with these programmes and helping to launch similar programmes in the respective countries. In addition, the WFP Centre is not only an important node for Brazil, but an essential node in the global governance mechanisms of food security, on its way to becoming a worldwide point of reference for long-lasting solutions and successfully tested public policies in the fight against hunger.

On the other hand, Brazil created two funds which concentrate a considerable amount of resources to engage in technical cooperation efforts based on the programmes and the rationale of Brazil's Zero Hunger Strategy. The IBSA Trust Fund concentrates the financial and institutional resources of UNDP, Brazil, India and South Africa, while the FAO Trust Fund combines Brazil's knowledge with the institutional infrastructure of FAO. Both funds diffuse Brazil's knowledge through specific short and long-term projects in the developing world, in particular in Latin America and Africa.

All four nodes share a particular way of thinking based on the transfer of knowledge in relation to the Zero Hunger Strategy. They concentrate a specific set of methods and technologies all based on Brazil's successful

experiences in its national fight against hunger and poverty. They concentrate the financial resources of Brazil and other actors in the global governance of food security committed to eradicating poverty and hunger. And they rely on an institutional framework - a research centre, a centre of excellence against hunger and two funds - which allows these nodes to spread the Zero Hunger Strategy throughout the world. Along with these four key characteristics, all the four nodes represent partnerships between Brazil and international organisations which facilitates a profound and quick integration into the global governance mechanisms of food security.

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ABSTRACT

Brazil's Zero Hunger Strategy is nowadays regarded as an international model in the global fight against hunger and poverty. I will analyse the mechanisms Brazil created to allow other governments and international organisations to benefit from the experience Brazil collected in the Zero Hunger Strategy. Based on the theoretical concept of "nodal governance" I will describe four of these global governance mechanisms (the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, the WFP Centre of Excellence Against Hunger, the IBSA Trust Fund and the FAO-Brazil Trust Fund) as essential nodes which helped to 1) strengthen Brazil's exercise of influence in its international fight against hunger and poverty and 2) reinforced the global governance of food security. This analysis demonstrates how Brazil has been able to raise its profile as a leader in fighting hunger and poverty in the global South.

KEYWORDS

Brazil; Global Governance; Global South.

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TRIANGULAR TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND THE ROLE OF INMETRO

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Introduction

Nowadays, the Triangular Technical Cooperation appears as a promising subfield of the Cooperation for Development area, uniting efforts of a developing country and developed country (or of a multilateral organization) in favor of a third nation destitute of resources. The Triangular Technical Cooperation meets the eighth goal of the United Nations 2000 Millennium Declaration, establishing partnerships for development in order to reduce global inequities.

After remaining for two decades a recipient of technical knowledge from more industrialized nations, Brazil gradually assumed the dual identity of recipient and provider thereof, accumulating forty years of experience in international technical cooperation with countries of less relative development. This cooperation was built in both bilateral and trilateral scope.

Initially, Brazil made use of triangular technical cooperation as an expedient to meet budgetary constraints at a time of severe economic hardship. Currently, this triangular partnership earns more complex features, since developing countries are likely to play an increasingly active role in technical

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cooperation as they expand their own profile on the international scene. In this context, the transmission of technical knowledge can be conceived not only as a means of fulfilling an UN goal, but also as a resource of soft power, capable of increasing the prestige of these countries in world politics.

This article aims to analyze the Brazilian technical cooperation, with special focus on the case of the triangular partnership between Mozambique, Brazil and Germany, in which the Institute of Metrology, Quality and Technology (Inmetro) is heavily involved. Thus, an example of triangular cooperation not covered by the contemporary literature is presented. For this purpose, the text below is divided in six items. In the first, the evolution of North-South International Technical Cooperation is described; in the second, the evolution of South-South International Technical Cooperation is examined; in the third, the Triangular Technical Cooperation is discussed; in the fourth, the history of Brazilian Technical Cooperation is evaluated; in the fifth, the Project of Triangular Technical Cooperation Mozambique-Brazil-Germany is analyzed; and finally, final considerations are exposed.

Evolution of the North-South International Technical Cooperation

Along with the financial cooperation, humanitarian aid, the scientific-technological cooperation and food aid, the International Technical Cooperation (ITC) is part of the comprehensive category of Cooperation for Development. This cooperation has as main objective to overcome, or at least mitigate, the economic and social disparities that lead the division between developed countries, developing countries and least developed countries.

According to Puente (2010), the ITC can be defined as:

"A multidisciplinary and multisectoral a process that usually involves a developing country and other International Actor(s) (country or multilateral organization), working together to promote, through programs, projects or activities, dissemination and transference of knowledge, techniques, successful experiences and technologies aiming to build and develop human and institutional capacities of the developing country, arousing thereby the necessary confidence that contributes to the achievement of sustainable development with social inclusion through the effective management and operation of the State, the production system, the economy and the society in general."

The expression ITC was, however, preceded by the term "Technical Assistance" (TA). In 1948, according to the Resolution 200, the General Assembly of the United Nations created this concept, based on which, the developed countries would assist poorer nations. From the 1970s, in the context in which the third world countries began to demand the construction of a more equitable international economic order, TA was replaced by ITC or North-South cooperation. This change was not merely semantic, once the expression TA could contain the idea of inactivity of the receiver before the charity donor. In contrast, the term "technical cooperation" opened up the possibility of greater constructive exchange between the provider and receiver (Puente 2010). This characteristic of ITC is also discussed in more detail in the next section of this article.

While the discourse of ITC contains some altruistic purposes linked to the idea of promoting development, there are other elements of political, strategic and economic order that should not be disregarded. Thus, when analyzing the ITC provided by a given country, it is necessary to evaluate not only the explicit principles and values, but also the underlying national interests. This explains why the ITC initially was not conducted based on the needs and preferences of the recipient countries, but, anchored in perceptions and interests of donor nations. In other words, not uncommonly, have occurred "manufacturing demand" based on priorities established by ITC donors.

In the 1980s, amid the severe economic crisis that affected the peripheral nations, especially in Latin America, some Northern donor countries undertook a review of the mechanisms of ITC and its decreased volume. Thus, during the so-called "lost decade", there was appreciable reflux of the ITC, making it difficult to advance towards development. At the end of that decade and the early nineties, this setback was accentuated by the neoliberal "Washington Consensus." Therefore, the ITC was used by some developed nations as a tool to stimulate the implementation of structural reforms in peripheral countries, which aimed to diminish and to weaken the State. According to the neoliberal creed, with the end of the Cold War, progress and growth would result in the free expression of market forces, rather than the implementation of public policies targeting development.

In late 2008, with the outbreak of the economic crisis in the United States, which spilled over to other regions, currently affecting mainly the countries of the Euro zone, the creed of the "Washington Consensus" was badly shaken. State intervention in the economy, in order to overcome the crisis, was seen as necessary not only in the peripheral countries, but also at the epicenter of global capitalism: the USA. In this turbulent environment, ITC gained renewed impetus, especially because of the innovations that were already being implemented by some emerging countries of the South under the scope of horizontal cooperation.

Evolution of South-South Technical Cooperation

Cooperation in South-South axis, also called horizontal cooperation, arises as an alternative to the traditional North-South Cooperation or vertical cooperation. It is observed that this partnership between the peripheral countries should not necessarily be thought of as a contraposition, since it can complement the efforts made in the North-South axis. The trilateral cooperation (discussed in the next section) illustrates the possibility of synergy between the two axes.

Moreover, horizontal cooperation results of a historical process in which some developing countries have gradually evolved from the simple condition of receptors of technical expertise from developed nations to the dual situation of providers of South-South Cooperation, but without abdicating entirely the benefits from the North-South Cooperation. Thus, emerging countries like Brazil, China and India started to offer technical cooperation on the horizontal axis, while still receiving dividends from technical cooperation with the core nations. However, it has been noted a gradual decline in the volume of technical knowledge transferred to these countries by industrialized nations as these emerging achieve a higher degree of socioeconomic development.

It is worth clarifying that South-South Cooperation can be understood through two interpretive lines, which have frequently tangled. According to the conception so far described, the horizontal cooperation refers to the definition of the United Nations Program for Development (UNDP), according to which technical partnership between the peripheral countries is developed. A second understanding refers to the diplomatic coordination among countries of the South through the formation of political coalitions of variable geometry

(coalition building) seeking, among other things, to increase the joint bargaining power in a multilateral forum (Lechini 2010). The IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the G-20 in WTO loom large as examples of political coalitions, in which Brazil is inserted.

Two international statements are identified as foundations of South-South cooperation oriented to development: the Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation, agreed during the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955, as well as the Plan of Action of Buenos Aires, formulated during the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, held in Buenos Aires in 1978 (Zimmermann and Smith 2011).

The Bandung Conference was an initiative of the Asian-African nations that had recently achieved political emancipation. These countries organized themselves in order to oppose Neocolonialism and Imperialism of the great powers in the context of the Cold War. The declaration that resulted from the conference stressed the need for Third World countries to reduce economic dependence of core countries through mutual technical cooperation. Furthermore, the Conference represented a first step for the future launch of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, which occurred in the Belgrade Conference in 1961.

In its turn, the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, arising from the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1978. This Plan competed effectively for the establishment of horizontal technical cooperation for development, which would be improved in the following decades. In this sense, the UNDP was designated as the body responsible for coordinating the activities of Technical Cooperation for Development (Puente 2010).

It is worth highlighting that the greatest activism of peripheral countries, in the 1970s, occurred in a context of Détente in the Cold War. The decrease of the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union facilitated the articulation between the countries of the South in favor of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Sombra Saraiva names this period "Equitable Illusions". According to the author, the peripheral countries

considered themselves able to change the parameters of the international order in their favor without, however, holding the power resources necessary to achieve that purpose. The severe economic crisis that occurred in the following decade corroborated this weakness (Saraiva 2001).

Still according to the vision of the peripheral countries, the traditional model of vertical cooperation is characterized by welfarism permeated by political, strategic and commercial interests. Furthermore, riddled with conditionalities, this welfarism stops contemplating the real priorities of the receptors states, which leads to the perpetuation of dependency before the central countries (Puente 2010).

Conversely, in order to provide technical cooperation, countries like Brazil, China and India do not establish conditionalities in what concerns economic, environmental, governance and human rights aspects, in addition to reducing the procedural requirements. Mindful of their sovereignty, due of having already been subject of foreign interference in the relatively recent past, these countries respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

Besides preserving sovereignty, the absence of conditionality has two other advantages. First, it provides recipient countries faster access to financing of the emerging countries. Second, it increases the bargaining power of the recipient countries facing cooperation offered by developed countries of the North, whose conditions are usually much more severe and inflexible (Souza 2012).

Moreover, based on the sharp criticism concerning the asymmetry of the North-South axis, technical cooperation in South-South axis emphasizes the concepts of partnership, reciprocity and equality, which bring greater legitimacy to cooperation. According to the logic of horizontal cooperation, development is conceived as a collective enterprise of dialectical character. Thus, it is not just a state granting assistance to another less developed, once the donor country acquires new experiences that can be applied to deepen its own development (Borges 2012).

Another benefit that comes from the dynamics of horizontal cooperation is the reduction of existing costs. In general, countries like Brazil and China do not hire external consultants for their technical cooperation projects in other countries. Instead, these countries send technical staff of the

federal government itself, with the goal of executing the project. This also simplifies accountability and monitoring of undertaken activities. Since the procedures of the technicians are paid by various public entities, actual expenditures on technical cooperation often do not enter the calculations of the agency responsible for coordinating the project.

The dynamics of South-South Cooperation is not, however, exempt from some limitations. Often, technicians of various public entities of the federal government do not have specific training to apply their knowledge to the foreign reality in a multicultural environment truly distinct. Also, these technicians do not have the same length and flexibility of time enjoyed by foreign independent consultants to implement cooperation activities, because the stay abroad implies the suspension of everyday tasks in their home institutions.

Another quite sensitive point is the constant need to respond to internal criticism regarding the expenditure of public funds to the horizontal technical cooperation. In light of the serious socio-economic problems still facing the donor country, it is mister justifying why public money is invested in improving social indicators of other disadvantaged countries.

Furthermore, another aspect vulnerable to criticism is that the supply of technical cooperation without conditionalities can prolong the stay of corrupt and authoritarian leaders who violate human rights and the environment. This concern is particularly acute with respect to the policies adopted by China in Africa.

The logic of horizontal technical cooperation may also be relativized, because, even if the partnership occurs between the southern states, there is a clear asymmetry between the donor and the recipient country. Thus, there is also a hierarchy of power blending the idea of horizontality. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that South-South cooperation is closer to the ideal of equality between the two poles of the equation than the North-South cooperation.

In short, despite some vicissitudes, horizontal cooperation is establishing itself as a catalyst for major changes in the international order after the Cold War. On August 3, 2011, the Secretary-General of the United Nations confirmed that idea in the report on South-South Cooperation for Development:

“South-South interactions are leading to deep changes in the fabric of international relations and have begun to yield a proven development impact, with countries of the South now constituting a powerful force in the global economy.” (UN 2011)

The Triangular Technical Cooperation

As discussed earlier, the vertical cooperation and horizontal cooperation are not a recent phenomenon. The horizontal cooperation has its roots in the 1970s, while the other dates back to the late 1940s. In contrast, the triangular technical cooperation presents itself as a new arrangement, which begins to gain importance in the 1990s.

In general, the triangular technical cooperation can be thought of as an amalgam between the vertical cooperation and horizontal cooperation, involving therefore a developed country and a developing nation, which act together in order to qualify technically a third country of the South which is poorest in resources.

Although prevalent, this is not the only type of trilateral dynamic possible, since there exists also cooperation between two countries of the South, with the aim of transferring technical resources to other peripheral nation (horizontal cooperation only). There is also a joint effort between a country and an international organization in another nation. Nevertheless, this section will address only the first type of triangular cooperation.

This type of partnership for development follows logical cascade cooperation (Lechini 2010). Peripheral countries have received and are still receiving, although to a lesser extent, the technical expertise of the core countries. Having achieved a reasonable level of development by adapting the technology of the industrialized countries to their needs, these peripheral countries start to transfer tropicalized technical expertise to other nations of the South.

Accordingly, the peripheral countries have adequate experience and are better positioned than the central states to meet the demands of their counterparts in the South, once they have faced in the recent past the same challenges to development, formulating creative solutions to improve their socioeconomic conditions (ECOSOC 2008). Moreover, technical cooperation of the southern countries tends to be best received by other peripheral countries, because it is devoid of remnants of the former metropolitan domination.

Often, this South-South partnership is marked, however, by financial difficulties of the developing country which supplies the cooperation. Thus, the financing of the project by a central country becomes truly relevant in order for the project to be put in practice (Burges 2012). This is one of the advantages of trilateral cooperation, because the technical knowledge and experience in the South adds to greater financing capacity of the central countries.

Triangular cooperation can therefore be seen as an intermediate arrangement between cooperation in the bilateral scope and multilateral cooperation, bringing together, at the same time, the efforts of developed and development countries for the improvement of the technical capabilities of a third Southern country (Abneur 2007). An example of trilateral cooperation in which Brazil participates will be provided later.

The History of Brazilian Technical Cooperation

Brazilian technical cooperation follows the historical pattern, mentioned above, based on which the country moves slowly from receiver to the condition of receptor-provider of technical knowledge. This evolution has unfolded between the 1950s and 1970s.

In the 1950s, with the advent of the National Commission for Technical Assistance (NCTA), linked to Itamaraty, Brazil starts to plan up in order to receive technical cooperation from developed countries. It was necessary to coordinate the demands of Brazilian institutions for technical knowledge, setting priorities in order to establish partnerships with the core countries and UN agencies (Puente 2010). Thus, in the following two decades, Brazil has received technical cooperation mainly from Germany, Canada, France, Britain, Italy and Japan as well as the UNDP (Cervo 2008).

In 1968, the Brazilian government created a system of technical cooperation involving the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This interministerial arrangement laid the foundations for Brazil to start, in 1973, at the end of the Medici government, as a provider of technical cooperation to the countries of Latin America and Lusophone Africa (Puente 2010).

This guidance deepened with Geisel's Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism (1974-1979), according to which foreign policy was conceived as a

tool to leverage the country's development. In the context of a serious crisis of the Brazilian economic miracle, parallel to the relative decline of U.S. power in the international arena, the presidency of Ernesto Geisel consolidated the Brazilian diplomacy global-multilateral tradition (Leite 2011; Pecequillo 2012). Brazil would have to transpose the ideological boundaries of the Cold War, expanding its international insertion through the approximation with various countries, especially those of the so-called third world. In this regard, technical cooperation has played a relevant role in the consolidation of Brazil's relations with developing countries. The impulse in South-South Cooperation was aligned with the Action Plan of Buenos Aires of 1978.

Despite the serious economic crisis that marked the 1980s, Sarney's government was able to continue horizontal technical cooperation efforts in the country through the reform of its institutional structure, based on the creation of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) in 1987, linked to the MFA. This reform lent greater dynamism and flexibility to technical cooperation, which favored triangular arrangements with the World Bank, the IDB and UNDP, among other multilateral agencies, as a way to circumvent budgetary constraints (Puente 2010). In the following year, "cooperation among peoples for the progress of humanity" was inscribed in the fourth article of the Brazilian Constitution as one of the principles governing the international relations of the country. Technical cooperation has started, therefore, to espouse, in a conspicuous way, a goal of teleological nature.

The Brazilian process of expansion and institutionalization of international technical cooperation remained during the 1990s. Despite the adoption of neoliberal policies by Collor and Cardoso governments, which entailed reducing the role of the state and less emphasis on the development, horizontal cooperation is thought, increasingly, as an instrument of foreign policy. In this sense, the choice of countries with which Brazil has cultivated partnerships, aiming to transfer technical knowledge, has been aligned with the diplomatic guidelines.

Thus, during the two governments of President Cardoso (1995-2002), technical cooperation with the countries of South America was prioritized, in the context of increasing regional integration. Conversely, cooperation with African countries has been relegated to the background, although some projects have been performed with the Portuguese-speaking nations of the continent as

part of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries. Sombra Saraiva even qualifies the nineties as a period of "long sleep" in Brazil's relations with Africa (Saraiva 2012).

During the two governments of President Lula (2003-2010), foreign policy went back to being intensely used as an instrument for development (not only economically, but also socially). The dogged pursuit for autonomy through diversification of the country's partnerships in the international arena, entails an "unsubmissive and active diplomacy" (Amorim 2010). In this context, South-South Cooperation (in its two conceptions) gains greater prominence. The increased relations with the countries of the South do not occur, however, at the expense of traditional partnerships with the nations of the North. Rather than that, these contacts tend to become stronger as a result of greater international prominence achieved by Brazil.

Moreover, the emphasis on policies to reduce poverty, via income transference and improving internal social indicators, conferred greater legitimacy on the international technical cooperation provided by the country. In fact, there is a clear congruence between the social inclusion policies adopted domestically and policies aimed at development in the international plan.

The increase in Brazilian technical cooperation was evident, especially with African countries due to the high priority given to the other side of the South Atlantic by the Lula government. Thus, 48% of technical cooperation projects coordinated by ABC were directed to Africa, covering 36 countries. Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe and Angola were the African nations, in that order, which received more transmission of technical knowledge, which demonstrates the focus of Brazil in Portuguese-speaking countries (MFA, 2010). Also, According to Puente (2010):

"the areas of greatest concentration of technical cooperation are agriculture, health, education and professional training, environment and natural resources, public administration, energy and biofuels, social development, business development, information technology and electronic government, transport, industry, standardization and metrology, urbanism, tourism, civil defense, among others."

Moreover, in eight years, President Lula remained 55 days on African soil and promoted the opening of 17 Brazilian embassies. In commercial terms,

exports to Africa increased from US 2.9 billion to US\$ 12.2 billion. The new partnership between Brazil and Africa reconciled, therefore, solidary commitment (based on altruistic values and perception of a common identity) with pragmatic economic interests. (Saraiva 2012; Valor 2013)

Since 2011, the current government of Dilma Rousseff has deepened ties with the African continent. In February 2013, the President participated in the III Summit of South America – Africa which took place in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. The Declaration of Malabo reaffirmed the joint commitment to strengthen the mechanisms for South-South Cooperation. Recently, in May of the same year, Rousseff attended the Celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. On this occasion, she announced that her government plans to renegotiate the debt of 12 African countries with Brazil. Likewise, announced the intention to create a new international cooperation, trade and investment agency to Africa and Latin America (Valor, 2013).

This purpose of inaugurating a new agency reveals that Brazilian technical cooperation includes not only teleological goals consistent with the constitutional provision. There are also interests of economic and political order (Puente 2010). These different goals are not mutually exclusive and, in most cases, are intertwined.

In the economic sphere, Brazil has considerably raised trade with the other nations of the South, reducing dependence on the markets of developed countries. Due to this change, Brazil has been less affected by the impacts of the economic crisis that hit the U.S.A, and later, Europe. When promoting bilateral rapprochement with other Southern countries, technical cooperation is also indirectly contributing to the internationalization of Brazilian companies, particularly in the services area.

One adverse consequence pointed out by some critics is that technical cooperation would lead to the emergence of potential competitors of Brazil in some areas, for example, agriculture and biofuels (Puente 2010). This possibility seems, however, to be offset by the benefits arising in different areas of horizontal partnership.

In the political sphere, through the consolidation of the bonds with the South, Brazil managed to increase its global profile, becoming an indispensable actor in different international forums. This "capacity to political and

diplomatic consolidation" appears as one of the most important assets of the country in the coexistence with the major powers, since, based on the Constitution and the signing of the NPT, Brazil abdicated to resort to the nuclear alternative as a strategic deterrent (Lima 2010). It is worth stressing that the support coming from the woven partnerships with countries in the South was essential to José Graziano to be elected Director-General of FAO, in 2011, and Roberto Azevedo, of the WTO, in 2013. To ascend to these two organizations, it is certain that the two Brazilians will continue to promote the development as an essential objective to be achieved.

It is clear, therefore, that technical cooperation emerges as a relevant instrument of Brazilian foreign policy, and African countries are major beneficiaries. In general, the literature highlights the role of Embrapa, Fiocruz and Senai, respectively, in the areas of agriculture (with the opening of an office in Ghana), health (in the fight against the epidemic of AIDS and Malaria) and professional education (Hirst, Lima and Pinheiro 2010; Pino 2010; Saraiva 2012). There are, however, other governmental actors which also play an important role in Africa.

Triangular Technical Cooperation Mozambique-Brazil-Germany: Technical and Institutional Strengthening of the National Institute of Standards and Quality of Mozambique (INNOQ)

As mentioned before, the Brazilian triangular cooperation begins in the late 1980s, through a partnership with multilateral agencies in order to cope with domestic financial difficulties. From the 1990s, Brazil began to cooperate with developed nations, with the aim of transmitting technical knowledge to a third country less developed. Although the Brazilian government prioritizes South-South bilateral cooperation, triangular cooperation arrangement is designed as a supplement that adds value to the horizontal logic.

One of the peculiarities of Brazilian trilateral cooperation is that the country often partners with nations from which has already received technical knowledge in order to foster the development of a third country. Thus, in recent years, Brazil has embarked in triangular cooperation with Japan, the United States, Spain, Germany, France, Italy, Norway, Switzerland and Canada, with the scope to act jointly in Latin America and Africa. Beside the International

Labour Organization (ILO), Japan stands out as the main partner of Brazil in trilateral cooperation (Pino 2012; Souza 2012).

Notwithstanding the triangular arrangements involving a partnership with developed countries in favor of a third nation, Brazil seeks to maintain the characteristics of horizontality. In this sense, cooperation is driven by demand (demand-driven), conditionalities are not imposed and it is sought to transfer good practices, adapting them to the reality of the recipient country.

According to Saraiva, in present-day Africa, Mozambique distinguishes itself as "a case model of haughty international insertion" (Saraiva 2012). Located in the Indic portion of the African continent, the country achieved political emancipation in 1975, plunging in the following year in a civil war that lasted until 1992. With democratization, Mozambique began gradual stabilization process that engendered satisfactory policy performance and macroeconomic equilibrium. In 2011, the country achieved a GDP growth of 7%, showing one of the highest growth rates in the international scene, at a time of severe economic crisis.

For the benefit of Mozambique, trilateral cooperation aimed at strengthening the INNOQ (the National Institute of Standards and Quality of Mozambique) is within the context of the traditional partnership between Brazil and Germany in the field of metrology. Created in 1973, the then National Institute of Metrology, Standardization and Industrial Quality (Inmetro) – federal agency under the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade – received transfer of technical knowledge of the National Metrology Institute of Germany (PTB). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, fifteen Inmetro technicians were sent to Germany to learn the language and make training in the laboratories of PTB, staying in the country around a year. During this period, they had the opportunity to be instructed on what was most modern in metrology. Thus, following the dynamics described above, Inmetro was receiver of technical cooperation before moving to the condition of the provider. With this goal, in 2000 was created the Division of International Technical Cooperation (DICOI), which integrates the General Coordination of International Articulation (CAINT) of Inmetro.

The transmission of technical knowledge to Mozambique is situated in the context of the consolidation of Brazil's relations with Africa from the Lula government, particularly with the Portuguese-speaking countries. It is worth

noting that, even in 1975, Brazil was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of Mozambique, opening an embassy in Maputo, the following year. In 2003, early in his administration, President Lula visited the country, signing eleven instruments of technical cooperation.

The basis of the exchange between Inmetro and INNOQ are established with the signing of the Agreement of Cooperation and Technical Assistance, 2007. According to the agreement, the Parties agreed to cooperate in the fields of Industrial and Legal Metrology, Conformity Assessment and the implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. This agreement between the two countries remained in force for three years.

In parallel, the trilateral cooperation starts being drafted in 2007, during the prospecting mission to Inmetro of two INNOQ leaders, accompanied by technicians of ABC and GTZ (German Agency for International Cooperation). This mission was intended to identify the Brazilian expertise of interest of INNOQ for the development of a pilot project for trilateral cooperation. In the same year, technicians from Inmetro, ABC, GTZ and PTB accomplished a mission to INNOQ in Maputo, to evaluate the needs of the Mozambican Institute.

Based on these two missions, a pilot project was designed in order to empower institutionally and technically the INNOQ, making it able to implement quality standards in the products manufactured and sold in Mozambique. This quality ensures the competitiveness of products in the domestic and foreign markets, besides providing security for consumers. The project was carried out in nine months with the participation of the five aforementioned actors. Among the activities developed are:

- I. Review of the INNOQ Annual Operating Plan;
- II. Support INNOQ in developing a career plan;
- III. Review of the INNOQ Strategic Plan;
- IV. Seminar held in order to publicize the INNOQ services;
- V. Conducting courses on Mass Measurement; Pre-Measured Products; Drafting Regulations and Structuring Mechanisms for the Implementation of Legal Metrology, Volume Measurement; Measurement Uncertainty Applied to Legal Metrology, Operation of Conformity Assessment.

The pilot project had three truly relevant results:

- I. INNOQ Institutional and Technical Strengthening. The organizational structure of the Institute was updated, increasing its capacity for political action and its recognition within Mozambican government and society. Moreover, the Legal Metrology started to be deployed in the areas of mass and volume (scales, weights and fuel metering pumps). A draft law to regulate the metrology activity in Mozambique was also prepared. The Metrology Act was finally passed by the National Assembly on May 21, 2010;
- II. Mutual learning on the part of Brazil and Germany concerning the dynamics and potentialities of the partnership between the two countries, involving ABC, INMETRO, GTZ and PTB, aiming to provide technical knowledge to a third country. In August 2010, Germany and Brazil signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Triangular Cooperation. The following common principles were defined: ownership by the third country, based on which it leads the process of the implementation of the triangular project; common standards in the planning, implementation and evaluation of projects, as well as equitable sharing of costs;
- III. Due to the positive evaluation of the three countries in relation to the advances made, it was agreed to further trilateral cooperation in Mozambique, by developing a new project more ambitious and comprehensive.

In 2010, Mozambique, Brazil and Germany prepared new triangular project, aimed at "INNOQ Technical and Institutional Strengthening ", with a duration of three years.

The three countries have set specific goals in six areas:

- I. Metrology: a) legal metrology services in the areas of weight, mass and volume nationwide and next to the Municipal Councils; b) services of industrial metrology (temperature, mass, volume, length, power, flow, pressure or force);

- II. Conformity Assessment: certification services of products and systems;
- III. Standardization: Information on sectorial committees, so that minimum quality criteria are set to domestic products, particularly regarding products in the food, agribusiness, electronics and construction industries;
- IV. Communication: communication plan internal and external (business, government, communities and the media), oriented to the goals of the business plan;
- V. Overcoming Technical Barriers to Trade: facilitating access for Mozambican products to the international market.
- VI. Internal management.

Regarding the actors involved, to the five participants of the pilot project (INNOQ, ABC, Inmetro, GTZ and PTB) two further Brazilian entities were added: ABNT (Brazilian Technical Standards Association) and INT (National Institute of Technology). Thus, the distribution of responsibilities was defined as follows:

- INNOQ – local counterpart, providing technical personnel and logistical support for the implementation of the project;
- ABC – coordinating physical and financial contribution to the Brazilian triangular project technical contributions.
- Inmetro – carrying out the Brazilian counterpart regarding legal and industrial metrology, conformity assessment, and certification of management systems, as well as overcoming technical barriers.
- ABNT – carrying out the Brazilian counterpart regarding standardization.
- INT – carrying out the Brazilian counterpart regarding product certification.
- GTZ and PTB – financing and carrying out the German technical contribution in the areas of Industrial Metrology, Conformity Assessment, Standards, Communication and Institutional Strengthening.

Synoptic Table Triangular Cooperation Areas		Responsible Counterpart
Metrology	Legal Metrology (weight, volume and length)	Inmetro
	Industrial Metrology (temperature, mass, volume, length, power, flow, pressure or force)	Inmetro PTB
Certification	Conformity assessment - Quality Management Systems	PTB + ABNT
	Products Certification	INT + ABNT
Normalization	Normalization	ABNT + PTB
Communication	Institucional Communication and Marketing	GTZ
	Internal Communication	GTZ
Overcoming Technical Barriers	Monitoring at the WTO	Inmetro
Institutional Strengthening - Internal Management	Support the adequacy of Physical Infrastructure	PTB
	Support to the accreditation process	ABNT
	Communication Network with Local Councils	GTZ + Inmetro
	Business Plan and Market Plan	PTB
	Planning, monitoring and evaluation	GTZ + PTB + Inmetro + ABC

Note that, at present, the project is still running. Some details about the implementation will be provided, as an example, regarding the area of Overcoming Technical Barriers, which is already concluded.

This area was already covered by the aforementioned Agreement for Cooperation and Technical Assistance between Inmetro and INNOQ. In the period 2007-2011, two Inmetro technical missions to Mozambique were made and one mission of INNOQ technicians came to Brazil. In these missions, the technicians of the two Institutes exchanged information on the operation and the main responsibilities of Enquiry Point of the Agreement on Technical

Barriers to Trade (WTO TBT Agreement). It is noteworthy that both institutions, the Inmetro and the INNOQ, are the focal points of this agreement in the Brazilian government and the Mozambican government, respectively. Thus, Inmetro transmitted its accumulated experience to INNOQ as a Focal Point since 1996.

It is worth mentioning that to each Focal Point of the TBT Agreement competes essentially to provide information on technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures in its country. In other words, the Focal Point acts as a center of reference on technical requirements of its country. Thus, information on changes in technical requirements for products are disseminated in order to avoid potential non-tariff barriers to international trade.

In May 2011, two technicians from the Division of Overcoming Technical Barriers of Inmetro (DISBT), which is part of CAINTEC, made a five-day mission to INNOQ in Maputo. During this period, they cooperated with the Institute for the effective establishment of the Mozambican Focal Point. Therefore, Inmetro technicians presented the most updated services offered by the Brazilian Focal Point (especially the "Export Alert!") and ensured a close partnership between the two Focal points.

Moreover, Inmetro worked with INNOQ so that key regulators of the Mozambican government and the main Mozambican companies, for which the services of the Focal Point would be available, were identified. These initiatives resulted in the holding of a meeting with regulators and another with the Association of Industries of Mozambique (AIMO). It must be emphasized that this collaboration with regulators and the private sector is critical so the INNOQ can notify technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures to the WTO and be able to respond to queries from nationals interested on technical requirements.

As an immediate result of the Mozambican mission, Inmetro helped INNOQ to clarify doubts regarding the process of notification to the WTO, based on the rules of the TBT Agreement. In this sense, the technicians of the two institutes jointly reviewed the first INNOQ notifications, which were sent to the WTO in 2012. Cooperation on Technical Barriers between Inmetro and INNOQ resulted, therefore, in the full participation of Mozambique in the

WTO's Committee on Technical Barriers being the Focal Point of the TBT Agreement.

As summarized in this part, the current dynamics of the triangular cooperation between Mozambique, Brazil and Germany is quite complex, comprising seven actors and six areas. The description of the partnership in overcoming technical barriers illustrated the important role played by Inmetro in only one of the five areas in which the Brazilian institution is involved.

Final Thoughts

The construction of triangular partnerships should be considered an important tool in order to foster cooperation for development in a period of global economic instability. By combining the efforts of three countries with different levels of development, triangular cooperation enhances the transfer of technical knowledge, reducing costs.

Brazil has been distinguished as one of the emerging powers in the field of international technical cooperation, with the increasing involvement of different government agencies, which reflects the level of excellence achieved by them in different domains. The active presence of the country in technical cooperation tends to increase its soft power in the international arena. As a result of the enhanced visibility enjoyed in world politics, Brazil is increasingly demanded to offer technical knowledge.

Inmetro is part of the list of public actors which have contributed to raise the reach and impact of Brazilian technical cooperation. Focusing both on the advancement of metrology as well as improving the quality of products and services, the Institute provides greater confidence to consumers, facilitating international trade.

The case of cooperation between Mozambique, Brazil and Germany demonstrates that in this triangular arrangement there is no simplistic division of labor in which a developing country supplies the technical knowledge while other developed country only funds the initiative. In contrast, Brazil and Germany divided on equal terms the technical, budget and management responsibilities, giving Mozambique leadership in implementing the project as its own needs. By doing so, it preserves the essence of horizontal technical cooperation, a valuable principle of Brazil's International Relations.

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ABSTRACT

Brazil outstands as one of the emerging powers in the technical cooperation field, with an increasing participation of different governmental agencies. This paper analyzes the Brazilian technical cooperation, with special focus on the triangular partnership between Mozambique, Brazil and Germany, with which Inmetro is deeply involved.

KEYWORDS

South-South Relations; Triangular Technical Cooperation; Inmetro.

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INSIDE THE BRIC: ANALYSIS OF THE SEMIPERIPHERAL CHARACTER OF BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA AND CHINA

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Introduction

Every approach and development of the World-Systems Theory is carried out in a structured time-space *continuum*. Concerning the spatiality, this theory understands the world in a stratified and hierarchical way on three areas: core, semiperiphery and periphery². Such division “is not merely functional – that is to say, occupational – but also geographical.” (Wallerstein 2003a, 492) That understood, the world-systems’ observed areas are not only a theoretical construct in order to understand the international division of labor but also real, authentic, historically built and spatially established geographical areas, whose differences – sudden or not – do exist, “as point the price criteria, the wages, the life levels, the gross domestic product, the *per capita* gross and the commercial balances” (Braudel 1984, 22). As David Harvey explains, these areas “are perpetually reproduced, sustained, undermined and reconfigured by the socioecological and political-economic processes that lie on the present” (Harvey 2000, 98). It indicates that the spaces do not belong to a single area anymore, but that the processes are “what structure the space” (Taylor and Flint 2002, 21) in an unstoppable and perpetual way.

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² Very broadly, the periphery of the world-system features “the lowest wage levels and nullified or scarce own technological developments, putting the most brutal, stark and extenuating forms of work exploitation in practice, along with the highest levels of poverty and absolute or relative misery, besides the general scarcity of available goods.” (Aguirre Rojas 2003, 45)

Immanuel Wallerstein sustains that the semiperiphery “is not a statistical cleavage artifice, nor a residual category. The semiperiphery is a structural element necessary in the world-economy” (Wallerstein 2003a, 493). Thus, the concept of semiperiphery ends up being an analytical category of great importance to cover the theoretical dichotomous blank existent in the core-periphery model.

Initially, nonetheless, the semiperiphery could be seen simply and plainly as a defined zone from the denial of the core and the periphery, that is to say, as a concept full of indetermination and ambiguity. And effectively the semiperiphery and the semiperipheral states form an amorphous group. Facing this, how to identify the semiperiphery and the semiperipheral countries in the present international context of the Post-Cold War? What are the particular characteristics of such areas? Where does its potential to remake the world-system lie? Which countries can be considered as semiperipheral states? What specificities do such states show in the interior of their national societies?

The objective of this investigation is to do a broad revision and reconstruction of the concept of semiperiphery, where the original ideas of Immanuel Wallerstein can be articulated to the developments made by other contemporaneous world-systems theorists. Once this goal is accomplished, the study of the semiperipheral nature – both internal and systemic – of the so-called “BRIC” countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in the international context of Post-Cold War.

1. Theoretical characteristics of the concept of semiperiphery

The characteristics and roles of semiperiphery in the world-system are going to be firstly exposed by Immanuel Wallerstein throughout its work “The Modern World-System” and right after in other books, essays and supplementary material. This idea has been complemented and discussed by other authors – like Fernand Braudel, André Gunder Frank, Janet Abu-Lughod, Giovanni Arrighi and Jessica Drangel, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Peter Taylor and Colin Flint, Kees Terlouw, Ben Deurdder, José Mauricio Domingues, Carlos Antonio Aguirre, and Peter Wilkin, among the most important ones –, who have also provided some feedback and gave to the semiperipheral conception a theoretical range much broader than the originally proposed.

1.1. Intermediate situation between core and periphery

In the first volume of “The Modern World-System” – which is called “The Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century” and was first published in English in 1974 – Immanuel Wallerstein approaches the existent conditions when of the origins of the world-system, between 1450-1640. Here, the semiperiphery is characterized as areas that were able to differentiate themselves from the periphery because of reasons like the past presence of many and relatively powerful merchants, the existence of a strong national bourgeoisie, the partnership’s practice³, the high land/workforce index and the partial proximity to the agriculture self-sufficiency, though with rifts and falls of the industrial activities.

Before concluding this book, Immanuel Wallerstein presents a theoretical reprise and unveils its reference mark for the systematization of the gathered empirical material. It is in this section where his definition is extended and the author notes that the semiperipheral areas

“play a role parallel to that played, *mutatis mutandis*, by middle trading groups in an empire. They are collection points of vital skills that are often politically unpopular. These middle areas (like middle groups in an empire) partially deflect the political pressures which groups primarily located in peripheral areas might otherwise direct against core-States and the groups which operate within and through their state machineries. On the other hand, the interests primarily located in the semiperiphery are located outside the political arena of the core-States, and find it difficult to pursue the ends in political coalitions that might be open to them were they in the same political arena.” (Wallerstein 2003a, 492-493)

In the interstate-international system, the semiperiphery is understood as “a significative number of States that seems to be permanently in an intermediate position between the ‘maturity’ and the ‘backwardness’, like the theorists of the modernization could say, or between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’, like the dependence theorists could say” (Arrighi and Drangel 1996, 9). This intermediate situation has exclusively nothing to do with the

³ Though it can be understood as the local peasants’ capacity to negotiate the benefits resulting from the crops with the land owners, it can also be seen as the service of the tenants in order to guarantee themselves protection against famine and the social status that the land ownership used to represent.

international division of labor⁴, as it also is related to a geoeconomic and geopolitical function in the interstate-international system, once “the geography of the world-system surely interferes in a decisive way” (Amin 1998, 215).

1.2. Industrializing national economies

The capitalist world-economy was throughout history built

“on a worldwide division of labor in which various zones of this economy (that which we have termed the core, the semiperiphery, and the periphery) were assigned specific economic roles, developed different class structures, used consequently different modes of labor control, and profited unequally from the workings of the system.” (Wallerstein 2003a, 229)

Albeit a geographic-functional division in the world-economy exists, Giovanni Arrighi and Jessica Drangel clarified that

“no particular activity (whether defined in terms of its output or of the technique used) is inherently core-like or periphery-like. Any activity can become at a particular point in time core-like or periphery-like, but each has that characteristic for a limited period.” (Arrighi and Drangel 1986, 18)

When dealing with the core-semiperiphery-periphery situations of ever-changing and transitory realities, will be interesting to observe in the world-economy not exactly the type of activities that are put in practice, but the vanguard/lag that could happen creating and developing the processes of industrialization.

The semiperipheral economies are characterized by the introduction of new goods, new energy sources, new methods of production and organization, although not in an innovative way, but reproducing and adapting what has

⁴ From the World-System Theory it is assumed that labor is internationally integrated in a series of production chains. It is here emphasized that “in the distribution of the total product, not in the production factors, but between the various knots of the production chain” (Arrighi and Drangel 1996, 16).

already been developed, patented and also refined in advance by the core economies. Nonetheless, inside the semiperiphery – when it refers to an area spatially localized in between the core and the periphery – there will be a mix of productive activities extremely differentiated to such an extent that Christopher Chase-Dunn identifies “two types of semiperipheral areas. In Type 1 there is a balance of both core and peripheral types of production within the boundaries of a single state. In Type 2 there is a preponderance of intermediate levels of capital-intensive production.” (Chase-Dunn 1990, 2)

Throughout the twentieth century, the semiperipheral economies have been in the process of mastering the second industrial revolution, started during the second half of the nineteenth century in the core of the world-economy and that was characterized by: the discovery and the massive utilization of sources of energy never seen before (like gas or petroleum); the emergence of new and improved techniques of production, thanks to progresses in electricity and mechanics (especially related to the internal combustion engine and the mechanic refrigeration); the emergence of new industries, like the chemical, the metallurgical or the automotive; the electrification; the invention of the telephone and the amplification of the telegraph; and also the mass production of consumer goods. In the actual context, in addition to control the second industrial revolution, the semiperipheral economies launched the path towards the third industrial revolution (Rifkin 2012), which is led nowadays by the core economies.

Now, with regard to the global chains of production, the semiperipheral economies have access to, are part of and enjoy their usufructs, but are not able to control the access to the most profitable gains. The core States and their enterprises are the ones which dominate the more profitable chains and the strategic nodes⁵ of the whole world-economy through an aggressive and expansive mercantilist policy. Differently, the semiperipheral states practice

⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein explains that “the activities of the more profitable nodes have tended to be geographically concentrated in a few, relatively small areas of the world-economy, which we may call collectively the core zone. The less profitable nodes tend to have their units of economic activity more geographically dispersed, most of these units being located in a much larger area we may call the peripheral zone.” (Wallerstein 2008, 106)

self-assuring economic policies, in order to keep themselves in the semiperiphery, and defensive policies, in order to conserve the conquered markets and avoid to be marginalized towards the periphery.

In respect to their national economies, Giovanni Arrighi and Jessica Drangel add that the semiperipheral states “(1) export the most diverse kind of products, (2) are characterized by the most diverse wage levels (and, in as far as we can tell, profit margins), and (3) pursue the most diverse policies toward the internal and world markets.” (Arrighi and Drangel 1986, 14) For that matter, it is possible to point out, firstly, that in the semiperipheral economies are not characterized by the exports the primary, secondary or tertiary goods, but by the incursion in all kinds of industries without, however, be part of the vanguard in any of them nor control the nodes of the most profitable chains of production; secondly, that the people’s income is, on average, of a medium level – in such a way that “should have a GNP *per capita* which is roughly intermediate in the distribution of cross-national comparisons” (Chase-Dunn 1990, 19) – and the consumer levels are equally average, though all of them with large distributive inequalities; third, that there is not a development model in the semiperiphery, but that there is a diverse myriad of strategies, options and paths.

For Edward Kick and Byron Davis, the intermediate situation of the semiperiphery in the world-economy would be then perpetuated by “(a) its economic domination over the periphery, which includes the exchange of finished goods for raw material products, and (b) its economic dependence on the core through foreign investment.” (Kick and Davis 2001, 1563) Hence the semiperipheral economies are subject to much stress and competence, more than any other area of the world-economy. In the words of Kees Terlouw, “the semiperiphery maximizes the necessity and lack of development” (Terlouw 2003, 77), in such way that it becomes at the same time viable and plausible that “new organizational forms, activities with very different logics of operation, are likely to emerge first in semiperipheral areas where both core and peripheral forms are combined and development is subjected to very contradictory forces.” (Chase-Dunn 1988, 34)

1.3. State apparatus in process of modernization

Immanuel Wallerstein clearly identifies two elements constituents of the modern world-system: on one hand, the world-economy in which each zone has its specific assigned roles; and, on the other hand, the political activity that “occurred primarily within the framework of states which, as a consequence of their different roles in the world-economy were structured differently” (Wallerstein 2003a, 229).

The *raison d'être* of the state has been and is to assure the survival of its national society (argument that has been perpetuated in the idea of sovereignty). However, in the last decades, the security has been seen in an increasingly broader way, interlinking it with the idea of human development. Rightly, “when problems like welfare or progress are raised, we tend to look to the development policies” (Barkin and Lemus 2011, 112) and, in this sense, results in state obligation not only to guarantee security, but also all the means possible so that its citizens are able to enjoy a long, healthy and decent life.

That said, a capable and competent state apparatus is essential to social development. In that regard, Immanuel Wallerstein notes that “The tax revenue enables the state to have a larger and more efficient civil bureaucracy and army which in turn leads to greater tax revenue” (Wallerstein 2003a, 500) in a process that continues *in crescendo*, though that phenomenon can also be observed in the other direction, that is to say,

“in those states in which the state machinery is weak, the state managers do not play the role of coordinating a complex industrial-commercial-agricultural mechanism. Rather they simply become one set of landlords amidst others, with little claim to legitimate authority over the whole. (Wallerstein 2003a, 501)

A semiperipheral state would, then, show intermediate governmental and bureaucratic aspects between fortress and debility, “while experiencing colossal transitions in national institutions and human capital outcomes.” (Kick and Davis 2001, 1563)

In respect to the state apparatus that are found in the semiperiphery, the direct and immediate interest is that of economic and social control, including in a much stronger way than in the core, where there are strong and historically consolidated state apparatus, or in the periphery, practically devoid

of them. Christopher Chase-Dunn explains that “whether leftist or rightist, upwardly mobile semiperipheral countries tend to employ more state-directed and state-mobilized development policies than do core countries.” (Chase-Dunn 1990, 5) It means that, due to the blend of capitalist activities in the semiperiphery, development and governmental policies with very opposite interests have surged, though – in their majority – characterized by the state control.

Notwithstanding such controlling vocation, the semiperipheral states’ apparatuses are inefficient in terms of tax revenue capitation, which has the consequence of currently lacking liquidity in order to guarantee social welfare. Besides, being the institutions⁶ fundamental to bring lawfulness and legitimacy to the actions made by States, the insolvency of governments’ apparatuses restricts and relaxes the modernization processes of their national institutions, which opens the door to corruption, impunity and illegality. It is worth noting that a state arbitrarily exerting its authority and systematically violating the rights of its national society not only brings internal volatility and instability, but also deteriorates its own image before the world, being susceptible to international interference and pressure.

As alerted by Peter Taylor and Colin Flint, the opportunities of change that are produced in the system “are connected to the political processes that are very important when it is time to triumph or fail in the world-economy.” (Taylor and Flint 2002, 22) Thus, semiperipheral states are in the checkpoint where two different paths emerge: to advance their democratic processes, the enhancement of their governmental institutions, the protection of human rights, that is to say, to aim the conformation of state apparatuses similar to the ones from core States; or to see themselves incapacitated to keep the rule of law, to move backwards towards the arbitrary exercise of authority and human

⁶ According to Martín Krause, institutions are understood as “norms that allow us to coordinate the actions of every individual in society, the ones that give us the predictability in respect to the actions of everybody else. Customs and practices origin expectations, which in turn guide people’s actions, and these practices that one expects to observe are what is normally known as law. The authority of (or the support to) a legal system ultimately derivates from the feeling that it is ‘right’ due to the fact that it matches the expectations.” (Krause 2007, 7)

rights violations, to decrease their institutional quality – in sum, to subsume in the processes of peripheralization.

In respect to their resources' protection, Kees Terlouw adds that the “combination of lax regulation and strong developmental pressures makes the semiperiphery vulnerable to ecological destruction.” (Terlouw 2003, 77)

1.4. Socioeconomic inequality and internal disparity

In the semiperipheral societies coexist welfare levels comparable to the ones from core societies, with peripheral circumstances of precariousness and lag. Huge socioeconomic inequality is definitely one of the features, but also one of the main problems that hunt semiperipheral societies.

Nonetheless, the inequality displayed by this countries is not just a inequality of grosses between different social classes, but also the existence of monumental disparities of development and welfare between different intrastate spatial zones: between urban and rural areas, between commercial/financial centers and undeveloped suburbs, between residential neighborhoods and shanty towns, etc. And, despite the fact that the national state is the most important entity when of studying global and international phenomena, Kees Terlouw underlines that “the world-system is characterized by semiperipheral development at different scales, periods and types of social space” (Terlouw 2003, 72). Semiperipheral states are usually treated as “a whole”, and this is the reason why, in order to better understand the specificities and dynamics of the semiperiphery, it is important to analytically break into the subnational scales of the state.

The research network GaWC distances itself from the traditional statecentric perspective of International Relations in order to aim a global analysis of the world focused on the cities. According to GaWC,

“cities are assessed in terms of their advanced producer services using the interlocking network model. Indirect measures of flows are derived to compute a city's network connectivity – this measures a city's integration into the world city network.” (Globalization and World Cities Research Network s.d.)

This way, research network GaWC finds out that metropolis show different approaches and repercussions in the globalization processes. Thus,

each city of the world receives a category that rates them as a Alpha (Alpha ++, Alpha +, Alpha and Alpha -), Beta (Beta +, Beta and Beta -) and Gamma (Gamma +, Gamma and Gamma -).

The semiperipheral states have managed to project and position a number of cities in the Alpha category, keeping a strong interconnection with the big metropolis and capitals of the core through this achievement; on the other hand, such Alpha cities from the semiperiphery display relative lags on infrastructure, as well as strong socioeconomic contrasts both in the interior and the geographically nearby zones, though.

All these strong disparities and inequalities convert to the semiperiphery in geographical zones of much social stress and natural spaces to the birth of alternative and anti-systemic movements. For Christopher Chase-Dunn:

“more stratified semiperipheries are likely to produce social revolutions which challenge the logic of capitalism, while relatively less stratified and politically liberal semiperipheries can achieve the degree of class harmony necessary for upward mobility within the capitalist world-economy.” (Chase-Dunn 1990, 9)

1.5. Attractive and influent (not dominant) geoculture

What is understood by geoculture? In response, Immanuel Wallerstein writes:

“Some describe geoculture as the superstructure of such world-economy. Personally, I rather think about that behind the latter’s scenes, the most hidden part, and thus the hardest to value, but whose existence makes it subsist. I call it ‘geoculture’ as an analogy to geopolitics not because it means a supralocal or supranational aspect, but because it represents the cultural mark inside the one which operates the world-system.” (Wallerstein 2007, 23)

Dominant geoculture has been characterized by the diffusion of the liberal ideals as universal values and the promotion of market with worldwide scope. However, such geoculture is found – since the 1968 revolutions – questioned, weakened and currently in crisis.

As well as modernity allowed thinking the joint emancipation of traditions or ideologies inherited and not problematized by the Middle Age, the

decline of the modern era – that would evolve and deepen throughout the second half of the Twentieth Century – is distinguished because of: a bet on the individual progress, where the only possible revolution will be the interior; the birth of huge critiques and changes respect to religion; the search for the immediatism and the disappearance of idealisms; questions on the modern sciences and the positivism as true knowledge generators; the emergence of a cult to technology and “informationalism” (Castells 2005a, 27-53); a desacralization of politics and loss of faith on leaders; capitalism evolving from a production economy to a consumer economy; communication ceasing to give importance to content of messages and valuing the way of emission; mass media becoming transmitters of “truth” and powerful instruments of power; and a revaluation of nature and the environment. These are some significant points. But it is within this context, where the geocultural values cover a significant importance, mostly because

“When the local strata are threatened by any incipient class-consciousness of lower strata, emphasis on local culture serves well to deflect local internal conflict, creating instead local solidarity against the outside. If, in addition, these local dominant strata feel themselves oppressed by higher strata of the world-system, they are doubly motivated to pursue the creation of a local identity.” (Wallerstein 2003a, 497)

Now, how is the given geoculture diffused and disseminated? Some media escape the state, like the cinematographic industry that form the entertainment sectors, for example; however, there are other media that depend directly on the state funds and are part of public policies. In this way, dominant geoculture has been developed in almost exclusively by the core States that own such media.

Nonetheless, the largest and most developed semiperipheral states have achieved throughout the decades projecting alternative geocultural values that also result encouraging – both for core and peripheral societies –, but are unable to be dominant in the world-system.

1.6. Discordant social forces

The semiperipheral societies are characterized by being meeting and discordance points between centralizing and peripheralizing social forces.

From the social and human development point of view, semiperipheral societies find themselves in an intermediate point between the core and the periphery: in comparison to the periphery, most part of semiperiphery is more educated, healthier and more advanced technologically; however, in respect to the core, semiperiphery shows huge gap and considerable lags concerning welfare and development levels.

According to Fernand Braudel, one of the simplest criteria to identify the importance between different zones of the world-economy is “the presence or otherwise, in a given region, of colonies of foreign merchants. If he rules the roost in a given city or region, the foreign merchant is a sign of the inferiority of that city or region, compared with the economy of which he is the representative or emissary.” (Braudel 1984, 22-23) The semiperipheral zones, finding themselves in an intermediate situation from the international division of labor and the geographical points of view, work as natural spaces of migrants’ attraction, both from the core and the periphery. With the same wording, Mattheu Mahutga and David Smith suggest that “semiperipheral countries are more attractive places for industrial migration than the core and peripheral countries.” (Mahutga and Smith 2011, 258)

Core agents that migrate to semiperiphery contribute to the decentralization and the replacement of resources towards more profitable areas. Such mobilization goes on supported of a willing to control – by the core agents side – societies and the governmental decisions that, however, is not that fundamental as it is in periphery due to the fact that in semiperiphery exists a strong national bourgeoisie supported by controlling governments.

By their own part, peripheral agents that migrate to semiperiphery proceed aiming to reach the core zones of the world-economy. Nonetheless, the physical and policy barriers raised by core States end up stopping the migratory fluxes, stagnating them in the semiperiphery and, therefore, allowing them to be absorbed by these zones. This process – allied to many others – makes the semiperipheral growth “grows faster than both the core and the periphery – corresponding to a particular phase in long term Kondratieff cycles of world-economic expansion and contraction” (Mahutga and Smith 2011, 258)

1.7. Complementary actors in the world-system governance

According to Peter Taylor and Colin Flint, the semiperipheral positioning between core and periphery is “more political than economic, once it is the intermediate crucial zone in the spatial structure” (Taylor and Flint 2002, 22), and therefore “the structural position of semiperiphery necessarily implies the presence of stronger global links than the peripheral ones.” (Kick and Davis 2001, 1563)

Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães considers that the objective of the core States is “to guarantee that their political, military and economic developments do not affect their local, regional and global interests” (Pinheiro Guimarães 2004, 17). Certainly the core States – simultaneously – compete and help each other for the geopolitical control and geoeconomic exploitation of the world-system. In order to do that, they rely on the semiperipheral States, entities that find themselves in a geographically intermediate position, so that they operate as unpopular spaces in the contention of pressure coming from the periphery towards the core. However, it does not erase the importance of semiperiphery in the world-system governance.

Differently from the core states, the semiperipheral states lack high welfare and socioeconomic development levels, which stop them – at least in the short and medium run – to guarantee global public goods and to determine a totally favorable political climate for their own interests in a global level.

Nonetheless, the semiperipheral states count on huge and dynamic national markets, sufficient territorial extensions, large armies and considerable levels of commercial interchange. It allows them – besides guaranteeing their territorial protection and preventing invasion attempts – creating infrastructural projects inside and outside their frontiers, ideating socioculturally in regional spaces, exercising leadership and eventually supremacy among their neighbors, impelling integration systems and deploying a proactive foreign policy in defense of the regional interests.

It is worth to advert that, even though they do not find themselves in position to politically and militarily compete for the world-system supremacy, the quick rising of some semiperipheral states in the international structure and their revisionist attitude have been stimulating some core states “to institute wide economic aid and military assistance programs whilst providing

conventional and non-conventional weapons to core-inclined regimes” (Kick and Davis 2001, 1564), in a try to coopt those States and to reduce their growing regional and global influences.

1.8 Significant transforming potential

In terms of changeable potential, it is the semiperiphery the most relevant and crucial area, because “the core States can convert into semiperipheral ones and the semiperipheral into peripheral” (Wallerstein 2003a, 493), in such way that this area “plays an important role in the mobility of the world-system” (Terlouw 2003, 72). Moreover, according to Christopher Chase-Dunn the semiperipheral states and regions “are unproportionally the locus of huge social changes agents” (Chase-Dunn 1988, 57) and the space where “interesting political movements are more likely to emerge” (Chase-Dunn 1990, 9).

In order to explain the happening of such semiperipheral areas, Immanuel Wallerstein proposes two answers in the first volume of “The Modern World-System”: that they can correspond to zones that “had been core-areas of earlier versions of a given world-economy” (Wallerstein 2003a, 492), that is to say, “antique central areas in evolution towards peripheral structures” (Wallerstein 2003a, 144); or they could “had been peripheral areas that were later promoted, so to speak, as a result of the changing geopolitics of an expanding world-economy” (Wallerstein 2003a, 492).

The previous idea is continued and amplified by Immanuel Wallerstein in the second volume of the same work – published for the first time in 1980 under the title of “Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750” – in which his objective is to study the process of the consolidation of the world system. Here, it is explained that the changes in relative economic strength “can be viewed (and indeed most often are viewed) as a sort of upward or downward ‘mobility’ of the state as an entity, a movement measured in relation to other states within the framework of the interstate system” (Wallerstein 2003b, 247). Thus, “semiperiphery would not be a fixed position, but a country’s promotion/relegation point” (Domingues 2012, 18), once “there are no semiperipheral processes; more specifically, the word ‘semiperiphery’ applies directly to zones, regions or States where the processes of the core or the periphery do not prevail” (Taylor and Flint 2002, 22).

Hence, two polarizing forces that drag semiperipheral zones to different directions are confirmed: on one hand, dynamics of peripherality that subordinate such zones to the needs of the core States; and, on the other hand, the state efforts to keep itself at an intermediate point of the hierarchic continuum and – eventually – be able to contest a place in the core-areas of the system. The structural positions in the world-system are evidently transitory and temporary, and though significant promotion/relegation changes might happen, they are only observed in the *moyenne durée* and *longue durée* periods.

The semiperiphery, most dynamic zone of transit, interconnection and fluxes, finds itself determined and influenced by core processes in the same way that it finds itself affected and intervened by peripheral processes; this is the reason why some semiperipheral states – and just a few of them – can be boosted towards the core, or as well restrained and dragged towards periphery. As pointed by Peter Taylor and Colin Flint, “the opportunities for change are produced during periods of recession, but they are very limited, once the whole semiperiphery cannot be converted into a core zone” (Taylor and Flint 2002, 22). And it is during the turning points of the Kondratieff Cycles that such periods of recession and possible structural change are more clearly posed (Kondratieff 1946).

2. Semiperipheral nature of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC)

Parallel to the evolution of the world-system theory there has been a spurt to empirically differentiate and identify zones and countries of the core-semiperiphery-periphery countries. Among such essays, it is necessary to highlight the works of: David Snyder and Edward Kick as the first effort to bring an empirical support – based on the commercial fluxes, the military interventions, the diplomatic interchanges and the membership in international treaties – for the structural positions theoretically proposed (Snyder and Kick 1979); of Roger Nemeth and David Smith who, in opposition to the orthodox tripartite division, propose four different structural positions – core, strong semiperiphery, weak semiperiphery and periphery – in the world-economy (Nemeth and Smith 1985); of Edward Kick and Byron Davis who, besides the core-periphery categorization, also dissert on a high semiperiphery – what they called a semicore – and a low semiperiphery (Kick and Davis 2001); and, more

recently, of Matthew Mahutga and David Smith who suggest other categories, like: core, core competitors, high-level semiperiphery, strong periphery, weak periphery and weakest periphery (Mahutga and Smith 2011).

As observed, it is the “intermediate” part of the world-system the one which raises more problems and difficulties at the time of empirical identification. Moreover, once the 20th Century was the period when the group of States typically identified as semiperipheral “has experienced social and economic transformations of long range, often associated to political convulsions” (Arrighi and Drangel 1986, 10), it is more complicated to precise exactly until what extent they have surpassed, maintained or diminished their intermediate status.

In spite of this complication, there is a broad consensus in the academy about the semiperipheral situation of countries like: Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Turkey, that is to say, States that have also been labeled as regional powers (Rocha Valencia and Morales Ruvalcaba 2011).

Regarding the group of semiperipheral countries and regional powers, the so-called BRIC members are the ones which have developed the most fastened and profound processes of structural ascension in the past two decades. That understood, and bearing in mind the theoretical cuts aforementioned, the paper will advance in the study of the semiperipheral nature of each one of these countries.

2.1. Brazil

Brazil can be labeled as a semiperipheral nation state and a regional power *par excellence*. André Gunder Frank already wrote in the 1970s: “Brazil has been by far the most spectacular and widely considered intermediate, semiperipheral and ‘associated’ or ‘sub-imperialist’ development in the Third World since the contemporaneous world crisis” (Gunder Frank 1979, 290).

Brazil finds itself experiencing profound core and peripheral dynamics at the same time because, on one hand, it has been historically linked to the great European centers of political and economic power thanks to its huge endowment of natural resources and area; but, simultaneously, it lies geographically in the periphery of the world-economy. Therefore, Brazil is one of the most representative cases of semiperiphery.

In the words of Maurício Domingues,

“(…) out of the Latin American countries, Brazil was the one that has gone further in its industrialization process. Since the beginnings of the 20th Century, a lightweight industry has developed surrounding the most dynamic commodity (mainly coffee) exporter centers, a second sector economy was established and, with the Vargas-U.S. agreement, it managed to import and little by little to dominate the steel technology already in the 1930s. Along with India, it was the sole country to develop a tool machine sector, that is to say, machines that produce machines, even if at a low sophistication level. Brazil, despite its high internal inequality, at some point seemed to get close to the control of basic technology of the second phase of modernity and its second industrial revolution.” (Domingues 2012, 28-29)

This is stated from the economic and industrial points of view. Nonetheless, the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution meant an emblematic moment for Brazil – at its transit process to democratization and consolidation of governmental institutions – from the political point of view. The new constitutional order was instituted thanks to a strong national frustration emerged from the differences between the project of government articulated by the military dictatorship (1964-1985) and the aspirations of society, in such manner that the 1988 Constitution acquired fundamental importance in the reshaping of the relations between state, market and civil society.

The year of 1987 was marked by the rollout of the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly presented, *grosso modo*, a conservative profile in moral questions and a progressive one in economic questions (it is worth mentioning that, though a minority, the progressive parties were able to approve many of their demands thanks to the support of social movements, universities, professional associations and trade unions). The conclusive result was, on the one hand, a constitution that embodied the human and social rights’ guarantees along with the formal sociopolitical equality; and, on the other hand, a demonstration of institutional maturity of the country in a redemocratization moment and a historical experience that represented a milestone in the Brazilian political history⁷.

⁷ Besides that, the 1988 Constitution aimed to surpass the pendulum movement between centralism and federalism, which finally transformed the municipalities in autonomous federative entities, but only in

Ever since Brazil has been able to internationally project attributes like political values, an active foreign policy and its cultural allures. As part of the geoculture of the South American giant, it is also possible to mention “the joy of Brazilian carnival and also of its favorite sport, football, is a milieu and a message of government and companies in their conviction strategy” (Branco Luiz and Heleno 2011, 43).

Despite these achievements, Brazil internally faces difficult socioeconomic challenges that need to be dealt with in order to improve its structural position in the International System. Differently from China, India and even South Africa, which have vigorously grown in the past few years, the Brazilian development has been intermittent, so that its economic performance has been more characterized by the discontinuous growth of its GDP and of its commercial exchange between the country and the rest of the world.

Besides, Brazil still suffers – since many decades ago – of large corruption, inequality, socioeconomic exclusion, deforestation, racism, violence and insecurity. Nowadays, Brazil retains the position of one of the most unequal countries of the world and a rough third part of its population lives in poverty. However, in the search for a solution to all these problems and the consequent Brazilian international prominence, two different streams of thinking and social forces have been confronting each other, according to Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães: one, represented by Barão do Rio Branco, Getúlio Vargas, Juscelino Kubitschek, Celso Furtado, Ernesto Geisel, Lula da Silva, Celso Amorim

“and the patriots who understood the need to promote the country’s industry, to build, expand and integrate its internal market, to develop the technological capacity, to diversify its foreign affairs and to reduce its vulnerability and

regard to subjects of local interest. Since 1988, the Brazilian state has been built over: a presidential system whose titular enjoys important faculties, a bicameral legislative system with symmetrical powers (the deputies are elected through proportional representation system, while the senators through the majority rule), a robust federation (whose levels – Union, States and Municipalities – enjoy significant autonomy) and a detailed and modern constitution with clear procedures for amendments. This political system tends, on one side, to disperse considerably the institutional power between many political powers; but, on the other side, it also tends to concentrate the political power in the ends of the Head of the Executive and to strength the presidential character of the state.

dependence in relation to the so-called great powers, ex-colonial metropolis or neocolonial metropolis.” (Pinheiro Guimarães 2004, 15)

And the other stream – with exponents like Visconde de Mauá, Gaspar Dutra, Collor de Mello and Fernando Henrique Cardoso –, which advocates that

“the Brazilian insertion should be made through its comparative advantages in terms of: soil and climate; privileges to foreign capital, companies and technology; overestimation of the monetary stability and free exchange, from the point of view that Brazil must accept a secondary and respectful role in relation to the great powers, an unarmed and discrete country, conscious of its power scarcity and cultural inferiority.” (Pinheiro Guimarães 2004, 15)

These streams of thought have had a strong influence respect to the internal development and to the formulation of strategies in Brazil’s foreign policy, prevailing the nationalist and developmentalist stream in the last decade. Therefore, Brazil has been playing a relatively more autonomous mediation role⁸ recently thanks to its sub-regional strategy of integration and consolidation: first, creating a strategic alliance with Argentina through the signature of the Integration, Cooperation and Development Treaty; second, promoting the constitution of Mercosur; third, supporting the formation of a South America Free Trade Area; and, finally, working for the creation of the Union of South American Nations. The efforts made by this foreign policy have been oriented towards the improvement of its bargaining power as a regional spokesman, the international recognition of its regional power status and a subtle shift of the balance of power to Latin America.

⁸ One of the examples of mediation can be found at the “role played by Brazil’s foreign policy in the creation of the ‘Group of Friends of Venezuela’ and the disarticulation of the coup process started to oust the president Hugo Chávez in the beginning of 2003” (Fernandes 2004, 7), which mitigated the risk of a civil war and helped the fulfillment of a popular referendum for the *Chavista* regime. A more recent example is observed when Brazil – along with a group of semiperipheral nation states – form a multilateral stabilization force (named MINUSTAH) through UNSC Resolution 1542. Before this unprecedented composition of mediation states, Ricardo Steinfus has considered a historical feat to be able to find ourselves in the beginning of a new stage of mediation and, in case of the solidary Brazilian diplomacy “getting to reap rewards in Haiti, a new mediation and intervention model will emerge. It will be an *austral* option capable of creating a new alternative to conflicts involving states in the path of development” (Steinfus 2007, 14).

In order to Brazil to continue a structural ascension process in world-system, it is imperative that this South American colossus is capable to deploy and to defend global interest, as well as to assume diversified agendas and positions, without bending to a sole partner.

2.2. Russia

Russia has been historically considered a semiperipheral state. Inclusive, Immanuel Wallerstein – in the first volume of its “The Modern World-System” – wrote: “when Russia is absorbed in the future by the world-economy, it enters as a semiperipheral state (like the 1600s-1700s Spain) and not as a peripheral one” (Wallerstein 2003a, 445).

It was perhaps during the existence of the Soviet Union (1922-1991) that an important national industry, a commercial link to the world, the diffusion of an alternative way to capitalism were developed, thus approaching it to the center of the world-system. Nonetheless, problems like the increase of public deficits, the lack of competitiveness of the national economic structures, the coercion of masses, the suppression of certain political rights, the generalized corruption, insecurity, difficulties to “assimilate informationalism” (Castells 2005c, 407) and, finally, the economic dependence on natural resources like gas and petroleum stopped Soviet Union from the consolidation at the core of the world-system. In respect to this process, Christopher Chase-Dunn is right to note that the formation of semiperipheral states “has frequently been recognized as a phenomenon related to the rise and the fall of empires and the shift of hegemony within interstate systems” (Chase-Dunn 1988, 36). According to Carlos Aguirre, the USSR only managed briefly “to improve its position within the world-system, increasing its international presence and its own relative autonomy, and provisionally creating an independent space for development” (Aguirre Rojas 2003, 59), but never managed to present itself as a serious contender before the U.S. for the global hegemony.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the foundation of the Russian Federation, a state that remained economically, politically and militarily reduced since its origins, and that stood in structural decline towards periphery until the end of the 1990s. With the advent of Vladimir Putin in the presidency in 2000, Russia entered a process of political restructuring – named “vertical of power” – that helped the state to conquer a leading role at the

conduction and dynamics of the national economy. Since then, and until the 2008 Crisis, the Russian economy has steadily grown at average rates of 6.95% and 7.31% in terms of its GDP and GDP per capita, respectively.

The Russian economic dynamism has helped: the promotion of a progressive presence of Russia in its neighbors and Europe, especially in the energetic field; the geocultural propagation, through the promotion of language and the penetration of Russian media; and, finally, the political leadership and the creation of regional institutions, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (in 2001) in dialogue with China; the Common Economic Space (in 2003) with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine; and the Collective Security Organization Treaty (also in 2003) with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia.

2.3. India

After 9/11, no region of the world has gained as much importance as South Asia⁹. For India, this new international context – added to domestic changes like the military growth and the transformations related to the political culture – permitted it to “give shape to a series of triangular strategic relations involving a myriad of both traditional and non-traditional powers” (Kapur 2006, 203), projecting itself as one of the biggest pan-Asian powers of recent years.

However, and not so long ago, India was part of the periphery of the world-system. Since the 16th Century, Portuguese, Dutch, French and finally British submitted India to processes of peripheralization. It wasn't until the 1990s that

“India opened up to foreign countries, allowing a freer installation of companies, whilst the financial sector continued, since the 1980s nationalization, in the hands of the state. The country, primarily counting on its Science & Technology resources, bet on microelectronics, which did not work well, and informatics, which ended up becoming a national pride as the area through which the country's ascension to an

⁹ Or Southern Asia. Though it has never been a coherent geopolitical region, from the geographical point of view it consists on the sum of the Iranian Plateau and the Indian Subcontinent. It encompasses Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

emergent position was substantiated, besides high growth rates that covered all the economy. In fact, India was able to attain a global semiperipheral position thanks to the project and modernizing turn launched by Nehru, with important industrial sectors (automobile, pharmaceuticals, steel), and was also able to penetrate the software industry like few other countries in the world.” (Domingues 2012, 41)

At present, India is enrolled in the *monster country* category (Kennan 1994, 143) or as “elephant country” (Fossaert 1994, 336-341) because of its territorial extension and population, and projected as one of the main economic powers for the 21st Century thanks to the vertical development showed in the last decades. Nonetheless, India’s growth is not exclusively limited to the economic-commercial scope, but also exceeds it to political and cultural aspects. According to André Gunder Frank, India “perhaps has the most sophisticated and independent bourgeoisie of the Third World” (Gunder Frank 1979, 312).

With its more than 1.2 billion inhabitants and consisting of a parliamentary democracy, India has been characterized as the largest democracy of the world. This image, coupled with its ancestral culture, has contributed for India to exercise a significant influence in Asia and the rest of the world. In the terms of Shashi Tharoor, ex-Under-Secretary General of the United Nations and member of the Indian Parliament,

“India’s is a civilization that, over millennia, has offered refuge and, more importantly, religious and cultural freedom, to Jews, Parsis, several varieties of Christians, and Muslims. [...] Indian mind has been shaped by remarkably diverse forces: ancient Hindu tradition, myth and scripture; the impact of Islam and Christianity; and two centuries of British colonial rule. The result is unique. Though there are some who think and speak of India as a Hindu country, Indian civilization today is an evolved hybrid. We cannot speak of Indian culture today without qawwali, the poetry of Ghalib, or for that matter the game of cricket, our de facto national sport. When an Indian dons ‘national dress’ for a formal event, he wears a variant of the sherwani, which did not exist before the Muslim invasions of India. When Indian Hindus voted recently in the cynical and contrived competition to select the ‘new seven wonders’ of the modern world, they voted for the Taj Mahal constructed by a Mughal king, not for Angkor Wat, the most magnificent architectural product of their religion. In the breadth (and not just the depth) of its cultural heritage lies some of India’s soft power.” (Tharoor 2009)

India's geoculture continues to expand itself widely and profoundly, especially in the direction of South and Southeast Asia, thanks to its huge diaspora, to the fact that it does not have any border disputes with them and, above all, to its very appreciated cultural products and values (music, cinema, television series, yoga, technology, gastronomy, etc.).

However, in spite of the increasing weight of India in the world-system, its situation remains semiperipheral. Inside the country, discrimination, violations to human rights by the hands of the state (specifically, by the police and the army), impunity, use of torture, death penalty, poverty, social inequality, lack of infrastructure, generalized corruption and ethnical disputes prevail – all of them problems that will hardly be solved in the short and/or medium term. Hence, it results hazardous “to think that India will be capable to surpass its clearly semiperipheral position in the next years” (Domingues 2012, 41).

2.4. China

The real and latent possibility of that some semiperipheral states could position themselves in the core of the world-system and eventually dispute the U.S. hegemony in the 21st Century has created much interest and speculation, being China the center of all of these discussions. However, from the *longue durée* perspective, it can be assumed that China does not emerge to occupy an outstanding post in the world-system, but “re-emerges” and win back a post that was of its centuries ago.

Janet Abu-Lughod – who rebuilds the shape of the world-system in the 13th Century – sustains that such period was known for the important economic developments of China:

“the breakup of estates, the rise of capitalistic-cure-state commerce, significant technological and social inventions that mark the beginning of a new industrial phase with highly developed metallurgy, and a new phase of long distance trade complete with banking, instruments of credit, and even paper money.” (Abu-Lughod 1987-1988, 16)

The socio-economic, political and military development of China during this period was outstanding and more advanced than in Europe.

However, Chinese defeats at the Opium Wars (between 1839-1842 and 1856-1860) and at the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the end of the Qing Dynasty – with the abdication of the Emperor Xuantong in 1912 –, the posterior attempt to form the unfruitful Republic of China (1912-1949) and, finally, the beginning of the Civil War in 1927 and its prolonging until 1950 made China to fall from the core to the semiperiphery and, later, to the periphery of the world-system. It was thanks to its millenary culture, tough nationalism and inextinguishable vocation to be a great power that China could keep itself cohesive and was able to survive to the most ruthless peripheralizing forces. In this sense, Christopher Chase-Dunn argues that

“China was never completely peripheralized, though areas within China were. The civilizational strength of China enabled her to resist colonization by the West and to rebuild political unity and military strength within the Europe-centered interstate system. China was also one of the most commercialized of the world-empires prior to its incorporation into the capitalist world-economy.” (Chase-Dunn 1990, 27)

Since the arrival of Deng Xiaoping to power and the launch of economic reforms in the end of the 1970s, China has managed to grow constantly between 1978-2011 in an average rate of 9.97% of its GDP and of 8.84% of its GDP per capita, becoming the nation a development paradigm. China has also created a whole independent model of development that has been named Beijing Consensus, which – opposite to the neoliberal program proposed by the Washington Consensus – is featured, according to Joshua Cooper Ramo, by

“It is defined by a ruthless willingness to innovate and experiment, by a lively defense of national borders and interests, and by the increasingly thoughtful accumulation of tools of asymmetric power projection. It is pragmatic and ideological at the same time, a reflection of an ancient Chinese philosophical outlook that makes little distinction between theory and practice.” (Cooper Ramo 2004, 4)

Along with the economic growth and the aforementioned development mode, the Chinese geocultural influence has also increased significantly. In 2005, Joseph Nye has already wrote:

“China has always had an attractive traditional culture, but now it is entering the realm of global popular culture as well. Chinese novelist Gao Xingjian won China's first Nobel Prize for Literature in 2000, and the Chinese film "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon" became the highest grossing non-English film. Yao Ming, the Chinese star of the U.S. National Basketball Association's Houston Rockets, is rapidly becoming a household name, and China is set to host the 2008 Summer Olympics. The enrollment of foreign students in China has tripled to 110,000 from 36,000 over the past decade, and the number of foreign tourists has also increased dramatically to 17 million last year. China has created 26 Confucius Institutes around the world to teach its language and culture, and while the Voice of America was cutting its Chinese broadcasts to 14 from 19 hours a day, China Radio International was increasing its broadcasts in English to 24 hours a day.” (Nye 2005)

However, despite seen itself at present as one of the main contenders for the global hegemony, China is in fact many countries: one developed and cosmopolitan, which is concentrated near the Chinese coast, with provinces like Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guandong, or municipalities like Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin; and another one marginalized and impoverished, located inland, with provinces like Guizhou, Gansu, Yunnan or the autonomous region of Tibet. Ben Derudder finds out that in China

“the three zone-articulations of the inherent spatial inequality within world-economy seem to be represented: an affluent region next to Hong Kong (which could be considered a core-area), regions ‘in development’ next to Beijing and Shanghai (which could be considered semiperipheral) and ‘underdeveloped’ regions in central and western regions of the country (which could be considered peripheral).” (Derudder 2003, 92)

Besides the enormous social inequality within the country, the Chinese development has been permeated by brutal political repression, illicit enrichment of all ranks of the Communist Party, social polarization and environment destruction, not mentioning other aspects. Therefore, it still remains arguable to what extent China has only managed to achieve “the most developed stages of semiperiphery” (Domingues 2012, 39) or has truly approached the core of the world-system.

Conclusions

It might seem that the so-called globalization has pushed humanity into a crisis situation. However, as pointed out by Elmar Altvater and Birgit Manhkopf, only “equipped with the World-System Theory’s scale it is easier to understand the trends of globalization when the world-system’s history is studied, once the globalization is inserted into it” (Altvater and Manhkopf 2002, 14). If the globalization is observed as a dynamics of the world-system, it will be noted that it is certainly not a recent phenomenon, nor of *courte durée*, but a result of processes of *moyenne* and *longue durée*; however – and at the same time – it produces new transformations. Thus, it is the modern world-system what finds itself in a historical moment of crisis and change stimulated certainly by globalization.

With the economic-financial crisis of 2008-09, the global geoeconomic order, which was until then commanded by the Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the U.S.), has started to change substantially. The crisis put in evidence the limitations of the antique club of “largest industrialized economies of the world” in respect to solve energetic, environmental, food and, above all, financial problems. The G7 – that because of strategic reasons has already invited Russia in 2002 – considered, since the Gleneagles Summit in 2005, to invite five remarkable semiperipheral countries: Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. The G8+5 finally resulted in the Group of 20, mechanism of global governance that has been holding meetings since 2008.

Nonetheless, further on a merge of politics and willpower, what prevailed in G20 was the existence of two different blocs: on one side, G7 and other contributing intermediate powers (Rocha Valencia and Morales Ruvalcaba 2008), “advocates of the neoliberal Washington consensus [that] emphasize that it is government interventions that are the source of the problem” (Stiglitz 2011, 16); and, on the other side, the so-called BRIC that – under the label of emergent and in-development economies – have insisted on the necessity of reform the liberal institutions emerged in Bretton Woods “so that they are able to reflect more properly the changes of economic weight in world-economy with the objective of incrementing their legitimacy and effectiveness” (G20 2008, 3).

In the past few years, the BRICS (with the embodiment of South Africa) has institutionalized itself as an international forum that holds presidential summits and ministerial meetings periodically. Within this space, its members are advancing in many ways towards the construction of a more equal and multipolar order, apart from the authority of G7: in December, 2010, they managed to complete the demanded reforms concerning quotas and government structures of the International Monetary Fund, such that “the 10 largest members of the Fund would consist of the United States, Japan, the BRIC countries, and the four largest European countries (France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom)” (Fondo Monetario Internacional 2011, 39); in 2011, they actively participated of the UN Security Council as a permanent member (China and Russia) or as a non-permanent member (Brazil between 2010-11 and India and South Africa between 2011-12); in 2012, they considered “the possibility of creating a new Bank of Development” (BRICS 2012, point 13), financial organism supplementary to the financial institutions directed by G7. Finally, in 2012-13, they modified their contributions to the UN Fund: China increased its quota in 61%, becoming the sixth largest contributor, going from 3.2% to 5.1% of the complete amount; Brazil was the member that, in terms of percentage, assumed the largest compromise, raising its quota in 82%, which represented a change from 1.6% to 2.9% of the fund; and India also increased its contributions, though only in 24%, which represents a modest increase from 0.5% to 0.66% of the global quota.

Perhaps with the exception of China – which has recently achieved extraordinary remarkable levels of structural positioning – the nature of BRICS remains semiperipheral. Despite its limits the BRICS Forum opens a dynamic window in many senses: it can be that at the margin other associations, groups or agreements are consolidated, or that BRICS itself expands and encompasses other regional powers that might compete at a global level, or else jointly form a counterweight to the present blocs and global powers, like the European Union and even to the United States.

The 21st Century will definitely remain a changeable scenario and one can expect that the deepest transformations come from the semiperiphery.

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ABSTRACT

The objective of this investigation is to carry out a broad revision and reconstruction of the concept of semiperiphery, in which the original ideas of Immanuel Wallerstein can be articulated with the developments made by other contemporaneous world-systems theorists. Once this goal is accomplished, the study of the semiperipheral nature – both internal and systemic – of the so-called “BRIC” countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in the international context of Post-Cold War.

KEYWORDS

BRIC; Semiperiphery; Neomarxism.

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LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE COMMUNITY OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STATES

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The creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in February 2010 reconfigures a new step in the process of the regional political concert. Resulting from the convergence of many regional instances, especially the Rio Group and the Latin America and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALC, initials in Spanish), besides increasing aspirations to cooperate, a new mechanism that aims to overcome the subregional level is created to activate multilevel forums and strengthen the tendency to build multidimensional agendas.

For the first time the thirty-three States of the wide Latin American and Caribbean spectrum agreed to conform a regional entity, which affirms distinct strategic goals: first, the geographic inclusion without restrictions (overcoming the divisions between South America and Central America, strengthening the geopolitics of the Latin American union); second, the partnership and inclusion based on the respect to the political plurality (the political regimes or the ideological orientations of their governments do not matter); third, the acceptance of the economic diversity (disparities in the models and levels of development, and in the different schemes of insertion into the international market). This has created a heterogeneous area in political,

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economic and strategic terms, which, added to the greatness of its aspirations, put forward questions on its strengths and weaknesses.

This paper is divided in three parts. In the first one, in which the regional representation or interlocation is going to be highlighted, the general objectives of the community will be analyzed; in the second section the thematic agendas will be the subject, along with their potentialities and limits; and in the third part the external axis drawn by the community to this date will be outlined, along with their obstacles and possibilities. The research ends up with some final considerations of prospective character.

Goals and objectives of CELAC

The Cancun Declaration is the constitutive document of CELAC, approved during the Unity Summit, formed by the XXI Rio Group Summit and the II Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALC), held on February 23, 2010.

In this constitutive document, two primary objects are mentioned: one is strictly referred to the intraregional links and is condensed in the proposal to build “a mutual place to deepen the integration (political, economic, social and cultural); and to determine effective compromises of joint action for the promotion of development.”

The second objective refers to extra-regional relations, that is to say, the possibility to reach a regional voice, to behave as a political actor in the international scenario and, in a certain way, it indicates the political representation and the construction of regional joint power. Aligned with this objective, the Cancun Declaration stresses the “regional aspiration to reassert its presence in the forums of which it is part and to have a voice on the big themes and developments of the global agenda.”

A third objective related to the instrumental utility of CELAC, not mentioned in the Cancun Declaration but incorporated in the December, 2011 Foundational Summit of CELAC held in Caracas, is the protection of democracy and political stability through crisis management. This role was embodied through the Special Declaration on Defense of Democracy and Constitutional Order, thus adopting a clause of democratic compromise.

Actually, the two first objectives are present since the first Latin American Summit on Integration and Development held in Salvador, state of

Bahia, on December 2008, where the States agreed “to deepen the integration, to determine effective compromises of joint action” and stressed the importance of the integration in order to “interact with the rest of the world.”

The new aspect of this initiative is that, even though the regionalism is a clear goal of the project, the objective to strengthen the links with the international arena is expressed with the same intensity. That is to say, the first guideline points out the international behavior, the group representation and the capacity to articulate a regional position. There are many explicit passages in the Cancun Declaration of the Unity Summit that show the priority for this objective: “to constitute a strengthened instance of political concert that support its international position and that could be translated in fast and efficient actions that promote the Latin American and Caribbean interests in front of the new themes of the international agenda”. In the same direction, it has the objective “to promote and project a unified voice for Latin America and the Caribbean in the discussion of the principal issues, and in the positions of the Region on the relevant global events at international meetings and conferences, as well as in the dialogue with other regions and countries”. It basically aspires “to project the region and increase its influence on the international scenario”.

The ideational structure from which CELAC emerges includes narratives inherited by the Latin American legalistic tradition (sovereign equity of states, non-intervention, territorial integrity) when it comes to principles of democracy and human rights defense, and to goals of autonomy and integrated development. To these are added the general principles that configure CELAC as a regime: the recognition of the solidarity, flexibility, gradualism, plurality, complementary actions and unanimity in the decisions and voluntary participation in initiatives.

There are some points of basic understanding that have been consolidated since the start of the construction process of CELAC: the member states consented on a shared vision about the International System configuration, based on a compromise with multilateralism and the United Nations. As confirmed by the I CELAC Summit, held in Santiago de Chile, multilateralism is considered as the foundation of an efficient international order, which could contribute to peace and global security, and was also

declared the explicit disapproval to the application of unilateral measures with extraterritorial effects contrary to the International Law, threatening multilateralism.

In respect to the United Nations, it is stressed the need to create a true reform that guarantees efficiency, transparency, representativeness and democratization inside its main organisms, especially the Security Council. Therefore, it highlights that multilateralism, integral reform of the UN System and democratization of more decisive international instances are the base for regional consensus from which guidelines for external action are fixed, being the axis that promotes global, inclusive and non-discriminatory governance, besides advancing towards a more stable international scenario.

CELAC is viewed as a mechanism to promote the interests of the member countries in multilateral organisms and also as a place where coordinate answers to the principal subjects of the international agenda are facilitated. According to the procedures agreed, CELAC has assumed attributions concerning association and interlocution with other countries and regional blocs, namely: the political dialog with other international intergovernmental actors, organisms and mechanisms; the coordination of common positions in multilateral forums; the impulse for the Latin American and Caribbean agenda in global forums; the regional positioning before relevant events. The *pro tempore* presidency must, particularly, coordinate the annual dialogues with other regional blocs or relevant countries of the international community.

CELAC defines itself as the representative mechanism of Latin America and the Caribbean, and assumes the interlocution with the Latin American and the Caribbean-European Union Summits (EU-LAC) and the Institutionalized Ministerial dialogue between Rio Group and the European Union, as well as the dialogues that Rio Group has maintained with countries or groups in lateral meetings during the UN General Assembly. It will also take charge of the regional representation at other forums that may be created in the future.

Regarding its function of establishing positions and acting coordinately in international meetings, it is interesting to mention the work that has been developed by the Permanent Representatives of the member states of CELAC at the United Nations, where they arranged an internal mechanism of joint

participation in debates of the different commissions where CELAC has presented a consensual position.

The other level of importance in the constitution of CELAC refers to the relation with the other regional initiatives. In this sense, it seeks to consolidate an integrated agenda, based on the Rio Group's legacy and the agreements of the Latin America and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALC), as well as on the existing mechanisms and groups related to integration or consultation (like MERCOSUR, CAN, UNASUR, SICA, CARICOM or ACS) considered a valuable regional asset. The scope and limits of this relationship are based on the principle of complementarity, which supposes that CELAC conducts a permanent dialogue, decides and acts, without overlapping or duplicating other regional and subregional experiences or institutions. From the operational point of view, it is believed that CELAC "should not be seen as an entity that competes with other ones, which have specific missions... and that might find in the first a place for aggregation and a forum for the integration of initiatives"(Rojas Aravena 2012, 26).

Strengths and weaknesses

As a political project, CELAC was pushed forward by two regional powers: Brazil and Mexico, being both countries conditioned by their respective geopolitical spaces and international models of international insertion. Brazil deploys its own regional and global projection policies by the simultaneous formation of different subregional (MERCOSUR, UNASUR, CELAC) and extra-regional (BRIC, IBSA, G20, etc.) blocs. Its objectives are oriented towards regional stability and development, and the creation of international coalitions that cater to "strengthen its international profile and presence (...) and to boost systemic changes towards a less unequal pattern of distribution of power" (Costa Vaz 2012, 176). The Brazilian posture combines "benign leadership", incremental strategy of concentric circles (Gratius and Gomes Saraiva 2013), intergovernmentalism, low regional institutionalization and limited engagement to the resources and costs of integration. The country's objectives related to autonomy and development are combined with a geographic projection towards Latin America and Africa.

Meanwhile, Mexico, which aims to overcome its regional bi-identity crisis (Pellicer 2006) – increasingly embedded in the North American space, yet it is historically, culturally and politically Latin American –, is promoting a project that suits multiple purposes: to strengthen its Latin American membership; to correct a declining regional influence, particularly in South America, where it remained excluded from recent advances in regionalism; to diversify its international presence; and reconcile its outward attitude with the profile and attributes of a middle-power, though without the clear aspirations of a regional power. Every country's objective is related to autonomy and trade, here combined with geographic projections towards Latin America and Asia-Pacific.

Thus CELAC can result functional to the interests of the two regional powers in question. And though a more political approach is essential for progress in this new regional space, the political will of both countries, which was necessary, is not sufficient to strengthen CELAC as the new Latin American multilateralism.

Regarding the reconfiguration of the international order, the general consensus supporting multilateralism cannot hide the nuances. Under the cohesive umbrella implied on the term “multilateralism”, two different models of international insertion can be identified: one is a multilateralism that strengthens the North-South axis (such as trade agreements between Mexico/Central America and the United States, or the progress made in the Alliance of the Pacific and in negotiating the agreements included in the Trans-Pacific Partnership) and the other is a multilateralism that strengthens the South-South axis (mainly led by Brazil in its BRIC and IBSA efforts and summits with Arab countries). Despite the flexibility built into this forum, there are dissents and inconsistencies when externally projecting the region.

The democratization and transparency of United Nations bodies, as well as of other international institutions, finds support in the region, but the reform of the UN Security Council comprehends a key point of regional disagreement. The positions differ and are grouped more or less formally in opposite ad hoc coalitions.

Regional representation is a priority; however, provided that the protection of their own national interests and the dispute over recognition and power could hinder that goal, states have retained the right to nominate

candidates for key positions in the International System whenever CELAC is not able to ratify consensual candidates, making use of flexibility and voluntary participation.

One example of the difficulties concerning regional representation and clashes for leadership underlying this forum is the recent appointment of the Brazilian Roberto Carvalho Azevêdo as Director-General of the World Trade Organization. In the ballot, the candidate defeated the Mexican Herminio Blanco, whom was favored by the European Union. It was certainly a triumph for Brazil, as Azevêdo will be the first Latin American to lead the organization and had the support of 93 among 159 member countries, including the BRICS, major emerging powers. Throughout the voting process, the Brazilian candidate managed to appear as a representative of the South against the North, which would identify with Blanco's profile. Although both candidates were from developing countries, the Mexican is considered one of the architects of NAFTA and is linked with the private sector and liberal positions, supporting bilateral regional agreements, such as the negotiations opened by the European Union, the U.S. and by all Pacific Rim countries, whose rules remain outside WTO. The remarkable thing about the situation is that the selection process had started last December, when nine countries presented their candidacy: South Korea, New Zealand, Jordan, Kenya, Indonesia, Ghana and surprisingly three Latin American candidates: the Minister of Foreign Trade of Costa Rica, Anabel Gonzalez; and the aforementioned Blanco and Azevêdo (El País 2013).

The three candidates from members of CELAC reveal two obstacles: the difficulty to identify which project of reconfiguration of the international organizations represents Latin America and the Caribbean as a region; and, as a second matter, the problems of relinquishing positions in order to strengthen regional representation, making it clear that the associative commitment does not weakens the strife for regional leadership and concentration of power, which may be instrumental to the interests of larger countries.

The principle of regional representation and the steps towards the construction of shared sovereignty are some of the weakest points of this initiative, once the period of socialization, learning and information interchange is not yet consolidated; internalization and compliance of agreements have been rare; and there is a "deficit of certainty regarding the application of the adopted

compromises, which, although binding, are not complied” (Rojas Aravena 2012, 18).

Compared to UNASUR, CELAC presents itself as a further open bet on the international context and oriented towards the external-projection of the region. Though Latin American countries have participated in different biregional dialogue mechanisms, they have so far failed to "articulate a strategic project that allows them to present themselves as an important and united actor on the international stage" (Rojas Aravena 2012, 17) and, bearing in mind the procedures and actions of preexisting forums, it represents a political challenge for the future.

The thematic issues of CELAC

From the point of view of the addressed thematic issues, CELAC is aligned with the multidimensional approach widespread in most recent concepts of regionalism. There are virtually no issues that remain outside the political agenda of CELAC. Their priority action lines are: cooperation between regional and subregional mechanisms of integration (convergence of actions); economic issues (financial crisis, trade, energy, physical infrastructural integration, science and technology); social development (social programs and eradication of hunger and poverty; food security and nutrition; education; health and public services; culture; migration; gender); sustainable development (climate change); natural disasters; human rights; security issues (global drug-related issues, terrorism); and South-South Cooperation.

The action plans reflect the thematic diversity that has characterized integration initiatives of the last decade: on the one hand, they are consistent with the historical legacy inherited from the Rio Group (which throughout its long history has not left any non-discussed subjects); on the other, it becomes a necessary concession to build consensus within a political framework that includes 33 states with different profiles, aspirations and models of integration.

From a broad perspective, the cooperation schemes in South America, such as UNASUR and ALBA-TCP, have been incorporating more social, political aspects than economic and commercial. In contrast, in the initiatives promoted by Mexico and Central America, particularly the Pacific Agreement, the contents of the traditional trade agenda are retaken. Therefore CELAC, as a

place for confluence, must amalgamate expectations, models of integration and different ideas on the priorities of a regional foreign policy.

Limits and scopes

The first concern arisen is referred to the administration, that is to say, the formulation, determination and implementation of concrete proposals in these areas. The members established as a rule the principle of complementarity, i.e. the specific projects will be developed on a subregional sphere and CELAC would work as a vertex of the regional architecture, connecting initiatives whenever possible. At the moment, it is unclear how this link will be conformed. Despite this functional vacuum, this division of tasks is a coherent principle for two reasons: because the administration at subregional level it is more efficient and effective, and because all the proposals, infrastructural or energetic, which by their own nature involve physical and geographical continuity, require subregional implementation, once the states with greater resources are hardly willing to support projects beyond their own territory.

It is a premature exercise to assess the concrete results achieved so far in this forum. But it seems clear that CELAC has been useful as a sounding bloc and as a space that looks over issues related to the particular interests of states. Some examples may illustrate this trend: Statement in Solidarity with Haiti, Special Declaration about Guatemala, the Declaration on the "Malvinas Islands issue", the Declaration of Support for the Yasuni-ITT of Ecuador, the Declaration on the need of ending the economic, commercial and financial blockade of the United States against Cuba, among others.

While CELAC has been the result of a form of collaborative leadership between the two regional powers, Brazil and Mexico, the effectiveness depends on the projection that the rest of the medium-sized countries in the region can generate and the level of associative commitment.

The external axes of CELAC

Since its recent creation, CELAC has launched a series of contacts with organizations and particular states, combining traditional and newer external axes for the region.

The relation with the European Union

The links between Latin American and Caribbean countries and the European Union (EU) have a long history. The bi-regional dialogue reflects guidelines established with base on goals, objectives, activities and expected results. In that sense, it is the most institutionalized and structured channel, which mainly presents progresses in terms of learning and socialization as a result of the negotiations of the successive EU-LAC Summits that have been held since 1999 and more focused initiatives, such as Iberoamerican Summits, organized since 1990.

There is a consolidated agenda that has been built on a long process of negotiations and agreements. At the last summit, held in Santiago (VII LAC-EU Summit and I CELAC-European Union Summit), a work plan for 2013-2015 was agreed, which extends the previous plan that covered the period between 2010 and 2012, including the areas of Gender and Investment & Entrepreneurship for Sustainable Development². The dynamics of this bond is conditioned by structural barriers that have been affecting these relations, as well as circumstantial elements associated to the financial and economic crisis faced by the European bloc. In comparative terms, the link with the EU is the axis of the greatest continuity amongst the previous dialogue schemes, and receives a historical collection of rules, standards and procedural guidelines constructed and accepted by the parties. This knowledge strengthens the national capacities for coordination of positions and may shape other regional approaches.

Besides the European Union, during his first year (2012), CELAC conducted an active international agenda. The Ministerial Troika, composed of the foreign ministers of three countries – the present occupant of the pro tempore presidency, the previous and the next ones –, visited India and China in August 2012.

² The list is completed by: science, research, innovation and technology; sustainable development, environment, climate change and biodiversity; energy; regional integration and interconnectivity to promote social inclusion and cohesion; migration; education and employment to promote social inclusion and cohesion; and the drug-related global issue. See *Plan de Acción 2013-2015* (CELAC-EU).

India

In the visit to New Delhi, the First Ministerial Dialogue between CELAC Troika and India took place. It set as a starting point the definition of common subjects of interest, with the objective to coordinate regional responses, such as the reform of the United Nations, the international financial crisis, climate change and international terrorism. Besides the strictly political issues, the agenda covered issues related to trade, investment, energy, minerals, agriculture, science, technology, culture and education³.

Regarding trade, bearing in mind that trade between India and the region has grown steadily from previous very low levels, it is recognized that opportunities for trade and investment are even greater. In order to seize these opportunities, it was suggested: the participation in trade fairs of each country; the interchange of business delegations; the creation of a regulatory framework; facilitating the flow of goods, services and nationals; and strengthening air connectivity and maritime links. Specifically, they agreed to establish an India-CELAC Business Council and an India-CELAC CEOs Forum, with the intention of keeping regular meetings of these institutional arrangements in order to present recommendations for the deepening of bilateral contacts between India and the region. It was also emphasized the need to conclude bilateral agreements on air services to promote direct air connections between India and CELAC, thus boosting business and tourism.

Regarding energetic security, including renewable energy, India was interested in the mineral endowment of Latin American and Caribbean countries, which could help their growth. On these areas, it was agreed to establish an Energy Forum, which is going to develop strategies to increase the aggregated value of the exchange of raw material through, among other options, the establishment of manufacturing units. The consultation included an offer made by the New Delhi government to provide technical resources for geological study and exploration through the utilization of the Indian satellite technology.

³ See *Declaración de la Primera Reunión Conjunta India-Troika CELAC*, New Delhi, August 07, 2012.

Food security was another issue of common agenda. In addition to the general idea of deepening the cooperation through the establishment of a mutually beneficial partnership in agriculture and food processing, it was examined the possibility of jointly work in agricultural research through institutional linkages. In this regard, the creation of an Agricultural Expert Group was agreed, whose mission will focus on advising Ministers.

On the other hand, the establishment of a Scientific Forum was also concerted, with a joint research program related to medicine, agriculture, agronomy, astronomy, information technology and renewable energy, specifically regarding biofuels and solar, wind and hydroelectric energy. For its part, India offered support for CELAC countries to launch low-cost satellites for communications and weather service. Other projects included areas of tele-education, e-governance and telemedicine. They also agreed on strengthening the cultural and academic links, including Indian Diplomatic Institutes and the counterparts of CELAC members.

In respect to the multilateral agenda, the countries stressed cooperation in the UN and other multilateral forums where they have identified broad common interests. In particular, they strongly rejected terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and agreed to cooperate on the challenge of eliminating the threat of international terrorism, calling the international community for the adoption of a comprehensive agreement on international terrorism as soon as possible. Regarding the climate change issues, the countries highlighted the efforts made at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (RIO+20) to renew political commitment to Sustainable Development and achieve poverty eradication through a balanced integration of economic, social and environmental aspects.

As for the mode of coordination and cooperation, the foreign ministers agreed to deepen the exchange of visits at all levels – including the possibility of a summit meeting – with the aim to create a "Strategic Alliance" between India and CELAC. In this regard, the possibility of alternating annual meetings in India and the country holding the pro-tempore presidency of CELAC was proposed as a guideline.

China

The first visit of CELAC representatives to Beijing was carried on

August 9, 2012. At the meeting, the Ministerial Troika and the Chinese Foreign Ministry agreed on establishing CELAC relations with the Popular Republic of China, constituting a dialogue mechanism at ministerial level to be held once a year in China, in the country of the pro-tempore president of CELAC or in New York, at the UN headquarters⁴, and also concerted to study the possibility of creating a Cooperation Forum in order to boost ties in commercial, energetic, infrastructure and natural resources areas.

The political dialogue follows other channels that have been developed, such as the China-Latin America Business Summits, which organizes its seventh edition this year in Costa Rica. Although China has sought economic agreements with a few individual countries rather than blocs (Malamud and Gardini 2012, 129), the region has a special political importance in its diplomatic dispute with Taiwan, and this is the reason why China has deployed a long-term strategy, which is the cause behind the Chinese participation in IDB, and as a permanent observer in OAS, ALADI and the Latin American Parliament. Though not very active recently, China also maintains dialogue mechanisms with MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and CARICOM (Cornejo and Navarro García 2010, 86).

The importance of China in shaping the international trade matrix of the region has been widely highlighted. However, this process begun in the early 1990s with very low levels of trade exchange, reached the top positions of commercial partnership in Latin America, mainly in South America, with an asymmetric impact, generating different perceptions in the region. Latin America and the Caribbean, as a whole, maintain a negative balance in the trade with China due to the increasing trade deficit of Mexico and Central America. In contrast, the South American national economies displayed fairly even trade balances over the past ten years (Rosales and Kuwayama 2012, 87). The strong commercial concentration in a few countries, the differences in terms of trade balance and the effect of "reprimarization" of the exports sector in the region outline the chiaroscuro of the relations with China.

⁴ See *Comunicado de Prensa de Primera Reunión de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de La República Popular China y Troika CELAC*. Beijing, August 09, 2012.

Contacts with other countries and regions

The international dialogues continued through meetings between the Ministerial Troika and foreign ministers of the Republic of Korea, Republic of China, the Russian Federation and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, all made in New York during the 67th Session of the UN General Assembly, and meetings organized by CELAC Troika at national coordinators level with high representatives from New Zealand, Australia and Norway, held in Santiago.

All these meetings have launched dialogues with countries or groups of countries, taking the first steps in the exercise of the CELAC function of concerting the international position of the region on issues of interest to its members. Undoubtedly, this function requires improving mechanisms and developing coordination skills within CELAC member countries to move towards a more effective articulation of the regional interests.

The relation with the United States

The axis of the relationship with the United States is a naturally divisive element between states of CELAC. History, geography and the position of U.S. power within the global political structure have been shaping that link. During the past decade, debates concerning the decline of U.S. power and conditions for hegemony recovery have dominated the domestic and regional levels. However, there are structural conditions that should be considered from the point of view of the outlines of Latin American foreign policy: the United States will remain the most important external actor for all Latin American countries, although their relative importance and relevance vary, depending on geographical location and the contents of their bilateral agenda (Russell and Tokatlian 2009).

The peak of integration initiatives responded in part to the low priority corresponded to Latin America in the United States foreign policy and the autonomous impulses generated by this fact. Washington has not prompted a renewal of hemispheric multilateralism that unfolds within traditional structures and initiatives of the 1990s, such as the Summits of the Americas (SOAs). By contrast, bilateralism and selective preference have been characterizing U.S. foreign policy towards Latin American countries in the last decade. But a shift towards a more active profile in the region, as recently

announced by President Obama, might mean an increase in relations with Latin America and sharpen the differences within CELAC.

Meanwhile, the countries of the region have changed their relationship with the United States according to conditions of the international system, hemispheric trends and features of Latin American governments themselves. The strategic options were not reduced to pure alignment or confrontation with U.S. interests, but have revolved around five models of foreign policy: engaging, accommodation, limited opposition, challenge and isolation (Russell and Tokatlian 2009). This diversity of approaches, which reflects their own economic and political interests of states, will shape the trajectory of CELAC. As a result, we expect a moderate position that neutralizes both "counter-hegemonic" as the "pro-American" positions, if the forum is to survive and gain some relevance.

The ability to materialize a link CELAC-U.S. is low or none. So far, the region has continued dialogue as part of institutionalized spaces such as the OAS and the Summits of the Americas. On the other hand, there is little reference in Washington and the North American political and academic circles about Latin American integration processes underway⁵ and the general attitude towards these processes has been of indifference. Nevertheless, Latin American countries can aspire to selectively deploy collaborative strategies, bounded containment and binding multilateralism (Russell and Tokatlian 2009), which, responding to common interests, allow the increase of autonomy, the restriction of North American power and the creation of opportunities for cooperation in the hemisphere in order to achieve development. CELAC can provide a space for the building of minimum consensus that help policy coordination between Latin American countries and facilitate those goals of autonomy, development, diversification and restriction of hegemonic power.

⁵ Though CELAC is the most ambitious initiative in terms of articulation and expression of regional autonomy, there are no mentions by the North American think tanks to this organization since 2010, except for the Inter-American Dialogue and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Ayerbe 2013, 12).

The relation with OAS

At the same time that new instances of regional integration in Latin America were created, criticism on the role of OAS and its operation also increased. However, this criticism and the questions about TIAR (Rio Treaty or Rio Pact) are different from country to country, where diverse degrees of recognition and legitimacy are expressed. In this context, since the creation of CELAC a question referring to the relationship with the OAS and the possible competition that would arise between the two organizations has been posed. The initial vision that CELAC could replace OAS has been dismissed, and the position that both institutions have different roles and vary in their membership, the type of cooperation, the structure and the organizational framework has been affirmed (Rojas Aravena 2012, 26).

In spite of that, the balance between the two forums has not yet been tested. There is no consensus on the role to be given to OAS in crisis management policies or institutional breakdowns, but the most extreme positions, that affirm CELAC as a replacement for OAS, have not been finding support. This hemispheric organization may be starting its own process of change, particularly by the impulse of some countries in the region, but this also reflects different views from South and Central Americas and even sub-spaces within. In general terms and nuances, in the first region, based on the performance of UNASUR, there is the perception that institutional crises or political tensions between states can be resolved through mediation and efforts promoted by the entity as a bloc, although some have been made with concurrent efforts of the General Secretariat of the OAS (as in Colombia-Ecuador, Bolivia, Ecuador, etc.) In Central America, however, probably because of the greater influence of the United States and the relative weakness of subregional institutions, OAS remains a relevant political reference at times of political crises (as was the case of Honduras) and its role in the organization of electoral observer missions is still valued. About this last point there are also differences regarding South America, where UNASUR has gained a major role and legitimacy in monitoring the elections of the region (such as recently in Venezuela).

The introduction of the democratic clause as one of the axes of CELAC creates scenarios of possible overlapping and superposition with OAS, and an

adequate consensus on this case is yet to be achieved, with ad hoc solutions solving particular problems with their own peculiarities.

Final considerations

In CELAC, multiple strategic interests overlap: to create a forum able to build a common identity concerning Latin America and the Caribbean; to consolidate a South-South space of belonging and cooperation; to renew existing forums to launch a space with bigger political weight and visibility; and to build a strategic project that, from the heterogeneity, seizes the opportunities of cooperation through the convergence of different integrating schemes.

As a regime, CELAC reduces transaction costs, increases information and decreases uncertainty among members, conditions that aim to achieve concrete agreements, though they should include guidelines and mechanisms to raise the threshold of fulfillment of commitments. Progress on specific cooperation agreements will be in those areas where the density of subjects is higher and where issues identifying shared benefits are easier, probably in areas such as infrastructure, energy and physical interconnection. Unlike the above, foreign policy is a dimension of a strong heterogeneity in terms of aspirations, strategic interests and models of international integration, where the values of identity and sovereignty play a role.

It is useful and necessary for Latin America and the Caribbean to consolidate a space for dialogue and to seek to project itself as an international player, but the meanings of general guidelines, such as the promotion of multilateralism and the reform of the UN Security Council are confusing. In respect to these points, there is still no clear understanding, and there is also no agreement to act as a forum that seeks to delegitimize OAS, or to be used as a platform to confront the United States. It can be interpreted as a space for interaction more balanced with Washington, but there is no consensus to adopt challenging, confrontational or isolationist strategies. It is not among the objectives to be a space of counter-hegemonic inspiration. The overlap or superposition with OAS is not going to mean a breakpoint too. It is more likely that the discussion of these issues in initial stages of the process might generate stagnation or paralysis. Regional representation may involve high costs in the

short term as long as progress in identifying consensual positions does not advance.

The objective is to build an instance of convergence and coordination of other subregional processes, but so far there is no institutional design to ensure that the coordination process is feasible. Inwards these subregional agreements there are also different political perspectives, which preclude the identification of a common strategic vision. In practical terms, mechanisms for proper articulation between the various subregional levels have not been defined. For now, progress in physical interconnection projects will be produced at the subregional level, where the larger countries in terms of resources and leadership have priority strategic interests (such as Mexico with Mesoamerica Project and Brazil with IRSA-UNASUR).

The intergovernmental design may also hinder the articulation of a consensual external strategy, since it is linked to ever-changing political will and national politicization processes. Still, agreements on specific issues that reflect common goals can be achieved.

However, the prerequisite for cooperation is that governments of the region identify a base of converging interests. This definition of convergence of interests is not objective, but rather responds to the perceptions of the governments (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991, 23). The decision of when and in what extent there is a convergence of interests is formed domestically, and because of the lack of significant pressures from non-governmental actors it remains in the hands of governments⁶. Therefore, these preferences can be modified in the processes of negotiation and dialogue in a framework of policy consultation, where common positions can be identified and joint actions consented.

The consolidated regionalisms can change the preferences and perceptions of states, but in the case of CELAC it is too soon for changing the rooted ones, and the impact of institutions in terms of rules and regulations on

⁶ States are more reluctant to cooperate in foreign policy than in other areas because of the different role played by non-governmental actors and the type of interests. Governments suffer less pressure on foreign policy issues because the costs and potential benefits to groups of interest are vague and uncertain. Only occasionally specific groups or the public opinion influence topics of foreign policy. This makes the government positions reflect more its ideologies and the domestic commitments of its leaders and traditional conceptions of national interest (Solomon 1999; Moravcsik 1993, 488-496).

the behavior of states is very low, so it is necessary to correct the shortfall in implementation of agreements and to strengthen the widespread commitment⁷. Moreover, the decision process remains under consensus rule and, although the principle of flexibility and voluntary participation was included, the possibility of adopting majority decision rules cannot be foreseen in the short run.

CELAC faces the same difficulties of recent regionalisms: how to solve the old dilemma of the "institutionalization level" suitable for regional integration experiences in Latin America (Llenderrozas 2012). Without being restricted by the most excessive bureaucratic structures, CELAC bet in low institutionalization levels, forming a "pro tempore multilateralism, without a permanent secretariat with effective power and own resources, preserving some level of supranationality and allowing creating institutional memory" (Legler 2010). They are all necessary elements to strengthen and ensure an own dynamic for the process at moments when originated by the political will of regional leaderships may decline.

In the discussion about foreign policy, the main interests at stake include the preservation of identity and sovereignty. There is an enormous tension between the impulse to cooperate and the perceived need for each state to maintain its own exterior profile, so it is generally an area of regionalism in which the interests of states converge in a lesser extent than in other areas. The mechanism of foreign policy coordination that is consolidated within CELAC must ensure flexibility, gradualism, complementarity of actions and voluntary participation in the initiatives, and it cannot be developed at the expense of national foreign policies. This is the big challenge ahead.

⁷ By "widespread commitment" it is understood the idea that supporting the regime will present better results than self-reliance in the long run (Keohane 1982).

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ABSTRACT

The creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in February 2010 reconfigures a new step in the process of regional political concert. As a result of the convergence of many regional instances, especially the Group Rio and the Latin America and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALC), besides increasing aspirations to cooperate, a new mechanism that aims to overcome the subregional plan is created to activate multilevel forums and strengthen the tendency to build multidimensional agendas.

This paper is divided in three parts. In the first one, in which the regional representation or interlocution is going to be highlighted, the general objectives of the community will be analyzed; in the second section the thematic agendas will be the subject, along with their potentialities and limits; and in the third part the external axis drawn by the community to this date will be outlined, along with their obstacles and possibilities. The research ends up with some final considerations of prospective character.

KEYWORDS

CELAC; Latin America; Regional Integration.

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MIDDLE POWERS IN THE FRAME OF GLOBAL CLIMATE ARCHITECTURE: THE HYBRIDIZATION OF THE NORTH-SOUTH GAP

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Introduction

The distribution of power among nations has been one of the most characteristic debates of International Relations. Unipolarity, multipolarity, bipolarity and non-polarity are just some of the concepts that promote an analysis of the International System and the links between state actors, in particular the nation states. Since the end of the 20th Century, after the last breath of the Cold War and, therefore, the end of bipolarity, the endless academic disagreements related to the existence of one or many centers of power in the global scene became apparent. Nonetheless, the relative power crisis in which the hegemonic power – United States – is the protagonist, followed by the difficulties Europe is passing through, has put the middle powers in a privileged sphere.

BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – were named as such by Jim O'Neill, economist of Goldman Sachs. His essay argued that the

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economic potential of these countries – excluding South Africa, which was incorporated in 2011 – catapulted them into converting themselves in dominant economies by the middle of the 21st Century. The idea not only accepted economic data, but also demographic and some other aspects. Therefore, it was argued that these countries would represent 40% of the world population in the aforementioned period.

The BRICS thesis is not the only one to recognize the increasing relevance of a group of actors apart from the traditional powers or superpowers. In this sense, the middle powers have inaugurated particular arenas, as well as they have taken part in forums as a result of the external recognition or the initiative of the traditional powers. Within the first group, the IBSA Forum – formed by India, Brazil and South Africa –, created in 2003 at the light of the failed negotiations of Cancun, can be mentioned. Furthermore, BASIC, which groups countries like Brazil, South Africa, India and China in a dialog related to the climate change, is a valid example of the first group. BASIC converted itself into a relevant climatic actor since the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP) of the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC), held in 2009 in the city of Copenhagen.

As an example of the second group, that is to say, forums that have been created by actors apart from the middle powers as a recognition of their growing profile within the International System, it is possible to mention the Group of 20. Since the economic and financial crisis, G20 became a broader space – and therefore replacing the G8 – to debate the world economy. Countries like Brazil, India, South Africa, China, Argentina, South Korea, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey were summoned.

The debates on world power distribution are not limited to the relation between superpowers and middle powers, but are also related to the traditional global division between more and less developed countries or what is considered the gap between North and South. This cleavage has characterized the International System since the decolonization process from which the international arena found itself stunned by the numerical increase of states. This process had profound repercussions within international forums, like the UN, once such increase meant the success of majorities in spaces where each state – regardless of status – has one vote, like the General Assembly.

The emergence and rising of the debate concerning the world division between industrialized and developing countries coincided with the insertion of environmental themes into the global agenda. Consequently, the emergence of such themes was entirely linked to such division. The climate issue has not escaped this affirmation. One of the most relevant elements when characterizing the climate issue is the South's achievement, obtaining the North's agreement to the *Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities*, in the Rio de Janeiro Summit of 1992. This principle became a symbol of a developing world and was concreted through the Kyoto Protocol and the division between countries of Annex 1 and 2.

One of the main spaces in which the South has become united in order to sustain positions concerning the climate issue was the Group of 77, which has been aiming to detain backward steps in historical achievements. Even if G77 has been divided in subgroups of negotiation – oil exporter countries, little insular countries and the African group, among others –, in part it has sustained common structural positions, like the principle of responsibilities.

From this brief description of contextual elements that characterize the object of study, it is relevant to express the purpose of this paper, as well as the hypothesis from which we start. The objective of this contribution is to analyze in which sense the BASIC group can modify the global climate architecture, focusing on the North-South gap in terms of climate change and its persistence as an analytical category. In that sense, we hypothesize that the BASIC group tends to hybridize the climate gap between North and South because of the disagreements generated by its postures, opposite to the South positions, centered on G77.

In order to cope with the aforementioned purpose, this work is divided into two parts. The first segment makes a quick theoretical development in relation to the conceptual differences between expressions as *middle power*, *emerging power* and *regional power*, among others. The second segment proposes to analyze the role of middle powers in the global architecture of climate change, taking BASIC as the central space of representation for such states. At its end, it starts a reflection about the South as a category.

1. Conceptual Elements

Likewise other theoretical perspectives, there is no agreement regarding the use of a single idea to classify middle powers, emerging countries or states with increasing attributes of power in the International System. Perhaps the work of Cartens Holbraad, who is behind the definition printed in a statement by the United Nations, is one of the most representatives. In such sense, it affirms: “The middle powers are those which, by reason of their size, their material resources, their willingness and ability to accept responsibility, their influence and their stability are close to being great powers”. The author included within this category both what he called “upper middle powers” and the rest of them, which by their turn comprehend subdivisions where lay the regional powers (Holbraad 1989).

This is a notable definition once it not only shows material resources of power, but also presents elements like the will and the capacity to deal with responsibilities, which has been an object of criticism towards countries like China, a country perceived as not likely to accept such compromises, especially concerning climate issues. On the other hand, the definition presents the logic of potentiality, once it assumes that these countries are in the path of becoming great powers, converting the concept of “middle power” into a changeable or transitory characteristic.

Despite the conceptual differences between authors, there seems to be a relative consensus concerning the fact that middle powers are a group of states structurally positioned under developed or more industrialized countries, while the regional powers can represent peripheral or semiperipheral countries that stand out among states located in a developing world due to their geographical positioning. On the other side, the concept of regional power figures more associated to historical moments, particularly to the Cold War, as well as the process of decolonization and the détente.

For his part, Robert Cox affirms that middle powers might be in a middle-ranking of material capacities and use to sustain an intermediate position in case of conflict. Nonetheless, he considers that middle powers, differently from the regional powers, have a secondary role in military alliances and, in general, are not relevant in regional blocs (Cox 1996).

Other authors that conceptually approach this discussion create their own categories, like Jordi Palou, who developed ranged concepts, such as

superpowers or world powers, great powers, middle powers, small or weak states and microstates (Palou 1993). Other cases that worth the mention are the works of José Miguel Insulza, who named the middle powers as “intermediate powers” (Insulza 1986), and Esther Barbé, who divided powers between superpowers, hegemonic powers, great powers, middle powers and regional powers. Barbé affirms that middle powers are countries with large or intermediate area and an active diplomacy concerning areas that associate them to a degree of prestige, like Spain, Brazil, Argentina, India, Mexico and Nigeria. On the other hand, regional and middle powers might overlap as categories applied to states that, due to their demographic, economic or military weight, as well as their politics in the regional environment, play the role of a great power in determined geographic space, establishing the rules of the game (Barbé 1995).

Finally, we remark the conception of Clarisa Giaccaglia, who defined a middle power as: “the political unity that, based on certain material capacities, perceives itself and is also perceived by other states as different both from the small states and the great powers” (Giaccaglia 2006, 65).

2. The middle powers and the global climate architecture

It is not the first time that a group of countries of the so-called Third World, presenting sustainable economic development, tries to undermine the pillars of the Bretton Woods regime. The 1960s and 1970s were privileged testimonies of how the process of decolonization was the starting point for peripheral countries, or the Third World – the “South” –, enabling them to explore their numerical majority in spaces of relative equity, like the UN General Assembly. This allowed them to take advantage of forums of debate, like the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and to create groups of negotiation and pressure, like the Group of 77 (G77) and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (MNA). All of them subsumed to the reality imposed by bipolarity and the Cold War.

Effectively, including moments of relative decline of the hegemonic power (United States), like the 1970s or the present time, the South-South Cooperation has faced internal and external limits. In the first case, as a result of the South inability to reduce differences and to work together in a broader front itself. In the second case, it must be recognized that hegemonic powers

were effective in disarticulating the strategies of the South, like the Club of Debtors in the 1980s. Both elements, internal and external, had a harmful effect on the initiatives of collective negotiation.

Some scholars sustain that the conception of “South” – or of developing countries – itself derives from a self-marginalizing logic since it represents, more than a discursive element, a collective identity not denied by the assigned group or the superpowers. Adil Najam (2005) argues that the concept of “South” emerges as a category of self-exclusion, underpinned by the characterization of periphery. That is to say, a notion related to marginalization, privation of power and economic rights to make business, which resulted in an illegitimate international system.

Consequently, answering the question of whether the South, or the gap between North and South itself, can still be considered an analytical category valid to describe a group of actors of the International System, scholars have positioned themselves alternatively in favor or against this viewpoint (Miller 1992; 1995; 1998; 2000; Williams 2005; Berger 2004; Bayar 1991; Kamrava 1993; 1995; Krasner 1989). Najam (2005) affirms that the resilience of the South has destroyed the hypothesis about its conceptual dysfunction. This paper is based on this perspective. We consider that the simple existence of a discussion about its reality denotes that it is just as functional as five decades ago, which does not mean that it is unchangeable in its margins or boundaries.

The self-compassion perspective has a particular rationale if one agrees with Alberto van Klaveren (2012, 132) that the main approach to the International Relations made by Latin American countries had been the focus on dependency and is not a coincidence. To the Dependency Theory one can add other theories related to the South, like the Development Theory, the Autonomy Theory of Juan Carlos Puig (1971; 1980; 1984) and the National Viability Theory of Hélio Jaguaribe (1964; 1969; 1972a; 1972b; 1977; 1982; 1992).

Though recognizing the self-perception of the developing countries from an excluding perspective, it is interesting to analyze how the environmental issues have performed during this process. Albeit in the 1960s and 1970s, when the subject entered the global agenda as an imposition from the North to the South (Estrada Oyuela 2007; Bueno 2010), since the effective inclusion of concept of development – the main concern of the Southern countries – the

South's position regarding the environment took place. The full incorporation of the sustainable development since the Rio Earth Summit showed, on the one hand, good effectiveness in articulating joint initiatives and solving differences, which was symbolized by many documents². On the other hand, it consequently showed how the Southern countries, when articulated, can manage to obtain North's concessions. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the incorporation of a principle like the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, which soon achieved materiality within UNFCCC through the Kyoto Protocol.

Respect to that, Najam (2005) qualifies the environmental action of Southern countries as a contesting one, previously and during the Conference on Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972, participative between that date and the Rio Earth Summit, and engaged ever since.

At this point we ask ourselves how this stage of recognition of middle powers is different from previous times. We could reformulate the question by saying: how are middle powers of the 21st Century different from the middle powers of the previous century? The great majority of analysts report the ephemeral character of thesis related to emerging powers and their capacities to undermine superpowers. Some examples may be found during the course of History, considering countries like Japan or the so-called "Asian Tigers", besides some Latin American countries. Japan used to be, until the end of the 20th Century, one of the most stable candidates to convert into a superpower; however, factors like the stagnation of the Japanese economy during the 1990s hindered such prognostic. A similar thing happened to the Asian Tigers, which

² The five documents signed in Rio were the starting point of the deepening of topics and search for posterior measures of implementation that in many cases were not completed, as subsequent failures of the regime. The Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity gave place to the periodical holding of meetings or conferences between the parties that sustain the regime – with their pluses and minuses; the Rio Statement elevated a set of juridical tools to the status of International Environmental Law, with the recognition of essential aspects as achievements of the South, such as the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and the Principle of Precaution. Furthermore, the Agenda 21 was the first – and for some scholars the only one – plan with concrete and focused measures concerning the decisional incorporation of the denominated Groups of Rio. Finally, the Bosques Declaration could not be converted into a regime similar to the climate or the diversity regimes thanks to the bid of developing countries, like Brazil, itself, which restricted them to sign an agreement that undermined their own sovereignties, like themselves understood.

achieved high levels of economic growth, industrialization and direct foreign investment until the crisis of 1997.

Regarding these events, it is worth asking what makes the BRICS countries capable of generating permanent structural changes in the global power of countries that were already labeled as middle powers before. Though the very BRICS capabilities are still to be confirmed during the making of this paper, we ask to what extent the climate changes might validate or shatter this hypothesis, as well as how it can be linked to the traditional gap between North and South in terms of environment and climate. The G77 may be a valid example. It was one of the pillars of the emergence and development of the South as an international entity searching for joint negotiations during the 1970s. Nonetheless, it is necessary to analyze how it behaved in terms of the climate issue.

Nowadays, the group is represented by approximately 130 nations, among which countries with very different realities can be seen. We refer not only to traditional aspects, like social and economic factors, but also to identities that characterize them as product of a collective history. This is how G77 brings together – besides other examples – oil exporter countries, African nations and small insular states. All of them reveal different positions concerning climate change. While small insular states are seeking for urgent measures able to stop what was predicted by the Intergovernmental Panel of Experts against Climate Change (IPCC), once nations of this group will perish as a product of the increase in sea levels, the oil-rich nations tend to slow down the efforts to modify global and individual energy consumption patterns that decrease the demand for what guarantees their subsistence source: petroleum.

Since there are a myriad of groups of negotiation transverse to G77, it is important to question in which sense the middle powers are capable to change the order/disorder regarding climate change. In order to cope with this objective, the platforms and instruments deployed to exert incidence in the recent global climate structure must be analyzed. Consequently, we focus on the BASIC group.

The BASIC group was transformed into a relevant climate actor after the COP- 15, held in Copenhagen. Doubtlessly, the conference represented the biggest challenge seeking the Road Map traced in Bali (2007) in order to obtain the so desired Kyoto Protocol 2.0. Following the international expectation on

this encounter, COP exhibited the cons setbacks of a withered conference system. Presidents and Prime Ministers overlapping at their arrivals, therefore not directly negotiating, and a host anxious to achieve an agreement that at least should indict the debate on a solution for the deadline of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 are only two of the many elements that could worth a mention.

The loss of Europe's leadership – traditional bulwark of the climate regime –, and even of the United States' leadership, resulted, as an outcome, in the activism of BASIC countries, which created a document that, according to many analysts, "saved the conference". Copenhagen became a climate stage in terms of middle powers' limelight. Among the features corroborating this affirmation we could mention the adoption of volunteer compromises concerning the reduction of carbon emissions and energy concentration; the leading role played by these actors in place of states like U.S. and European countries; and finally, the G77 embarrassment regarding the self-exclusion of these actors and their consolidation as climate leaders.

This is probably the reason why the BASIC members continually strive in order to clarify that this was not a rupture with G77³, or a related sphere, once it is not a political decision group as the second. It is rightful that the group's most recent positions break away from the ones traditionally sustained by G77, starting from the volunteer compromises concerning the effects of greenhouse gas emissions. However, it is undeniable that the condition of BASIC members is quite different from the situation of the majority of G77 members.

As previously mentioned, within G77 coexist countries like China, on the one hand, and like Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, Center African Republic, Rwanda, Somalia or Uganda, which according to the World Bank represent 0.1 metric tons of carbon dioxide emission per capita, on the other. The Chinese case is notable because, though it holds the first or second place – depending on the source of data – in the global ranking of

³ The reference to G77 is present in every joint statement or report made by BASIC countries since the first-ever meeting of November, 2009 in Beijing, China. There is a particular effort to stress that it represents a zone for cooperation and negotiation within G77, and not parallel to it.

countries emitting carbon dioxide (of the total emissions), it gets a different position in amounts of per capita emission. It happens because of the enormous Chinese population, of more than 1.3 billion of inhabitants within a global population of 7 billion. A similar situation occurs in India, but not in South Africa, where the per capita value is just as highly ranked as the total emission amount.

If G77 is composed of a variety of countries with very different realities, how could be argued that BASIC disrupts the recent climate consensus of the developing world, if there are other groups like the Alliance of Small Insular States (AOSIS), the group of Less-Developed Countries (LDC), the Group of Environmental Integrity or even OPEP, showing the same inner opposite positions? It is possible that the answer lays on the fact that BASIC was transformed into a trampoline that, according to some scholars, notices the climate veto power of its members (Viola, Franchini and Ribeiro 2012).

Anywise, the number of negotiations initiated since COP-13 – held in Bali – has decreased. These negotiations present the difficulty of achieving an agreement after Kyoto. Such debate starts with the wavering U.S. engagement based on the argument that China cannot continue to hide itself behind its condition of developing country, not assuming compulsory compromises. Many countries of the EU came out sympathetic to this argument, once EU is not only formed by countries like Germany and France, but also by other countries like the ones from the former Soviet orbit, which still struggle to achieve their own development, even more in the context of a global financial crisis. In this sense, these nations are not willing to finance global increasing emissions of countries like China and India.

On the other hand, it is questionable how the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities will be interpreted in a new global climate agreement. This new interpretation will happen like it did in the 1990s, in a strict way, or rather, it will be adjusted to the present realities in terms of quantity and concentration of emissions.

Analyzing reports and joint statements from 2009 onwards, as well as the links between them and the COP meetings, an average of four meetings were held each year, , setting off spaces of negotiation, consultation and

agreements towards the COPs.

At the II Ministerial Meeting held on January, 2010 in New Delhi⁴, right after Copenhagen, the group defined itself as a forum of cooperative actions for mitigation and adaptation to climate change, which included information exchange. Furthermore, it defended the importance of the *ad hoc* workgroups established within both UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol frameworks. Other element that emerged there, stressed in further reports, was the relevance of the implementation and financing of REDD+, that is to say, the Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries.

After the great negotiator impact of BASIC in Copenhagen (COP-15, 2009), the differences deepened, first in Cancun (COP-16, 2010) and later in Durban (COP-17, 2011). If the provision of equity capital to support the mitigation in less developed countries, a measure that added up to the volunteer compromises of COP-15, was defined in New Delhi, disagreements stepped in. The four countries discoursed towards the legal character of the forthcoming climate agreement. However, while India and China opposed a legally compulsory agreement, South Africa and Brazil tended to accept it. Despite these points, the quartet has always sustained that the base of any agreement must be the equity and the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities.

Before the holding of the COP-16 in Cancun, BASIC has met in many opportunities. The III Ministerial Meeting was held on April, 2010 in Cape Town⁵. Amongst the aspects to be highlighted within the joint statement, it is possible to point out the importance to sustain the Road Map conceived in Bali and the double-path proposed at that moment. It implied a double agreement: one arrangement concerning the quantity of emissions in the framework of a second compromised post-Kyoto period and a long-term compromising agreement. Some of the prioritized areas pointed in the document are: the mechanisms of *fast start*, or quick financing, evaluated in 10 billion dollars; the

⁴ Document available at:

<http://www.chinafaqs.org/files/chinainfo/BASIC%20Joint%20Statement%2024%20January%202010.pdf>

⁵ Document available at: <http://www.moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/BASIC-statement.pdf>

implementation and financing of REDD+; the technological architecture for development and transfer; the creation of a framework for adaptation; and the creation of a work plan related to MRV (measurement, reporting and verification) by the developed countries.

Previously to the COP-16, the IV Ministerial Meeting was held on July, 2010 in Rio de Janeiro⁶. The importance of fast start, equity and the need to achieve a second post-Kyoto stage of compromises were reaffirmed, as well as other aspects, like the consensus on public funds being the origin of financing for developed countries. Slowly the first points have formed the base of every joint statement. In fact, at the V Ministerial Meeting held in the Chinese city of Tianjin on October, 2010⁷, additions to the main aspects of previous reports could not be noticed.

After COP-16, the VI Ministerial Meeting was held in New Delhi⁸ on February, 2011. Aiming at Durban, the results of Cancun were there analyzed. One of the remarkable points was the drafting of the Cancun agreements itself, which in any way should replace the Bali Road Map from BASIC perspective. The novel and outstanding theme of the declaration is the matter of international comparativeness, including the accountability and action of developing countries in relation to the developed world, which must seriously compromise to mitigation and financing of the agreed actions.

There is a significant change at the VII Ministerial Meeting, held in Zimbali, South Africa, on May, 2011⁹. This change responds to the unilateral actions taken by the European Union respect to the inclusion of emissions related to aviation in the regime of emissions commerce. Facing this decision, China asked its airlines not to take part of such business, whilst India discursively opposed. BASIC affirmed in its Zimbali report that such kind of action does not contribute to the construction of a solid multilateral regime and

⁶ Document available at:

<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/joint-statement-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-fourth-meeting-of-ministers-of-the-basic-group-rio-de-janeiro-25-26-july-2010>

⁷ Document available at:

<http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/Fifth-BASIC-Ministerial-Meeting-on-Climate-Change.pdf>

⁸ Document available at: <http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/BASIC-Stat-6.pdf>

⁹ Document available at:

<http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/Joint%20statement%20BASIC%2029th%20May.pdf>

does not respect the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities or other principles supported by BASIC, such as the equity. Moreover, they strongly emphasized the balance between mitigation and adaptation measures, discussion that has been deepened at the meetings after Zimbali. The VIII Ministerial Meeting, celebrated on August, 2011 in the city of Inhotim, Brazil¹⁰ reaffirmed those aspects, as well as stressed the extension of the Kyoto mandate and the compromise of countries from Annex 1, owing to the deadline established in the aforementioned protocol.

The last meeting organized by BASIC, aiming at COP-17 in Durban, was the IX Ministerial Meeting held in Beijing, on November, 2011¹¹. The equity, the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, the historical responsibilities, the Bali Road Map and the last's proposal of a two-way agreement were then reassured as fundamental principles of negotiation. Just as previously stated, these four aspects turned into the pillar of every joint statement or report. Furthermore, the need to establish a second term of compromises under Kyoto mandate to have industrialized countries adopting clear commitments to decrease their emissions was also stressed. In this sense, a new element of this statement was that the maintenance of the flexible mechanisms for countries from Annex 1 in a second round of compromises must rely on the establishment of reduction commitments. Moreover, the developed countries must also cater a fund of 30 billion dollars for the so-called fast start. On the other hand, and for the first time, the inexistence of a balance between mitigation and adaptation was not clear, but instead an imbalance in favor of the second factor prevailed because of the vulnerability of less-developed countries. Finally, India proposed the inclusion of subjects like the equal commerce and intellectual property in the agenda of COP-17.

After the conference held in Durban, BASIC countries – as a gesture for one of its members, which was the host – appraised the document named Durban Platform at the X Ministerial Meeting, celebrated in New Delhi on February, 2012¹². This appraisal particularly comprehended: the formation of a

¹⁰ Document available at:

http://www.za.boell.org/downloads/BASIC_Joint_Statement_Inhotim_final_version.pdf

¹¹ Available at: <http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/newsDetails.aspx?NewsId=267>

¹² Document available at:

global green fund; the adaptation committee; the executive committee of technology; and a center for climate technology. Moreover, the countries agreed on the necessity of a second term of negotiations under Kyoto mandate and the presentation until May, 2012 – by Annex 1 countries – of information regarding the emission reduction and the possibility to amend the Annex B of the protocol in such task. The maintenance of the flexible mechanisms, subjected to quantitative commitments concerning reduction by Annex 1 countries, was also remembered. Finally, they deplored the Canadian announcement regarding quitting the agreement.

With respect to the XI Ministerial Meeting of July, 2012, held in Johannesburg¹³, BASIC gave support to the documents drafted at the Rio+20 Summit as a way to express condescension towards its host. There is also, and ever since, a strong emphasis on implementation. Similarly, a concern about the information expressed on the so-called QELRCs (Quantified Emission Limitation or Reduction Commitments) reports regarding the advance in terms of emission reduction of countries from the Annex 1 was mentioned and the urgent need to rely on common rules that allow international comparativeness was expressed. The themes characterized as poorly attained at the conference were: intellectual property, European unilateral actions and the equity question.

Close to the celebration of COP-18 in Doha, the XII Ministerial Meeting was held in Brasilia on September, 2012¹⁴. A distinct element was that the meeting had the participation of other representatives, a space called BASIC Plus. In this case, Barbados, Algeria (as Chair of G77+China), Qatar (as the host of the then-next COP) and Argentina were present in the Brazilian capital city. Aiming at COP-18, the countries stressed the necessity: to approach the beginning of the second round of compromises, starting January, 2013; to make

<http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/10th-BASIC-Meeting-Delhi-Joint-Statement.pdf>

¹³ Document available at:

<http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=29011&tid=76046>

¹⁴ Document available at:

<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-conjunta-proferida-na-conclusao-da-xii-reuniao-ministerial-do-basic-sobre-mudanca-do-clima-brasilia-brasil-20-e-21-de-setembro-2012>

countries of Annex 1 present emphatic information concerning emissions reduction; to highlight the relevance of the implementation – here the long term financing is included –; and, finally, to materialize the Green Climate Fund. They also stated that the base of the 2020 Agreement should be what was convened in Bali, Copenhagen, Cancun and Durban.

The last meeting before Doha was the XIII Ministerial Meeting on November, 2012 in Beijing¹⁵. Since it has also hosted BASIC Plus, the representatives of Algeria (as Chair of G77+China), Fiji (as a member of AOSIS and future Chair of G77+China) and Qatar (as the host of COP-18) joined as observers. The Beijing statement shows no new issues, except for the effectiveness of the advertence concerning developed countries that do not take part of the second compromise and the consequent absence of the clean development mechanism of Kyoto. The countries also displayed consternation once the mitigation efforts by less-developed countries seem greater than the industrialized countries' attempts. This must not represent transference of compromises or an inversion of the Principle of Responsibilities. Additionally, regarding the European unilateral measures, they repudiated the EU intention to stop their implementation for a year.

The COP-18, held in Doha, showed the most reluctant side of some states respect to a compromise to extend Kyoto right after its announced expiration in 2012. Although Doha established a prorogation until 2020, the present parties of Kyoto do not correspond to 15% of the total emissions once Russia, Japan and Canada decided to quit the agreement. Other countries joined this position, like Belarus and Ukraine, hesitant to extend Kyoto.

The COP document, named Doha Climatic Gateway, not only exhibits the main problem in compromising a few countries and a limited percentage of emitters (EU, Australia, Norway, Croatia), but also postpone the commitment to achieve a new global climate pact for 2015 without possessing an universal objective of reduction or deepening a central aspect like financing, which was decisively delayed for 2013. In this sense, the document tries to push the Green Climate Fund forward and support an agreement at the 2013 Warsaw Climate

¹⁵ Document available at: <http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/newsDetails.aspx?NewsId=381>

Change Conference concerning a cooperation of about 100 billion dollars by industrialized countries.

After the events of Doha, BASIC countries – at their XIV Ministerial Meeting on February, 2013, in the Indian city of Chennai¹⁶ – manifested their disappointment with the lack of commitment by developed countries concerning financing and mitigating, as well as the need that industrialized countries that did not make part of the original Kyoto agreements and Annex 1 acquire mitigation duties in the UNFCCC framework during the second round of compromises. Moreover, and emphasizing their view on the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, the members established that, due to the historical greenhouse gas emissions, it is imperative to comply what was set by IPCC regarding the need for Annex 1 countries to reduce their emissions at least by 25-40% comparing their 1990 levels to 2020. They also reiterated that developing countries, amongst them BASIC, have been carrying out much bigger efforts than the industrialized countries in order to comply what was established by UNFCCC. Because of this last point, what is, from our point of view, one of the most remarkable aspects of the statement, the countries declared that the objective of the Durban Platform was to reinforce the efforts of all parties, strengthening the multilateral regime based on norms and assuring the complete, effective and sustainable implementation of the Convention for the year of 2020, not being permitted any rereading, renegotiation or reinterpretation. Finally, as presented by every BASIC document, the countries sustained the group's unity and its alignment with G77 + China, as well as its commitment to strengthen itself in the framework of South-South Cooperation.

The results of the last COP meetings are, according to some experts (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012), an example of the incapacity of emerging countries to sustain historical procedures and preferential statuses. For others, the commitments taken by BASIC are part of the structural, dynamic changes of International System, as well as of the inexorability of a forthcoming new economy under low carbon levels (Viola, Franchini and Ribeiro 2012).

¹⁶ Document available at: http://moef.nic.in/assets/XIV_BASIC_Joint_Statement_FINAL.pdf

Evaluating the structural conditions and its logic of power, we can thus affirm that the division between North and South seem to enjoy a good health from the climate perspective. That is to say, developing countries continue to fundamentally defend a posture in favor of the common but differentiated responsibilities. In terms of International Environmental Law, this principle is derived from the recognition of the principle of sovereign equity that appears in many international instruments, such as, for example, the UN Charter. There is also a juridical recognition by more industrialized countries concerning their larger contribution to environmental degradation and heavier pressure on natural resources; not only this, but it is also clear that in not complying their – greater – responsibilities to protect the environment, they become responsible for disfavoring the possibilities of developing countries to achieve a better living standard¹⁷.

The comparative exercise between declarations and statements of the BASIC countries' ministers and the documents written within COP meetings cast a change in the influence exerted by groups participating of the conferences in favor of the space shared by the four middle powers. This means that their power of influence has increased in detriment of traditional powers like the U.S. – which continue hesitant in respect to the compulsory commitments of reduction – and Europe, as a historical bastion of climate regimes. It should be stressed in favor of our argument the active participation of these four countries at COPs; its conditioning of content of final drafts; the fact that internal disagreements have not broken the group; the joint engagement of problems while being externally threatened, like what happened with the unilateral measures taken by European Union; the commitment to power building within, at least symbolically, G77 + China.

However, and in spite of the presumption and reiteration of BASIC about their belonging to G77 + China, the BASIC countries have tended to shatter the Group of 77, in function of their own interpretation of the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities; to have postures that in many cases are contradictory when compared to the rest of the group; and to present

¹⁷ For more details, see Borrás Pentinat, 2004.

differences that deepen in terms of quantity and concentration of emissions as a product of economic growth, being it distributed – or concentrated – in social terms between the members of the group. Furthermore, besides the aforementioned factors, it happens because of the establishment of own bulwarks as a product of the numerous meetings, which has improved the mechanisms of cooperation and negotiation, that is to say: the Principle of Equity; the second round of commitments of Kyoto; the validation of UNFCCC and its leadership, along with the Kyoto Protocol, as international climate regimes; the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities; and the Principle of Historical Responsibilities.

To the question on how middle powers can change the global climate order, the answer given by us is that climate change displays the hybridization of the traditional gap between North and South. This opened space is for some people an intermediate space, being for others, who highlight the climate veto power of these countries, an ostensible transformation of the structure and dynamics of International System.

Conclusions

This paper has proposed to analyze whether BASIC group changes the global climate architecture or not, emphasizing the gap between North and South and its persistence as an analytical category. Respect to that, we have affirmed that one of the most relevant characteristics of middle climate powers, centered on the BASIC group, is that, differently from other emerging powers, they have showed conditions to push the climate game forward during controversial times, as was the case in Copenhagen. Further, these countries have been recognized by superpowers and traditional powers because of their relevance in negotiation tables. The decision of Brazil, China, India and South Africa to adopt volunteer commitments of reduction can be read through many ways, though two of them seem more relevant in our analysis: that it constitutes a step back in terms of interpretation of the principle of responsibilities and a loss of autonomy for the South; or that it means an inevitable position due to the role that these countries perform in the list of main global emitters.

In any case, this means a cutting point from the more inflexible interpretation that G77 has tended to sustain regarding this principle, in order to defend the historical goals of the South. From our point of view, although

these four countries will continue to negotiate with G77, BASIC constitutes this trampoline to which we have referred. BASIC is a joint platform used like other ones – BRICS, IBSA – as a way to sponsor their individual growth as players of big global leagues or even as core players.

We do not doubt the existence of the gap between North and South, but rather dismiss it is stationary. Just like many other analytical categories, it is changeable. The hybridization of such gap by the middle powers is an example of change, whereas four countries were able to benefit from empty spaces created by traditional powers like the U.S. and Europe, as well as enforce their increasing attributes of material power, going through differences and divisions between others countries of the South and using its association as a middle power to multiply their efforts. To these elements we can add the possibility to demonstrate their commitment, will and capacity to accept responsibilities and their potential to convert into great powers (Holbraad 1989).

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this contribution is to analyze in what sense the BASIC modify global climate change architecture, focusing on the North-South climate division and its persistence as an analytical category. The hypothesis is that the BASIC group tends to hybridize the North-South climate division as a result of the discord generated by their positions in contrast to the G77.

KEYWORDS

Middle Powers; Climate Change; North-South Division.

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GEOGRAPHY AND THE MARITIME POTENTIAL OF CHINA AND IRAN

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Introduction

In recent years, developments in Chinese and Iranian foreign policy have been a constant in discussions in the West, particularly in the United States. It is a haphazard process but the Chinese continue to modernize and expand their forces and strategic reach. In the meantime, Iranian political and military leaders are fond of reminding the world of their thousands of missiles that are supposedly but a push of a button away. Outlandish projects aside, when it comes to strictly maritime matters it becomes possible to see that each state has a certain maritime potential, meaning the ability to leverage the near and far seas so as to achieve its objectives at some point in the near future. We seek to show how this potential is influenced by geography.

In 1942, U.S. geostrategist Nicholas Spykman famously wrote that “ministers come and go, even dictators die, but mountain ranges stand unperturbed” (Spykman 1942, 41). A central tenet of classical geopolitics, this maxim shows the timeless role of geography in the turbulent course of human history, which, as posited by British geographer Halford Mackinder, is guided if not outright governed by geographical features (Mackinder 1890, 78). Contrary to popular conceptions of geopolitics as the ruthless pursuit of power, those scholars of the late 19th and early 20th century who stand for the classical geopolitical perspective sought to explain socio-political phenomena through location and physical features in geographical space. This style of analysis has

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become rare with the notable exception of Robert Kaplan's recent contributions on the rise of China and the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean (Kaplan 2009; 2010a; 2010b). A common misconception is that classical geopolitics is geo-determinist, yet neither we nor the scholars to whom we refer claim that geography mechanistically dictates human action. Rather, we argue that it sets the frame within which human action occurs (Mackinder 1895), action that is presumably bounded by the constraints and opportunities provided by geographic factors. Hence, courses of action that reflect geography in procurement and operational practice are the ones that will be successful in creating effective tools for the completion of objectives. They prevail in the long run and knowing geography therefore helps us to evaluate the maritime potential of challengers to U.S. naval supremacy such as China and Iran.

Shaping Maritime Geopolitics

To assess the impact of geography on maritime potential, this general category must be divided into several distinct elements. For our purposes, Alfred Thayer Mahan's work is an excellent reference point; following his analyses (Mahan 1890, 29-49), we consider the location and physical geography of a state as well as structural features of its economy. The "national character" and the "character of its government", which Mahan included in his analysis, will not be addressed by us.

First, location matters. Taking up a key idea advanced by Mahan, Spykman reasoned that "it is the geographic location of a country and its relations to centers of military power that define its problem[s] of security" (Spykman 1942, 447). The most advantageous is an island because this only leaves the threat of amphibious invasions and allows states to predominantly concentrate their efforts on the fleet, unlike the typical continental state, which does not only require a fleet and an army but also a separate fleet per sea it borders. This challenge is exacerbated by diffusion of power stemming from a large territory or distant territorial outposts. Sea lines of communication (SLOC), identified as prime targets by Julian Corbett (1911, 94-95), stretch thin and even unsustainable if state capabilities are not sufficient to protect them. Seeing the open seas as "highways", like Mahan (1890, 25-28) did, means that every state should build naval bases along the SLOC on which it is dependent. If a state faces a multidirectional or omnidirectional cohort of maritime rivals,

this also forces division of naval strength; temporary and localized as it already is (Corbett 1911, 93), command of the sea will become even more difficult.

Moreover, proximity to rivals has a profound effect on naval force structure; large, sophisticated platforms intended for a blue-water navy will take a backseat to a green-water structure composed of aircraft and platforms optimized for amphibious warfare and air defense. As distances increase, the ability of a navy to bring power sufficient to punch through enemy defenses gradually decreases unless one is able to deploy carrier groups that are extensively supported by other naval, air and space assets. Only a tiny minority of states has the infrastructure and experience needed to do so. The stopping power of water, as John Mearsheimer (2001, 44, 77, 114-128) calls it, has been the bane of many continental powers through history and will continue to be a major obstacle to the ambitions of many more, even in the hyper-technological 21st century. After all, there is only so much that ground-based troops and aircraft can do without becoming a projectile to be fired by the navy.

Second, when defined as the terrain and length of the coastline, coastal topography determines the likelihood of a successful amphibious invasion as well as the opportunities for the defenders to setup fixed and mobile positions and to construct hardened facilities and ports able to support maritime operations. The longer the coast, the more difficult it becomes to engage in rapid, strategically decisive operations. Difficult terrain, from broken hills and cliffs to mud flats and deltas, can greatly hamper any invaders and force them into geographically determined chokepoints. If a state's primary orientation is defensive or relies heavily on a brown water approach, strategic depth will become a prime objective, whether it is achieved by dispersion across wide distances, camouflage in urban terrain, multiple hardened facilities or a combination thereof. An asymmetric war of attrition that seeks to blunt the impact of a naval invasion will be more likely if there are few strategic targets close to shore, as it is easier to use defense in depth and fortified urban areas to bleed the invaders dry and try for a political victory.

Third, trade, i.e. the acquisition of key supplies for a state's economy and defense sector, is bound to geography. Maritime commerce depends on SLOCs, which can be targeted for great effect. 90 percent by volume and 80 percent by value of global trade relies on maritime transportation, including all

strategic hydrocarbon and rare earth resources. For states without domestic production of such commodities, strategic reserves, especially oil, become necessary; they are costly to maintain but without them, systematic disruption of oil imports can grind to a halt even the mightiest of economies. Many multinational businesses make use of just-in-time logistics to reduce overhead, but this makes them highly sensitive to instability at any given point in the supply chains, whether it stems from unpredictable events like natural and environmental disasters or completely intentional and hostile disruption. Linking the geostrategic relevance of SLOCs to locational factors, proximity to rival or even neutral trade lanes makes it easier to disrupt them; and commerce raiding is a naturally dispersed approach that presents a real and multilayered challenge to the defender. The brazen piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Straits of Malacca shows that it is not even necessary to have the full array of a state's resources to be able to do so. In any case, global trade in general is a strong motivator for a large navy, both to protect one's own trade and to disrupt the trade of adversaries in the event of conflict. Therefore, we refer to transport and resources as indicators for the trade orientation of a state, which can be either continental or maritime (Spykman 1938, 229-236), in order to assess its dependence on maritime transport and resulting vulnerability to according disruptions.

Lastly, not only maritime defense, also offense depends on geography: Following Spykman (1942, 90-91; 1944, 23, 28-33), topography is essential for maritime offense because of its impact on transport and resources. If one seeks to go on the offensive, to deploy multiple large vessels and shoot for command of the sea, then it is more advantageous to have a long, populated coastline with several deepwater ports and extensive transport and infrastructure links to the heartland and its industrial base as well as the global trade network and its suppliers of resources and technology. Topography moreover provides directions of comparatively easy, economically and strategically beneficial expansion. Expansion into certain areas (e.g. coasts with natural harbors), some forms of expansion (e.g. circumferential control of large seas), or even the geography-based course of SLOCs (e.g. from one small island to another) are simply speaking rational (Spykman and Rollins 1939).

China: A Maritime Power Constrained by Unfavorable Geography

The sea and the numerous SLOCs that crisscross are vital to China's economy. Exports of manufactured goods and imports of mineral resources remain preeminent, totaling USD 1.6 trillion in 2010, the largest for any single country. Nine of the world's 20 busiest ports by tonnage are in China, and this massive engine of export, based as it is on just-in-time logistics, is sensitive to disruption. The energy consumption of the People's Republic is expected to increase drastically. Coal-fired plants are the main source of energy consumption and indigenous sources can fill the rising demand. This is not true for hydrocarbons; China already imports 1.6 billion barrels of oil and 7.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. Development of shale oil reserves in Xinjiang remains slow and, despite a considerable potential, unable to fill energy needs (Yunlai, Hua and Kai 2011), so China will continue to turn to foreign suppliers. Natural gas needs can be filled to an extent by Russia and Central Asian states, and this conveniently uses established land pipelines in friendly states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), thus bypassing the need for seaborne transport. Rising demand may, however, strain the infrastructure and place even greater focus on Indonesia, China's main supplier of natural gas by sea. Oil is another question. Imports from the Persian Gulf alone hovering around 50 percent, while the rest is filled up by African and, increasingly, Latin American sources. In any case, most oil imports to China must transit either the Straits of Malacca or Lombok, where they are perceived as exposed to Indonesia and Singapore, two states that may not be entirely friendly to Chinese goals, as well as hostile criminal, pirate, and terrorist groups active in these waters.

Given these threats to China's economic prosperity, it is not surprising that rising China looks to the sea. It is not the first time in Chinese history. Whenever a Chinese dynasty was not threatened by nomads at its borders or internal rebellions, it sought to expand its reach; the most spectacular example is Zheng He's exploration fleets in the 15th century, consisting of armed merchant junks many times the tonnage of Columbus' caravels. They carried Chinese power as far as the Indian Ocean. But being able to break out into maritime power in this fashion has always been a significant challenge given the geography of the Western Pacific, dominated above all by islands like Guam,

Japan and Taiwan. Because of its location at the coast of the Eurasian land mass, China also had to split its attention between a long land border and the sea. The Japanese, benefiting from a geostrategic position very similar to the one of England, have long contested Chinese supremacy through maritime power, most spectacularly during the Shogunate's invasions of Korea at the turn of the 16th century. During a long century of "humiliation" from the 1830s to the 1940s, a naval built-up was unthinkable for the Qing Dynasty and later the Kuomintang, both unable to resist European and Japanese invasions. After the Communist revolution, the lack of maritime assets left the People's Republic unable to reclaim Taiwan from the Nationalists, unlike the other "wayward provinces", forcing an uneasy stalemate that continues to this day.

Nonetheless, China certainly holds many geographical advantages in developing strong naval capabilities. They result from the fact that the economic cores of China are located along its coast line. These cores are marked by a booming shipbuilding sector, large populations, well-developed ports, and an extensive scientific and technical infrastructure that is able to indigenously develop weapons systems to a great extent. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) can deploy capabilities across the full spectrum of military theaters: land, sea, air, space and cyberspace (Office of the Secretary of Defence 2011, 27-40). But for all its power, we argue that the geographic constraints we already touched upon severely limit China's strategic choices about the use of naval forces or, in other words, its potential as a maritime power.

First, the need to protect its economic growth drives China to explore the establishment of a naval presence in the Indian Ocean and beyond that is more permanent than their current counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. At the same time, the Pacific Ocean is China's prime maritime theater, especially since the decision of the Obama administration to boost its navy there. The problem that arises from this for China follows the classical line of thought on the division of naval forces by theater as weakening the overall concentration of power (Mahan 1890, 29). The U.S. Navy may be able to manage this situation and still project considerable power across all theaters, but for China, whose military and scientific structures remain significantly constrained despite recent growth, it is a significant drawback, forcing tough choices on where to prioritize warship stationing and deployment. This disadvantage is enforced by the fact that China does not possess a coastline on

the Indian Ocean, depriving its fleet of safe harbors. Even as China-sponsored deepwater ports like Gwadar in Pakistan and Dawei in Myanmar are established, China is likely to limit the size of forces deployed in the Indian Ocean (Kostecka 2011, 60-61). Building a Chinese naval base or at least a re-supply station on the Seychelles, as offered by the island state discussed during a visit of China's Defense Minister in 2011 (Simpson 2011), remains an uncertain yet geostrategically important vision. Given these geographical disadvantages, the People's Republic can, at least in the Indian Ocean, be balanced by India. It is in no position to challenge the United States there. Ultimately, this may present strong incentives for China to be more than a pure competitor and instead become a valued partner in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) operations in the South Asia region.

Second, in the Chinese littoral, Taiwan and its navy is the main immediate obstacle to the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ambitions, especially when it comes to projecting power further away from the coast through major surface combatants and long-range aircraft. Taiwan may be immobile, but mountainous as it is, it represents a perfect example of the "unsinkable aircraft carrier". Thus, Taiwan encapsulates the dichotomy central in Chinese naval thinking. On one hand, the PLAN has pursued the so called "Offshore Active Defense" doctrine since 1985, perceiving that it stands to gain much by being able to project a defensive perimeter up to the first island chain, stretching from Okinawa to the Spratlys, or even more ambitiously to a second island chain that encompasses even Guam and the Philippines (Cole 2003, 130-133).³ This would entail a strategy of sea control via major surface combatants and advanced submarines. On the other hand, as long as an island as large and as fortified as Taiwan stays outside Beijing's control while pursuing close security ties with the United States, such a strategy is simply unfeasible and this manifests in China's concerted efforts at developing advanced long-range and anti-satellite missiles and directed energy weapons. The objective here is to deny access to opposing forces (Anti-Access/Area Denial or A2AD), especially

³ The website GlobalSecurity.org provides a concise description of the "Offshore Active Defense" doctrine: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm>.

the U.S. Navy, to waters several hundred nautical miles from the Chinese coast. In effect, Taiwan turns the Western Pacific into a zero-sum game, giving very significant forward basing advantages to whoever it aligns with. China cannot hope to break out of the littoral and project power further without asserting control over Taiwan first. Missiles, submarines and to a certain extent destroyers form the core of China's hybrid strategy in the Pacific Ocean, layering a defensive aspect in depth with a more offensive aspect aimed at high-value targets like carriers and bases (O'Rourke 2012, 8-40). If Taiwan were to be integrated in some capacity into a distributed defense network as envisioned by the proposed Air Sea Battle strategy, it would become even more imperative for China to neutralize it, even as it would become more difficult for them to do so successfully. The same logic explains, regardless of ultra-nationalist rhetoric, the intensity of the recent confrontation over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

Iran: Asymmetric Warfare as a Reflection of Geography

Strategically, looking to the sea has been an unaffordable luxury for most of Persian history, with successive waves of foreign invaders making defense of the vast land borders far more crucial. Piracy, once rampant in the Persian Gulf, was neutralized by Portuguese and then British colonial forces; and with no Persian fleet to assert control, the British were able to gain control over vast wealth through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), one of the forerunners of British Petrol (BP). It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that Iran acquired significant maritime assets. Geographic considerations dictated such force composition. The Shah regime relied on oil exports for its wealth and these SLOCs had to be protected from interference. Furthermore, persistent disputes over control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway and the desire of Iraq under the Baath Party to rise to regional hegemony led Iran and Iraq on a collision course. To gain sea control in the Persian Gulf, the Shah used his favored anti-Communist status with the West, especially his privileged role as regional proxy of the United States, to extensively arm the Iranian Navy with modern warships, including British Vosper-class frigates, which remain active to this day.

The 1979 revolution and subsequent Iran-Iraq War did little to change the geographic calculus, as the main threat remained Iraq, with the conservative Arab oil-exporting Gulf States, which supported Iraq heavily for

the First Gulf War, added. The Iranian Navy asserted maritime supremacy from the onset and maintained the Tanker War, aiming to damage Iraq's oil exports. It was not until 1988, when the United States launched Operation Praying Mantis in retaliation for Iranian mining of the Gulf, that the geographic aspect of Iranian strategy changed. The change was significant: the Iranians faced a powerful new adversary and could no longer hope to assert sea control with the means of symmetric warfare. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the dramatic defeat of Iraq in 1991, Iran found itself in a situation unprecedented in its history, given that its main rivals suddenly came from the sea rather than land; the Gulf States were arrayed in the immediate vicinity, while British and U.S. warships lurked beyond the Strait of Hormuz. This paradigm shift prompted a reconsideration of strategic priorities based on the geographic context of the threat (Office of Naval Intelligence 2009, 7). Ever since then, Iran's maritime potential has been characterized by three geographical aspects:

First, the most defining feature of the Persian Gulf is the narrow chokepoint at the Strait of Hormuz. Its strategic importance cannot be overstated. Only 54 kilometers wide at its narrowest points, its navigable channels see an average of 15.5 million barrels of oil every day, representing one third of seaborne oil traffic and almost one fifth of total world production. At its northern edge sits a constellation of rocky islands and the busy Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. The strait gives its controller enormous leverage over its neighbors and the world economy. To secure its control over the strait, Iran has built a distributed defense network that uses the many small islands to conceal stationary emplacements and small fast-attack and patrol craft (Cordesman and Seitz 2009, 16). Qeshm, the largest of these islands, was once occupied by Portuguese and British colonial forces, operating with impunity in Safavid Persia's littoral. In case of a military confrontation between Iran on the one side and Israel (and the United States) on the other side, Iran will most likely attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz. Existing garrisons would certainly be augmented by aircraft, submarines and extensive mine laying operations. The Revolutionary Guards and proxies of Iran such as Hezbollah can be expected to launch terrorist attacks against Israeli and U.S. targets worldwide. In the long term, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would also be devastating to the

Iranian economy, but it remains a potent threat. The tyranny of geography is on full display there, and despite the many advances in remote sensing and robotics that aim to blunt such asymmetric warfare, it remains impossible to neutralize every threat, especially when a natural chokepoint allows for the concentration of nimble asymmetric maritime forces. Taking a look at the history of the Persian Gulf reveals how likely such a scenario is: at the end of the First Gulf War, the Iranians attacked tankers in the Persian Gulf and mined parts of it, which eventually led to the internationalization of the conflict.

Second, the narrowness of the Persian Gulf means short reaction times and the myriad small islands and swamps on the Iranian coast gives good concealment to small, fast boats and mobile missile launchers. The forces of the Iranian Navy and the Revolutionary Guards Navy can be expected to take full advantage of this in deploying the kind of asymmetric approach on display at the U.S. Navy's Millennium Challenge 2002 war game. Furthermore, unlike in China, where the littoral is highly developed, Iran's coast is not. Most major cities are further inland; thus, Iran possesses true strategic depth, although the lack of littoral development also stymies the infrastructure and personnel factors identified as crucial to naval power. When making strategic choices, Iran therefore faces many material constraints. From a maritime perspective, maximizing security is achieved by respecting the geographic context and investing in relatively low-cost and plentiful asymmetric warfare systems like anti-ship missiles, backed up by silent diesel-electric submarines. The Iranians have been able to acquire advanced Kilo-class submarines from the Russians as well as advanced missiles from the Chinese despite international pressure (Cordesman and al-Rodhan 2006, 29-30, 33). Even if this fairly comprehensive A2AD approach fails to completely stop enemy attacks or invasion attempts, it has the potential to extract a high cost to the attackers. This means that conventional forces adapted to modern understanding of warfare on the high seas are well-suited to the Western Pacific and ideal for the burgeoning concept of Air Sea Battle but they would not do so well if forced to breach the constricted littoral defenses at the strait. Iran's gamble is to hold out long enough to turn such a hypothetical conflict into a war of attrition, and thus force the kind of unacceptable casualties and material costs that would lead to a political victory.

Third, the Persian Gulf does not only provide geographical advantages to Iran's maritime potential. Iran may have prioritized A2AD but this means that few resources are left to develop frigates or corvettes, multi-mission vessels able to handle the kind of MOOTW operations that are becoming commonplace for navies across the globe and which, for Iran, would also include counter-piracy in the neighboring Western Indian Ocean. Hence, while India is able to send multiple warships, Iran can only intermittently deploy a single, aging Vosper-class frigate and a helicopter (Stratfor 2013). Going against geography by attempting to field major surface combatants and other more conventional assets would not only be prohibitively expensive but would achieve suboptimal results if matched against the maritime power of Iran's chief rivals, regional or otherwise. This highlights the difficulty for Iran of ever being able to break out of the Persian Gulf and range into the Indian Ocean because the chokepoint, which controls the entrance to the Gulf and channels oil tankers, also leaves Iranian naval forces vulnerable and exposed to extensive surveillance. Somehow like China, whose navy has to operate in two oceans, the Iranians need maritime capacities for the shallow Persian Gulf and for the Indian Ocean. In other words, the geographical forces that favor asymmetric warfare in the Persian Gulf make Iran weak beyond the Strait of Hormuz. This division of theaters matters much because the question of breaking out of the Persian Gulf is not merely one of prolonging reach. It also affects Iran's defensive capacities in a confrontation with any major maritime power: by ceding the Western Indian Ocean to others, Iran possesses no means to counter the deployment of nuclear submarines, which can be outfitted with long-range cruise missiles, and long-range aircraft there.

Outlook

As this paper has shown, geography plays a significant role for the maritime potential of China and Iran. It provides opportunities and constraints and, this way, guides the strategic choices taken by these two emerging powers. However, one should bear in mind that geography interacts with various other factors that influence the maritime potential of states. Even though geography itself is persistent, its specific impact on maritime potential may shift due to non-geographical factors: technology transfers and security agreements shore

up maritime potential, while strong rivals that engage in sustained containment and accelerated shipbuilding programs erode it. Specifically, technology and its rapid progress play a decisive role, as it allows navies to mitigate constraining geographic factors to a certain degree.

At the same time, one may argue that geography accounts for much more than what we have analyzed in this paper. Some adherents of classical geopolitics went beyond rather modest physiocratic reasoning on geographical advantages and disadvantages. For example, James Fairgrieve (1915, 66) posited that geography reacted on the mind and so caused it to choose courses of action. Using contemporary language, geography induces what Colin Gray calls “strategic orientations”. Gray (1988, 43, 45-52, 58; 1991, 313-315; 1996, 257-258) reasons that experiences with geographic factors in the long run cause states to develop unique strategic cultures, meaning that their foreign policy thinking is shaped by their past interaction with geographical constraints and opportunities.

In the cases of China and Iran, we do indeed find strategic orientations that appear worthwhile being investigated further: China’s cautious efforts to build blue water naval assets in order to protect its SLOCs, along with projects to establish deepwater ports in Burma, Pakistan and Iran reflect centuries of expansion shaped by the seas and rivers. From the destruction of the Song Dynasty at the hands of the Mongols, to the glory of the Ming Dynasty and Zheng He’s exploration fleets, then setbacks at the hands of Wokou pirates and Japanese invaders during the Qing Dynasty, and finally the showdown with Taiwan, Chinese strategic freedom of action was always greatest when they were able to field significant naval power. This experience of strategic rewards of breaking out into the sea appears to shape present-day Chinese strategic orientation. Meanwhile, the inability of the Persians to defend even the islands closest to their shores from successive Portuguese and British invasions, partly motivated by pirate activity in the Persian Gulf, made their eventual loss of freedom of action in the early 20th century all but inevitable. This harsh lesson is one that the current Islamic Republic would not like to see repeated. Such geographically induced, cognitive fundamentals of maritime strategies should be a vital component of geostrategic assessment and planning.

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ABSTRACT

Geographical factors – in particular location, length and terrain of the coastline, and SLOCs – enable us to assess the maritime potential of two key emerging powers: China and Iran. Referring to said geographical factors, we also derive specific features of the Chinese and Iranian naval strategies, and conclude with an outlook on their geographically shaped “strategic cultures”. Pursuing this approach to international relations/security studies, we seek to revitalize classical geopolitical thinking.

KEYWORDS

Geopolitics; Naval Strategy; Asymmetric Warfare; China; Iran.

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The Brazilian Center for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) was the first center dedicated exclusively to the study and research in international relations in Southern Brazil. It was established in 1999 at the Latin American Institute for Advanced Studies (ILEA), within the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Porto Alegre (known for hosting the World Social Forum), Brazil. Its main goal has always been the study of main transformations within the post-Cold War international system through an innovative and argumentative perspective. Also, NERINT has always sought ways to contribute to the discussion of a renewed national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options to consolidate an autonomous international presence for the country from the perspective of the developing world.

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Volume 1, Number 1 (Jan/Jun. 2012)

Presentation

Celso Amorim

Editor's Note

Paulo Visentini

The Future of MERCOSUR

Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães

The Brazil of Lula : A global and affirmative diplomacy (2003-2010)

Paulo Visentini

Russia turning on Latin America

Yuri Paniev

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Mamoudou Gazibo, Olivier Mbabia

The Jacob Zuma Government's Foreign Policy: Association or Dissociation?

Chris Landsberg

South-South Cooperation and the Changing Role of the Gulf States

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

The Financial Crisis and the Dollar Hegemony

Marcelo Milan

Volume 1, Number 2 (Jul/Dec. 2012)

Editor's Note

Paulo Visentini

Presentation: The Foreign Policy of Brazil

Amado Luiz Cervo

The Lessons From The Euro Experience

Richard Griffiths

Brazil in the Current World Order

Amado Luiz Cervo

Neo-Developmentalism and the Search of a New International Insertion

Giorgio Romano Schutte

Teaching and Research on Foreign Policy in the Field of International Relations of Brazil

Carlos Aurélio Pimenta de Faria

Brazil in Face of the Chinese Rise: the Risks of Regressive Specialization

André Moreira Cunha, Marcos Tadeu Caputi Lélis, Julimar da Silva Bichara, Manuela Gomes de Lima

The Impact of the International Crisis on Brazil's Trade with the Trade with the other BRICS (Russia, India, China and South Africa)

André Luiz Reis da Silva, Luiza Peruffo

The Financial Crisis and the Dollar Hegemony

Guilherme Stolle Paixão e Casarões

Developing From the South: South-South Cooperation in the Global Development Game

Sean W. Burges

Colonial Globalisation to Post Colonial Globalisation: Non Alignment and South-South Cooperation

Aditya Mukherjee

Volume 2, Number 3 (Jan/Jun. 2012)

Editor's Note

Paulo Fagundes Visentini

Military Power, Financial Crisis and International Security Panorama in The 21st Century

Érico Esteves Duarte

Beyond The Organized Crime: The Reformulation of The Insurgency Concept and Its Impacts on The South America's Strategic Surroundings

Mariano César Bartolomé

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Francis Kornegay

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Marianne L. Wiesebron

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İlter Turan

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Gladys Lechini, Norma S. Rabbia

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Maj-Lis Follér

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Luiz Augusto Estrella Faria

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Leonardo Ramos

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Luciano Vaz Ferreira, Fabio Costa Morosini