Introduction

In all revolutions there is the paradoxical presence of circulation [...]. Western man has appeared superior and dominant, despite inferior demographics, because he appeared more rapid, because he is in effect the ‘super-quick’ ‘survivor’ (sur-vif); the French word vif concentrates at least three meanings: swiftness, speed likened to violence (from vive force, toucher au vif, etc.), movement likened to life itself.

Paul Virilio

2010 was a decade that began with newspaper headlines such as the following:

A trial of a scanner that produces “naked” images of passengers has begun at Manchester Airport. The authorities say it will speed up security checks by quickly revealing any concealed weapons or explosives (BBCNews, 13/October/2009).

I.e. that decade began with worries over security. This was nothing new of course. For years we have been asking ourselves questions...
such as: How can we guarantee the security of our means of transport? How can we strengthen that of our communications? How can we keep our ideology or our market safe? Etc. In this context, the press has recently been asking whether it is possible to be 100% certain that a person is not concealing a dangerous item on passing through an airport control. And curiously, if we stop to think about it, the answer is obvious: Yes, it is! There is a very simple procedure: strip the suspect naked. However, such an exercise is only simple in appearance. If the security controls at airports, at railway stations or in road transport are a nightmare, imagine for a second what would happen if, in addition to taking off our jackets, belts, and often shoes, we had to undress completely. What a Dantesque scenario would dominate the transport and traffic panorama! Luckily, this situation only rises from time to time. Nonetheless, technical solutions may be about to alter the aforementioned scenario. Indeed, the authorities in a number of countries have decided to install scanners at airports that allow people to be completely undressed without having to remove their clothes. The protests which have been voiced, quite reasonably, against this measure have been completely stifled by arguments based on security. Just a glance at the press in any European country in the last few days will confirm this affirmation.

Nonetheless, technical solutions may be about to alter the aforementioned scenario. Indeed, the authorities in a number of countries have decided to install scanners at airports that allow people to be completely undressed without having to remove their clothes. The protests which have been voiced, quite reasonably, against this measure have been completely stifled by arguments based on security. Just a glance at the press in any European country in the last few days will confirm this affirmation.

The example of scanners has not been a random choice to begin this article. It has to do with the fact that airports are truly a unique place to illustrate one of the most characteristic phenomena of our current societies: the need to manage mobility and security in unison. The uniqueness that airports present in this regard has already been underlined by various authors (ADEY, 2004; LYON, 2007). Lyon especially emphasises an argument put forward by Bauman (2000) which directly identifies mobility as the most defining feature of our present situation. Nonetheless, the author comes to the conclusion that mobility inevitably means a potential problem of security. This judgment leads him to favour and legitimise the monitoring processes in his analysis. Thus, for Lyon, if global mobility leads to global surveillance, it is because the former is a challenge to security, which according to the author, has become a trait so essential to modern states that a subtle shift from welfare to safety can be seen in them. This argument allows him to apply the term ‘safety state’ to define them. The most characteristic aspect of these analyses is that they present mobility and circulation as a risk or threat.

However, from our point of view security is much more than an excuse for legitimising procedures for surveillance and control, or a characteristic feature of contemporary states. It constitutes the very logic of such states. It is characterised by circulation and movement, and it operates as an authentic code that is capable of generating new forms of sociality and regimes of power. To explain all this properly we should first of all recall the notion of security that Michel Foucault offers in Security, Territory, Population. In this work, the link between security and movement is so strong that the latter appears as a necessary corollary of the former, and therefore never as its main threat. As Foucault explains, the security device only works if there is freedom, and this must be understood in a modern sense: not as a privilege or franchise associated with a person, but as the possibility of movement, of displacement, and a process of circulation of people and things. We shall secondly argue that Foucault’s approach can be developed much further by re-examining some of Michel Serres’s propo-
sals, and arguing that movement in itself is an encoding dimension that generates new social expressions, many of them closely linked with the production of security. We shall refer to these expressions as extitutions, employing a term coined by Michel Serres himself. Thirdly, we shall describe three examples of extitutions. In these we shall observe how they exist as the result of a trajectory, i.e. they are encodings of this, and how security is often unimaginable without taking into account the definition of a particular and specific movement. Finally, we shall conclude that the control regimes that arise and are applied in extitutions are directly related to the management of movement, and constitute an alternative device to that which Foucault called biopolitics. We have called this device Kinepolitics, thereby indicating the inextricable relationship that exists between movement and politics.

2 Michel Foucault and the notion of security

As some authors sustain (ELDEN, 2007), the recent publication of the courses that Michel Foucault conducted in the Collège from January 1971 until his death in June 1984, reveals a new dimension to his work. This is very “enlightening” for two reasons. Firstly, because it clarifies a good number of issues that only appeared as outlines in his books or with some obscure areas, and secondly, because it shows the interest that the author showed for some concepts at particular moments of his life, and later forgot or simply changed for others. This is the case, for instance, of the concept of security. This issue is crucial in the course entitled Security, territory, population (the 1977-1978 course). And although it appears diffusely in many of his works, in the course held the following year, entitled The Birth of Biopolitics (the 1978-1979 course), it is replaced by the idea of biopolitics.

Indeed, in the 1977-1978 course, the concept of security is so important that it appears as the set of devices that characterise our modernity and run counter to those of discipline. Whereas this second is characterised by spatial confinement and delimitation, the first refers to open spaces, landscapes and movement. Examples of security devices include urban planning, the accumulation of food to prevent famine, and vaccination campaigns (FOUCAULT, 2007). Such devices characterise what Foucault dubs societies of government or of security. In these, the overall economy of power is transformed and becomes dominated by technologies that provide assurance rather than punishment.

Security is characterised by establishing two types of relationship. The first of these is the relationship with the event. A strong interest emerges in dealing with the random and unexpected, work is carried out on possibilities and risks, and thus the techniques we recognise are developed to normalise populations. Security depends on material data and relies on sitting. The second relationship has to do with the milieu. Security is defined as the equipping of an environment on the basis of series of events that need to be regulated within a versatile and transformable framework. The milieu helps to explain the action at a distance of one body on another, and security intervenes in the medium to regulate these homogeneous conglomerates of individuals that we call a population. The main differences between the devices for discipline and those for security can be summed up in the following table:
Discipline | Security
---|---
- Centripedal: it isolates, confines and centres  
  - Everything is regulated and the detail is cancelled out  
  - The tension between the permitted and the prohibited is generated  
- Centrifugal: it generates extensive circuits  
  - It rests on the detail  
  - It seeks to regulate reality, apprehending something in the level of its nature

For Foucault, the milieu is that which is necessary to explain the action at a distance of one body on another, and it is the management of this milieu that is the main objective of security devices. However, and this is highly relevant, it does not operate by fixing and demarcating. For security devices, it is essential "to allow circulations to flow, controlling them, selecting the good and the bad, allowing things and people to move at all times; moving ceaselessly, going perpetually from one point to another, but in such a way that the dangers inherent in such circulations are cancelled out (FOUCAULT, 2007, p. 86). Therefore, management of the milieu cannot be considered based on an exhaustive, global surveillance. This does not of course mean that everything is allowed, that surveillance loses all meaning; rather that the dividing line between what is allowed and what is prohibited is no longer obvious, and in its place a milieu considered to be optimal is established, and then certain limits for what is acceptable that cannot be overstepped. Clearly not everything is allowed, yet permissiveness is indispensable. I.e. a limited “laissez-faire” is instituted.

Ultimately, security requires a dual movement. In the first place there is a physical movement – things, people and ideas move. And this circulation must not be prohibited or proscribed under any circumstances. It simply needs to be made secure. And secondly, there is an imaginary circulation, in which movement is instituted as one more dimension of reality that can be manipulated and transformed, i.e. managed. In this sense, Foucault insists that one should not understand circulation as being simply the material network that allows the movement of goods or people, but the circulation itself, i.e. the set of regulations, restrictions and limits, or conversely, facilities and incentives that permit transit (FOUCAULT, 2007). Nonetheless, Foucault’s analysis halts at this point. The issue is settled and closed in two very simple ways: either by converting mobility into a function of the territory and the milieu, whereby the important action is that which must be applied to this second one; or by transforming it into one more dimension of the population, becoming another variable to be regulated by certain areas of scientific knowledge. He does not go beyond this, and fails to clarify the role played by movement in delimiting social regulations *sui generis* or government regimes. In other words, at no time is movement itself considered as having effects, as being capable of generating its own social regulations. And, in this sense, neither does he warn that what he calls “assured milieu” is no more than one of these specific configurations in which security is expressed, and depends on the movement. In short, he did not envision that movement itself might be conceptualised as a code.

### 3 Movement as a code

It is not very hard to understand that all the examples of circulation that Foucault points to in *Security, territory, population* (goods, the circulation of the blood, armies, currency, trade, etc.) are currently a function of infor-
mation. And therefore, circulation and displacement are based on complex coding processes (LEVY, 1998; RHEINGOLD, 2000). In this sense, Michel Serres (1993) reminds us that cold, mechanical work based on the displacement and handling of solid bodies, rooted in the production of “form”, has long given way to hot work, to the era of energy, to the power of transforming things and handling fluids. And more recently, we have witnessed the emergence of a third stage. In this, we encode, we transmit messages, we decode, we decipher and we interpret missives. The characteristics of this stage are communication, interference, transmission, translation, distribution and interpretation (SERRES, 1993). In an extremely poetic way, this author considers that we work like angels, or put better, that we are angels – a word whose etymological meaning is a bearer of messages. Sometimes we bear them inscribed on our body, while at others we haul them with our hands. The arrival of a messenger is an ambiguous sign, an event that is somewhat unclear. It is an irruption of novelty. Economy, science, education, the media... all these areas depend on coding and decoding and on messages, and operate exclusively via them. Yet the angels are not a caste of privileged beings. We should be under no illusions: they are the labourers of the universe (SERRES, 1993). Complex, chaotic, daring, displaced in arrhythmic pulses, from scattered locations, intermittent, twinkling, they move towards several attempts, achieved or failed, to weave systems, durations. They create flows, waves. The proliferation of messengers is nothing more than the proliferation of codes in movement, and involves the visibility of motility in all its dimensions.

Movement is a relatively new subject to be included in the agenda of social sciences. Among those pioneering its analysis are Paul Virilio (2007) and Zigmun Bauman (1999). They have shown that the movement of people, things, information and ideas is central to our daily lives. The issue has become so relevant that John Urry (2007) has postulated that there is a “new paradigm of mobility” in social thinking. This allows phenomena that have thus far been opaque to be made visible, for example: (a) the emergence of new exclusion devices that affect large populations, (b) the constitution of networks and transnational social movements, (c) the strong interdependence between changes in physical movement and electronic communications, etc. Among the most important effects of this new dynamics is the reorganisation of old institutions, the globalisation of diseases until now local, and the transformation of education and of social life. Mobility has two facets. It presents itself simultaneously both as an analysis of the different systems of movement that have been developed historically, and as an argument that allows us to analyse our present.

Movement restructures social and symbolic space and power relationships. However, as Bill Maurer (2004) has pointed out, the recent discussions on mobility are based on several assumptions that are dealt with in a completely uncritical way. Specifically, it is assumed that movement per se generates change, which is self-evident, and that the main characteristic of our present is the enormous capacity for mobility that we have available to us. Given this state of affairs, it is essential to ask ourselves what counts as movement and what does not. While the movement of thousands of tourists through the international circuits prepared for such an event is completely legitimate, the movement of the last nomadic Tuareg families through countries around the Sahara
is considered illegitimate, and is prohibited and persecuted. Faced with the clear, obvious and ethereal image of movement offered by current descriptions of mobility, we must assume that we are faced with a multitude of practices that establish the conditions for what is considered movement or not, or mobility that is legitimate or illegitimate. In short, mobility is not something that is obvious and self-evident. It constitutes a precarious achievement that requires an effort and the establishment of a set of practices and definitions that either allow or refuse it.

However, there are two major issues that systematically go unnoticed in the previous discussions on movement. The first of these refers to the intimate relationship that exists between movement and life or the living. As Michel Serres (1994) affirms, life hides its secret in its propagation over time and space, based on small and unexpected relationships, on brief and local singularities, associated by closeness and remoteness. Life – close and short, fragile and folded, obstinate and connected – must be sought for in its unique prolongation, in the event that always opens with its movement of expansion. Life encodes its reality in this expansion, and is at the same time defined and encoded as such a life by its perpetual movement. The second issue that must be addressed has to do with the fact that movement itself should be considered as a code or an act of encoding. Michel Serres (1980) illustrates this well by using the example of a football match. In this way, each player obtains his identity because the ball establishes his relationship to the others as a result of his position with regard to the ball or the trajectory that this marks out. In this way, each player and his identity is nothing more than a mode of activity that the trajectory of the ball opens and closes.

The ball has no meaning in itself. However, as it traces its trajectory, in flight, passing from one foot to another, from hand to hand, from head to head, it weaves together a group. In fact it defines two groups, those that possess the ball and are within its movement, and those that do not have it and are outside. In addition, it organises the bodies of the players, who move in relation to its path, in anticipation of it or as a retroactive effect of its passage. The movement of the ball is itself a code. Thus the members of the group are members to the extent that they become something in relation to this movement. Moreover, each player recognises each other as adversaries and represent themselves as a group.

One is before or after, passing at a distance or towards the ball. The player’s body is a material link between two phases of the passage of the ball, just as a preposition is in a sentence. Neither subject nor object, only the means of passage (SERRES, 1980, p. 226).

The lesson to be drawn from Serres’s proposals is that movement is itself an act of encoding. It has effects and generates realities, and it distributes responsibilities and positions. Viewed from this perspective, a new light is cast on the relationship that Foucault establi-
shes between movement and security. Both terms appear inextricably related because the movements that he describes in his security devices are in fact trajectories that are defining stable social formations which will come to be described as secure. In other words, movement is producing “secure milieus”.

4 Extitutions: three tales of new social orderings

In Michel Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical analyses there are always buildings present, such as the school, the workshop, the factory, the hospital, the asylum, the prison or the barracks. All of these represent core institutions that are very important in our society. However, if there is something that characterises our present situation, it is that most of these old institutions have entered into a crisis and have transformed their appearance (DUBET, 2002). New social formations have derived from these, ones that flee from walls and confinement. In some cases these evoke their predecessors, in fact they often have the same name, but they need to be looked at anew and a different semantics employed for their conceptualisation. They are distanced from the building, from the architectural plan and from geometry. They are not something closed but rather open, and therefore they circulate (SERRES, 1994). They are social orderings rooted in the very existence of movement. We shall call these entities ‘extitutions’ – adopting a term used by Michel Serres (1994). The prefix “in-” is transformed into “ex-” to connote a “outside” or “beyond” rather than an “inside” or “inwards” and to show the primacy of movement over rest. In addition, in many of them, security is the essential horizon that configures this movement. Below we shall examine three examples of extitutions:

4.1 Science: secure and reliable knowledge is only possible in movement

In our institutes and universities we learn that science is the best reliable and secure device for producing knowledge that we know. Its methodological and epistemological conditions ensure this characteristic. However, on a grey morning when we accompanied some colleagues to a molecular biology laboratory in Barcelona, we discovered that perhaps this reliability and security depended on a more basic element. We were embarking on an ethnographic study (DOMENECH; TIRADO, 2009), and in fact that day, all the members of the laboratory were awaiting the arrival of an important, expensive and sophisticated device: a mass spectrometer. When the delivery van arrived, something unexpected occurred: they couldn’t get the spectrometer into the laboratory. Of course, its purchasers knew that the device was enormous and very heavy, and for that reason they had asked the supplier to pack it in small units. Well, no one had expected that these small units would, in turn, be packed together in one single very large box. The problem was simply that the doorway was too small to allow this huge package to pass through, and the laboratory had no fork-lift truck to move it. The researchers observing the scene grumbled and complained openly. They appealed to the building’s architect and accused him of not knowing how to build laboratories. The question was: How should a laboratory be built? What specific attributes should such a building have? The biology lab did not appear to be open enough to be able to perform its activity normally. They called for fewer walls
and wider doorways. All of this left us deeply confused: did we not have the image of laboratories as being closed spaces? Is the laboratory an entity that tends towards that which is public and open, or that which is private and closed? Should it be a building or something else? In reality these are very old questions. In fact they hail back to the emergence in Europe of the first laboratories and the constitution of science (SHAPIN; SCHAFFER, 1985).

The laboratory was born amidst an intense debate about the nature of its space. The early experimenters insisted on the public nature of their activity. It could hardly be otherwise, given the aspirations of truth involved: the search for an absolutely reliable and secure knowledge. And this proposal justifies claiming the laboratory as a place of experimentation. This is a counterpart to the alchemist’s private, isolated, closed, and hidden refuge. The laboratory is the place for public “facts”. In it the experimenters work side by side, they discuss, and what is more important, they observe and share the same system of visibility. The presence of witnesses is a crucial aspect for incipient science. Indeed, the testimony of the relevant community is what ensures that the status of “fact” is attributed to the result of the various experiments.

We know, however, that Hobbes’s thinking opposed the above scenario. According to him, the laboratory is far from being the re-public declared by the experimenters. Hobbes explains that not everyone has the right of access to Gresham College, the building in which the members of the Royal Society meet to experiment. His argument refers to the presence of a “master” who decides who may attend the experiment and who may not, who is an appropriate and qualified witness, and who falls outside of that category; which people guarantee

the generation of a safe and reliable knowledge, and which others only contribute confusion and error (SHAPIN; SHAFFER, 1985).

Both Hobbes and the scientists of his age (exemplified by the figure of Boyle) are right. The structure of the early laboratories delimited a public space with restricted access. In fact, the parties involved in the debate are talking about different things. Hobbes bases his argument on an exclusively physical conception of the laboratory. He has in mind a building, a closed place, arranged geometrically for the meeting of individuals. He is thinking of an institution. Boyle, in contrast, is imagining a space that overflows the walls of the building. He is thinking of a community that does not need to meet physically in order to be a group, and one that does not need to assemble in a building in order to act like a group. Yet we could then ask: how does such a community organise and maintain itself?

In order to answer this question it must be understood that Boyle is defining the laboratory as an extitution. Firstly, it is a virtual space in which everyone can monitor an experiment. It is not exactly a building, but rather a concept that describes the blend of heterogeneous elements, distributed over different times and places, designed to produce knowledge. Secondly, the laboratory space is a multitude of spaces. In reality it constitutes a network of laboratories around which, and for which, the scientists move. Thus, in order to understand the development of the air pump (one of Boyle’s inventions) we need to follow the experimenters (Boyle, Huygens, Schott, etc.), the machines and the letters on their journeys through London, Paris, The Hague, Magdeburg, etc. From one experimenting centre to another, they move ceaselessly. In this arrangement of centres and movement the
production of habits typical of institutions does not flourish. It is impossible to find two identical journeys, two devices that are the same, two experiments that are completely similar, etc. Directions and reference points change continually. Nonetheless, totalities emerge, and a group is prefigured. Moreover, these Europe-wide journeys ensure that science becomes a universal knowledge and one with a certain level of reliability and security. Without all these exchanges, knowledge would never be put in doubt, tested, verified and/or rejected. It is clear that scientific practice requires buildings (buildings with a plan, of course), but they need to be porous, to have openings of multiple sizes, bridges and connections that allow things to enter and leave. It is impossible to define them as closed circles or independent variables. The laboratory is one more node in a set of trajectories delimited by the movement of people and things.

Bruno Latour (1987, 1999) has demonstrated this issue brilliantly. If we wish to understand science, we have to move and follow the scientists in their movements. In short, science has been configured, since its emergence, as an enormous extitution. Its aim is reliable and secure knowledge, and for such a thing it needs circulation to exist. Moreover, science is encoded as a whole, and acquires its maximum meaning in the paths that people and objects continually trace.

4.2 Movement encodes security and care in mental illness

A few years ago, a mental health project entitled “Pla de Serveis Individualitzat [Plan for Individualised Services]” (PSI) was implemented in Catalonia (Quaderns de Salut Mental, 2003). This is a proposal for organising the process of managing severe mental disorders (SMD). It came into being in a climate of crisis in the system of conventional care, and of denunciation of the serious social problems that this implied. The project’s main goal was to:

Adapt the social and health services to the specific needs of each patient as closely as possible to their natural environment, thereby strengthening the continuity of care (PSI, 2003, p. 23).

The PSI aims to prevent any person with a SMD from falling through the health care safety net. Curiously, the way to ensure this does not involve following an institutional scheme (increased number of centres, therapists, etc.), but precisely the creation of a path or movement. In order to understand the philosophy of this project fully, it should be explained that it is based on the so-called “case management” system (DOMENECH et al., 1999). I.e., each client in the programme is an individual case that receives individualised management. Its regulating principles are: a) personal management of cases; (b) the “locus” of care is the community; (c) there is flexibility in the frequency of care, length of time and places for the contacts, but firmness in aspects such as medication; (d) the programme should achieve as much individualisation as possible, while paying special attention to two maxims: strengthening health capacities before treating the pathology, and emphasising the maximum amount of autonomy and accountability for the user.

Compared to traditional care commitments based on institutional structures and places, the PSI presents a model in which each individual case is seen as an event which involves and includes all the institutions taking part in the programme. The proposed programmes
and their corresponding individualised projects can be summarised, together with the places or structures that provide them (i.e. hospitals, work, families, rehabilitation centres, etc.), as horizontal ordering processes that run through them from one part to another. The PSI incorporates a logic in which the horizontal trajectories running through traditional institutions such as the “Hospital,” the “Day Centre”, the “Family”, the “Home” or “Work” are observed. In addition, there is a person working as a coordinator for each individualised project; i.e. a coordinator for every twenty clients/patients. This figure is known as the “case monitor” (if the individual is independent from the providing structures), or a “key worker” (if the person occupies a place in any of these structures).

In fact, the PSI as a whole is an extitution that brings together a multitude of traditional care centres and resources, whose purpose is to ensure security and care for people affected by severe mental disorders, and which is structured along the following lines:

a) It does not have a central building as a point of reference. The programme involves a host of buildings − day hospitals, town halls, schools, homes, psychiatric hospitals, factories and social centres. Yet, in fact, it neither resides nor is implemented in any of these. It is not possible to inhabit the PSI. The different elements of the plan exist around it and frequent it, yet are dispersed in an open space.

b) The PSI takes on the configuration of a network. In this sense, the concept of extitution is similar to the notion of a fabric. The programme draws together different entities, and generates heterogeneous conglomerates. There are clients, families, diagnostics, medications, hospitals, diseases, social policies, documents all acquiring the same epistemic relevance. To alter one of those elements is to alter the whole fabric and reconfigure in turn the identity and meaning of each element.

c) In the PSI there is no clearly opposing inside/outside. Institutions have very clear limits, with a perfectly established system of inclusion-exclusion. Above all, they establish a system with a clear centre and peripheries. Extitutions do not possess this differentiation; they are simply pure limit. There are elements and entities that are simply able or unable to connect with the extitution, nothing more. In our case, there are elements that can either be connected with the programme at a given moment or not. Connecting with the programme means becoming a client, a case monitor, a family, an employer, an intelligence quotient, a user, etc. The programme is not a surface capable of being geometrised. Rather, it is an amalgam of changing connections and associations. What counts are the positions, vicinities, proximities, distances, adherences or accumulation ratios. The community that the PSI creates is heterogeneous, and allows elements that have different times and spaces to combine in a single community.

d) Coordinators are a key figure in the project. They form the third element in the patient-health programme relationship. With their movement and trajectory they connect the different elements of the PSI. We should remember that one of the characteristics of this figure is the flexibility in frequency, and the absence of restrictions regarding contact times and places. The coordinator’s movements are highly unpredictable. It is a movement that is local, and flexible in terms of how it is carried out. It is he or she who decides who to visit, negotiates the place with the client, and changes the appointment to suit the patient’s family. If there are traffic problems, they can chan-
ge their mind and visit another member of the programme, etc. This tangle of local and discontinuous movements has a completely global effect. These movements create a totality; one that is fragile, uncertain and changing, but in the end an ordering.

The PSI offers high levels of security and care for people affected by a severe mental disorder, but such elements are defined and operate due to the establishment of a movement or trajectory. This encodes what will be regarded as safe or not, what will be understood by care or not. And moreover, if one day, for whatever reason, this trajectory should disappear, the whole programme would cease to operate.

4.3 Simap: security and movement in telecare

Some months ago we began to analyse (TIRADO et al., 2009) one of the great technological innovations that has promoted the recent Spanish Law for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Care for People in Situation of Dependency: telecare devices. In spirit, this law enshrines the desire to transform former care practices, especially those aimed at people with serious physical disabilities of a functional or cognitive nature. It is well known that in the case of dementias, in order to prevent those affected from getting lost frequently on leaving their homes or wandering about aimlessly, relatives and caregivers end up restricting these people’s freedom of movement, and confine them at home. (TIRADO et al., 2009).

In this context, telecare introduces a new approach to care, and out attention was drawn particularly to a new mobile telecare device known as SIMAP. It is aimed specifically at people with mild or moderate cognitive impairment, and consists of a tracking system that uses mobile telephony and GPS (Global Positioning Systems) to determine the position of a subject with a margin of error of 5 metres. The service consists of a small mobile device with a GPS receiver and a GSM modem, attached to the trouser belt-loop or skirt of people affected by dementia, which allows the authorised person (relative or caregiver) to know the wearer’s movements and location at all times. These coordinates are updated every three minutes, and in case the user enters into a building or an area without coverage, it emits a signal indicating that this is not the position in real time, but rather the last one received. In addition, it is possible to access a register that systematically saves a record of each of the locations detected in each update. Access to this information by the caregivers is provided via a Red Cross Contact Centre, via an SMS request or by direct consultation over the internet.

Thus it allows the caregiver to know the location of the person wearing the device at all times, and thanks to a pre-configured program of warnings and alarms, to detect potentially dangerous situations. For this reason, on the basis of the habits and daily movements of the people with dementia, the relatives can map out in advance the area in which the wearer can move. They establish a virtual geographical area around the wearer’s home – 250 to 500 metres approximately – and are alerted if the user abandons the safe area. The alarm in the control centre is also activated in the event that the device detects that the user is moving at a speed of more than 35 km/h, which would mean that they are using some means of transport. This mapping, which is personalised for each user, sets out the areas that are safe and those that are not (such as motorways, the underground, roads, etc.), and can even specify locations that are not identified officially (es-
pecially useful in rural contexts). In response to the progression of degenerative disease, the initial mapping must be updated periodically, reducing the size of its safe areas and incorporating new points of risk.

The SIMAP directly and explicitly defends mobility as a correlate for quality of life. In fact, the advertising which promotes the service explicitly states:

“Shall we go out to play?” SIMAP gives them back their freedom and gives you back your peace of mind”

The device re-establishes mobility as a re-vindication of the quality of life of its users, and that fact enables the possibility of freedom and peace of mind. Yet, for who, we might ask. Well, both for the users and their caregivers or those who are normally responsible for them. If the user is able to leave the house, and the caregiver does not have to maintain a constant and direct vigilance, reducing the physical restrictions in the domestic sphere reduces the anxiety and stress experienced by the caregiver and increases the quality of life for all the people involved in the care situation. Yet in addition the device deploys far beyond the level of a mere technical solution, and offers a second dimension of reality that has to do with the sphere of affection and welfare. In this sense, the SIMAP deploys a set of practices that involve affections, ethical claims and political formulations about its users. In these, for example, capital and movement are fused into a single value. The use of the device means enjoying mobility as the welfare capital for both users and for caregivers. The service makes this very clear by insisting that they are promoting:

“The peace of mind that comes from knowing that your relative is enjoying his or her freedom safely”

This mobility is formulated like capital; a thing that can be acquired, purchased or exchanged. However, the GPS location systems do not claim any type of movement, or do so in an abstract sense. Just the opposite. Any movement is not valid, in fact, any movement not defined as such. In the case of people with some kind of dementia or cognitive impairment, only movement that allows a permanent location of this person and the detection of potentially dangerous situations in connection with his or her geographical position is considered to be a “good movement”. Without the device which offers this security, mobility is pure risk, and an unintended consequence of a disorder that must be controlled. Thus the SIMAP does not raise a question with regard to movement as such. It is not a question of seeking to restore the natural movement of the sick person or the habits of movement that this person enjoyed prior to the disorder. The device installs its own mobility, with its map of geographical movement, its risk areas, boundaries, etc. The SIMAP offers a value that has to do with a new encoding of a body’s lost power, and with the control of the disease or handicap which it suffers. I.e. it establishes its own movement reality, its own regime of motility; and in this, biology and economics unite in a seamless fabric.

The SIMAP is another good example of an extitution. In it we clearly perceive a double encoding operated by movement itself. On the one hand, without it there would be no service. I.e. we would not have the care, security, peace of mind and quality of life that sufferers and caregivers acquire thanks to the device. Yet, on the other hand, the possibility of maintai-
ning mobility redefines the sufferers themselves and their illness for us. Or to put it another way, the movement that the existence of the device makes possible re-encodes the haphazard and dangerous movement that appears with the onset of the pathology.

5 How extitutions work

What do all the above examples show? They illustrate three interesting questions. Firstly, something that is very evident: the old institutions are being replaced by another type of social orderings; one that are not confined either to the physical limits nor to the symbolic boundaries of the former. Secondly, they show how, by acting locally, affecting each individual, and tracing various paths (sometimes direct, others contrary) from situations that are absolutely local to more global ones, extitutions express the adjustment of several multiplicities as a result of the existence of a movement or trajectory. This is encoded as totalities or globalities with meaning, and constitutes its true raison d’être. And thirdly, our examples indicate that the association between movement and danger is as simplistic and uninformative as the suggestion that living is a risk. Movement or circulation forms an essential part of our existence. In fact, it is an establishing element of it. Differentiating the two dimensions makes no sense. If we seek to understand our current lifestyles, we need to examine the role that movement exercises in encoding them.

And in this sense it is interesting to understand the main differences that exist between extitutions and institutions. Various authors (EWALD, 1990) have shown how a hard materiality predominates in the case of the latter. Stone occupies the position of God and establishes itself as the centre of all judgment. In contrast, the extitution establishes itself in what we might call a soft materiality. We have buildings, but they occupy a secondary position in relation to movement; the former needs to be porous and the trajectory gives each of the players involved their role and definition. In short, its materiality is diffuse. The institution is defined using levels, it is planned. The extitution has overlapping levels and geometric arrangements in a topological fabric. Hard materiality allows the institution to establish relationships that are weighty, repetitive and well-defined. Those established in an extitution will be variable and floating. In this way, the former creates routines that lead to an enduring and constant sociality. The latter, in contrast, only shows the possibility of movement. And an increasing amount of movement. And this leads it to create a kind of fluctuating sociality. As a result of this, the institution retains a memory for its social tie, in the extitution only a momentary performativity occurs. The institution deploys some kind of confinement, either physical or symbolic. The extitution is like a great apparatus for capturing, incorporating and connecting.

6 Conclusion from biopolitics to kinepolitics

Our current concern about security gives an especially novel value to the analysis that Foucault made of the concept in one of his best-known seminars (1977-1978 course). In this text we have re-examined that course and highlighted its relevance, and in accordance with the approaches set out in it we have shown how security and movement are inextricably connected. In our present analysis, one refers
directly to the other, and to suggest that they
are conflicting or mutually threatening ele-
ments seems to us to be nonsensical. Rather
we have gone beyond this idea, and we have
argued that in order to analyse the role that
movement plays in our lives we must under-
stand that it operates as an encoder. In other
words, it generates social formations that are
based on the very existence of paths or move-
ment. We have dubbed such formations exti-
tutions, and we have shown, finally, how these
differ in their characteristics from the old ins-
titutions.

In fact, in the 1978-1979 course, given a
year later, Foucault abandoned the notion of
security and replaced it with that of biopolitics.
This transformation had two important con-
sequences in his thinking. Firstly, the author
discovered a concept that pointed to a historic
moment in which life and the living became the
terrain of political strife and economic strate-
gies. I.e. the line of thinking turned to dealing
with the consideration of the devices that have
acted through life as an object and subject in
order to generate power relationships. Secon-
dly, these exercises were linked directly to the
action of the old institutional structures (the
prison, workshop, school, etc.). In this sense,
Foucault describes magnificently how their ac-
tivity, standards and truth games have a direct
impact on our bodies as machines and as a
species for generating populations. And the-
se will be understood as the privileged aim of
the governing action of liberalism (FOUCAULT,
2008).

The extitutions that we have referred to in
these pages point in a different direction. Our
brief accounts define a set of practices and
transformations that show that the diagram of
action encoded by biopolitical behaviour opens
up and gives way to practices, resources and
technologies that operate in, and because of,
movement. We are therefore witnessing the
birth of devices that aspire to regulate and ma-
nage movement and paths without having to
prohibit or revoke them. What notions should
we use to understand the power relationships
and resistance in extitutions? Obviously biopo-
litical action, in its broad sense of life mana-
gement, is not disappearing, and maintains a
certain analytical capacity. Yet it can indeed be
said to be subsumed in the apparently simpler
process that is portrayed in our accounts, i.e.
of establishing systems of motility. In other
words: it is included in the process of uniting
biology and movement. This new conjunction,
and the devices that are created from this, we
have dubbed kinepolitics. The concept unites
two words: “politics”, and the Greek expres-
sion kine (movement). And in the same way
that biopolitics describes a device that sub-
sumes that of discipline, we understand that ki-
nepolitics is portrayed as a new one, which in
turn subsumes that of biopolitics. Its descrip-
tion and analysis represent a future challenge
for social science.
References


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