

PRESENTATION: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF BRAZIL

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The students of foreign policy of Brazil moved from the old diplomatic history, through the history of foreign policy, to reach the international insertion of the country. The concept of insertion involves three components: the diplomatic negotiation, the foreign policy which adds values and national interests to the former and the movement of non-state actors who act externally in pursuit of specific interests. From this concept of integration, the paradigmatic analysis distinguishes four historical impulses, called paradigms, to constrain the functionality of foreign policy, namely: the primary-exports model from Independence to 1930; the developmental model, from 1930 to 1989; the neoliberalism of the 1990s; and what we call the Logistic State, in the 21st century.

When the University enters the areas of teaching and research Brazilian foreign relations, since the 1970s, the studies multiplied, hitherto reserved primarily to the question of the diplomatic corps. Although it is possible to do so, scholars rarely isolate, in their analysis, one of the three components of insertion. This is because, in recent decades, proved to be clear and understandable not only the close links between diplomacy, foreign policy and foreign relations, but also the rise of society and the new relationship between society and State.

The development to be promoted submits itself to the national impulse since the rise of Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s. The development would be guided

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via industrialization as the long-term ratio, but was designed differently, by the leaders over time, as to the mechanisms, steps, ways to relate internal and external spheres, and the maturity of the process. The liberals of all decades have understood development, primarily, as an external responsibility of the more advanced nations, who would meet the national plan with the capital, enterprises and technologies. Nationalists of all time conceived it, primarily, as internal responsibility, to be carried out through own inputs. The followers of the Dependent and those of the Independent theories divided, thus, the opinion into two branches, which fought for power, i.e., the State.

Drawing strength from these two groups, the liberal and the autonomist, Brazil's national composition resulted balanced, liberal and national, open and autonomous, tied to the world and to its own path. Diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations are increasingly conditioning one another, over the decades, in such a way that the insertion resulted remarkably balanced.

One of the first requirements of this model would be the autonomy of foreign policy, without which the development strategy would escape from national control. Designed as a decision-making autonomy, as far back as the 1930s, foreign policy was based, however, on cooperation with foreign countries and the non-confrontation. Obviously, liberals tended to the decisive subservience and the dependent insertion, as much as the nationalists were prone to confrontation and isolation. However, balance prevailed as a guideline over time. In short, the political calculation would have to include the reciprocity of benefits of the insertion when considering one's own interests and those of the others.

The Brazilian model of integration, based on this vision of international relations in which nations cooperate with one another, certainly does not rule out the inevitable clash of interests whose overcoming, by reconciliation or not, is a duty of diplomatic negotiation. If the management of the link between the distinct national and international interests, particularly the economic ones, has been historically difficult in the Brazilian experience, even harder the attempt to reconcile values among nations, based on Brazil's own vision of the world, should be. West, socialism, capitalism, clash of civilizations, among other elements, interfered their ideological and cultural dimensions in thinking and decision-making process as inputs and as national challenges. Sometimes such

inputs deepened the rift between liberals and independists, as witnessed in the controversy between intellectuals and rulers in the 1960s, a debate that arose again at the turn of the millennium, at the time of the neo-liberal experience.

Ethnically heterogeneous and culturally plural, the national identity of Brazil, as a nation with enormous social inequalities and ambitious of development, served as the source of external conduct. The relationship between national identity and international insertion rendered the coexistence of differences and pacifism as values and goods in their own right. However, managing values in international politics has proved itself even more troublesome than managing material interests or security. The global scene is made up of the imposition of its own values, which are understood as systemic bargains by governments and societies in which distinct national identities are constituted.

The foreign policy of Brazil moves, as mentioned before, toward its international insertion maturity. Thus, the 21st century is an advanced point of arrival of a new country, searching its own destiny. What are the traits of the Brazilian model of international insertion in the 21st century?

Nothing of neo-developmentalism is observed in the Brazil of the 21st century if we consider as paradigm the Argentinian experience, which is mainly composed of a return of the exacerbated deviations of developmentalism: re-nationalization, protectionism, monetary instability, and economic and financial isolation. The Latin America of the 21st century does not realize the consensus of a paradigm, as it had done from the independence until 2000. The international rise of Brazil in the 21st century detaches itself from its neighbors and that is precisely due to its progress to systemic maturity, which better incorporates the benefits of development, adds to it the convenient interdependence of liberalism, but extends the autonomy inherent to the strategic calculus of foreign policy, all surrounded by balance.

The key determinant of international insertion of Brazil in the 21st century is the emergence of society. Over six decades, it was up the State to conceive and dictate to a society, which was almost inert to the nature and requirements of national interests, as well as the values of identity, and drag this society towards development. The neoliberal paradigm of the 1990s, weakening the State and using external subservience, induced beneficial result

to nation building. The 21st century matures this evolution, which draws strength from the past, given that various trends in designing and implementing the policy have always been present in the national tradition. Thus emerges the society, with organized segments, active leaders, specific interests to perform, and willing to move.

The functionality of Brazilian foreign policy in the 21st century is changed in its essence. A new pattern of relationship is established between State and society, never before having been cultivated with such intensity. The connection involves the three components of international insertion: diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations. The State transfers power and responsibility to non-governmental actors to promote the development and concedes part of the strategic decision in foreign policy.

At the time of developmentalism, primarily the State had the command of diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations. At the time of neoliberalism, this command was delivered to market forces. In the 21st century, the innovation is based on bringing society into the State, whose functionality is to administer, from the top, the interests of the segments that act externally, which are sometimes conflicting interests, and aggregate them into the greater national interest. This new pattern is called the Logistic State, since it is no longer the Business State, nor the Neglect State, but only the driver of the society in pursuit of external opportunities or even inventor of opportunities, besides being the responsible for the harmonization of its segments.

The diplomatic conduct during the Logistic State is guided by the principles of reciprocity of benefits among nations in the field of multilateral negotiations and by the strengthening of bilateral partnerships, since these partnerships also extend the interests and national power. Among the stable and appreciated, in economic, political and geopolitical terms, partnerships of Brazil, we can cite: England, the United States, Argentina, Germany, Italy, France, Japan, China, Portugal, Spain, among others, which include the entire neighboring area of Brazil.

The regional integration becomes, in the 21st century, an instrument of support to Brazilian globalist call. This is accomplished through the influence on the international scene in order to transform the rules of order and through more robust links of global interdependence, particularly through the outward expansion of Brazilian companies. The integration preserves, however, as

perennial, the function to maintain and cultivate the climate of political understanding in South America, perhaps in Latin America, since its neighbors constitute a strategic reserve needed for the global goal to be achieved.

In three areas of external action, the evolution to the systemic maturity produces the best effects. On the one hand, regional integration builds the environment of political understanding and cordial relations, although, given the diversity of national designs and models of integration in the region, it eventually sacrifices the Brazilian project of productive integration, which would come alongside the country's economic internationalization. Secondly, the strengthening of ties with emerging countries, among which Brazil finds itself. The calculation of benefits contaminates rulers and social leaders. Emerging countries are more likely, when compared with the countries of the old advanced capitalist core, to consider the reciprocity of benefits in the rules that compose the international order; they are more likely to overcome asymmetries among the nations; and, finally, they share the concept of international security that replaces the strategy of violence, implemented by NATO in the Second World War, with the strategy of conciliatory negotiation in face of conflicts.

The most tangible result of the evolution to maturity is, however, found in the internationalization of the Brazilian economy. A shy movement until around 2005, it is subsequently reinforces and geographically shifts: from South America to North America, to Africa and Europe, Brazilian capitals and companies move and establish economic interdependence in conditions of systemic operation.

The efficiency limits of the Brazilian model of international insertion are created, primarily, internally, in the form of obstacles to the achievement of results. In the security area, there are the abandonment of the military autonomy project conceived in the 1970s and the neglect of the defense industry. In the field of utilization of internal and external investments, the greatest obstacles put on evolution to maturity abound: excessive tax burden, high interest rates, bloated bureaucracy and poor infrastructure. In the sphere of the relationship between State and society, the biggest obstacle is the low technological innovation derived from the lack of public incentives aimed at education for innovation and the traditional low propensity of Brazilian

business community to innovate, except for the agribusiness. These constraints tend to weaken both the level of competitiveness of the production and the service systems in the domestic and the foreign trade and outward expansion of Brazilian enterprises.

*Translated by Gabriela Perin