

ANALYSIS OF SWEDEN'S BID TO JOIN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AFTER THE TURKISH EARTHQUAKE: A DISASTER DIPLOMACY PERSPECTIVE

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Introduction

Turkey and Sweden are at odds linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkêren Kurdistan, PKK). The PKK has committed several terrorist assaults for over 40 years to mobilize Kurds to establish an independent state. Although the PKK has not yet successfully created an independent state, the party has actively employed mass media, like Roj TV, to spread its messages throughout various European nations. The book by Samih Teymur and Cindy J. Smith titled "The PKK: A Decades-old Brutal Kurdish-Terrorist Organization" has about 1,500 PKK members in Turkey and close to 4,500 in Northern Iraq. In fact, George W. Bush is quoted in the book as saying, "PKK is a terrorist organization and enemy of Turkey, enemy of the United States, and enemy of free-democratic Iraq" (Teymur and Smith 2008).

The military coups of 1971 and 1980 resulted in many Turks and Kurds moving to rural areas and migrating out of Turkey to escape military violence. As a haven for multiculturalism, it is not surprising that in the 1980s, Sweden became a destination for several refugee flows from Chile, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. A thesis from the European University Institute stated that the majority of the refugee population in

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Sweden consists of Iranians, Iraqis, Chileans, Argentina, Peruvians, Kurds, Turks, and Eritreans. Even though Kurds from Turkey are the largest group in the country, most migrant groups are descendants of native Kurds who came to Sweden in search of asylum (Baser 2012).

One of the scientific research articles published by the Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security said that Kurdish groups in Sweden are considered extremist groups and supporters of terrorism, where they have been providing support to PKK activists (Baser 2013). Because of this, it is not surprising that Turkey then accused Sweden of being a country that provides protection for terrorist groups that are included in the European Union (EU) blacklist. Turkey has also urged Sweden to hand over PKK activists who fled to the country as a condition if Sweden wants to get Turkey's approval to become a member of the North African Treaty Organization (NATO). But unfortunately, the insistence received a negative response from demonstrators who recognized themselves as PKK.

The demonstration, which took place on Saturday, January 21, 2023, was marked by the burning of copies of the Qur'an by a leader of Denmark's hardline right-wing party, Rasmus Paludan. The demonstration, which received permission from the Swedish government, then received strong criticism from several parties such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and also Turkey. The arson was carried out outside the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gave his first response on Monday, saying: "Those who allow such blasphemy in front of our embassy (in Stockholm) can no longer expect our support for their NATO membership". President Erdogan also added that the Quran burning carried out outside the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm was an attack on the 85 million Muslim population in Turkey. "If you do not show respect to the religious beliefs of the Republic of Turkiye or Muslims, you will not receive any support for NATO (membership) from us" (Aljazeera 2023a).

Anger was also shown by the Turkish Foreign Minister by issuing a statement "We condemn in the strongest possible terms the vile attack on our holy book... Permitting this anti-Islam act, which targets Muslims and insults our sacred values, under the guise of freedom of expression is completely unacceptable.". Mevlut Cavusoglu even expressed anger at the Swedish government for failing to stop the demonstrations, saying: "It's a racist action, it's not about freedom of expression," (Aljazeera 2023c). Although 28 other NATO countries have ratified Sweden, Turkey and Hungary remain steadfast on their choice. As a result of this event, the conflict between Turkey and Sweden became increasingly heated and Turkey became increasingly

resistant to Sweden's application for NATO membership. This further reduces Sweden's chances, so it takes even more effort for the country to get full support from Turkey.

Two weeks after the demonstration and arson took place, suddenly an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.8 occurred on February 6, 2023 in the Southern Turkey region with a depth of 11 km and has triggered a tsunami as high as 30 cm in the city of Erdemli, Mersin. The magnitude of the earthquake that occurred at that time did not necessarily end the earthquake event that occurred in the country. After that day, hundreds of aftershocks were reported and have resulted in dozens of buildings, schools and hospitals collapsing. According to United Nations Humanitarian Chief Martin Griffiths, three weeks after a magnitude 7.8 earthquake struck Southern Turkey and Northern Syria, there have been at least 44,000 deaths in Turkey and about 6,000 in Syria. Griffiths also said there were many injured, tens of thousands of people missing and hundreds of thousands of residents left homeless (Lederer 2023).

Seeing the condition of his country devastated in an earthquake that occurred, the Turkish government swiftly coordinated with Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) and also the Turkish Red Crescent. Turkish authorities then declared a level 4 state of emergency in ten provinces of the country for the next three months. Turkey has also not hesitated to ask for international help to restore conditions in its country. Governments from all over the world quickly responded to requests for international assistance by offering a wide range of humanitarian assistance and sending rescue teams to Turkey (CDP 2023).

Based on the report from Aljazeera, countries that participated directly in Turkey include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, European Union, Germany, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Palestine, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Ukraine, UAE, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). While the international organizations involved include: World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations (UN), Red Crescent, Norwegian Refugee Council, NATO and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Aljazeera 2023b).

By reviewing several studies using the keyword "Turkey, Sweden and NATO" obtained data from the Scopus and Publish or Perish databases, where Abdullah Murat Tuncer wrote his articles about "Turkey's options for Finland and Sweden's NATO membership applications", and he analyzed Turkey or Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who are taking advantage of the heated situation between Russia and Ukraine to create favorable conditions

for him in the 2023 elections (Tuncer 2022). In the writings of O. D. Çakir and M. E. Chasnouski entitled “Turkey in NATO: An extraordinary position”, he explained Turkey’s interest in NATO membership to maintain the stability of his country’s security, although sometimes Turkey does not always agree with the strategies pursued by the US regarding its interests in the Middle East region (Çakir and Chasnouski 2020).

In addition, an article written by Selin M. Bölme, “NATO-Türkiye relations: From irreplaceable partner to questionable ally”, described NATO’s relationship with Turkey and the country’s role in the alliance through a historical perspective (Bölme 2022). Based on Tarık Oguzlu’s article, “Making sense of Turkey’s rising power status: What does Turkey’s approach within NATO tell us?”, he focused on observations to find out how Turkey’s rise as a developing country capable of establishing close ties with NATO as one of the most respected organizations in the world (Oguzlu 2013). Finally, Müge Kinacioglu and Aylin G. Gürzel in their research entitled, “Turkey’s contribution to NATO’s role in post-cold war security governance: The use of force and security identity formation”, he investigated Turkey’s involvement as the only Muslim country capable of joining the world security organization in operations outside NATO territory using a constructivist perspective (Kinacioglu and Gürzel 2019).

The five authors focused on research related to President Erdogan’s strategy in creating favorable conditions for himself in the 2023 elections amid the heat of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, differences in strategy between Turkey and the US regarding interests in the Middle East, relations between NATO and Turkey reviewed from a historical perspective, Turkey’s rise in establishing close ties with NATO, as well as the importance of Turkey’s involvement in conducting operations outside NATO territory are viewed through a constructivist perspective. Based on a comparison of several literature reviews, the authors make a research question of how Sweden used the earthquake that occurred in Turkey to get full support for its application for NATO membership.

Concept of Disaster Diplomacy

Diplomacy is a peaceful negotiation between a sovereign state and official representatives of other countries. But in practice, there are many actors involved in it. Regarding its relationship with disasters, diplomacy can be an analytical framework to investigate more deeply the relationship between disasters, humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic activities through the

process of disaster risk reduction and disaster response. Disaster diplomacy is used to understand how and why activities related to disasters, pre-disaster, post-disaster, or even during disasters can affect diplomacy efforts. It also emphasizes a reality in which disaster and its management activities become a political effort that can give rise to short-term diplomatic relations based on previous relationships, but not applicable in long-term diplomatic efforts (Whittaker et al. 2018).

Through a collection of research articles "Disaster Diplomacy: Discord Disintegrated?", shows that disasters can encourage diplomatic efforts even though it does not allow the creation of new diplomacy between countries in conflict (Ganapati, Kelman, and Koukis 2015). An article titled "Governmental duty of care for disaster-related science diplomacy" specifically explained that disaster diplomacy is a disaster-related activity that is able to affect the diplomatic process, where the application of disaster diplomacy includes things needed to reduce disaster risk and diplomacy involved can affect peace and conflict (Kelman 2017). Furthermore, it was also conveyed that disaster diplomacy is impossible without a rapprochement between the two countries. Even conflict, peace and disaster also have interactions to support each other explaining the meaning of this disaster diplomacy (Duda and Kelman 2023).

Various kinds of disasters can have an impact on several important sectors of a country. In some countries, disasters such as Cyclone Nargis devastated Myanmar in 2008 and left more than 130,000 people dead. In Southeast Asia, the December 26, 2004, tsunami left more than 220,000 people dead (Oh and Oetzel 2011). Therefore, disaster management is needed as an effort to prevent, manage, and reduce the impact of disasters caused. Conceptually, disaster management is divided into four elements, namely: preparedness (facilitating response to hazards), response (actions taken before, during and after a hazard occurs to protect people and property, as well as improve recovery), recovery (actions taken after a hazard occurs to restore the state to its pre-disaster condition) and mitigation (actions taken before or after the hazard occurs to reduce the impact caused) (Henstra and McBean 2005).

The same thing is also conveyed in a book entitled "Struktur dan Kebijakan Diplomasia Bencana Malaysia", where the disaster management cycle which refers to the regulations of the National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA) consists of the emergence of disasters, response to disasters, recovery, mitigation and then forming a culture of preparedness in facing disasters.

Figure 1. Disaster Management Cycle



Source: Surwandono 2020.

All forms of activities that have a connection with this disaster can affect diplomatic relations by spurring or providing space for reconciliation efforts. For example, the earthquake and tsunami on December 26, 2004, shook Aceh, Indonesia and has caused countries around Asia and Africa to be affected. The regions of Aceh, Indonesia and Eastern Sri Lanka are known to be the centers of violence worst affected by the tsunami and require great efforts in the post-conflict and post-tsunami reconstruction process. Many international actors came massively to Aceh to clean up and rebuild the region from violence and tsunami. In the midst of this massive humanitarian response from the international community, the Indonesian government and Acehese separatist groups negotiated and finally signed a peace agreement on August 15, 2005. The Aceh tsunami event shows that peace could succeed if the parties involved really strive for a reconciliation process. Although it is not known for certain whether the ongoing negotiations will succeed or not, the earthquake and tsunami could be the reason for making peace between the Indonesian government and separatists (Kelman 2016).

Other case studies are also illustrated by the emergence of epidemic and pandemic diseases that can be disastrous for people around the world. Some efforts to eradicate smallpox, rinderpest, polio, dracunculiasis (guinea worm disease), measles, and rubella are all underway and involve health interventions in conflict areas. Many measures taken to reduce disaster risk and disaster response, ceasefires began to be negotiated amid the war to prioritize health for children and spurred vaccination campaigns in places

like Afghanistan, Cambodia, Lebanon, Liberia, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. Some advocates use vaccine diplomacy to build peace by separating any health intervention from conflict. Under these conditions, vaccines have successfully contributed to health-related success because neither side feels threatened from the spread of the disease outbreak. All disaster-related activities have proven to have the potential to catalyze pre-existing diplomacy, but there is no guarantee that they will have a long-term impact or that disaster-related activities will shape diplomacy going forward (Kelman 2018b).

For some practitioners, disaster diplomacy is related to disaster prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery activities in cooperation with opposing parties nationally and globally. But behind its role as a facilitator of cooperation and negotiation, disaster diplomacy has encountered opposition among politicians. As it develops broadly, disaster diplomacy will produce political consequences from previous humanitarian actions. For them, disaster diplomacy has been considered a violation of the principle of neutrality, where the attitude of quick disaster response is considered to have been politicized (Yim et al. 2009). Even by definition of literature, disaster diplomacy is understood as the study of how and why natural disasters are able to contribute to the establishment of peace or trigger conflict (Kelman 2018a).

Methodology

This article research uses qualitative descriptive methods in collecting several sources of information. The data obtained is also secondary data from several document sources such as: journal articles, official websites and some reports from official online media which are then analyzed and described descriptively to explain the essence of this writing. This data analysis method aims to find out how Sweden took advantage of the earthquake and established systematic disaster diplomacy with Turkey to get ratification of its NATO membership application.

Results and Discussion

Relations Between Kurds, Turks, and Swedes

The Kurdish diaspora is described as a form of stateless diaspora (Alinia and Eliass 2014) and is the product of the political repression and economic dispossession taking place in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. This

has resulted in hundreds of thousands of ethnic Kurds fleeing their homes and migrating to Europe in search of security, political and cultural, as well as economic rights (Eliassi 2016). As a result, the first Kurdish refugees arrived in Sweden in the early 1970s. Over the next few decades, Kurds from all over Kurdistan and countries around the world flocked to Sweden to escape the oppressive regime.

In some European countries such as Sweden, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, there is a strong and active ethnic Kurdish diaspora. Each diaspora differs from each other in terms of composition, profile of migrants and asylum seekers, dimensions of time and generation, and degree of integration. For example, the Kurds in Germany are mostly of Turkish origin and their emergence as a result of political instability in Turkey and the PKK's efforts to raise awareness among ethnic Kurds about their identity and rights. In the United Kingdom, the majority of ethnic Kurds are Iraqi, and they have been well integrated into British society. In Sweden, more Kurds are intellectually mobilized to develop Kurdish culture and literature (Baser, Emanuelsson, and Toivanen 2015).

Sweden also has many ethnic Kurds who have shown their commitment to previous homeland politics. Generally, the Kurdish diaspora often celebrates various festivals and honors a number of anniversaries, such as the respect for Anfal and Halabja, and the Newroz festival celebration carried out annually by thousands of ethnic Kurds in Sweden and other countries (Khayati and Dahlstedt 2014). Through the article titled "Music, memory, and affect attunement: Connecting Kurdish diaspora in Stockholm", it is said that there are 60,000 to 70,000 ethnic Kurds from various parts of Kurdistan living in Sweden. As a result, since the 1980s Sweden has been a major destination and important place for cultural and political activity within the Kurdish diaspora community (Volgsten and Pripp 2016).

The 1960s saw the beginning of large-scale labour migration in Europe by ethnic Kurds, one of which was Turkey. These migratory flows were dominated by the arrival of Kurdish intellectuals which led to the formation of associations and networks throughout Europe, especially Western Europe (Germany, Britain, Sweden, and France). This large-scale migration flow began with the arrival of ethnic Turkish Kurds which was then followed by political migration flows due to the conflict between the Turkish military and the PKK in the late 1980s to mid-1990s. Although not the largest overall, the Turkish diaspora in Sweden is quite large. Family reunification and asylum seekers are the main motivations of Turkish immigrants.

The initial migrant workforce was mostly Sunni Muslim Turks from areas such as Konya, most of the subsequent arrivals were Armenian,

Assyrian, or Kurdish (Wackenhut 2022). Political upheaval in Turkey has created discrimination, persecution, mass killings and widespread war, resulting in a significant increase in the wave of ethnic Turkish Kurdish migration to Europe in search of asylum in the span of ten years (Syrett and Keles 2019). In addition, political oppression and economic deprivation are other reasons for migrant workers as well as asylum seekers to enter Europe (Wahlbeck 2019).

For the republican regime in Turkey, cultural differences are a national threat, so both language and expressions of cultural identity related to Kurds are banned in the country. Kurds in Turkey have had to face decades of forced assimilation and attempts to destroy their cultural identity. Harsh repression and cultural genocide led to the formation of the PKK, which began in 1973 and was inaugurated by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978. The party advocated for the right to self-determination by forming an independent and united Kurdistan and transforming into a socialist society (Jongerden and Akkaya 2016).

Before the 1980 military coup, the PKK had attracted much attention because it was considered the most radical Kurdish organization and prone to violence. By calling it a revolution “anti-colonial liberation struggle”, the PKK carried out various acts of resistance against the class and opponents of its group. After the 1980 coup, a number of PKK activists went to Sweden and Germany, where they managed to build networks and organizations by establishing publishing businesses that produced journals, books and newsletters in Turkish, Kurdish, and European. In the late summer of 1984, the PKK resumed its offensive activities by carrying out hit-and-run attacks against military personnel and Kurdish civilians. By mid-1985, the PKK had strong members and supporters in Europe, where its participants consisted of young militant radicals, middle-aged, not highly politicized and their own families (Bruinessen 1988).

In Sweden, there are many ethnic Kurds who have gradually adopted the identity of Kurdistan, they no longer use the national identity of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Thanks to Sweden's multiculturalism policies, ethnic Kurds can mobilize themselves and engage in politics without being separated from Swedish society. The Kurdish diaspora does not want a choice between Kurdish and Swedish identities, but they do want to harmonize a symbiotic relationship. Kurds in Sweden have not come to fully assimilate or give up their Kurdish identity but continue to be ethnic Kurds without having to feel alienated from their daily activities in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres of Sweden (Eliassi 2015).

As a country with a political culture that emphasizes elements of human rights and dignity, as well as an open policy that supports refugees

from conflict zones, Sweden is considered the country most conducive to claims of recognition (Koinova 2019). For Kurdish intellectuals, Sweden was a safe haven to develop their culture. There are many influential figures, such as writers, singers, and public intellectuals among Kurdish migrants in Sweden. The ability of Kurdish culture to adapt has helped the ethnic group assimilate into Sweden's dominant culture. Although labor migration from Turkey is an important historical event in Europe, the presence of large numbers of political refugees has had a major social, cultural, and political impact on Sweden given that relations between Turkey and the Kurds have always been in a cycle of conflict. Through its politics and policies, the conflict between Turkey and ethnic Kurds was actually "imported" to Sweden directly or indirectly (Akçalı 2017).

One such conflict has been virtual fights and provocations in website chat rooms between politically active Turkish and Kurdish youths. Many Turkish members blog and react to Kurdish activism in Sweden. They even condemned the country for allowing the ethnic Kurdish diaspora to show their support for the PKK, which has been considered a "terrorist group" in Turkey. One of the most famous blogs at the time was "The Anatolian Voice" (Baser 2014). Another conflict is also taking place in Sweden, where several sources from a youth organization say Turkey has been portrayed negatively in the Swedish media. But luckily, since AK PARTİ (Justice and Development Party, AKP) came along, positive changes have changed the portrayal of Turkey in the media (Mencutek and Baser 2018).

Recently, the conflict came to the fore again after Turkey accused Sweden and Finland of aiding the PKK and armed groups in Syria which it considers an extension of the PKK. As a result, on October 6 last year President Erdogan suddenly suggested that Finland and Sweden join the NATO alliance separately despite Turkey previously agreeing to a trilateral memorandum with Finland and Sweden under NATO auspices. Turkey's stance is one attempt to block Sweden's accession despite the country's firm support to Turkey to counter threats to its national security (Arms Control Association 2023).

Swedish Humanitarian Aid to Turkey

The epicenter of the February earthquake was 26 km East of Nurdagi, Gaziantep and in the West of Southeastern Anatolia close to Aleppo. The location of the epicenter is 18 km with the ground surface and occurred in an environment with a bad building structure, so the earthquake that occurred

in Turkey-Syria became one of the largest earthquakes that occurred in the country. Several aftershocks also occurred 11 minutes later with a magnitude of 6.7 and 9 hours later followed by an earthquake of magnitude 7.5. This is the reason why seismologists say that earthquakes in Turkey are the most feared earthquake phenomenon (Sisfofitb 2023).

Many buildings were destroyed and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that around 210 million tonnes of debris had to be cleared in Turkey. This is equivalent to 14,000 football areas with a size of 10x10 km and a height of one meter. The devastation has displaced 1.5 million people and requires about 500,000 new housing units to compensate earthquake victims. This situation is further exacerbated by the cold weather conditions that are currently sweeping the country. This is why UNDP then urged the government to immediately clear the rubble so that road access is immediately open and the distribution of humanitarian aid in the form of food, water, health, and other essential supplies is not hampered (UN 2023).

Based on AFAD's report during its stay in the Pazarcik and Elbistan regions of Kahramanmaraş, a total of 360,167 tents have been installed in 332 cities and 189 container cities have been formed providing for the installation of 90,914 containers in earthquake-affected areas. A total of 1,440,668 residents were in shelter tents and 34,120 residents were provided shelter inside container houses. The total number of displaced people in the earthquake-affected areas reached 1,593,808 people, while in other provinces as many as 329,960 residents affected by the earthquake reportedly received accommodation services. In the shelter area itself, 2,284 mobile shower facilities and 5,058 toilet containers are also provided to be used for earthquake victims (AFAD 2023).

Sweden is one of the world's largest humanitarian donors and says it stands ready to lend its support to the United Nations and the International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent. These grants are essential to ensure that humanitarian organizations have the capacity and readiness to provide immediate assistance without having to wait for emergency assistance requests or additional donor contributions. The government is closely monitoring developments to provide support for earthquake victims in need, both in Turkey and Syria (Government Offices of Sweden 2023d)

As a form of Sweden's quick response in providing humanitarian assistance to earthquake victims, on February 6, 2023, the Swedish Presidency immediately took the initiative to hold an Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) meeting regarding the initial situation in Turkey and Syria. As a first step, the government immediately allocated around SEK 7 million to the IFRC to provide initial assistance for the two countries. The government will decide

on additional aid funds once humanitarian needs become clearer and there is further coordination with Turkey, the EU, the UN and the IFRC. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency has also received requests for assistance from Turkey and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). At that time, the agency immediately prepared tents, temporary emergency shelters and expert assistance in the fields of water, sanitation, energy, logistics and construction. Sweden also closely monitored developments and maintained contact with Turkey at various levels, including politics (Government Offices of Sweden 2023g).

The day after the earthquake occurred, on February 7, 2023, the Swedish government decided to provide additional assistance of SEK 30 million and send some experts to Turkey and Syria. Around SEK 20 million will be channelled to the IFRC and SEK 10 million to the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Sweden also provided aid funds of around SEK 55 million to the IFRC and SEK 663 million to UN CERF. Through UCPM, Sweden even sent experts in construction, IT and logistics experts to Turkey. The Swedish government also offered to send more than 300 family tents that can accommodate four to five people (Government Offices of Sweden 2023a).

Two days later, on February 9, 2023, Sweden sent 45 additional personnel, sniffer dogs and rescue teams using aircraft provided by the Swedish Armed Forces to Turkey. Of the 45 personnel, 5 are team leaders employed by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and 40 are employed by the Swedish Armed Forces. Three search teams totaled 24 people, four sniffer dog teams totalled 8 people and two medical teams totalled 8 people. In addition to this support, Sweden also sent 7 experts and provided humanitarian assistance amounting to SEK 37 million to alleviate the situation on the ground (Government Offices of Sweden 2023i).

Six days after the earthquake, a transport plane organized by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency landed in Turkey with 300 family tents. As of that day, February 12, 2023, it is reported that Sweden has contributed around €10.1 million to help Turkey and Syria. Sweden will continue to be committed to providing a rapid response to catastrophic events occurring in Turkey and Syria. The Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission have even taken the initiative to organize an International Donor Conference in coordination with the Turkish Government (Government Offices of Sweden 2023b).

Through a report from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency on February 17, 2023, it was reported that some essential equipment such as 300 larger tents, beds, mattresses, food, and electricity had been delivered to Turkey on that day. Donations were made through the NATO-Euro Atlantic Disaster

Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), which was then transported using the Türkiye Lions Club (MSB 2023c). On the same day, Sweden also sent 500 emergency homes to earthquake victims through a joint project between Sweden and the EU, rescEU. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency also dispatched emergency housing resources, beds, heaters, and other essential equipment to help people who lost their homes as well as emergency response teams to ensure that the resources sent arrived on time and on target. The main focus of vital aid to provide for the earthquake victims is food, water, shelter, medicine and accommodation, where all humanitarian assistance can be used for a longer period of time during the reconstruction process (MSB 2023b).

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) provided emergency funding of €3 million to victims affected by earthquakes in Turkey and Syria. The emergency funding was provided through four humanitarian partners, namely the Norwegian Refugee Council, Action Against Hunger, Save the Children and Oxfam. Assistance is used to meet basic needs such as winter clothing, water, and psychosocial support for children. In total, Sweden has provided around €13.6 million in aid to both countries. The assistance includes cash support to buy food needs and arrange shelter. These organizations also provide hygiene items, health services and medicines, portable toilets, cholera prevention assistance and repair of damaged water systems (Government Offices of Sweden 2023h).

The Swedish plane also transported about 500 tents weighing nearly 40 tons from Pakistan to Incirlik, Turkey. In addition, the aircraft also carries a logistics center for humanitarian and emergency assistance (Swedish Armed Forces 2023). Sweden has again provided an additional €7.63 million in aid for people affected by the earthquake in Turkey and Syria. Of this, about €6.28 million is humanitarian aid from SIDA through UNICEF and UNHCR for Turkey and through UNICEF and OCHA for Syria. In addition, SIDA is also providing about €1.35 million through the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency to set up 1,000 tents and accommodate their transportation to Turkey and Syria (Government Offices of Sweden 2023c).

Based on a report from the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union released on March 10, 2023, it is reported that Sweden-EU is rapidly allocating humanitarian assistance to earthquake-affected people in Turkey and Syria, as well as mobilizing EU emergency reserves through the European Humanitarian Response Capacity and RescEU. A total of nearly €12 million in EU humanitarian assistance has been allocated to residents in Turkey and around €10 million has been mobilized for disaster response in Syria. UCPM has also deployed 1,750 rescue teams and 111 sniffer dogs to

assist in the search and rescue process in Turkey. As a result, several lives have been saved by search and rescue teams deployed through UCPM. In addition, 20 EU member states, including Sweden and Montenegro also offer various equipment as shelters, heaters, generators, furniture, medical equipment, hygiene kits, food, and warm clothing for Turkish residents. Sweden even set up 500 relief housing units equipped with 2,500 beds (Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2023).

On Monday 20 March 2023, the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission will host an International Donor Conference with the theme “Together for the people of Türkiye and Syria”. The conference was hosted by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, the Prime Minister of Sweden, Ulf Kristersson who represented the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, with Minister for International Development Cooperation and Foreign Trade, Johan Forssell and Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Olivér Várhelyi moderating. The conference, which took place in Brussels and has been coordinated with the Turkish Government, was attended by more than 60 representatives of EU member states, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, neighboring countries and partner countries, G20 countries (except Russia), Gulf cooperation council member states, the UN, international organizations, humanitarian actors, and international and European financial institutions, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), as well as other relevant stakeholders (Government Offices of Sweden 2023f).

During the conference, a total of €7 billion in humanitarian aid was raised by the international community to help earthquake victims in Turkey and Syria. As of €6.05 billion in aid and loans were provided to Turkey and €950 million in aid to Syria. Turkish aid funds are used to meet humanitarian needs and assist in the reconstruction of affected areas, while aid funds for Syria are used to help meet humanitarian needs and support recovery, as well as resilience in the country (Government Offices of Sweden 2023e). Through a report from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency published on March 22, 2023, it is reported that more than 350 medical bed supplies were shipped from Sweden to Syria and Turkey. The shipment of medical supplies was donated by a medical company called OneMed and was shared equally between the two countries. The request for assistance received by UCPM is then coordinated with actors in Sweden, where UCPM works with transportation companies, the National Health and Welfare Agency and OneMed. The request for assistance includes medical equipment, several types of machinery, personnel and other materials used to respond to disasters. UCPM is also responsible

for the distribution of logistical assistance, the transportation of donations and cooperation with other international actors (MSB 2023a)

Comparative Analysis of Disaster Management Elements

The four elements of disaster management consist of response, recovery, mitigation, and preparedness. Table 1 will show a comparison of the four elements of disaster management that Sweden implemented after the earthquakes in Turkey and Syria.

Table 1. Analysis of Turkish Disaster Management by Sweden

Type of Assistance/ Elements	Response	Recovery	Mitigation	Preparation
The Swedish government continues to monitor developments in Turkey and Syria.	Yes			
Sweden held an Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) meeting.	Yes			
The Swedish government allocates humanitarian aid funds for Turkey and Syria.	Yes			
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency prepared tents and temporary emergency shelters.	Yes			
Sweden sent some experts in the fields of water, sanitation, energy, logistics, construction and IT.	Yes			
Sweden sent 45 additional personnel, sniffer dogs and rescue teams.	Yes			

Sweden hosted International Donor Conference.	Yes			
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency distributed emergency housing resources, beds, heating and electricity.	Sim			
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency provided food, water, medicine and accommodation.	Sim			
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency provides transportation accommodation to deliver humanitarian aid.	Sim			
Sweden offered a variety of equipment, such as generators, furniture, cleaning supplies, and warm clothes to Turkish residents.	Sim			

Table 1 shows how Sweden responds to the impact of the earthquake that occurred in Turkey several months ago. As shown in the Disaster Management Cycle, mitigation and preparation is an action that must be taken before a hazard occurs, while response and recovery are carried out when a hazard has occurred. If we look at the Disaster Management table carried out by Sweden in dealing with the impact of the earthquake in Turkey, then Sweden looks very aggressive in providing humanitarian assistance, in terms of financial, medical, accommodation, experts and logistics. All aid was immediately sent and handed over one day after the earthquake and Sweden is also monitoring developments in Turkey and Syria for any developments in both countries. Sweden also seemed to take advantage of this moment very well to attract Turkish sympathy so that the country concerned would give its approval to Sweden's application for NATO membership.

This is even more interesting because with the aggressiveness shown in providing various kinds of humanitarian assistance to Turkey, Sweden

until now has not received Turkey's approval to join NATO. This contrasts with Finland which apparently first received Turkey's approval, where the country officially became a member of NATO on March 30, 2023. As we know, Sweden is the largest donor of humanitarian aid in the world, but Sweden's involvement with ethnic Kurds in the country is an obstacle for Sweden to be able to attract sympathetic of Turkey. So, it is not surprising that until now Turkey is still resistant to Sweden considering that the country allegedly protects groups considered terrorist for Turkey, the US and also the EU.

Conclusion

The Islamic world has been shocked by the burning of copies of the Qur'an in front of the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm as a form of freedom of expression after Turkey expressed its rejection of Sweden's application for NATO membership. A few weeks after the anarchy drew various reactions and condemnations from the top brass, suddenly Turkey and Syria were rocked by an earthquake and caused both countries to be destroyed instantly. Turkey immediately declared a state of emergency and asked for help from the international community to restore conditions in the country. Despite the prolonged conflict between Turkey and Sweden and events that had heated up some time ago, Sweden emerged as the largest donor country in the world by providing various kinds of humanitarian assistance in the form of financial, medical, accommodation, experts, and logistics. Sweden is seen to be very aggressive in allocating aid funds, ready to monitor any developments and responsive in providing and sending various humanitarian assistance to earthquake victims. This study proposes to be carried out further research on Turkey's reasons for giving approval for Finland to join NATO after all the efforts made by Sweden to help restore the condition of the country, considering that Sweden and Finland are both countries that have links to the ethnic Kurdish diaspora from Turkey. That way, better analysis results can be found, especially to answer more complex problems in the future.

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ABSTRACT

After Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan requested Sweden to turn over the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkêren Kurdistan*, PKK) activists to secure Turkey's approval for its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), tensions between the two countries erupted again. Several weeks after the tension heated up, Turkey was abruptly hit by a catastrophic earthquake on February 6, 2023, abandoning the country instantly, just a few weeks after the arson incident. Then, Turkey's government proclaimed a level 4 emergency and promptly requested assistance from other countries. The paper aims to clarify how Sweden used the Turkish earthquake to ratify its membership in NATO. To respond to the problems raised by this scientific literature, this research employs qualitative descriptive methodologies while keeping the idea of disaster diplomacy in mind. This study includes information from various literary sources, including journal publications, government websites, and news items from various online media. The findings revealed that Sweden used systematic disaster diplomacy to its advantage by offering various aid to earthquake victims hoping that Turkey would postpone ratifying its NATO membership.

KEY WORDS

Turkey, Sweden, Earthquake, Humanitarian Aid, Ratification, NATO.

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