Realidades para virem-a-ser: sobre cosmopolíticas

Realities to be-come: on cosmopolitics

1 Introduction

To assume that all things we want to describe – humans and non-humans alike – can be done so properly only in terms of ‘societies’, requires a contrast – a momentum of cosmopolitics – to the very abstract distinctions upon which our classical understanding of sociology and its key terms rests: ‘The social’ as defined in opposition to ‘the non-social’, ‘society’ in opposition to ‘nature’. The concept of cosmopolitics tries to avoid such modernist strategy that A. N. Whitehead called ‘bifurcation of nature’ (cf. WHITEHEAD, 1978, 2000). The inventive production of contrasts names a cosmopolitical tool which does not attempt to denounce, debunk, replace or overcome abstract, exclusivist oppositions that suggest divisions as ‘either...or’-relations. Rather, as the Belgian philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers stresses, ‘the contrast will have to be celebrated in the manner of a new existent, adding a new dimension to the cosmos’ (STENGERS, 2011, p. 513). Cosmopolitics, then, engages with ‘habits we experiment with in order to become capable of new experiences’ (STENGERS, 2001, p. 241) and opens up the possibility of agency of the non-expected Other, the non-normal, the non-human, the non-social, the un-common. ‘The Other is the existence of a possible world’, as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1994, p. 17-18) have put it. It is ‘the condition for our passing from one world to another. The Other [...] makes the world go by.’

Keywords: Cosmopolitics. Technology. Ontology. Whitehead.

mension to the cosmos’ (STENGERS, 2011, p. 513). Cosmopolitics, then, engages with ‘habits we experiment with in order to become capable of new experiences’ (STENGERS, 2001, p. 241) and opens up the possibility of agency of the non-expected Other, the non-normal, the non-human, the non-social, the un-common. ‘The Other is the existence of a possible world’, as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1994, p. 17-18) have put it. It is ‘the condition for our passing from one world to another. The Other [...] makes the world go by.’

Cosmopolitics, as I would like to suggest, draws our attention to practices as a mode of creative resistance to supposedly given, normal or hegemonic realities and related divisions that bring these realities into existence. It opens up the space for a cosmopolitical sociology as a provocative research agenda in as much as it tries to resist to merely represent social reality but to create it instead. Beyond mere description, cosmopolitical sociology aims to fabricate possible contrasts to the common economy of knowledge production of social realities. Cosmopolitical sociology, then, is through and through a political endeavour that tackles our ‘lack of resistance to the present’ (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1994). Thereby, as Bruno Latour has argued, the notion of ‘cosmos’ and ‘politics’ are relational terms:

‘Cosmos protects against the premature closure of politics, and politics against the premature closure of cosmos. [...] if cosmos is to mean anything, it must embrace, literally, everything – including all the vast numbers of non-human entities making humans act (LATOUR, 2004, p. 454).

Such a reading of cosmopolitics names a visible contrast to classical accounts of ‘critical theories of cosmopolitanism’ that find their origin in Immanuel Kant’s ‘cosmopolitanism’.1 Following Stengers, cosmopolitics is ‘not designed primarily for “generalists”; it has meaning only in concrete situations where practitioners operate’ (STENGERS, 2005, p. 994). Hence, the powerful and asymmetric division between theory and practice whereby practices are meant to fill in the empty boxes of ‘generalizing theoreticians’ (ibid) is resisted. Rather, a cosmopolitical understanding of practices is ‘actively linked with the concept of minority’: ‘practices diverge, and their divergence, not to be confused with contradiction, makes them recalcitrant to any consensual definition of a common good [or social order, MS] that would assign them roles and turn them into functional parts of public [social, MS] order’ (STEN- GERS, 2010b, p. 16). Cosmopolitical sociology aims not to denounce or eliminate realities but to produce and construct situated contrasts to the different modes of normalization, which provoke a lack of resistance to the present in the first place. These situated contrasts are enabled by practices as they emerge in the way sociologists are connected with the respective field of research. Such a connection is a risky relation since it is experimental in character insofar as the objects of research, i.e. the field and its actors – human and nonhuman alike – may ‘object to’ the views and strategies of the social researcher.2 The researcher on the other hand – enacted by the objects researched – is nevertheless meant to be a good practitioner as well. S/he is thought to create a coherent account of the empirical ‘matters of concern’

1 Whenever the notion ‘cosmopolitanism’ is used, it refers to the Greek/Kantian tradition.
2 See e.g. Haraway (1988).
(LATOUR, 2005), which enables a possible contrast that diverges from the researcher’s common modes of description and perception of the very situation (cf. LATIMER; SKEGGS, 2011).

2 Thinking ‘Societies’ beyond the ‘Bifurcation of Nature’

From their research experience, both social and naturalist scientists know very well that human routines and institutionalized settings or functions, devices, technologies and artefacts, which are considered ‘facts’, are the very achievement of collective action of heterogeneous entities, human and nonhuman. It is precisely the very collective action that brings these emerging ‘facts’ into being, i.e. the creative process by which these relations gain local endurance, that turns invisible and mute once ‘facts’ become human routine or technology. This intriguing relation between the achievement of collective action that relates heterogeneous actors with diverging practices and supposedly ‘matter of facts’ names the very strange and riddling double bind of social realities: The more entities – human and nonhuman alike – become social (gain/have endurance) the more these entities appear as ‘given’ facts and not as ‘achieved’ relations of diverging practices. It names a rather seductive situation provoking the risk of what A.N. Whitehead (1978) called ‘the fallacy of misplaced concreteness’. The latter conflates the abstract with the concrete, explaining and fixing the latter by the former. In our case there are at least two ways of possible misplacement: 1) To deny matter of facts as being fabricated by the collective achievements of diverging practices, or 2) to deny their ‘factish’ reality in the process of creating novel realities and to treat them as mere ‘fetishes’ instead (cf. LATOUR, 1999; 2010). The first misplacement would fix entities as mere facts and thereby rendering the lively histories invisible which would tell about heterogeneous actors and diverging practices that fabricate the multiplicity of facts. The second misplacement would render ‘facts’ as mere systems of belief, as blank surfaces onto which we project our manipulations, values, desires, feelings and emotions etc., easily to be dismissed by the critical mind as nothing in itself, a cosa non grata which only has been erroneously been taken as an autonomous object, powerfully actor, a thing in itself (ibid).

For us moderns, the seduction of the double bind of social realities led to a curious but well-established form of disciplined differentiation between the realm of ‘collective achievement’ belonging to ‘society’ analyzed by social scientists and the realm of ‘facts’ as part of ‘nature’ analysed by natural scientists. For sociologists ‘the social’ appears to be the most normal and powerful tool to describe and explain the complexity of the world we live in. It also functions as a marker of difference to other disciplines and sciences. Thus, for sociologists it is similarly normal and normalized to defend and define ‘the social’ against the natural, biological, physical, psychological or spiritual in order to resist the lure of naturalizing, individualizing or ontologizing reality. By doing so, sociologists – un/wittingly – stabilize the aforementioned very modern mode of division that cosmopolitan sociologists try to resist: the bifurcation of nature. The philosopher Whitehead stresses:

No perplexity concerning the object of knowledge can be solved by saying there is a mind knowing. [...] What I am essentially protesting against is the bifurcation of nature into two systems of reality, which, in so far they
are real, are real in different senses. [...] Another way of phrasing this theory which I am arguing against is to bifurcate nature into two divisions, namely onto the nature apprehended in awareness and the nature which is the cause of awareness (WHITEHEAD, 1995, p. 30).

Obviously, ‘the social’ as being used and defended by most classical sociologists radicalizes such a bifurcation, since it is not merely ‘the mind’ knowing, but ‘society’ that apprehends and knows ‘nature’ by ‘social awareness’ or ‘social construction’ that apprehends ‘the mind’ and ‘nature’. ‘Society’ functions as a placeholder for a theory of ‘social additions’ to ‘psychic additions’ and – like the latter – would leave to nature merely the molecules and the radiant energy which influences the mind towards that perception’ (WHITEHEAD, 1995, p. 29). For classical sociologists ‘society’ is connected to ‘nature’, but the bond has been lost, only ‘society’ is aware of, perceives and constructs the ‘mind’ and ‘nature’ (cf. SCHILLMEIER, 2008).

For natural scientist, the bifurcation of nature draws their attention merely to the ‘causes of awareness’, be it molecules, electrons, atoms, neutrinos etc.; the ‘social additions’ to which sociologists draw attention, are more or less inconvenient complications. The discussions concerning e.g. human genome project, GMOs, stem cells, nanotechnologies, atomic energy etc. are vivid examples of practicing the bifurcation of nature. This decisive and highly modernistic way of solving the double bind of social reality not only equates the relationship between ‘collective action’ and ‘facts’ with the relationship between ‘society’ and ‘nature’, but treats social and natural facts as competing, mutually exclusive and thus confrontational realities. By representing two self-referential realities, ‘society’ and ‘nature’, the social and natural scientist’s argument gain full strength, coherence and validity by relating the differences of their mode of explanation in a disjunctive manner of the ‘either-or’. In effect, social sciences are busy with demystifying natural facts as emerging from within human society in order not to be conflated with natural scientists, who for their part are thought to treat facts as ‘truths’ belonging to nature and not society.5. ‘Society’ and ‘nature’ became the struggle between ‘“master words”’, as Isabelle Stengers would say, ‘which can be used to pass judgement without having to encounter or experience, which can be used to avoid turning the practices of others as witnesses of a problem that is liable to “frighten” us, that is liable to call into question our own modern requirements’ (STENGERS, 2011, p. 330). Obviously, such a mode of relating differences mimics a war like ‘them or us’ situation,6 it conquers and eliminates in order to gain the respective explanatory power of defining reality: Whereas social sciences add the social reality to increase the complexity of reality, natural sciences are supposed to eliminate the social factor to let nature speak. At the same time though the moderns are proud of having ‘pacified’ the confrontational way of divisions by disciplining the ‘either-or’ through the exhibition of tolerance.

5 Obviously, this does not mean that a ‘social fact’ cannot be treated as a ‘natural fact’. Quite on the contrary, it was Émile Durkheim’s famous maxim in his ‘Rules of Sociological Method’ (1982) to treat social facts as things. He radicalized the method of separating off individual facts from social facts and explaining the former reality through the latter. For his antipode Gabriel Tarde (2009) such a strategy was mistaking the explanation with what has to be explained. Moreover, his concept of ‘thing’ was more than meagre (cf. SCHILLMEIER, 2008; 2012b).

6 In that sense, the polemic controversies of the so-called ‘science wars’ was predictable, as Stengers rightly points out (and predicted). See Stengers (2001, 2010a, b).

---

4 At the same though, the created objects are constantly associating and refiguring what is meant to set apart: ‘society’ and ‘nature’. See e.g. Latour (1999), Michael (2000).
'Nothing is easier for modern man than tolerance'; proud ‘to be ‘adults’, the moderns ‘are capable of confronting a world stripped of its guarantees and enchantments’ (STENGERS, 2011, p. 303). Consequently, social scientists and natural scientists tolerate the respective other by sharing the idea that what is ‘known’ as either ‘social’ or ‘natural’ needs to be protected and armed, since it is able to disqualify the respective reality of the other as not relevant, as a mere added reality to the realm of one’s own reality, or as a danger to lay into the production of each regimes of reality and related forms of knowledge. At the same time, the moderns celebrate such niceties of relating as a civilized way of enduring contingency: Through the ‘curse of tolerance’ (STENGERS, 2011, p. 303) it became a ‘stubborn fact’ (WHITEHEAD, 1978) of modern thought that the question concerning the nature of social things – human and non-human alike – requires the very bifurcation of nature.

Since the beginning of 19th century this let to another long-lasting scenario of the ‘great divide’, between scientific experts and lay people, that is ‘between the scientific, rational, or objective approach to a situation and the beliefs customs, habits, illusions [...] that define the actors’ (STENGERS, 2011, p. 308). To demystify the expertocratic (self-) understanding of science, social scientists have been keen to address the social construction of scientific facts and knowledge by outlining precisely the non-scientific beliefs, customs, habits, and illusions as being the core set of scientific practices. Although it is of great importance to trouble any claim of authority to the truth, the social constructionist attempt missed out to address the specificities and singularity of experimental scientific practices: the creation of experimental objects. The creation of the experimental device creates, gives birth to a new relation of forces: ‘The art of the experimenter is in league with power: the invention of the power to confer on things the power of conferring on the experimenter the power of speaking in their name’ (STENGERS, 1997, p. 165, original emphasis).’ In this way, science justifies the feeling of ‘astonishment’ it is producing. Stengers stresses: ‘Scientists recognize “nature” as their sole “authority”, as the phenomenon they are concerned with, but they know that the possibility for this “authority” to create authority is not a given. It is up to them to constitute nature as an authority (2000, p. 93). Moreover, these creations make history in the way they change and produce new collectives between humans and non-humans. Here, then, we find the singularity of modern sciences: to have invented a device, which allows a new actor to participate in discussions on knowledge:

The singularity of scientific arguments is that they involve third parties. Whether they be human or non-human is not essential: what is essential is that it is with respect to them that scientists have discussions and that, if they can only intervene in the discussion as represented by a scientist, the arguments of the scientists themselves only have influence if they act as representatives for the third party. With this notion of third party, it is obviously the “phenomenon studied” that makes an appearance, but in the guise of a problem. For scientists, it is actually a matter of constituting phenomena as actors in the discussion, that is, not only of letting them speak, but of letting them speak in a way that all other scientists recognize as reliable (2000, p. 85, emphasis by MS).
With this, an event appears. This notion of ‘the event’, which Stengers borrows from the philosophy of A. N. Whitehead (1978) and G. Deleuze (2006), supposes the emergence of some novelty in an unforeseeable way. A relevant occurrence, which is nevertheless contingent, not necessary: it happened, but it could as well not have happened, and it is neither predictable nor reproducible. But once it has taken place, it ‘conditions’ facts coming after it, of which it will become a constitutive part. The event is the ‘terrain of invention’⁸. Still, experimental sciences have always been seduced by their inventions insofar as scientists try to black box or undo the trace of the event in order to argue that the experiment functions only to illustrate the ‘truth of facts’, a ‘rational truth’ (STENGERS, 1997; 2000). This is why it is important to draw upon the singularity of science without taking it as the universal and only way of creating the world. For a cosmopolitical sociology this includes bringing into existence relations between ‘busy’ scientific practices and ‘empowered minorities who have become collectively able to object, question, and impose as mattering aspects situation that would otherwise be mistreated or neglected’ (STENGERS, 2010).

3 Concernedness

Cosmopolitical sociology tries to trouble supposedly ‘matter of facts’ and turn them into the articulation of ‘matters of concern’, to use Latour’s expression (cf. LATOUR, 2005). Matters of concern refer to processes of connecting heterogeneous entities with diverging practices, societies as it were, that make up a contrasting event which enables ‘the creation of new possibilities and new questions for the concerned’ entities (STENGERS, 2010b, p. 25). Societal contrasts bring to the fore a ‘concern’⁹ for the being/becoming of social realities and its relations, actors, feelings and practices whereby the ‘non-normal’, ‘unexpected’, ‘uncommon’, or ‘unknown’ Other plays a central part. Cosmopolitics highlight the social normalcy of realities as a normative construct, an achievement. Thus, the supposedly standard, natural or (pre-)given identities and universal differences that define the normal or pathological, the good or bad etc., the hegemonic and marginal come into view as the effect of contingent societal controversies, practices and power relations that unfold their own situated histories. What seems to be specific about modern processes of normalization is that they do not simply refer to processes of inclusion or exclusion. Rather, it is a subtler either-or. Modern normalization gains power, stability and durability through inclusion the other by excluding his/her/its own voice, interests, desires, i.e. their own way of doing things: The others, otherness, or the non-normal are welcome, are tolerated, but only according to the rules, knowledge and understanding of the normals. Without the latter the former are nothing; this is the rule of normalization, which – and this important – is not the rules and knowledge of ‘anybody’, but the ‘majoritarian Fact of Nobody’ (DELEUZE; GUATTARI 1987, p. 118). Differently put: It is the majoritarian fact of ‘somebody’ who/which due to his/her/its majoritarian outlook is seen as a

⁸ The idea of a contingent process excludes explanation which would transform the description into a deduction. It also excludes arbitrariness, which would insist on the contingency only in order to affirm, in a monotonous manner, that nothing has taken place, that the constructed significations and engendered problems are all valid because they are all relative to their context. The contingent process invites us to “follow” it, each effect being both a prolongation and a reinvention’ (STENGERS, 2000, p. 72).

⁹ I use the notion of ‘concern’ in the Quaker sense of the word as outlined by Whitehead (1967) and Stengers (2010a, b).
fact of nobody, a ‘rational truth’, a natural fact. But this nobody has always a name (‘Nobody’, ‘Man’) that frames such excessive abstraction: the human, nature, society, etc. Being a majoritarian fact of Nobody, the non-normal, the other turns into a privation, deprivation and alteration of the normal, the majoritarian fact. The better such a process of inclusion by exclusion succeeds, the more normalization become stubborn, powerful and socially stable matters of fact exempting reflection considering the labour of division involved, i.e. the ways, these normalities, normativities, identities and differences are produced, what and whom these processes make strong, favour or weaken, marginalize and silence (HETHERINGTON; MUNRO, 1997; MUNRO, 1997; SCHILLMEIER, 2010). Michel Foucault’s eloquent analyses carve out the very productive forces of modern power relations (discursive practices) through which the pathological, the ‘abnormal’ are observed, analysed, defined, disciplined and controlled by techno-scientific and medical practices, which set the rules of normality and reason. Luckily, over the past century, the different agendas of social research have been sensitive to analysis practices that generate and challenge social normalcy: The feminist imaginary and postcolonial experience, the figure of the oppressed worker, the migrant, the fugitive, the mad, the global stranger and cultural Other, the disabled, the ill, the nonhuman.

To initiate a concern, then, is very much about the articulation of a contrast to processes of normalization that by including the other necessarily have to exclude their very mode of existence that is highly indifferent to what is considered ‘normal’ (including one’s own position). To initiate a concern is very much about articulating contrasts that articulate differences as the creative activity enacting a concern for others, for otherness. Such a concern is cosmological since it highlights that the process of creation is the form of unity of the Universe (WHITEHEAD, 1967, p. 179) and yet such a concern should not be conflated with the dream of a ‘majoritarian’ cosmos (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1987, p. 117). ‘Majority’, so Deleuze & Guattari (p. 116-7),

[…] implies a constant, of expression or content, serving as a standard measure by which to evaluate it. Let us suppose that the constant or standard is the average adult-white-heterogeneous-European-male speaking a standard language. [...] It is obvious that “man” holds the majority, even if he is less numerous than mosquitoes, children, women, blacks, peasants, homosexuals, etc. That is because he appears twice, once in the constant and again in the variable from which the constant is extracted. Majority assumes a state of power and domination, not the other way round. It assumes the standard measure, not the other way round.

Thus, there is no ‘majoritarian becoming’ but only a ‘becoming minoritarian’. Becoming minoritarian, so Deleuze & Guattari, is ‘making possible a becoming over which they [minorities] have no ownership, into which they themselves may enter’ (ibid). The latter suggest that minorities can be defined properly, but their ‘uni-verse’ should be conceived as a ‘multi-verse’ (JAMES, 1912), since becoming is ‘the becoming of everybody, and that becoming is creation’ (ibid). This does not mean, though, that a minority is not in itself free of the risk of being caught by the Fact of Nobody assuming a specific state power, domination and standard measure that resists the becoming of ‘anybody’. By doing so it would conflate ‘minority’ with ‘majority’.10 Analysing these processes

10 Elsewhere I have shown this point in detail by analysing ‘disability studies’ which follow a ‘social model’ as the major fact of constituting disability (cf. SCHILLMEIER, 2009a, b; 2010).
of becoming, contingent and heterogeneous actors (human and non-human alike) become visible: novel, experimental, speculative ‘realities to be-come’ who/which are not only creating and exemplifying but also questioning and altering the different modes of social ordering and its immanent power relations. These processes assemble the eventfulness of realities and name the ‘adventures’ of cosmopolitics: ‘the creativity of the world’ as ‘the throbbing emotion of the past hurling into a new transcendent fact. It is flying dart, of which Lucretius speaks, hurled beyond the bounds of the world’ (WHITEHEAD, 1967, p. 177).

4 Cosmopolitical events

The ‘entities’ of concern that become visible are cosmopolitical events ‘contributory to the process of becoming’ (WHITEHEAD, 1978, p. 28). They don’t fit ‘an unchanging subject of change’ (ibid, p. 29) such as e.g. the human that could be taken as a majoritarian and transcendental figure of cosmopolitan society. Hence, cosmopolitics should not be conflated with the Kantian philo-political project of modern humanism. Nor should it be mistaken as a renewed ancient political project that – closely related to the former – aims a “perpetual peace” in which everyone might envisage themselves as members in their own right of the worldwide civil society, in accordance with citizens’ rights’ (STENGERS, 2005, p. 994). Rather, it draws attention to the very situatedness of agencies – human and nonhuman alike – that question, disrupt and alter the normalcy of modes of orderings and related actors. Through the diverse ways of how heterogeneous entities – e.g. humans and nonhumans – relate, novel feelings, meanings and thoughts are created concerning such questions as ‘who is acting?’, ‘what is given as routine or as a common relation?’, ‘what is seen or felt as a normal/ized set of activities?’. The social normalcy turns into an event and is getting complicated, re-created by it without being fully conditioned by its effects. For cosmopolitical sociology, then, the event is not be explained by the human social, but the human social becomes an event initiated by the multiplicity of emerging, possible agencies contributory to the process of becoming.

To be sure, to set a cosmopolitical contrast to Kant’s modern ethos of ‘cosmopolitanism’ does not mean to dismiss it altogether. Cosmopolitics very much shares the de-territorializing idea of resisting to the present as a merely given, normalized, enforced set of rules and norms. Following Whitehead (1967, p. 83):

The creation of the world – said Plato – is the victory of persuasion over force. The worth of men consists in their liability to persuasion. They can persuade and can be persuaded by the disclosure of alternatives, the better and the worse. [...] Thus in a live civilization there is always an element of unrest. For sensitiveness to ideas means curiosity, adventure, change.

At the same time, though, cosmopolitics tries to resist a critical anthropology which confines the very nature of human being as the only cosmopolitan agent. For a cosmopolitical ethos, cosmopolitical agency is not incarcerate to human nature but unforeseeable, multiple and eventful. As argued by Stengers, cosmopolitics is about practices and for practitioners. It is a political practice against any authority of generalists and normative philosophies. For cosmopolitics neither the ‘subject’, nor ‘society’ and ‘nature’ are permanent in the sense of ‘substance’, but as ‘form’ (WHITEHEAD, 1978,
'Form' is a direct repudiation of Kant's doctrine of 'substance':

'Forms suffer changing relations'; actual entities perpetually perish subjectively, but are immortal objectively. Actuality in perishing acquires objectivity, while it loses subjective immediacy. It loses its final causation which is its internal principle of unrest, and it acquires efficient causation whereby it is the ground of obligation characterizing the creativity. Actual occasions in their 'formal' constitutions are devoid of all indetermination. Potentiality has passed into realization. They are complete and determinate matter of fact, devoid of all indecision. They form the ground of obligation. But eternal objects, and propositions, and some more complex sorts of contrasts, involve in their own natures indecision. They are, like all entities, potentials for the process of becoming (WHITEHEAD, 1978, p. 29).

By analysing forms, '[t]he definiteness of fact is due its forms; but the individual fact is a creature, and creativity is the ultimate behind all forms, inexplicable by forms, and conditioned by its creatures' (ibid, p. 20). By drawing on the nexus of actual occasions as events, Whitehead avoids to substantialize permanence and change in a majoritarian way. This is precisely the contrast the proposed cosmopolitical sociology wishes to make: By addressing the eventfulness of social relations ('societies') there is no need to substantialize permanence and change into the world of humans on the one hand [subjects that know, things as appearances, phenomena] and non-humans [objects to be known, things themselves, noumena] on the other. Differently put, a cosmopolitical sociology resists the majoritarian modernist tradition to equate human relations with social relations that are equated with 'society' that frees us from non-human relations, which are equated with the necessities of 'natural relations' which belong to 'nature'. Such tradition has been taught and learned for a long time and consequently appears highly stubborn to possible contrasts. The stubbornness is most evident when possible 'contrasts' are perceived as oppositions, as 'adverse opposites' (TARDE, 1899) that suggest an 'either-or' situation, which according to the 'cosmopolitical proposal' (STENGERS, 2005) as advocated here, is a rather 'lossy' [verlustreich] activity or war-like operation. Oppositions as entities of a maximum (contradicting) difference unfold the logic of the 'either-or'. Still, to just dismiss the 'either-or' would be foolish since they play an important and mundane part in our lives. Cosmopolitical sociology conceives the 'either-or' as a specific and simplified mode of difference that exhibits a maximum of difference with a minimum of repetition in relation to difference itself (cf. DELEUZE, 2001; TARDE, 1899). The 'either-or' names a distinction 'from which life has been emptied' as Georg Simmel (1997, p. 104) and thus lacks 'creation', diminishes possible 'creatures', and seeks homogeneity by destroying 'novel togetherness' (WHITEHEAD, 1978, p. 21). In that sense, cosmopolitical sociology tries to pacify or civilize either-or-differences by turning them into a mode of creation: Cosmopolitical sociology is concerned with multiplying differences as contrasts to the trenchant 'either-or'. Accordingly, cosmopolitical sociology is interested in peace and not war, since it advocates an 'ecology of practices' (STENGERS, 2010a, b; 2011) that does not

---

11 On 'ecology of practice', see Stengers (2010b, p. 25): 'Using the term ecology means that practices are to be characterized in irreducibly etho-eco/logical terms—that is, in terms that do not dissociate the ethos of a practice and its oikos, not only the matter-of-fact environment but the way it defines its relation with other practices and the opportunities of the environment. From this point of view, new connections or a changing connection, or a change in the environment, are events indeed, a possible transformation of what we would have been tempted to accept as the identity of a practice.'
diminish, denounce, kill, substrate the (emerging) actors and agencies involved, but aims at their multiplication.

Cosmopolitan sociology unfolds a speculative research agenda which a) promotes the creative ‘agency of ideas’ (WHITEHEAD, 1967, p. 25) as ‘lure[s], explicitly and mutely appealing for an imaginative leap’ (STENGERS, 2001, p. 240), and b) installs its own philosophical ‘test’ as giving its chance to peace or, more precisely, as fabricating the conceptual possibility of peace in order for us to be existentially fabricated by it’ (STENGERS, 2001, p. 241). For cosmopolitan sociology as scientific practices, this requires to outline not only that peace is always a ‘fabricated peace [...] , selective, partial, specialized and potentially conflictual’ (ibid, p. 241), but to engage with fabricating peace as the aim of social research itself. Cosmopolitan research, then, unfolds an eventful and immanently risky practice whereby politics is distributed among researcher and researched. Consequently, the research set by the researcher is always at risk of being objected by the ‘objects’ researched. Cosmopolitan research is not a mere representational act, or as Stengers (2010b, p. 24) would say, a ‘technological’ function of a self-closed scientific routine and its emerging matter of facts. Rather, it tries to draw our research attention on eventfulness of societies.

Now I am able to specify what can be understood as cosmopolitan events. Firstly, cosmopolitan events refer to the general observation that in the course of life events may occur that unbutton the world taken as ‘normal’ and in consequence disrupt, question and alter common and taken-for-granted relations of social being and its common ways of description. Viruses like the SARS virus mutate from being benign to becoming a serious threat for our health (SCHILLMEIER, 2008, forthcoming). People fall in love. Galileo’s ball on an inclined plane silences scholastic power regimes. My best friend is pregnant. Fukushima (SCHILLMEIER, 2011). My father got cancer, his friend dementia. 9/11 etc. All these events are exceptional and extraordinary: ‘they take us by surprise, they overtake us’ (CLOOTS, 2009, p. 61; see also ULIG, 2008). At the same time, these events bring into being something new and other, who/which has not been part of constituting of the social relations previous to the event. Moreover, It is the exceptional and extraordinary and its effects –the cosmopolitan event – that makes us aware of the ‘ordinary’ eventfulness of (social)‘forms’, as outlined above. Through the event of the extraordinary we may tackle the ordinary (and its limits) that is itself the effect of eventful processes. To be sure, cosmopolitan events may happen every day but they are not everyday events. Notwithstanding, cosmopolitan events help to imagine the everyday social as different from being ‘decided by nature’ (cf. GARFINKEL, 1967) and thus vulnerable to uncertainty and change. Being a scientific endeavour, cosmopolitan sociology is not primarily about the creation of ‘concepts’, but concerned with the creation of novel associations (cf. DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1994).This means that cosmopolitan social research gains a critical voice inasmuch as it unbuttons the normalcy of collective action by multiplying relevant actors and promote the imaginaries of an eventful reality. It includes for instance to investigate the question concerning ‘agency’ and to research entities that are thought to ‘generally’ lack agency – be it e.g. children, the disabled, the demented, the ill etc. (cf. SCHILLMEIER, 2009; 2010, forthcoming). This does not only mean to analyse how these actors and their experiences, fee-
lings and practices are part of processes and societal forms of power relations that configure institutionalized normalcy, but also how illness and disability articulate possible forms of cosmopolitical agency – practices – which disrupt, question and alter social normalcy.

5 Humans and things – contrasting cosmopolitanism

In more recent discussions within Science and Technology Studies (STS), it is precisely non-human things – artefacts, technologies, environmental objects – that play a challenging role in understanding the eventfulness of social relations. Once, the non-humans do not merely play the part of ‘objects’ in opposition to ‘subjects’, but gain importance as ‘existents’ (STENGERS, 2010b, p. 3), cosmopolitics cannot be thought without the non-human. In such a reading, cosmopolitics draws our attention on realities to be-come– events – that ‘concern alliance [...]’, *symbiosis* that brings into play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms, with no possible filiation (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1988, p. 262-3; cf. also GROSZ, 1999). This in mind, my discussion on cosmopolitics is thought as an incipient rapprochement to the question *ability* of realities to be-come. Thereby, the relationship between humans and things is of central importance, since it unfolds the very difference between classical cosmopolitan sociology and cosmopolitical sociology.

We have already touched briefly that the cosmopolitical position as advocated here names a strong contrast to Kant’s cosmopolitanism. It is important to explicate this contrast, since the sociological imagination and related versions of cosmopolitanism (cf. BROWN; HELD, 2010) have been deeply affected – wittingly and unwittingly – by Kant’s ‘ethos of knowing’ [*Wissenshaltung*] (HEIDEGGER, 1987, p. 42). I agree with Heidegger that for many who dismiss or think they have overcome Kant’s ‘subjectivist turn’, they nevertheless remain highly dependent on Kant’s way of reasoning. The Kantian metaphysic plays an important role and influences – unwittingly – how social, political and cultural studies, anthropologists and historians imagine ‘materiality’, be it objects, artefacts or technologies. Notwithstanding all the differences of respective accounts, there seems to be a consensus concerning the question ‘do artefacts have agency?’. The amicable answer, I suppose, would be ‘no’. But, to be sure, this does not mean that technologies don’t play an important role. Quite on the contrary, since K. Marx and many of the classical figures, anthropologists, social and cultural studies have been aware of the societal embeddedness and relevance of technologies and things. The more so today: It is imperative in contemporary investigations of ‘material culture’ to put much efforts in researching the centrality of ‘things’ within the human and socio-cultural context.

In his introductory notes to ‘The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective’, Arjun Appadurai documents nicely this development. It also underlines the updating of the Kantian heritage and not so much its challenge overcoming. Appadurai argues that the cultural perspective on things is ‘conditio-

---


13 To be sure, the idea of cosmpolitics is not to dismiss or denounce the tradition of ‘cosmopolitanism’, but to set a contrast to the ‘normalized’ discourse in order to make it more interesting and open.
ned necessarily by the view that things have no meaning apart from those that human transactions, attributions, and motivations endow them with, the anthropological problem is that this formal truth does not illuminate the concrete, historical circulation of things’ (1986, p. 5, highlighted by MS). In effect, things, next to people and what they think things are, need to be followed as well. For Appadurai the anthropological problem confirms the Kantian ‘theoretical point’ that we humans do things to things and not the other way round. On other hand, such a formal truth limits our ‘methodological point of view’, he argues, if we remain within the ‘methodological fetishism’ that ‘excessively socializes transactions in things’ (ibid) and forget to ‘returning our attention to the things themselves’ (ibid). Obviously, according to Appadurai, we continue the practice of ‘methodological fetishism’ insofar as we value the importance to follow the things themselves.

6 Theory and practice

What is striking about Appadurai’s effort to ‘de-sociologize’ of how to approach the world of things pursues the very asymmetry of distinctions, which is not only truly Kantian and highly modernistic, but made the sociological thought possible in the first place: the oppositions between facts vs. fetish, theory vs. practice. Both (modes of) divisions are at the heart of Kant’s critical and theoretical endeavour helping to construct a ‘future metaphysics’ that ‘proved to be scientific’ (KANT [1783], 1995). Obviously, Kant does not use the notion of ‘fetish’ since the ‘subjective position’, i.e. the ‘process of thought’ that brings about ‘facts’, is anything but a foolish belief in the power of objects. Far from it: It is the only reasona-

ble site of construction which is able to provide the scientific proof of facts’ objective content; it saves us from the lures of simple speculation concerning the power of an external force. It also functions to free us humans from the old Platonic Idea, which precisely because the latter is non-human ‘causes them to define themselves as humans’ (STENGERS, 2010b, p. 6). For Kant, the Platonic Idea turned into a human construction. It is the ‘phenomena’ [Ding für sich] that has to be distinguished from ‘noumena’ [Ding an sich]. Thus, it is the latter theoretical distinction, which will a) distinguish ‘science’ from ‘shallow babble’ and which will b) proof everybody foolish if s/he believes in facts themselves – be it in theory and/or practice.

To be sure, Appadurai does not simply set facts vs. fetishes. Quite on the contrary, what he says is that there are no facts, but only the production of fetishes. What is important though, is, that Appadurai’s argument rests upon the very clear difference between of how to approach things ‘theoretically’ or ‘practically’ [methodologically]. Theoretically, we know (and subsequently believe) that facts are nothing but fetishes, phenomena, products and thus nothing in themselves. The production of theoretical knowledge is meant to keep fetishes outside and let pure knowledge/Reason speak instead. In practice though, one cannot deny that things are real since they have effects on human life, they affect us and thus things cannot be dismissed. Still, one always has to keep in mind that things are only ‘real’ because they do not ‘exist’ as things themselves. Such a modernist position allows ‘to keep the practical form of life, in which one causes something to be fabricated, at a distance from the theoretical forms of life, in which one has to choose between facts and fetishes’ (LATOUR, 2010, p. 20-1).
7 Kant’s copernican turn socialized

This has been precisely what made Kant’s critical philosophy so challenging and lasting: it is the idea not just to belief and speculate but to proof that objects ‘must conform to our cognition’ and not the other way round ([1787] 1998 BXVI-II). ‘Objects’, Kant stresses in his Critique of Pure Reason (1787), [...] ,are given to us through our sensibility. Sensibility alone supplies us with intuitions. These intuitions become thought through the understanding, and hence arise conceptions’ (ibid, B34). For Kant the knowledge of objects is always conceptual because only concepts can be known. According to Kant, the subjectivist doctrine is meant to offer a ‘more successful’ metaphysic by experimenting with the idea that ‘the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intution’ and not the other way round that ‘intuition must conform to the nature of the objects’ (ibid, BXVI-II). In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant outlined what he called ‘transcendental’, a theoretical construction of universal propositions that address the possibility of experience as the conditions of an ‘apparent’ objective world. All accounts that refer to the ‘social life’ or ‘social construction’ of things would be in total agreement with Kant’s ‘Copernican turn’, although they won’t follow the logic of ‘cognition’ and ‘proof’. Obviously, it is not the ‘mind’ – social constructionist scientist are very critical about the mind as the origin of ‘objective content’ – but ‘society’ to which the objects conform to.

Kant’s transcendental criticism has profound impact on understanding humans and things since it analyses the relationship as a ‘constructed’ one. Kant’s analysis of the act of experience as a process of thought appears so seductive since it not only rejects a mere ‘rationalist’ account which would equate the things sensed with what the things are. It also dismisses a mere ‘rationalist’ metaphysics that knows things without intuition. As Kant famously has put it: ‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’. This means that ‘objects’ are given by sense perception, but they become only relevant as a matter of subjective construction. It names the ‘intermediate’ [Zwischen] – though quite different than the ‘Zwischen’ as imagined by the Greeks and the Platonic idea – where and when ‘humans and things move therein’ (HEIDEGGER, 1987, p. 188). For subsequent humanist and/or social constructionist accounts, Kant’s ontology of things provided an ‘epistemic zone’ that was meant to criticise any rationalist, speculative, ontological or positivist claim. Humans and things cannot be thought anymore as ‘divided’, but as ‘constructed’ since experienced by processes of human thought and only by human thought! At the same time though, humans and things turn out as bifurcated and as different as possible. So much so that following Kant’s subjectivist position ‘things themselves’ [noumena] are merely ‘real’, given by sense-perception, but not ‘existent’. They become existent things for themselves [phenomena] merely as a construction of thought. This means, as Whitehead rightly points out, by adopting a subjectivist position, for Kant

[...] the temporal world was merely experienced[and] no element in the temporal world could in itself be an expierient. His temporal world, [...] was in its essence dead, phantasmal, phenomenal. Kant was a mathematical physicist, and his cosmological solution was sufficient for the abstraction to which mathematical physics is confined (1978, p. 190).
To draw upon the importance of ‘things’ in order to invent an ‘apparent’ objective world which is beginning and ending with ‘the thinking and reflecting human in time’ reveals the ‘metaphysical centre’ (HEIDEGGER, 1987, p. 42) of Kant’s philosophy. It also enables a constant switching between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ as long as the theoretical authority isn’t challenged which has installed the division in the first place. It offers a very serious and seductive form of applied theoretical and epistemic critique, which by denying ‘things in themselves’ is always right. It is a dependency theory of things, an idea, where things themselves disappear because they depend on only one ‘thing’, the human act. Such a metaphysics of things having ‘two worlds, one world of mere appearance, and the other world compact of ultimate substantial fact’ (WHITEHEAD, 1978, p. 152) had tremendous effects on the ‘general history’ of a highly normative concept of cosmopolitanism which was ‘led to balance the world upon thought’ (ibid, p. 151). It is the most elegant and thoughtful philosophical idea causing a critical, social constructionist perspective on humans and things coming into existence. But one may ask: What is striking about its’ attractiveness? It performs a ‘vicious regress’ whereby the construction of objects is ‘essentially a process of understanding’ whereby ‘in understanding, what is understood is analysed, insofar as it is understood’ (WHITEHEAD, 1978, p. 153). Social constructionists will rework Kant’s idea and will argue that ‘what’ is understood may vary of’ how’ it is constructed at different places and/or in different times. This novel idea, then, addresses the problems of an altogether different sphere of reality: ‘society’. Whereas for critical philosophy it is ‘the human’, it is for cosmopolitan sociology ‘the social’ or ‘society’ that function as global, universal explanatory devices to conceive and describe the non-social and non-human.

8 Agency without actors?

Kant already saw that a ‘cosmopolitan right’, which is thought to connect and civilize the Globe, couldn’t be achieved without non-human entities. For Kant, technologies and animals such as money, ship and camel (camel as the ‘ship of the desert’) – made a global ‘cosmopolitan constitution’ possible in the first place. Money, ship and camel are relating people and places; they create a common sphere of action, travel and exchange which couldn’t be associated by humans only (KANT, [1795] 1983, p. 118). Once we are able to share the Globe with the help of non-humans, it appears necessary that all mobile strangers that arrive on foreign land should have the right of hospitality, i.e. the right not to be treated hostile; it demands to respect a global ‘visiting right’, i.e. the ‘right of the Other’ to collectively own the finite ‘surface of the earth’. If we globally value the right of hospitality, humanity is coming closer to a cosmopolitan constitution that may bring about the possibility of perpetual peace. Kant was also very much aware that economic globalisation unleashes the ‘non hospitable conduct’ of trading states affecting inequalities, adversities, conflicts, slavery and war.15 It is, interestingly, Kant argued that the globalised world of his time makes it possible ‘to feel’ the violation of hospitality at one place from everywhere on the globe. Consequently, the ideal of a cosmopolitan constitution is not a phantasmagoria but a necessary, even a natural supplement to given laws (KANT, [1795], 1983, p. 300). However, the crucial importance of his ‘feelings’ as ‘forces of thought’ (STENGER, 2010) did not lead Kant to any hesitation concerning his theory of understanding, objects and cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitics,

14 Durkheimians would assert that ‘society’ is also more complex than the ‘individual nature’ that let it emerge.
‘the horse’, so Kant, which can be considered the first essential animal ‘tool of war’ (KANT, [1795], 1983, p. 121). Hence, although the world Kant is experiencing is completely changing and rests upon the creative association with non-humans that either stabilize perpetual peace between humans (ship, camel and money) or engage in war (horse), his theoretical position does not allow conceiving non-humans as righteous actors. Kant’s critique does not enable non-humans to act as ‘mediators’, to borrow a notion form Actor-Network-Theory (cf. LATOUR, 2005). Mediators not only transport but transform the cosmos of what is to be understood as the human social [mankind]. Rather, non-humans remain mere ‘intermediaries’ of human nature – they are nothing but transporters of human nature. Non-humans fulfil a ‘practical’ role to set in place the realities of cosmopolitan society, which ‘theoretically’ is nevertheless made by and for humans. It is due to the ‘final step that reason took’, so Kant’s ‘Speculative Beginning of Human History’, that man/kind is able conceive him/itself [... altogether beyond any community with animals, [...] which he now no longer regarded as his fellows in creation, but as subject to his will as means and tools for achieving his own chosen objectives. This picture of things includes [...] the thought of its contrary, namely, that he may not speak in this way to any man but must regard all men as equal recipients of nature’s gifts’ (ibid, p. 52-3; Highlighted by MS).

The way Kant relates the scientific proof of ‘the humanness of humans’ with the Christian history of creation is crucial in understanding Kant’s enlightenment as a most profound ‘religion of modernity’ (cf. SCHILLMEIER, 2010) that will colonise social and political thought.16 Cosmopolitan agency is man’s own ability to emancipate from his/her ‘self-fabricated immaturity’ in order to resist that ‘others to establish themselves as their guardians’(KANT, [1784], 1983, p. 41). Resistance necessarily includes the ‘mastery of reason over impulses’ such as the ‘instinct for sex’ and related ‘objects of the senses’ (KANT, [1786], 1983, p. 51).

Kant’s ‘cosmopolitan’ can be seen as a ‘conceptual persona’ (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1994) of a highly powerful, modernist political figure. As the signet of nature’s progress, man’s maturity symbolizes ‘the true end of nature [Zweck der Natur]’ (KANT, [1786], 1983, p. 52). Like in the Bible, it is the ‘standing’, ‘speaking’ and ‘thinking’ man that is cosmopolitan. Like Adam and Eve, the cosmopolitan has secured himself from predators and any other natural dangers (KANT, 1983, p. 49-50). Still, it is the ‘animal nature’ which annoys the practical men; and it is the different noises and sounds of ‘the thoughtless man and children’ that annoys the ‘thinking man of the commonwealth’ (ibid, p. 50). Hence, contrary to cosmopolitics as advocated here, for which the object, the nonhuman, the other are the ‘forces for thought’ (STENGERS, 2010a, b) due to the subject’s concernedness for the other, for cosmopolitanism, the non-human other, who/which is everything and everybody diverging from the ‘standing, speaking and thinking’ human being, is either the product of thought orthought’s endangerment. In ‘practical’ terms the non-human other is either mere means of human’s end or compulsive.

---

16 This is the trick: You don’t have to be a religious ‘believer’ to believe in it, since what is understood/believed in as ‘human’ is authorized by theory.
9 Cosmopolitanism, oedagogy and the lures of ‘Thinking Big’

Kant’s cosmopolitanism is the effect of ‘thinking big’ as a philosopher [KANT, 1784], who as investigated ‘universal qualities’ concerning the question of ‘What is the Human-ness of the Human?’. After the interrogated ‘the fact’ has been proven entirely human, a political programme, a social and cultural pedagogy of cosmopolitanism has been installed to teach, learn about and ‘practice’ human nature. According to Whitehead (1967, p. 200), ‘the region [of humanity, MS] with its Laws of Nature is a synonym for the enduring substance with its Essential Character [‘Reason’, MS]. ‘Hence, Kant’s philosophy is interested in learning (and teaching) about the ‘region’ of human being, a region that is meant to name the space of humanity that practices and institutionalizes human agency. Such a space of taught and learned human agency Kant calls ‘cosmopolitanism’.

In his book on Kant, Heidegger (1987, p. 56) notes that learning is taking notice of what things in general are. Interestingly, so Heidegger, the knowledge gained by learning is what we already know viz. have, otherwise we would not be able to hear them in the first place. To learn what we already have/know, also means to learn regardless the objects from which we may create our knowledge (ibid, p. 58). Thus, Kant was interested in teaching what might be called the ‘mathematics of humanity’, a general pedagogy of human self-referentiality, a teaching of learning about ‘ourselves’ being human. What makes the symmetry of learning and teaching so seductive and powerful is, that his argument is about the application of a ‘universal idea’, which – as already noted above – is ‘circular’ in style (HEIDEGGER, ibid): For Kant, universal laws of experience are meant to proof the explanation of the possibility of the experience of objects (ibid). Hence, that Kant’s bespeaks cosmopolitan agency to ‘humans only’ is very much embedded in a modernistic scientific belief system that is meant to solely found – self-explicable and thus reasonable – the analysis and constitution of general principles and ‘eternal and unchallengeable laws’ (1787), 1998, p. AXII) of reason, of human nature.

10 Cosmopolitan objects of resistance

Cosmopolitanism is resisting the dark world of the non-human. However, the Kantian ‘objects’ that have to be resisted are no ‘objects’ that exhibit the alienating or coercive governance of an external power. According to Kant, it is due to our natural progress in reason that we have arrived at a stage where we humans know precisely well that we deal with our self-made, i.e. human problems and dangers. Hence, what is at stake is our human ‘maturity’ which remains highly ‘immature’ if we remain too awed, lazy and cowardice to tackle and question the self-imposed, common, mechanical or objectified forms of rationality and belief systems, be it institutionalized rules, technological systems or expert-knowledge. Kant stresses:

Immaturity is the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! [dare to know] “Have courage to use your own understanding!” --that is the motto of enlightenment (KANT, 1784, 1983, p. 41).
Still, Kant laments, it remains rather difficult to do so, since ‘it is so easy to be immature’, and the more so for the individual: ‘If I have a book to serve as my understanding, a pastor to serve as my conscience, a physician to determine my diet for me, and so on, I need not exert myself at all. I need not think, if only I can pay: others will readily undertake the irksome work for me’ (ibid). It is more likely that the public [Publicum] is able to freely perform self-enlightenment (ibid, p. 41). In effect, Kant’s cosmopolitanism applies his critical ethos of delimiting the process of ‘nature’ as a self-referential, rational and imaginative human construction [process of thought] by giving it its societal region: the public sphere. Following Kant, due to his natural mettle, every rational human being has the capacity to become cosmopolitan. However, to fully develop cosmopolitan capabilities, humans need more than one human life to work on it. Unlike human’s instinct, human reason needs to be socially practiced and culturalized through education programmes, political governance, juridical laws, and public discourse. For Kant, cosmopolitanism is the cultural and political means to exemplify and socialize the circularity of what it means to be human. It frames the moral region of ‘citizen[s] of a general human state’ [ius cosmopoliticum] who has/have been – although related – emancipated and freed from the status naturalis, the state of practised and threatening war (KANT, [1795], 1983, p. 111). The better ‘human nature’ is performed the more the cosmopolitan is able to transcend and resist his animal nature. The cosmopolitan society names the final progress of human nature which enables a public space for ‘reading’, ‘thinking’, and ‘imagining’.

It is quite clear who is generally able and who is also likely to become a cosmopolitan actor in Kant’s cosmopolitan society, it is the adult, healthy and well-educated scholar. Kant’s proposed cosmopolitan ‘mise en equivalence’, which outlines the beginning and end of human/kind, is precisely what the idea of cosmopolitics tries to resist. ‘Equivalence’, as celebrated by Kant as the final step taken by reason, refers to a commonly shared criterion and suggests the compatibility of positions. Cosmopolitics, on the other, troubles the ‘mise en equivalence’ and thereby conceives the ‘cosmos’ as an operator of ‘mise en égalité’, of egalization (cf. STENGERS, 2005, p. 995). The world becomes more interesting if we consider the non-human other, children, the disabled, the ill, the idiotic etc. as cosmopolitan agencies that resist the apparent consensus concerning the (cosmopolitan) present. Cosmopolitical sociology as advocated here, argues that cosmopolitanism is only one possible way, and not the position to address the relationship between humans and things. For cosmopolitics, human-nonhuman relations refer the very becoming and multiplication of associations that constantly enforce questioning what ‘the human’ or/and ‘societies’ are. Such a concern – as Isabelle Stengers (2005, p. 994) would say – enables ‘to “slow down” reasoning and create an opportunity to arouse a slightly different awareness of the problems and situations mobilizing us’. Cosmopolitics spares time to resist the present and turns our concern towards realities to be-come.

---

17 For Kant, in the life of individuals the natural turning point from immaturity to maturity is around the age of 16-17. From that moment of natural maturity onwards, he still needs approximately 10 years to gain full maturity in order to deal properly with societal issues. For Kant the difference between ‘natural’ and ‘societal’ maturity was a clear sign of different, self-referential logics of human nature: humanity as ‘animal species’ and ‘moral species’. To be sure, in Kant’s world only the male part seems to able to get mature in the first place (cf. KANT, [1786], 1983, p. 54).
References


_____.


_____.


Submetido para avaliação em 24 de janeiro de 2013.
Aprovado para publicação em 22 de abril de 2013.

**Michael Schillmeier**
Institut für Soziologie, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munique, Alemanhã.
E-mail: m.schillmeier@lmu.de