ABOUT THE JOURNAL

AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the International Strategic Studies Doctoral Program (PPGEEI) of the Faculty of Economics (FCE) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and to the Brazilian Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies (NERINT) – a research center of the Latin American Institute for Advanced Studies (ILEA/UFRGS). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing countries.

The journal publishes original articles and book reviews in English, Portuguese or Spanish about themes that lie in the vast area of Strategy and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and the South-South relations, their security issues, the economic, political and diplomatic development of emerging nations and their relations with the traditional powers. The journal’s target audience consists of researchers, specialists and postgraduate students of International Relations.

The journal will try, through its publication policy, to ensure that each volume has at least one author from each of the great southern continents (Asia, Latin America, Africa), in order to stimulate the debate and the diffusion of the knowledge produced in these regions. All of the contributions will be subjected to a scientific review.

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EDITOR’S NOTE

Paulo Fagundes Visentini

In the last decade of the 20th century, after the Cold War was over, the security issues have started to become neglected and eclipsed as a study object, in the frame of the predominantly economic agenda of the neoliberal globalization, both in the Academy and the political rhetoric. But the 9/11 attacks put the security in the center of the academic debate again, as part of the War on Terror and the asymmetrical conflicts. The focus adopted was directed towards the rift between the Western powers and the new threats of the terrorist groups and the so-called “Rogue States”. Few analysts have explored the geopolitical dimensions that were implicit in such scenario.

As the second decade of the 21st century begins, the frame suffers a substantial change: the economic crisis of the OECD countries impacted the political equilibrium, while China became the second largest economy of the world and the acronym BRICS obtained political-strategic substance and materiality. Thus, the security analysis gained a new dimension, reaching the South. And this is the central subject of the third number of the journal AUSTRAL.

The global analysis of international security is followed by the regional approach of the issue – South American and South Atlantic –, where a new geopolitical space gains consistence. This space, evidently, connects itself to the African continent, and the last one to the Middle East, shaken by the “Arab Spring”. This event, of aftermath still uncertain, sends shockwaves to every direction, including Africa and the South Atlantic. This set of matters is approached here, also because in academic, political and governmental milieux

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of the NATO countries and associated, the idea of an “Atlantic Community” (with Northern leadership) is being launched, theoretically to counterbalance the Asia-Pacific area.

And because the approach of such subjects is limited, we present two articles in the realm of instrumental theoretical approaches, constantly recycled in traditional academic circuits, from a critical perspective. The new emerging realities cannot be understood only through old visions and conventional reasoning. In this context, AUSTRAL journal shows the Brazilian and foreign readers that it develops another goal: to contribute for the theoretical-analytical renewal of the international strategic studies. Completing the third number, it is presented one more article about the South-South Cooperation on the HIV/AIDS fight, and a last one about the Anti-Corruption Law applied to transnational companies.

At last, we would like to highlight that the first anniversary of AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal Strategy & International Relations coincides with the commencement of the first ten Masters, together with three Doctors, of the International Strategic Studies Doctoral Program (PPGEEI), sealing the consolidation of the new program, created just two years ago. In the same period, the Brazilian Center of Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul’s (UFRGS) Latin American Institute for Advanced Studies (ILEA), changed its South Africa-Brazil Studies Center (CESUL) into CEBRAFRICA: Brazilian Centre of African Studies. The South African Series has become African Series, having published two new titles: “The African Countries” and “Congo, The African World War”, both in Portuguese.

Parallel to the release of the third number of AUSTRAL, NERINT starts its new “International Relations and Strategy Series” (through Editora Leitura XXI), which substitutes the Integration and International Relations and International Studies series, with the release of the book “Marxist Revolutions and Regimes” (in Portuguese). Thus, all the Professors and students involved in this interrelated projects array must be congratulated.

We thank again the support from IPEA and the Government of the State of Rio Grande do Sul’s International Office for the publication of the third number of the journal, as well as all the team that worked in editing and translating, particularly Pedro Alt and Guilherme Ziebell de Oliveira.
MILITARY POWER, FINANCIAL CRISIS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PANORAMA IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Érico Esteves Duarte

Introduction: Mearsheimer’s Assumptions
The instruments of a country’s foreign policy are one, they are discreet just in branches of hard, soft and smart power in the academic mind as a way to simplify the analysis and because of peculiar grammar of means, whether they are diplomatic, military, economic or ideological. Therefore, an assessment of the impacts of the 2008 financial crisis in the international security landscape of the 21st century requires the need for caution, rather than a certainty, in relation with their effects on international patterns of power.

Since that looking to the future demands looking to the past, any prediction of the financial crisis implications on international security should refer to the trends of power distribution in the last twenty years. For the elaboration of an international security scenario for the 21st century, the effort of analysis to assess whether the expectations built on this recent past of international relations should be maintained, revised or discarded.

For this inquire, this article proposes as focus the two hypotheses formulated at the turn of the century by John Mearsheimer (2001), one of the exponents of the realist theory and responsible for the revitalization of the same for the 21st century (Mearsheimer 2009). He stipulated that the U.S. military presence in Asia and Europe, so its role in international relations, would be

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equivalent to the continuity or discontinuity of patterns of economic growth and political integrity in these two continents. His assumptions were based on the understanding that the United States has been the only regional hegemony in the Americas, and as a consequence, since the early 20th century, have played the role of balancer against potential external hegemonic states around the world since the claim of imperial Germany to the Soviet Union. The continuity of this role in the future is dependent on expectations of collapse or transformation of Russia and China, the main candidates for regional hegemony in the 21st century (Mearsheimer 2001, ch. 10).

Both hypotheses forwarded presented alternatives on the production of power between the United States and its main rivals, in a way to anticipate specific patterns of competition and accommodation. The first Mearsheimer hypothesis considers the maintenance of trends concerning production of relative wealth and political integrity in the decade of 1990 in the 21st century, whose results would be:

- The United States would withdraw from Asia and Europe as a result of lack of competitors and threats;
- Faced with these two distinct patterns of power distribution in Europe and Asia. While, in the first region, would set a balanced multipolarity, in the second, an unbalanced multipolarity with China’s hegemonic power. Both in one case as in the other, these power redeployments, due to its own logic, would lead to instability and possible wars in the two continents, mainly in the Asian scene;
- Taking into account the perception of threat by the United States and the costs involved, there would be the doubt if they would return to project a military presence for these two regions again.

Alternatively, Mearsheimer presented a second hypothesis, drawn from a scenario in which there was a radical change in relation to economic and political landscapes of the 1990’s. Their results would be:

- The emergence of a potential hegemonic status in Europe and/or Asia;
- So that the United States would remain overseas present and articulated in coalitions with other regional powers in one or two regions.
These two scenario formulations raise more questions than enclose them, particularly when considering whether the 2008 Financial Crisis could be the event that triggers new patterns of power distribution under Mearsheimer’s second hypothesis. For an initial verification of this hypothesis, this article seeks to address four aspects.

In the first section of the article, that follows this introduction, are presented some indexes to establish that the patterns of international distribution of power before the 2008 Financial Crisis favored a United States’ unipolarity. Second, an assessment of the political effects of the 2008 financial crisis and, reasonably, point if Mearsheimer’s second hypothesis is being proven in demerit of the first one – in other words, to appreciate in what extent the recent financial crisis promotes power redistribution leveraging rivals to the United States. Third, to identify changes in the pattern of U.S. foreign policy as a reaction to changes in the pattern of power since 2008. Fourth, the paper presents its findings and recommended a research agenda on the production and conversion of power, so that one can establish more robust conceptual bases that allow the development of more consistent diagnostics and prognostics in international security.

The United States’ Unipolarity: patterns of power distribution until the 2008 Financial Crisis

For the purposes of this article, we adhere to the definition of power of offensive realism: ground forces and nuclear power, for which large population and wealth are prerequisites and considered only when producing the expected negative or positive effect on real power capabilities, that is to say, the military power (Mearsheimer 2001, ch. 4). Still, we adopted this approach with some caution, particularly because Mearsheimer proposal raises an objective observation, but, to some extent, too quantitative when it is proven that qualitative and non-material aspects cannot be disregarded, especially in the contemporary warfare (Biddle 2006). Because of these and other reasons the need for an ongoing research effort to overcome the limitations of data and account for a more reliable correction of international forces is discussed at the last section of this paper.
For a diagnosis of the period before the 2008 financial crisis, there are indexes which indicate that in the early years of the post-Cold War there was a disproportionate and continuous concentration of power around the United States. This section seeks to identify some of these data and their systemic consequences in terms of patterns of international relations.

According to data processed by professor Gilberto Dupas (2007), between the 1970s and 2000s, even before the 2008 Financial Crisis, the ‘large core countries’ – including the United States, Germany, Italy, France, Spain, England and Japan – have accumulated 63% of global wealth (see Chart 1 in Appendix). On the other hand, the ‘large peripheral countries’ – which includes, according to Dupas, the BRICS plus Argentina, Turkey, Poland, Iran, Indonesia, Mexico and Thailand – have accumulated only 14%. In comparative terms, the ‘big central countries’ maintained a pattern of international wealth distribution so concentrated that even the high growth rates of emerging powers were not able to reduce the gap.

That places the large core countries in comfortable position in demerit of large peripheral countries, which would give to the last ones a more fearful, reactive and defensive international position. Now, although insufficient to prove systemic changes, the high growth rates of most large peripheral countries were fundamental domestically for their respective modernization processes and, in some cases, even consolidation and legitimization of their internal political orders. Thus, this international condition has approached a relationship of asymmetrical interdependence in the relation of these countries with an international order too benign to core countries. Such condition would foster the coordination, initially defensive, in blocks among some of those countries, such as the G-20 and the IBSA initiative (de Oliveira and Onuki 2000).

However, although there are magic models in predicting patterns of power from the comparison of GDP growth across countries (for example, Organski and Kugler 1981; Tammen et al. 2000) in the International Relations literature, this kind of index is transient and does not point immediately critical changes in the international power system in terms of offensive realism. It happens because is historically and conceptually well developed that the accumulation of wealth does not automatically mean military power (Mearsheimer 2001, ch. 3; see also Aron 1986 and Gilpin 1981). Therefore, even
a preliminary assessment of the international distribution of power should not be limited to a consolidated index of wealth production.

A second index available and closer to the realistic understanding of power – but still inconclusive for a definitive comparison of combatants capabilities – is the compilation of the main military expenditure between 1998 and 2008. In Chart 2 of the appendix, it is more explicit the growing U.S. military protuberance in the post-Cold War, starting from a expenditure level, in 1998, equivalent to the other eight largest military budgets to a level, in 2008, equivalent to the sum of the other fifteen largest military budgets in the world. This change basically reflected the expansion of expenses in the “Wars on Terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq. On the other hand, it is still possible to see the inclusion or the rise of non-Western countries that have managed to bring their budgets to levels equivalent to the European countries.

A third more objective power index is the post-Cold War distribution of nuclear capacity. The Table 1 of the Appendix provides a quantitative and preliminary, but useful, overview of the inventories assets of nuclear artifacts. It is noted, first, the maintenance of the traditional advantages of Russia and the United States in comparison to the other nuclear powers, but with some reduction in quantitative terms. A second point to draw attention in Table 1 is the equivalence on the number of nuclear warheads between Asian and European countries around the year 2006 and the expectation of the first ones overcoming the last during the second decade of the 21st century. It has important consequences, especially in giving greater dissuasive capacity to the countries of the region when dealing with extra-regional powers, giving Asia a higher range of own security dynamics. It does not mean, however, a greater possibility on the part of Asian countries to interfere in matters of other regions, because of the very limited numbers and uses in the Asian region of such nuclear capabilities.

A consolidated assessment of these three indexes allows establishing some partial considerations during this stage of the study.

The first refers to an international systemic condition until 2008 favorable to the United States because there was no demographic or economic data suggesting infeasibility in maintaining U.S. military supremacy. On the contrary, the international concentration of wealth pointed by Dupas suggested
the possibility of maintaining this international correlation of forces during, at least, the medium term.

This distribution of power and its ability of perseverance express a unipolar international system. This configuration of power, although theoretically possible, was only marginally considered in the theory of international relations until the end of the Cold War (Jervis 2009). Because of that, although relevant, this research agenda is not substantive (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Ikenberry et al. 2009 and 2011; Kaufman et al. 2007; Wohlforth, 1999) and subject to important criticism (Layne 2006; Lima 1996). Still, there is some reflection on the international patterns pointed as characteristic of unipolarity that allows adding some points to the propositions presented by Mearsheimer (Diniz 2006).

First, the United States would concentrate military capabilities so much superior than the other countries that it would give them the condition of command of the common areas in the planet: the Earth orbital space, the oceans and the airspace above 15,000 feet, beyond the reach of most ground-air anti-aircraft systems (Posen 2003). Although this condition does not mean omnipotence, especially by the dynamics of specific strategic and tactical engagements on land and in coastal areas in the age of missiles (Biddle 2006; Hughes 2000), it would give the United States the ability to project long-ranging forces and, consequently, greater leeway in international affairs than any other country or coalition of countries of the contemporary international system. That would be a distinctive and superior condition when compared to other current great powers – notably China and Russia – that would have just the sufficient capacity to guarantee their autonomy and timely involvement in regional issues, but not for some action or more protruding involvement in other regions on the globe.

Second, rivals to the United States would not be able to accumulate power (internal balancing) or collect alliances (external balancing) significantly without causing the perception of threat and, thus, balance actions by their own regional neighbors, which could be strengthened by balancing actions overseas by the United States (offshore balancing). Thus, unipolarity would be characterized by a threshold power concentration in which the competition for systemic change would be counterproductive and the establishment of the challenge for countries that wish to review the political status quo to shape
regional changes of power that are not destabilizing or, at least, perceived as such (Wohlforth 1999).

Third, the sum of U.S. capabilities and the capabilities of its main allies appears to configure an international order in which the security and values of the United States could not be significantly threatened. It would limit the action of its major rivals to a type of soft balancing, applied to limitation and wear of U.S. power, yet too narrow to cause a structural change in the international system without a problem or a systematic error of production and use of power by the United States (Nye Jr. 2010; Pape 2005). Therefore, this feature of international action would make more sense as a defensive way to limit the U.S. action by organizing blocks within international regimes.

A final possible consideration is in connection with a significant change in the relative weight of Europe and Asia in the international system. The indexes of power distribution described above allow drawing attention to a clear transfer of power from Europe to Asia. Taking into account the impacts of the 2008 Financial Crisis on the European wealth, it is possible to see a worsening of this redistribution of power because of the difficulty that possibly the European countries have to maintain their military expenditures and capabilities. In the international post-2008 Crisis reality, besides a scenario of a relative Asian nuclear strategic advantage on European countries, it was already registered in 2012 the overcoming of this region in military expenditure in comparison to European countries (IISS 2012, 31).

Still, it is important to call attention again to the fact that higher rates of population and wealth do not translate immediately into military power. The superiority in technology and equipment of Asia when compared to Europe has been, historically, the rule rather than the exception in the comparison between the two regions. However, Europe has always been able to avoid military subjugation to Asia. The reverse, however, was possible in several moments and became continuous from the 17th century. Since then, European countries have always been able to maintain an advantage in military power on Asian countries (Parker 1996 and 2005).

From systemic and objective analysis, it is still possible to identify that differentiated regional developments between Europe and Asia enter in greater competition for security and power inside the Asian continent when compared
to the European. It would result in more instances of use of force, possibilities of change in the distribution of power and, consequently, greater U.S. attention. It would in fact strengthen the relevance of the Mearsheimer’s hypotheses, that is to say, the need to check if the first hypothesis would explain the European scene, while the second hypothesis would favors the understanding of the Asian panorama. It means assessing the impacts of the 2008 Financial Crisis on the main rivals of the United States in Europe and Asia: Russia and China.

**Implications of the 2008 Financial Crisis in Russia and China**

The 2008 Financial Crisis had distinct political and economic effects on Russia, China and the United States, as well as their conditions of security and ability in projecting power securing its interests. Keeping as reference the assumptions of Mearsheimer, it is important to consider, first, whether the 2008 crisis favored the accumulation of power and any possibility of regional primacy to Russia and China to, further, compare these observed effects on the relative strength conditions of the United States.

In Russia’s case, the financial crisis had two major economic effects. On the one hand, an imbalance in its balance of payments due to the reduction of its energy exports to Europe. Moreover, the extent of the downturn in economic activity in this region due to a structural crisis in the Euro zone will not allow a recovery of that Russian revenue as early and negative impacts will continue to exist in its reserves (Sotner-Weiss 2009).

Moreover, the financial crisis has given the opportunity for a flight of capital from Russia, less because of the effects of the crisis itself, but ultimately as an accumulated perception of political risk before the expansion of the Russian state under Putin about all instances of social life, especially business. Since 2000, several statist shocks were given by Putin government on corporations in Russia, including those backed by foreign investment. The Russian invasion of Georgia also reinforced this perception of risk reviving bitter memories of the Cold War by Western foreign investors (Sakwa 2008). Finally, the 2008 financial crisis exacerbated the tensions of dispute in current power inside the Russian elite since the 1990’s between corporate oligarchies - *silovarchi* - and the new political elite of Putin’s era - the *silovarchi* (Maknoff 2010, 08; Sratfor 2010a). Because of all of it, in the first half of 2009 the volume of direct investment in Russia had fallen around 45% (Maknoff 2010, 4-5).
As a consequence of reducing exports and capital flight, the Russian government has been forced to reduce their capital reserves - the third largest in the world - to support the Russian banking sector and the main economic sectors: energy and minerals. Therefore, the economic effects of the financial crisis in Russia were quite serious, as is evident in the contraction of its GDP and industrial production (see Charts 3 and 4 of Appendix).

However, it is important to advance the analytical scope to the political implications of these economic effects.

A first political implication derived precisely from the reduction of the European demand for Russian oil and gas. On the one hand, it reduced the European sensitivity to the Russian supply and, so, the possibility of handling these complex interdependence relations. Second, it reduced the main Russian recipe for investment in modernizing the infrastructure, the park producer of oil and gas and its armed forces, which had been occurring continuously in the Putin era. Particularly in the latter case, between 2000 and 2008, Putin had expanded the military budget and started a program of re-structuring the conventional Russian armed forces (Aldis and McDermott 2003; see Duarte 2012), whose improvement of performance could already be observed in the offensive to Georgia (McDermott 2009).

A second political implication was the reduction of reserves for public investments for the provision of social welfare, which is reaching the legitimacy of the Russian government with the sectors of society. Until the 2008 crisis, the Russian population, especially the urban, was complacent about the growing concentration of power in the hands of Putin to be outweighed by the benefits of economic expansion. With the economic downturn and government compensation, it has begun to occur public demonstrations of discontent and popular uprisings (Maknoff 2010, 9).

Third, in the last years before the 2008 crisis, Russia implemented a campaign for reversion of democratizing movements that occurred in the former Soviet republics since the 1990’s. Especially in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the elites pro-Russia were released again to positions of command or key of the political life of the countries of this region primarily through financial support to political parties and direct investments of Russian state and private corporations. This program of political reframing of its near abroad was
perceived as especially necessary because of the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in direction to the east and the U.S. presence in Central Asia in competition for their natural resources, and then according to the War in Afghanistan. However, among the various political implications observable in Russia, this is the lower end, because, historically, Russia has been able to maintain influence over these regions at low cost (Goodrich and Zeihan 2010; Stratfor 2010b).

Finally, Putin's Russia has been meaning to rehearse movements to reassert itself internationally through the establishment of partnerships with countries outside the region rivals or dissidents in the United States through the provision of loans and subsidized sales of weapons, natural resources and energy. However, the effects of the financial crisis in Russia render the maintenance of such subsidies, which has been limited to Russia to more indirect actions in forums and international regimes.

For all these reasons, the 2008 financial crisis does not seem to have favored Russia, on one hand, in the production and international projection of power, and in the creation of regional advantage or opportunity, on another. Thus, Russia remains relevant as a great power in Europe, but the 2008 financial crisis restricts its available power resources, historically concentrated in the western portion of the country, in demerit of a less active presence in Asia.

The processes of economic growth and modernization of Chinese society are notorious, which resulted in a limited direct impact of the financial crisis compared with other countries in the world. Still, despite this resistance of China to the crisis, its leaders are extremely apprehensive about the future because of the much more significant impacts of American and European recessions in Chinese exports. Therefore, the growth assumptions for the next years are decelerating. Although the impact of the crisis in the direct rate of investment appears to have been temporary, the reduction on the Chinese trade balance remains until the current dials (see Chart 5).

After two decades of growth, a slowdown would not bother most countries. But China is different. Political and social stability, and even integrity, lie in maintaining growth. The enormous scale of foreign investment and exports around the coastal and more populated provinces that provides China with enough surplus to increase the welfare of the interior provinces and
thus minimize the severe concentration of income between urban and rural areas and between coastal and inland provinces. It is by state intervention that there is an attenuation of this imbalance. Exemplary, this is the case of the most western provinces of Xiang and Tibet, whose variations between local income produced and per capita income are striking and result of state intervention in the redistribution of wealth produced among the Chinese provinces (compare maps 1 and 2 in Appendix).

Besides the attendance of less wealthy provinces, the surplus of Chinese exports have also been applied in the modernization of the country so that, in the medium term, China will be able to mitigate its large external vulnerability for its growth and expand its domestic consumer market, which is still much reduced.

Thus, the reduction of surpluses on external transactions limits the capital available for performing these two operations in a continuous and balanced way. More than that, it is confirmed that income concentration was exacerbated after the financial crisis of 2008 (see Chart 5). Therefore, the social pressure rises as domestic groups realize that the government measures have been insufficient to deal with the problem of wealth redistribution. In fact, there are mutually excluding demands for gain in the share of wealth between rural and urban areas that reflect the directory of the Communist Party. The Chinese solution has been subsidizing domestic production through artificial mechanisms, basically subsidies and intense public investment, thus avoiding unemployment. But it is noted that exports and domestic consumption have been the exponents in support of Chinese growth after 2008 crisis.

The Chinese external vulnerability, besides internal tensions, has had important implications for Chinese foreign policy, raising the tension in its relations with its neighbors. The contraction of the international market demands that the access to natural resources be more efficient and cheaper for that its exports and modernization do not be stagnated. Thus, China needs to raise the competitiveness of its products by reducing the costs of production and distribution of its manufactures.

It has led China to conduct an almost mercantilist foreign policy in the use of the entire range of possible diplomatic resources to reduce this external vulnerability through increased access to natural resources and other measures.
related to the protection of shipping lines through their trade pass. In this sense, the recent Chinese foreign policy has invested in three areas of action with respective and important geopolitical consequences.

First, China has increased its presence in Central Asia, formerly members of the Soviet Union, for access to energy resources. As a result, this Chinese presence in some of these countries, especially in Kazakhstan, has caused some distancing the relations between China and Russia.

Second, China has been investing substantially in agreement with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar to establish maritime warehouses logistical hubs for the flowing of natural resources and manufactures between these warehouses and China. This Chinese network in South Asia has led to the perception of threat by India which, in turn, signed unprecedented military cooperation agreements with the United States and Japan.

Third, with the identification of natural resources in the South China Sea, the Chinese suits for maritime sovereignty in the region have become more acute, causing friction and apprehension of several countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Japan (see map 3). This seems to be a case of security dilemma, because there are occasional cases of diplomatic tensions and a regional climb of investments in navies. Additionally, this competitive environment created the opportunity to approximation or consolidation of the U.S. military cooperation with several countries in the region. This ‘renaissance’ of the U.S. presence in Asia was recently released as a pillar of its foreign policy for the 21st century.

Therefore, although the economic implications of the 2008 Financial Crisis in China appear to have been minor when compared to Russia and even compared to most countries, its domestic and regional political implications seem to establish relevant challenges to the Chinese political leadership, particularly because China has no ideological pretensions or proposals of alliances or regional arrangements that may favor some kind of appeasement with its neighbors (Walton 2002, 208).

This regional perception of Chinese rise becomes particularly acute when one considers that China has the second largest military budget in the world. In the post-Cold War, this budget was invested in the training of China to deny or at least significantly increase the costs of an intervention,
particularly the U.S., in its sovereignty. More recently, China began investing in an aircraft carrier and a program to increase the capacity of its expeditionary land forces. While these capabilities are not sufficient for an effective and inter-regional projection of power or to face the United States, China already has the largest navy in East Asia (IISS 2012), which hold, in the evaluation of their neighbors means to meet more compelling regional intentions of Chinese foreign policy.

This correlation of capabilities, perceptions and actions may suggest the manifestation of the second conceptual prediction of international patterns of unipolarity indicated above. The rise of a regional power in search of some equalization - to safeguard or dispute - with the unipolar power causes the perception of threat and, thus, balance actions - internal and external - in parts of Asian countries and the opportunity for offshore balancing by the United States.

Therefore, from the data presented, it is possible to speculate the occurrence of the first Mearsheimer hypothesis in Europe and an anticipation of the occurrence of the second event in Asia. That is, the 2008 financial crisis have highlighted the re-distribution of power and political patterns potentially threatening or challenging the United States in Asia, China, than in Europe, Russia. These regional changes tend to impact the Americans perceptions and calculations, so, in its military presence and engagement with security issues in the two regions. Following the Mearsheimer propositions, in the medium term, this would offer greater pressure on China and greater latitude for Russia.

However, it is still important to consider if the impacts on the 2008 financial crisis had more forceful implications in their home country, the United States, so that may have weakened the possibility conditions of their differentiated ability of projecting military power in the international system and, subsequently, its international agenda.

The Role of the United States in the 21st Century International Security: Erosion of the Command of the Commons?

Similarly to the proceeded in the previous section, the preliminary assessment of the impacts of the 2008 financial crisis on the foreign policy agendas of the
United States provides an overview of the international security agenda of the 21st century.

In the American case, the financial crisis and economic recession deepened the debt. However, the effects in the defense posture are not yet critical, although there are adjustments that need attention.

The economic situation seems to be the final justification for the reversal of the increase pattern in the defense budget, which came occurring every year since 2001, amassing a real increase of about 75% and as a percentage of GDP from 3 to almost 5% (IISS 2010, 22). It is in this sense that we note a reduction in the rate of annual increase in the budget of a pattern of more than 5% between 2007 and 2009 for an increase of 1% in 2010 and a reduction of the U.S. military budget by 1.3% in 2011 (Silva Filho and Moraes 2012, 27-38).

The military budget cuts were, first, to reduce the transfer of funds for financial aid and international regimes as instruments of foreign policy, standard still very skewed by accounting of commitments in Afghanistan, Iraq and even Pakistan (IISS 2010, 25)². Thus, it is important to contrast these effects of the financial crisis on the agenda of the security policy of the United States since the end of the Cold War to evaluate its effects.

Additionally, it is explicit the U.S. decision to cut military budget and discomfit good portion of the contingent and material size used in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, most of the components of the aircraft carrier groups used in Iraq will not be re-oriented to the Pacific, but will be kept in low regime readiness in the United States. Thus, these units will be available in case of extreme necessity, but, in fact, they will be at minimum levels of maintenance that safeguard its roadworthiness. Therefore, Secretary Gates also has completely revised the previous administrative orientation from Transformation and, thus, building a military capability that would guarantee the primacy slack around 2020 (Duarte 2012, 26-27). The new focus of expenses

² Additionally, there is an accumulated debt to the United Nations and also an effort to increase the sharing of IMF’s costs with emerging powers, including Brazil, and in fact there is the construction of a perception of irrelevance of these institutions (Teslik 2008).
has been by the modularity of the fighting forces and by the gain of versatility to cope with various threats in the security landscape characterized in international short and medium term.

Finally, there is a critical overview of the reduction of U.S. troops. However, it is necessary to pay attention to two facts. First, the numbers of effective troops are considerably expressive and supported by more resources and that any other country (see IISS 2012, ch. 2). Second, the U.S. armed forces rely on a global basis system and on the still existing command of common areas, which allow a capacity without a parallel of displacement and concentration on its fighters’ capabilities.

Given these economic and military considerations, it is interesting adjustments in U.S. security policy.

Its international agenda in the post Cold War has been to maintain its global primacy, which is based on three pillars: (i) the support of its ability to project power; (ii) neutralization or reduction of the ability to project power on the United States by other powers; (iii) and preserve regional political structures that perpetuate these advantages (Diniz 2006).

Following this agenda, the great American legacy of the Cold War is that the United States maintains what Barry Posen in 2003 called the command of commons, that is, its almost absolute domain of space (understood as the Earth’s orbit), its “command of the maritime lanes of communications” from the oceans, and its ability to impose and sustain air supremacy above 15 thousand feet in any given area of ground military action. Given the importance for the United States to maintain this condition of operation and the existence of efforts with effective results to denial such access, especially the maritime ones by Iran and China; a proposal to orientate U.S. military capabilities for the maintenance of the command of commons in the 21st century has been recently submitted to Congress by the program Air-Sea Battle (U.S. Department of Defense 2011)³.

³ A clear allusion to the Air-Land Battle program, designed in order to face the terrestrial capabilities of the Warsaw Pact in the 1980’s (see Duarte 2012, 14-16).
In practical terms, this first item on the agenda of the United States also continues through alliances with countries whose geographic locations are particularly useful in the employment of its means of force, making them the global projection by providing bases for pre-positioning of equipment, ammunition and supplies (Diniz 2004; Duarte 2003; Proença Jr and Duarte 2003).

The second agenda item is being materialized by the construction of two architectures. The first is a ballistic missile defense around Europe, but potentially with installations in Japan and the Pacific. Beyond the ballistic shield, this project focuses primarily on support Space Command through a network of satellites and radar systems positioned on the surface of various countries. The second architecture is a multiple monitoring network, based primarily by the use of unmanned vehicles (BAMS - Broad Area Maritime Surveillance), which may allow wide scope of observation of maritime activities in most countries.

The third agenda item began in the Bush era and was only strengthened by the 2008 crisis. The United States has articulated bilateral and multilateral limited relations with the objective of producing some kind of restraint or even friction with its main rivals: Russia and especially China.

In Europe, the United States has encouraged military agreements outside the Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) - escaping the rigidity of this alliance, especially by private agendas of France and Germany. Exemplary is the case of the ongoing agreement among Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Republic around a limited military alliance external to the NATO: the Visegrad 4. Interestingly, it is precisely placed on these countries that are advancing bilateral agreements with the United States to install the network bases of anti-ballistic shield in Europe. In Asia, initially bilateral relations among India, Australia, Japan and South Korea to develop a broad coalition monitored under the coordination of the United States maritime presence to articulate in the Indian and Pacific oceans for, as discussed above, contain China.

This description of the U.S. security agenda allows advancing some final considerations of the article.
Final Thoughts: An Agenda for Research in Production and Conversion of Military Power

On a consolidated assessment of the effects of the financial crisis in the international security landscape, four general trends can be pointed out.

First, the financial crisis has led Russia to suspend, at least temporarily, its recent initiative to balance the primacy of U.S. power.

Second, China’s breakneck economic growth over the last twenty years has allowed the country to maintain the second largest military budget in the world. However, it does not reflect an equal rise of its international influence and military might. On one hand, its economy has a great structural and external vulnerability that entails the use of artificial mechanisms for its support in times of shrinking international market, which constrains its excess capital to harmonize its wealth distribution and social discrepancies. On the other hand, China has a big regional challenge to overcome or accommodate the competition for security and containment actions by its neighbors, in combination with the United States, which its regional actions have caused.

Third, there are already data indicating the reduction of the ability of U.S. traditional European allies to conduct operations around the world. It confirms not only the rise in Asia instead of Europe, but it reinforces the U.S. perception of the need to update its list of alliances and military presence overseas. It also helps explaining the recent initiatives of President Obama of reaching bilateral expanded agreements and relations into other continents, mainly with India, Indonesia, Australia, Japan and South Korea. In this transition environment, the reduction of U.S. commitment in other regions, and with multilateral mechanisms that do not concern uprightly solutions for convenience, may be a consequence.

It allows registering the caution of the United States to seek mechanisms of balance and intervention at low cost after the profligate involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, both in terms of media monitored and sensing and in terms of military presence, the United States seek technological and political mechanisms that ensure efficient performances and delegated to countries that have foreign policy objectives converging with theirs.
Fourth, in comparing the relative abilities of the United States, Russia and China, it is possible to point the maintenance of a wide U.S. lead. As well pointed by Nye Jr. (2010), no country maintained its armed forces at levels as high as those of the United States after the Cold War. It produces a reserve of veterans troops expanded for years of revision and updating doctrine, organization frameworks and operation plans that, if well managed, will maintain a qualitative edge in military capability over Armed Forces maintained over long periods of peace. Comparing Russian and Chinese cases, one can point a relevant distinction in terms of capability of military employment. Russia suffered a breakdown, which in some cases reached two-thirds of the officer cadre, and recognizes the need for major investment and restructuring their forces. China, however, has been conducting an extensive modernization in bases of unclear evaluation and certification of skills.

Anyway, Russia and China focus their defense policies to confront regional threats, mainly border ones (Duarte 2012), while the United States does not have the same kind of regional constraints and, moreover, have incentives to keep its presence and involvement in other regions, particularly in Asia.

Thus, from the final test of Mearsheimer’s hypothesis, one can conclude the possibility of occurrence of the first one in Europe – namely, U.S. disengagement with the possibility of developing a multipolar with benefits to Russian interests – and the occurrence of the second event in Asia. That is to say, the perception of important changes in the distribution of power demanding the U.S. action in anticipation of the evolution of a systemic condition that allows China's rise. Accordingly, the expectation that sets is a scenario of increased competition and attrition in Asia in short and medium terms and relative stability in Europe; and on medium and long terms, of the escalation of competitive relations for security and national interests in Europe.

A more rigorous reader of this article can point out that the considerations presented so far are too subjective. This accusation is correct and brings out the fragility of the theoretical tools from the field of International Relations for the analysis of security issues. So some methodological final paragraphs are relevant in defense of an agenda of research of the attributes of military power, necessary for the advancement of tools for the analysis of international security landscape of the 21st century.
The neorealist conception from the Kenneth Waltz (2002, originally 1979) theory of international politics points out as central the analysis of the international system to assess the differences in capabilities between states. These differences of capabilities define international patterns of competition for power and security, as well as the possibilities of each actor to manage and operate the system. Still, as well Mearsheimer points out, any claim of systemic analysis of international relations passes through the need of assessing the properties of military power to conclude these different capabilities. However, most authors dealing with the field of international security, including the realistic, offers unsatisfactory propositions of military power.

Starting by Waltz himself, he disregards the role of nuclear weapons and the effective use of conventional forces as elements of change in the system. In addition, he summarizes the production of military capacity to invest in high technology and its application on dissuasive use (Waltz 2002, 252-258). Already the neoclassical realists – like Stephen Brooks, William Wohlforth and Paul Kennedy (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Kennedy 1989) – limited the consideration of military power to economic and quantitative data, like the total military budget, the investment in military research and development, and capability of industrial mobilization. Mearsheimer is the one who makes further investigation of military power by pointing as its elements large ground forces and nuclear weapons, besides air and maritime forces as means of support and projection of the first ones. Mearsheimer yet qualifies the properties of these elements of military power by the possibility of disproportionate effects of non-material factors as a sound strategic climate and diseases. Additionally, he recognizes as important but does not define how to analyze the variations of mobilization and conversion of potential power in real. Finally, only Gilpin takes into account how particular aspects and techniques of production and employment of military power are a vector of change in the system (Gilpin 1983, 40).

This state of the literature of International Relations directed harsh critics to the field (for example, Kugler 1993). The best summary of these was prepared by Stephen Biddle (2006). He makes three main critics that characterize the fragility of this literature in the understanding of military power. First, military capability and military institutions are not the same
thing, because an armed force wins and losses fighting capability over time, and this is therefore a dynamic property and primarily relational. The evaluation of the relative capability of a country’s military power must be constantly updated and take into account the conditions on the forces, the provision of geographic space and the character of employment between the armed forces involved, especially because defensive and offensive employments are essentially distinct.

Second, such conditions relating to military power depend essentially on non-material aspects related to the employment of combat forces. Therefore, it is important to take into account several studies that present that the employment of military power in the modern environment of great lethality depends crucially on the quality of each individual soldier and collective quality of an armed force in correspondence to its doctrine and organization (Bailey 2003; English and Gudmunsson 1994; Grossman 1996; Hughes 2000; Simpkin 1980). This is the main element that makes the relative conditions of power, on the one hand, dynamic and not static and, moreover, different of conclusions simply based on quantitative firsts budget, material or technology between two armed forces. Biddle points out that numbers and high tech just maximize the military power according to a high performance employment.

Third, Biddle criticizes the lack of methodological rigor and historical case studies for development of conceptual propositions from which scholars can elaborate diagnoses and prognoses of contemporary international security.

A first consequence of this lack of analytical apparatus is the imprecision on the qualification of the relative abilities of the United States in each region of the globe. For example, in comparison with the possibilities of projecting American power in Europe and Asia, is necessary to access countries’ differentiated political conditions of alignment, the quantitative skills, but mostly qualitative, military power and even the different effects of geography in each scenario.

Another consequence of this weakness is the exaggeration and precipitation of conclusions. For example, if we take the indexes reported by Mearsheimer, Wohlforth and Kennedy as indexes of military power, it is possible to conclude that China has greater military power than Russia right now. However, the Russian development in organization, doctrine and military
technology throughout its military history, besides its nuclear arsenal, put it in better shape to deal with regional security challenges than China.

Therefore, despite the assessment of changes and economic and political trends are important to analyze prospects for international security, these factors allow us understanding the intentions, goals and perceptions of the States. From a standpoint of systemic analysis of international relations, hierarchies of preferences of these states are influenced mainly by the relative capabilities of military power.

So, if there is no advance towards a solid understanding of the grammars of military capabilities, the analysis of international security becomes hostage to the official communications of the foreign ministries, with all its expedient and diversionary contents, and indexes data that allow, as undertaken in this article, only preliminary assessments of contemporary international security.
REFERENCES


Érico Esteves Duarte


APPENDIX 1

Chart 1: GDP comparison between Large Core Countries and Large Peripheral Countries.

Chart 2: Main military expenditure comparison between 1998 and 2008.

Table 1: Nuclear artifacts active stocks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Until 1990</th>
<th>Until 2006</th>
<th>Until 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>9680</td>
<td>5235</td>
<td>1700 to 2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>10996</td>
<td>3503</td>
<td>1700 to 2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>200 a 400</td>
<td>building more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>40 a 50</td>
<td>building more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>30 a 50</td>
<td>following India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>100 a 200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Possibly 1 or 2</td>
<td>until 10</td>
<td>possibly building more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 to 10 years for nuclear capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A Shrinking Gap

China's current-account surplus, the broadest measure of a trade surplus with the rest of the world, appears to be narrowing faster than expected.

Sources: International Monetary Fund; China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange

Map 1: China GRP by province.

Map 2: China GRP per capita by province.

Chart 5: Comparison of per capita income between urban and Rural areas of China, 2005-2009.

Map 3: Claims of maritime sovereignty and natural resources at the South China Sea.

More than six decades of fighting for control in the South and East China Seas, some of the most holy contested waters on Earth

The circles are sized to indicate the number of disputes a country has been involved in; the lines represent the relative composition of parties within disputes.

The graph below represents the number of disputes by decade.

ABSTRACT
This article searches for a preliminary, but structured, assessment of the international security landscape of the 21st century. It focuses on the predictions of offensive realism (Mearsheimer 2001), which are contrasted with conceptual propositions about international standards of unipolarity (Wohlforth 1999; Diniz 2006) and data indexes on the international production of wealth, its allocations in means of military power and the appreciation of alterations in this correlation because of the 2008 Financial Crisis. The article points out that trends of power distributions do not widely favor Russia and China. However, because of the greater Chinese resilience to the crisis, the accumulated value of their military investments overcome all its neighbors and its large demand for natural resources in other countries or areas in dispute have led the organization of major systemic constraints when compared to the Russian case. The paper also shows that these dynamics of regional power do not allow reconsidering the U.S. military primacy. Finally, the article presents some final considerations of methodological and conceptual slant in order to advance on the research in international security.

KEYWORDS
International Security; Military Power; Strategic Studies; Financial Crisis; Armed Forces.

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BEYOND THE ORGANIZED CRIME: THE REFORMULATION OF THE INSURGENCY CONCEPT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE SOUTH AMERICA’S STRATEGIC SURROUNDINGS

Mariano Bartolomé

The organized crime in Latin America and the reformulation of the concept of insurgency

In terms of security, Latin America shows a scenario that presents itself as a contradiction, depending on the eyes which analyze it. Based on a traditional point of view, of Westphalian roots, in which the security questions are centered on interstate dialectics and express themselves as military codes, the hemisphere reality is truly exceptional. Nonetheless, the situation is much less pleasing when we analyze it through non-conventional terms.

From that traditional point of view, the installation and consolidation of democratic regimes all over the region allowed the majority of the everlasting territorial disputes, concrete casus belli, to be solved through diplomatic ways. Along this process, many Security and Trust Construction Measures (CSBMs, initials in Spanish) of different types made contributions to the transformation of old trustless bilateral relations in cooperation ties and common integration initiatives.

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In this context, is important to point out the progress registered in South America, region that describes itself as a Peace Zone, in reference to a geographic area where the state members share the same values (including democracy, among others) and compromise them not to compete in terms of realpolitik. This position was officially adopted on the mid-2002, at the Second Presidential Meeting of the region, organized in Guayaquil, respecting the principles of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OEA, initials in Spanish), taking as predecessors multilateral protocols celebrated by the Andean Community of Nations (CAN, initials in Spanish) and the Common Market of the Conesur (MERCOSUR, initials in Spanish).

It’s fair to highlight that this scenario was dramatically changed by the crisis that happened in March 1st 2008, when Colombia put in practice the joint military operation “Fénix” against a camping of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, initials in Spanish) located in Angostura, a place of the Ecuadorian north, close to the common boundary. This incident started a difficult stage of the relations between Colombia, Ecuador and mainly Venezuela that lasted for about two years. From Casa de Nariño, the Bolivarian regime was accused many times of collaboration with the FARC, while Venezuela accused Colombia of a warmonger act when the latter authorized the USA to use some of its military bases.

Even though it shows great gravity, the mentioned crisis had a positive consequence: the constitution of the South American Defense Council (CDS, initials in Spanish), the first institution of multilateral security created in the region throughout its history. At a meeting celebrated in Lima the May 2011, the council rectified the progress made in Guayaquil almost a decade before, confirming the Peace Zone nature to South America.

Against the positions sustained by orthodox realist perspectives that emphasize the balance of power, this situation is not changed by the notable growth of the budget spent on the military inventory of the region over the last few years, mainly linked up to the expenditures of Brazil, Colombia, Chile and

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Venezuela. In this geographic space we cannot observe arms races and the spending in this sector are inferior to 2% of its GDP, the smallest of the world in relative terms. Of course there is a “security dilemma” on the relations between Chile and Peru\(^3\), but both OEA through its XL General Assembly (June 2010) and CDS from its Extraordinary Meeting November 2011 had assumed the responsibility of drawing mechanisms of making the arms expenditures more transparent and avoid this kind of perceptions.

The positive scenario of security that is described in the previous paragraphs coexists with a much more complicated situation in terms of non-conventional threats to security, an outlook in which the hemisphere loses its relatives advantages to integrate an unstable and volatile global board, with high levels of uncertainty.

The non-conventional threats to security spot just three regular aspects: their protagonists are non-state actors; the use of violence as a rational political tool is not always used and, when it’s the case, it is out of the traditional formats associated with the Clausewitzian logic, introducing itself into what is commonly known as asymmetry. Besides these elements, this realm is known for its heterogeneity, incremented by different processes of securization\(^4\), resulting in a situation that was symbolically defined as “strategic uncertainty”, or “globalization of fear”. Namely, a permanent perception of insecurity that reaches every individual, without allowing them to ignore it, in which the dangers and threats don’t feature a clear source nor territorial and political limits for their actions.\(^5\)

\(^3\) In a situation of this kind, the decisions made by a nation through its sovereign exercise of the right to retain the means it thinks are necessary to feel secure unintentionally cause insecurity in its neighbor states; in other words, the “search for security” that leads these actors is interpreted by the rest as a simple “search for power”.

\(^4\) From a constructivist perspective, the “securization” is a discursive and political process in which a political community decides to treat something as a threat towards a valued object of reference, allowing the adoption of urgent and exceptional measures to respond that threat.

Inside the non-conventional security agenda the transnational threats insert themselves and their dynamics – as with any process of this nature – transcend the possibilities of a state reaching two or more political actors of the kind. These phenomena are also denominated as “new threats”, a wrong idea that leads to confusion because, with one or another exception associated to the cybernetic question, such events are not new in the global arena; in any case, they differ from older times in some characteristics and also have changed the importance acquired in the external agenda of the states.

A closed list of transnational threats does not exist in the scope of International Security, or a hierarchy showing their different grades of importance. Things are like that because the surroundings of these phenomena are diffuse, people use different focuses to analyze them, and their gravity varies according to space and temporal criteria. Either way, it is necessary to try to do some basic identification because, quoting the Spanish intellectual Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, “naming what hurts us help us to protect ourselves”⁶. To that effect, among the transnational threats’ inventory of Latin America the organized crime, through different labels, can be highlighted.

It is common to link directly the criminal question (mainly when related to expansion, growth and depth of its action) to governance, which deterioration beyond reasonable levels may concede space to a erosion of the state capacity of exercising authority over all the territory and monopolize the use of violence in an effective way. The logic of this link is that in a process as described above, a symptom of a state “weakening”?⁷, the loss of control over geographic spaces increasingly bigger makes them attractive to organizations tied to criminality and also terrorism that can start their activities from these places.

Concerning the organized crime, Latin America finds itself completely inserted in global schemes of this transnational threat which dimensions are truly enormous: on the final document of the Latin American Commission on

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⁶ Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, foreword to “Notas sobre globalizadores y globalizados”, in Geopolítica Del Caos, multiple authors. (Barcelona: Le Monde Diplomatique/Temas de Debate, 1999), 15.
Drugs and Democracy, created by three ex-presidents of the region, one can identify four different characteristics of the Latin American organized crime: (i) its quantitative growth, both through international traffic and control of domestic markets by competing groups; (ii) the growth of violence, reaching every sector of society; (iii) the proliferation of links with the political realm and the proliferation within democratic institutions; finally, (iv) the corruption of public employees, especially members of the security groupings and policemen.

According to data from OAS, the criminal violence in Latin America has a “pandemic” character and costs to the Latin Americans more than US$ 16bi per year; on the other hand, the region has just 8% of the world population and almost 70% of extortive kidnappings that occur every year. In line with evaluations made by a NGO specialized in urban violence, 24 of the 25 most violent cities of the world are Latin American, being the only exception the North American city of New Orleans holding the 21st place. The list is headed by the Honduran city of San Pedro Sula, with a homicide rate bigger than 159 cases for every 100 thousand inhabitants (159/00000), followed by Ciudad Juárez in Mexico with 148/00000. Some authors talk about the “five wars of globalization” in reference to the identical quantity of predominant expressions of the organized crime.

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10 The report also points out that five out of the ten more violent cities of the world are located in Mexico; 45 out of the 50 most violent cities are located in America, of which 40 are located in Latin America; the most violent sub-national jurisdiction is located in Honduras and three of the ten most violent sub-national jurisdictions are Hondurans; and 19 out of the 50 most violent sub-national jurisdictions are located in Mexico or Central America. For more data, see: Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justicia Penal, Metodología del ranking (2011) de las 50 ciudades y las 50 jurisdicciones subnacionales más violentas del mundo. (México DF: CCSP, 2012)
11 According to some sources, the real homicide rate of Ciudad Juárez is much bigger than the data indicated by official organisms, and in fact it would be the biggest of the world: 191 cases out of 100 thousand inhabitants. See: “Criminalidad y violencia en América Latina iniciando la segunda década del Siglo XXI”, Informes Del GERIUP. (January 11th 2012).
nowadays: the illegal traffic of drugs, armaments, people, intellectual property and money\textsuperscript{12}. The first three have been denominated “transboundary transactions of high value” by a specialist on the subject\textsuperscript{13}, a concept that we don’t share because of the variation of the “value” of a illegal transboudary transaction according to the place and the moment that it occurs, not being convenient to limit it to just three types of traffic.

In Latin America one can find these five manifestations of criminality, along with other ones such as the contraband of the most diverse goods, or the traffic of fauna, biodiversity and gemstones. But these types are not present with the same intensity. Clearly the drugs’ traffic and production and also the traffic of small arms and light weapons stand out because of their gravity. The key value that these features represent inside the map of Latin American organized crime is also proven by an exhaustive survey made by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which focused on five specific illegal transnational flows: cocaine, heroin, small arms and light weapons, migration and human traffic\textsuperscript{14}.

Concerning the weapon traffic, according to data presented some years ago by the non-governmental entity \textit{Oxfam}, there are almost 700 million light weapons all around the world, representing nearly one weapon for each ten inhabitants. About 60\% of these arms are in hands of civil people, while a fourth part of them is sold in illegal markets or smuggled, which means these weapons end in possession of offenders, insurgent groups or criminals\textsuperscript{15}. Based on this data, one can suppose that Latin America concentrates about a half of the illegal weapons in circulation in the world, if the numbers estimated by the


\textsuperscript{13} The concept is related to Moisés Naím and was taken out from: Ivan Briscoe, “Crimen y drogas en los Estados frágiles”, \textit{Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE)}, 20 de julio de 2007, http://www.fride.org/publicacion/151/cremen-y-drogas-en-los-estados-fragiles


\textsuperscript{15} These data were concluded at the UN Conference on Traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), which occurred in New York between June and July 2006. The event allowed this problem, responsible for the majority of the deaths by armed violence in the world, to be known in a detailed and updated way.
Defense Information Center (DIC) from Washington, which calculate them as more than 80 million, are taken in account\(^\text{16}\).

Regarding the drugs problem, South America plays an important role: without accounting marginal amounts of heroin and cannabis, the subcontinent is responsible for the total of the cocaine produced globally. In its last annual report, the UNODC stated that the area dedicated to illegal culturing of this drug hung around the 153,7 thousand hectares in 2011, which 64 thousand, or 41.6% of the global amount, are located in Colombia; 62.5 thousand (40.7%) in Peru; and 27.2 thousand in Bolivia (17.7%).

The cocaine produced in these three Andean countries is the tip of an iceberg with global dimensions. The illegal culture of the coca leaf; its transport through different ways, racking and storage; its sales to giant distributors and posterior commercialization to consumers; the payment of protection services to ensure each one of these phases; and the corruption of public employees configure together a multimillionaire business. Just considering that the coca croppers, peasants with few resources and low level of education, can receive between US$ 300 and US$ 500 for the number of leaves necessary to produce a kilogram of cocaine is enough. This cocaine, when leaves Colombia, costs about one thousand dollars, in Guatemala it is cataloged costing US$ 13,000, in the USA its value reaches the US$ 30, 000 and, when it goes to Europe, the price can hit more than US$ 160,000\(^\text{17}\). Even though one cannot affirm precisely the amount of money of these illegal processes, UNODC calculates the annual total as something between US$ 75bi and US$100bi\(^\text{18}\).

Beyond the South American framework, even though the importance of Europe as a consumer market of the Andean cocaine is notably growing, doubling its share in the last few years, the USA still holds the first spot, hoarding up 36% of the global production, or 157 tons. The long path roamed by the South American cocaine to reach its main market helps us to understand a great part of the violence observed in other parts of the hemisphere, once it

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\(^{17}\) “La Conferencia Internacional de Apoyo a la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica”, Informes del GERIUP (June 29th 2011).

crosses the isthmus and Mexico when travels northbound. It is estimated that more than 80% of the cocaine that passes through Mexican and Central American lands tend to make it through the North American market, with the other 20% planning an insertion into the European market.

In Central America, the cocaine traffic from the Andean countries involves, on its path to the North American market, both Mexican cartels (such as *infra*) and local gangs, which account more than 70 thousand members. This way, a truly severe deterioration of the security conditions of the region is helped out, which, according to the World Bank, diminishes the hopes for peace and stability that followed the resolutions of the civil wars\(^{19}\). According to the first World Report on Homicides, presented last year by the UNODC, the Caribbean and the Central America are the only two regions of the world where the number of homicides has increased when compared to 1995. In fact, with 6.2 thousand assassinations and a population of 7.7mi (murder rate of 82/00000), Honduras is the most violence country of the planet, followed by El Salvador with four thousand homicides and a population of 6.1mi inhabitants\(^{20}\).

Endorsing this quantitative data, Douglas Fraser, chief of the North American South Command, has declared in the beginning of last year (2011) that the Central American area “probably has become the more ‘deadliest’ zone of the planet, aside Iraq and Afghanistan”\(^{21}\). Validating this overwhelming appreciation, the homicide taxes of some cities of this region, such as the Honduran city of San Pedro Sula, located in the north of the country, are equal to the ones registered in Mogadishu (Somalia) or the Afghan location of Kandahar.

A similar situation is noted in Mexico, where the protagonist status of drug traffic aiming USA is shared by six big cartels that work in the Aztecan territory (one from *Sinaloa*, one from *Ciudad Juárez*, other from *Tijuana*, one from the Mexican Gulf, the *Familia Michoacana* – almost disappearing

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nowadays – and Los Zetas), complemented by many other less-known but equally important groups (among them: La Línea, Los Aztecas, Los Mexicas and Los Caballeros Templarios). According to the well-known specialist Eduardo Buscaglia, the Mexican criminal groups are today the third most important in the world, behind the Russian mafia and the Chinese triad, and ahead of the Italian mafia and the Colombian cartels22.

As shown by official statistics of the Attorney General of the Republic of Mexico (PGR, initials in Spanish), in just a lustrum, since Felipe Calderón took office as President of Mexico in the end of 2006 until similar moment of 2011, the violence associated to the organized crime produced almost 50 thousand deaths, number to which must me added something around 1.5 mi of displaced people and 5.4 thousand people reported as missing by the National Commission on Human Rights. The non-official numbers raise the quantity of homicides to more than 60 thousand, according to the following progression: in the last month of 2006, 62 deaths; 2826 in 2007; 6837 in 2008; 19546 in 2010; and 20646 in 201123.

From the more than 60 thousand deaths caused by criminality, 80 per cent is concentrated in just a dozen of the 32 Mexican states. The first place is held by Chihuahua, with 12.7 thousand assassinations, the majority in Ciudad Juárez, which disputes the dramatic role of the most violent city of the world. The Chihuahua State Commission on Human Rights has documented 12 thousand orphan children in this boundary city and more than 120 thousand displaced people because of the violence. The second place is occupied by Sinaloa, with seven thousand deaths, and in third place Guerrero, with 5.1 thousand24.

In through this wave of criminal violence that characterized the presidential tenure of Calderón, probably the most critical episode was registered in August 2011, when Los Zetas was the main character of an

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22 Buscaglia is an expert recognized by the United Nations, is a Professor at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) and directs the International Law and Economic Development Center.
explosive attempt killed 60 people in a Monterrey casino when of daylight. The words expressed in that moment by the Mexican Executive Power reflected the dimension of these events:

“It is evident that we are not facing common criminals. We are in front of truly terrorists that have got over us not only within the limits of the law, but also within the common element sense of respect for life”.

The “Conflicts Barometer” that is elaborated by the Heidelberg University provides an eloquent example of the current perceptions on some academic center of the so-called First World about the gravity of the Mexican case. In the year of 2010 the German institution had already included Mexico in the group of the six most dangerous countries of the planet, with levels of violence only comparable to the ones from Somalia, Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In a scale from 1 to 5, Mexico was credited the maximum rate, which means “war”. It means, according to the analysis, that the country lives “a conflict in which the violent use of force happens in an organized and systematic way, and in which the destruction is massive and of large duration”.

Along the described context, the versions that highlighted the severe problems of governance that the criminal organizations cause to the Mexican State have become stronger again to gamble with its “fault” in the medium term, if the conditions are not reverted. It is useful to remember that this kind of interpretation has started in the beginning of the year of 2009 in the USA, when its Department of Defense qualified Mexico as a “Failed State” along with Pakistan; shortly after, a top official of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has commented that a possible collapse at the south of the border was among the main security problems of the institution.

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The Calderón Government has permanently denied this accusation arguing – from our point of view correctly – that in Mexico clear losses of control of geographic areas to non-state challengers, a key characteristic of a “Failed State”, are yet to be registered. Neither the institutional perspective proportionate a solid argument to the idea of “failing” once the failure would be limited to just a small part of the federal structure; in fact, the ones related to security, intelligence, police and justice activities.

Nonetheless, disturbing territorial progress by the criminal gangs are being registered recently, typified as symptoms of an incipient refeudalization that destroy what was gained in the Revolution with its counterpart of disarmament and demobilization of irregular groups. Even though large geographic areas taken away from the State in a traditional way are yet to be detected, an investigation leaded by the Senate few years ago proved that the cartels completely controlled (through corruption and cooptation of officials) around 195 town halls and had direct influence over another 1536, which totaled 71% of the 2439 Mexican cities.

Certain areas, particularly relevant for the illegal traffic because of their proximity to the North American territory, have seen the multiplied presence of criminal groups, which face long and fierce battles for their control.

Watching these progresses, the hypothesis of a state failure has returned to be part of the thought of many experts, both national and international, with a novelty: the supposed existence of an insurgency is now integrating the analysis. North American officials can be found among the ones who agree with this point of view, despite the White House officially classifying the Mexican organizations as transnational criminals.

It was the case of Richard Lugar, the best ranked Republican in the Foreign Relations Commission of the Senate and one of the most influent members of the Capitol, when he declared that the violence associated to the organized crime in Mexico had acquired characteristics of a “drug insurgency” because the cartels try to limit the government control in some parts of the

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28 Raúl Benítez Manaut, op. cit.
country, convincing the population that the military offensive and the political reforms of President Calderón are futile and, therefore, the reason of the violence spiral.

Starring the first reference on importance of the Mexican drug insurgency, Lugar has emphasized the increasing infrastructure of the Azteca cartels in USA, including distribution networks, safe houses and money laundering operations. In these terms, he has sustained that the problem has direct influence on the national security of his country and thus has demanded the use of the Armed Forces and the intelligence community to the Obama administration so that more active vigilance could be offered to help stopping the illegal transnational trafficking from Mexico. In this sense, has proposed “deploying airplanes, surveillance and joint intelligence goods” and “adapting the tactics to face the cartel changing menaces”30.

Because of these moments, the aforementioned Buscaglia has contributed to this question stating the Mexican organized criminality is already part of the State, being present in different areas of its. Textually: “When we speak that the Mexican State has fragmented itself in its debility, we want to say that different fragments of the Mexican State in a municipal or provincial level already form part of the structure of the organized crime”. This expert has gone beyond the conventional classifications to postulate, based on these local or regional fragments, an incipient “Afghanization” of the State; namely, its absence in almost a thousand of regional areas in which the criminal cartels have shaken or captured the municipal governments to therefore continue their illegal business. The analogy with the Afghan situation progress until the point of typifying the Mexican criminal gangs as “insurgent mafia”, because they face the State in equal terms and carry out complex operations similar to the ones accomplished by the Taliban to ambush North American or Allied troops31.

Almost two years after the appreciation made by Lugar, this vision continued to enjoy validation and the second civil mandatory of the North American Army, Joseph Westphal, alleged that the criminal insurgents could

31 “Cárteles controlan casi mil territorios del país, dice experto”, Informador (June 27th, 2010).
end controlling Mexico. At the same time, the proposal of employing new arms and tactics to face the cartels made by the veteran Senator reigned in purlieu cities next to the south border, where the local police demanded to the political authorities: armored vehicles; communicational military teams; M-16, M-14 automatic weapons and grenade launchers; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); and the corresponding trainings, including combat tactics.

According to the Texas Public Security director, who has reported in a number of occasions to the Congress, the growth and complexity of the Mexican cartels activities near the common border are the causes of the police demands, which many times are satisfied by donations from the Defense Department\(^\text{32}\).

The North American academy also formulated interpretations on the organized criminality in terms of insurgency. The independent think tank Center for a New American Security (CNAS) published a dossier entitled “Criminal Wars: Gangs, Cartels and North American National Security” two years ago. In its content, they indicate that the organized crime “metastasizes in a new organized criminal insurgency” that menaces the governments and civil societies of the Western Hemisphere and, more and more, the USA\(^\text{33}\).

One of the authors of the aforementioned dossier sustained that into the criminal insurgencies the search for earnings (economic) occupy the place that in other circumstances correspond to the ideology, religion or ethnic group. He added that this recent phenomenon erodes and punches the political institutions and the societies of democratic States through corruption and violence, pursuing the establishment of geographic areas where then can develop their activities in an unstoppable way.

Concerning the USA, source of these new approaches, it seems that these Mexican criminal insurgencies represent a real menace to the North American welfare, although the growth and consolidation of these non-state actors foreshadow them as potential direct menaces to the national security of the superpower. This idea is sustained as follows:

\(^{32}\) “Criminalidad y violencia en América Latina iniciando la segunda década del Siglo XXI”, Informes Del GERIUP (January 11th 2012).

“The Mexican cartels operate psychological operations, foment the antigovernment protests, attack both the police and the Armed Forces through infantry assaults, assassinate politicians and journalists, decapitate their victims to amplify the strategic impact of their attacks, co-opt and corrupt military men, policemen and public officials at all levels of government. The result is an extreme banditry and a group of criminal insurgents that are interconnected, resulting in a virtual civil war. In consequence, some Mexican cartels have combined high levels of violence, symbols and religious rituals, and political action to consolidate their control over the huge business that they intend to master. They also look for the legitimate of the community, cultivation the popular perception that they are protectors of the society”34.

In this area, the most recent conceptual contribution belongs to Ioan Grillo, specialist in studies on the Mexican and Central American criminality. From his perspective, what defines Mexican organized crime as a case of criminal insurgency is the will of the protagonists to face the State through a type of armed rebellion that doesn’t sustain itself on any kind of ideology thinking. So, despite the influence of ideological factors, the Mexican criminality is at the same time a political and paramilitary phenomenon. Political because of its decision to face the State forces in order to preserve the preservation of its businesses; paramilitary because of the well-armed and very specialized armies that are formed to accomplish the previous objective.

From this British reporter’s point of view, the evolution of the Mexican organized crime until the present insurgency stage recognizes the year of 2006 as a critical point. This year these groups have started to apply violence systematically and to fight for the control of territory through the use of tactics to spread terror, as it has in Central America some decades before. There is a transformation from a classic “war for drugs” to a new “war for feoffs” (the idea of refeudalism stated before by Benítez Manaut) financed by the drugs; the difference, albeit slight, is really important. Textually:

“The motivations of the gangsters define in many aspects what they really are. If they kill civilians deliberately and on purpose, they behave as terrorists. If what they look after is to hold the monopoly of the use of violence in certain territory, they behave like warlords. And if they are fighting a total war against the central government, many would allege that they are rebels or insurgents”35.

The aforementioned readings, elaborated by Lugar, Buscaglia, the CNAS and Grillo, have a great significance since then deconstruct and redefine the concept of insurgency. Beyond its different approaches, it has traditionally been understood as “the prolonged use of low intensity violence to nullify or force a fundamental change on the political system or its status quo”36. On the other hand, the North American Department of Defense makes reference to “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks the removal of a governing authority or to force its change”37. A third interpretation understands the insurgent movements as “an organic group of men who rise against the established order and which objectives are embodied on basic documents”38. In this last case, the armed warfare is the way through which the rising is canalized, despite the non-explicit mention.

Whatever the definitions that were just described, the insurgency (like the terrorism) remains attached to the political violence sphere, understood as that violence that comes from organized agents that look to change, substitute or destabilize the current State institutionalization39.

This deconstruction and redefinition, mainly of North American precedence, has not been able to conquer the adhesion of Mexican experts. From their point of view, even when the local criminal groups increasingly

36 Here is used the simplified definition of: Steven Metz, The Future of Insurgency. (Carlisle Barracs: USAWC, Strategic Studies Institute, 2012)
appeal to terrorist tactics, they cannot be named this way neither as insurgents because of a myriad of motivations, including the following three: (i) the criminality lack the type of wanting that characterizes the insurgency groups, that use to attach themselves to some kind of collective identity, have a political content and include some government program; consequently (ii) the criminal gangs do not have a symbolic representation as defendants of the people; last (iii) the insurgencies might (and have to) be considered as valid interlocutors for the State in the frame of a political negotiation that tend to solve intrastate armed conflicts, a thing that does not happen with criminality40.

Deepening the subject, although there are a great number of works that approach the interaction between political violence (insurgencies or terrorism) and organized crime, these lectures usually defend that in this nexus the first type is the one which might venture criminal activities and not the other way round. It can be mentioned two different analytical approaches to the dynamics that are established between the parts, the first suggesting that the relation must start from a specific necessity of the insurgent or terrorist, which might be related to financing or equipment; examples would be the engagement with drug trafficking or the incursion to the weapons commercialization business, respectively.

Some organizational and operational characteristics that are shared between the political violence and the criminality ease the described process, including the rationality; the secret action; the challenge to the State and its laws; the asymmetric use of violence; and the innovation and adaptation capabilities. Nonetheless, the terrorists or insurgents have never abjured the political points of their goals, or forsworn publicizing and diffusing their actions, while the criminal organizations act depending on economic reasons and pursue keeping the anonymity41.

The alternative analytical approach, which does complement the last one, proposes that although the organized crime and the political violence are different phenomena, the increasing interaction between them may make room for a situation of “motivational convergence”. In this process of progressive convergence, the resulting surplus of the criminal activities might be able to build the goal of all insurgent or terrorist organizations, or at least part of them, though they don’t abdicate their political flags in order to maintain their legitimacy before the eyes of their retinues or sympathizers.

Concrete examples of this second approach would be the Afghan taliban and the aforementioned Colombian FARC. In both cases the groups, in a specific moment of their histories, start to collect taxes first from the peasants engaged to the drug trafficking business, later expanding it to the processing and commercialization activities. The last stage of this process of growing engagement would be the above organizations posing themselves as narcotic dealers42.

From the vision of Makarenko, the referred motivational convergence is explained by a “rebellion-crime nexus” that adopts the form of a continuous, with the criminality on an extreme of the spectrum and the insurgency on the other one, and the two of them are considered different phenomena. In between the two extremes, are presented the different possibilities of interaction (Frame number one)43.

In front of this panorama, the true importance of the redefinition of the insurgency concept by Lugar, the CNAS and Grillo is located on the privation of its traditional political connotation, emphasizing its most clear effect, weaken or stop the functions of a government, especially its control over certain territorial spaces, independently of its main goal44. In the completely opposite direction of the traditional writings, it is not watched here the incursion of insurgent organizations to the criminality field, but just the contrary.

Frame number one: Rebellion-crime nexus.

Alliance with crime 
Operational insurgents use of violence convergence 
Motivational involvement taxing 
Instrumental Insurgency 
Alliance/Ideological

The South American scenario opposite the new focus on Insurgency

An approach on the present South American scenario in terms of insurgency, from a traditional perspective of this concept, has been limited to two residual cases of other times and at the same time true remnants of the Cold War: on one side, the FARC in their own country; on the other, the Sendero Luminoso (SL) in Peru. Both organizations have started to enter the criminality field a long time ago, progressively denaturing themselves to the point of being normally typified in the crime scope.

Concerning the FARC, their turning point in direction of the organized crime has started in the beginning of the 1990’s, with the frame being a reorientation generated by the death of their leader, Jacobo Arenas, who used to maintain the ideological and doctrinal purity of the organization. This process was marked by a profound reorganization of the Colombian criminality scenario, originated by the loss and breakup of the mythical drug trafficking cartels in Cali and Medellín. In the mid of the decade the country’s Justice has acted in accordance to this change and has emitted almost fifty arrest warrants against hierarchs and intermediaries of the group for drug trafficking. The list included the founder and maximum chief of the organization, Manuel Marulanda Vélez (aka “Tirofijo”), besides Luis Edgar Devia (“Raúl Reyes”), Luciano Marín (“Iván Márquez”), Guillermo Sánchez Vargas (“Alfonso Cano”), and Jorge Briceño Suárez (“Mono Jojoy”).

It has been said of the FARC that in other times they used to be an ideological insurgency, but they have soon become a “criminal bunch of drug dealers with brutal expressions of contra productive terrorism”. Broadening this idea, the Salvadoran Joaquín Villalobos has said: “They have started extorting drug dealers and ended being the owners of the biggest cocaine production of the world. They have wandered from a political Latin America guerrilla to the
first irregular army of the drug traffic”\textsuperscript{45}. The remarkable of this last phrase is that it was not emitted by a Colombian official, but by an old leader of the \textit{Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front} (FMLN), unhappy with the change of the organization towards the criminal activities.

There are plenty of evidences on the levels of complexity and transnationality that the criminal actions of the FARC have reached. These constancies have dramatically increased since the information obtained from the personal computers of Raúl Reyes, found in the Angostura camps, where this insurgent chief was killed during the \textit{Operación Fénix} that was mentioned in the initial part of this paper\textsuperscript{46}.

In this sense, can also be mentioned the ties with criminal groups of Brazil; the arms trafficking in Peru, where else they are able to coordinate actions with \textit{Sendero Luminoso}, cultivate coca in the Amazonian territory and forcibly recruit indigenes; the installation of sanctuaries in Ecuador and Venezuela; the legalization of actives precedents from Costa Rica or other Central American nations; in Mexico, the link with criminal cartels and the \textit{Popular Revolutionary Army} (EPR, initials in Spanish); the execution of extortive kidnappings in Paraguay, jointly operating with the \textit{Patria Libre} party; the ties with the Basque separatist organization ETA and the Ireland Republican Army (IRA); the contacts with the recently defeated Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, looking for the acquisition of anti-aircraft missiles; the significant net of European NGOs that back them and promote their ideals (the official ones, not the criminals, of course); and the support of the Latin American political forces centered on the Bolivarian Continental Movement (CCB, initials in Spanish).


\textsuperscript{46} We find the reports emitted by the Colombian government concerning the information from the personal computers of Raúl Reyes faithful, and also consider reliable the verification made by INTERPOL, which details are open to public. See: OIPC-INTERPOL, \textit{Informe forense de Interpol sobre los ordenadores y equipos informáticos de las FARC decomisados por Colombia}. (Lyon: OIPC-INTERPOL, 2008)
In the past four years the FARC have suffered the worst losses of their entire history. In February 2008 their founder and leader “Tirofijo” has died; in March Raúl Reyes and Iván Ríos had the same destiny, finalized by their own bodyguard; “Mono Jojoy” was killed in September 2010 and Alfonso Cano in October 2011. Concerning Nelly Ávila Moreno (“Karina”), the maximum female chief of the group, she has surrendered in May 2008 in undernourishment state so she could make a public claim to her old comrades to put their guns down and reintegrate society. One must add to these misfortunes the Operación Jaque, which has rescued ten refugees of the group, including the political director and ex-presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, in the mid of the year of 2008. Throughout the whole process, thousands of insurgents have deserted from the organization, which has lost the required capacity to make big operations and had to be satisfied with isolated and sporadic assaults.

In the end of the previous year (2011), the Colombian Armed Forces Command has estimated that the FARC ranks had no more than nine thousand active personnel, number that supposed a reduction of 50 percent in the body of the organization when compared to the situation of eight or nine years ago. In this context, analyses speculating the definite defeat of this group in the short run, or at least the acceptance of negotiations with the government, a clear sign of fragility, have started to crop up.

Precisely, some delegations sent by the Colombian government and the FARC have gone through some really secret exploratory dialogues in Cuba between February and August 2012, which have resulted the signature of an accord in Oslo through which public and official negotiations were inaugurate.

Concerning Sendero, this armed group has emerged with a Maoist stamp in the beginnings of the 80’s and was appointed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru as the responsible for more than a half of the seventy thousand fatal victims that the internal war which occurred in the last two decades of the 20th century has left. As soon as the main leaders of the

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47 “FARC están reducidas al 50% frente a hace 8 años”, ABC (Asunción), December 18, 2011.
48 See for example: Eduardo Posada Carbo, “¿El fin de las FARC?”, Infolatam, November 06, 2011.
49 SL was created with a clear Maoist philosophy in the end of the 1960s by the Professor Abimael Guzmán and has always claimed the title of ‘Communist Party of Peru’. It has been aiming to change the existing institutions for a communist, peasant and revolutionary regime. In the 1970s it has achieved
organization were jailed, the organization was virtually disarticulated, but since a little more than a decade ago remaining people have started to act in the Valley of the Apurimac and Ene Rivers forest zone (VRAE, initials in Spanish). This residual senderism has been linked more and more to the drug trafficking business, obtaining this way the funds to sustain its operations and acquire armament.

In the frame of this criminalization process, the senderistas evolved from the protection of the drug that was transferred out of this zone of the Department of Ayacucho, to the direct participation in the seeding of the coca leaf, its harvest and posterior transformation in cocaine hydrochloride. Few years ago a dossier made by the Ministry of Defense has affirmed that the SL behaves “like an enterprise more dedicated to the illegal drug traffic in the VRAE”. This perspective was ratified by the minister Ántero Flores-Aráoz, who has asserted that the ideological component of the senderistas had diluted with a function of “society” with the drug trafficking50.

In the mid of the past decade, the remaining senderistas have extended their activities beyond the borders of Peru, affirming their transnationality. This way, the SL has started to rob banks in Bolivia and to sell drugs in low class neighborhoods of Buenos Aires51. At the same time, has it has resumed the armed actions in the VRAE with increasing levels of violence, including assaults against military and police headcounts; the capacity obtained by the group was in evidence in the end of the year of 2009, when it managed to bring down a Mi-27 helicopter of Russian origin using an anti-aircraft machine gun of 12.7mm and a RPG grenade launcher in the middle of the forest.

On the other hand, the government has launched the intensive use of its Armed Forces to face this problem, executing huge operations. These actions were made with great difficulty and limited success, which a Peruvian expert

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51 “Senderistas se capitalizan en Bolivia”, La Razón, March 7th, 2009; Leonardo de Corso y Virginia Messi, “Cómo funciona el mayor centro de venta de drogas”, Clarín, April 18th, 2010.
has attributed to the evolution of the tactics and enrollments of the SL, faster than the updating of the military doctrine of the country; in this sense, makes parallelisms with the action of the USA in Afghanistan. Textually: “For any Armed Force, the doctrine ends being equivalent to the software that is going to be applied to its hardware, which is all the equipment. The doctrine is important because it tells you how a organization is going to battle, if it is the case of facing a non-state and asymmetric enemy, which is exactly what happens in the VRAE”52.

The updating of the Peruvian Armed Forces, mainly in terms of asymmetric combat, picking and analyzing combat information, and joint operations, has allowed the greatest effectiveness in February 2012, when the so-called “Comrade Artemio”, maximum leader of the SL in the VRAE was captured (seriously injured after a combat with the official forces). Aside from this important strike, at the very moment of the closure of this paper the remaining criminal senderistas have not laid down their arms.

Nonetheless, the South American situation in terms of insurgency is completely different of the one expressed in the precedent paragraphs if the traditional focus of this concept is opened up and the readings about the deterioration of the Mexican situation are adopted. In this case, in the South American space the existing insurgencies raise from two to four, with the possibility of including a fifth episode. To the aforementioned FARC and SL are added the Emerging Criminal Bands in Colombia (BACRIM, initials in Spanish), the criminal organizations located in the big urban agglomerations of Brazil and even the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP, initials in Spanish).

The BACRIM were typified has the new armed enemy of the State by the Ministry of Interior and Justice of Colombia. The drug traffic is the founding base of the activities of these groups, of which origins go back to the year of 2006, when the process of disarmament and demobilization of the paramilitary groups centered on the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC, initials in Spanish) has ended, result of an agreement with the then-President Álvaro Uribe. The members of the groups that have not accepted the

government invitation and have continued to stay out of the law reorganized themselves into new criminal entities that today total nearly seven thousand troops. The most important groups at the national level, bearing in mind both their dimensions and their territorial domain, are the Paisas, Rastrojos, Urabeños, Popular Revolutionary Antiterrorist Army of Colombia (ERPAC, initials in Spanish), Nueva Generación and Águilas Negras.

Concerning Brazil, in the favelas of its most populated cities, mainly Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, the bases of many criminal organizations linked mostly to drug trafficking can be found, and in a secondary place also other illegal activities like prostitution, gambling, arms trafficking, contraband and extortion.

The power and dimension of these groups, among them the Primeiro Comando da Capital from São Paulo and the Comando Vermelho from Rio de Janeiro, is so big that the operations headed by the State to demobilize them count cents of specialized policemen, backed logistically by the Armed Forces. For example, the operations against criminality developed in the last two years in the favelas of Vila Cruzeiro, Complexo do Alemão or Rocinha were executed by provincial and federal police units that have entered these agglomerations through the use of armored vehicles of the Marine Infantry.

Finally, the EPP is result of the regrouping of old members of the Patria Libre Party. Though it defines itself as a revolutionary group of Marxist-Leninist principles, with ideological elements related to the ideas of the local caudillo Francisco Solano López, its activities are clearly oriented towards the surplus obtained through the making of extortive kidnappings of important ranchers. The Paraguayan authorities affirm that the group is linked to the FARC and its members receive from the Colombian group training in rural combat and kidnapping execution.

After the EPP has invaded a ranch causing the killings of four people five years ago, the Executive has sent different police and military groupings to the North of the national territory. The initiatives included the deployment of thousands of troops that, however, could not be able to stop the main leaders of the group. Throughout the process, the problem has started to concern the Brazilian government and parliament because of the “spill” it could cause over their territory. A measure taken because of this restlessness was provided by the
ex-president José Sarney, who has admitted to fear that the increasing of the activities of the EPP could produce a “colombianization” of Paraguay53.

**Some conclusions**

Inside the Latin American security panorama, the low levels of conflict in Westphalian terms that are registered coexist with a dynamic and heterogeneous agenda in terms of non-conventional threats. These threats deploy themselves in a transnational way and are represented by non-state actors that use the violence, as a rational political tool, asymmetrically. In this frame, the organized crime occupies a preponderant place, highlighting the Andean area as a cocaine producer zone, and Mexico and the Central American isthmus being a drug trafficking corridor aiming the USA, the main consumer market of the world.

In this context, the increase and complexity of the organized crime in Mexico has urged the dawn of a current of thought that reformulates the concept of insurgency in order to apply it to the Azteca case. The reformulation of the insurgency overlooks the political nature of the goals of who leads it, playing down its setting into the political violence realm. At the same time, it disregards the traditional approaches that understand that, in case of links between insurgency and criminality, the first is the one that changes itself in order to enter the field of the second.

The reformulated approach of insurgency emphasizes its debility or stopping effect on the right exercise of the government functions, mainly its effective control over all the national territory. The instrumental aspects of insurgency occupy the center of the question, displacing the pursued goals from this position. In this link between insurgency and criminality, it is the second factor the one that adapts the first’s physiognomy.

An application of this new concept of insurgency, emerged at the heat of the deterioration of the Mexican situation in terms of criminality, to the South American security panorama generates important repercussions. From a

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quantitative point of view, the common diagnosis that consist on the existence of two residual insurgencies characterized more and more by a drug-terrorist stamp, the FARC and the SL, give room to other works that raise the number of insurgencies to no less than five: to the frianos and senderistas are added the BACRIM, Brazilian organizations that act in the favelas of the biggest cities of Brazil and the Paraguayan EPP.

Qualitatively, the analysis of South America from the new interpretation of insurgency allows the formation of at least three important conclusions. First, it establishes that the South American insurgency is not a decreasing phenomenon but, on the contrary, a increasing one; second, it stops confining the insurgency to the Andean zone, with the geographical and cultural particularities that it has, to extend it to other parts of the region; finally, also in space terms, it stops thinking it as a quasi-rural phenomenon to link it to the analysis of urban surroundings.

In addition to these qualitative and quantitative changes, an eventual consolidation of these new approaches on insurgency may generate other effects on South America. First, in respect to the use of military instruments, bearing in mind that a combat against criminality does not represent the same thing that one against an enemy that challenges its control over the territory and the exercise of authority; second, in respect to the treatment used towards the insurgents, once the resolution of an insurgency case can be developed from a “political” deal with the counterpart, a thing that the criminal bands have not access to; third, the new perspectives might generate repercussions, both cooperative and doctrinal, in terms of security, especially in the frame of the multilateral institutions, like the South American Security Council (CDS, initials in Spanish) of UNASUR.
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ABSTRACT
The Latin America’s geographic space is prodigal with non-conventional threats to the security of the states, the societies and the individuals which integrate it. These threats are characterized by their transnational dynamics, the non-state character of their protagonists and the asymmetrical use of violence.

Inside this outlook we can highlight the organized criminality, which is present in every region of the hemisphere, showing different features in each case. The case of Mexico can be emphasized because of its gravity, typified by research centers and experts as an example of a new form of insurgency. This readings force us to reformulate the concept of insurgency, defining it with more attention to the question of territorial control than the political motivation of its acts.

Based on the outlook described, the objective of this paper is to apply the reformulation of the concept of insurgency to the South America’s scenario. In order to do this, the scope of this concept will be established, concrete cases of application will be identified, as well as their impacts on the regional strategic surroundings and the multilateral cooperation about security.

KEYWORDS
Security; South America; Organized Crime; Insurgency.

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SOUTH AFRICA, THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND THE IBSA-BRICS EQUATION: THE TRANSATLANTIC SPACE IN TRANSITION

Francis A. Kornegay

Introduction

2013 will mark the 10th anniversary of the Brasilia Declaration which, two years later, led to the formalizing of the trilateral India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) dialogue forum. By 2012, all three members of this fledgling partnership in South-South cooperation had been incorporated into the BRICS forum along with Russia and China. The interplay between the IBSA and BRICS forums has generated no small amount of debate over the geostrategic, economic and political implications and efficacy of these new generation formations in the international politics of emerging powers. It is a debate that seeks, among other things to make sense of an overlap in the international relations of developing countries of the so-called global South into the domain of emerging powers.

In this regard, the IBSA-BRICS equation is emblematic of this overlap, especially in terms of IBSA’s effective incorporation into BRICS, bringing together two categories of overlap between emerging (or re-emerging) powers and those of the global South. This has to do with the manner in which BRICS brings together the ‘middle powers’ of the IBSA trilateral and the putative Eurasian ‘great powers’ of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) under the co-leadership of China and Russia.

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The fact that India, with its observer membership in the SCO represents something of a ‘swing state’ between the northern hemispheric trajectory of the SCO and the southern hemispheric gravitational pull of IBSA, adds yet another dimension of complexity to this overlapping global South-emerging powers equation. Moreover, nested within the IBSA-BRICS equation is the trilateral ministerial between India, Russia and China as a strategic triangle for managing their ambivalent interrelationships in the greater Eurasian space.

This background is all prelude to exploring the southern hemispheric dimensions of the global South-emerging powers equation revolving around IBSA and BRICS centered on the geostrategic space of the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic. However, unlike an earlier occasional paper off of which this one is adapted focusing on the Indian Ocean, emphasis here is on problematizing South Africa’s South Atlantic strategic potential in tandem with Brazil.2

This necessarily entails drawing comparative reference to the Indian Ocean dimension of this relationship as reflected in the trilateral maritime arrangement among the IBSA troika: IBSAMAR. This paper, therefore, attempts to analyze how South Africa relates to this southern hemispheric context in terms of its unique role and positioning on the African continent as well as how Africa figures in this picture linked to the broader strategic implications of South Africa’s membership in both IBSA and BRICS.

From the vantage-point of how South Africa navigates its bilateral relations within these multilateral frameworks, growing questions of foreign policy identity and strategic autonomy have emerged in the intellectual and policy debates and discourses concerning the utility of the country’s membership and participation in both IBSA and BRICS.

Whereas IBSA was seen as a natural outgrowth of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy trajectory prioritizing Africa and the South and evoked no controversy, the BRICS connection remains controversial. In the southern transatlantic context, however, BRICS it takes a back seat to IBSA; this is in
as much as the western hemisphere is much farther removed from the Eurasian dynamics revolving around the India-China-Russian nexus than the Indian Ocean.

But the relationship between IBSA and BRICS should not be approached on a zero-sum basis. IBSA has the potential to actually strengthen BRICS in terms of the geostrategic synergies that can emerge from them both depending on how diplomatic strategies are coordinated within SCO-IBSA geopolitical dynamics. How Tshwane-Pretoria navigates the southern transatlantic in conjunction with Brazil while navigating the Indian Ocean terrain with India may reveal the possibilities of such synergies being realized.

South Africa and the Southern Transatlantic: Defining the terrain
In assessing the IBSA-BRICS equation in Tshwane-Pretoria’s evolving foreign policy, the geostrategic logic of IBSA as the basis of a ‘Gondwanan’ configuring of relations in the Southern Hemisphere is compelling. It places IBSA’s trilateralism within an entirely different frame of reference from BRICS. In comparative terms, however, the Indian Ocean dimension of trilateralism is eminently more developed and in a more highly resolved definition than the case of the South Atlantic. Therefore, there is a need to contextualize the greater Atlantic space as this portion of the southern hemisphere relates to South Africa and the rest of the African continent.

The starting point for such an attempt requires a taking in of the larger African continental picture and how, what this author refers to as Africa’s geostrategic spatial interdependencies, conditions its international relations with all other continental regions as well as the maritime environments that form part of their interconnectivity.3 Africa, fragmented as it is as the result of its 1874 colonial partitioning (effectively ratified by the first generation of

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3 This conceptual perspective was the focal point of a former blogspot by this author: “India, NATO, Africom and the Dilemma of Geostrategic Spatial Interdependencies”, *The Post-West Forum*, November 07, 2007. (This blog no longer functions.) This analysis of the Indian Ocean dynamics between Africa and India were referenced in an unpublished conference presentation on Africom: Steve McDonald (director of the Africa programme of the Woodrow Wilson International Centre of Scholars), “Changes in US Policy on Africa in the New Administration: What will it mean for Africom?”, March 10, 2009, University of Pittsburgh. (See footnote 4.)
African leaders in the 1963 founding of the Organisation of African Unity), is uniquely vulnerable to a variety of external influences.

Its vulnerability is a function of its positioning as the peninsula of the geological super-continent referred to as “Afro-Eurasia”\(^4\). This is reinforced by a political fragmentation into 54 nominally sovereign states depriving it of a coherent security system of control over its coastal waters. (Unpacking “Eurasia” is important in African terms in as much as it embraces the North African Maghreb in geo-cultural, political and economic terms, as well as in its ecology and biodiversity.) Otherwise, “Eurasia” comprises Europe at the far western end of its extremity bordering the transatlantic.

This can be defined as “Western Eurasia” with Asia at the far eastern end of what can be considered “Eastern Eurasia” with “Central Eurasia” comprising the trans-Eurasian “heartland” with Russia as the geo-political arbiter of dynamics in both Europe and Asia with the contested space of Central Asia in the middle. To the extent that such control constitutes an important element of what can be referred to as “continental sovereignty”, Africa’s links with Europe via the Mediterranean and to Asia and Middle East via the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf, all abutting the western Indian Ocean, places it in a comparatively weak strategic position.

However, potential advances in regional and continental political as well as economic integration could conceivably transform this vulnerability, as Africa’s interdependencies with other non-African continental regions are a two-way street. Such inter-linkages are potentially manageable as a function of greater effectiveness in regional, continental and inter-continental cooperative governance.

These interdependencies, in their geostrategic spatial dimension reflect the geopolitical, economic and strategic interplay of linkages between continents and regions defined by their geographic proximities either by land or by sea.\(^5\) In this regard, Africa’s spatial interdependence is reflected by the

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\(^4\) See Wikipedia “Afro-Eurasia” discussion of the mega-landmass also referred to as “Afrabia” and “Eurafrasia”. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afro-Eurasia.

\(^5\) This conceptual framework is elaborated in more detail in this author’s Journal of the Indian Ocean Region (JIOR) 8(1) essay: “South Africa and SADC in the Indian Ocean Maritime Security Equation”, 72-90.
interplay of its land and sea proximities to Europe, the Middle East, Asia and South America.

The sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) provide the maritime inter-oceanic dimension defining such interdependencies. As will be illustrated this has particular relevance to the Indian Ocean. Otherwise, continental sovereignty becomes a more general function of ‘maritime sovereignty.’ This is conditioned on control of Combined Exclusive Maritime Zones.

The Atlantic Basin definitional point-of-departure
As a peninsular continent, Africa’s geostrategic spatial interdependencies constitute a three-sided phenomenon, one that converges at the southerly hemispheric extremity of Africa occupied by South Africa. This is the Cape Sea Route linking the Indian and South Atlantic oceans in a veritable encirclement of the continent.

From the vantage point of rethinking ‘The Atlantic Space’ which preoccupied a July 1, 2011 seminar hosted by the European Commission, this author proposed that the “Atlantic Basin and its governance from an African perspective from South Africa’s vantage point” would might take in three considerations:

“The Atlantic geopolitical and geo-economic space has to be approached as a developmental terrain of North-South dialogue between emerging powers, developing countries and the established powers of the Euro-American North Atlantic;

The north-south Atlantic geostrategic landscape can be differentiated into three subsystemic zones: the Atlantic-Caribbean nexus where the American northern mid-Atlantic meets the ‘Central Atlantic’ at the Atlantic-Mediterranean nexus and, farther south, the South Atlantic-Indian Ocean nexus;

In terms of South Africa’s interests, from a southern hemispheric geostrategic perspective, the Atlantic has to be contextualize, one in relationship to the Indian Ocean within the broader Indo-Pacific strategic realm. This means looking at the two regions comparatively as complementary to a broader African agenda of fashioning maritime governance addressing
security imperative and building functional cooperation and trade and investment flows.”

Conceptualised in this light, it was suggested that from an African continental perspective, “the Atlantic forms one part of what might be referred to as a quadrilateral encirclement of geostrategic spatial interdependencies intruding into its affairs. As such, one can speak of three African covering four realms:

1. An Afro-Latin South Atlantic – or ‘Afroatlantica’.
2. ‘Euro-Afrabia’ spanning from the southern Mediterranean with outlets onto the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf/Red Sea/Gulf of Aden abutting the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean. (This conception, in relation to the European Union can be characterized as ‘Eurafrica’ as in French president Nicholas Sarkozy’s ‘Euratique’ merging into his Mediterranean union vision – now immensely problematized by the Great Arab Revolt of 2011).
3. Afro-Asia spanning the Afroasiatic realm of the Indian Ocean bordering the littorals of the Middle East, South Asia and the Southeast Asia-Pacific as well as Eastern and Southern Africa (with the COMESA-SADC-EAC ‘grand free trade scheme) with a plethora of regional economic and security communities addressing regional and interregional governance agendas.”

It is the Afro-Latin South Atlantic, or afroatlantica, dimension of Africa’s continental identity that preoccupies this analysis. Here, with particular significance in southern transatlantic relations, it should be pointed out that the uniqueness of SADC from the vantage point of South Africa, as the African point of reference for this analysis, is that unlike all other regional economic communities (RECs) on the continent, SADC is the only transcontinental formation of its kind. SADC is bi-coastal, bordering the South Atlantic as well as the Indian Ocean. As such, any comprehensive SADC maritime security SWOT analysis has to incorporate both oceans. This, in turn, underlines the

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6 Kornegay, The Transatlantic Strategic Landscape: A South African perspective.” Presentation abstract prepared for a conference for which a synthesis report has been issued as The Atlantic Geopolitical Space: common opportunities and challenges. This conference was jointly organised by DG Research and Innovation and BEPA, European Commission, July 01, 2011. Rapporteur: Mark Aspinall, 1. As a programmatic focus on the Atlantic in its north-south western hemispheric expanse, this exercise has informed an undertaking called the Atlantic Basin Initiative of the Centre for Transatlantic Relations (CTR) at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

7 Ibid, 1-2.
geostrategic centrality of South Africa in formulating a “Gondwanan” vision of an Africa-centered southern hemispheric security community.

From an historical perspective, as far as Africa is concerned, these three-sided interdependencies have reflected a “one-way street”. This has been reflected in the extent to which external powers from Europe mainly but also from the Middle East have variously penetrated different regions of the continent. This penetration has emanated from both Indian Ocean as well as transatlantic vantage points.

In one or another way these intrusions have tended to involve an extractive proposition, be it the brutal human trafficking in what constituted the depopulating slave trade or in regard to natural resource exploitation. Updated to more recent times, the contemporary “new scramble” for Africa by traditional and emerging powers alike for Africa’s mineral and energy resources reflects a continuity in this pattern accompanied by various and sundry illicit trafficking: in drugs, people, wildlife, the raiding of coastal fishing stocks and illegal logging.

There are, however, positive aspects to this more contemporary “new scramble” as the emergence of major Asian actors such as China, India, Korea among others as well as Brazil, as economic partners, is propelling a surging new chapter in Africa’s economic growth and development. As a result, there is a fledgling trend toward Africa and Africans asserting greater control over the continent’s destiny.

**The Trans-Mediterranean**

Spatial interdependencies between Africa and Europe and Africa and Asia cut both ways – not always to either Africa’s or Europe’s benefit. In Europe’s case, the trans-Mediterranean has long been an illegal immigration transit corridor from African impoverishment below the Sahara and from within the Maghreb itself into a Europe of rapidly aging and declining populations and, now, of uncertain economic prospects.

Thus far, a mutually beneficial framework for the inter-continental management of population flows across the Mediterranean accompanied by a more structured economic integration has proved elusive. This predicament has been made all the more complicated by the “Arab Awakening” upheavals in the
Maghreb on the one hand and the southern European debt crisis threatening the European Union (EU) on the other. Both the asymmetric EU-Africa Strategic Partnership and the separate Mediterranean Partnership between the EU and North Africa seem inadequate to managing these destabilizing trends. There is more about this subject later.

Then there is the energy security dimension. Here, the trans-Mediterranean geostrategic interdependency between Africa and Europe reaches into the Eurasian geopolitical-economic calculus. This is underlined by the possible disruption of an incipient energy alliance that Russia had been hoping to consolidate with Libya and Algeria as a means of tightening its control of the European energy market from the southern Mediterranean.\(^8\) This involves a trans-Saharan oil pipeline hook-up with Nigeria where Russia’s energy giant, Gazprom, is also heavily invested. As such, the upheavals along the southern Mediterranean rim implicate a much broader array of geo-economic interests than the simplistic picture often drawn of a “recolonising” Western economic imperialism.

Indeed, there may have been no need for NATO to back Libyan rebels simply to secure that country’s hydrocarbon resources since those economic and energy security links were already in place (especially between Gaddafi-Berlusconi/Libya and Italy). The mass exodus of Chinese laborers from Libya further underlines this point.

The fact of the matter is that energy security geo-strategy is the leitmotif of Russian aims at integrating into what is envisioned as a ‘pan-European space’ on Russian terms; terms that, from Moscow’s vantage point, will optimally secure its geostrategic spatial interdependence within the Greater Eurasian east-west equation. Meanwhile, as demonstrated in the sidelining of the AU (in favor of the Arab League much to the chagrin of former South African president Thabo Mbeki!) – and South Africa – in Addis’ efforts to mediate the Libyan conflict, these trans-Mediterranean dynamics present a formidable challenge to sub-Saharan African efforts at exerting prerogatives of presumed continental sovereignty over the Maghreb.

The fact that the Western Sahara dispute remains unresolved to the detriment of the AU’s cohesion with a non-functional Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) says it all! The AU is effectively without a northern regional REC pillar bordering the southern Mediterranean. This is how Africa’s geostrategic spatial interdependencies with Eurasia work against it in trans-Mediterranean terms. As such, Africa is at the mercy of destabilizing dynamics endemic to northern Africa extending down below the Sahara in such vulnerable Sahelian ‘states’ as a currently fractured Mali.

**Afroatlantica/Trans-Med Contradictions**

Given the fact that in Euro-American capitals, there is a bureaucratic bifurcation of Africa into different sub-Saharan (SSA) and ‘the Middle East and North Africa’ bureaus, it would have taken a functioning UMA as the North African REC pillar within the AU to have prevented the diplomatic divide that occurred between the AU and the Arab League in the case of Libya. More to the point in terms of southern transatlantic relations, these geopolitical dynamics involving what amounts to a realignment of convergence between the Arab World via the Gulf Cooperation Council and the West, is its southern Mediterranean-Atlantic nexus revolving around Morocco.

Morocco, as an outlier in inter-African affairs due to the Western Sahara stalemate, has become an alternative pole of geopolitical revisionism aimed at redefining the “Atlantic Space” on Arab-Francophone African terms in apparent alignment with France, Portugal and Spain. In successive conferences, Rabat has launched a *Tri-continental Atlantic Initiative* (May 29-30, 2009) and an *African Federation of Strategic Studies* in Marrakesh.9

This latter launching occurred at the beginning of 2010 under the auspices of the Moroccan Centre for Strategic Studies. It may be seen as one more indication of a bid to influence the geopolitical and economic trajectory of the mid-Atlantic abutting the Mediterranean interface between Africa and

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Europe. As such, NATO reportedly endorsed a closely related *Mediterranean Dialogue* at its Chicago summit in May 2012.\(^\text{10}\)

What kinds of conflicts of interests there are that could emerge out these North African dynamics revolving around Morocco and the new South American regionalism emanating out of Brasilia as well as AU-African diaspora linkages with Caricom pertaining to the Caribbean are anyone’s guess. Geopolitically, this seems to be a terrain ‘up for grabs.’ But all of these ill-defined emerging centres of powers impinging on a redefining of transatlantic relations will have to be factored into any calculus aimed at carving out a sphere – or spheres – of geostrategic autonomy as pertains to evolve a South Atlantic agenda compatible with the aims of IBSA in tandem with a broader BRICS global calculus.

This is where defining the Atlantic Space will require some intellectual reengineering of the geopolitical imagination among African and South American intelligentsias in sorting out contradictions between the Afro-Latin *afroatlantica* and trans-Mediterranean streams impinging on transatlantic ties. Here, West Africa will have to play a major role which means that South Africa and Brazil will have to develop an IBSA outreach that draws in the western arm of SADC revolving around the emerging geopolitical assertion of Angola and the ECOWAS powers of such major actors as Nigeria and Ghana. In security terms, ECOWAS already has an institutional stake along its littoral domains of the South Atlantic focusing on the stability of the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea.

Given the dearth of focus on the South Atlantic within the transatlantic equations in search of strategic coherence, the Afroasiatic-Indian Ocean realm of Africa’s interdependencies will not be touched on here as they have been amply dealt with elsewhere by this author and others of more authoritative vintage. Suffice it to be stressed that the Indian Ocean nexus forms an emerging centre of gravity in the overall west-to-east shift in the global economy as one of the main, if not the main, trans-shipment focal point of commercial and energy transactions. It is a lake of convergence in the interdependent economic

relations between Africa, the Middle East and greater Asia as well as the centre of geostrategic maneuverings between the US, India and China stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Asia-Pacific and from the Straits of Malacca to the Mozambique Channel.

Nevertheless, where the Indian Ocean meets the South Atlantic around South Africa’s ‘Cape Sea Route’ is where the IBSA countries are presented with a major opportunity for delving in some proactive redefining of the southern hemispheric strategic landscape as it pertains to issues of maritime security and functional cooperation. As such, an assessment of the meager multilateral infrastructure of southern transatlantic relations is in order.

SA and the Rise of Angola in an Emerging South Atlantic Calculus
Far from having the level of multilateral cooperation that is emerging in the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic has no real multilateral architecture to speak of. To be sure, there is no lacking in issues around which a southern transatlantic agenda could be developed.

There also exist initiatives that could serve as a basis for cooperation in addressing such issues in developing an agenda and multilateral architecture. Unlike in the case of the Indian Ocean, however, South Africa does not figure as a central African actor as its fellow SADC member state, Angola.

As far as the issues are concerned, these include the same maritime security challenges as faces the Indian Ocean. These pertain to piracy and the full panoply of transnational crime in the illicit trafficking in drugs, people, arms and various illegal commodities. There are intense efforts underway in combating these non-traditional threats especially in the more northerly mid-Atlantic abutting the Caribbean, northern coastal South America and across the ocean in the Gulf of Guinea domain of ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). However, these efforts have yet to inspire a transatlantic architecture apart from such localized cooperation initiatives as those addressing Nigeria’s preoccupation with the Niger Delta and broader regional security concerns in the Gulf of Guinea.

From the vantage point of regional cooperation along the western African Atlantic littoral, the three RECs pertaining to this realm includes, besides ECOWAS, ECCAS and SADC. SADC is the only REC within the AU
framework that is bicoastal in embracing both the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean regions of the continent. In terms of how Tshwane-Pretoria relates to the South Atlantic, a major geopolitical development along the southerly littoral of coastal West Africa is the rise of Angola.

It is as the main aspiring regional emerging power within both SADC as well as ECCAS that Angola must be afforded greater attention. What is more, South Atlantic issues such as they are at this point, tend to fall more in the domain of ECCAS and ECOWAS than within SADC. This does not necessarily relegate South Africa to a back seat in the southern transatlantic. But it does imply a sharing of leadership with fellow SADC member Angola as well as, in terms of ECOWAS, Nigeria.

For Tshwane-Pretoria, the Angolan connection is especially strategic. It has both its cooperative as well as its competitive aspects. This was born out most graphically in the July accession of South Africa’s former Home Affairs (and former Foreign Affairs) minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to the Chairmanship of the AU Commission. As SADC’s candidate for this hotly contested position against the opposition of Nigeria and ECOWAS, Angola played a major role in her becoming the AU chair. Luanda bankrolled the lobbying of her candidacy to the tune of $176,000.11

With one of the fastest growing economies in Africa and a highly motivated compulsion to play a more active role in inter-African affairs, Luanda has already exhibited its activism with the memorandum of understanding it had recently with Guinea-Bissau to strengthen that country’s capacity to cope with transnational criminal penetration from South American drug cartels. The fact that Guinea-Bissau, like Angola, is a Lusophone former colony of Portugal highlights another major factor in the still unfocused southern transatlantic picture: the Lusophone dimension via the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP).

_Lusophonie_ encompasses a geo-cultural community ranging from Brazil, on the South American side of the Atlantic, as well as Portugal, a long-standing member of the northern transatlantic community, to Guinea-Bissau.

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and Cape Verde within ECOWAS and Angola, with its overlapping memberships in the SADC and ECCAS regional economic communities. With respect to the latter, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) also forms part of this African interregional picture.

**ZPCSA: Lusophone platform of southern transatlanticism?**

Lusophone ties are a major factor in what have been long-standing strategic relations between Brazil and Angola. This is irrespective of either country’s relations with South Africa. In recent years, the Angola-Brazil bilateral relationship has figured prominently in efforts to revive and reinvigorate the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA). The history of the ZPCSA goes back to the Cold War and the height of the apartheid Afrikaner nationalist regime in South Africa’s bid to break out of diplomatic isolation. Projecting itself as a bulwark against communism in the service of protecting the Cape Sea lanes around the southern oceans from Soviet expansion on land and at sea, there was a short-lived idea floated of there being established a ‘SATO’ – South Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

As an anti-Soviet alliance of right-wing regimes in the Southern Hemisphere, from South Africa on the African side to authoritarian “Cone Sur” regimes like Chile under Augusto Pinochet, SATO would have become the southern complement to NATO of which Portugal is a member and, at the time, as colonial overseer of Angola, would have been a strategic linchpin in an all-Atlantic strategy against Moscow. Such a southern transatlantic regime would have rounded out US strategies under Nixon, Carter and Reagan administration throughout the 1970s and much of the 1980s. Indeed, post-liberation Angola’s civil war featuring Soviet-Cuban backing of the MPLA against a tacit alliance between Washington, Beijing and Pretoria in support of Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA can be viewed as a variant of such a South Atlantic anti-communist-cum-Soviet strategy.

The international opprobrium directed at the apartheid regime in Pretoria, the Pinochet regime in Chile and other southern cone autocracies along with the overthrow of settler colonialism in the Portuguese ‘overseas provinces’ of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe (as well as Mozambique on the Indian Ocean side of Africa), foreclosed any
possibility of SATO gaining geopolitical-diplomatic traction. The joint ending of the Cold War by Ronald Reagan administration and Mikhail Gorbachev’s Kremlin which eventually facilitated Cuba’s withdrawal from Angola after the decisive battlefield victory over South African forces at Cuito Cuanavale created a new Southern African landscape: the retreat of Afrikanerdom from Namibia and from the pinnacle of political power in South Africa. Overall, the South Atlantic situation, geopolitically, had been transformed.

The ZPCSAs had been formed as part of a global anti-apartheid strategy against the legitimizing of Afrikaner nationalist regime attempts at overcoming isolation as well as to oppose any prospect of pro-NATO strategic positioning by the US and the West in the South Atlantic. Post-apartheid, ZPCSAs represented an attempt to maintain this region, at least in its southern-most reaches, as a zone of nonaligned neutrality; the South Atlantic would be kept out of geostrategic “Great Game” geopolitics. In this, Brazil has tended to emerge more or less as the guardian of what could be viewed as an extension of its regional sphere of influence, an expansion from the Amazonian mainland to the off-shore “Blue Amazon” as it were.

At the same time, the South Atlantic, via the ZPCSAs, has served as a convenient vehicle for Brasilia in optimizing a strategic element of its Africa policy dovetailing with the Lusophone CPLP agenda with Angola emerging at a key linchpin. Luanda, in the meantime, had become estranged from a newly liberated post-apartheid South Africa wherein Nelson Mandela’s government of the African National Congress (ANC) regime sought a diplomatic solution as opposed to a military one to the MPLA regime’s civil war with Savimbi’s UNITA. The tensions emanating out of these differences in strategy toward Savimbi coloured SA-Angola relations throughout the Mandela and Thabo Mbeki administrations in Tshwane-Pretoria until Mbeki’s ouster by the ANC in 2009 and the assumption of the current Jacob Zuma administration.

This history of post-liberation estrangement and reconciliation between South Africa and Angola is critically important to understand the inter-African politics of SADC’s component of the South Atlantic and how it may intersect with the South American side across the ocean, Brazil in particular. After all, it was not necessarily detrimental to Brasilia’s interest that Luanda and Tshwane-Pretoria were not seeing eye-to-eye.
Moreover, it meant that the MPLA government itself was split between pro-Brazil and pro-South Africa elements, as well as pro-South Africa elements being offset by those who could be viewed as patently anti-South Africa. In any case, it gave Brazil an one-up on South Africa in the courting of a geo-strategically “pivotal state” along the western African Atlantic littoral. It also meant that Brasilia would never be totally beholden to Tshwane-Pretoria in pursuing its African economic diplomacy.

In the rotational between South America and Africa in presiding over the ZPCSA, Angola’s assumption of the chairmanship of this grouping has elevated Luanda’s importance. The post-apartheid and post-Cold War agenda of the ZCPSA can be summarized as reflecting a rather expansive six-point human security cooperation agenda:

- Economic cooperation in eradicating poverty by creating partnerships for sustainable development, trade, investment and tourism;
- Crime prevention and combating drug trafficking, illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and transnational organized crime, including piracy;
- Peace, stability and security, including conflict prevention and peace-building within the Zone;
- Scientific research, environmental and marine issues;
- Cross-cutting issues and means of implementation;
- And the need for an “implementation and follow-up mechanism.”

Known as the Luanda Action Plan, what has been formulated calls for the establishment of rules of procedures for a Permanent Committee and Ministerial Meetings driven by national focal points amongst member States. It is not clear how much has transpired since this action plan was adopted at the 6th Ministerial Conference in Luanda on June 19, 2007. But it is important to note that this attempt to revitalize the Zone is part of a more generalized global South diplomacy that, between Africa and South America, included the 1st Africa-South America summit that was held in Abuja on 26-30 November 2006 and which acknowledged ZPCSA support.

The fact that action plan called for a “review of national and multilateral financial mechanisms which can be used to finance projects in the
Zone…”12 is a potentially important factor in activating an autonomous sphere of interregional cooperation; this is in light of the current BRICS agenda promoting local currency financing in trade and investment amongst emerging powers and within the global South. As members of the BRICS banking mechanism, this is where the membership of South Africa and Brazil in IBSA provides a point of strategic convergence between IBSA and BRICS that could have major geo-economic impact in the inter and intra-regional politics of the global South such as in the South Atlantic.

**Angola – not Nigeria – and the Gulf of Guinea**

The Luanda Declaration which produced the plan of action also welcomed the establishment of the Commission of the Gulf of Guinea as a “sub-regional vehicle for cooperation, promotion and maintenance of stability and security, and for the attainment of the principles and objectives of the Zone.”13 Noticeable in this regard as a reflection of Angola’s increasing diplomatic activism was the ZPCSA’s expression of “gratitude to the Government of Angola for hosting the headquarters of the Commission and facilitating the operationalization of its secretariat.”14 As such, Angola is proving to be a key strategic linchpin linking the agendas of the African RECs bordering the South Atlantic littoral.

Apart from Angola’s SADC membership, its headquartering of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) places Luanda squarely in the geopolitical dynamics of ECOWAS as well as in the Central African politics of ECCAS/CEMAC. The Commission’s cabinet council includes, besides Angola, Nigeria, Cameroon, Sao Tome & Principe, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Indeed, interestingly, although it tends to be a superficial association of Gulf of Guinea dynamics with the ECOWAS region and Nigeria’s maritime security concerns associated with oil exploration and exports, the interregional balance within the GGC is heavily

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14 Ibid, 5.
weighted toward the Central African ECCAS where Angola vies for leadership with the DRC, both also being members of SADC.\textsuperscript{15}

The influence of ECCAS is further enhanced by a GGC decision taken to establish a Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) based in Congo-Brazzaville. Nigeria, however, has called for the GGC to serve as the point of departure for the establishment of an international naval force to protect the off-shore oil industry in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, within the framework of an inter-African geopolitics of cooperation within the South Atlantic generally and the Zone in particular, the GGC provides a fitting platform for a pan-African strategic convergence of agendas.

The rub here, however, is the unfortunate manner in which inter and intra-state regional instabilities have forced major states to be at loggerheads in their response to such crises, the Ivory Coast civil war a case in point. This is where a closer examination of South Africa’s diplomacy in the ECCAS and ECOWAS regions in alignment with Angola merit attention although the details of the inter-African dynamics surrounding Ivory Coast are still unclear. What is clear, however, is that Tshwane-Pretoria may need to fashion a much broader South Atlantic geostrategic diplomacy as a means of more effectively balancing its interests in this part of the continent. This is where IBSA may emerge as a key factor.

\textbf{Tshwane-Pretoria’s Balancing Act: The IBSA dimension}
Whereas Brazil-Angola relations have been on a good Lusophone geo-cultural and political footing for quite a lengthy period, it may well be that the post-liberation estrangement between South Africa and Angola has made Tshwane-Pretoria anxious to play catch-up under the Zuma administration. It is understandable that, under the circumstances, the ANC in Luthuli House and the Union Buildings would not want its rapprochement with Luanda to be channeled through Brasilia. However, in its anxiety to cover lost ground in

what should have been a close post-liberation bilateral relationship. South Africa may be guilty of over-compensating in indulging the MPLA on critical issues of inter-African diplomacy.

South Africa’s alleged siding with Angola in backing former Ivory Coast leader Laurent Gbagbo over French-aligned Alessane Ouattara over the outcome of presidential elections won by Ouattara, may be seen as a case in point. Luanda’s brief against Ouattara, supported as he was by ECOWAS led by Nigeria, was rooted the political – and perhaps more than political – backing France gave to Savimbi. The ‘friend of my enemy being my enemy seems to have meant that Tshwane-Pretoria may have felt compelled to realign its position on Ivory Coast to harmonize with Luanda, a position at loggerheads with Nigeria and much of ECOWAS but also compatible with the tacitly pro-Gbagbo postures of China and Russia.

In effect, in the Ivory Coast imbroglio, the two most powerful members of SADC were going up against Nigeria and ECOWAS in a consequential regional power where French interests figured significantly in the equation. Both Luanda and Tshwane-Pretoria had their beef with Paris. Neither country is accommodative of the neocolonial sphere of influence France wants to maintain in francophone Africa.

But from South Africa’s vantage point, was Ivory Coast the right battleground on which to challenge France’s irresistible compulsion to interfere in the politics of its former colonies? Gbagbo, after all, had dubiously distinguished himself as an ethno-regional entrepreneur cloaked in anti-imperialist garb at the expense of Ivory Coast’s territorial integrity. To then jeopardize the much needed coordination on inter-African politics between South Africa and Nigeria did not bode well for South Africa’s reputation as a stabilizer in its bid for continental leadership.

The difficulties encountered by Tshwane-Pretoria in trying to get Abuja to back Home Affairs minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as SADC’s candidate for Chair of the AU Commission seems emblematic of South Africa’s recent difficulties in inter-African diplomacy. The Abuja-Pretoria axis that existed during the respective Nigerian and South African presidencies of Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki no longer exist.

Yet SA-Nigerian relations is basic to any kind of serious pan-African strategic alliance formation within the AU as a compass in guiding African
common positions and for informing African strategy in engaging emerging and traditional powers alike. Ideally a ‘strategic triangle’ between South Africa, Nigeria and a post-Mubarak Egypt as a networking framework within the AU slotting in other key actors such as Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana and Kenya would be optimum in anchoring Tshwane-Pretoria’s strategies within the global South/emerging powers concentric circle where BRICS and IBSA enter the equation.

Within the South Atlantic geopolitical context, why not a ‘strategic triangle’ between South Africa and Brazil with Angola? Extrapolating off of such a trilateral linkage, an IBSA outreach providing greater strategic definition to the southern transatlantic would lend IBSA greater regional depth to the benefit of South Africa, Brazil and India. Of course such a potential would logically amplify the geostrategic logic of the trilateral maritime/naval cooperation exercises between these three regional powers in IBSAMAR; and this at a time when India is chairing the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) for the next two years while South Africa, over the same period is chairing the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS).

The question that goes begging: what will the IBSA trilateral do with IBSAMAR over the next two years while Delhi and Tshwane-Pretoria are holding down these two Indian Ocean chairmanships? It would seem that a multilateral architectural linkage is there for the making between the IOR-ARC and IONS on the one hand and the ZPCSA on the other. But this is where a strategic triangulation of creativity between South Africa, Angola and Brazil becomes compelling in developing a multilateral strategic convergence with the admittedly still underdeveloped (but more sharply resolved) Indian Ocean framework. As such, what might the options be for building on the ZPCSA and such auxiliary sub-regional initiatives as the GGC?

Here, it is not the African members of the ZPCSA who will set the pace. Rather, it will be Brazil as the only South Atlantic powerhouse in the western hemisphere with the geopolitical-economic heft and capacity to offset the US and its North Atlantic allies in influencing the terms of multilateralism in the southern transatlantic. But South Africa, as the “Gondwanan Pivot” astride the southern sea lanes and as Brazil’s strategic partner in IBSA and BRICS legitimately has as much reason to influence South Atlantic developments as
either Brasilia or Luanda. Nevertheless, it is the western hemispheric inter-American dynamic between Brasilia and Washington around which the future of much of the South Atlantic will revolve.

A consequential determining factor will be Brasilia’s “state of mind” informing its strategic compulsions vis-à-vis the “Blue Amazon”, how expansively or narrowly inclined it is to motivate its own outreach and that of IBSA and the ZPCSA in structuring multilateralism in the South Atlantic. Indeed, a more actively considered IBSA outreach strategy would seem critical in whatever course South Atlantic diplomacy might take.

IBSA outreach is the key contingent variable. As such, in consultative conjunction with South Africa and Angola, there are at least three options that Brazil might consider depending on how proactive it and they are in agenda-setting in the transatlantic:

**Option I: A South Atlantic sphere of influence**

Here, Brasilia, in conjunction with Tshwane-Pretoria and Luanda, explores with other ZPCSA member States the transformation of the Zone into a South Atlantic Council to offset the long-established northern transatlantic community. This would seem to require a more elaborated institutionalizing of a South Atlantic geopolitical, economic and maritime security and functional cooperation agenda. It would involve a more comprehensively defined role for the Brazilian leg of IBSAMAR to serve as the focal point for the kind of international naval force advocated by Nigeria, except with a much broader writ beyond protecting the offshore oil industry in the Gulf of Guinea. It may mean the establishment of a South Atlantic treaty whereby all ZPCSA member states would become signatories.

The South Atlantic Council would, at least initially, be focused on building up its own collective strategic autonomy and capacity vis-à-vis all the other external actors as a precondition to a more expansive multilateral engagement beyond the South Atlantic. The question is: how far into the mid-Atlantic should a South Atlantic Council encompass? Into the Caribbean within the western hemisphere and the Mediterranean on the African side where a distinctly Moroccan agenda has been taking shape? Or geopolitical scope is limited to the current Afro-South American membership of the ZPCSA? More than likely, from at least a developmental standpoint, the ZPSCA would define
the scope of a South Atlantic Council where priority would be given to establishing its own identity unencumbered by an already established northern transatlantic agenda, though this agenda is being rethought in the think-tanking ‘hot houses’ of Washington and Brussels.

Option II: A north-south transatlantic dialogue
The establishment of a South Atlantic Council takes place within the context of an expansive maritime security dialogue between IBSA/IBSAMAR and the ZPCSA on the one hand and selected northern transatlantic institutional actors. These might include the Atlantic Council in Washington accompanied by the Centre for Transatlantic Relations (CTR) situated at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and its fledgling Atlantic Basin Initiative.\(^{16}\) This might entail roping in Portugal, Spain and Morocco as well.

Within the context of such a north-south dialogue, there should still be ample scope for the carving out of an independent South Atlantic multilateral identity through the setting up of a South Atlantic Council building on the Zone and in tandem with a more robust IBSAMAR. Ultimately, this might lead to an interactive architecture embracing the Atlantic Basin around an Atlantic Council-South and an Atlantic Council-North linked to a transatlantic assembly-type structure that institutionalizes a dialogue of strategic convergence between north and south.

Here, it should be kept in mind that the north Atlantic is not sitting still. There remains that idea of a ‘transatlantic free trade area’ between the US and Europe that could, at some point revive geo-economics momentum in the northern hemisphere as the EU navigates its way out a Eurozone crisis that leads to greater integration, political union perhaps. This in turn could be accompanied by the idea of a more integrated North America along the lines of a “North American Blueprint” outlined in the July/August 2012 issue of *The

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\(^{16}\) The CTR convened an “eminent persons group exploratory meeting” at the Palacio dos Bandeirantes, São Paulo, Brazil, on 19-20 April, 2012; and will convene a follow-up authors’ workshop on “The rising importance of the Atlantic Hemisphere” on 12-13 September, 2012.
American Interest by Robert Pastor, professor and director of the Center for North American Studies at American University. Pastor advocates that the NAFTA strategic triangle of the US, Canada and Mexico adopt a principle of “managed interdependence” in moving from a “dual-bilateral relationship to a trilateral approach” in deepening North American integration.17

No doubt given the fraught geopolitics of inter-American relations, including the continued unresolved question of Cuba, the abortive Free Trade Area of the Americas is unlikely to see a revival while Washington focuses on ‘free trade’ by other means via the Trans-Pacific Partnership (which will likely incorporate some of South and Central America). Renewed interest in North American integration revolving around an enhanced NAFTA linked to economic integration with a recovering Eurozone are other possibilities to be kept in mind while generating multilateral momentum in the South Atlantic. Ultimately both ends of the Atlantic will have to be approached geopolitically and economically as one zone of north-south integration within the western hemisphere interacting with integrationist dynamics in both Africa and Europe.

Option III: A South Atlantic-Indian Ocean maritime security council
This option could accommodate either of the first two as it is critically important that IBSA/IBSAMAR be afforded an integrally central role in whichever path a more highly resolved South Atlantic multilateralism would take. But this option would make it incumbent on South Africa and India, in their respective chairmanships of IONS and the IOR-ARC, to coordinate with Brazil in establishing a multilateral maritime structure of security and cooperation spanning the southern sea lanes under the IBSAMAR banner. This might entail bringing together the ZPCSA with IONS and the IOR-ARC in some form of high-level and ongoing consultation and dialogue, perhaps an IBSA/IBSAMAR summit that South Africa would host. Its aim would be to initiate the structuring of a multilateral mechanism that enhance the leverage of IBSA in accelerating UN Security Council reform.

This should obtain in as much as any external “out of area” involvement in a “maritime security and cooperation council” for the South Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean would have to be predicated on new terms of reference for the current outdated collective security regime. In any case, such a proposed maritime multilateral structure does not require necessarily being situated within the UN system, unless major reforms are contemplated and able to be leveraged by a proactive IBSA strategy in the southern oceans.

**Conclusion**

There are several observations to be made from the forgoing surveying of South Atlantic dynamics as they pertain to South Africa within the context of the IBSA-BRICS equation. The first has to do with the emergence of Angola as an alternative power centre in inter-African politics to South Africa’s dominance within SADC and farther afield on the continent. It is not for nothing that a proposal for the setting up of a SADC development bank to compete with Tshwane-Pretoria’s Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) has emerged in the wake of South Africa’s becoming a member of BRICS with its emerging financing mechanisms (including all five BRICS pledging billions to the IMF as a global financial “firewall” in the context of the Eurozone crisis).

Apart from Luanda politically and financially supporting Dlamini-Zuma as SADC’s successful candidate to head up the AU Commission, only Angola, within SADC, could financially mount an alternative development financing initiative to DBSA – and this at a time when DBSA has embarked upon its own international subsidiary to address the bank’s development financing role in BRICS in terms of Africa. Where this proposal will lead at a time when the BRICS countries are vetting the feasibility of their own development bank initiative linked to local currency financing is far from clear. It cannot be excluded that Brazil itself could be a factor in a Luanda DFI initiative within SADC countering the DBSA as South Africa’s signatory to the BRICS Banking Mechanism. For apart from the South Africa-Brazilian bilateral relationship within the context of both IBSA as well as BRICS, there has emerged something of a Lusophonic Brasilia-Luanda axis in the affairs of the South Atlantic revolving around the ZPCSA.
The question here is to what extent this Lusophone axis on both sides of the South Atlantic can interact with a bilateral axis between Tshwane-Pretoria and Brasilia within the trilateral framework of IBSA to accommodate a strategic triangle between South Africa, Brazil and Angola? Quite possibly much may depend here on Brazil’s calculus as Itamaraty may perceive it in its interest to promote Angola as a counterweight to South Africa in the geopolitics of the ‘African gateway’ to Africa’s vast and rich continental market.

If, however, there could emerge a political-diplomatic meeting of the minds between Brasilia and Tshwane-Pretoria on the need for them both to join with India in proactively giving more multilateral structure to a southern hemisphere linking Africa, Asia and the Americas via the southern sea lanes, then Brasilia may well value and prioritize a trilateral axis between itself and Angola that includes South Africa. For Angola’s geostrategic potential is incomparably limited compared to South Africa’s. The geographic positioning of South Africa as a triple gateway to the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean as well as to the hinterland African market makes it an unavoidable factor in anyone’s southern hemispheric geopolitical-strategic calculus. The question outstanding is what will South Africa’s leaders make out of these natural advantages in how it navigates with Angola and Brazil in regard to the future of the southern transatlantic?

Will they, in conjunction with India, within IBSA, exhibit sufficient boldness of geopolitical and strategic imagination to translate South Africa’s natural advantages of geography into a new international subsystem; one that enhances their individual and collective strategic autonomy within BRICS as a potentially revisionist global economic governance alliance?

Dominated as BRICS is by China and Russia, the fact that these two have other strategic ‘fish to fry’ in reconfiguring northern hemispheric Eurasian power equations must also be factored into the calculus of the IBSA members of BRICS. This is critical given the interdependency of changes in the global North and the global South. Both IBSA and BRICS constitute different but interrelated paths toward a new multipolar strategic landscape. In this regard, IBSA might well reinforce the overall potency of BRICS through the fashioning of a new South Atlantic multilateralism in tandem with the Indian Ocean. The trajectory could well be toward a vision of building global integration from south to north.
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ABSTRACT
In a context of increasing South-South cooperation, the members of an important trilateral dialogue forum that represent the emergent powers – IBSA –, have been incorporated into another organization, BRICS. It resulted from an overlap of the Southern developing countries into the domain of the Euro-Asiatic great powers. Bearing in mind that both alliances are centered on the geostrategic space of the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic, South Africa’s South Atlantic strategic potential in tandem with Brazil is of extreme importance. It is possible to differentiate two steams in the transatlantic ties: the Afro-Latin and the trans-Mediterranean. It is also relevant to place the role of Angola in the African continent as a possible influence in South Atlantic’s dynamics, given due importance to the Lusophone ties which are represented by CPLP.

KEYWORDS
IBSA; BRICS; South Atlantic; South Africa; South-South Cooperation.

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BLUE AMAZON: THINKING THE DEFENSE OF BRAZILIAN MARITIME TERRITORY

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“Brazil has a true “Blue Amazon”, for which, undoubtedly, has rights, but also has obligations to know it and exploit it economically, rationally and sustainably. Consequently, the untold riches of the marine space under national jurisdiction also require a Naval Power able to protect them.” (Carvalho in LEPLAC 2010)

Introduction

Brazil, with almost 7500 kilometers of Atlantic coastline, is a country directly concerned about the developments related to the Atlantic Ocean. Thanks to the archipelagos of São Pedro e São Paulo and Trindade e Martim Vaz, mainly the first one, Brazil’s maritime border advanced a lot in the direction of Africa. The São Pedro e São Paulo archipelago lies 1010 km from the nearest point of the Brazilian Coast and 1824 km from the African coast (Viana 2009, 55).

In the last few years the Atlantic Ocean, which since the beginning of colonization played a key role for Brazil, has become even more crucial to the country due to the natural resources that are located in the Exclusive Economic Zone (ZEE, initials in Portuguese) and in the Continental Shelf (PC, initials in Portuguese). These concepts were defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 and became crucial after the discovery of

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1A preliminary study “L’Amazonie bleue et les enjeux et contraintes maritimes du Brésil” was published in Revue Défense Nationale 738 (Mars 2011), 45-51.
2 Prof. Dr. Marianne L Wiesebron, Department of Latin American Studies, University of Leiden. E-mail: mlwiesebron@hum.leidenuniv.nl
huge deposits of oil and gas in the deep ocean. (Martins 2010, 84-86; Assad 2010, 49-50).³

However, despite the fact that 80% of the Brazilian population lives near the coast, the importance of the Ocean has not been commonsensical in Brazil. Especially during the twentieth century, the main concern was ensuring the occupation of the whole territory with its continental dimensions, encouraging settlement and economic activities in the west, and defending the boundaries of the country. The decision to build a new capital city, Brasilia, inaugurated in 1960, at the center of the country, was an emblematic expression of this strategy. There is much attention directed to the Green Amazon and its natural resources, but not to the riches of the sea, which are at least, if not more, as diverse and important for the development of Brazil.

For this reason, in 2004, the Navy of Brazil launched the concept of “Blue Amazon”, which became a trademark in 2010. To emphasize the importance of the sea, the Ministry of Education, in collaboration with the Inter-ministerial Commission for Sea Resources (CIRM, initials in Portuguese) has produced two books: The Sea in the Brazilian Geographic Space, and The Importance of the Sea in the Brazilian History, published in 2005 and 2006, respectively.⁴ Almost 180,000 copies of each book were distributed to institutions of elementary and secondary education. However, in Brazilian atlases later published, there were no references to Blue Amazon, neither to several of its archipelagos.⁵ But it is not only to alert the Government or the public about the importance of the Blue Amazon: the Navy of Brazil also needs to be prepared for new challenges, able to protect all these riches.

This study seeks to analyze the rationale behind the creation of the concept of Blue Amazon and its consequences for Brazil, especially in terms of

³CNUDM was established in 1982, and more than 156 countries have ratified this convention. Brazil has signed it in 1982 and ratified it in 1988. The U.S. have signed but not ratified the convention, as evidenced by the Brazilian Navy. For definitions of the concepts according to CNUDM see, for example, Souza 1999.


⁵Research carried out in several major bookstores in Brazil in the first half of 2011.
security, in particular for the Navy of Brazil, the country’s role in the South Atlantic and its relations with West Africa.

**Blue Amazon**

The term “Blue Amazon” was created to call the attention to the immense riches of the oceanic area under the Brazilian jurisdiction. This area covers a ZEE of 200 nautical miles, with a surface of 3,539,919 km², while the PC is up to 350 nautical miles, corresponding to 960,000 km². If added, they cover 4,499,919 km², or almost 4.5 million km², which aggregate a maritime area equivalent to more than 50% of the total area of Brazil. In 2004, the Brazilian government presented its first proposal pleading the recognition of the PC to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLPC) of the United Nations.⁶

After negotiations with the CLPC, a more robust proposal was presented by the Brazilian government in March 2007. In April of the same year, the Commission responded not accepting 19% of the Brazilian claim. That is why a Revised Proposal Outer Limit of the Brazilian Continental Shelf is being prepared. In the meantime, back in 2010 the CIRM drafted the Resolution 03/10 assuming the right to evaluate requests for research “on its PC beyond 200 nautical miles” (More 2010). However, this resolution only seems to confirm the statement made by the Government of Brazil in 1982, when it signed the United Nations Convention Law of the Sea: “I. Brazil makes use of its sovereignty rights over the continental shelf, beyond the distance of two hundred nautical miles from the baselines, up to the outer edge of the continental margin, as defined in article 76.” (Declarations or Statements upon UNCLOS ratification; More 2010)

It is expected that in 2012 the CLPC would give Brazil a proper answer about the remaining 19% of the PC. This response is crucial because the recommendations of the CLPC establish “definitive and mandatory” limits according to the article 76.8 of CNDUM (Silva 2011, 117). For now, some definition of the Commission is anticipated. In the meantime, even the 81%

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⁶It was the second country to present a demand for recognition of the PC, after Russia, according to the law of UNCLOS. http://www.mar.mil.br/secirm/leplac.htm.
over which the Commission has manifested no objections are not defined as an official part of Brazil’s PC.

Right now, oil and gas within the ZEE are explored, and there are other exploitable areas within the ZEE as well. However, the natural resources extend to the PC. It is in the PC, for example, that huge amounts of oil and gas in the pre-salt were discovered. On the other side of the Atlantic, in Africa, oil and gas were also discovered in the pre-salt layers. These similarities in geological formation are not a strange fact since Brazil and Africa were part of West Gondwana. Petrobras is developing activities in Africa, including the pre-salt areas in Namibia and the Republic of Gabon (Izundu 2009; Martin et al. 2009; Pre-sal.info 2011; Godoi, 2011).

Nonetheless, the main activities of Petrobras are concentrated in Brazil. For decades, Brazil had deficiencies in the production of oil and gas. Thanks to fodder at sea, the country became more than self-sufficient in oil and will soon be in gas, which it still imports, even if only partially. Now, with the discovery of large reserves of oil and gas in the pre-salt layers, the country is becoming a major world producer of oil and must become one of the ten largest in the world. There are some technical challenges to face, though (Caroli 2010, 125-128). As for the gas, Brazil not only will become self-sufficient but will also become an important exporter in a few years.

There are also other raw materials to be exploited in the bottom of the Ocean, in the ZEE and possibly on the PC, such as polymetallic nodules containing manganese, nickel, copper, and cobalt; and polymetallic sulfides containing iron, zinc, copper and other types of metal. With the growing demand for metals and minerals and rising prices for these materials, interest in learning more about the resources in the deep sea and explore what is economically viable is growing (Martins 2006, 125-131).

Another sector that deserves to be developed is fishing, both in the Ocean, along the coast through aquaculture production, and in freshwater. It requires a much greater knowledge about the natural resources in the Ocean and the possibilities of developing fishery in a sustainable manner. Unfortunately, biodiversity of the Ocean is still poorly researched and recorded. In any case, it must be protected and, therefore, the toxic pollution and waste avoided. Many vessels were already caught in the act spawning polluted ballast.
One of the actions of the Navy is exactly trying to prevent illegal evictions and other violations in waters under Brazilian jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, the research to be done goes well beyond biodiversity. The oceanographic studies in Brazil began in 1934 and were strengthened after 1946, but they really got momentum only in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The CIRM has played a key role in this context once it aims to coordinate the National Policy for Sea Resources (PNRM, initials in Portuguese), where the marine research, technology and science to be promoted are detailed (República Federativa do Brasil 2005a). It was in this context that in November 24, 2011, a ship left Rio Grande to Cape Town with sixteen researchers from five universities on board with the mission to understand the role of oceans as absorbers of atmospheric carbon dioxide (Rota Marinha 2011). The participation of the CIRM in a meeting in Fortaleza in 2007 where course surveys, research projects, and problems related to personnel workload were discussed, was also indicative of the growing importance of sea related issues to the country. Indeed, due to the increasing importance of the sea to Brazil, the country must be able to train professionals and other scholars of the highest level (Krug and Santos 2007).

Two research projects deserve special attention: the research centre established in the São Pedro e São Paulo Archipelago in 1998, and which is supported by five Ministries. Researchers take turns continuously in the archipelago so that it is inhabited, otherwise it would not be permitted to establish a ZEE around it. The geological formation of the archipelago is very peculiar, because it is a complex of plutonic rocks with sedimentary ones, and not of volcanic type (Viana 2009, 11, 55-63). Brazil also wants to establish an oceanographic laboratory at sea, a project of three Ministries: Defense, Science and Technology, and Environment, in order to deepen the knowledge of the sea, especially in the areas of environmental safety, the development of naval technology and biotechnology, and the establishment of an underwater observatory (Maltchik and Oliveira 2011).

7The researchers are linked to the Universidade Estadual Rio de Janeiro, Universidade Federal Rio de Janeiro, Institute of Oceanography of the Universidade Federal de Rio Grande, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, and the Center for Marine Biology of the Universidade de São Paulo.
However, for the country’s economy, the Ocean plays another key role: in the transportation area, which it goes well beyond the Blue Amazon: 95% of international trade, exports and imports, is done by the sea. The Navy Commandant, Fleet Admiral Roberto de Guimarães Carvalho, considers the enormous dependence on maritime traffic a large vulnerability for the country, since any interference in the sea free transit could have very serious consequences for the economy, including bringing it to “collapse” (Carvalho 2004). Moreover, only 3% of this transport is operated by the Brazilian Merchant Shipping. Major investments in this sector are needed to reduce the use of foreign ship owners, which has a negative weight in the country’s trade balance. Other substantial investments are needed to modernize the ports of Brazil that cannot be as competitive as the major ports of the world (Vidigal 2006, 103-119). It is clear that, for the economy, the dependence on the Ocean is enormous and that it will become even greater with the development of the immense riches that lie in the Ocean or in its bottom.

Aspects of security and the role of the Brazilian Navy

There is no doubt that these natural resources have to be protected. But, in the Blue Amazon, the jurisdictional limits of waters are just imaginary lines over the sea, which are not physically demarcated, as it is the case when on the ground (Carvalho 2005, 19). Thus, heavy investments are needed if the Brazilian Navy is to exercise control over such waters and have the deterrent power, if necessary. In December 18, 2008, the Brazilian government published the National Defense Strategy (END, initials in Portuguese), which determines which actions the Armed Forces must take to be capable of defending the country and support its development (República Federativa do Brasil 2008). The Government recognizes that there is a tradition in Brazil as far as the country’s defense is concerned, since the country was involved in few wars and, after the borders’ demarcation, has no confrontations with its ten neighbors whatsoever. Brazil has always had a peaceful vocation and has not needed to pay much attention to defense, but this is possibly changing (Peixoto 2010, 155-165). If the country, which became the sixth economy in the world in the end of 2011, wants to play a role in the development of the world, its defense has to follow the path of its growth. The operation of the Armed Forces – Navy, Army and Air Force – has to be rethought in the long run. To become more effective,
the Armed Forces must establish a united staff and more systematically coordinate the operations of the three forces. It is necessary to go far beyond sporadic operations involving the three forces. What is needed is reaching the cooperation among the three forces in order to increase their effectiveness and power to (re)act quickly. The Armed Forces must be organized “under the aegis of the triad monitoring/control, mobility and presence” (República Federativa do Brasil 2008, 4). This organization can take place while work on the modernization and development of the Armed Forces, which will require heavy investments, is done.

A key priority is to maintain the sovereignty of the (green) Amazon Region. No organization or individual action, possibly serving foreign interests, may infringe the country’s sovereignty: “the Green Amazon will be developed by Brazil” (República Federativa do Brasil 2008, 10th directive).

On the other hand, the military integration in South America have to be encouraged, particularly the industrial and defense bases, to get to the construction of the South American unity, without the participation of foreign countries in the region (República Federativa do Brasil 2008, 18th directive). The government probably makes reference to the U.S. military presence in Colombia and Paraguay, near the Triple Frontier, among others, and the British presence in the Falkland Islands (Sousa and Soligo 2011). The integration could also prevent possible conflicts in the region and reduce tensions between neighboring countries in the Andean region (República Federativa do Brasil 2008; Villa 2010, 91-114). On the day of her inauguration as the President (January 1st 2011), Dilma Rousseff spoke to her Colombian counterpart and invited Colombia to become a partner of MERCOSUR. This became unlikely after the formation of the Pacific Alliance in the same year, whose free trade agreement was signed among Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru in 2012. Concerning the Falkland Islands, Brazil, as much as the other MERCOSUR and South American countries, supports the Argentinean position, through the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the newly formed Commonwealth of Latin American and Caribbean.

The relations between Argentina and the United Kingdom became more strained after the repeal by President Néstor Kirchner cooperation in the Special Cooperative Area, established by President Menem, which included the
prospect of natural resources in the sea, including oil. The growing British investment in oil exploration after 2012 made the issue even more serious, with actions of both countries’ Navies and claims by the Argentinean government to the CLPC and the Secretary General of the United Nations on the Falklands. Indeed, the dispute between the two governments is not limited to the Falklands, but the conflict has worsened now that the British government also wants to extend the continental shelf not only of the Malvinas, but also of other islands in the South Atlantic and the seas around Antarctica. Thus, both countries are claiming areas that partially or totally overlap (Dodds and Benwell 2010; International Boundaries Research Unit 2010). The resolution of this question seems urgent, although it is unlikely to be solved in the short term in a satisfactory way to Argentina. In the meantime, through a solidarity act to the Argentine ports, ships with the flag of the Falklands cannot anchor in the ports of other MERCOSUR countries, a symbolic decision, since there would be no problems if a different flag was displayed. However, if the Argentinean government decides to take military action, it could have much more serious implications to the members of MERCOSUR and UNASUR. The Argentinean government thinks that the British presence is a “relic of colonialism”, a remnant of the old international order, and that the UK is stealing non-renewable resources of Argentina (Dodds and Benwell 2010, 578-579).

The about case is illustrative of much riches is being discovered and exploited in the South Atlantic in recent decades and how it involves security issues that are not limited to these two countries. The Brazilian Navy is quite aware of the number of British islands located in the South Atlantic. Besides the Falklands and its strategic position, the Ascensão Island allows the control of maritime traffic, since it is located at the narrowest point between the Northeast of Brazil and the West African coast (Abreu 2010).

It is thus understandable the key role played by the Brazilian government in intensifying, expanding and diversifying the integration process in South America. Among the various existing plans, it can be stressed the Initiative for Regional Infrastructural Integration of South America, launched in Brasilia in the year of 2000, which is a very ambitious project for the development of the regional infrastructure of transportation, energy and communication in South America. Among the many projects a road between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans is planned, besides several smaller
waterways. The physical integration of the region is considered one of the priorities for the Brazilian government. In 2009, in order to strengthen this aspect, the UNASUR’s Coordinating Committee of the South American Council of Infrastructure and Planning (COSIPLAN) was created. Its first meeting took place in 2011 in Rio de Janeiro, and the projects prioritized were those directly related to the development of the region for the next 10 years. Besides the infrastructure, energy is another sector that receives special attention within UNASUR. Another important proposal and Brazilian initiative is the establishment of the Council of South American Defense, which integrates the security Ministries from 12 countries and was approved in 2008. This Council has several goals: the development of common defense policies, the integration of industrial and military equipment bases, and the conducting of joint military exercises (Villa and Viana 2010, 99-110). Indeed, it is worth noticing the number of initiatives being developed under the auspices of UNASUR, established as recently as 2004, and whose constituent treaty of 2008 entered into force in 2011.

The importance of energy resources is also emphasized in the EDN, because, as a first priority for the Navy, the proactive defense of oil platforms and, more generally, the areas of oil production at sea are mentioned. The second priority is to defend the Brazilian jurisdictional waters and its territory, including islands, archipelagos, maritime coast and rivers. The mouth of the Amazon River deserves special attention. Concerning the Atlantic, the field of action of the Armed Forces is not only limited to the Blue Amazon, but it also covers the South Atlantic, one of the main areas in which defense issues were taken into account (República Federativa do Brasil 2008b). Finally, in the 2005 National Defense Policy (República Federativa do Brasil 2005a) it was already mentioned several times how much the South Atlantic is of great strategic importance to Brazil and why it is a priority for the National Defense (República Federativa do Brasil 2005b). It is interesting to notice that, in the 2005 PDN, the Blue Amazon appears once, while it was not even mentioned in the EDN.

The PDN is a fundamental document that defines what is expected of the Armed Forces in general and of the Navy, in particular. The Navy must defend the Atlantic region, with the support of Naval Aviation and Air Force.
To fulfill this role, the presence of the Navy must be modernized and increased. Together with the fleet located in Rio de Janeiro, the creation of a second fleet in the North/Northeast of the country is considered necessary, due to the special attention paid to the mouth of the Amazon River. Each fleet will have its own aircraft carrier, a variety of ships in different numbers, including multi-purpose and logistical ships, and an amphibious division. All these details are defined in the Plan of Articulation and Equipment of the Brazilian Navy (PAEMB), which stems from the EDN and provides the guidelines for the PAEMB between the years 2011 and 2030, including projects of short, medium and long terms, with a funding that must be substantial to allow improvements and an increase of the current equipment of the Navy. In addition, the modernization project should not end in 2030, but to be extended until 2047, at least (Mendonça 2011, 151-162). Moreover, when studying the time needed for the desired equipment planned by the Navy to be acquired in order to defend Brazil in case of need, one can only agree with Rui Barbosa who used to say that “fleets are not improvised.”

The PAEMB is part of the Plan of Organization and Equipment of the National Defense, which has yet to be approved by the Congress to become a state policy. The problem is that the defense is not a priority and therefore the budgets are not adequate (Pesce 2010; id. 2012). This has to do with the peaceful vocation of Brazil and the absence of enemies against which the country has to be defended. Another factor which helps to explain the reluctance of the Congress to make available greater sums of money in Defense is the fact that Brazil had a military regime for about 20 years (1964-1985) and with the return of democracy the Armed Forces lost space. Thus, over a long period, the defense budget in Brazil has been 1.5% of Gross National Product (GNP). In recent years, it increased to 2.5% of the GNP. Most of this budget is spent on salaries, with 4% of it being used for investments in the modernization of equipment (Villa 2008). The budget is relatively modest and, in its first year in office, the new government of Rousseff began reducing all budgets to fight inflation, including this one. Most investment remains concentrated in programs related to the submarine: the development of the nuclear fuel cycle and the prototype reactor for nuclear submarine propulsion. The Submarine Development Programme (PROSUB) includes the construction of four conventional submarines and nuclear technology transfer to the country, the
establishment of a shipyard and a submarine base in Itaguaí in the State of Rio de Janeiro. In the budget, there is also funding left for the Brazilian Antarctic Program (Proantar). The financing of Proantar will become more substantial in 2012, due to the serious problems that occurred there earlier this year. The goal is to use the nuclear submarine to control the continental shelf, along with a conventional submarine. The nuclear submarine is slightly faster and can stay underwater for longer. Patrol vessels and a satellite system to monitor the entire Blue Amazon are planned. It is being assembled a Management System of Blue Amazon (SisGAAZ) for its defense and maritime security (Maltchik and Oliveira 2011; Mendonça 2011, 158). With a whole system of the SisGAAZ sensors will monitor what happens on the surface, subsurface and air space of the Brazilian territorial waters and much of the South Atlantic because as the Vice-Admiral Ilques Barbosa Junior rightly says, the Blue Amazon is a three-dimensional space (Galante 2010a).

The investment in nuclear energy, not only in submarines, is considered essential within the framework of EDN. It is about “developing and dominating nuclear technology.” In order for that to be achieved there will be given support to universities through scholarships for doctoral and postdoctoral studies, both in fundamental and applied sciences. Another area considered fundamental is cybernetics – both space and nuclear. The intention is to sign strategic partnerships in these areas, particularly with countries of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (National Defense Strategy 2008). The Brazilian government wants to develop nuclear research as much as possible within the limits permitted by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Brazil is a signatory. (Peixoto 2010, 163-165).

One way to accelerate the development of technology in the country is to require the transfer of technology, now a sine qua non condition to reach the area of defense cooperation with the Brazilian government. In addition,

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8The base must be rebuilt after the fire at the research station Comandante Ferraz Antarctic Station in February 2012, and possibly will be strengthened. “Measure provisional release R$40 million for reconstruction of base in Antarctica”, August 08, 2012, <http://www2.camara.gov.br/agencia/noticias/CIENCIA-E-TECNOLOGIA/410843-MEDIDA-PROVISORIA-LIBERA-R$-40-MILHOES-PARA-RECONSTRUCAO-DE-BASE-NA-ANTARTICA.html>.
construction equipment shall be made in Brazil itself, and the goal is to produce units for sale, after reaching the quantities deemed necessary to defend the country. To reach this result, the Government of Brazil signed strategic partnerships in the defense area with several countries: Germany, France, Italy and Russia, and in 2010, with the U.S. as well. However, all the contents are very different and, among these, the partnership with France is considered the most elaborate and crucial. Under the partnership agreement signed between France and Brazil in 2008, the French Government will pay the installation of the site that will be transferred to Brazil after 20 years. This is where the four Scorpene submarines will be built, besides the nuclear submarine of Ruby class. The only difference is that the weapons of the nuclear submarine will be conventional (Moreira 2011, 127-149). However, if the essential partner for the construction of submarines, Germany is the most probable candidate for partnership in the construction of ships.

As far as submarines are concerned, the PROSUB is considered a priority. An agreement was reached between Brazil and France, which has designed much of the equipment budget of the Navy used for the modernization of the Brazilian Navy. For the renewal of the surface fleet of Brazilian Navy it was established the Program for Getting Media Surface (PROSUPER). The details of both programs, including the type, quantity and time of all naval units that are designed, is a document presented by Rear-Admiral Rodolfo Henrique de Saboia during a lecture. It also includes prospects for the domestic industry. Incidentally, there are two fundamental aspects in this project for the defense of sovereignty and modernization: the transfer of technology and the strengthening and encouragement of the defense industry in Brazil (Freitas 2011; Saboia s.d., 13-15). Several companies from seven countries – Germany, South Korea, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK – have shown interest in participating in PROSUPER, accepting the requirement of technology transfer and construction of equipment in Brazil. The question is when will the means to implement the program, as part of the project scheduled for 2011 (and postponed to 2012) will be met (Pesce 2011).

Concerning the selection of naval aircraft, the Navy expects the Air Force's decision to follow the same choice. The fleet of Air Force fighters must be modernized. In fact it should have happened years ago. The intention is to buy 100 devices, but to start with 36, which represents a budget of US$4 to 7
billion. The discussion on the modernization and the choice of fighter aircraft was not completed during Lula’s government, as it was intended. It was postponed to Dilma’s Government, which has not made a decision yet. For several years, the final selection was limited to three fighter aircrafts, among which one would be chosen: the Rafale from Dassault (French), Gripen NG from Saab (Swedish) and F-18 Super Hornet Boeing (American).

The Air Force seemed to prefer the Gripen, while the then Defense Minister Jobim, and President Lula expressed interest in the Rafale, taking into account the excellent relations with France and the signature of a strategic agreement between the two countries. To reach a final decision, a number of factors must be taken into account: the purchase price, the price per hour of flight time and cost control of the aircraft after the flight, the transfer of technology, production in Brazil and the possibility of selling a posteriori. The Rafale is the most expensive in the acquisition, use and maintenance, but the French government promised an impressive transfer of technology, including even secret codes of the device. But both Sweden and the U.S. promised to also provide a significant transfer of technology. However, the Gripen is only a project, there is not even a prototype of it, and it will remain a virtual plane until interested is shown in buying it. Technically, the Super Hornet seems to be the most advanced model. However, the presence of U.S. technology, even minimal, can complicate and even prevent the sale of fighter jets produced in Brazil, as it was the case in 2005 when Brazil was not allowed to sell to Venezuela the ALX Super Tucano aircraft manufactured by Embraer, the Brazilian aircraft manufacturer, because of its U.S. components. The Government of Venezuela ended up buying planes in Russia, a great loss to Brazil.

It can be seen that the Government of Brazil wants firstly to develop its own military industry, in order to innovate without having to rely on third countries; secondly, to meet their own needs; and thirdly, in a later moment, to sell its production to neighboring countries. To do this, it is necessary to avoid repeating the Venezuelan case. However, these three planes contain U.S. components. This means that Brazil must negotiate with the U.S. to avoid possible restrictions to the development of the national military industry (Villa 2008; Barbosa 2010, 42-45; Bertonha 2010, 120-121). The question is whether,
as the decision continues to be delayed, one should not consider further options for fighters over the years because the technology continues to advance and given the scale of the project it would be a shame if they did such a great investment for fighters that would become obsolete in a few years.

Obviously, the acquisition of much new material also requires large investments in human resources, with special attention to the Marines in the case of the Navy. According to the EDN, the Brazilian government has no intention to abolish military service, but rather to reorganize it to make it more democratic and that all social classes actually participate, which is not the case today. In the EDN, fairer participation in military service is mentioned several times, particularly in what concerns to the surpluses number for enlistment that will have to participate in the civil service in a region different from their region of origin for further integration of the country and national identity (República Federativa do Brasil 2008). The Brazilian government is actually rethinking its defense and the armed forces are doing the same. However, on the one hand, the compulsory military service can be useful for the construction of national identity, on the other, in a world where technological knowledge and expertise become increasingly essential, Bertonha suggests the wiser option of developing good and well-paid professionals (2010, 119).

The challenges that the Navy has to face in the context of Blue Amazon were highlighted at a seminar held 14 and 15 of October 2010, in the Naval War College in Rio de Janeiro. Naval and other senior officials stressed that the Navy must not only defend the Brazilian jurisdictional waters, but must also be present throughout the South Atlantic, because most African countries gained independence only in the second half of the twentieth century, and are still building its institutions and its military power, which is currently facing major challenges. The exception is South Africa with which Brazil has signed a military cooperation agreement in 2003. The two navies operate in close cooperation, ensuring the protection of the maritime border between Brazil and Africa on one hand and the access roads in the South Atlantic, not only toward Africa but especially toward the sea lanes of Asia, on the other. These routes pass through South Africa and are considered key strategic areas for Brazil. Moreover, cooperation with South Africa is growing in many areas due to the IBSA Forum (India, Brazil, South Africa), officially launched in 2005. Within
IBSA, defense is one of the areas of cooperation and there have already been Navy joint exercises between the three countries (Bueno 2010).

Brazil also wants to cooperate with other African countries, especially the Western ones, and those rich in oil, such as Angola, which currently produces about 6% of world oil. The Brazilian Government would like these countries to take steps to protect their exclusive economic zones and, if applicable, their continental shelves. It also wants to encourage and assist these countries to submit their demands for recognition to the CLPC. If Brazil does not fulfill its role and is not present in the area, other countries will, such is the case of China, which is very present and active in Africa.

On the other hand, Brazil is also aware that there are two NATO powers present in the South Atlantic, particularly the UK that controls about eight islands located around the middle area of the ocean, one of them being Ascensão. The other power is the U.S. (Galante 2010b). This is one of the reasons why Brazil launched the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS, initials in Portuguese) initiative in 1986, still during the Cold War. This project incorporates 24 countries, three in South America and 21 in Africa. The United Nations General Assembly recognized the ZOPACAS, but there were votes against from the Great Britain, the United States and France - which has a border with Brazil via French Guiana - among others. The goal of ZOPACAS is to avoid the presence of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and external conflicts in the South Atlantic region (UN 1986). In 1996, the ZOPACAS was again re-affirmed and strengthened, with the addition of human rights and political, economic, scientific and cultural areas of cooperation. It also mentions issues related to the environment and prevention of illegal fishing (UN 1996). The existence of ZOPACAS was used as an argument in the National Defense Policy (NDP) document in 1996, during the Government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, to point out that with the end of the Cold War a nuclear confrontation seemed highly unlikely... The ZOPACAS, along with the MERCOSUR and the “closer relations with the Amazon neighboring countries” establishes “a ring of peace around the country”. The government could therefore focus its attention on the development of the country and fight against social inequality, according to the PDN in 1996 (2.10). This document is very different from the 2005 PDN and especially from
the National Defense Strategy (EDN) of 2008. The president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) changed the perspective on the role of the defense for the country and the need to invest in the armed forces as developed in the EDN. In fact, the EDN is sometimes called the military Growth Acceleration Program (PAC, initials in Portuguese), compared with the economic PAC that Lula launched in his second term to boost economic growth in Brazil. It is about having the ability to defend Brazil, boosting its power of deterrence and prioritizing the country's sovereignty both on land and at sea.

The importance of the South Atlantic for national security also has consequences for the Brazilian relations with the African continent, in particular with the countries bordering that Ocean. During Lula's presidency, relations with Africa have not only intensified, but also widened in a number of cases. In particular, Brazil has begun to help some African countries to improve their defense systems. In most cases, Brazil assists in the formation of military professionals. In 2010, the then Defense Minister Jobim, also said that the Navy of Brazil would provide assistance to West African countries to make maps of the continental shelf and to delineate the boundaries of their platforms (Maltchik and Oliveira 2011). The goal is to keep the South Atlantic under the sovereign control of the countries on both sides of that ocean, as far as possible.

President Lula da Silva (2003-2010) has stimulated an active cooperation with the African countries, especially the Portuguese-speaking ones and the oil-producing ones from the West Coast, where the Brazilian multinational Petrobras also has large interests, such as in Angola and Nigeria. For this reason, the Brazilian government negotiated in 2010 military strategic partnerships with these countries, mainly to help to train soldiers. (Visentini 2010, 215-236). These partnerships are also expected to prevent that the shipping routes are restricted by countries that explore oil and wish to create exclusion zones around their platforms. This would make the transportation even more expensive and time consuming. When oil deposits were discovered in Namibia, the cooperation between the Navy of both countries, which dates from 1994, was reinforced. In 2010, a first group of Namibian Marines was formed with the help of the Navy of Brazil.

There is a special and very old partnership between Angola and Brazil. This dates back from colonial times. Brazil was the first country to recognize the independence of Angola. Relations with Angola are complex and quite
varied. The Brazilian Economic and Social Development Bank opened a credit line of US$2 billion at the end of April 2012 for Angola. The country is also of interest to Brazil because it is a major oil producer, holding 6% of the hydrocarbon resources of the world. A specific agreement was signed in 2010 for training the Angolan military and giving technological assistance for Angola to claim its continental shelf. Moreover, the country is a member of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), established in 1989. Most of these countries are located in West Africa, with the exception of Mozambique (Visentini 2010, 233-234, 236-237). The Portuguese-speaking African countries formed their own sub-organization, the African Countries of Portuguese Official Language. The defense is one of the cooperation areas of the CPLP. The defense ministers meet almost yearly. In November 2011, XIII such meeting was held in Cape Verde. The final statement clearly demonstrated that Brazil played a crucial role in this meeting and that its key partners are the African countries (Final Declaration of the XIII Meeting of Defence Ministers of the CPLP, 2011).

In that same year, Brazil signed a military cooperation agreement with Nigeria seeking firstly to protect the sea lanes against foreign oil companies and secondly to strengthen the relations between the navies of Nigeria and Brazil. Moreover, the country may be interested in school boats developed by the Brazilian Navy, to transport students from coastal communities to public schools in the Northern Region. More generally, Brazil encourages African countries to take care of navigation routes to avoid problems when granting mining rights to international companies (Poggio 2010).

**Final considerations**

The Navy of Brazil is not just building Blue Amazon, rethinking the South Atlantic, the national security and all the challenges that stem from these issues, but it wants Brazil to re-discover its maritime vocation. It is investing heavily in the modernization and expansion of several naval forces: the Submarine Force (which will have submarines propelled by nuclear energy), the Surface Force, and the Naval Air Force. Combined, they will help the country to develop its role nationally and internationally in the South Atlantic. Because of that, Brazil is expanding its cooperation with the countries of West Africa; it
is about supporting African countries so that the South Atlantic is the South Ocean, without the presence of “the North”, or at least that this very presence does not jeopardize the interests of the South in general and of Brazil in particular.

To accelerate its goal of becoming a new maritime power, the Brazilian Navy works closely with a number of European countries, especially with France, to ensure that their equipment is adequate, that technology will be transferred and that the establishment of the naval industry in Brazil becomes a reality. The Ministry of Defense, the Armed Forces and the Navy more in particular moved from a reactive attitude to a very proactive one. The National Defense Strategy plays a crucial role and indicates a different direction for the country. If the country wants to assume the role of a world power, so far mainly in the southern hemisphere, its military power has to follow its ambitions.

To achieve these objectives, the Government and the Congress must give the necessary support, especially in financial terms, for the Armed Forces. In case of the Blue Amazon, the Navy and Air Force must be prepared with modern equipments in order to ensure country’ sovereignty and its power of deterrence, “preserving the ability of a coastal state to strengthen national security.” (Barbosa 2007, 51) The coastal state with the Blue Amazon certainly requires further attention.

The Brazilian defense has to grow again, which is why the President Dilma Rousseff is giving special attention to this industry, establishing special measures, such as tax reduction. However, these objectives have to be followed by an appropriate budget.

“We are the sixth economy in the world and want to be a developed Country, with a high human development index. Our Armed Forces must also be equal to the country on meritocracy, professionalism, technical capacity and, moreover, dissuasive capacity” (Rousseff 2012).
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ABSTRACT
The Brazilian Navy launched the concept of Blue Amazon to draw attention to the existing resources in the Ocean and their importance for the Brazilian economy. This also implies thinking about the defense of these national resources and about the investments needed for the Navy to have the capacity to protect the maritime territory under the Brazilian jurisdiction.

KEYWORDS
Blue Amazon; South Atlantic; Sea Resources; Defense; Security; Brazilian Navy.
ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK: SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN RECENT TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Ilter Turan

Turkish Foreign Policy: An Overview
During the years of the Cold War, the study of Turkey’s foreign policy hardly generated interest in the international arena. This was neither unique nor surprising. In a highly polarized environment, the members of each camp had to subscribe, in the final analysis, to the preferences of the superpower who led it and who provided for their nuclear defense. Turkey, it may be noted, was more observant of the expectations of the US who led the Western Bloc than some other members for two reasons. First, Turkey had long land and sea borders with the USSR and other members of the Warsaw Pact such as Romania and Bulgaria. Furthermore, it was in possession of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, briefly referred to as the Turkish Straits, a narrow waterway controlling access of the Soviets to the Mediterranean. Hence, it saw itself as a front line state with more intense security concerns than many other members of the alliance. These concerns were intensified by dependence on allies, naturally headed by the US, for the provision of arms to maintain a credible military. Second, as a country with a poorly developed economy that had opted for import substitution oriented industrialization, Turkey relied on its more prosperous allies to come to its assistance in order to cope with the periodic crises Turkey’s economy encountered since its external earnings often failed to meet its import needs. When balance of payments difficulties emerged, arguments emphasizing Turkey’s indispensible contribution to the security of

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the Western Bloc were usually mobilized to ask the allies to help the Turkish economy to regain its health.

The conditions under which Turkish foreign policy was made began to change after 1980. Particularly after the oil crisis of 1973, it became increasingly difficult to sustain the policy of import substitution oriented industrialization. Such a policy required large and continual inflow of loans and grants from abroad which were not forthcoming. As a result, Turkey had to bring about a major shift in its economic policy to increase its external earnings. Change came in January 1980 in the form of doing away with the complex of regulations that had come to be referred to as “Rules and Regulations for the Protection of the Value of the Turkish Lira.” This step was no more than liberalization of the foreign exchange regime, making it attractive for Turkish industries to export. Quickly, Turkish industrial exports began to increase and the Turkish economy began to become integrated to the world economic system.

Becoming more reliant on exports for the prosperity of its own economy constituted the background condition against which a process of gradual change in Turkish foreign policy was initiated. In contrast to earlier times when maximizing military and economic assistance from its allies was the major concern of Turkey’s policymakers, finding new markets and forging new relationships in which economic factors prevailed became the order of the day. These efforts were clearly facilitated initially by the thawing in the East-West relations and then the end of the Cold War marked by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and then the demise of the Soviet Union.

In retrospect, the change of Turkey’s economic policy appears to have been well timed. The painful process of Turkey’s integration to the international economy had already advanced to a certain level by the time the Cold War ended such that Turkey could retain a functioning economy without any longer having to resort to “contribution to western security” arguments whose powers of persuasion had rapidly declined. Furthermore, under the widely transformed political and security environment, previously existing barriers to engaging in trade with former “adversaries” had now been removed. Turkey’s economic relations with Russia and the countries of the Former Soviet Union rapidly expanded as well as those with countries of the Middle East while the country
continued its efforts to find new markets in Africa, East Asia and even Latin America.

**Background to Departure from Traditional Foreign Policy**

Despite a rapidly changing environment, initial changes in Turkish foreign policy were modest, reflecting the cautious approach that had characterized Turkey’s diplomacy under the republic. After its founding in the heartland of the Ottoman Empire, The republican governments had initially pursued a policy of neutrality and balancing pressures of the major European powers on the country. Such a policy enabled Turkey to stay out of the Second World War. The rapid rise of the bipolar world after the Second World War produced an equally rapid response when Turkey chose to associate itself with the Western Bloc and pursued efforts that led to its becoming a member of NATO. This was a manifestation of a more general approach that guided post-war Turkish foreign policy: do not stay out of the major institutional developments in the Western World. Accordingly, Turkey joined the Council of Europe, the OEEC (later OECD) and sought immediate association with the European Economic Community (later the European Union) when it was established. Finally, when Turkey’s economy came to rely on export-oriented growth and later when the Cold War came to an end, there was a gradual broadening of relations with others while maintaining close ties with both the US and Western Europe.

In this context, the rise of the Justice and Development party (AKP) to power in 2002 was initially met with concern that this party which represented a more religious orientation than other parties in Turkish politics might depart in major ways from the main direction of Turkish foreign policy. Such concerns were prompted, among others, by the behavior of the pre-2002 Felicity Party and its predecessors that had worked with limited success to move Turkey from the Western Bloc to a yet non-existent Islamic Bloc, in the construction of which Turkey would presumably play a leading role.

The refusal in 2003 of the Turkish parliament to allow US troops to go through Turkey in their plans to invade Iraq might have been seen as evidence of a major departure. Yet, the incident did not constitute the watershed event
marking a clear departure point from Turkey’s foreign policy. The government, it is to be remembered, had undertaken to secure the parliament’s approval for such passage and managed to achieve a parliamentary majority, but the procedure failed by one vote in view of some defections that the government was unable to control. Both sides tried to mend fences afterwards. Furthermore, in 2004, after much hesitation deriving from what Turkey might be asked to concede on Cyprus, the AKP government accepted EU’s invitation to commence with accession negotiations, a process that began in 2005.

The event marking Turkey’s beginning to act more independently in foreign policy came much later (2010) in the form of voting along with Brazil in the UN Security Council regarding the adoption of sanctions against Iran for its failure to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This had been preceded by two months by a major confrontation with Israel, America’s major ally in the Middle East, over the shipment of humanitarian aid to Gaza. The incident marked the beginning of the deterioration of relations with Israel that continues today. What were the circumstances that promoted the shift in foreign policy, directing it to unusual activism uncharacteristic of earlier times and why?

Structure and Agent in the Making of Foreign Policy
Those analyzing foreign policy usually turn to one of two types of explanations commonly known as structure-based and agent based, to explain what is done and why. Those that are structure-based refer to the conditions that generate pressures for change such as shifts in the relative power of other states, major developments in technology, and considerations of economic need and advantage. The second, i.e. agent-based explanations, on the other hand, focus on the ideas, ideologies, cognitive maps and also the psychologies of policymakers as sources of explaining policy shifts. It is reasonable to argue that a comprehensive analysis would have to incorporate both modes, although it is clear that a shift in only one of the domains may also produce changes. More likely is a situation, however, in which both structural and agent based forces are at work.

In the preceding description of the evolution and changes in Turkish foreign policy, the explanation has relied on structural elements. It has been
argued that the post WWII order directed Turkey to side with the Western Bloc and that change in the Turkish economy and the end of the Cold War were important in initiating change during the last two decades of the last century. Prior to the emergence of more independent activism in foreign policy, two additional developments of a structural nature also occurred. First, in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won an overwhelming victory in the national elections, ending a prolonged period beginning in 1991 during which Turkey had been ruled by unwieldy coalition governments. These governments, characterized by major internal rifts were, for the most part, incapable of producing often even minor policy decisions, external affairs not excepted. With the subsequent victory of the AKP in the elections of 2007 and 2011, Turkey entered a period of governmental stability which made it easier for the government to formulate and implement changes in foreign policy. Second, after going through a major economic crisis in 1999-2001 during which major institutional reforms and policies were introduced to prevent a recurrence, the Turkish economy entered a period of sustained economic growth that continues to this day. Such growth not only reduced the reliance of the prosperity of the Turkish economy to support from other friendly countries in order to overcome its difficulties but also generated resources that could be used in the implementation of foreign policy. That fact that Turkish economic and humanitarian assistance to Somalia tops that of any other country is a case in point.

Now, let us introduce the agents into our analysis. After the victory of the AKP in 2002, Turkish foreign policy was initially guided by Abdullah Gül, the current president of Turkey, who was first the prime minister until the legal hurdles could be cleared for the election of Tayyip Erdoğan, the head of AKP, to join the parliament by winning a by-election and become the prime minister. After the ascent of the latter to the premiership, Mr. Gül assumed the command of Turkish foreign policy. Mr. Gül continued the cautious change tradition in Turkish foreign policy. He was the foreign minister when Turkey was invited to become a member of the European Union.

Mr. Gül left the foreign ministry in 2004. Since that time, Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu has been a critical figure in the shaping of Turkish foreign policy. Currently the foreign minister, he did not actually assume that position until
2009. Serving as the chief foreign policy advisor to the prime minister, however, his determining input into the making and implementation of Turkish foreign policy is widely acknowledged. His role appears to have been enhanced particularly after the elections of 2007, and reinforced with his becoming the foreign minister in 2009 and then his election to the parliament in the 2011 elections underscoring a major victory for the AKP.

Coming from an academic background, the essence of Mr. Davutoğlu’s thinking is expressed in a book he wrote in 2001 entitled *Strategic Depth*. The book identifies geography, history, culture and the Turkish economy as elements that make Turkey a candidate for regional leadership. Turkey can build a zone of stability and prosperity by helping solve regional problems. The book defines a framework or a broad goal for Turkish foreign policy but does not prescribe specific courses of action. Over time, it has constituted the source of inspiration for the challenging goal of “zero problems with neighbors,” another idea of the foreign minister.

It seems that Mr. Davutoğlu, judging that the power balances in the world was shifting and that Turkey’s fortunes were on the rise, set out develop a greater say in world governance as well as to strengthen Turkey’s claim to regional leadership. With regard to his first goal, his line of logic was reasonable. The system of world governance had been devised at the end of the Second World War and had failed to adjust to the realities of the contemporary world. This led him to turn to policies that tried to expand Turkey’s space for independent action in the world system and to cooperate with other countries that found themselves in a similar situation. With regard to his second goal, his aspirations were understandable. As claimant to regional leadership, Egypt was deeply embroiled in its own economic and political problems at the time. The other claimant, Iran, was not only unacceptable to the Western World but also too closely identified with the minority sect of Shia Islam for its leadership claims to be recognized by a majority of the regional states. Furthermore, Turkey seemed to be highly popular on the Arab Street, demonstrating that a society with a majority Muslim population could be reasonably democratic and achieve economic prosperity.

Under Mr. Davutoğlu’s steermanship, three impulses have been important in the shaping of Turkish foreign policy: Remaining within the general framework of the Western alliance including the US and the EU;
challenging the global distribution of power and the global system of governance; and becoming the regional leader, peacemaker and the builder of a regional order. Each of these impulses has carried greater weight at different points in time and they have harbored contradictions that have caused tensions with allies, neighbors and rivals. Mr. Davutoğlu appears to have persuaded the Prime Minister that his line of thinking and the policies he recommended were sound and ought to be implemented. Therefore he has enjoyed the full support of the Erdoğan government.

Building up to Regional Leadership
From 2004 until 2010, the particular way the three impulses were molded into policy involved cooperation with the Western World but expanding room for independent action, keeping sustained economic development on course, and achieving regional leadership by trying to broker good relations and peace between feuding parties in the region.

Maintaining good relations with the Western allies included both cooperating with the US and advancing relations with the EU. With the US, Turkey not only worked to help build a stable Iraq, but it also contributed non-combat troops to the NATO operation in Afghanistan as well as in the Balkans. However, there were many sources of discord in the relationship. Kurdish terrorism directed to Turkey from bases in Northern Iraq was a constant source of irritation. The US discouraged Turkey from directing incursions into Iraq even if these might be in the nature of hot pursuit. It offered to give Turkey satellite based intelligence but the information provided was found to be not “actionable,” i.e. put to immediate use to capture or disable terrorists. It is only after much negotiation that the provision of more “actionable intelligence” began to flow. There were occasional unfriendly incidents between American military personnel involved in logistical activity in Turkey and Turkish soldiers as well as Turkish military delegations in Northern Iraq.

As regards the EU, the accession negotiations did not progress smoothly. Specifically, Turkey did not recognize Cyprus and open its ports to Cypriot vessels. Cyprus, in return, prevented several chapters from being opened in the accession negotiations. But there emerged a more general problem
of will on both sides, but first originating in the EU. It seems that the end of the Cold War and the expansion of the EU to include the countries of Eastern Europe radically transformed the conditions under which Turkey was seen to be an indispensable component of the EU. First, the security considerations that had figured heavily in the inclusion of Turkey in the future plans of the EU were no longer compelling. Second, there were concerns that it would be difficult for the EU to digest a very large and relatively poor country after a major wave of expansion that had already restrained its resources. Third, Turkey’s entry would clearly challenge the existing distribution of power in the EU that could best be characterized currently as a Franco-German condominium. This was probably one of the main motives behind the French objections to Turkish accession under Nicholas Sarkozy. Finally, there was a general rise of cultural conservatism in Europe that conceptualized the EU as a Christian club that naturally excluded Turkey whose population is almost exclusively Moslem. The leadership of both France and Germany kept alluding to an undefined “special relationship” that would replace Turkey’s full membership in the Union. The change of heart in the EU dampened Turkey’s enthusiasm for membership since that appeared to be an increasingly elusive prospect. Strong economic ties with more than 50 percent of Turkey’s exports going to the EU (currently 34 percent and declining) and significant EU member investments in Turkey, however, helped prevent a serious rupture in the relationship.

While trying to maintain good ties with its traditional allies, the 2004-2010 period was also a time when Turkey tried to expand its ties with other countries and regions of the world. Turkey initiated diplomatic relations with numerous new African countries, as well as forging new ties and strengthening existing ties with Latin American and Asian countries. This is a period during which Turkish embassies opened in new capitals, Turkish external aid agency TIKA assumed an activist posture in many an underdeveloped country and after an energetic campaign, Turkey was elected as a temporary member of the UN Security Council.

With regard to its neighboring region, Turkey adopted a facilitator role in enhancing better relations among the countries in the area. Within this framework, Turkey managed to get the Saudi’s and Syrians to talk to each other, help Iranians and Saudis to communicate, bring the feuding factions of
Palestinians together and most importantly came close to getting the Syrians and the Israelis reach an accommodation on the status of Golan heights. In all of these endeavors, Turkey managed to stand equidistant to all sides, acquire their trust and be recognized as an impartial neighbor in the region.

**Zero Problems with Neighbors**

Regarding its own problems with neighbors, a “zero problems with neighbors” approach was adopted. Such an approach did not imply, as is sometimes suggested, that no problems would be left between Turkey and its neighbors, but rather that Turkey would work at settling its disputes with its neighbors through peaceful means rather than ignore them. Historically, Turkey had a highly problematical relationship with Syria that entertained claims on the Turkish province of Hatay and supported the Kurdish PKK terror to prevent Turkey from building dams on the Euphrates, fearing that Turkey would eventually use much of the water and not release sufficient quantities for Syria to meet its needs. This policy was changed by Hafez al Assad (the father) only after Turkey threatened to intervene militarily. Beginning in 1999, relations had started to improve, gaining new momentum after 2004. Syria went quiet on its claims to Hatay and its challenges regarding Turkey’s construction of dams on the Euphrates. One by one, border restrictions were removed, a project to clear the border region from mines was developed, visa requirements were lifted, trade began to expand rapidly, Turkish investments began to trickle in, and finally, a strategic partnership was announced. Turkish and Syrian ministers would hereafter hold periodic joint meetings. Relations appeared to have reached an ideal state that hardly any observer would have imagined as possible a few years ago.

After the US intervention, relations with Iraq too seemed on the whole to develop in a satisfactory direction. Turkey was committed to maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq and the evolution of a regime that would bring peace and stability to that country. Turkey had an interest in preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity in Iraq’s north which it judged might develop separatist linkages with Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish Southeast, a position that suited the government in Baghdad well. Turkey
looked forward to expanding economic relations in a market that generated sizable demands for goods and services. Furthermore, Turkey thought that it was a natural transport route for the oil and gas that Iraq would be exporting to the world markets. A pipeline from Kirkuk to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Yumurtalik already existed and it could certainly be expanded.

Turkey’s relations with Iran also improved during this period. Turkey expanded its economic relations with Iran and became a major customer of Iranian gas and oil. In contrast to western leaders that shunned from developing close relations with Iran, Turkey’s leaders were warm and receptive to their Iranian counterparts. Turkish foreign policy leadership tried to restrain western governments, especially the US in pursuing a non-compromising line against Iran, and argued for engagement and communication. Again Turkey saw Iran as a major economic partner and Turkish trade with Iran was constantly growing. Turkey also attracted a respectable number of Iranian tourists who found in Turkey a liberal society in which they could enjoy food and drink without having to worry about gender and dress codes. It is to be remembered that the Turco-Iranian relationship has always harbored both competitive and cooperative elements. While the competitive elements did not disappear during the period in question, clearly a more cooperative mood characterized the relationship.

Syria, Iraq and Iran all had bad relations with Israel. Turkey, on the other hand, had developed reasonably close relations with Israel despite its unhappiness regarding the latter’s failure to accommodate the aspirations of the Palestinians. Turkey viewed the Israeli relationship as being important for two reasons. First, Israel was a reliable partner in defense items which Turkey sometimes had difficulty getting from other allies including the US. Furthermore, military and non-military wares and technologies imported from Israel were cheaper than those acquired from Western partners. Second, Israel had a strong lobby in Congress whereas Turkey did not. This lobby often came to Turkey’s support on issues before the Congress where they constituted a counterweight to Armenian and Greek lobbies that displayed strong anti-Turkish proclivities. In return, Israel was insured of the support of a moderating influence in regional politics and got access to using Turkish territory for air force training exercises. Trade between the two countries flourished and Turkey was a popular destination for Israeli tourists.
It is interesting to note that the Turkish government tried also to improve relations with Armenia. The Armenian state has insisted that Turkey should assume responsibility for the alleged genocide of Armenians in 1915 under Ottoman rule. It also calls much of Eastern Turkey “western Armenia and which it judges to be rightful Armenian territory. Turkey rejects Armenian claims and argues that Armenia should withdraw from Nagorno-Karabagh and several Azeri provinces that it occupied in a war with Azerbaijan. The Turkish-Armenian conflict is of broader interest than just the bilateral relations since the Armenian diaspora in France and the United States, in addition to many other parts of the world, lobby governments to recognize the events of 1915 as genocide, an act which the Turks consider to be inaccurate, unfair and downright insulting. The practical outcome is that Armenia and Turkey do not have diplomatic relations and the border is closed.

Both the US and European allies encouraged the parties to settle their differences. A process of conciliation was initiated in September 2008 with the Turkish President Gül traveling to Armenia, ostensibly to attend a soccer game between two national teams in a European championship match which provided an opportunity for him to talk with the Armenian president. These initial acts were followed by the preparation of an agreement that involved the initiation of diplomatic relations and the opening of the border. The agreement was signed in Geneva in September 2009. The Turkish side believed that there was a tacit understanding that Armenia would begin to withdraw from some of the provinces of Azerbaijan that it was occupying, but this did not materialize. Azerbaijan with whom Turkey shares a common culture and language as well as substantial economic interests the most important of which the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, protested vehemently, arguing that it had been betrayed. Under the circumstances neither Turkey nor Armenia felt ready to implement the agreement. A unique effort to terminate a state of hostile relations with a neighbor failed.

A similar experiment also failed in Cyprus. In 2005, Mehmet Ali Talat got elected the president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. He represented a line of thinking that argued that it was possible to negotiate with the Greek side to bring about the unification of the Island. This change provided a window of opportunity for Turkey to address a problem that had
proven insoluble in the past. Bilateral negotiations, however, proved fruitless. The Greek Cypriot government not only felt that in the long run both Turkish Cyprus and Turkey would have to yield to their position because of Turkey’s interest in becoming a member of the EU, but it had also become enslaved in the hands of its own public whom Cypriot political parties had led to believe that it would be possible to unify the Island without making any concession to the Turks. The negotiations under the auspices of the UN delivered little progress. The solution of the problem was therefore laid to rest.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s relations with Russia had grown rapidly. Freed from the adversarial perception produced by the bipolar global politics, there was a rapid expansion of economic relations. Russia became the major supplier of natural gas to Turkey while led construction services in Russia. Consumer goods from Turkey filled Russian shelves while Russian tourists filled hotel rooms on the Turkish Mediterranean coast. Relations were further facilitated by the personal chemistry between Mr. Putin and the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan. Eventually references to a strategic partnership (a loosely employed word by Turkish policymakers) began to be used to describe the relationship. Russia undertook to build Turkey’s first nuclear plant. Mainly through Turkish efforts, visa requirements for short term travel were removed between the two countries.

From the very beginning, Turkey worked also to develop sound relations with the former Soviet states and broadly succeeded in this endeavor. Lively economic and/or cultural relations were established with the Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. But these were understandably overshadowed by size and the significance of the Russian relationship. Turkey’s efforts to develop a special relationship with the Turkic speaking republics in Central Asia, on the other hand, have been reasonably successful but not advanced as much as Turkey has hoped for. The ruling elites, generally apparatchiks from the days of the USSR maintained a strong orientation toward Russia. Furthermore, economic dependencies developed during the Soviet times cannot be undone easily. Close relations, on the other hand, were established with Georgia and Azerbaijan. This has culminated in the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and later a parallel natural gas line, both originating in Baku and going across Georgia into Turkey. Recently, it has been agreed to develop the gas pipeline into the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, intended to be the beginning leg of
system that will transport Azeri and possibly Kazakh and Turkmen gas into Europe, serving Turkey’s aspirations to become a global energy hub.

Turning to Turkey’s West, although a number of unsettled issues connected with Aegean airspace, continental shelf, territorial waters and economic zone, Turkey’s relations with Greece were good. The two societies had learned to live with problems and did not allow them to undermine a peaceful relationship between them. Beyond Greece, in the Balkans, Turkey that hosts significant immigrant populations from Balkan countries, was active in contributing to peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts cooperating with the UN, NATO and the EU. It was also an economic actor that offered both economic assistance and conducted trade. It enjoyed the trust of contesting parties in the region and used this confidence to broker better relations even between the Serbs and the Bosnian Moslems.

If one were to describe where Turkey stood in terms of its foreign policy in 2009, it may said that the country had been moving toward becoming a regional leader. It was perceived as an honest broker among countries of the Middle East and the Balkans, its economic performance and the ensuing prosperity impressed others; its secular, liberal atmosphere and democratic politics led publics of neighboring countries in its South to aspire to be like Turkey. For them, Turkey was a neighbor, but it belonged to a different world of more industrialized, more democratic countries of the west. More broadly, Turkey appeared to have succeeded in building a zone of prosperity around it, it was a trusted neighbor and an honest broker. It was an important economic partner. It was a country tourists from the region wanted to visit at their first opportunity. Hardly anyone would have predicted that this idyllic state of affairs would unravel in such a short time.

Experiment in Going Independent
What had happened, what had gone wrong? One incident appears to have had a clear contribution to triggering the change- the Israeli attack on Gaza in December 2008. The attack came a few days after the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had returned to Israel from Turkey with a proposal to reach an accommodation with Syria on the status of Golan Heights. The
Turkish Prime Minister had invested time and effort to bring this about. The end of hostilities between Syria and Israel would have constituted a huge step in converting the Middle East into a zone of peace and hopefully prosperity. Turkey would be a leading political and economic beneficiary of this development. Ehud Barak had gone back to Israel, leaving the impression that he would put some finishing touches on the proposal and get cabinet approval. Instead came the attack on Gaza. Mr. Erdoğan felt betrayed and thought that he had been duped by Israel to gain time in preparing the attack on Gaza.

It is probably after this incident that the prime minister concluded that Israel had no intention of making peace and it was out to take more territory from the Palestinians. He appears further to have judged that Israel’s recalcitrance derived from insufficiencies in the world system of governance which prevented international action to stop Israel. He began, ever more frequently, to utter critical remarks about Israel. He soon discovered that such talk made him very popular in the Arab streets since Arab leaders were generally more reserved in their remarks about Israel.

Then in May 2009, Mr. Davutoğlu became the foreign minister. Although he had been an influential foreign policy advisor to the prime minister, being made a minister, he was now at the helm of foreign policy. The prime minister showed great confidence in him, a fact that enhanced his input into policymaking. Whether his promotion to ministerial position reflected the prime minister’s desire to bring about changes in foreign policy or whether Mr. Davutoğlu formed policy and persuaded the prime minister that policy should be changed is difficult to establish, but it is clear that within a year Turkish foreign policy turned more independent and assertive. The landmark event, of course, is the negative vote that Turkey cast along with Brazil against the imposition of sanctions on Iran for failing to submit its nuclear program to the review of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Although the US government may have led Brazil and Turkey to believe that the deal they brokered with Iran was acceptable to the Obama administration and that the US was in fact reneging on its promise, not abstaining but voting against an ally, was not received kindly by the Americans. Turkey accepted to observe the sanctions depicted in the decision of the UN Security Council but made clear that it would not observe additional measures that would be introduced by the US or the EU.
The UN vote was on June 9, 2010. This had been preceded a few days ago by an incident on the high seas in which Israeli commandoes had attacked Mavi Marmara, a boat carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza as the flagship of an international flotilla, killing eight Turks and one American of Turkish origin. There were concerns that Turco-Israeli relations would take a sharp turn for the worse and indeed they were severely damaged, still waiting to be repaired.

Putting these developments together, it seemed Turkey had now become interested in pursuing an increasingly independent foreign policy. Challenging Americans and Israelis enhanced the public admiration for Prime Minister Erdoğan among Muslim populations in the Middle East, a phenomenon which he found gratifying. Turkey’s traditional western Allies found Turkish behavior puzzling, the EU felt relief that Turkish attention was turning elsewhere while the Americans did not want a rupture since Turkish cooperation was still needed in insuring a smooth exit from Iraq.

The Turning of the Tide: From Regional Leader to Regional Actor
The outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring in the December of 2010 did not initially arouse major interest in Turkish foreign policy establishment. Turkey had limited relations with Tunisia though AKP had some linkages with the Islamic opposition movement in that country. Then came Tahrir Square. Again, while the government might be sympathetic to the demands for change and had relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, they kept their distance. Libya, however, constituted a turning point. Turkey had construction contracts totaling 25 billion USD there and more than 20000 citizens working in those projects. When Turkey’s western allies suggested that NATO should stage an intervention to stop bloodshed, the initial reaction of Prime Minister Erdoğan was to ask “What business does NATO have there?” When it became evident that France and Britain were going to intervene anyhow, Turkey affected a major turnaround, returned to the fold, and extended naval support to the operation and helped evacuate foreign nationals.

The developments in Libya demonstrated to Mr. Erdoğan and Davutoğlu that Turkey did not have the means to implement a regional policy and shape events by itself and that it had to make difficult choices. The decision
to take part in NATO operations was an earlier example. But it had already been preceded by another example in the November 2010 NATO summit when the US proposal to build and ABM radar system was adopted. Although no adversary against whom the system was designed was ever specified, it was understood that the primary target would be Iran and a subsidiary target Russia. The missiles would not be deployed on Turkish territory, but a radar station needed to be built in Southeastern Turkey. Saying no to the proposal would cause a serious and may be an irreparable rift with NATO allies, especially the US. Saying yes, on the other hand, would be unwelcome by Iran and to a lesser degree by Russia.

**Syria: The Pivotal Case**

A rather difficult choice also emerged with regard to Syria. The Arab Spring reached Syria late. When demonstrations in various cities of Syria started, both the Turkish Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister visited Bashar Assad to persuade him to accede rather than to stand against the tide demanding political reforms and liberalization. The Syrian president pretended to be accommodating, made promises for change but never delivered on his promises. This put the Turkish leadership in an embarrassing position since they had been trying to convince their allies to pursue moderation and engagement toward Syria. Prime Minister Erdoğan who values personal relationships highly, also felt personally betrayed and turned into an opponent of the Syrian leader.

As the domestic strife in Syria continued, the Syrian government escalated the means it employed to include tanks, field guns and fighter-bomber jets to put the opposition down. The internal strife also produced a wave of refugees that flooded into Turkey. If hesitantly at first, Turkey joined its Western allies an in condemnation of the Syrian leadership conservative Arab regimes, becoming an active promoter of Syrian opposition. It has hosted meetings of the Friends of Syria that extends support to the opposition. It has allowed the political opposition to hold meetings in Istanbul. Newspapers have reported that light arms and ammunition as well as volunteers from other countries have transited through Turkey to make their way to the Syrian opposition forces. And most recently, it has been alleged that Turkey has been offering training to members of the Free Syrian Army whose headquarters are
located in the province of Hatay on the Syrian border. The Turkish Prime Minister has made it clear that Assad must go. Inadvertently, Turkey has become a party to Syrian domestic politics.

Turkey’s increasing involvement in Syria in favor of the opposition has not been without its costs. To begin with, it has strained Turkey’s relations with Iran and Russia who are supportive of the current Syrian regime for different reasons. Russia, in trying to restore the power position that was once enjoyed by the Soviet Union, has had an interest in refurbishing the naval base in Tartus through which it can project its naval prowess to the Eastern Mediterranean. Whereas in earlier times, Soviets had a number of friends on the Eastern half of the Mediterranean including Libya and Egypt or even Cyprus, none of those are available now. Iran, on the other hand, tries to prevent the emergence of regimes to its West that are favorably disposed to the US and the western alliance. Furthermore, it desires to project its power toward the Mediterranean in which Syria constitutes a critical link. Of the two neighbors, Iran has been more open in its criticism of Turkey’s position on Syria and its increasingly pro-western disposition.

A second negative outcome of the worsening relationship with Syria has been possible return of the support of the Syrian government to Kurdish terrorism of the PKK. Although the extent of such support is difficult to establish, particularly in light of the fact that the regime is fighting for its own life, the removal of controls by the Syrian government and its promotion of terror is a discomforting thought for Turkey. Turkish anxieties are further exacerbated by the takeover of some local governments by Kurdish groups in towns bordering Turkey. Though these towns are disparate and do not constitute a unified region, their assertions of autonomy, it is feared, would reinforce similar demands on the Turkish side of the border.

A third problematical outcome has been the identification of Turkey as a pro-Sunni force in the region. A pro-Sunni designation clearly undermines Turkey’s claim to be equidistant to all parties in the region; a trusted partner, a mediator among rival parties and a builder of peace. This identification has been the outcome of Turkey’s close collaboration with Saudi Arabia and Qatar in supporting the Syrian opposition to bring about the downfall of the Ba’athist Assad regime. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has denied the allegation vigorously.
but other evidence also suggests that the Turkish government may in fact have introduced a sectarian filter to its policymaking in the region. For example, Tariq Hashimi, the Iraqi vice premier representing the Sunnis has escaped to Turkey after allegations by Prime Minister Maliki that he is involved in a plot to assassinate him. Turkey has not only refused to return Mr. Hashimi to Iraq but also given him asylum and the freedom to conduct political activity. It is difficult to judge the truthfulness of the accusations against Mr. Hashimi in a society where politics is characterized by sectarian rivalries and where “unorthodox” methods of dealing with opponents are not uncommon. But it is understandable that extending liberties to a political fugitive is seen as taking the Sunni side in Iraqi politics.

A fourth outcome is that the Syrian episode is that it has tested Turkey’s capabilities in its perceived new power position and shown its limits. It has become clear that Turkey by itself cannot play a determining role in the region or even in the fate of a neighbor such as Syria and has to work with allies and other regional forces. Additional evidence for this observation comes again from Iraq where Turkey’s efforts to cooperate with certain domestic forces in Iraq to bring down the government of Nuri al-Maliki and replace it with Iyad Allawi have not just failed but made relations with the current Iraqi government more problematical.

Finally, the Syrian developments have had direct and indirect negative economic effects. Turkey’s trade with Syria has been reduced to a trickle. This is particularly hard on the economies of provinces that border Syria where the local economy had come to rely on trade with Syria including the purchasing power of large numbers of Syrian tourists. The negative economic effects have been reinforced by the fact that Syria is Turkey’s major truck route to eleven other countries further South, particularly in the Gulf. Alternative shipping routes exist but not only are they in need of development, but they also increase the costs of shipping significantly.

**Problems with Iraq and Iran and Israel**

The “Syrian Spring,” it has become evident, has had negative effects not only on Turkey’s relations with Syria but with other neighbors such as Iraq, Iran
and Russia. With Iraq and Iran, other problems have surfaced as well. In Iraq, as the ability of the Baghdad government to exercise authority over the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has waned, Turkey has begun to deal with the regional government in Erbil. Turkey feels that in bringing PKK terror under control, enlisting the cooperation of the KRG as opposed to that of Baghdad is more critical. In addition, Turkey has developed a lively trade with Northern Iraq that is rapidly expanding. Finally, as the government in Baghdad and the KRG fail to reach an agreement on how to share the oil and gas wealth of Northern Iraq, Turkey along with other major countries, have chosen to work with the KRG to develop these resources to the unhappiness of Baghdad which says that it will not recognize arrangements that have not obtained its approval.

It has already been pointed out that the construction of an ABM radar base in southeastern Turkey has aroused Iran’s ire. In addition, regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the US has insisted that economic sanctions it has adopted be applied against Iran, indicating that the countries that violate these sanctions would be sanctioned by America. Within that context, Turkey has been asked to reduce the amount of oil it imports from Iran, a request that Turkey has had to accede to, however reluctantly. Nevertheless, mutual dependence constitutes an effective check against a significant rupture in relations. Turkey serves as Iran’s gateway to the West; Iran serves as one of Turkey’s gateways to Central Asia. Turkey gets Iranian natural gas for heating in its Eastern provinces, while Iran is a major export market for Turkey. In the confusing power structure of Iran, some government agencies make highly critical and even threatening remarks toward Turkey while others offer conciliatory remarks and extol the virtues of good relations. The competitive mood that characterizes the Turkish-Iranian relationship, however, cannot be concealed in shroud of words. Recently, for example, the Turkish prime ministers announced that Turkey was working on the incorporation of long range missiles into its stockpiles, explaining that since other countries in the vicinity (i.e. Iran) were developing them, Turkey also ought to have its own.

Turkish-Israeli relations continue to be cool. Despite intense pressure from the US, they have not improved. In fairness, this failure cannot be credited to the Turkish side alone. Some members of the Netanyahu coalition
have absolutely refused to accept responsibility for the death of nine persons on the *Mavi Marmara*, the boat raided by Israel on the high seas, and to offer Turkey an apology and indemnity to the families of the deceased, thereby tying the hands of the Netanyahu government to open the way toward improving relations. Rather, Israel has turned to developing closer relations with Cyprus and Greece as a way of sidelining Turkey as a key friend in the region. The new friendship with Cyprus has now been cemented by the discovery of natural gas in the exclusive economic zone of Israel and in the Turkish-Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus contested zone of Cyprus. Israel has offered Cyprus to provide for the security of production and joint plans to develop a LNG plant on the island to ship the gas to world markets.

**From Zero Problems with Neighbors to Zero Neighbors without Problems?**

To conclude, what started out as a rise of Turkey to the level of the regional power has ended with Turkey as a regional actor, far from its aspirations of bringing about change in the global system of governance and building a zone of peace and prosperity under Turkey’s stewardship. While it is true that Turkey is an economically stronger country than before, that it now reaches corners of the world where it was not present before, partly the developments in the Middle East over which Turkey had little control and partly the choices of the Turkish political leadership, especially Mr. Erdoğan and Mr. Davutoğlu, Turkey now finds itself slowly being reduced to just one of the many actors in the region. Its initial moves to challenge the international system of governance have now been replaced by a reluctant return to the fold of the Western Bloc, especially the US. Yet the earlier experimentation that reflects overjudging Turkey’s enhanced capabilities and its failure to keep a neutral stance toward different countries of the region and different interpretation of religion, has done damage to Turkey’s international standing. Turkey is becoming identified more and more not as a part of the West bordering on the region, but as a part of the region itself. Turkey’s inability to solve its own domestic Kurdish problem not only reinforces this impression but also reduces Turkey’s capacity to project its power in the region.
Quo Vadis?
The Turkish government had invested much prestige in changing the Assad government in Syria. If the Assad government survives against all odds, it will be taken as an indicator of Turkey’s impotence. For this reason, Turkey has been trying to persuade its allies that a more active intervention is needed against a brutal dictatorship. Russia and China are actively opposed to this. Western allies going through economically difficult times (and in the US the presidential election is approaching), shy away from military engagements. Turkish public also seems not to support a Turkish military intervention in Syria. Nevertheless, Turkish military action against Syria should not be fully ruled out. Complaining that Turkey is having difficulty in accommodating tens of thousands of refugees, the Turkish foreign minister continues to insist that a security zone should be established within Syria itself. The only way that is possible is using military force.

The downfall of the Assad regime will not assure comfort either. Syria is a highly fragmented society where ethnic, tribal and religious cleavages run deep in society. It is feared that the country will go into a long lasting and bloody internal struggle that will have destabilizing effects on the neighboring countries, Turkey not excepted.

Turkish newspapers have turned more and more critical of Turkey’s foreign policy and the foreign minister Davutoğlu who is seen as its architect. Yet a major turnaround does not seem to be around the corner. There will be difficult days ahead. Sadly, the success of Turkey’s foreign policy has come to hinge upon what happens in Syria. It is certain that the makers of Turkish foreign policy did not intend to get themselves into this position, but this is where Turkey is now
ABSTRACT
Turkey’s growing economy and the end of the Cold war have interjected a dynamism into Turkish foreign policy. It has meant reaching new countries and parts of the world as well as expanding and deepening existing ties. Three motivations appear to have guided Turkish foreign policy: maintaining good relations with the traditional allies; affecting changes in the global system of governance favoring rising powers; and becoming a regional leader. During the 2004-2010 period, Turkey has managed good relations with allies and advanced in regional leadership. Its efforts to bring change in the global system of governance through voting against sanctions for Iran have not proven successful. The Arab Spring has forced Turkey to work with its allies while the crisis in Syria and the way Turkey has become involved in the crisis has undermined Turkey’s claim to regional leadership and produced other undesirable outcomes. Turkey appears to be losing its status as a regional leader and becoming only a regional actor.

KEYWORDS
Arab Spring; Regional Leadership; Middle East.
ARAB SPRING INCIDENTS IN THE END OF THE “GREEN ERA” IN LIBYA: QUESTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE AND THE DUTY TO INTERFERE

Gladys Lechini de Álvarez¹, Noemí S. Rabbia²

The Arab Spring has quietly started in the end of 2010 with the wave of protests against the Tunisian regime of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, in power for more than two decades. Nonetheless, it caused a domino effect that fully impacted the oldest autocracies in Northern Africa and the Middle East. In this context, the Tunis’ case has been constituted in the beginning of a long series of successes that reshaped the Arab and Maghrebi regional political scene with similar results, considering the specifics of each scenario. It is interesting to highlight that Tunis paradoxically had been sustained many times by the same Western countries that defended the end of the Libyan autocracy.

In reference to this particular case, Muammar Gaddafi has died in obscure circumstances during the seizure of his hometown, Sirte, in October 20th, 2011. The elucidation of this fact has been diluted with the euphoria and increasing successes, and Western employees like the Vice-President of the United States of America, Joseph Biden, have limited themselves to affirm that

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“the important thing is that Gaddafi has gone”, a sentence which interpretations transcend the political insolence and show us much more profound meanings: the complex relation between realpolitik, international law, and colonialism (Morasso 2011) of power/knowledge3 in the present world.

The disappearance of Gaddafi from the local, regional and international political scene has meant to some people the start of a new historical phase in Libya, but it also has meant a relief to many others, mainly the governs and groups of power punctually interested in the Maghrebi country and with a struggling domestic economy. The Libyan case is one of the clearest and most recent examples of the double standard of the West in terms of international security and battle against international terrorism, and it has been used as a scapegoat by countries like the USA, France, Great Britain and even Italy to dilute the generalized concerns about the internal situations of their countries, still emerged in one of the latest most profound economic and financial crisis.

The fall and violent death of Muammar Gaddafi was however one of the last and numerous quakes produced by the domino effect of the Arab Spring, yet we are all about to see the final happenings in Syria. The outcome of the events in the Arab world has left a series of questions on the table, opening profound discussions and finally allowing evaluations about the crisis in Syria that have put in first the place the debate about why Libya yes and Syria no.

In the aftermath of the “Green Era”, the idea of this fact opening the road leading democracy in Libya has been sustained by the academic and political world. However, we can ask ourselves in what extent these arguments have been based upon relevant conditioning elements, like the Western strategic interests on one hand, and the colonization of power/knowledge, which wrongly reigns in many analysis of the African realities, on the other. Both elements

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3 The colonization of knowledge is, according to Quijano, a colonization of the imaginary of the dominated peoples, namely the domination over time of: knowledge means; knowledge production; perspective production; images and images systems; symbols and signification ways. It has developed into the application of the same patterns of analysis for very different scenarios, like the African and the European, for example. The imposition of these schemes ends been functional to the global domination logics of the powerful countries.
explain a great deal of the emphasis with which the international support to the intervention in Libya has been sought, and the idea of a quick and lasting stability once the democracy is imposed has been promoted in an almost obsequious way.

The confluence of realpolitik – i.e., the foreign policy based on practical interests and both immediate and concrete necessities –, together with the way it has affected the so many times questioned and slammed international law, are going to be the lines guiding this analysis of the regional context in which the fall of the Jamahiriya regime has triggered and the lessons of the post-“Green Era” in Libya.

Interventions like the one in Libya are going to produce a more insecure and more militarized world? What is the legacy of this new Western intervention? How is it going to affect the international law? This questions will act like triggers to advance in terms of comprehension of this change of order in the Arab world, the consequent redimension of the regional geopolitics post-Arab Spring, and also the particularities of the Libyan Case. As a complement to the post-“Green Era” analysis, the implications of the debate on the right to intervene and the duty to interfere in the present international context are going to be approached.

A change of order with new elements

“Of course Mohamed Bouazizi did not know that his decision to set himself on fire in front of the city hall of Sid Bouzid would start one of the biggest changes of the last decades, comparable, because of its depth and also because of its still uncertain consequences, to the fall of the Berlin Wall or to the 9/11 attacks in 2011.” (Naïr et al. 2012, 9)

It was a simple and local fact, but of macro-systemic consequences that were not conceivable until that point.

The process of protests that started in Tunis and Egypt had a great expansion potential with effects not only unexpected for the autocrats of the
region, but also for their, until that moment, partners and advocates. It has meant a change of order that has started in Tunis with the popular aversion to the continuity in power of the Ben Alí lineage and spreaded quickly to Algeria, Morocco, Syria, Bahrain and finally Libya, where we can raise the originality of the process in reference to the precedent revolutionary movements of the region. The most serious cases were the ones from Tunis, Libya and Egypt, with the end of the autarchies and the sequence of violence scenes after the fall of their respective governments.

The first great particularity of the events during Arab Spring was the speed through which the facts have developed and the protest levels have potentialized. In this sense, the role played by the social networks – taking the protagonism once occupied by the mass media – was essential not only in the convening of the manifestations, but also in the sum of ideas beyond the national borders. Different from the previous revolutions, the ones in the Arab world have done their street rallies thanks to the internet.

“The technological development has acted like a natural accelerator of the revolutionary processes that had origin in the center of the Arab World. (...) In Maghreb, like the rest of the world, the new technologies have increased their importances in the political and social scenes (...) in such way that their use is not just a elitist question anymore, like it used to be in their early days (...). Increasingly bigger sectors of the urban Maghrebi population are accessing such technologies, specially the younger sectors.” (Macias Amoretti 2011, 54).

In second place, we can highlight the variety of actors involved in the events, besides the traditional ones like political parties, religious organizations, groups of interests and opposition political groups in general. Since their

4 We refer not only to Western Europe and the U.S., but also to Russia.

5 The massive use of internet has accelerated the so-called “contagion effect”, allowing not only the mobilization of societies through their articulation and coordination in these devices, but also getting other countries’ experiences closer to the local realities that their own eyes could see.
beginnings, the events gathered together the most diverse voices, from professional young people to military dissidents fractions – mainly in the Libyan case –, the civil society in general, tribes or clans, to which were added the traditional actors that, in cases like the Egyptian, have ended playing a secondary role due to the rare political freedom that enjoyed for a long time and the consequent inexperience heired by this situation. In the majority of cases, spontaneous manifestations of protest were organized without a defined leadership, contrary to what happened with Nasser in Egypt, or Gaddafi at the beginning of the Green Revolution, in 1969.

As a consequence of the second element, the emergency of a claim variety was produced, the third element in consideration. A diversity of disagreements on the power structures of the lasting regimes was then revealed, which in the cases of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt accumulated enough tensions to set the complete regime change as a non-negotiable aspect in the transformation of the countries.

In each of these countries there were punctual facts that acted like catalysts in the situation of latent dissatisfaction that responded to many causes. This way, we can observe that the triggering aspect of the protests in Tunis was of socio-economic origin, while in the Egyptian case it was mostly of political origin; though it was also what happened in Libya, ethnical and clan questions that were particular to the Libyans were added, which gave it a very specific character.

In fourth place, it is important to stress that the Arab Spring happens in a context of international economic and financial crisis. The world economic crisis, together with its sequels, like unemployment, loss of social gains, famine and food shortage for many popular sectors, has also affected the Arab world, contributing to rush the social protest processes. Santiago Rico Alba (Naïr et al. 2012, 49-63) names it anthropological effects (not only economic) of globalization and a capitalist model in crisis for at least five years.

“Those who say that the Arab revolutions are consequence of the new technologies are right. Those who say that they are consequence of the social and economic exclusion are right, too. It is necessary to announce the explosive relation between corporal exclusion and technological inclusión to understand
what is going on. In the last decade, as we know it, the food prices could not help rising in a single place of the world; according to FAO, between 2000-2010 the inflation was about 105% in nominal terms and about 70.20% in real terms, with 184% for the oil, 116% for the sugar, 110% for milk products and 60% for meat.” (Nair et al. 2012, 60)

Parallel to the rise in the food prices, the technological prices could not help going down. As a consequence, in a world reigned by the Capitalism bosses, the capacity of materially building or possessing has become infinitely smaller than the possibility of imagining and producing technologically, that is to say, through the social networks. “The new technologies, mainly the mobile phones, have been playing a decisive role in the construction of the exclusion/inclusion opposition from which the painful revolutionary spontaneity emerges.” (Nair et al. 2012, 59)

One may gather from it that the globalization had the double “virtue” of what Bernard Cassen named the neutralization of space and time, which would be the permanent interaction between the local and the global on one hand, and the live, the immediacy that the communication tools made irreversible. These phenomena were the ones that have determined, because of their speed and quick repercussion, the range from Tunis to the rest of the region, through a domino effect and in a global context of crisis.

Regarding the purely economical consequences of the international crisis (i.e., its impact on the facts that made the political quake of the region possible), we can point out as most decisive the stagnation of the most important Western economies and the consequent reduction of the export flows aiming these countries, in a frame of generalized international recession characterized by a increase of the agricultural commodities⁶, the current decrease of the

⁶ After the outbreak of the last financial crisis, the price of some commodities and services were temporarily downsized, like the oil, the most important commodity of the global market. The world oil consumption is of 86mi barrels each day and its quota has varied between U$147 and U$55 since 2008. On the other hand, since 2008 the rise in every agricultural commodity has been registered because of elements that showed a demand bigger than the supply of some products. For more information, see: Lorena D’Angelo and Rogelio Pontón, “La crisis financiera y las commodities agrícolas”. Revista Institucional/ XCVIII (1506). http://www.bcr.com.ar/Pages/Publicaciones/revista.aspx.
energy commodities, the application of conservative measures in the main world economies and the shrinkage of the spendings in Europe and U.S., mainly.

These regimes – autocracies and “securitocracies” – have depended throughout their existence on the welfare of their economies – in general centrally planified –, which has gave them their main base of power and allowed them to “extract or manage” resources with freedom (Gideon 1998, 161). Additionally, one must consider that “both politics and economy contain two important and vital elements that play the spiritual and soul roles inside the structure of any system and which inexistence would make everything impossible; they are: ‘the legitimacy’ and the ‘efficacy’.”

When the two elements yielded the impossibility of these governments to absorb the tensions resulting from the civil society, make adjustments, satisfy needs and give proper answers to punctual demands, their instability and posterior ouster were consequences of their inability to control the high levels of poverty, the inequality, the unfair distribution of income and the high levels of unemployment, among other internal tensions.

If the economic efficacy of these regimes was their main source of legitimacy for decades, the deepening of the economical problems, the increase of the use of new technologies – or the wish to have access to them and the consequent restriction by some of these States – resulted in the acceleration of a process consisting in loss of stability and legitimacy.

On balance, the societies of the Arab Spring were governed by autocrats – in power for at least two decades, others for longer time –, through the use of force or the formation of fraudulent political systems that worked for their perpetuity. Besides that, their governments were dominated by corruption and pork-barrel practices in favor of their protégées and relatives that applied their public positions for personal gain. Such regimes enjoyed legitimacy as long as were stable and were able to accomplish their essential functions, like Defense,


8 In large part secured not by an efficient administration, but much more by their excessive disposition.
social order and economic development, including at expense of the individual freedom. Great part of these countries have adopted the form of a Police State, that is to say, governments that repressively exerted political, economical and social control through the arbitrary utilization of the police, what ended criminalizing the dissidents.

The loss of efficacy was added to the generalized unrest in socio-political terms, triggering a wave of political quakes that responded not only internal causes, but also set off because of the intervention – direct or not – of the world powers that protected strategic and economical punctual interests in the affected countries.

**Libya and the fallacy of the single factor**

The particular situation of Libya in the frame of Arab Spring and the fall of Muammar Gaddafi reflected to some extent a move beyond the predominant conjectures by the Western academy, which have materialized strategic interests, including in forms that transcended the international law.

The interventionist paranoia, previously exclusive to North American governments, has reached the European circles of decision and found France heading a crusade in favor of the defense and protection of civil rights in Libya. Thus, a deep debate on the justifications for this action was opened, establishing parallels with past interventions and also a comparison between European and North American interests.

The events in Libya had an intelectual support based on different theoretical realms, aiming to justify the extra-regional interference. Many analysis echoed the arguments raised by the Resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council: the need to protect civilians, make humanitarian aid possible for them and secure peace and international security (the last one related to the Chapter VII of the UN Charter). Nonetheless, and bearing in mind what Hans Morgenthau called the fallacy of the single factor, we can recognize multiple interventionist factors that could give reasons to the end of the “Green Era” in Libya and give strength to the central argument that made the NATO forces’ intervention possible.

A series of underlying internal factors formed the base for the fall of the regime, added to other variables which the Libyan government was not able to
control due to the impact generated and the speed through which produced collateral effects, speeding a process that aimed to restructure the internal politics of the country up.

There were both domestic and extra-regional factors that determined the development of events. The extra-regional strategic interests basically from Western Europe were central, bringing to light more profound questions than the intervention per se, for example the manipulation of international community rules’ interpretations to warrant the use of force.

In a context of international financial crisis, the intervention in Libya is an interesting example of action lines that belong to intermestic spectra, that is to say, where domestic needs – in this case from European countries – have intercrossed questions of external outreach and ended up creating lines of foreign action that were functional to internan political interests. While the U.S.\(^9\) opted to play a secondary role, seeking to pass the protagonism and command of the operations to their allies and NATO, France, Great Britain and Italy had more important stimuli to take part in the subject\(^10\).

The intervention in Libyan territory was boosted basically from Europe, though a complete harmony with the decisive processes that followed such decision never existed: since the first moment, the coalition members have missed togetherness in relation to political and military objectives, a situation that ultimately resulted in a complete confusion about the role and scope of NATO in the conflict, and also the very objectives of the mission, which started being – at least in words – humanitarian ones.

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\(^9\) Despite the low profile, United States have monitored the evolution of events, mainly because of their concerns about the Islamic integration. For a long time these autocracies were supported by Western countries since they were functional to their regional security objectives, like the cases of Bahrain and Egypt.

\(^10\) These three countries have historically maintained a link of economic cooperation or confrontation with Libya, in which have always prevailed the financial and economic aspects. Italy in particular, including during the Cold War and Libyan detachment due to links with international terrorism agents, sustained increasing links dominated by economic and financial questions. Nonetheless, because of its proximity and strategic localization, the history of Libya is in deep connection with the development of social, economic and political events in Europe; first as a colony, later as a protectorate and finally as an independent State inside its own influence sphere by being considered a door to both African and European Continents.
In the French case, Nicolás Sarkozy was influenced by the need to increase his popularity and the keenness to project the power of France into the Mediterranean region after the meagre success of the Mediterranean Union, a personal initiative by Sarkozy. “It seems France [sought] to affirm its role as an European leader in foreign affairs and security, opposing the role of economic power played by Germany.” Besides:

“(…) France was left out of place after its first answer to rebellions in Tunis and Egypt. The French President intended to distance from the initiatives of his ex-Foreign Affairs Minister, Michele Alliot-Marie, who had offered the support of French security forces to suppress the opposition acts in Tunis, few days before the President Ben Ali left the government. Sarkozy, influenced by the need to increase his popularity, [customized] to a great extent all the initiatives related to the Libyan question. An exemple of the surprise of these actions was showed by his then-new Minister of Foreign Affairs, the veteran Alain Juppé, when he got to know, while participating of an EU Council, the declarations of the Gallic President in which he recognized the National Transition Council of Libya as the legitimate interlocutor.” (Sorroza 2011, 2)

Great Britain, on the other hand, worked for the approval of the UN Resolution that would function as a legal umbrella to be able to participate of the intervention and contour the critics in an intra-European context of economic recession, readjustments and budget cuts in terms of Defense, where had antecedents like Afghanistan and Iraq were at the order of the day. Including before the intervention “the United Kingdom [had] a great interest and a lot to gain with a post-Gaddafi government, thankful for the participation in the military mission and that, for that matter, is more receptive to investments and the development of businesses from Great Britain” (Sorroza 2011, 3), that were decreasing due to complaints by the Libyan governments about the Lockerbie attacks since 2007.

Italy, since the first incidents before the fall of the regime, sustained an ambiguous diatribe until the point where the tendencies from its partners sounded out and the probability of the success in a crusade against the Libyan
leader, and ex-close friend, was outlined. These two questions were beared in mind due to the Italian economic interests in Libya, the oldest ones among the European countries.

Despite the Friendship Pact between the two countries signed in 2008, in which Italy commited to prohibit the utilization of its own territory as a operation platform against Libya, Rome finally worried about not only staying out of the post-conflict businesses, but also to secure the required support to the rebels’ success once the link to Gaddafi was rotten. The Italian attitude responded clearly to the traditional interests of the realpolitik, which always leaded its relation with the Jamahiriya regime. Thus, responded clearly to the double standard of the official declarations from Italy and the continuous indecision from defense of the Jamahiriya government, to silence and later build links to Libyan rebels.

The Libyan large oil reserves and the privileged strategic position of the country constituted a reasonable price to the States and private interests to take the risks of entering the conflict and seek at any price to the triumph of the Libyan counter-revolution. Besides protecting civilians, the European countries, with the North American indifference, looked for a regime change in the context of the “new democratic wave” that started in the Arab world. The aim was to stabilize the region, with a renewed air that could satisfy the unrest and weariness of the civil societies from these countries.

**Interventionism versus international law?**

In March, 2011, the Libyan War has started through the intervention of a military coalition leaded by the U.S, the United Kingdom and France – with Italian support –, being the start of what was a long process that ended with the ousting and posterior death of Muammar al-Gaddafi. Once more the international community watched the event as the spectator of an action of Western interference in the internal affairs of a country disguised under a skin made by an intervention with humanitarian goals. But, like some experts deliver:

“The cause of the humanitarian intervention clearly has converted itself into a moral crusade for the intellectual liberals, who seem in love with the idea of fair violence. (...) These interventions have absorbed great quantities of
resources that could have been used in a better way, for more genuinely humanitarian purposes, once they have increased the suffering in the countries that have been their objectives.” (Berube and Gibbs 2012, 2)

Likewise, the problem of this kind of intervention is that it not only generates diversions from the relevant and urgent subjects of domestic realities but also are excused by diffuse criteria, marked by a double standard policy. Consequently, the internal humanitarian situation of the countries that are objects of the interventions worsens, the international law deteriorates even more and the already existing asymmetries of global power get deeper and deeper through the imposition of the “law of the strongest” in questions that could be considered as relevant for the whole world, like cases of Human Rights violations.

In the words of Pérez Llana, in the so-called “old international order” the principle of non-intervention was violated many times, but who did it at least was morally condemned by the global public opinion. With the emergence of the “new international order” in the context of post-Cold War, and marked by the international intervention by the U.S. in the First Gulf War, the principle of non-intervention has started to erode in front of the advent of the denominated duty to interfere, concretely in relation to the provision, defense and validity of the Human Rights.

“If the duty to interfere constitutes one of the relevant supports of the new order, immediately appears the central question: in the name of what values and who is the responsible ‘operator’.” (Pérez Llana 1992, 86) Concerning the role that the United Nations could play as a responsible operator, the problem is that in general this international organization ends acting to solve the damages caused by almost arbitrary unilateral or multilateral interventions, through the action of its subsidiary organisms and to put tasks of meagre strategic value in practice.

The erosion of internation law has deepened once more in the Libyan case, once it can be considered that NATO has bypassed the UN Charter, through which it is guided (NATO 1949), due to the fact that actions that were first raised as humanitarian had as previous goal – though initially not
announced – a regime change, event that violates the Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter.

One may add that in the recent past other so-called humanitarian interventions ended up worsening the humanitarian situations, like the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. “In general, there is a trend to believe that interventions denominated as ‘humanitarian’ must always have positive results” (Gibbs 2012, 3), a sentence that is very far from reality. Libya was not an exception to the rule.

The moralpolitik, that is to say, the policy based on moral or ethical questions, more than oppose the realpolitik has passed to be used as a warrant to interventions of dubious relevance. This situation has put on the table questions on why Libya was a case punished through intervention while many actiones that violated rights in Syria did not receive the same response or reaction by the European community.

In that regard, Paul MacDonald considers that the Periphery deserves a bigger analytical interest in international politics because what happens there generally causes global repercussions and many times push the behavior of the great powers forward. In other words, these interventions don’t solely answer a simple case of domination in name of the Center, but also more complex and profound interests. Consequently, this author affirms that:

“In first place, the powerful States are those more inclined to see their interests threatened in the Periphery, precisely because it is the place where they are weaker. (…) In second place, the big powers are likely to be more sensible concerning such defiances in Periphery once it is where they feel more vulnerable. (…) In third place, (…) they assume that the intervention in the Periphery is easier because of their comparative advantages in economic and military power.” (MacDonald 2009, 134-135)

These three considerations explain the extra-regional interests in Libya and the fall of the Jamahiriya regime.

However, if the will to use arguments based on moral judgements existed, as it is exemplified by the Deauville’s declaration in the G-8 Chamber in the end of May, 2008, opportunity in which it was sustained that the Libyan
government had failed to fulfill its responsability to protect its people, losing its legitimacy (Marchetti 2011, 3), can this judgement be enough substantiation to put such intervention in practice? Is this affirmation enough to violate the spirit of the United Nations Charter? Why was the Gaddafi’s proposal – right after his meeting with Jacob Zuma – to make an African Union guideline to Libya ignored? Why in June, after this meeting, NATO intensified its attacks, qualified as the most intense since the beginning of the mission?

The end of the “Green Era” in Libya left more doubts than certainties, and a bitter sensation in front of the reality that shows that “the international law is important, but it is at the same time less powerful than what the many public employees, legal experts and media believe.” (Goldsmith and Posner 2005, 1) It has not been able to prevent wars, preserve peace, nor regulate the economical, political and cultural relations between States, being in many occasions ignored and constrained by realpolitik or used as an excuse for a presumed moralpolitik.

From the “Jamahiriya Era” to democracy?
Libya is a country whose people reached in the last years one of the highest life levels in Africa, a result from the government plan of Muammar al-Gaddafi. Through management of natural resources it benefited the poorest classes of the Libyan society and, at the same time, created many enemies.

Among the successes of the Jamahiriya government, it elevated the role played by women in its society and opened their way to universities – together with the poorest Libyans. It has also known how to profit from the fact that Libya has the second biggest aquifer in the world – situated between the borders of Sudan and Chad, under the desert sand – building a canal that brings water to the Mediterranean Coast, in the Benghazi Zone, transforming its enormous littoral into a green strip of approximately 200 kilometers where the Libyan cities are located, from the border with Tunisia until Egypt. Applied oil as an international bargain tool and the benefits from its exploitation to promote the external direct investment in the non-petroleum sectors of the country, like tourism and the agriculture; destined thousands of millions of petrodollars to increase African power and watch its closest neighbors, what gave Gaddafi the nickname of “King of Kings” in the continent.
Among its excesses are the sortage of political freedom, repression, persecution and death of regime’s enemies, and the conflict with sectors of the Armed Forces, the Libyan medium class and some clans of the country, due to the power centralization in Gaddafi’s hands, as the leader of the Revolution. One can also count the corruption, the deliver of powerful key sectors to tribes allied to the government, Gaddafi’s family (and his own) eccentricities, and the support to international companies destined to position the country as a regional and African leader through an Anti-West discourse, that nonetheless become softer after the 9/11 attacks.

The tribal life and structure in Libya were a predominant pattern in the country’s history long before its independence. During the reign of Idris I – who has given part of his authority to local families, which consolidated this power base through matrimonial knots –, the “tribalism” was a central element of the United Kingdom of Libya. Belonging to different tribes produced a high level of fragmentation that escorted the social differences linked to education and life quality.

The government of the 1969 Revolution opposed the influence exerted by these clans in the political affairs of the country and seeked to weaken the existing tribal loyalties and destroy their organizations. Since the origins of the formation of the Jamahiriya regime, Gaddafi was an emblematic figure that had the virtue to short and canalize great part of the divergences between the different sectors of Libyan societies. On the other hand, thanks to a series of oil production nationalizations canalized through the national Libyan company (National Oil Corporation), the riches of the Libyan State have seen themselves notably favoured by its profits. However, despite the efforts made by the regime, the ideological factors never had the same weight that the tribal and blood ties.

Having blurred the Gaddafi’s figure in the political panorama, the believers of the international liberal order celebrate the arrival of democracy in Libya. But is democracy possible in Libya? Because of the aforementioned realities, the Libyan present panorama casts not only existent divisions in the center of society but also picks extreme violence journeys up, shortly before celebrating the first general elections since Gaddafi’s death and the fall of his regime last July.
One year has passed since the physical disappearance of Muammar Gaddafi and the levels of violence and deaths are still to be reduced, and the participation or collaboration exerted by the international forces in the subject are not clear. Confrontation between armed factions are still happening and large part of the Colonel’s ex-Armed Forces are suffering attacks, persecutions and even death. The pre-announced revanchism of the factions that refuse to put arms down results not only in the revenge against whom participated (or are suspects of) of the Jamahiriya regime, but also against rival groups in a fierce fight for power that is centered in the richest regions. Likewise, the authorities were not able to organize themselves in such a manner that it can support the official forces that fight against men loyal to the dead man in Bani Walid, old Gaddafi’s bastion in the north of the country.

In August the Transtion Council passed the control of the country to a National Assembly whose function would be the formation of the new government of Libya. Almost three months after this event, the chaotic post-conflict situation is yet to be controlled. The only thing that quickly normalized its activities since the beginning of the “post-Green Era” was the Western oil production, including before the very death of Gaddafi, which explains the priorities of the Western partners about the future of the country.

Moreover, the situation of large part of the population was aggravated by the food and water shortage, the flow of refugees due to the violence and inexistence of hospital centers by virtue of the armed conflicts. To this critical situation one must add that Eurozone countries have closed their borders after the worsening of the crisis’ effects in Europe, increasing thus the tensions inside the country and redirecting the flows to other countries in Africa.

On the other hand, in front of the challenge to creat a new set of national rules for the country, it is opportune to ask what is going to happen to the virtues of the Jamahiriya, like many of the equality, fairness and popular sovereignty principles that are announced in the Green Book that ruled most part of the Libyan life in the past thirty years.

Generally speaking, democracy is a form of organization in which the ownership of power resides in the entirety of its members; such collective will materializes at least in the election of the people’s representatives. But Libya owns a political reality different from other countries, once its composition is
largely clan-based: it is composed of, at least, 150 different clans\textsuperscript{11}. This data does not make more than renewing the question of where is Libya going. Beyond the political inexperience, a whole new political system must be recreated if they want to put all the own structures of the Jamahiriya government, which have been organizing the political life of Libya since 1977, down.

Democracy as a number and a compendium of modernity could once more involve as a result the enforcement of political structures for which Libya, due to its cultural, ethnical and historical particularities – i.e., its structural conditions –, is not prepared.

“Richly circulates in the present political debate the idea that democracy lies in full course of affirmation in the whole world. This idea refers to the fact that the majority of the current governments result from elections. The vote, in consequence, is assumed as the exclusive decisive institution of democracy. (...) With all its vital importance, without the presence of democratic conditions in basic social relations, the vote not only may be object of fraud, manipulation, ignorance (...)” (Quijano 2000)

However, for the Libyan case it might be useful to ask whether the fundamentalisms maintained by Gaddafi since the beginning of the Revolution are going to be contained. Is it possible to think in a democracy of the Libyan people if its particular social organization and the role played by clans and ethnies in political matters are considered? What is the real level of range obtained by this affirmation depending on the predominantly role played by the Islam, not only in the Arab world, but also in Libya? Is it possible to consolidate democratic processes that somehow “displace” the compliance to the divine will that comes from the Islam belief? How a regime of this kind is going to reach stability, bearing in mind challenges like the inexistence of an

\textsuperscript{11} Despite the ceasefire in March, day after day the conflicts between different tribes repeat themselves, especially in the south of the country. These conflicts are rooted on one hand in the important resources of the respective regions and, on the other, in the fight for local power.
experienced political class and a national identity that overcomes the clan-based sentiments?

Gaddafi was the Libyan Stante, the Jamahiriya government, the spiritual leader, and has not left any kind of institutional structure. It makes thinking about a quick national reconstruction starting from zero a tough task, considering also the peculiarities of the case and a scenario dominated by dozens of militias that decline to surrender and still stain the Libyan territory with deaths and armed conflicts. One of the most significant events took place in September, when the North American Ambassador in Libya, Christopher Stevens – who had also acted as a representative in the Transition Council during the Civil War –, was killed in the United States consulate in Benghazi in the middle of an armed assault of radical Islamists militiamen.

If one analyses the Egyptian case, the rise to power through free elections by Mohamed Morsi, candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the strong influence that the Armed Forces still exert over this country’s reality, it is revealed that we are probably going to find ourselves in front of the emergence of “protected democracies” or “procedural democracies” in the Arab world as a form of managing governments.

In the best of cases Libya will follow this path. But it also has many elements that add more complexity to the search for the ideal of democracy, excluding the role that will be played in the whole political process by the giant volume of oil, which are going to be once more essential to the acquisition of loyalty, way beyond the democratic principles that the West supposedly defends so much for the control of the region.
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ABSTRACT
This paper intends to focus on the analysis of what happened in Libya during the Arab Spring, explaining the intentions of Western powers when opted to intervene in the African country and what the future reserves for the Libyans after the death of Muammar Gaddafi, bearing also in mind legal questions on intervention and interference.

KEYWORDS
Arab Spring; Democracy; Intervention; Civil War.

Translated by Pedro Alt
SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION: BRAZILIAN PARTNERSHIP WITH MOZAMBIQUE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN AIDS DRUG PLANT

Maj-Lis Follér

1. Introduction
This article will focus on development cooperation between Brazil and Mozambique, especially within the public health sector and regarding support for issues related to HIV/AIDS. To do this both countries will be seen as part of a globalized world and contextualized into a historical and socio-economic converse. Brazil has a long tradition of politics of health with far-reaching public health reforms and a Constitution from 1988 stating, among many issues; civil rights, the right to health and health care for all (da Costa Marques 2003; Nunn 2009). During the 1960s a sanitary reform movement of health professionals demanded equitable access to medical care and preventive health services (Nunn 2009, 31). Brazil introduced in 1990 a Unified Health System – “Sistema Único de Saúde” (SUS) – based on universal access to health care and equity. Even if the country, as a recipient country, had strong press from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to act according to the structural adjustment plan and introduce more market-oriented policy in front of health care, the government, enforced by civil society organizations and social

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movements on health, resisted and a strong national decentralized health system was established. Brazil has one of the better functioning health systems compared to other countries with similar economic situation (Oliveira Cruz et al. 2004; Costa Vaz and Inoue 2007). The strong social movement for health that exists since the 60s and a well functioning health system with good infrastructure will be important factors to understand the Brazilian success in implementing the AIDS program, and to carry out antiretroviral therapy (ART) with universal right to treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). It is within this context that South-South Cooperation will be analyzed, and the ambition to export the Brazilian model on HIV/AIDS to countries in the Global South.

2. The transformation of “development aid” into “development cooperation”
At the end of the Cold War a transformation of power structures took place to rebuild countries in need of aid for reconstruction and to support ‘poor countries’ or the ‘Third World’. The leaders of the industrial world initiated the Bretton Woods Organizations. It can be described as a monetary order to rebuild the economy after the war. The leaders from the ‘rich’ countries established the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), today part of the group around the World Bank (WB) to govern the development. Money and human resources were transferred from the North to the South with strict conditionality for the recipient countries to follow the rules and regulations set by the donors. The world was seen as a dichotomy, one part of the world was ‘developed’ and the other part ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘developing’, and during the 1950s the concepts ‘central’ and ‘peripheral’ countries were coined to illustrate the same divide. This division is today questioned and challenged with the upcoming of the so-called emerging states. In the period after World War II, the Global North wanted through development assistance to create a stable and secure world and the emphasis was on bilateral cooperation between governments and mega-projects through the newly created IMF and WB.

The process of globalization has changed the world order and among various alterations the politics of aid has been re-defined and made less state-
centered (Thörn and Follér 2008, 277). This does not mean that the state has been undermined but repositioned in certain respects – and in relation to development aid there is a pervasive transformation with more multilateral agreements including new partners from countries, which earlier were recipient countries. Another aspect is that civil society organizations are playing a more active role in development cooperation. They act through International Non Governmental Organizations (INGOs) supporting civil society in recipient countries; as watchdogs, service providers or with social aims on issues such as gender, human rights or with health related programs.

With the increased role of civil society and the integration of CSOs as part of decision-making processes, scientists and activists have stated more substantial questioning of IMF and the WB. The watchdog function by global civil society organizations, communicating and distributing information through Internet, is one such factor. Campaigns have been initiated against multilateral aid that destroy the environment through e.g. building dams, displacement of people due to mega-projects and other activities harming the local population. The institutions have been forced to be more sensitive after a heavy critique regarding their approaches (structural adjustment programs and other interventions). The IMF and WB are at present dominated by the Global North. Even if there is an alteration with new countries entering the closed circles, the power concerning aid is still Global North governing the South ‘at a distance’. Decisions whether a country in the Global South should receive support or not are still taken by the Global North through institutions governed by powerful political and economic leaders and hybrid public-private enterprises or consortiums.

In 2000 at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, there was a call for a doubling of aid to Africa. The impact of aid to Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) has been discussed and questioned over the decades (UNCTAD 2006). This chapter will focus on Africa and the presence of other donors than the Global North. The so-called emerging donors have existed for a long time, but without a consistent structure, and the economic impact has not been significant. Countries such as Russia, Brazil, China and the Arabic countries have over history been involved in different development projects. But the reality is that during the 1990s and the early years of the present
century 95 % of development aid came from the 22 member countries of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (Manning 2006: 371). But the non-DAC donors (or emerging donors as I would like to call them, even if they are not new) are today returning to Africa with more strength (Kragelund 2008, 555).

Brazil with South-South Cooperation for at least 40 years, first within Latin America and from the 70s also as a bridge to Africa, has been less visible than North-South Cooperation (ODI 2010; Costa Vaz and Inoue 2007). Today China (road and building constructions) and Brazil (health, agriculture, education and technical projects) are well established and highly visible in many African countries. Brazil, not least in the Portuguese speaking countries, is becoming a main player on the aid cooperation agenda.

Over the years the leaders of the world have signed many agreements and declarations, and commissions have been created to develop a world with less poverty, hunger and to eradicate deadly diseases. Some projects have been successful, such as the eradication of smallpox. But poverty and poverty-related deadly diseases still exist and new problems, such as refugees living a life without dignity are increasing. Also global climate change and pandemics, e.g. HIV/AIDS, are threatening the security and sustainable development of the planet.

In the field of development aid some ‘new’ landmarks started with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.\(^3\) A strong effort and political will to achieve concrete goals started at the first decade of the 21st century and a global hope was raised that global governance was at a crossroad to move forward and reduce poverty. The reasons for these observations are some initiatives and declarations pointing at the state of the world and the need for transfer of resources from the North to the South and with focus of how this transaction through development aid should be more effective and giving more power to the recipient countries through the achievement of local ownership and mutual accountability for the recipient countries. The United Nation Millennium

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\(^3\) The term ‘development aid’ has in the official aid discourse been replaced by ‘development cooperation’ (Rottenburg 2009, xii). This change of terminology indicates that there are two equal partners, which are questioned in this article and I use both concepts parallel.
Development Goals (MDGs) was signed in 2001. It is a global action plan to accomplish the eight anti-poverty goals by 2015. Three of its eight objectives focus on health problems, and assign great importance to social health determinants, such as poverty, hunger, basic education and environmental sustainability (Buss and Ferreira 2010). The next declaration with focus on development aid is the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (hereafter PD) endorsed on 2 March 2005 to follow-up and complemented the MDGs. It is an agreement signed by one hundred ministers, heads of agencies and other actors. It is an action-oriented roadmap intended to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. In 2008, the Summit called Accra Agenda for Action (hereafter AAA) gathered governmental leaders, powerful organizations and activists from NGOs. It can be seen as a follow-up of the PD to deepen the implementation of the agreement and to respond to emerging aid effectiveness issues. The 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness will take place in November-December 2011 in Busan, Korea. The question when the world’s leaders, organizations, institutions and activists meet again is to evaluate the global progress to decrease poverty.

There are several reports written during the years, evaluating advances and failures of the PD. The evaluations are both on a general level, but also describing the situation in the recipient countries. There are examples of successful implementation of the PD in North-South Cooperation with a constructive cooperation with transfer of power and responsibility from the donor to a local ownership by the governments (Wood et al. 2011, 11). Regarding the prevalence of HIV/AIDS there is globally a significant decline of cases of new infected, even if it is uneven between countries and also within a country (UNAIDS 2010). This is, of course, good news, even if the goals from the MDGs are far from reached. There are about 33.3 million people living with HIV globally. Of the estimated 15 million people living with HIV in low- and middle-income countries who need treatment today, 5.2 million have access (UNAIDS 2010, 7). Through evaluating and monitoring it is difficult to separate if the improvement is due to donor interventions or if other domestic factors, such as a committed government or a vital civil society, are the actual causes, which the situation for PLWHA have changed for the better. There can also be biomedical and epidemiological factors behind the decreased number of
new cases of AIDS, due to that the virus is becoming less virulent.

At the High Level Meetings mentioned, discussions on the changing world system and the emerging powers entering the development aid through South-South Cooperation have been on the agenda. The Brazilian delegation at the Accra meeting represented a new voice being raised. They highlighted that Brazil is not a passive object of aid, but an active agent resisting the conditions set by donors and creating a space for independent interpretation and action. And in the OECD evaluation several times the South-South Cooperation is raised as something that has to be taken into consideration as a positive development (Wood et al. 2011: 11, 12). But there are also doubts, which are elucidated in the evaluation, and that is if South-South Cooperation fulfills ‘good governance’ and aid effectiveness as stipulated in the PD (Wood et al. 2011).

The AIDS pandemic is part of MDGs anti-poverty goals and prioritized area within UN organizations and national donors development programs. Through cooperation between UN organizations, hybrid organizations, such as the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (hereafter GF) and governments, the agenda concerning what is good AIDS governance and how to implement it is set. The U.S. is through the development assistance organization USAID, and the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) the principal economic donors in Africa. They are dominant actors and often criticized for the strings they attach to the aid delivered.

The market (in this case mainly the pharmaceutical industry) and civil society organizations are integrated parts of global AIDS governance and are becoming transnational in their activities, while the state and public institutions that guide development are still national. Therefore, the globalization process currently taking place is highly relevant as one influential factor when development aid is discussed and what happens when emerging actors such as Brazil want to enter into the global arena.

3. Emerging powers
I have mentioned ‘traditional’ Northern aid and a move towards more cooperation between the countries in the Global South. There are processes of
regionalization – that is cooperation between neighboring countries or within the same continent, and South-South Cooperation when the activities are crossing the sea and relate to cooperation mainly between countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The question is if we see a ‘paradigmatic shift’ of the world order with the upcoming ’emerging powers’. The ‘emerging economies’ on the agenda in the discussions are Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, South Africa, and Thailand. There are some special associations of countries, which are referred to as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), which extended into BRICS (also included South Africa). Another association is the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) established in 2003 (www.ibsa-trilateral.org).

Through these associations, emerging countries want to strengthen their voices and be part in the construction of a novel aid architecture. The common characteristics for these countries are the shift in global economic power, a process away from the hegemonic Global North power states, towards countries situated in the Global South. These countries have recently increased their trade with and development assistance to other countries in the Global South.

4. Brazil’s foreign policy and history of development aid
Brazil is today regarded as a significant economic and political power in Latin America and in the world. The foreign relations are managed through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Itamaraty. What will be discussed in this chapter is its upcoming role on the global arena as a donor country. Most development aid goes through “Agência Brasileira de Cooperação” (ABC), the Brazilian Agency of Cooperation. There is a long tradition within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for international cooperation and development aid and the focus has principally been on technology and capacity building related to agriculture and issues on public health. Partnership and South-South Cooperation related to HIV/AIDS started during President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the 1990s as one important part of foreign policy (Nunn 2009, 80ff; Sousa 2010). The initiatives continued and were strengthened during President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from his inauguration in 2003 and during his eight years at power (Captain 2010, 184; Sousa 2010). Various cooperation programs related to technical health cooperation and HIV/AIDS have gained a strategic place in the policy (Almeida et al. 2010). Already in 2003 President Lula promised to construct an
AIDS drug plant in Mozambique. This partnership will be analyzed as a manifestation of Brazil’s intensified international cooperation.

The foreign policy of Brazil undertaken by Itamaraty and ABC cooperate with institutions such as the International Centre for Technical Cooperation on HIV/AIDS (ICTC/AIDS) and joint projects between CSOs in Brazil and countries in the Global South (Terto Jr et al. 2009). Institutions such as ABC, ICTC/AIDS and similar organizations, together with Brazilian AIDS NGOs, international organizations such as UNAIDS, GF, donor organizations and the pharmaceutical industry constitute the global AIDS governance (Follér 2010).

During the two presidential terms mentioned above, the Brazilian government has, through close cooperation between Itamaraty and the Ministry of Health (hereafter MoH), taken an active role at a global level to export the Brazilian model on AIDS, including the National AIDS Program. This pro-active position is making Brazil one of the most outspoken “emerging countries” concerning global AIDS governance. An example of the “Brazilian model” worth mentioning is the “Brazilian Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy”, or “Comitê Brasileiro de Direitos Humanos e Política Externa”. This committee has existed since 2005 with the aims of providing greater transparency between civil society organizations and foreign policy and of strengthening citizen participation and democratic control of Brazilian foreign policy related to human rights (www.dhpoliticaexterna.org.br) (Foller 2010, 203). The Brazilian model includes and highlights that HIV/AIDS is not just a medical problem, but includes human and sexual rights.

The development aid policy is still not a formalized and well-functioning policy compared to the European Community and the United States, but the country has increased its involvement in several international health activities, both regionally in Latin America, but also in several countries in Africa (Buss 2011; Pimenta et al. 2006; Oliveira Cruz et al. 2004). The developing pattern of Brazilian South-South Cooperation has been described as a ‘global model in waiting’. The expression comes from an article in the Economist and describes Brazil as one of the most important aid givers to the Global South indicating Brazil’s aid as a transfer of knowledge, built on the
countries own experience to struggle with poverty and high prevalence of HIV/AIDS (Economist 2010; ODI 2010). One example is an aid program to post-earthquake Haiti. Brazil used its own experience from the domestic poverty reduction program ‘Bolsa Família’ – and transferred the technology, learned experience and knowledge from a successful domestic activity to the reality of Haiti.

But Brazilian aid is not only humanitarian and express solidarity with poor countries. The Economist continues: “Moreover, aid makes commercial sense. For example, Brazil is the world’s most efficient ethanol producer, and wants to create a global market in the green fuel. But it cannot do so if it is the world’s only real provider. Spreading ethanol technology to poor countries creates new suppliers, boosts the chances of a global market and generates business for Brazilian firms” (Economist 2010). This indicates that foreign policy and, to some extent, economic interests have played and play a major part in energizing Brazil’s development cooperation. It is also well known that Brazil wants a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and to have influence in international relations, in line with its successful economic trajectory. The country’s successful businesses are eager to expand their operations overseas. With these aims in mind, and in response to growing demand for Brazil’s assistance, President Lula da Silva has expanded Brazil’s diplomatic presence worldwide and development cooperation through South-South initiatives originating from official country visits made by the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Technical cooperation with developing countries is, therefore, emerging as an important operational instrument of Brazilian foreign policy (ODI 2010).

What often is highlighted is the contradiction, motivating a term such as “a model in waiting”. Brazil’s role on the international arena, with specific focus on Africa, has been strengthened and more funds are distributed. But, the ambivalence is that Brazil still has domestic poverty problems. Some technical and juridical ambiguities have also been raised, related to the construction of the AIDS medicine plant. Brazil produces generic drugs at the state owned pharmaceutical industry and the Brazilian law says that it is forbidden to give public money to other governments. Therefore, the AIDS medicine plant has to find a specific construction between aid and business.
Brazil’s role as both a recipient and a provider of aid, gives it, according to some, a better understanding of the needs and constraints facing aid (ODI 2010). But, according to some critics, the government should first solve the domestic problems.

The Brazilian way described above is different from most of the North-South Cooperation. It is in its approach more ‘horizontal’ due to cultural similarities and as in e.g. Mozambique, they speak the same language. The cooperation is more often based on Brazil’s own experience and knowledge of successful social programs, such as “Bolsa Família” and the Brazilian AIDS model. Brazil has challenged global institutions with a committed policy of universal access to ARVs and questions on patents and intellectual property rights. The government, together with CSOs, have been lobbying at the WTO meetings, especially in connection with the signing of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights –TRIPS (read more in Chavez et al. 2008).

5. The Brazilian AIDS Model
A brief background to the Brazilian AIDS epidemic will be carried out. The first official AIDS cases were reported in 1981 and at the beginning of the 1990s Brazil had the third highest absolute number of people with AIDS in the world (Terto Jr and García 2008). A military regime governed the country between 1964 and 1985. It was an authoritarian dictatorship, and many intellectuals and left activists had to leave the country. Just like in many other countries the government did at first not take the epidemic seriously, not the militaries and not the first civilian government that took over. Through the political process with activists and professionals returning home from the exile, an emerging civil society started to act. The earlier mentioned sanitary reform movement had continued to exist during the years and built a bridge to the incipient civil society. What is recognized is that civil society actors played a key role in bringing about the national AIDS policy through a process of re-democratization after twenty years of dictatorship (Bastos 1999; Berkman 2005; Galvão 2000; Follér 2005; Nunn 2009; Parker 1997). Civil society organizations improved the democratic accountability and fulfilled various
roles, creating public opinion about HIV/AIDS, campaigns against discrimination and stigma, the right to health and debates on sexual rights. The newly created AIDS NGOs, church organizations and CSOs, acted as service providers for the infected and their families, and they completed the watchdog function through the principle of *social control*. This is a central principle in the Brazilian Constitution stating that health care is the right of the citizens and the obligation of the State (Terto Jr and García 2008). Today the Brazilian model is all over the world seen as a success story with less than 1% of the population living with HIV/AIDS (Lieberman 2009, Nunn 2009).

During the 1990s, when Brazil was reconstructing itself on issues related to democracy, human rights and freedom of speech, it was a recipient country with support from multilateral institutions as well as from other organizations and countries. I will focus on the support they got to create the National STD (Sexually Transmitted Diseases) and AIDS Program (hereafter NAP) “Programa Nacional de DST/AIDS” and what will also be related to as “The Brazilian Model of Prevention and Treatment of HIV/AIDS”. The model was constructed in close cooperation between the government and civil society organizations and with foreign resources. For the creation of a sustainable AIDS-program, Brazil received substantial loans from the World Bank. These were distributed between 1995–1998 and 1999–2002, and a smaller one 2003–2006. This large amount of funding was for the most part used to implement prevention programs, services, and epidemiological monitoring, and to strengthen the health infrastructure. The loans were debated and questioned, especially by civil society organizations, because of the conditions attached to them were strict and contradicted with the domestic plan to work with HIV/AIDS in a multidimensional and broad human right influenced perspective. The WB policies for example *strictly forbade* expenditures for antiretrovirals (ARVs). The motivation of the WB was that treatment with ARVs was too costly for developing countries with limited resources. At the same time as the WB loans were delivered, a pro-active civil society through AIDS NGOs had campaigns and carried out lobby activities towards the government, and together with ‘radical’ people within the government, for activities with the goal to ‘scaling up AIDS treatment’ (Follér 2010a; Nunn 2009, 63). The AIDS NGOs pressured the government for universal access to
treatment. Global civil society activists, international organizations including the United Nations and the World Health Organization (WHO), supported the campaign. It later leads to the signing of the UNGASS (United Nations General Assembly Special Session) declaration (Follér 2010, 208).

The policy of WB was criticized, undermined and resisted. Parallel with the WB support to Brazilian AIDS NGOs working with prevention, the same organizations received simultaneously governmental support to lobby for expansion of ARV treatment (Nunn 2009, 100). The WB loans achieved their set goals of strengthening the health infrastructure and improving monitoring of the logistics. But many unintended goals were also reached when the Brazilian model expanded. This is a vital point to highlight as it illustrates the power dynamics and conflicting value systems that existed between the WB and the Brazilian National AIDS Program including the AIDS movement. The unified Brazilian AIDS governance had the strength to carry out the program in line with political and social goals set in the country.

The IMF has during the years been criticized for imposing Structural Adjustment Programs or other reforms on countries in the South. The policy of the WB was the same top-down policy with strict conditions set in Washington D.C. Just as in other policy areas, the WB attempted to shape the Brazilian AIDS program. An open clash came up between the WB’s emphasis on prevention and the NGOs’ pressure for universal treatment and the government followed the way of the AIDS movements. The Brazilian government kept its plans and continued the determined goals for universal access to ARVs. The power aspects elucidated in the Brazilian society during this period are of vital interest. It illustrates an emerging civil society, setting strong pressure on the government, and not acting as passive recipients of aid, but with resistance. This has been defined as the Brazilian government acting as an “activist state.” The government did not accept the World Bank’s conditions to cancel such activities as the promotion of condoms and special programs for sex workers (Biehl 2004 and 2007, 207). The blurring of borders between the state and civil society is typical of the Brazilian AIDS governance throughout its history. It can be seen as a victory of local ownership bourgeoning in front of the donors. The loans led (unintentionally) to a strengthening of the ‘Brazilian AIDS
model’. Probably there was a softening of the WB’s value system in the global discussions on aid and due to the Washington Consensus losing credibility. What could be observed during the negotiations with the government, and under strong pressure from civil society actors, was that the WB had to deviate from the neo-liberal logic of costs and benefits, viewing prevention as likely to bring about more economic benefit. The government and civil society actors leaned towards the Brazilian constitution that expressly states ‘everybody’s right to health care’ and the citizens’ duty to exert ‘social control’ on the government – and so they did.

6. Brazilian South-South Cooperation
Emerging aid donors, such as China, India and increasingly Brazil, are changing the international aid architecture and challenging some of its tenets, such as the current consensus on ‘aid effectiveness’, the main statement of the PD. Things are becoming more complex, with aid moving across the South, and old definitions of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries are losing their meaning. South-South aid has been less evaluated and little is known about its effect in the recipient countries (ODI 2010). Support for South-South Cooperation exists in different constellations and on different levels in society. From multilateral organization some overarching constructions are created, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), where a South-South Cooperation Fund (www.undp.org) is set up as a special unit. Since 1989, the Group for South-South Consultation and Coordination (G-15) has been promoting bilateral South-South cooperation. The changes are evident and indicate a ‘new’ horizontal communication involving a transfer of resources, human and economical, and exchange of technical knowledge and capacity building within health, education, energy, climate and other areas. The constructions of the cooperation can be the establishment of bilateral, triangular and multilateral networks.

The National AIDS Program initiated in 2002 the Brazilian International Cooperation Program (ICP) with technical support to poor countries in the Global South and Mozambique was included. Brazil wanted, in opposition to the WB and other donors, to illustrate that it was possible to create sustainable ART in countries with limited financial resources. Some
initiatives, e.g. Brazilian support to the Khayelitsha project in South Africa, proved encouraging results (Follér 2010, 212; MSF 2003). In 2004 the program “Laços Sul-Sul” was launched. The Brazilian Government, through NAP, offered universal access to first line HIV/AIDS treatment to neighboring Latin American countries, committed to combating the epidemic. The aim was to contribute towards strengthening policies and national efforts by supporting universal access to ARV treatment. Later the same year it also included several countries in Africa and in East Timor.4

7. Cooperation between Brazil and Mozambique

Brazil and Mozambique were both part of the Portuguese colonial empire. Brazil became an independent country in 1822 and Mozambique first in 1975. Besides differences in the colonial history, the two countries have evolved diverge into two culturally and socio-economically states (Fry 2005, 45ff). Brazil’s economic situation has been described, as stable and growing, but Mozambique is still one of the poorest countries in the world with over half of the population living in absolute poverty. After the independence from Portugal, the country only experienced a few years of peace before a destabilization war broke out that lasted for 16 years. It had a devastating impact on the development of the country. Since independence, Mozambique has undergone major structural political changes, from being a centralist socialist economy to a market economy in the end of the 1980s. During the last decade, changes in poverty level have occurred, but the development is unequal. Some data claim that poverty is increasing in some parts and in other parts declining at a slow rate (de Renzo and Hanlon 2009, 246), but international donors, such as the IMF, the WB, several UN organizations and Northern donors, see Mozambique as a success story in terms of economic growth during the last decade.

Mozambique is heavily aid dependent, with more than 50% of the state budget coming from external sources, while Brazil is a global emerging

economy. Other dissimilarity between the countries is the existence and strength of civil society organizations and independent media. In Mozambique CSOs are fairly recent phenomena and the right to freedom of association was initially established in 1990 with the new Constitution that introduced political pluralism. But an emerging civil society is growing and there are several AIDS NGOs with external support working with information campaigns, spread of condoms, and they are acting as service providers or having a watchdog function in front of the government (see e.g. Matsinhe 2008).

I visited Mozambique at two different occasions during 2010 and 2011 and interviewed several AIDS NGOs, and some examples will be given. The Mozambican Network of AIDS Services Organizations (MONASO) is a national HIV/AIDS civil society network with regional offices in several parts of the country. Another international organization with well functioning activities is the Comunidade de Sant’ Egidio. I visited them in the outskirt of Maputo and they provide assistance to many HIV-positive Mozambicans, and distributed ARVs to as many as they had resources. The group carried out a program DREAM (Drug Resource Enhancement Against AIDS and Malnutrition), which gives out free ARVs, food supplements, and water filters. The program has been successful in preventing mother-to-child transmission. But, what I heard many times during my interviews with CSOs in Maputo, was that they did not get resources any longer, and had to stop the program due to lack of money. Some examples are the Mozambican Access to Treatment Movement (MATRAM) – Movimento de Acesso ao Tratamento em Moçambique – and the Mozambican organization in defense of sexual minorities (LAMBDA). Two organizations with good infrastructure educated and committed staff, with regional and partly global networks, but with limited economic resources. LAMBDA has struggled with bureaucratic problems to get registered as an NGO, but they had still not succeeded when I last visited them in March 2011.

One influential Brazilian development aid institute, mentioned earlier, is the International Centre for Technical Cooperation on HIV/AIDS (ICTC). The center was established in 2005 and has played an important role in promoting technical cooperation on AIDS. It was created as a collaboration between the Brazilian government and UNAIDS with support from the World Bank and other international partners, such as GTZ (German Agency for
Technical Cooperation) and the British DFID (Development for International Development) and others. The Brazilian AIDS model started to expand with initiatives such as the ICP and Laços Sul-Sul. They carried with them experience and knowledge from Brazil’s domestic process and were sometimes developed in cooperation with multilateral organizations, such as UNDP or UNICEF. This kind of cooperation with Northern donors, named triangular, has the intention to transfer the leadership and ownership from the Northern donors to the Southern, in this case Brazil.

Mozambique had during the 1980s and 90s a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS an insufficient public health structure, lack of centers for HIV testing, counseling units and capable health personnel to give care to the infected and with capacity to confirm infection and give accurate advice and therapy (UNAIDS 2010; Matsinhe 2008). According to the Global Report, Mozambique has a decreasing AIDS epidemic, but it is still high (UNAIDS 2010, 61). There are about 500 new HIV/AIDS cases a day and official statistics show that about 1.4 million people in the country have HIV/AIDS. Among these less than 40 % (estimated 32%) receive ART (UNAIDS 2010, 97).

From 2009 the cooperation between Brazil and Mozambique is intensified, and there are more Brazilian projects in the country than in any other country in Africa, often carried out with the MoH and the ICTC (Almeida et al. 2010). Over the years there has been distribution of Brazilian produced generic AID drugs to health centers and patients in Mozambique. The programs contain the same components as most development aid: logistic support, evaluation and monitoring, strengthening the public health infrastructure; diagnosis, prevention, treatment, training programs for health professionals and the logistic of drug distribution. There has also been exchange of knowledge and capacity building, workshops and seminars with technicians and health personnel from Brazil going to Mozambique and vice versa.

I made an interview at the Brazilian embassy in Maputo in 2010. They said that they had different small-scale projects and some of them were really basic knowledge transfer. Mozambique had asked Brazil of technical support to clean the hospitals. They had a growing problem with hygiene and resistant bacteria. In Brazil the cleaning of hospitals is outsourced and well functioning.
A program started with exchange of technical staff going to Brazil for training and staff coming to Mozambique to transfer knowledge and practice. There is no language and cultural obstacles in this kind of cooperation projects, I was told.

To illustrate the multitudes of aid constructions, cooperation and partnerships that exist and how the borders between Northern and Southern donors are becoming blurred, another example I was told about at the Embassy, will be mentioned. It is a triangular cooperation, which was signed some months before my visit in March 2010. It is a cooperation between Brazil (MoH, NAP, Fiocruz5) – Mozambique (MoH, CNCS6) and The U.S. (PEPFAR, CDC – Centers for Disease Control and Prevention –, USAID). The main goals are to ‘Strengthen the response in Mozambique on the HIV/AIDS epidemic’. It is a project on a governmental level with the duration of 2 years and a budget of more than 3 million USD. The project was about to start when I visited the Embassy and besides to strengthen institutions and made them excellence, there is a goal to improve the logistics in the health sector. There is also a focus on epidemiology and to reinforce social relations within the program. The list of projects could be extended, but my intention is to show that Brazil is today an important actor on the global AIDS arena.

8. The AIDS medicine plant in Mozambique
One of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva promises of collaborations with Mozambique in 2003 was to construct a pharmaceutical plant to provide medical support and capacity building for health personnel, in cooperation with the National School of Public Health/ Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (Fiocruz). This is a health institution (connected to the MoH) that conducts advanced medical, pharmaceutical, and public health research. In addition, it has post-graduate programs, health training, and hospitals, and it produces vaccines and pharmaceutical drugs. The unit set up in Maputo is the first extension of Fiocruz outside Brazil. In July 2005 the two countries signed an agreement to study the feasibility of a plant to produce generic ARVs. It is emphasized that

5 Fiocruz - (www.fiocruz.br)
6 CNCS – Conselho Nacional de Combate ao HIV/SIDA em Moçambique (http://www.cnecs.org.mz)
the drugs could be distributed and sold in Mozambique, but also outside the country. The two presidents of Brazil and Mozambique inaugurated, the yet not existing factory, in October 2008. Some initial steps have been taken with the construction of a pharmaceutical factory in Matola (a city south of Maputo). There are different information concerning the function and ambition of the plant. One main objective, mentioned in the press, was to produce ARVs. But during President Lula’s visit in 2010, the inventiveness forwarded was more modest and the president admitted that there are logistical problems. It is for the moment difficult to say what will be produced at the AIDS medicine plant. It is one of Brazil’s most ambitious foreign assistance projects and the aid package includes 23 million USD to construct the plant (Sotero 2009). No one questions the need for the plant in the region. It is obvious that in Southern Africa, which is hardest hit by the AIDS epidemic, an effective plant with production of antiretroviral could be one step closer to universal access for PLWHA.

President Lula has stated that the aim of the ongoing collaboration with Mozambique is to strengthen the overall health situation in the country. One component of the “aid package” is to transfer scientific knowledge and build capacity among health staff through an exchange program where health professionals from Brazil visit Mozambique and students from Mozambique take part in courses at Fiocruz. The other part is more technological, with Brazilian technicians constructing the pharmaceutical plant and starting up the production of ARV generies. This is an advanced level of production, and the distribution of drugs requires a well functioning infrastructure and biotechnical knowledge and ability, as well as augmented economic resources and political stability to be sustainable.

President Lula has stated that Brazil can help the African countries because “we have a more solid and stronger economy” and adds that “it is our responsibility to take care of that things proceed in a good way between Brazil and Africa. That is to say, Brazil has to be a part of the development of the African continent” (Damé 2008). In the Mozambican newspaper Notícias, the bilateral cooperation and the factory are discussed. One article reveals that the factory would start production during December–January 2009/2010 and the
first step is to produce the packaging for the AIDS drugs, which will be produced in Brazil. The article describes the exchange of scientists and technicians between the countries, and even if the process has been extended, the Brazilian ambassador in Mozambique who is interviewed declares that “the process will continue and antiretrovirals will be produced in Mozambique within a certain time” (Notícias June 23, 2009). The other article deals in more general terms with bilateral cooperation between the two countries and has the title “From Romanticism to Development: The President in Brazil to Stimulate Investments.” Related to the antiretroviral plant, the article states that there are indications that the cooperation protocols and financial details related to the factory have advanced. The articles illustrate a strong Brazilian interest in the foreign policy for bilateral cooperation, investments, and trade with Mozambique, especially within the sectors of agriculture and biofuel (Notícias July 20, 2009). The last week of October 2010 when President Lula was on his way to Brazil the Mozambican newspapers were filled with photos and texts. The front page of O País had a large photo of the Brazilian president and the title: “Lula’s visit to the country. The Brazilian interests in Mozambique.” (October 26, 2010) Other titles are “Company that is going to mount antiretroviral plant in the country will be announced next week.” (CRIAS Notícias September 9, 2010). After the president’s popular visit, O País states: “Lula hopes to come back in 2010 to take the first pill of the antiretroviral plant.” (November 11, 2010)

The Brazilian Congress has approved the allocation of R$ 13.6 million for the project in December, 2009. The examples of the mass media interests in the AIDS fabric are massive and the project is important with a lot of prestige for President Lula, but also for Mozambique President Armando Guebuza. The day the fabric start producing anti-AIDS drug it will be the first public plant on the African continent. Private laboratories produce ARVs on small scale in Uganda, Kenya and South Africa. According to the latest news the plant will also produce drugs to fight tuberculosis and malaria.

9. Some concluding remarks
It is not yet a paradigmatic shift of the world order regarding the relation between donors and recipient countries and between the Global North and the
Global South, but a movement of power to the emerging states can be seen. The borders between the Global North and Global South are more blurred as new actors are entering the aid arena. But how different are the emerging donors, such as Brazil, compared to the old donors, when it comes to their role in the recipient country? I have tried to illustrate that Brazil has achieved a central place in development aid and partly, together with other emerging states, is challenging the hegemony of the Global North.

One example from Brazil’s own experience as a recipient country was when the state acted in a pro-active way when the WB (1993-2002) imposed the strict conditions on Brazil for receiving loans. But thanks to the burgeoned National AIDS Program and pressure from a pro-active civil society, it has been able to continue on the path of national ownership and universal access to treatment. This example shows the Brazilian state acting more as an activist state than a governing at distance donor. They have learned from their own experience as a recipient country and they kept the universal access to treatment as a flagship and challenges WTO with the export of the Brazilian AIDS model. I will draw the conclusions that the Brazilian aid cooperation projects are closer to the target groups than most traditional North-South cooperation, more solidarity and horizontal practice.

Another determining factor is the ‘political will’ and commitment of the government. In the case of Brazil, they found their own form of ‘local ownership’ beyond the Paris Declaration and Accra. Together with other emerging economies they are pro-active in the new aid architecture by raising their voices at the High Level Summits.

Brazil’s AIDS policies nowadays have a good international reputation. The model functions in Brazil, and other countries can learn lessons from, but not copy, the model. Brazil exports knowledge and experience of the donation of AIDS drugs and capacity building, supporting the construction of pharmaceutical laboratories and factories in the Global South. The decisions relating to goals are based on their own priorities and they have strong self-esteem based on effective practical activities. They have knowledge to share with countries still struggling with high AIDS prevalence, and the commitment illustrated through the projects from the president and on political, social,
academic level is evident and based on a strong solidarity more than economic. From different sources the virtue and challenge of the AIDS medicine plant is emphasized as not bringing commercial gain to Brazil. “In this sense, Brazil international cooperation contrasts with the tied-aid of the traditional model of North-South cooperation and even with the policies of other BRIC countries, such as China” (Sotero 2009, 19).

Do regional cooperation and South-South cooperation imply another rationale or logic in cooperation projects than the multilateral and bilateral transfer of North-South aid? It is probably too early to answer this question, but the aid landscape is changing, with new actors entering the scene; a constructive dialogue between northern and southern donors to achieve sustainable development and poverty reduction should be in focus. In general terms, the following things are necessary if changes in the power relations are to take place. The role of the donors should be limited and be made less interventionist, as local ownership implies a shift of power. The national plans of the recipient countries should be supported in a more overt way. The role of the Global North could be to act as a broker or facilitator and pave the way for dialogue. If the donors wish to set any conditions – with the argument that they use the money from their taxpayers - these should be transparent and open to negotiation.
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ABSTRACT
The paper intends to clarify the Brazilian foreign policy concerning AIDS treatment in Africa. The building of an AIDS drug plant in Mozambique is the concrete example of the diplomatic evolution showed by Brazil in the past few years – evolution that is detailed in the present article.

KEYWORDS
South-South Cooperation; Emerging Powers; AIDS.

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THE VALUE OF THE CONCEPT OF HEGEMONY FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Luiz Augusto Estrella Faria

“Guicciardini states that for the life of a State two things are absolutely necessary: arms and religion.”

Antonio Gramsci

The great influence of Gramsci’s work on Political Science in the twentieth century has continued to extend also into one of its derivations, the theory of International Relations. The great Italian thinker was interested in understand the forces that produce the stability of power relations in politically organized societies, sustained by a State. What was the reason for a social order founded on inequality and exploitation of the majority by the hands of a ruling minority to be long lasting? From his studies of the works of Renaissance masters Francesco Gucciardini and Nicolló Machiavelli, Gramsci came up with a concept of hegemony that, with the dissemination of his work in Italy after the end of the Second World War by the Communist Party that he helped to found, became widely disseminated and debated around the world. Firstly by the Political Science, but it very briefly transcended to other areas, such as the Economics and the International Relations.

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Gramsci’s discovery rescued Marx's analysis of the social function of ideology. For the German thinker, ideology could be understood as a false consciousness, a fetishized and mystified vision of reality that is broadcasted by the dominant classes with the function to conform the subaltermen to their oppressed condition. In ideological perspective, social oppression is seen as some kind of inexorable fate, a God's will, and so on. Gramsci used the image of the cement that holds the bricks of social structure to describe the function of ideology. In this sense, it is one of the “two things [that] are absolutely necessary” to an organized political system, i.e., a State. In his words:

“Guicciardini’s formula can be translated into several other less drastic formulas: strength and consensus; coercion and persuasion; Church and State; political society and civil society; political and moral (ethical-political history of Croce); law and freedom; order and discipline; or with a view implicit literary flavor, violence and fraud” (Gramsci 1976, 137-138).

Defined in this formula as the sum of coercion and consent, hegemony fulfills the essential role of maintaining a stable social order and its higher form of political organization, the State, cementing the construction of the social structure. In this role, the strength of hegemony takes place on two levels, as suggested by the Gramscian formula. On the material level, coercion is exerted not only by the monopoly of legitimate violence by the State power, but also by the subsumption of social subjects to obligations and requirements imposed by the economic conditions that determine the form of access to the means of production and subsistence controlled by the ruling class. At the level of ideology, on the other hand, the consensus is produced by the introjections into the same social individuals of values and symbolic projections conforming a particular ethical conduct and a set of intersubjective reasons that shape the various forms of belonging to the structure of society.

The modern secular State, which emerged with the end of absolutism, had to create and develop mechanisms and procedures to maintain the crucial decisions on the continuity of social relations within the limits necessary for the reproduction of structures of domination and their forms of sociability. In place of the will of the sovereign and the religious preaching, it has established an institutionalized system of public choices under the aegis of the democratic exercise of popular sovereignty defining what the State does and does not do.
“social domination organized by it is a ‘selective regulatory system’ (Offe 1984). That is to say, the adoption of public policies ‘functional’ to the system operates from the setup of exclusion rules through which alternatives policies cannot occur” (Faria and Winckler 1994, 17).

Such rules and mechanisms conform a network of institutions with the purpose of effecting the regulation of the social system as a whole. The effectiveness of this regulation is what gives stability and ensures the continuity of the organized society in the State form. The ruling class can exercise its power within appropriate rules and the lower classes become conformed to their status of social and political subordination and economic exploitation, adapting to the prevalent forms of sociability. It was in this sense that Marx and Engels identified the origin of the State in the division of society into classes. Before the formula popularized as the “central committee of the ruling class”, the State, as presented in the Manifesto of the Communist Party or in the Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (Marx and Engels 1976; Engels 1982), emerges as a structure created to give unit to this social order founded on the division and domination that separates the human community in classes with fundamentally different rights and obligations. Or, in his view, divided between those who only have rights and those who only have obligations.2

The foundational norm of organized societies in States was the regulation of the access and the use of the fundamental means of production, the land, because in its beginnings there were only agricultural societies. If this was initially imposed by force, in the form of a standard coercive, soon came to combine the mechanisms of production of a consensus of religious nature, as stated in the quotation above from Guicciardini reported by Gramsci. The hegemonic character was completed with the investiture of religion as the first ideological apparatus of the State.

The development and increase in the level of complexity of social relations were also making the State structure more complex, giving rise to new features, activities and functions. One of these new functions was the relations

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2 As stated in the Manifesto, “Until now, the history of all societies that have existed until today has been the history of class struggle” (Marx and Engels 1848, 21).
with other companies, in the way where evolution itself was multiplying social interactions and developing new activities, especially trade, for which the geographic scale was expanded by connections of long distance. The war was the movement by which relations of coexistence were settled by conquest or balance of power, the first forms of these international relations based on the primeval force. Nevertheless, the need for cooperation was also present during this early period, giving rise to the need for coding these foreign relations to make negotiations possible and feasible for the prevalence of agreements and rules arising from them. That’s what the Romans codified as people’s right (*jus gentium*).

The so prevalent Eurocentrism in the Social Sciences often indicate the Renaissance period as the moment of emergence of societies organized in States and therefore having a political order characteristic of hegemony.3 A proviso is made to this generalization jurists, once it rightly relate the form of the State to the constitution of a social order based on law. Where there is law, there is some form of institutionalized social relations of power and, therefore, a political structure of State. Obviously one of the most important encodings for social stability is the differences between people, which highlights the division into classes and relations of domination and exploitation that are, as seen in the Marxist view, the foundations of the State.

The same Eurocentric position describes the Treaty of Westphalia as the founding moment of an international order based on a shared notion of law. However, it is worth remembering that even in Europe the characteristics of the modern State were present in Greece or Rome, something that can surely be extended to the China of the Qin dynasty and to the Inca Empire or the Mexico of the Mayas. In all these examples, there was sustained contact, including the establishment of stable patterns of relations between those States and other societies. Therefore it can be inferred that foreign relations were also among the many tasks carried on by these national organizations. This implies the existence of some form of international order, based on alliances, agreements and, as it is well known, on violent conflicts in particular.

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3 Yes, because the agreement is not an exclusive feature of democracy. Remember that Gramsci wrote about hegemony from his prison cell under the fascist dictatorship of Mussolini, which, even if making extensive use of violence did not stop developing a hegemonic feature.
Following the typology adopted by Fiori (1997), we can characterize most systems of international relations prevailing in different regions of the world throughout history as imperial types, in that the violence was the predominant force in its constitution. However, to the extent that recourse to coercion came to be undesirable, ineffective or even impossible, due to the evolution of relations between nations, the ties of interdependence, the need for cooperation or whatever, the appeal to consensus gave rise to a new kind of order: the hegemonic order.4

Focusing on the European international order, which throughout history has been expanding to the point of covering the whole world, we see the prevalence of an imperial system in its Mediterranean origin, which was replaced by a condition of chaos following the fall of Rome. After its regression during the middle ages, the State returned in the Renaissance, a time when the authority of the Catholic Church on the European political relations had declined. According to the establishment of an interstate international order in the place of a system relatively anarchic under the auspices of the Roman curia hitherto existing in Europe, this order was set up by rules accepted by the participating States. An international right to replace papal edicts that rewrites the relations between the European dynastic states was born. If the Peace of Westphalia is a benchmark of this new reality in foreign nations, its genesis comes from further back in time.5

The development of this new environment for relations between nations opened a space for the original statement of their powers, that was the creation of an standard and its obedience. As recalled Susan Strange noticed (1994), the exercise of power has a relational aspect – the ability to force the other’s behavior – and a structural aspect, the ability to decide the rules of the game. This step forward in the evolution of the interstate system, the creation of an international law as a result of changing relationships between nations, opened space for the introduction of the kind of world order prevalent since the

4 Indeed, the typology is, in our point of view, based on balancing or degree of prevalence duo coercion and consensus. Even in the Roman Empire, the reasons for hegemony were present, just remember the Latinization linguistics, Christianization or the institutions of law.

5 In 3100 BC, the Sumerians had already produced a treaty of territorial boundaries.
nineteenth century, an order in which the use of force is being gradually replaced by ideology: the hegemonic order.6

The admission of the existence of that other kind of international system was a milestone in the evolution of the scientific field of International Relations. But to make this possible, it was needed the step forward made by the critique to the realist and neorealist tendency and their narrow and economist view of politics. As far as power is concerned, States are not rational utility maximizes individuals. Political action is not solely devoted to the accumulation of more power. And the balance of power, the impossibility to destroy the other, is not the only reason for stability in international relations (Cox 1999b). Men, their invention and societies are much more complex than the vision created by the crude utilitarianism of conventional sociology and economics makes believe. And above all, humanity and its forms of collective experience have history, is always changing, and never pursues the same goals or work in the same way.

The alternative perspective stressed in Guicciardini’s formula opened a new and successful horizon for the development of the discipline of International Relations, which allowed the proposition of theories that could take into account a greater portion of its real complexity, overcoming the easy solution of realist and economist simplification. Robert Cox called this perspective “critical theory”, as opposed to that of “problem solving” (Cox 1999a). The contrast between the two views is marked, firstly by the totalizing perspective against the particularism of the traditional view; secondly, by the historicity of one as opposed to the abstraction of the other; thirdly, by considering the change as a central element of reality to be explained versus the

6 It is important to note the difference between the concepts of hegemony, here taken in the sense of Gramsci, as it is also used by Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi. Although the Marxist inspiration is clear in their works, what for both authors is described as a period of hegemonic organization of the world capitalist system is the relative stability provided by the control of a State and its capitalist ruling class over the main points that structure the international economic relations. Wallerstein (2000) mentions three instances, the agro-industrial, the commercial and the financial ones, for which the hegemonic power of the world economy needs to exert simultaneous superiority to consolidate its domination over the whole system. On the other hand, Arrighi (1996) talks about control over financial networks (cash and credit) and productive (trade and value addition) networks. The two authors do not fail to also point out the military power projection capabilities of this very power worldwide as essential to the exercise of such domination. Outside these hegemonic moments, the world-economy would live an anarchic or chaotic regime in its organization.
static scenario and fixed frame of the orthodoxy; and, fourthly, critical theory sees the possibility of social and political transformation while the conservative viewpoint seeks the restoration of the order.\textsuperscript{7}

In this theoretical horizon, the complexity of the many determinations of power relations can be treated as a whole by using the idea of hegemony. Several authors have sought to extend the use of this concept to the context of International Relations. The use of this term, already quite widespread, has served even to just “add an epicyclic coda”\textsuperscript{8} to the dominant theory, without adding anything to the understanding of reality. This is the case, for example, unsuspected economists of neoclassical formation as Robert Gilpin and Charles Kindleberger and their concepts of hegemonic stability. Their propositions are prisoners of the fiction of the rational agent and the methodological individualism that reduces the structural reality to the condition of the State as an actor with interests. This retains the worst of neoclassical economics and the worse of positivist politics, defining the exercise of hegemony as “the provision of public goods necessary for the stability of the international order”, including security, payment methods, institutions, etc. Why does the leader looks so benevolent and willing to pay the costs of maintaining expensive military or issue currency for the world market? His compensation would be the generation of a stable climate for business.

A very different perspective comes from the authors influenced by the Marxist tradition where Gramsci was situated. Among them Robert Cox stands out, and it does the so-called English school of international political economy, and its best example, Susan Strange. According to this point of view, what is necessary to understand is business, not stability.\textsuperscript{9}

The starting point of Susan Strange (1994) is a methodological critique of the influence of neoclassical economics in the study of international relations with its simplistic reductionism, its abuse of quantitative techniques to describe known things and its “evidence” of what is plain common sense. What she

\textsuperscript{7} Cox mentions some pioneers of this view, besides Machiavelli and Guicciardini cited by Gramsci, in particular the reflections of Giambattista Vico and the precursory ideas of Ibn Khaldun.

\textsuperscript{8} The irony was made by Immanuel Wallerstein.

\textsuperscript{9} Especially because it would not otherwise be possible to understand how the hegemonic power itself causes instability (Fiori 2008).
proposes is to understand the link between authority and market, a nexus understood as the influence of reciprocal (a two-way causality) and that she illustrates with the figure of a see-saw. From this relation emerges a hierarchical international system in different relative positions as established from how much power may be exercised by each nation-state on the system as a whole and in relation to others. In explicitation of the sources of that power, we see how dynamic she imagined the arrangement of the interstate world to be.

This power is exercised hegemonically in four distinct levels. In *States and markets* (Strange 1994), she presents a picture of a rhombus formed by four triangles to represent these four sources of power, defined as interactive structures. She defines them as not peculiar to the world system, being also present in small groups of humans, and that she and exemplifies citing a family or small village, until the whole world.

In Figure 1, ACD is the productive structure, ABD is security, ABC is finance and BCD knowledge (Strange 1994). The overlap is intentional, because all four spheres are interrelated and influence each other. The power materializes in the control of each of these structures, in the sense of the ability to threaten it or preserve it. The power over the productive structure is the power to decide or to control how goods and services are produced for subsistence, i.e. what should be produced, how it should be produced and using what kind of means among land, capital, labor and technology. The power over the safety of people is fundamentally based on the control of violence, the ability to offer security over essential items such as food distribution and health services, or the administration of justice.

**Figure 1: The four structures around the State-market see-saw**
The power over knowledge is not merely the control of its generation and dissemination, but also of ideas and beliefs. Developing or acquiring knowledge, controlling access to something desired or respected and dominating the channels of communication and dissemination of knowledge are all special features of structural power. Nowadays, the most important knowledge as a power resource is technology.

Finally, the financial power is the control over credit, which implies the control over purchasing power, or the ability to create credit from nothing. Susan Strange was especially insightful in pointing out the relevance of financial power in times of globalization.

“the facet that possibly grew in importance more than any other in the last quarter of a century, and has become of decisive importance in international economic relations and competition between companies, (...) its power to determine outcomes – in security, production and research – is enormous (...), credit is what is invested in advanced economies rather than cash, and (...) credit can be created. It does not need to be accumulated. So who is acquiring the trust of others in their ability to create credit will control a capitalist economy – and also a socialist one.” (Strange 1994, 30)

However, it was Robert Cox who developed a theoretical resource with greater ability to explain the issue of power and hegemony in its totality. He named this method of “historical structures”, representative of what he called “limited wholes”. Its starting point is the determination of a world order in which structural causality articulate states and social forces, as shown in Figure 2.

As indicated by the arrows, there is an interconnection between the three levels. The relations between them, however, are not un-linear. It was the transnationalized social forces that have influenced States, which both

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10 She says: “For this reason, the priesthood in every religion has maintained their power in a more miserly way than the military or noble varieties” (Strange 1994, 30). This and other quotes from original foreign language were translated for us.

11 See about the idea of casino capitalism and discussion of the concept of mad money in Strange (1998).

12 In this sense, the criticism directed by Susan Strange of a production rule is unfounded. We imagine that she is extending to Cox the critic focused on the Marxist view prevalent throughout the twentieth century and its production and economic.
shape and are shaped by the international order. Similarly, States also interfere in the action of social forces and these very actions produce effects on the global orders. “Each of these levels can be studied as a succession of rivals structures, a dominant one and an emerging one” (Cox 1999a, 100).

**Figure 2: The three levels or spheres of activity**

![Diagram of three levels or spheres of activity](image)

In the structures, three categories of forces interact in each one of them, constituting forces expressed as potential or capacities. They are:

“material capabilities, ideas and institutions. No un-linear determinism must be assumed among these three, the relationship can be assumed to be reciprocal. The question in what sense the power lines moving is always a historical question to be answered by a study of the particular case” (Cox 1999a, 98).

As we interpret Cox's vision, the endowment of these three elements determines the relative position of each pair of State-national bourgeoisie, which are the stars of this expanding universe that is the international order. This means that hegemony over this world system is the result of the supremacy in each of these categories of forces.

In defining what elements make up each of the three forces, we see that dialectically the scheme of Robert Cox can be interpreted as including, or perhaps subsuming the conception of Susan Strange at the same time that it is

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13 The expression expanding universe was borrowed from José Luis Fiori (2008). Likewise, it is yours proposition considered the duet formed by each State and its respective national bourgeoisies as constituent parts of the capitalist world system.
completed and enlightened in some aspects by her work. This procedure will enable these ideas to be taken as a basis for a theoretical step ahead. In this new step we will add a greater precision to the role and scope of each of these levels and associate this analytical procedure to an approach that seeks to develop itself simultaneously at different levels of analysis in order to achieve a the comprehension of the totality. We can therefore move forward in proposing an interpretation of the international order as a system of hegemony that defines the hierarchy of power, the place and function of each of its constituent elements, States and social forces in its composition.

The material capacities are, in the words of Cox, the potential of production and destruction. Their dynamic forms are the technological and organizational capabilities, and their static forms are the natural resources transformed by technology, inventories of equipment (weapons and industries) and the wealth that command them (Cox 1981). This category includes some of the constituent elements of productive structures (production potential), security (potential for destruction), finance (wealth) and knowledge (technology) proposed by Susan Strange, though reconfigured.

The second force are the ideas, divided into two types. Inter-subjective meanings, or common notions of the nature of social relations that lead to the continuation of habits and behavior patterns which lead to the obedience of the rules. And the collective images of social order shared by different human groups in relation to the meaning of the public good, the legitimacy of the existing power or of the justice.

Finally, institutions are the third force: “Institutionalization is a way for stabilizing and perpetuating a certain order.” (Cox 1981, 99) Even if they crystallize certain correlation of forces, they also acquire relative autonomy and can become an arena of dispute between antagonistic positions. Indeed, even antagonistic institutions can prevail: “Institutions are an amalgam of particular ideas and material power, which in turn influence the development of the ideas and material capacities.” (Cox 1981, 99)

Cox goes on pointing to the close connection between institutionalization and what Gramsci defined as hegemony, inasmuch as they are both means to resolve conflicts without resorting to violence. The exercise of violence by the stronger is unnecessary when the weakest accepts the
The prevalence of the strongest, and it occurs to the extent that the dominant makes its interests to be seen as everyone’s. This is the idea of ideology as a veil to hide the reality described by Marx and adopted in the work of Gramsci and that produces a type of consciousness that makes acceptable by the dominated its condition of inferiority.

It is in this circumstance that hegemony is established. Not as a mere stock of endowment of factors of power, as the theory of hegemonic stability in a form of fetishism of power makes one believe (something already criticized by Cox 1981, 105), but as a particular arrangement or coherent conjunction between a certain configuration of material power (economic and military hierarchy), the prevalent collective image of world order (a certain pattern to be preserved and maintained, including its standards) and the set of institutions that administers this order within an atmosphere of universality (so that it is not seen as a mere instrument of domination of the leading-State).

We will later retake the idea of how the system of hegemony is structured, but still following Robert Cox, it is necessary to shed some light on how the world order is formed and how it is transformed. Consisting of States and markets, as noted by Susan Strange, or of social forces and forms of state, as defined by Cox, the genesis of international relations is explained by historical materialism as resulting from the action of social forces shaped by relations of production (this would constitute a determination in the last instance). Beyond this still very abstract statement, some mediation is needed. The relationships between social forces internal to each State will determine its shape. In capitalism the bourgeoisie is the ruling class and does not need to directly control the State apparatus as it was done by the Chinese mandarins, for example. As mentioned above, the modern State is organized so that there is a selectivity of its actions and policies to which the dominant power of the bourgeoisie is a premise. However, selective control of the ruling class does not make the configuration of the State impervious to other social classes. Commitments as the American New Deal or the European social-democracy are examples of that.

It is this set of national state-bourgeoisie that will coordinate with its counterparts to form the world order, opening space for the phenomenon
understood by Cox as the beyond-border actions of the social forces.\textsuperscript{14} Their articulations and common interests create networks of association between factions of the bourgeoisie that influence the direction of the international system as well as the relative power of States. As a result, the range and possibilities of each State-national bourgeoisie are defined by their relative power – or their place in the hierarchy of the world. The marxists called this configuration of power differentials “imperialism”, inasmuch as it is based on certain division of labor between its constituent parts, not only in the economic but also social and political.

It is also the nature of the system of its permanent transformation; its history is an evolutionary process consisting of successive ruptures where stability is an always temporary condition, not its destiny or necessity.\textsuperscript{15} What is the necessary for the system is that hegemony is permanently challenged and recurrently disrupted because the logic that articulates it is the competition between states and their national bourgeoisies (Fiori 1997 and 2008).\textsuperscript{16} The very internationalization of the States, the production and the finances – one of the characteristics of globalization or globalization of capital –, is part of this competitive effort to remain ahead of its rivals and to acquire new resources of power and new sources of economic surplus.

The internationalization of the State has nothing to do with the idea of emptying the State or the displacement of its sovereignty to the multilateral organizations. States are constituent parts of the system, a reality perceived by Max Weber, and its disappearance would necessarily mean the end of the very international capitalist system. The internationalization that we are dealing with here is exemplified in the phenomenon visible from central banks and ministries of finance and economy, which are fractions of the State

\textsuperscript{14} Somehow, Susan Strange (1998) in her analysis of what she called “mad money” also includes the internationalization of social classes in the study of the action of high finance in globalization.

\textsuperscript{15} There is an identification here with the research program known as the world systems theory, whose reference authors are Wallerstein and Arrighi, besides the Brazilian Theutonio dos Santos.

\textsuperscript{16} We are using the term competition in place of economic competition to emphasize the difference with the economic view that sees competition as producing balance. In fact, it produces winners and losers. Braudel (1987) was right when he said that capitalism is always the monopoly and the use of the State. Monopoly is the position of who wins the competition process in the market and the use of State intervention translates into political power in support of capital accumulation, capital of certain friends of the prince.
internationally articulated, whose links are transmission networks of the interests of the large financial capital, especially the globalized one. This process of globalization has created a political axis, as pointed out by Robert Cox (1981), in which a network of interests articulates the social forces internationally, this also includes government agencies and multilateral organizations where the “big business” (particularly its strategic direction, the big finance) participates as an articulator and beneficiary. The author stresses that this network acts as a body for capital control and planning, and mentions the concept of collective capitalist proposed by Lenin in his famous analysis of imperialism.

To complete these methodological considerations about hegemony, we present below a scheme that seeks to interpret and make more understandable the nature of this kind of world order that is organized in the form of hegemony. In this theoretical route, we set the method to articulate different levels of analysis developed initially by the School of Regulation17 and discussed in Faria (2007).

Hegemony is a form of exercise of power and the way it is organized in a complex society where the use of violence can only be made in extreme situations. Even if the violence itself is a big business, beyond its intrinsic cost the use of force leads to the disruption of other businesses. The appearance of a stable democracy is the best environment for capital, as it can be seen in the example of the institutional continuity of a century and a half in the U.S. after the American Civil War, not to mention the UK, which opened much longer ago this pattern of predictability in the actions of the rulers. Not coincidentally, these have been the only two world powers in such hegemonic order.18

After quoting Gramsci when the Italian author asks whether the International Relations precede or follow the fundamental social relations (and

17 By method we mean a way to make this articulation since combining several plans of analysis is an usual epistemological feature, at least for those who study more complex objects. The regulationist vision is developed in Boyer (2004).
18 Appearance because, especially in relation to the United States, the abuse of economic power and the selection filters of public policies that are so prominent, in fact, it is a plutocracy of the big businesses and their lobbies. The last promise of change, the election of Barack Obama, was unable to avoid the high finance that exerts control over the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department, not the military industrial complex Pentagon’s control over the entire structure and safety USA. That left some crumbs for Medicare.
when the author himself replies “there can be no doubt that follow” Gramsci apud Cox 1983, 133), Robert Cox continues with the following definition:

“Hegemony on the international level is not, then, merely an order among States. It is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of social relations that connects international social classes of different countries. The world hegemony can be described as a social structure, economic structure and political structure, and cannot be just one of those things, but all three. The world hegemony is further expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms that establish general rules of behavior for States and those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries, rules that underpin the dominant mode of production” (Cox 1983, 137)

In our analysis, as we have said, we rethink the work of Robert Cox and Susan Strange, especially the first, to establish an analytical framework capable of interpreting this type of world order. The structural arrangement whereby the hegemonic power is exercised is articulated in three levels: a material level, an ideological level and, between the two, the level of institutions. The institutional level is intermediate because these structures are both material – insofar as they have power and rules are binding in relation to the actions of social subjects – and ideological therefore prescribing attitudes and indicating the rights and wrongs in the behavior of the agents. The agents here are the social forces and the States, as Cox defined (1981); or, in a more allegorical and symbolic fashion, “States and markets” Susan Strange (1994); or even “Wars games and games market”, as in José Luis Fiori (2004). The graphical representation of this methodological resource appears in Figure 3.

Starting at first level, we can identify that the factors of power, in material terms, come from four different sources. Firstly, the military, the ability to control the security of the whole system, which involves the provision of deterrence and power projection throughout the geographic area of the world economy. Hence the need for armed forces sufficiently trained and equipped, and ready to work, capable of successfully intervening in any dispute arising, and especially endowed with a significant difference with respect to the action
over long distances. The power of the Royal Navy in the nineteenth century was decisive, as it is the U.S. Air Force since the mid-twentieth century.

The second material factor, control over production, is based on the efficiency of the productive apparatus, especially the industry, in its competitive superiority in relation to other economies in the world and also on a larger scale in terms of production volume. The production factor is complete with control of sources of energy, raw materials and food, and also with the organizational effectiveness, by using methods of management and administration of this structure that contributes to its superiority over the others. It is also necessary to complement this economic supremacy with logistical support that enables to intervene and control the flow of international trade, transport and storage.

A third factor, the finance, encompasses the control of credit and the issuance of means of payment whose convertibility is accepted everywhere. The power over the credit allows the decision on where investments are going to happen and gives access to capital ownership, to influence over political power and so on. The issuance of the convertible currency is not only a feature of seigniorage, but will also allow the foreign exchange arbitrage, relative price control and more.

Finally, and in the fourth place in the material level, the power over technology: possessing the more advanced national innovation system and the ability to develop more efficient ways of producing wealth; to be ahead of competitors to invent new products and processes; and to give security forces the best weapons and the most effective communication systems, etc. All this requires an efficient articulation between business, government and institutes of research, development and scientific production, universities, laboratories. Ultimately, the whole chain of generation and application of knowledge.

The second plan is the ideology, divided into three levels of hegemonic exercise in this context. Its usefulness for the proper functioning of the system is the creation and dissemination of values, ideas and moral principles, and also shared views of ethics, rights and wrongs, the beautiful and the ugly, that provide a relative stability and continuity for the reproduction of social relations fundamental to all areas around the globe that are articulated in shaping the world system.
The first is the sphere of values, in which it is established a collective interpretation of the nature and purpose of the world order, of its moral principles, i.e. a collective ethics. It is also within this sphere that rules of behavior of the agents are defined, as well as the normatization that defines what is the expected behavior of the participants of the system. Such values must be internalized so the behaviors can occur in a proactive manner to the international order, so that eventual anti-systemic actions are avoided. Values act as a kind of filter of attitudes and behaviors to fit them within a range of action consistent with the stability and continuity of their structures. The hegemonic power is not only a propagator as it needs to be in its actions an example of obedience to these values.

The second sphere of this ideological level is the shared beliefs, images and symbols, collective representations and the reasons that govern the interaction between subjects. In this sphere, the definitions of right and wrong, the beautiful and the ugly will shape a worldview shared by the whole world system, from which arise a moral and an aesthetic chairing the behavior and work of members of the international society. Robert Cox defines this as the sphere of inter subjective reasons, which directs behaviors and works with the aim of ensuring the maintenance and widened reproduction of the dominant mode of production, of its connections with other subaltern modes of production and of its forms of organic sociability.¹⁹

A third sphere is one where it is generated the knowledge that creates and justifies the beliefs and values in the form of education and scientific and artistic production, besides its laws, conventions and techniques. It is certainly the most fluid of all three, and the one which can more easily spread all over the structure of the world system. The control over knowledge is not only necessary to the normal operation of the world political economy, because their production and dissemination is the core of the ideological hegemony, but is also crucial for hegemony on the material level. Through knowledge it is possible to exercise power over the production, on the ability of destruction and war, and on the processes of innovation, including in the sphere of finance. If the

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¹⁹ The term organic has been used by Gramsci in the sense of prevalent in long term. There are forms of sociability that are this type, permanent, as opposed to cyclical variants.
permanent revolution of the mode of production is a fundamental aspect of capitalism, as Marx noted, what enables this continued transformation is knowledge.

**Figure 3: The three levels of exercise of hegemony**

### Material Level:

1. Security: military advantage, destructiveness
2. Economy: productive advantage, commercial domain
3. Technology: control of innovation and research
4. Finance: control of currency and credit

### Ideological Level:

1. Values: moral prescription and the proposition of rules and behaviors
2. Beliefs: creation of symbolic images, representations, shared knowledge and reasons for the relationship between subjects of the social structure
3. Knowledge: leadership in scientific and artistic production

The ideological and material levels are connected and interdependent, and what makes this connection between both is the institutional level. There is no need to deepen the analysis of the specific contours of the structures that
constitute what might be called the mode of regulation of the world order. Enough is to refer to what has already been well established in the definition of the five structural forms of the school of regulation, including a discussion of what its authors called “modality of adherence to the international regime.” (Boyer 2004; Faria 2004 and 2007) The key here is to understand the functioning of these structures that give effective validity to the rules and habits of everyday life and shape an organizational framework that ensures the continuity of the established order in all its dynamics even through a filter between the various alternative possibilities of its development, which emerged along its permanent process of transformation. Their prescriptions and patterns of behavior have a double content that leads to voluntary adhesion in some cases, but also produces binding obligations in the form of laws, agreements and treaties (soft power). Furthermore, and not less important, these structures take the form of authoritative organizations with authoritative effectiveness, including via military power, as the United Nations Security Council (hard power).

Still following a suggestion from the school of regulation, we can say that the number of institutions of the international order is materialized in a network articulated with the web of the relations of production. The tissue that arises from this combination sets the mode of development of the world system, which corresponds to a regime of accumulation in a world scale, and its mode of regulation, in the form of its institutions (Lipietz 1988).

The different regimes that organize the world order give the specific materiality of each of these international institutions. They are composed of norms and organisms, of multilateral or interstate character, with coercive power and establishing standards for trade relations, financial circuits, investment flows, security, communications, migration, political freedoms and human rights, environmental protection, intellectual property, transportation, exploitation of natural resources, health, education, and humanitarian assistance, preservation of artistic and cultural heritage, etc. They establish goals and obligations of behaviors and actions for purposes that their values and beliefs define as desirable. On one hand the materialization of the ideas is realized and, on the other, these very ideas are shaped under the pressure of the material order.
The diagram in Figure 3 shows the relationship between the material and ideological levels and institutions. The two arrows are part of the trapezoid that represents the level of institutions, form the bridge or the cement that unites the other two levels representing the interconnection between these plans made by the institutional arrangement, which is why it is pointing in both directions. Institutions are the glue that holds together the material and ideological orders, the two blocks of our world-building. If the relationship between the two is bidirectional, with over determination among them is important to emphasize that – and here Robert Cox, following Marx, is right – that there is a first instance or a causal precedence in the construction of all social relations, and it comes from the material order.

Three points more to conclude. First, the hegemonic mode, as already mentioned, is one of the possible ways through which the international order can be organized, the same occurring within the national States that Gramsci analyzed. There are examples in history of multipolar balance, of systemic anarchy and chaos, or imperial orders. Second, the condition of global hegemony by a particular State and its ruling class can be exercised even when the leader is not able to control all the elements constitutive of this form of power. The continuity of American hegemony, an episode analyzed in a pioneer work by Conceição Tavares (1997), is such that, despite having lost the supremacy in some of the factors described herein, like power requirements for this type of leadership, the ability to use resources still available to the U.S. can preserve the American dominant position.

The third point concerns the possibility of making use of the concept of hegemony as developed here to explain this phenomenon that has developed intensively since the second half of the twentieth century, although it is a much earlier phenomenon in history: regional integration. The formation of blocks of national States can take place in the form of a structure hegemony. Or, perhaps, it can only exist as a hierarchical configuration of their actors with these characteristics. If we refer to the beginning of these notes, when discussing the implementation of the concept of hegemony in its original proposal, the analysis
of political domination within a State, for the interpretation of the international regime, we must answer “yes”, an arrangement of regional integration may, and probably will, be more successful in their stability, if it assumes an hegemonic form.
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ABSTRACT
The article details the concept of hegemony, with special attention to its historical evolution, and its present use in the study of International Relations.

KEYWORDS
Hegemony; International Relations; Gramsci.

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CRITICALLY THINKING THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: ASSESSMENTS FOR THE STUDY OF MIDDLE EMERGING POWERS

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Introduction
Series of transformations which occurred during the last decades have called for attention of investment banks, newspapers and the academy to the emergency of certain States in the global political economy. In that process, the emerging States have been developing distinct articulations, such as the BRICS, IBAS, Agriculture G20, articulations in financial G20 et, that increase the highlight given to them. There have been several attempts to classify and analyze these countries and their impacts on global political economy: emerging middle powers (Jordan 2003), intermediate States (Lima and Hirst 2006) e would-be great powers (Hurrell 2006) are a few examples. However, in a context of crisis and uncertainty, critical approaches are extremely relevant, particularly the ones that refer to the potentialities of a qualitative change of reality (Cox 1981 and 1996). Is in this debate that this article wishes to insert itself. The idea is to present and articulate the potentiality of two approaches and, specially, two concepts associated to them, with the aim to understand the emerging middle powers and their role in the contemporary world politics: world-system – and the idea of semi-periphery; and neo-gramscian – and the idea of transnationalization of the State. The hypothesis is that the idea of

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transnationalization of the State could complement the idea of semi-periphery, and the study of the two ideas together could enhance our understanding of the new configurations of the global political economy.

In this matter, first will be presented the concept of semi-periphery, in regards of how this idea is thought in the analysis of world-system (WSA). Done that, second it will be presented the concept of internationalization of the State and, next, the arise of a transnational fraction in the capitalist class. Both questions are fundamental to contextualize the emergence and the analytical potential of the idea of transnationalization of the State, specially related to the context of globalization. At last, there will be made some final considerations about the potentialities and limits as well as possible research lines that result from the presented questions.

**World-System and the idea of Semi-Periphery**

Since the second half of the 70s, the WSA has consolidated as an alternative to handle questions of the hierarchy of the global political economy. This approach emerges as a critic to the theory of modernization, stressing two fundamental questions: (i) the limits of state centralism – or the critic to the idea of States being the operational units of society; (ii) critic to the idea of “general theory of development”, i.e., of the idea that there would be stages by which late societies must pass until they become developed countries (Mariutti 2004).

In this sense, the world-system would be a social system “(...) which has limits, structures, associated groups, legitimate rules and coherence” (Wallerstein 1990, 337). This system is dynamic, once its own existence derives from the groups that compose it, whose interactions keep the system united by tension or dilacerate it, given the fact that such groups constantly pursue to reform it for their own benefit. Therefore, in last resort what makes the world-system a social system “(...) is the fact (sic) that life in its essence is in a great measure self-contained, and that the dynamic of its development be in a great sense internal” (Idibem). Thus, the system itself is the unity of analysis (Mariutti 2004; Brewer 1990).

Historically there were only two forms of world-systems: in first place, world-empires, where there is only one political system above most part of the area of the world-system; in second place, world-economies, which would be
world-systems that are not commanded by one political authority. Before the modern era, there were two possible ways to the establishment of the world-economies: first, to achieve the status of world-empires by the development of a political structure able the embrace the world-economies or being conquered by a world-empire in expansion; in second place, the disintegration. The big peculiarity of the modern world-system is the fact that “a world-economy have survived for 500 years however have not become a world-empire – a peculiarity that is the secret of its strength” (Wallerstein 1990, 338).

Such peculiarity – and strength – says much about the political aspect of capitalism, which developed by the fact that the world-economy contains in its limits not one but multiples political systems. Only the modern world-system developed a political structure compose of autonomous political units, “sovereign” States in a certain geographical area, a political structure that guarantee the continuity of a partially free trade logic – which is a *sinequa non* condition to the accumulation of capital in a systemic scale (Arrighi 1996). Therefore, the capitalist world-economy and the modern system of States are not historical separate innovations that articulate with one another: both were developed simultaneously, being the existence of one being depended of the existence of the other (Wallerstein 1996b).

Consequently, the capitalists achieve a capacity of articulation and mobility that has a structural base, a fact that enabled a constant economic and geographical expansion in the modern world-system beyond its initial European borders. In this process, new areas and peoples were incorporated in the capitalist division of labor until its process of accumulation and reproduction covered the whole world, around the end of the nineteen century, being that the first world-system of history to have achieved such condition – despite of the unequal distribution of its gains (Wallerstein 1990; 1996b; 2004a).

The unequal distribution derives from one of the defining definitions of a world-system, the division of labor. Thus, it is possible to realize the existence of “(...) *one space-time whole* (author’s griffin) whose special scope coincides with the axes of the social division of labor that integrates its composing parts” (Maiutti 2004, 97). The most profitable activities tend to concentrate geographically in certain reduced areas of the world-economy, called the *center*. The least profitable activities tend to be widely geographic scattered, in the
**periphery.** In this sense, the division of labor that occurs in the capitalist world-economy regards to a hierarchy of assignments that depends on the distinct levels of qualification and capitalization, a fact that has significant impact on the profitability and, therefore, implies in the transference of the surplus value from the periphery to the center. There is an element, though, that makes this process more complex, the semi-periphery, which is:

“(...) a necessary structural element in a world-economy. (...) They are collection points of vital skills that are often poetically unpopular. These middle areas partially deflect the political pressures which groups primarily located in peripheral areas might otherwise direct against core-States and the groups which operate within and through their state machineries. On the other hand, the interests primarily located in the semi-periphery are located outside the political arena of the core-States, and find it difficult to pursue the ends in political coalitions that might be open to them were they in the same political arena” (Wallerstein 1990, 339).

Therefore, the semi-periphery, acting in the same time as a peripheral area in relation to the core and as a core area in relation to the periphery, can contribute in the perpetuation of the modern world-system by reducing the tension between the extremes. Besides that, there is a dynamism role, given the fact that in periods of economic crisis the States of the semi-periphery can gain advantages and, because of their hybrid constitution, threaten the system core (Wallerstein 1996b; Mariuttì 2004). In this sense, they are States with certain instabilities: in political terms, one might say of fragile state structures; in social terms, of unequal structures in urbanization processes, which have intense migratory fluxes for example (cf. inter alia Chase-Dunn 1989).

The idea of semi-periphery arises from empirical verification, i.e., from the identification of countries that, in regards to GDP per capita, are between the core advanced States and the underdevelopment periphery. On the other hand, with the passage of time the term acquired analytical significance in the study of the core-periphery dynamics (Radice 2009). Although core and periphery (and semi-periphery) are terms with a geographical origin and consequences, they are not used mainly in space terms, but in relational terms
The relation between core and periphery stands itself as being a relation between global capital and global work, between high and low profitable activities. Thus, as the integration of such activities happens there is the transfer of surplus of peripheral productive activities to the central activities, and the result is “an uneven distribution of the value of the world production” (Arienti and Filomeno 2007, 109) – not only of the workers to the owners, but also of the periphery owners to the core owners (Wallerstein 1996b; 2004a).

In the words of Wallerstein (2004a, x; 2004b, 53-76), “The proponents of world-systems analysis have been talking about globalization since long before the word was invented – not, however, as something new but as something that has been basic to the modern world-system ever since it began in the sixteenth century”. Even though at first sight such statement might be seen as meritorious, because it places globalization as something real, later some problems emerge. At first, the identification of globalization as a phenomenon that dates back to the sixteenth century impoverishes its meaning because it empties its heuristic potential. Besides, to the WSA, the capitalism dates back to the sixteenth century and has remained essentially the same, without any big changes, since then. In the last instance, this perspective analyses capitalism as, basically, “(…) a static system of exploration” (Brewer 1990, 18). In this respect, besides highlighting the centrality of the States and their endurance in the processes referring to the dynamics of expansion of world capitalism since the formation of the modern world-system – as well as the persistence of the core-peripheral structure in the global political economy – the WSA sees globalization as something that has always existed, without fundamental or relevant changes in this tendency in contemporary processes (Arrighi 2005).

Likewise, as it concentrate itself mainly in the cycles of the system and of systemic crisis, the WSA ends up developing a analysis of the real which, in a certain way, alleviate the subjectivity of history, bringing a limited reading about the power relations in a context of globalization.

One may note, thus, that the conceptualization of the semi-periphery shares certain analytical distinction between economy and politics, fact that leads to the development of two analytically independent structural concepts (Radice 2009). Once such problems are aggregated to critics of Laclau (1997)
about the current reductionism in systemic approaches as the WSA, it can be enhanced some of the main problems of the conventional definitions of semi-periphery: reductionism, determinism and state-centralism. Therefore, it is necessary, mainly because of the context of increasing transnationalization of capital and relevance of middle emerging powers, to break the ontology of world-system, in the search of a better understanding of such countries and their behavior in the global scope.

**State Internationalization, *Pax Americana* and Globalization**

The intensification of the globalizing processes has cause some problems to the state-centric classifications of the core-periphery relation and, hence, to the interpretations of the semi-periphery (Worth 2009). Consequently, despite of the initial pertinence of this concept it is important to search for elements of critical inspiration in order to better understand the behavior of the middle emerging powers. It is at this point that the neo-gramscian approaches can be of great value.

Central in these approaches is the perception of the political impacts of the intensification of certain processes of production internationalization. Cox has named that state internationalization, a fundamental concept to better comprehend the mechanisms in which the American hegemony stood itself in the period of *Pax Americana* as well as to the understanding of the new context that arose with the intensification of the globalization processes.

State internationalization would be “a global process in which the national politics and practices have been adjusted by the demands of the world economy (…)” (Cox 1987, 253). Underlying this point is the fact that States have become part of a complex structural politic emergent in international scale. Hence two questions emerge: first, the state can’t disappear from this process: with the uprising of the “global”, a new scope of interactions appears without, however, the implication of the encompassment or the hierarchy of the other ambits. Second, this internationalization doesn’t occur in a homogeneous way around the world. Actually, the prominence given to the “national

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2 To Cox, such process must be seen as a *nêbuleuse*, i.e., as “something that doesn’t have an imposing firm institutional structure (…)” (Cox 2002, 33). To further reading about this topic, see: Cox 1981 and 1996.
moment” contributes for the perception of the existent “interscale articulations” (Morton 2007, 138) between the national and the international scope; i.e., it is fundamental at this point to realize the special dynamics of the globalization dialectics.

One may note, thus, a process of change in the state political structures that happens because of new alignments in the power relations among the domestic groups and between these groups and groups of other States in a wider process of construction of a historical bloc beyond the limits of the national state. Hence, there is the formation of an interstate consensus intimately linked to the needs of the world economy, whose participation is hierarchically structured from the establish outlines in the historical dominant bloc. Given this external structure, the internal structures of the participant States are adjusted to translate this consensus in the national public policies.

In Pax Americana prevails an hegemonic world order in which dominates, in the advanced industrial States, a form of state that is accountable to the institutions of world economy – IMF and World Bank, for example – and to the domestic public opinion. It was the “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982) or the possibility of combine free-trade in the international level with state interventionism in the national level in order to guarantee stability. In such change in the gravitational center of the national economy to the world economy the State remains as the responsible to the stability in both fields.

The political internalized process associated with the internationalization of the State required a political structure in which agencies and other United States government components had a prominent position. However, such structure did not operate just in the top-down approach nor was a exclusive structure of the State. As any process of hegemonic construction, it assumed that its subordinates would identify with this structure, which relates with the dimension of the consensus and to the processes of negotiations and haggling between dominants and subordinates within the establish limits of the historical bloc in question. The process of State internationalization should, thus, be understood in a dialectical way, not as something inexorable but as a tendency that, as any tendency, generates contradictions and opposition movements.
The hegemonic world order established by *Pax Americana*, during which the process of state internationalization occurred, “was founded by a country in which the social hegemony have been established and in which such hegemony was sufficiently expansive to project itself in a world scale” (Cox 1987, 266). In this same process, the fordist way of production and a determinate form of the State have become world models, being exported and modeled elsewhere. In other words, such hegemonic world order was closely related to

“(…) a global scale [projection of] those institutions and practices that had already developed in the United States, such as Fordist mass production/consumption industrial organization, electoral democracy, limited state welfare policies, and government economic policies directed toward stimulating private economic activities” (Agnew 2005, 124)

Once the hegemonies do not appear by chance, being deliberately constructed, one can note behind the *Pax Americana* a vision of hegemony, the heir of the New Deal success and associated to the economic internationalism through which social American groups pursued incitation of the demand through mass consumption. It is fundamental of realize there questions, because they express the relevance to the space scope in the process of hegemonic construction “the place that comes to exercise hegemony matters therefore, in the content and form that hegemony takes.” (Agnew 2005, 9)

This hegemony had some particularities. Its geography of power is one that follows logically from the networked power that has long been “cultivated within American marketplace society” (Agnew 2005, 61) and, from and by these peculiarities, has led to a increasing internationalization of production and finances that brought negative consequences, mainly the erosion of the principles of the *Pax Americana* world order. In this process, the “economic-cultural model of the United States and its hegemonic global position” (ibdem) were fundamental, being possible to notice a growing integration of the production processes not just in international but in global scale through determinate processes of articulation of transnational corporations in different territorial places. This question is very important once is “this organization of
production and finances in the transnational level [that] primarily distinguishes *Pax Americana* globalization” (Morton 2007, 124).

**Globalization and social forces: The formation of a transnational fraction of the capitalist class**

An analysis of the class formation process must arise from the superiority of the social relations of production within the process of constitution of the antagonistic classes and from the fact that the classes fractions derive from the classes struggle that are a result of these social relations. In this sense, it is fundamental to start from the analysis of the prevailing social relations of production in order to the understanding of the class structure of a certain society in a certain period of time. In the contemporary era, the reinstruction of capitalism, in a global scale, causes the emergency of new social forces. In other words, the intensification of the processes of globalization in the 1970 would be leading to a modification of the central premises in the analysis of the social classes (van der Pijl 1995; 1998), in particular the notion that the classes are, by definition, entailed with the State. To some Marxists, the bourgeoisie, although a global agent, would de organically national since its development happens within the State national boundaries. Consequently, it would be a nationally based class.

The problem of such approach is intimately related to the lack of knowledge about the historical specificity of this social phenomenon, which leads to a trans-historical conclusion in regards to the dynamics of the class formation since some historical period of capitalism. The relation among national States, economic institutions and social structures has modified itself in the extent that the national economy reorganizes and integrates itself with a new system of global production. In this process, in spite of the permanence of States and his fundamental role to the global political economy, the globalization of the production provides bases to a transnationalization of classes and the following outbreak of a transnational capitalist class. Explaining in another way, in a world of national economies the classes develop in national circles of accumulation. These circles transnationalize themselves, and the same thing happen with the social classes that, if in one hand do not stop to
articulate themselves in the national level, in the other hand they start to articulate themselves in other interaction scopes.

Therefore, the following question emerges: how these social forces have been generated by the processes of globalization? During the “State phase” of capitalism— i.e. in the period in which the classes developed having as focal point only the national States – the local social structures of accumulation that have been developed frequently assumed the form of developmental and welfare projects, all of them based in a redistributive logic and in a labor and other popular classes incorporation in the national historical bloc (Cox 1987; Przeworski 1989; Rupert 1995). As these Keynesian/fordist modes of accumulation start to lose their strength because of the intensification of the globalizing processes of social relations since the 1970, new models of accumulation emerge and the social arrangement previously existent among dominant and subordinate e groups start to disintegrate, making way to the emergence of new political agendas.

Closely looking to the processes of formation and transformation of such classes’ fractions and of the historical blocs articulated to them, it is possible to realize that, in the passage from the XIX to the XX century, the transatlantic finance in the prominent form of internationalization of capital. Great volumes of European investment – especially of British investment - went to the United States, financing its economic development in this period. However, there is a change in this process in the end to the First World War: the volume of loans from the United States bankers to the allies made Wall Street the new world finance center. The most intimately fraction of class linked to this Atlantic circuit of capital represented or defended a liberal-internationalist concept of financial flux control, being formed mainly by international bankers but including as well the interests of the industrial and agricultural classes engaged in the transatlantic trade and the interests of some allies among the intensive labor industries that were financed by those bankers (van der Pijl 1984; Polanyi 2000). Nevertheless, the industry of mass production – articulated with a new model of mass consumption - arose in the United States, causing the penetration of his biggest firms in the foreign markets, remodeling the world division of labor and establishing new patters of productivity, competition and consumption all over the globe (Rupert 1995; Agnew 2005).
The relation between financial and productive capital is a nuclear social relation in the process of development of capitalism. Thus, there is a increasing tension between the predominance of financial capital and its vision of a liberal-internationalist world and the emergent fraction of class which represented the industrial capital in large scale – i.e., the fordist model of accumulation – and its concept of productive capital. This fraction of class had a critic in regards to the volatile “non productive” financial capital and its predominance trough the deregulated markets, a critic that gain strength with the financial collapse and global crisis in the inter-Wars period (Polanyi 2000). In this period a new dominant class emerged in the United Stated, a class that would be the ground for a hegemonic vision of the world capitalist order that was:

“The synthesis between the laissez-faire liberalism, the internationalist-liberal fraction (…) and the State intervention brought to the scene by the requirements of the large scale industry and the organized labor, which during the interwar period walked along many forms of class conciliation generally called corporativism.” (van der Pijl 1984, c. XV)

This vision of a “proto-hegemonic” world, related to the anti-communism after the Second World War, was central to the process of construction of the alliance between the Keynesians planners and the liberal internationalists. The historical bloc that emerges of the alliance promoted the increasing and expansion of international trade and investment in this period, especially inside and among the “triad” regions. Although successive rounds in the multilateral GATT regime have decrease the tariff barriers in a relative progressive way, the liberal globalization did not limit itself to trade. In the financial scope, excess liquidity originated in the constant deficits of the United States Balance of Payments, the collapse of the regime of Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates and of the its associated capital controls, the recycling of petrodollars and the emergence of offshore markets resulted in huge volumes of international trade and of speculative international investment. Concomitant with this process of financial globalization there is a revival of the laissez-faire fundamentalism since the 1970 – which is possible to the perceived in the
neoliberal austerity that has eclipsed the growth oriented ideology that was the fulcrum of world economy after the Second World War.

It is noted, thus, the implications of globalization to the construction of the social classes. In previous moments the dominant classes developed themselves mainly under the State protection and developed its interests in opposition to the interests of rival national capitals. In this sense, States expressed the classes and groups coalitions that were incorporated in the national historical blocs. However, the processes of integration, in a transnational scale, of the national productive structures given the processes of globalization of social relations impact significantly the social classes, which begin to experiment an supranational integration with “national “classes and fractions of classes of other States. Therefore, as certain systems of local production are integrated in globalized circuits of production through the processes of transnationalization, the local and global accumulation logic tend to converge and the rivalries to stop being expressed in terms of national rivalries. It is not affirmed that there is, because of the intensification of the globalizing processes, one general interest in all capitalist class (Gill 2003). The competition among capitalists continues, but now it also occurs among oligopolistic clusters in a transnational environment.

This new transnational capitalist class is the owners of the transnational capital, i.e., the group who possesses the world production resources that are expressed, mainly, in the transnational corporations and in the private financial institutions. This fraction of class is transnational because it is connected to the world circuits of production, marketing and finance – unbind, thus, not only to the identities but also to the territories of each national State in particular – and because its interests are focused to the accumulation in global scale. It is possible to assume, therefore, that the difference between the transnational and local/national fractions evolves from the fact of the former is involved in the in the global production and in the managing of globalized circuits of accumulation that give it an objective class existence and an identity that is as special as politically distinct from the local territories and politics. As agents of world economy, this capitalist transnational class fraction has become the hegemonic fraction of capital in a
world scale. The capitalist class would be, thus, an dynamic unit of heterogeneous in which there is a dispute about the projects and the interests that will be highlighted in the process of reproduction of social relations and, more specifically, in the process of capitalist accumulation. Summarizing, there is a struggle for the leadership of the historical bloc or, in other words, for the hegemony.

**From internationalization to the transnationalization of the State**

The incorporation of globalization as an analytical category leads not only to the emergence of Cox’s concept of state internationalization but also to the development of such concept by other authors with the objective of better understand its application and real heuristic potential. Stephen Gill contributed to the understanding of this process as part of the exchangeable character of the world hegemony centered in the United States, mainly in regards to his analysis of the role of the Trilateral Commission (Gill 1990). Gill, as well as Cox, sees global restructuring of production in post-fordism lines happening in a context of structural change in the 1970. Is in this period that there is, according to Gill, a transition of the international historical bloc to the transnational liberal historical bloc.

Since the end of Second World War – especially since the end of the 1960 – there was a fast process of internationalization of production, being extreme that about 30% of OECD’s workers hired by transnational companies and a high number of other workers being dependent of transnational production and international trade to their survival (Gill 1990). Concomitant with this process there is also a significant integration of capital markets and of the exchange rate in global scale. In this context, the national governments and the workers are increasingly constrained by the resources of power and by the transnational mobility of capital (Gill and Law 1989). Is this process there is

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3 It is important to take into knowledge that the concept of fraction here is related to segments within classes that are determined by its relation with social production and with the class as a whole. The hegemonic fraction would be, thus, the fraction that was able to be the main direction and the character of production that conditions the cultural, political and social scope of the capitalist society. To further details, see: Robinson 2004 and 2005; Overbeek and van der Pijl 1993; van Apeldoorn 2001.
the mobilization of the emerging transnational fraction of the capitalist class, which begins to develop a conscience and a solidarity that are expressed, for example, in the international organizations, international financial institutions and private councils in the international relations. This fraction, therefore, become increasingly the center of an emerging transnational liberal historical bloc that has a wider leadership than the transatlantic hegemony of the previous period and a small incorporation of the labor sectors. With these questions about the transition of historical blocs, Gill has contributed to the coxian thesis of State internationalization and, beyond that, through the development of the concept of State transnationalization the author tried to, with a semantic change, raise attention to the relevance of transnational actors:

“(…) a process whereby state policies and institutional arrangements are conditioned and changed by the power and mobility of transnational fractions of capital. In the 1970s and 1980s this gave increased weight to certain parts of government, notably finance and economics ministries (…)”
(Gill 1990, 94)

This supremacy is organized in a global scope based on two fundamental processes: the new constitutionalism and the disciplinary neo-liberalism, concomitant with the diffusion of the market civilization. Disciplinary neo-liberalism would be the expression of a counter-revolution of capital in a world scale happened in 1990, which reconstitutes the State and capitalism and intensifies the social hierarchies associated with class, race and gender relations in world scale. This revolution involves specifically the extension of the processes of “convenience” and alienation based on the intensification of capital discipline in the social relations. Thus, it is a concrete form of structural and behavior power binding the structural power of capital with the “capilar power” of “panopticism” (Gill 2003). This disciplinary neo-liberalism is institutionalized through State rebuilding and international institutions, involving the imposition of new legal structures and constitutional or semi-constitutional policies, what is referred by Gill as new constitutionalism “(…) the political process of making liberalism transnational and, if possible, making the democratic liberal capitalism the only model for future
development” (Gill 2003, 131-132). Related to this project is the attempt of a global dissemination of what would be a market civilization based in a capitalist progress ideology.

The concept of State transnationalization allows us to realize the existent dialectic between territoriosity and globalization. The process of capitalism social relations creation, thus, must be understood in association with “the (exchangeable) role of the State in the social and spatial reproduction of capital” (Lacher 2006, 12). It is fundamental to have in mind the inherent contradiction, in the process of development of capitalist social relations, between spaces of accumulation and spaces of governance.

Consequently, such concept applies as an antidote to the idea of “homoefficiency of capitalism” – the assumption that the diffusion and impact of capitalism around the world would be cohesive, despite of “contradictions in the unequal development expressed trough the vary relations of capital in the different processes of State formation” (Morton 2007, 147). However, the contradictions of unequal development are expressions of class struggle which happen trough diverse spatial scales, from the local to the global scope passing necessarily by the state.

In other words, to say that “the global processes and the transformations can, and actually do, destabilize the hierarchy of scales centered in the nation State” (Sassen 2007, 24) doesn’t mean that new global scales outdo the old scales of the national level. Based on these considerations, it is realized that a more fruitful appreciation of the State transnationalization concept is important to an avoidance of not only the “territorial trap” (Agnew 2005) – and the negation of the global associated to it – but also the globalism: both perspectives suffer from a shallow ontology because they deny the global or state as a spatial scale still meaningful in the process of accumulation of capital. It helps to understand the processes of neo-liberalization, which if on the one hand present themselves through a systemic dimension, on the other have been historically expressed in the discontinue, unequal and contradictory reconstitution of the relations between global and national. In other words, the processes of neo-liberalization have, at the same time, caused the expansion of neo-liberalism around the world and intensified “the unequal development of the regulatory rules in many places, territories and scales”; to summarize, has
led to a “systemic production of geo-institutionalized differentiation” (Brenner et al. 2010, 3)

There is, therefore, the necessity of understanding how the process of capital accumulation happens through multi-scale social relations, in which the State has to be seen not as dominant figure, but as a nodal point. The geographical space is “an inseparable assemble of object and actions systems“, systems that change over time. Given that, then the “objects constituting the current geographical space are intentionally conceived to certain endings, intentionally manufactured and localized. The resultant spatial order is, thus, intentional.” (Santos 2004, 332)

Final Considerations
If, on the one hand, there is the existence of a process that has a significant impact in the form of organization of the social relation in space, on the other hand this phenomenon causes, through a process of internalization of certain processes, manners and ideologies, the reproduction of capital inside distinct States. Thus, what one may note in the emergency of globalization that it is not the end or the withdraw of the State, is the restructuring of different State forms basing on the internalization, within States, of “new configurations of social forces expressed by a class struggle among distinct fractions (national and transnational) of capital and of work” (Morton 2007, 133). One of the fundamental elements in this point is the fact that through a neo-gramscian perspective – the concept of State transnationalization – it is possible to realize how “the global can (...) constitute itself inside the national (...)” and how “the State has actually gain power because it has to execute the job of implementing necessary politics to the global corporative economy” (Sassen 2008, 63).

Therefore, such concept is of most importance in the understanding of the current global political economy once it contributes significantly to the comprehension of the process of denationalization.

It is noticeable that the neo-gramscian approaches and their articulated concepts have a significant heuristic potential to deal with the last decades transformations in the global political economy. Nevertheless, only a few has been said, from this approach, about the answers given by the middle emergence powers to those transformations. Few are the analyses of the emerging process and its relation to norms and rules of the current world order:
articulations/coalitions as BRICS and IBAS, for example; the role of some of these articulations in wider forums as the financial G20 or UN are questions that demand attention from this critical perspective.

There are certain aspects of the systemic change associated with the emergency of new powers that are frequently ignored; in special, the fact that such processes occur in a structural-historical context of the capitalist world order characterized by the deepening of the processes of capital transnationalization. Thus, even if it assumes the principle that the idea of semi-periphery was relevant when it was elaborated in the context of ASM, the processes of capital transnationalization altered significantly the role of the semi-peripheral countries in the global political economy: with changes in investment and information flows. The distinction between States based in the emphasis on resources or industry becomes harder and harder, which places the semi-periphery – as moment of equilibrium and mediation – in a increasingly fluid situation (Worth 2009).

The idea of semi-periphery is fruitful because it contributes to the understanding of the potential of change and influences that such middle-States can have in the international order without losing from sight the capital re-structural power dimension. Specially, there questions are relevant as critics to the hyperglobalist approaches that emerged since the 1990s. On its part, the concept of State transnationalization is relevant once it indicates the complexities of international insertion in a context of neoliberal globalization. Thus, it complements the idea of semi-periphery because it shows certain articulations existent between the semi-peripheral States and transnational capital, inserting classes issues in debates as well as clarifying how certain process of the global-national dialectic are structure – or, in other terms, how State remains central in the processes of denationalization.

At the same time that he presents a fruitful articulation between national and international, stating important clues to the reflection about the global, Gramsci makes an important critic to state-centrism, not visualizing the State as something on its own, as something absolute is its fetishized sense (Gramsci 2002b, 279-280, 332-333). The State is seen as a form of social relation in which methodological – and not organic – distinctions can be contrasted among the dimensions related to consensus and coercion phenomena. This
question is relevant because it open space to think the contemporary State changes, i.e., its process of denationalization articulated to the emergency of the global.

In this process a fundamental question that emerges is about the real potential of transformation presented by these middle emerging powers. The idea of State transnationalization has some explicationsary effect, but not in a conclusive way. Thus, a fundamental concept that requires a further discussion is of passive revolution, which would help to understand in which way States not only inserts in the order but also how its actions and articulations relates themselves with the current order. Therefore, an agenda to future researches about the middle emerging powers refers to the model(s) of development presented by them and in what level this(these) is(are) really alternative to the current model. This issue would demand an analysis of the civil/State complexes of the middle emerging powers and their articulations within the process of State transnationalization highlighting the relevance of these countries in the capitalist structure of production – that would point, once again, to the relevance of the concepts presented here to the understanding of middle emergence powers in the contemporary world order.
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ABSTRACT
The current article intends to present and articulate the potentiality of two approaches and, specially, of two concepts, with the aim to understand the middle emerging powers and their role in the contemporary world politics: world-system – and the idea of Semi-periphery; and neo-gramscian – and the idea of transnationalization of the State.

KEYWORDS
Transnationalization; Globalization; Political Economy; Middle Emerging Powers.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW IN BUSINESS: LEGAL CONTROL OF CORRUPTION DIRECTED TO TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

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1. Introduction
Corruption is no longer seen as a problem of underdeveloped nations, but a matter of international concern. Based on the international initiatives and exchange of experiences among countries, new strategies for control of corruption have been developed. A new approach, inspired by the “principal-client-agent” model, proposes the development of anti-corruption policies directed to the private sector. The idea is to implement mechanisms that attack the supply side of corruption to reduce its occurrence. The lack of territorial barriers for enterprises and the emergence of transnational corporations in the context of globalization represent a challenge for the implementation of anti-corruption mechanisms. This also reinforces the need for establishment of an international policy about this issue.


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This research aims to analyze the evolution of international mechanisms for control of corruption directed to transnational corporations. The focus will be on the initiatives of international organizations (OAS, OECD and UN) in the form of international treaties. The goal is to identify the existence of an international anti-corruption regime, composed of a specific legal framework, which is able to compel States to fight against corruption.

The research is exploratory in nature. It is an introduction on the subject, especially for policymakers from countries with emerging economies, like Brazil, that are not yet familiar with the study of control of corruption. It was decided to conduct a bibliographic review, using interdisciplinary sources.

The article is developed in four sections. The first part deals with the phenomenon of corruption, providing definitions, possible causes and consequences. The second part explores the relationship between the private sector and corrupt practices, focusing on the conduct of transnational corporations. The third part refers to the construction of an international anti-corruption regime. It is necessary to seek its origin, found in the U.S. anti-corruption law. In this segment are also studied efforts of international organizations in establishing an international policy to control corruption, represented by the creation of international treaties on the subject. In the last part are discussed the consequences of the existence of an international corruption regime and the Brazilian context.

2. The Phenomenon of Corruption
The World Bank (1997, 08) defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain”. The definition is broad and includes a series of behaviors. The most apparent is the practice of bribery, involving civil servants who require or request improper advantage and private agents who pay these values to have some benefit from the government. Patronage and appropriation of public resources are also included in the definition of corruption.

Transparency International (2008, 02) understands corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. There is no reference to the word “public office”. This idea allows the existence of corrupt practices involving only private actors (“private or corporate corruption”).
Researching the causes of corruption, there is a risk to get stuck in a counterproductive discussion about problems of morality and cultural determinism. In Brazil, there is the idea that corruption is inherent to the Brazilian culture, a kind of “damned inheritance”, which can only be overcome by a utopian revolution of values. However, some studies show that corruption is as old as the existence of the State, found in several periods of human history (Tanzi 1998, 559), and universally condemned (Noonan Jr. 1989). There are reported cases in several countries, regardless of economic status (Klitgaard 1994, 22-28; Rose-Ackerman 1997, 32).

A new point of view can be used to approach the problem of corruption, seeking inspiration from economic reasoning. The idea is to understand corruption as a result of constant interaction between public and private interests within the State structure. According to Rose-Ackerman (1997, 31) there are incentives for corrupt practices whenever a public authority exercises his discretion on the distribution of a benefit or a cost to the private sector. It is well known that the State has the power to buy and sell goods and services, offer concessions and distribute subsidies (benefits), as well as collect taxes, enforce regulations and require authorizations (costs). On the other hand, there is a private sector with economic power and ready to pay for benefits or to reduce the costs that were imposed. As all the activities mentioned are inherent to the functioning of a government today, creating incentives for corruption is inevitable.

The “principal-agent-client” model, proposed by Klitgaard (1994, 83), helps to understand the dynamics of corruption. The “principal” can be represented as a superior officer in public administration, the “agent” as a petty officer responsible for maintaining contact with the “client”; the “client” represents the private sector. They all have independent interests.

The “principal” responsible for implementing an anti-corruption policy in his administration should know that the “agent”, although inserted in the State structure, makes his own calculations in order to measure the profits of accepting a bribe and the probable costs to be identified and punished. In the same way, the “client” will be compelled to try to corrupt the “agent” in order to obtain benefits or reduce costs, unless he is able to glimpse the possibility of punishment. As may be seen, corruption is a “crime of calculation”, a matter of
opportunity. “People will tend to engage in corruption when the risks are low, the penalties mild, and the rewards great” (Klitgaard et al. 2000, 27).

An extensive survey of literature suggests that corruption causes serious economic and social damage, which justifies the establishment of policies for its control. Below are enrolled the principal negative consequences of corruption:

a) Fiscal controls tainted by corruption facilitate tax evasion, causing losses to the government budget (Mauro 1997, 87).

b) In a corrupt environment, the government can give priority to public works of little benefit to the general population rather than investments in education and health (Shleifer and Vishny 1993, 616).

c) Without strong deterrents to corruption, the competition to take advantage of the benefits offered by the government will be influenced by the conduct of the least scrupulous participants (Heimann 1997, 148). In a bidding process, the one that offers the best quality or price for his service will not win, the chosen will be the one who maintains an unlawful relationship with the government.

d) Research conducted by Wei (2000); and Teixeira and Grande (2011) indicates that the perception of corruption in a country may negatively impact on its ability to attract foreign direct investment, because of the high cost to maintain enterprises in an environment of corruption. This situation is especially troublesome for developing countries, which need foreign capital for technology transfer, acquisition of know-how and realization of large infrastructure projects (Sornarajah 2010, 48).

3. Corrupt Practices and Transnational Corporations

Anti-corruption policies are usually concentrated in the role of the “agent”, with the monitoring of their conduct and application of severe penalties for the corrupt. Despite the undeniable importance of these mechanisms, in recent years a more comprehensive approach has been more widely adopted. This approach includes the role of the “client” in the development of control for corruption.

Milton Friedman (1970) once said that the “only social responsibility of business is to increase its profits”. This assertion reflects the economic rationale that drives the enterprises, but does not correspond to today's societal
expectations over private sector’s behavior. Nowadays, the concept of governance prevails: the problems of society shall not be administered only by the State, but also by international organizations and private actors (such as individuals, nongovernmental organizations and corporations) (Comissão sobre Governança Global 1995, 02). In a governance environment, companies are responsible for the impact that their “activities may have on the social, political, economic and developmental aspects of society” (Adeyeye 2011, 149).

In this context, the responsibility for the control of corrupt practices is not only from the State but shared with the business. It creates the idea that the private sector may be the main responsible for providing fuel for the machinery of corruption (Transparency International 2008, 02).

It is up to the government to create a system of incentives and punishments to make corruption less attractive to corporations. The development of “national anti-corruption law” focused on business practices can be an important mechanism for this purpose.

It is not, however, an easy task. One of the challenges is related to the nature of contemporary business structures. While the mechanisms of State control are limited to the national territory, corporate activities transcend borders in the figure of “multinational” or “transnational corporations”, enterprises that organize their activities in more than one country. According to data from 2009-2010, it was estimated that there are 82,000 transnational corporations (TNCs) worldwide, with 810,000 foreign affiliates (UNCTAD 2009, xxi). They are responsible for more than a quarter of gross world product and more than a third of exports (UNCTAD 2011, 24). Studies indicate that there are TNCs with gross domestic product larger than many nations (Grauwwe and Camerman 2003, 27).

TNCs participation in corruption schemes is very common. This connection has been justified for years as necessary to conduct business in other

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3TNCs are not limited to import and export operations, they realize long term investments abroad (‘foreign direct investment’). According to World Bank, foreign direct investment are 'the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor'. It is divided into “greenfield investment”, when the foreign investor opens a new venture, and “cross-border merger and acquisitions”, when the investor buys or makes merging with existing enterprise.
countries, especially the “undeveloped”, where there would be a culture of corruption. Until recently, European countries allowed corporate tax deductions for overseas bribes (Naim et al. 1997, 13). This situation benefited the corrupt corporations at the expense of honest companies in gaining access to foreign markets, while they helped in maintaining highly corrupt governments. In the face of this scenario, it is necessary to build an international regime of corruption control with a focus on private sector. The goal is to create a compromise between countries in confronting the problem through the exchange of experiences and the harmonization of national laws, preventing the existence of zones of impunity. The focus on TNCs can make a difference. According to Naim et al. (1997, p. 22-23), it is easier to prevent corruption in TNCs than imposing complex institutional reforms in several developing countries. The attack on the supply side of corruption makes it more difficult to corrupt agents to reach their objectives. Another important aspect is the possibility of these TNCs disseminate their values around the world among its business partners, which will be compelled to adopt anti-corruption practices at the risk they will not be able to do business with ethical companies in the future.

4. The International Anti-Corruption Regime

4.1. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)

The United States was the first country to be concerned about the connection between TNCs and the phenomenon of corruption.

The political context of the country in the 70s was decisive. After the Watergate scandal, which President Nixon was accused of using his power to illegally spy on political opponents, a series of investigations was conducted by the U.S. Senate to find irregularities in the government. While investigating the financing of political campaigns, it was discovered the existence of irregular funds maintained by U.S. TNCs for the purpose of bribing foreign governments to ensure lucrative business in these countries. In collaboration with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the agency responsible for regulating the stock market in the U.S., more than five hundred U.S. companies
have admitted paying the equivalent of 300 million dollars in bribes to foreign officials (Biegelman and Biegelman 2010, 10).

Despite the existence of a solid set of norms that prohibit bribery of national public servants in the United States, there was nothing in the U.S. law about the bribery of foreign public officer. Inspired by the “wave of moralizing” it was sanctioned in 1977 by President Jimmy Carter, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), law that prohibited the payment of bribes to foreign officials in order to establish lucrative business relationships. At the time, the President made the following statement: “bribery is ethically repugnant and competitively unnecessary. Corrupt practices between corporations and public officials overseas undermine the integrity and stability of governments and harm our relations with other countries” (Koehler 2010, 913).

The FCPA is an U.S. law with extraterritorial enforcement, aiming to prevent and punish the use of bribery abroad by corporations. The legislation applies not only to U.S. companies, but also to their subsidiaries operating in foreign countries, joint ventures, and even foreign companies with operations or mere registration in the U.S., as well as companies that trade on the stock exchange⁴.

The law provides preventive and repressive measures. The supervision of the application is made by the SEC and the Department of Justice (DOJ). The subjects of the FCPA are required to keep detailed records of all financial and commercial transactions and carry out internal and external audits periodically. Penalties for those violating the FCPA may be of a civil (such as fines and prohibition from contracting with public administration) or criminal nature (imprisonment for executives and employees).

The government maintains the “whistleblower bounty program”, giving rewards for whistleblowers that indicate violations of the FCPA. A curious fact is that the FCPA cases are rarely decided by a U.S. Court: the tendency is to sign agreements with regulators.

The impact of the FCPA in the activities of companies is a matter of disagreement in the U.S. Part of the business community believes that the

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⁴ In 1975, only 2.12% of companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) were foreigners. In 2005, the percentage was 37%. All are subject to the FCPA (Tafara and Peterson 2007, 34).
legislation created a competitive disadvantage for U.S. companies compared to companies from countries where such corruption is allowed. Unable to bribe, the companies would soon lose markets, bringing consequences for the U.S. economy (Naim et al. 1997, 17-19). On the other hand, there is the argument that reducing corruption helps maintain an environment of equal conditions for competitiveness abroad (“level playing field”) between U.S. companies and their partners. The weight of the U.S. economy and the extraterritorial nature of FCPA fulfill an important role in the dissemination of corporate governance around the world.

4.2. International Anti-Corruption Treaties

With the implementation of the FCPA, the U.S. government started to press for the internationalization of the fight against corruption and the adoption by countries of similar law. Thus, it would overcome the discrepancies between the regulatory conditions for U.S. companies and from other countries, which would be bound by the same international anti-corruption regime. In the words of Carr and Outhwaite (2008, 07):

“The U.S recognized that bribery of foreign public officials was not simply a U.S problem but a universal one. In aggressively promoting the adoption of similar legislation in other industrialized countries the U.S sought to ensure a level playing field for competing businesses and to increase market integrity and stability”.

The U.S. strategy was to take the issue for discussion in international forums. In 1975, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) condemned the corruption perpetrated by transnational corporations. The following year, it was the turn of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). France, Germany and the United Kingdom were opponents of the initiative, pointing out that the fight against corruption should be directed solely to the actions of public servants. The FCPA was accused of being an illegal exercise of extraterritoriality, and a treaty on these lines would be the imposition of an international criminal code, infringing State sovereignty (Naim et al. 1997, p. 20).
In the 90s, the negotiations for an international anti-corruption agenda continued. In 1993, the Clinton administration placed as a priority in its trade policy the development of an international anti-corruption treaty. The American victory was not caused by its ability to negotiate, but because of the headlines from newspapers. The period was marked by a series of investigations involving misconduct of European (most notably Germany, France and Italy) and Asian politics, so that the defence of any form of corruption would not be forgiven by the international public opinion.

At this point, it was possible to glimpse the establishment of an international treaty. The international institution initially chosen for the implementation of this project was the OECD, which discusses issues involving development, democracy and free markets. It is composed traditionally by developed countries (and some developing) and represents the main competitors of U.S. for business opportunities abroad5.

In 1994, the OECD Council has met to issue the following statement: “bribery is a widespread phenomenon in international business transactions, including trade and investment, raising serious moral and political concerns and distorting international competitive condition”. The document indicates that the responsibility in confronting corruption in international transactions is shared by all countries. Thus, calls upon Member States to take necessary measures to combat the phenomenon, through reforms of its domestic law.

The discussions about the resolution were responsible for triggering a series of other international initiatives. Regionally, there were the first meetings of the Council of Europe and the Organization of American States (OAS) to address the problem of corruption. Meanwhile, the UN intensified its discussions on the subject.

At the OAS, the “Inter-American Convention against Corruption” was created. It was signed in 1996 and became effective in 1997. Provides that

5 Today, the organization has 34 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. Due to the current configuration of the global economy, the organization maintains a strong channel of communication with Russia, China, India, South Africa, Indonesia and Brazil.
States Parties shall prohibit the offering of bribes to domestic public officials (article VI) and foreign officials (article VIII). Clearly influenced by the FCPA, the regional instrument made history by being the first to deal, albeit briefly, with bribery carried out by transnational corporations.

In the text of the treaty can be highlighted the protection of whistleblowers (article III.8), the establishment of a governmental agency for corruption control (article III.9) and the obligation to maintain detailed accounting records by companies to facilitate detection of corruption (article III.10).

The main flaw of the treaty is the absence of mechanisms to evaluate compliance. Evaluation mechanisms were only implemented in 2003 and still require further development (Webb 2005, 194).

In December of 1997, the “OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions” was finally signed. Currently, the participating States are OECD members plus Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, South Africa and Russia. The workgroup about bribery is also integrated by China, Peru, Indonesia, Malaysia and Colombia, which may sign the Convention in the future. It entered into force in 1999.

The biggest difference compared to the document OAS Convention is its global reach. Like the FCPA, its source of inspiration, the OECD Convention deals only with bribery involving foreign public officials, a situation related to international business. The strategy is to establish a political and legal commitment between the signatory States to modify national law in order to prohibit corrupt practices harmful to transnational economic relations (article 1.1).

It is observed that the list of signatories is composed of developed and developing countries that account for 90% of foreign direct investment, 2/3 of the international trade and 75% of transnational companies (OECD 2011a, 01). The objective of the treaty is the prevention and punishment of corrupt practices by bribe payers, it is understood that the attack on the main financial source of corruption would cause its “starvation”. The prohibition of the use of corruption in international business represents an attempt to “level the playing field” of economic forces in a context of global free market, the main United States’ goal in the internationalization of corruption control.
The OECD Convention adopts a style that is also present in other anti-corruption treaties: the international instruments are unable to automatically prohibit corrupt conduct, even in the existence of the ratification process. It is necessary that Member States create their own national laws in order to criminalize such conduct and implement its control mechanisms.

Thus, the international legal instrument merely presents “templates” that can be copied by the signatory States, similar to a “soft law”. If the legislative procedure is not performed, such clause of the treaty is not applied. While the domestic regulations are not created, other states may press for the signatory countries to take action, through monitoring mechanisms.

The Convention requires that the attribution of the conduct of bribery a foreign public official to be extended to legal persons (article 2). There is also a requirement for maintaining detailed accounting records, auditing systems and the dissemination of companies' financial statements (article 8.1).

According to the treaty, criminal, civil or administrative penalties must be implemented for the wrongdoers. The OECD exemplifies some types of non-criminal penalties: exclusion from access to public resources, the temporary prohibition from participating in bidding, and the prohibition on practicing certain commercial activities (OCDE 2011b, 16).

The mechanism of monitoring and evaluating implementation of the OECD Convention is one of its major highlights, due to its degree of accuracy, detail and rigidity. Currently the process is composed of three phases and conducted by a working group composed of teams of experts from Member States.

The first phase analyzes whether the country has implemented national anti-corruption law in accordance with the parameters of the OECD Convention. For this, the State responds questionnaires and submits its legislation and legal texts for evaluation. In the second phase, the effectiveness of the law is evaluated. To do so, visits to the country are scheduled and meetings are conducted with social actors in various segments such as government, chambers of commerce, development agencies, business and civil society. The reports produced by the experts are extremely detailed. They evaluate the changes made in national legislation, statistics from criminal prosecution, public awareness, details of sanctions and degree of international
cooperation (Carr and Outhwaite 2008, 08; Webb 2005, 197). The third phase, recently implemented, consists of periodic evaluations carried out in order to observe the evolution of the national anti-corruption mechanisms.

After signing the OECD treaty, the institution began to issue recommendations in order to detail the obligations. It is the use of “soft law” to avoid an exhausting and complicated treaty reform. It has created a complementary framework to the Convention of great importance, since the parameters set out in these recommendations are being used by the OECD in the evaluation of compliance with the treaty.

Member States are recommended to end the tax deductibility of bribes, for too long accepted in industrialized countries. Another document recommends that countries monitor the spread of bribes to foreign officials in export operations, especially those assisted by programs of official credits and government funding agencies. Countries should also maintain accessible channels for submitting complaints to the competent authorities and to protect whistleblowers.

Recommendations also deal with the need to set up a culture of transparency in business, in order to prevent and detect cases of transnational corruption. In addition to the supervision of the accounting records mentioned in the Convention, OECD recommends the establishment of a program of “internal controls, ethics and compliance”, based on a “best practices guidelines” and the maintaining a system of independent external audit. Governments may require the maintenance of compliance mechanisms to participate in public procurement (concessions, bidding) or access to funding programs and public credit.

After the OECD initiative, several regional anti-corruption treaties were created. These efforts culminated in the creation of a new treaty with

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global reach. In 2003, it was signed in Merida at the UN Convention against Corruption. It entered into force in 2005.

The main difference of the UN Convention, in relation to the OECD Convention, is the imposition of the prohibition of practice of bribery involving not only the foreign official (article 16) and also the national official (article 15). The treaty is directed to all countries, unlike the OECD, which targets the supply side of the bribery. The UN treaty has been ratified by 159 countries. The international treaty also requires that the conduct of corruption is also attributed to legal persons (article 26). Regarding preventive mechanisms applied to companies, the treaty establishes audits and control systems and audits (article 12.1); maintenance of books and disclosure of commercial financial statements (article 12.3); dissemination of codes of conduct (article 12.2 ‘a’); and prevention of conflicts of interest (article 12.2 ‘a’). The treaty also states that should be guaranteed protection to whistleblowers (article 33). Evaluation mechanisms were not implemented until 2009, and they still require further development.

Because of the range of the theme (dealing with all types of corruption) and geography (universal), Carr (2007, 26.) considers the possibility that the countries denounce the treaties and focus all their efforts in the UN initiative. Although it is simpler to centralize the international anti-corruption policies in a single treaty, it should not discard the role of the OECD, which develops an intense work on the detailing and updating of anti-corruption mechanisms through soft law. Also, the OECD treaty provides an evaluation mechanism more developed than the UN. Thanks to the pressures made by this evaluation procedure, several countries have reformed their anti-corruption law. The OECD's official position is that both treaties are complementary (2011b, 46). It is understood that the pluralism of legal sources, inherent to international law, is a positive aspect because it allows the multiplicity of experiences.

5. The regulatory race to the top and the Brazilian case
As a result of massive linking to different international legal instruments and the international awareness of the damage that corruption causes in the world economic system, the signatory States promoted national legal reforms in order
to restrain the practice of corruption in international business. In this step, the international treaties play an important role, because they spread successful experiences from many countries and establish mechanisms for mutual evaluation. It brings dynamism to the legal instrument, because establishes a forum for dialogue between the various national regulators, while compelling States to fulfill the treaty, forcing the adoption of practical measures.

The result was the occurrence of the anti-corruption phenomenon called “regulatory race to the top”, which was extremely beneficial for the international community. Today, most major economies have reformed their legislation to prohibit bribery in international business. Among them are the U.S. legislation (FCPA), obviously, and the reforms that occurred in Germany (1998), France (2000 and 2007), Japan (2005) and the United Kingdom (UK Bribery Act 2010). Brazil, Russia, China and India are in the process of adapting their legal framework.

The first cases of application of the international anti-corruption, some involving multiple jurisdictions, have been reported. According to OECD data, since the entry into force of the treaty have been punished more than 290 companies in 13 countries (OECD 2011a, 01-02). Two famous cases demonstrate the strength of the regulatory regime.

In 2008, the U.S. DOJ announced a lawsuit against Siemens, the giant German technology company. The company was subject to the FCPA because they had issued shares on the New York Stock Exchange. Investigations showed that the company had paid the equivalent of 1.4 billion dollars in bribes in several countries. In order not to suffer a more severe punishment, Siemens confessed the irregularities and agreed to pay a large fine to the U.S. and German governments to suspend the practice (Koehler 2010, 991-993). Since then, the company sponsors academic projects aimed at the dissemination of ethical principles in business.

The other known case occurred in 2010, with BAE Systems, from United Kingdom's defense industry. The company was accused by the government (DOJ / SEC) and UK (Serious Fraud Office) for the use of corrupt practices to win contracts for the sale of weapons to foreign governments. Its main partners were Saudi Arabia, Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. The case has not yet been resolved (Koehler 2010, 993-996).
The inclusion of Brazil in the international anti-corruption regime is a challenge, deserving a detailed study. This is a country with a fast economic ascension, being considered as the seventh largest economy and the fifth country to receive more foreign direct investment. On the other hand, the country is perceived to be highly corrupt.7

The country ratified the three international treaties on the subject (OAS, UN and OECD) and currently prohibits the practice of corruption in international business under domestic law. However, the implementation of anti-corruption mechanisms has been considered to be ineffective in certain points of OECD evaluations. The main criticisms are the lack of an effective legal framework to punish companies linked to corruption; absence of a program for the protection of whistleblowers; and need for further development of accounting regulations, internal control and external audit in order to detect foreign bribery.

It is unclear if noncompliance of the international anti-corruption regime by an emerging country (such as Brazil) can cause economic loss, or if is it just a matter of international politics. Evidence points to the first option.

First, control of corruption in Brazilian companies that operate in the country helps the country to do business with foreign companies that want to invest in Brazil. The investing companies will likely come from countries with an anti-corruption regime with extraterritorial application. Therefore, the perception that Brazilian partners maintain an illicit relationship with their government can frustrate business. In this context, it has become usual practice for foreign investors to conduct complex audits before mergers, acquisitions or joint ventures with Brazilian enterprises, in order to ensure the absence of corrupt practice and avoid a possible penalty of their home state.

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7 In the latest report of Transparency International (Corruption Perceptions Index 2011), Brazil received the grade 3.8. It has the No. 73 position among 182 countries evaluated. This is a 'perception' of corruption: as the world community views the problem in that country. The ranking is developed through interviews conducted by respectable institutions, reflecting the views of observers around the world. They are consulted experts, risk analysts and businessmen, including people who live and work in the countries evaluated.
Two academic studies confirm the argument. Weitzel and Berns (2006, 01), in an analysis of almost 5,000 mergers and acquisitions involving foreign direct investment, found that environments with high levels of corruption reduce the rating of national companies, making them less attractive to investors. By conducting an empirical study, Cuervo-Cazurra (2008, 02) found that investor countries that have implemented the OECD Convention reduced their foreign direct investment in corrupt States after their home countries passed laws against foreign bribery.

Second, the incentive to create mechanisms for preventive control of corruption (compliance) in Brazilian transnational companies helps to prevent these enterprises from punishment abroad. The regulatory race made the international anti-corruption regime omnipresent. In some jurisdictions, such as the U.S., the mere registration of shares on its stock exchange has characterized the submission of its anti-corruption law. Thus, Brazilian companies that wish to compete in foreign markets must invest in preventing corruption, or will suffer punishment at the place where they intend to do business. The Brazilian government incentives may help in the dissemination of anti-corruption culture among the national companies, preventing major problems in the future.

6. Conclusion
From this initial study, some partial conclusions can be made. The existence of corruption is the result of interaction between public and private interests. It is not just a moral issue but a matter of opportunity. A subject will act corruptly when the benefits from corruption outweigh the loss of a possible punishment. The State has to interfere in this process, creating disadvantages for corrupt practices.

The use of the model “principal-agent-client” (Klitgaard) is an interesting proposal for the development of anti-corruption policies. It is imperative to develop strategies designed to control the conduct of the “client”, the private sector, which is primarily responsible for fueling the corruption. In this context, cannot be forgotten the role of “transnational corporations”. The implementation of anti-corruption mechanisms focused on these companies may be the best way to establish an international control of corruption, given the
importance that these entities have in the contemporary economy and the range of their activities in the world scenario.

It is understood that the construction of an international anti-corruption framework is required because it formalizes a compromise between countries in confronting the problem. The exchange of experiences and harmonization of national law prevent the formation of zones of impunity. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) emerged in a very particular situation of American politics, but its importance in developing of new global strategies for control of corruption must be recognized. International anti-corruption treaties are clearly inspired by the American experience, which would justify further study of the FCPA.

The existence of an “international anti-corruption regime”, composed of a specific legal framework, was recognized. It is observed that these international treaties do not have the power to automatically implement anti-corruption mechanisms, requiring legislative reforms in the States Parties. In order to compel States to take action, international organizations maintain evaluation systems that verify compliance with the treaties. As a result, there is a “regulatory race to the top” of anti-corruption standards, beneficial to the entire international community.

With the omnipresence of corruption control in the world, a good option for emerging countries like Brazil is implementing anticorruption measures provided in international norms. Besides the obvious economic and social benefits that the decrease in corruption causes, such as increased efficiency in public spending and “level playing field” for competitiveness, adherence to the legal framework is necessary also to avoid penalties imposed by an international community committed to anti-corruption policy. Control of corruption in Brazilian companies (or companies of other emerging countries) can help to do business with foreign companies that want to invest in the country. It is also important to mention that the implementation of anti-corruption mechanisms is necessary to protect Brazilian transnational companies that operate abroad from possible punishment in the locations where they develop their enterprise.
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ABSTRACT
Lately, corruption has become a matter of international concern. A new approach proposes the development of anti-corruption policies directed to the private sector, especially transnational corporations. The idea is to implement mechanisms that attack the supply side of corruption. This research aims to analyze the evolution of international mechanisms for control of corruption directed to transnational corporations. The focus will be on the international treaties. The goal is to identify the existence of an international anti-corruption regime. This research is exploratory in nature. It is an introduction to the subject, especially for policymakers from countries with emerging economies that are not yet familiar with the study on the subject. It was decided to conduct a bibliographic review, using interdisciplinary sources. Some preliminary conclusions were reached. States must intervene in this process by creating disincentives for the realization of corrupt practices by the business sector, especially in relation to transnational corporations. International treaties do not have the power to automatically implement anti-corruption mechanisms, requiring legislative reforms on the part of the States Parties. In this context, the evaluation systems play an important role in compelling nations to take action. As a result, there is a “regulatory race to the top” of anti-corruption norms, extremely beneficial for the international community. With the omnipresence of the corruption control in the world, a good alternative for emerging economies, like Brazil, is implementing anti-corruption measures provided by international law; otherwise they may suffer losses in their business activities.

KEYWORDS
Corruption; Transnational Corporations; International Relations; International Law.

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NERINT
The Brazilian Center for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) was the first center dedicated exclusively to the study and research in international relations in Southern Brazil. It was established in 1999 at the Latin American Institute for Advanced Studies (ILEA), within the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Porto Alegre (known for hosting the World Social Forum), Brazil. Its main goal has always been the study of main transformations within the post-Cold War international system through an innovative and argumentative perspective. Also, NERINT has always sought ways to contribute to the discussion of a renewed national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options to consolidate an autonomous international presence for the country from the perspective of the developing world.

Brazil’s choice of an “active, affirmative, and proactive diplomacy” at the beginning of the 21st century has converged with projections and studies put forward over numerous seminars and publications organized by NERINT (2 collections amounting to 24 published volumes). Exploratory studies on the new areas of active engagement by developing countries have proven themselves correct and have met remarkable development over the years. Over the years, cooperation with States, business, academic, and social institutions has been intensified. Similar developments have also been made through direct contact with centers in Latin American, African, and Asian centers, not to mention the growing interactions with previous partners from Europe and North America.

Among the positive outcomes that are a direct consequence of this new reality are the implementation of an undergraduate degree on International Relations (2004) and a graduate level program, the International Strategic Studies Doctoral Program (2010); and the launching of two journals – the bimonthly Conjuntura Austral and the biannual and bilingual Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations. Thus, besides ongoing research on
developing countries, NERINT is also the birthplace of undergraduate and graduate programs, not to mention its intense editorial activities.

**PPGEEI**

The International Strategic Studies Doctoral Program (PPGEEI) started in 2010/2011, offering a Masters and a Doctorate degrees both supported by qualified professors and researchers with international experience. It is the result of several developments on research and education at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and its roots can be traced to the Brazilian Center of Strategy and International Relations (NERINT), a center established in 1999 which conducts research, seminars, and edits two journals. Other main partners are the Center for Studies on Technology, Industry, and Labor (NETIT/FCE) and the Center for International Government Studies (CEGOV), located at the Latin American Institute for Advanced Studies (ILEA/UFRGS). In 2004, an undergraduate degree in International Relations was created at the Faculty of Economics/UFRGS; in 2005 came the Center for Studies on Brazil-South Africa (CESUL), recently renamed as Brazilian Centre for African Studies (2012). All those actions together enabled the rise of an independent line of thinking propped by specialized bibliography.

The research tradition that gave rise to PPGEEI was based on a prospective analysis of the trends of the 1990s. The remarkable expansion of Brazilian diplomacy and economics from the beginning of the century confirmed the perspective adopted, which allowed the intense cooperation with the diplomatic and international economic organizations in Brazil. The course is already a reference in the strategic analysis of the integration of emerging powers in international and South-South relations.

The Program’s vision emphasizes strategic, theoretical and applied methods, always relying on rigorous scientific and academic principles to do so. For this reason, it has been approached by students from all over Brazil and several other countries and it has established partnerships in all continents. Thus, the Graduate Program in International Strategic Studies is a program focused on understanding the rapid changes within the international system. Alongside NERINT, it publishes two journals: *Conjuntura Austral* (bimonthly)
Partners

and *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* (bimonthly and bilingual).

PPGEEI has three research lines:

- **International Political Economy**
  It focuses on the international insertion of the Brazilian economy and other major developing countries in South America, Asia and Africa; discusses the characteristics and effects of globalization; and develops comparative and sector studies concerned with the effects of the internationalization of companies and productive sectors. Special attention is paid to international financial crises and its effects in Brazil and other countries of the South.

- **Foreign Policy and Regional Integration**
  It emphasizes the analysis of the process of formation, implementation and evaluation of foreign policy. It seeks to confront patterns of international integration of strategic countries of South America, Africa and Asia, considering institutional patterns, trade policy structures of intermediation of interests, and agents of civil society in the South-South axis of contemporary international relations.

- **Technology, State and International Security**
  It discusses the leading security issues in the international system from a perspective that takes into account the most powerful states at the global level, but which introduces in a systematic way the problem of the regional balances of power, the South-South axis, the existence of regional security complexes and the impact of information technology in the Digital Age.

**BRAZILIAN CENTRE FOR AFRICAN STUDIES (CEBRAFRICA)**
The Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) has its origins in Brazil-South Africa Studies Centre (CESUL), a program established in 2005 through an association between the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG), of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its research activities are developed within the
Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT), located in the Latin American Institute for Advanced Studies (ILEA) of UFRGS.

In March 2012, CESUL was expanded into CEBRAFRICA in order to cover the whole of Africa. At the same time, the South Africa series, which published five books, was transformed into the African Series, with new titles on the way. The center’s main objectives remain the same as before: to conduct research, to support the development of memoirs, thesis and undergraduate memoirs, to congregate research groups on Africa, to organize seminars, to promote student and professor exchanges with other institutions, to establish research networks and joint projects with African and Africanist institutions, to publish national and translated works on the field, and to expand the specialized library made available by FUNAG.

The numerous research themes seek to increased knowledge of the African continent and its relations to Brazil on the following topics: International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations, and Schools of Thought. CEBRAFRICA counts among its partners renowned institutions from Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Cape Verde, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Portugal, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, India, and China. Current researches focus on “Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian Presence in Africa”, “Africa in South-South Cooperation”, African Conflicts”, Integration and Development in Africa”, “African Relations with Great Powers”, and “Inter-African Relations).
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5. The bibliography must follow the rules of the Chicago system (Author, date), specifying the used literature at the end of the text;
6. Contributions must be original and unpublished and can be submitted in Portuguese, English or Spanish;
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10. Book reviews must contain the complete data and the ISBN of the analyzed work;
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As part of the submission process, authors are required to check off their submission's compliance with all of the following items, and submissions may be returned to authors that do not adhere to these guidelines.

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4. The text must be single-spaced; Times New Roman typeface 12 pt must be used for the body of the text; italic is to be used instead of underline (except in URL addresses); Figures and Tables must be embedded in the text.
5. The text must follow patterns of style and bibliographical requirements described in Author Guidelines, in the section “About the Journal”.
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