

NEW DAWN OR ETERNAL TWILIGHT?¹

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On June 29, 2021, the South African Constitutional Court sentenced the former President of the Republic of South Africa and the ruling party - the African National Congress - Jacob Zuma to 15 months in prison for “contempt of court”, expressed in refusing to testify during the work of the state commission, unauthorized withdrawal from its meeting, and then refusal to participate in her work. This body, which bears the official name “the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture”, was created in early 2018 during the presidency of Zuma himself, although not by his will, but by the order of the Public Protector, as the ombudsman is called in South Africa. Since it is chaired by the Deputy Chief Justice of the South African Supreme Court, Raymond Zondo, it has become commonly referred to by his name.

In accordance with the court’s decision, Zuma was to surrender at the police station in Nkandla in the province of Kwazulu-Natal, where he has an estate, or in central Johannesburg no later than July 4. Zuma’s defence filed an appeal with the Constitutional Court of South Africa for a rescission of the contempt of court order against him, taking into account the health condition of the former President, who has already turned 79 years old, as well as the serious threat of coronavirus, the “third wave” of which has covered South Africa in June 2021. It was considered on July 12, but the decision was reserved. In parallel, Zuma petitioned the South African High Court in the provincial capital of Pietermaritzburg to reject or postpone his imprisonment, but the judgment was also postponed until July 9.

Negative decisions were later issued in both cases, but earlier, since Zuma did not voluntarily enter the police custody on July 4, the police command was obliged to arrest him within three days, that is, until midnight

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on July 7, otherwise the South African National Police Commissioner Khehla Sitole and his immediate superior, the Minister of Police Bheki Cele, would face criminal prosecution. Police forces have already begun arriving at Zuma's estate, but even earlier, to prevent his arrest, his supporters gathered there, some with weapons, including members of the so-called "Umkhonto we Sizwe³ Veterans Association" (MKVA). This organisation, however, includes not only veterans of the armed struggle against the apartheid regime, it never was the official structure of the ANC and recently was disbanded in the process of the formation of an united MK veterans body.

As it happened, that night I was staying in South Africa, in Cape Town, and was watching the developments on local TV. The situation was becoming visibly tense, but very close to a midnight a convoy of official cars left the site. Initially it was reported that Zuma remained in his house and the cars carried high government officials who had come earlier but failed to convince him to report to the police. However, in a number of minutes this information was revised: it was former president who left the estate accompanied by his VIP protection unit.

Zuma, accompanied by relatives went to the town of Estcourt, to the newly built "correctional facility" which is considered to be an exemplary one. "I handed myself over to avoid bloodshed", he said later to his supporters (ENCA 2021). It was reported that it was Zuma's ex-wife, Nkosozana Dlamini-Zuma, a minister in the cabinet of Cyril Ramaphosa, who was his main competitor in the ANC presidential elections, was able to persuade Zuma to do this.

It seemed that the worst was avoided, but the next day riots broke out in Zuma's home province of KwaZulu-Natal, and on Sunday, July 11 they spread to the country's central province, Gauteng, where the largest city of South Africa Johannesburg and its administrative capital Tshwane (Pretoria) are located. Besides, there were isolated disturbances of public order in two other provinces, but five of the country's nine provinces were not affected.

It all began with the blocking of the main highways, where supporters of Zuma stopped or even set fire to trucks, and this was quickly followed by pogroms and arsons of shops and warehouses, banks and even schools. Thus, the arrest of Zuma served as a "trigger" and catalyst for unrest, the losses from which, both human and material, were enormous. According to preliminary data, over 350 people died within ten days, many of them in a stampede during the looting of shops, more than two and a half thousand participants in the riots were detained. The South African government claimed that a total

³ Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was an armed wing of the ANC, it existed in 1961-1993.

of 40,000 businesses were affected, and the losses to the country's economy are estimated at R50 billion (\$ 3.4 billion). Extensive damage has been caused to 161 malls and shopping centres, 11 warehouses, 8 factories and 161 liquor outlets and distributors (South African Government 2021a). 1,400 ATMs and 90 pharmacies were damaged and about 300 banks and post offices were vandalized. In addition, 40,000 businesses and 50,000 traders were affected overall, while stock worth R1.5 billion was lost and 150,000 jobs were stated to be at risk (Van Zyl 2021). Some losses were just unbelievable: 140 schools have been vandalized or burned in the province of Kwazulu-Natal.

Later, President Cyril Ramaphosa admitted that the state had not acted as quickly as it should have, and called the incident a lesson for the future. The police were indeed initially too slow in taking action against the rioters, and there were several reasons for this. First, even previously it had lacked staff and equipment, and in 2021, due to the covid-19 austerity budget, police spending was reduced by 11.8 billion rand (Mayibongwe 2021).

Secondly, there was a lack of proper exchange of information between the police and state security agencies, they even contradicted each other in public statements. Finally, the police may have acted overly cautiously, as they were previously heavily criticized for the deaths of 34 miners during the strike and riots at the Marikana mine in 2012, besides 11 alleged violators of the quarantine regime were killed during the full lockdown in South Africa in the first half of 2020 as a result of the excessive use of force by the army.

Initially the government was reluctant to send troops to the cities, but only after entering the streets to suppress riots on the orders of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the South African National Defence Force, first 2,500 and then 25,000 soldiers and officers were able to stop the tragic course of events. However, it should be noted that in many places local residents cooperated with police and army, stood to protect property from robbers and arsonists, and then are actively involved in cleaning the streets and looted premises.

Julius Malema, the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a radical party, criticised Ramaphosa's decision to deploy the military to quell the unrest, and threatened to join in. "No soldiers on our streets! Otherwise, we are joining. All fighters must be ready", he said. However, he did not specify what side he was going to join, and fortunately no actions were taken by his party when the army did go to the streets (News 24 2021).

What caused these events? President Cyril Ramaphosa called them an "attempted insurrection that failed" (SA News 2021). According to him, the riots were planned and coordinated, and their instigators were well organized. Nonetheless the question of who these people were still remains open. It was

reported that 12 people were identified as the instigators of the riots, but only two of them were detained - a former DJ on radio and a candidate for mayor of a small town from the Patriotic Alliance, a newly formed small party. Official sources provided information that among the organizers there were former and even current members of the special services - supporters of Zuma, but no names have yet mentioned.

At the same time, although South Africans are trying not to talk about the ethnic factor in riots, it is hardly accidental that the riots took place mainly in KwaZulu-Natal and in Gauteng, where many Zulu also live. The removal of Zuma, an ethnic Zulu from the presidency, and then his imprisonment, displeased many of his fellow homelander. But, on the other hand, many Zulu participated in the resistance to the rioters, assisting the forces of law and order and it is clear that the thousands of people who participated in the riots were not necessarily supporters of Zuma.

The protestors had no political slogans, and attacks on the offices of the ruling party have not been recorded anywhere in the country. Another peculiar feature of these events is a lack of conflicts between Africans and whites. The only interracial conflict happened in Phoenix, a traditionally Indian township where over 30 persons, both looters and innocent persons were killed by local vigilantes.

The question is legitimate: did the mass riots arise spontaneously, or were there certain forces behind them? It looks like the first actions could have been organized by the lieutenants of Jacob Zuma, who were more worried about their own safety, being suspects in crimes of corruption, and not about the ex-president of South Africa. But the initial plans for a local protest, apparently, failed and it spread into the vastness of the country.

South Africa has undoubted achievements over the years of democracy, in particular in the areas of electrification, education and housing, but although the ruling ANC party is allied by the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the Communist Party, the majority of the people in South Africa still live very poorly; moreover, the gap between the rich and the poor has grown noticeably after 1994.

The unemployment rate is very high, according to official data it has reached the record 34,4% in the second quarter of 2021, and 44,4% according to an expanded definition of unemployment that includes those discouraged from seeking work (Reuters 2021), and it is even worse among the young people. The situation was aggravated by the pandemic, which led to the loss of several million jobs, the closure of enterprises, especially small businesses.

One more cause of dissatisfaction was a low tempo of vaccination and

the renewal of severe restrictions that President Ramaphosa announced on June 27 that again included in particular a complete ban on selling, purchasing and transportation of alcohol. So, it looks like the limit has come to patience of many people and they began to destroy everything in their path.

In the early 1990s in South Africa a popular term, often used in particular by a Nobel Prize winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu, was a “rainbow nation”. However later, when the situation in South Africa became not as bright as many had expected, a bitter joke appeared: “Rainbow is just an optic illusion.” Now similarly a bitter expression appeared: “Is it new dawn or eternal twilight?”.

In any case, as we all know, a dawn cannot be long and a new day comes, be it good or bad. However, it is hard to assess the developments in South Africa during “Ramaphosa’s rule” in these simple terms. Perhaps, it is fair to compare its contradictory nature with a controversial nature of Cyril Ramaphosa’s life story. In the years of apartheid, being the General Secretary of the National Miners’ Union, he openly advocated socialism, but as soon as the Constitutional Assembly completed its work under his chairmanship, he went to business and became one of the richest Africans in the RSA. Ramaphosa’s assessment of himself is telling: “I am a socialist, but I operate in a capitalist world. I am therefore a capitalist with a socialist instinct.” (Ebrahim 2015).

True, under his leadership the ANC initially restored the moral authority and confidence of the people lost during “Zuma’s rule”. It was confirmed by the results of the elections to the national parliament and legislative assemblies of nine provinces of South Africa on May 8, 2019, when ANC received 57,5% of votes, down from 62.15% in the election four years earlier but 3,5 % higher than in local election in November 2017 before Zuma’s resignation.

Cyril Ramaphosa ensured the support of other members of the Tripartite Alliance led by the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) with its quarter of a million members that greatly contributed to the election success of the ANC, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (COSATU). Nevertheless, while Ramaphosa is in power for the fourth year, one can hardly find traces of socialism in his activities.

ANC’s firm control of the central government and of eight provincial governments (one province, Western Cape remains run by the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance), have not resulted in the economic and political stability in the following years. The GDP experienced ups and downs, unemployment remained very high and “the Ramaphosa effect”, the broad sympathy to a new leader began waning.

A new and heavy blow against the South Africa economy was the COVID-19 pandemic. Initially resolute steps taken by Ramaphosa, a total lockdown, including a ban on alcohol and tobacco, which were welcomed in spite of their severity. However, the continuing aggravation of the economic situation, delays in mass vaccination and especially the disclosure of corruption, connected with purchase of personal protective equipment (PPE) changed the mood. At first the most popular political figure after Ramaphosa was Zweli Mkhize, the Minister of Health, who was regarded by many as his successor (he received the biggest number of votes in the direct election of the ANC NEC members in 2017), so the disappointment was especially deep when he was accused of corruption himself.

Ramaphosa reacted to these developments in a strongly (perhaps, too strongly) worded open letter: "Today, the ANC and its leaders stand accused of corruption. The ANC may not stand alone in the dock, but it does stand as Accused No 1. This is the stark reality that we must now confront. At its last meeting, at the beginning of this month, the ANC national executive committee (NEC) recognised the justifiable public outrage caused by recent reports of corruption. It said these developments cause us collectively to dip our heads in shame and to humble ourselves before the people." (Siviwe 2020).

However, no less damage was caused by political striving and squabbles within the ANC. If after the resignation of Zuma and the 2019 general election it looked united, at least on the surface, later the talk about factions in the ANC became widespread.

The Zondo Commission, mentioned above, started its work in August 2018, and its term was extended several times. Some prominent lawyers believe that the process of the Commission raises serious questions of its fairness. Non-collegiality of its composition, the lack of the witnesses' proper cross-examination, the politicization of its work pose danger to the effective achievement of the officially proclaimed aims and to the positive outcome of this Commission of inquiry (Mezyaev 2021)⁴. Besides, this exercise is rather costly, the money spent is close to 1 billion Rand. However, in any case its activity, especially the statements of the witnesses are the valuable testimony of the political and economic life in South Africa in the last years.

In particular, during the sessions of Zondo commission many facts detrimental to Zuma were revealed, but it brought to light a number of cases

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that harmful to Ramaphosa and his colleagues as well. It was alleged in particular that a number of the ANC leaders received bribes (either by cash or by services) from the Bossasa company that provided services to the party. 500 thousand rand were allocated by this company to the CR 17 campaign aimed to facilitate election of Ramaphosa to the post of the ANC president at its congress in December 2017, moreover he initially made a mistake when said that the money was a payment to his son for the work done for Bossasa. Public Protector Busisiwe Mkhwebane even used this incident to accuse Ramaphosa in violation of the constitution and executive ethics code when he “misled” MPs about a campaign donation from Bossasa (Businessstech 2019). She lost the case in court, but another blow against president was the disclosure by her office the list of donations to CR17, that included large sums from white-owned companies.

Then the evidence given by Sidney Mufamadi, former Minister of Public Security who headed the special commission “on the assessment of the mandate, potential and organizational integrity” of the South Africa’s State Security Agency (SSA) made clear that its report, forwarded to Ramaphosa many months earlier was very critical of the SSA activities under Zuma. Only after this disclosure the presidency made it public: “A key finding of the panel is that there has been political malpurposing and factionalisation of the intelligence community over the past decade or more that has resulted in an almost complete disregard for the Constitution, policy, legislation and other prescripts.” (The Presidency 2021). Nevertheless, most of the recommendations of the commission have not been carried out so far. Arthur Fraser, Director-General of the SSA had to leave his post, but in a very specific way: he was transferred to the same position in in the Department of correctional services. It is only recently the issue of his suspension has been raised.

Ramaphosa himself had to face the Zondo Commission, giving his evidence first as the ANC leader and then as former deputy to Zuma, and as the current head of state. Trying to explain his “inaction”, he said that the best way to fight state capture was from within the government and the governing party, and, therefore, he had served as deputy to Zuma while it raged at its worst. “The final option for me, which is what I chose, was to remain in my position as deputy president; not to resign, not to acquiesce and join in, or not to be confrontational, but to work with others in the executive to resist the abuses and bring about change where we could.” (Ferreira 2021). However, his arguments were not convincing for many South Africans.

Among the decisions taken at the ANC conference in 2017 three were regarded as the most important: on the nationalization of the Reserve

Bank, on the redistribution of land and “a step aside” rule, demanding those charged with corruption to voluntarily step aside and those alleged, reported and accused of corruption to face the ANC Integrity committee. To put it in short, the first two decisions have not been carried out so far: Tito Mboweni, appointed by Ramaphosa as minister of finance, publicly opposed the change of Bank’s ownership⁵; and the process of adopting a new law that allows confiscation of land without compensation is going on, but very slow.

The notion of factions became often used in South Africa, but is it really correct to use it? True, the end of the unrest is viewed in South Africa as a defeat for the so-called “radical economic transformation (RET) faction” in the ANC. Its members used this term, approved by the ANC conference, but they are known not only for “leftist” rhetoric and support for Zuma, but often for participation in corrupt deals. However, it is wrong to speak about Ramaphosa’s faction, because it is not a faction, but a majority, at least so far.

The most famous person in the so called “RET faction” is the ANC Secretary General Elias (“Ace”) Magashule, elected in 2017 with a small margin, just 24 votes, whose membership in this party has been suspended. due to the beginning of the trial on charges of corruption and his refusal to step-aside. He was arrested on November 11, 2020 and charged with 74 counts of corruption, money laundering and fraud related to the asbestos project during his time as premier in the Free State (Liseka 2021) and now on 200-thousand-rand bail.

Magashule and others who have been criminally charged were given 30 days to consult and step aside, but he refused to do it, and he has been suspended by the ANC National Executive Committee. He had appealed the letter of his suspension and went to the court but lost the case. Under these circumstances he, as they say, bet the farm: sent a letter of suspension to the ANC President, claiming that he had done it before his suspension. His action was naturally met with dismay by the ANC leadership, and lost another case in court .

Let us come back now to the destiny of Jacob Zuma. According to the mass-media reports, Zuma has not spent a single night in his prison cell. He was placed in the medical room of that “correction facility”, then transferred to hospitals first inside and then outside prison. His service was interrupted on July 22 when he was temporarily released from prison to attend the funeral of his brother. Then on September 5 Arthur Fraser, mentioned above, granted him a medical parole, though the parole board had not recommended it.

Zuma went to his estate in Nkandla, and from there he addressed

⁵ He left this post in October 2021, when the cabinet was reshuffled.

by video a “Welcome home” party, organized by his supporters in Durban. Typical of him, in his speech he was adamant. Then he left Nkandla with the permission of authorities to meet a group of his supporters including Magashule in an entertainment centre in Durban.

In a previous article published in this journal in 2018 the author predicted, that, taking into account South African legal system, we would probably wait for years to know what would happen with Jacob Zuma. I proved to be right, the first real session of his corruption trial in connection with the arms deal, officially known as the “Strategic Defence Package” should start on April 11, 2022, that is over four years after its formal beginning. Moreover, it still can be further delayed because the court still have to consider one more of Zuma’s appeals.

Meanwhile the main opponent of the ANC, the Democratic Alliance had no less problems. Its leader Mmusi Maimane, former Major of Johannesburg Herman Mashaba and some other prominent Africans left the party. All these developments happened when South Africa was preparing for a municipal election. The Independent Electoral Commission proposed to postpone it to 2022 due to the pandemic, but the Constitutional court rejected its proposal, because it had to take place every five years and it was held on November 1st.

The disillusionment of voters in the major political parties and in the democratic structures resulted in a massive drop in the number of participants in elections, from 57% in 2016 to 45,7%, in and on shift of votes from ANC and DA to smaller parties, some of them recently formed. The ANC’s head of elections Fikile Mbalula called the party’s poor showing in some areas is a “warning shot” for the ANC. Quite candidly he explained: “Those in our base that have not come out to vote, that is what it tells us. We have to deal with grievances raised. We had to deal with issues of electricity, issues of water. How do you tell a person who has been without water for five years, that on the eve of the elections, which let us go and vote (Mahlati 2021). On top of it “load shedding”, a blackout was performed by the state-owned ESCOM company in a number of areas in South Africa on the eve and even on the election day.

South Africans protest on that day took various forms, in some cases quite unusual. 22 voting stations in the province of Eastern Cape. The ANC’s historical stronghold could not open on time after angry communities dug trenches around the centres and, locked gates with their own padlocks.

The results of the local elections were utterly disappointing for the ANC. It received less than 47,9%, that is 6% less than at the previous local election five years earlier (and 9,5% less than at the 2019 national and provincial election). For the first time since the birth of the democratic South

Africa less than a half of the voters supported the ruling party. The DA lost 6.9% down to 20% while the EFF was 2,3% up to 10.6%.

However, despite this evident debacle and sharp criticism of the current ANC government, it is universally recognised in South Africa that so far there is no other real force in South Africa that could rule the country. However, the situation is quite different at a local level. On the eve of elections Ramaphosa expressed his confidence that the ANC would win outright and said that coalitions were not part of it his vocabulary (Sidimba 2021). Alas, the ANC vocabulary had to change pretty soon. The question now is not to go into coalitions or not, but on what conditions to go. Talking coalitions, ANC Deputy Secretary-General Jessie Duarte said that nothing was off the table: “There are many types of coalitions that exist such as transactional coalitions. One thing is for sure is that we are not negotiating from a position of weakness. Coalitions are about compromise” (Pillay 2021).

David Makhura, the ANC provincial chairperson specified: “I want to emphasise that we’re not desperate to be in government in municipalities for its own sake... So, we were approaching everything based on principle, but also based on experience and we don’t want to set up coalitions that will collapse halfway through [the term]. We don’t want to set up coalitions that have a group of people who have not made up their minds what it is they really want to do. So, we are not desperately looking for partners.” He said the voter apathy in Gauteng meant that people were not convinced by the party’s campaign message of renewal. The party now needed to approach the renewal agenda with urgency (Bomgekile 2021).

All in all, of the 213 municipalities contested, the ANC achieved a good majority in 161 municipalities, the DA achieved a majority in 13 municipalities and the IFP in 10 municipalities, 66 municipalities are “hanging”. However, having ensured its control over 75% of the country’s municipalities, the ANC had to really fight for major cities, and with a limited success.

The ANC has won over 50% of seats only in two of eight metropolitan municipalities in South Africa, Mangaung (Bloemfontein) and Buffalo City (East London). It has received more votes than the DA in three hung metropolitan municipalities in the central province of Gauteng, Johannesburg, Tshwane, the administrative capital of South Africa, and Ekurhuleni, but it needs coalition partners to form local governments. It has lost its outright majority in Ethekwini (Durban), shedding 30 seats in the city council and has to look for coalition partners there as well. Almost equal number of votes the two leading partners received in Gqeberha (Port-Elizabeth) with just 2564 votes (0,5%) more for DA. So, a coalition with one of them at the head is also inevitable there. The Democratic Alliance preserved its control over

Cape Town, the parliamentary capital, though with a reduced majority. Hence appears a unique role of smaller parties, which can play a role of kingmakers even with a small number of seats.

Naturally, it will take time to deeply analyse the causes of this dramatic setback, but the coming opinions are quite revealing. According to Dr Blade Nzimande, the ANC NEC member and the SACP General Secretary, who is also minister of higher education, science and technology, “factors contributing to the decline in voter turnout include internal divisions within the ANC, factional conduct, and situations where alliance partners (SACP and COSATU) were marginalised. “[...] we have initial observations to highlight. The results that started emerging were predictable. This is why during the campaign, we sought to turn the tide against or, at least, limit the extent of the decline. There were service delivery problems affecting a number of communities across the country. Problems within our broad movement, such as internal divisions and counter-campaigning of the ANC, factional conduct, and situations where Alliance partners were marginalised, resulting in divided communities and a failure to provide quality services”, Nzimande said.

He further emphasised the ANC needs COSATU and SACP to survive. “Those who think otherwise, those who think that the ANC can survive and do well by abandoning the Alliance, will cause more harm to the ANC and its nature and character. To allow that to take precedence would be tantamount to paving the way for the abandonment of the path of a national democratic revolution and strengthening the counter-revolutionary current, of which some elements are to be found within the ranks of our broad movement.” (Tarryn-Leigh 2021).

The representative of another member of the ANC-led alliance, COSATU’s national spokesperson Sizwe Pamla called the number of voters “disappointing but not shocking. Factionalism, corruption, mismanagement of the economy, SOEs [State owned enterprises], and municipalities. Load shedding and other myriads of reasons have led to voter apathy. Factionalism and infighting are some of the contributing factors” (Tarryn-Leigh 2021).

As distinct from his pre-election statements, President Ramaphosa took a conciliatory tone when he spoke at the presentation of the election results by the IEC. Having reminded that the election “was contested by a record 325 political parties and nearly 95,000 candidates, of whom over 1,500 were independent candidates, he continued: “If we are to make this a new and better era, we as leaders must put aside our differences and work together in a spirit of partnership, of co-operation, of collaboration and common purpose in the interests of the people of SA. At the end of the day, we all want the

same thing: to better the lives of the South African people... Let us turn the promises that we made on the campaign trail into reality. Let us unite for the common purpose of recovery and rebuilding (South African Government 2021b).

The election results were announced by the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa on November 4 in the evening, and it was reported that the ANC National Working Committee would soon convene an extended national working committee, which includes provincial leaders. Then the ruling party is set to hold a National General Council to decide on policy and constitutional matters to be followed by the 55th National elective conference in 2022 year and the 2024 general parliamentary and provincial elections.

The forthcoming period will not be easy for President Ramaphosa. "The ANC needs to start discussion with Cyril to serve one term, in 2024 we need strong leader", such a comment appeared in Internet. Zakhele Ndlovu, South African political analyst said: "The Zuma faction is to try and capitalise on the poor showing in the elections and try to get rid of Ramaphosa." A defeat of "the RET faction" strengthened Ramaphosa's position in the ANC. Besides, after his suspension Magashule is no more able to inflate the number of the party's branches and members in order to ensure more supporters at the forthcoming elective conference. However, Zuma is still popular, especially in KwaZulu Natal, a victim incumbent president and others those in the ANC who are allegedly connected with "the white monopoly capital".

True, so far there is no visible contender for the highest post, but such candidates will appear if Ramaphosa continues losing his initial popularity. The situation in South Africa has definitely stabilized after the tragic events of July 2021 and a proof of it was quiet and peaceful election void of significant incidents. However, some in South Africa believe that the past events are only a "tentative rehearsal" of the future, and in particular, the expected verdict of Zuma in the corruption trial may serve as a new "trigger".

There is a lot of talking about the need for "economic reforms" in South Africa but it is often reduced to further privatisation and "liberalisation" of the labour law. However, it seems that in order to ensure stability and prevent the repetition of such tragic events, along with improving the work of the government safety and other organs, it is necessary to ensure a real rise in the standard of living of the majority of South Africans. Is it possible without abandoning the current economic policy, which in South Africa is called "neoliberal" and strengthening the role of the state in the economy? That is the question.

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