


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About the Journal

AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations was the first Brazilian journal in the area of International Relations to be fully published in English (2012). It is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) and the Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) of the Faculty of Economics (FCE) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing world.

The journal publishes original articles in the area of Strategy and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and South-South Cooperation – its security problems; the political, economic and diplomatic developments of emerging countries; and their relations with the traditional powers. *AUSTRAL* is published semi-annually in English and Portuguese. The journal's target audience consists of researchers, experts, diplomats, military personnel and graduate students of International Relations.

The content of the journal consists of in-depth analytical articles written by experts (Professors and Doctors), focusing on each of the great continents of the South: Asia, Latin America and Africa. Thus, the debate and diffusion of knowledge produced in these regions is stimulated. All contributions submitted to *AUSTRAL* are subject to rigorous scientific evaluation.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Special Dossier: Security and Defence in South America

It is with great satisfaction that we bring to the public the Special Dossier *Security and Defence in South America*, coordinated by professors Rafael Villa and Juliana Viggiano, renowned academics in the field of Defence Studies. This is the result of an extensive research carried out in the framework of CAPES' "Pró-Defesa" Notice by a group of researchers led by Professor Villa, composing a set of ten articles and complemented by two others of similar theme that were aggregated by the Editorial Board of *AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*.

Due to Brazil's strategic position vis-a-vis its regional environment (which also encompasses the South Atlantic ocean), the internal political instability of the states of the region and the so-called non-traditional threats, the challenge of South American integration is central to Brazil's long term strategy. In this sense, one of NERINT's research proposals, linked to the line of research "Brazil's Grand Strategy for the 21st Century", seeks precisely to analyze the political, economic and security opportunities and challenges in the South American strategic sphere.

Thus, this Special Edition of *AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* comes up against the backdrop of a series of setbacks that these processes have been experiencing in recent times. Far from being overtaken by recent events, the Dossier describes and analyzes, with theoretical and methodological rigor, the complex process of building regional security cooperation in South America. Refluxes of this kind occur periodically, but the political reality also eventually creates conditions for the resumption of similar projects in relatively short periods of time.

The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Council of South American Defence (CDS), despite their weaknesses and without ideological appropriations, have promoted an institutional framework that is essential to Brazil's diplomatic and defence policies. Recent redefinitions, such as the abandonment of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Paraguay, however, put the organization at risk of obsolescence, fundamentally damaging any perspective of deepening cooperation in the area of Defence.

The primordial objectives of the CDS were the gathering and regionalization of consensus on Security and Defence in South America through three main foundations: dialogue, cooperation and political concertation. As explained by Prof. Rafael Villa during the 10th Meeting of the Brazilian Association of Defence Studies (ABED), held in September 2018 at the University of São Paulo (USP), three current dynamics profoundly alter this process of cooperation in the continent: (1) the “Venezuela factor” and the spillover of the Venezuelan economic, political and social crises; (2) the “Colombia factor”, which suspended its participation in the organization and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a “global partner”; and (3) the “Mercosur factor”, where most countries experienced the end of the “pink wave” and the return of neoliberal governments, economic crises and intense polarization and judicialization of politics. All four of its current full member-states suspended their participation in UNASUR in April 2018.

The papers that compose this Dossier cover a wide range of topics, such as the tabulation of South American navies, the expenditures of the local Armed Forces, regional cooperation in public security and current Brazilian policies in light of terrorist threats. The direct military presence of European powers in the region (French Guiana and Malvinas), the military modernization in South America and the role of Russia, China and South Korea are discussed next. Concluding the Dossier, the mobilization of the Industrial Defence Base in South America, the geopolitics of South American cyber space and the civil-military relationship in the ambit of the Peacekeeping Missions are also discussed by the authors of the Dossier, specialists of several Brazilian institutions. Finally, an article on Brazil's Defence Industry and an interesting comparison between Costa Rica and Ecuador regarding the perception of external threat were added to this thematic edition.

The publication of this Dossier was made possible thanks to the Research Office at UFRGS, through the Support Program for Journal Editing (PAEP), and CAPES, through the *Security and Defence in South America* project of the “Pró-Defesa” notice. The translation team, composed of Graduate and Undergraduate researchers of NERINT (with some guest appearances), as well as Assistant Editors Guilherme Thudium and Bruna Hayashi Dalcin, with the collaboration of Magnus Kenji Hiraiwa, deserve special recognition. Finally, we thank Professor Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo for the hard work of revising the translations.

PRESENTATION: PERSPECTIVES FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN SOUTH AMERICA

Juliana Viggiano¹
Rafael Duarte Villa²

The papers that compose this special dossier were developed from the deepening of discussions about the contemporary outlook on security and defence in South America, as part of the interinstitutional project “Regional and International Security and Defence Scenarios: A Civil-Military Approach”, contemplated by the “Pró-Defesa 031/2013” notice and published in a partnership between the Ministry of Defence and CAPES. This project was developed over the course of five years (2013-2018) and had the participation, under the coordination of Professor Rafael Villa, of members from the Graduate Programs of the Political Science Department and the Institute of International Relations of the University of São Paulo, the Graduate Program in International Relations of the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC), the Graduate Program in Political Science of the Federal Fluminense University (UFF), the Graduate Program in Political Science of the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE), the Graduate Program in Maritime Studies of the Naval War School (EGN) and the Graduate Program in Military Sciences of the School of Command and General Staff of the Brazilian Army (ECEME). We thank the “Pró-Defesa” CAPES/Ministry of Defense Program (Edital 2013) for the financial support that made it possible to translate and publish this Special Dossier in English.

The reflection on the absence of regional answers to particular problems on Security and Defence started to change in recent years, as we observe that Brazil has adopted more incisive Security and Defence policies. Thus, the creation of the Council of South American Defence (CDS) can be seen as an instrument for collective Defence capable of offering answers to specific re-

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gional problems. This is consistent to the regional scenarios that South America, and specially Brazil, must face in its Security and Defence policies for the next decades to come. And the answers to those challenges must involve the recovery of South American strategic action around scenarios of recent action as a permanent objective.

This objective is consistent with a change that can be observed in the academic and scientific segment of the civil society, which is, the change regarding the idea that the studies and practices on the thematic of Defence are tasks that competes only to the military sector. Defence, understood as a political dimension, is a problematic of both state and social nature, and, therefore, must involve different branches of society and the state. In other words, the collective effort of understanding and acting on matters related to Security and Defence must clearly involve a cooperative endeavor of both civilian and military institutions, and in the specific case to which this proposition is referred, the joint effort of superior education institutions of the civil sector and the military sector that can collaborate not only to evaluate the state of art of Security and Defence studies, but also to generate the human resources needed to propel the changes that this state of art requires.

The papers presented here prioritize the dynamics and challenges associated with the regional dimension of Security and Defence. While recognizing the existence of a set of regional action scenarios that are affected by alterations in the structure of international relations, be that in terms of actors or practices, these researches seek to offer an outlook that reveals patterns, tendencies and potentialities of conflict and cooperation in the regional sphere and, we hope, can contribute to identify pathways for Security and Defence policies for the countries involved for the coming years. The somewhat uncontroversial acceptance by the academia and decisions-makers on the relevance of particular dynamics in the regional level in creating opportunities or constraints for the performance of their countries exempts long justifications in order to understand it as the background of this research. However, it is important to reinforce the perception that the challenges imposed by the growing processes of interdependence and transnationalization of subjects in the regional – and international – agenda require further understanding, specially the new elements aggregated to these phenomena and the way they interact with existent practices and structures, in order to evaluate its potential impacts on security and defence scenarios for the coming decades.

With this purpose, the papers presented in this issue articulate eight lines of research designed in the project that brief the strategic performance of state actors in the fields of security and regional defence. In particular, the debate about a new security architecture of the inter-american system, which

is a result of the necessity to adjust the hemispheric institutional framework in order to face non-state nature threats such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking, human trafficking, natural disasters, humanitarian emergencies, money laundering, terrorism, among others. In this context, the concept of multi-dimensional security was incorporated and new roles were delineated to the Armed Forces, which evidenced some divergences among South American countries and the United States on the matter of collaboration and coordination of the Armed Forces and the National Police when it comes to facing problems such as drug trafficking, terrorism and organized crime. Moreover, the role played by Brazil in this process and the divergences correlated to the “Global War on Terror” as elaborated by the central powers complement the complex framework that make up the regional relations.

In this way, while seeking to map aspects of the broad scale of phenomena that make up the regional sphere, this dossier approaches distinct strands of Security and Defence within three particular themes: (a) regional cooperation; (b) domestic dynamics within countries in light of the regional sphere; and (c) Defence policies and their articulation within regional processes and dynamics. Regarding regional cooperation, Graciela Pagliari’s paper discusses the role of the Council of South American Defence of UNASUR as a guarantor of mutual security measures, and Juliana Viggiano investigates the (incipient) initiatives to think about cooperation and public security from a regional perspective in light of the South American Council on Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Transnational Organized Crime of UNASUR. From a less evident perspective, Francisco Alves de Almeida and Ricardo Pereira Cabral seek to build a comparative methodology capable of classifying the relative power of the Navy, indirectly suggesting the cooperation potential of the South American Navies.

Specifically aimed at understanding the domestic dynamics of South American countries, Adriana Marques’ paper evaluates the Brazilian Armed Forces performance in peacekeeping missions and its repercussions, Marcial Suarez addresses the antiterrorism policies adopted in Brazil, and Selma Gonzales and Lucas Portela analyse the cybernetic security and defence policies in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia and the possible links among them in the context of two regional forums: the Organisation of American States (OEA) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).

Finally, the other studies that compose this dossier deal with the implications and characteristics of domestic and regional defence policies by exploring its many dimensions. Rafael Villa deepens the discussion on the motivations and interpretations regarding the restructuring of the Armed Forces of the countries in the region, questioning the widespread idea in the

current literature that points to the existence of two security subsystems in South America. Ricardo Borges offers a comparative evaluation on the impact of political changes in some countries in the region and their relation with military equipment purchases, and Sabrina Medeiros and William Moreira seek to demonstrate the potential projection impact of the South American Industrial Defence Base through the involvement of Brazil with the NATO Cataloging System. Marcos Valle, by its turn, from a more traditional point of view of defence policies, explores possible repercussions of the extra-continental military presence in the region for Brazilian defence interests in South America.

The broad range of issues addressed here indicate the abundance of the research agenda in regional Security and Defence in South America, and, in general terms, the existence of many convergences – real or potential – among perspectives, structures and policies by the countries in the region. With caution and without being carried away by optimism, the works compiled in this dossier reveal practices that indicate a form of validation of the regional dimension by the South American countries as a catalyst for dynamics that can offer political answers to common problems. They also suggest the existence of considerable hindrances of political, bureaucratic and conceptual nature, to mention the most evident ones, reflected in different degrees of involvement by these countries when it comes to the Security and Defence agenda.

Translated by Guilherme Thudium

NAVY CLASSIFICATION: PROPOSAL FOR A COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY

Francisco Eduardo Alves de Almeida¹

Ricardo Pereira Cabral²

Introduction

One of the major difficulties that navy analysts face in the present relates to classifying war navies around the globe based on their relative power. Being a relative comparison, which parameters to consider in the analysis? How to define which combat means would be more powerful? Some comparisons are more evident and easy-taking. We know that an aircraft carrier with its boarded aviation group is more powerful than a coastal patrol-boat. Another easy example is an attack submarine nuclear-powered facing a supply ship. The chances of the last surviving are minimal. Other comparisons, however, require more care. Between a modern destroyer with sensors and missile systems and an old destroyer equipped only with cannons, the logic makes us think that the first has a bigger survival chance, due the technology and response capacity. However, in special occasions, this logic may be questioned, in example in internal waters, where the more powerful one is surprised, still in cruise route.

For means with similar capacities the comparison already gets complicated. Which would be more powerful, a modern frigate with high-end technology or an attack submarine nuclear-powered from the 1990's, or even a conventional submarine with modern technology? Other factors must be considered, not only the technology and number of conflicting actors. This

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confrontation is impacted by geography, training level and other subjective factors that are difficult to evaluate.

Raising the sample universe, when related to the comparison between war navies, which variables should be considered? Would the number of assets be enough to indicate the most powerful navy? For instance, a 100 patrol-ship navy is stronger than one with 10 destroyers? These questions still become more serious when one considers the issue of a given country being able to design and build its own combat capabilities, to be able to possess a higher technology aggregated to the shipbuilding sector, to dispose of more financial resources for the preparation and use of its war ships for achieving its missions, and, finally, the capacity to train the crew that guard its combat assets. Would the naval tradition also be a factor to be considered? Without these definitions, and if possible, without some relative measures, the comparison gets even more problematic.

The purpose of this research is to establish parameters that can be compared, having as sample the number and capacities published in journals and official documents of war navies present in activity. How to classify these navies regarding their combat power? How to set up a relative ranking of combat navies using tools that can be collected on those sources (publications and journals of general access) for a general classification in accordance with their relative power? This is the major problem developed by this research. When defining these parameters we can track down the evolution of a given naval power in the region that is being studied and in which way it is occurring. In the case of the “Pró-Defesa” Project, in which the security and scenarios are established in the Americas, this methodology would be able to contribute for the analysis of naval scenarios and comparative processes of regional naval forces. The relevance of such methodology is evident when we rank naval powers in accord to their relative power between themselves in a given geographical power space involving the sea.

Currently in the digital universe some sites that specialized in classifying war navies are available and in this case the Coast Guards are not included, within a ranking of relative power between the countries surveyed. The main digital rating agency is the Global Firepower (GFP) which at its specialized site <https://www.globalfirepower.com>³ indicates the 110 most relevant navies at the present time.

This GFP initiative has been widely referred both in the military and academic milieus as a site with credibility and permeation in the defense area. In spite of its importance, some incongruities can be easily perceived. The

³ Accessed June 8, 2018.

most important one is that navies are classified in relation to the number of warships, which introduces considerable distortions in the comparative assessment between the armed forces. As an example, the classification of the US Navy, which is known to have the greatest absolute and relative power among its peers, is listed in third place, behind North Korea and China, which have a higher number of assets, if confronted with the American. Ship types, retaliatory capacity, nuclear weaponry and equipment, industrial and financial capacity are not considered, among other factors that must be taken into account when confronting ships and squadrons with similar or at least similar tasks.

Some relevant scholars in the academic world also sought to classify the navy according to their geographical scope and power projection capacity. The first to do so was Michael Morris (1988) who proposed in 1985 a nautical typology to distinguish the so-called third-world naval forces or medium naval forces that would differentiate themselves from those of the “developed” world with larger naval powers. Thus, it reached six levels of naval power, distinguishing regional, subregional, for area defense, coastal, surveillance and symbolic navies, using quantitative factors. A relative rank of power has never been established among the war navies.

The ranking established by Eric Grove (1990) has also been very referenced. He relied in part on Michael Morris’s classification and thus established a ranking of navies with nine levels, however such a classification was based only on the “perception” of the author without distinguishing them comparatively. This is a qualitative analysis without comparative classification and without the establishment of quantitative factors.

Another classification without considering the comparison between navies is that of Hervé Coutau-Begarie (2010), which presents a typology similar to Eric Grove (1990), which is also based on “perception” without classifying them among themselves, but pointing to a ranking of tasks to be accomplished by these navies. For Coutau-Begarie (2010) the navy in the world can be classified into six different levels according to their power and capabilities.

These typologies took into consideration qualitative aspects and in the case of Morris a quantitative aspect, without presenting a ranking of war navies. This research attempts exactly to establish this ranking.

As to the justification of this research, the result presented by this investigation will allow a methodology of relative classification between war navy to be made available, using measurable scientific parameters that will be available to all researchers working on the naval theme.

In summary, what is intended with this research is to establish a meth-

odology to classify the world's navy in a ranking, according to measurable parameters. In order to accomplish this goal we need to define what parameters would be compared and the type of navy being evaluated, according to their capabilities and tasks.

In this way we intend to discuss the main classifications of navies according to the perceptions of the main theorists of the Maritime Studies in the present time and then to present the ambiguities of these theoretical models. Following, the proposed methodology will be discussed and the guiding principles for the classification of naval powers. Last, the application of the proposed model in the case of the navies of the Americas will be presented, presenting a comparative classification and ranking of power between them.

Classification of Navies, a problem yet to be solved

The first model that became a reference as a comparative example of naval powers was named Model of Long Cycles of Maritime Power elaborated by George Modelski and William Thompson (1987) of the Universities of Washington and the State of Florida, respectively. Their research were published in the book *Sea Power in Global Politics, 1494-1993* in 1988, edited by the University of Washington.

The model proposed by Modelski / Thompson aimed to develop a set of numerical data, spanning 500 years, from 1494 to 1993 in order to analyze how maritime power (within global reach) had been distributed, the depth of this power concentration in one or more states and how these degrees of concentration varied over this period of time. Both researchers, at no time, had the intention of ranking navies in different historical times, mas only to comparatively explain their relative powers and how these powers had the capacity to use and fight for world leadership from the sea. (Modelski and Thompson 1987).

Whereas studying the dominance of maritime power in international relations, Modelski and Thompson (1987) raised fundamental problems. They verified that the conditions of world leadership of a determined State and the causes and consequences of the relevant world wars were submitted to regularities that were repetitive, cyclical and evolutionary. These regularities, changes and world wars were defined by the authors as long cycles of foreign policy. Following, the authors identified in the research the respectively dominant naval powers from 1494 till 1993: Long Cycle I – naval dominant power, Portugal, supporting powers - Spain, England and France, from 1494 till 1516; Long Cycle II - naval dominant power Netherlands, supporting powers - England, France and Spain, from 1580 till 1608; Long Cycle III - naval

dominant power Britain, supporting powers - Netherlands, France, Spain and Russia in the period from 1688 till 1713; Long Cycle IV - naval dominant power - Great Britain, supporting powers - France, Russia, Netherlands and Spain, from 1792 till 1815, and, lastly, the Long Cycle V - Netherlands - United States of America, - United Kingdom, France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Germany and Japan from 1914 till 1945.

Nowadays, US dominance persists. In each year of each cycle, a percentage of power was established for the main naval actors appointed. Just as an example, in 1509, during the Long Cycle I Portugal gathered 68% of the relative power amongst the naval powers of the period, followed by Spain with 19%, France with 8% and England with 4%. At the peak of Long Cycle II, in 1608, Netherlands gathered 51% of relative power, followed by England with 31% and Spain with 18%. During Long Cycle III - Great Britain gathered 47% in 1713, Netherlands 29% and France 25%. Once more in Long Cycle IV Great Britain gathered 44% in 1808, France 21%, Russia 18%, Spain 12% and the Netherlands 4%. In the last cycle in 1945, the US gathered 50%, followed by the United Kingdom with 35%, the USSR with 7% and France with 5%, and Japan with 2%. In 1990, the US reached the amazing amount of almost 63% of power when compared to its peers.

This model presents many conceptual and methodological weaknesses, however for the scope of this research the most outstanding one is the inability to hierarchize naval powers within a classification that considers all the naval world powers in the defined time frame. It focus on an average of three or four major powers and their relative power percentages. Despite this weakness, these studies seek to compare naval powers in different historical times, by making use of a clear, but not always comprehensive, quantitative methodology.

A second attempt to rank war navies in the current time was proposed by Michael Morris in its book *Expansion of Third World Marines* published in 1985 by St Martin's Press, which focused on navies from the so-called Third World, and pinpointed six levels based on a mainly quantitative analysis, using as parameters the definition of "major battle ships". For Morris, Third World navies could be ranked as: Level 1 - Regional Navies composed of over 15 major surface battle ships or submarines, detaining all categories of military equipment, including onboard aircrafts, with a strong coastal defense capability and for ocean projection capacity; Level 2- Subregional Navies or of Adjacent Projection, Navies composed of over 15 major surface battle ships or submarines, detaining all categories of military equipment, with the exception of onboard aircraft, with a strong coastal defense capability and a capacity of ocean projection limited to the exclusive economic zone. Level 3 - Area Defense Navies - with 6 to 15 major surface battle ships or submarines detaining

several categories of military equipment with strong coastal defense capability limited to the exclusive economic zone; Level 4 - Coastal Navies - from 1 to 5 major surface battle ships or submarines, detaining limited military equipment and good coastal defense capability and limited projection within the exclusive economic zone; Level 5 - Surveillance Navies - with no large ships, only patrol ships capable of launching missiles and patrolling territorial waters and finally Level 6 - Symbolic Navies - without patrol ships, only boats with no ability to control territorial waters (Morris 1988).

This ranking, although relevant due to the lack of alternative classifications, is fragile in several respects. First, how to classify “third-world navies”. What does this classification of countries mean? Which countries are included in this category? A second point, what do major battle ships mean? Would a destroyer be like a tanker? Or maybe a corvette? Would they be considered major ships? And how to compare them? Would they have the same rating? What about effective combat capability? And the logistical capacity to support them would not be considered? The simplicity of the model weakens it, and perceptions of what “good coastal defense capacity” can be, vary from analyst to analyst. What is an “ocean projection capability”? Can it be measured? These are points that undermine the acceptance of the Morris model as a navy ranking. Finally, there is no relative comparison between war navies, the main issue for the development of this research.

A third proposal for the classification of navies was conceived by Hervé Coutau-Bégarie in his book *Tratado de Estratégia*, published by the Naval War School in partnership with the Board of Directors of the Historical Heritage and Documentation of the Navy, in 2010. In this proposal Coutau-Bégarie, inspired by the use of sailboats of the Modelski / Thompson model, framed the combat navies in six levels as follows: 1- 1st Level Navies - these are called Global Navies. They have all the categories of modern armaments and equipment and can carry out all the functions of deterrence and intervention anywhere in the world. Their ability to retaliate is very large. Nowadays, the only Navy that fits into this category is the US Navy; 2- Second level Navies- are also navies with global capacity, with oceanic force capable of appearing in all the oceans, being able to intervene occasionally beyond its regional environment. Coutau-Bégarie fits the British, French and Russian Navies, however of course the Chinese can already be included in this group; 3- Third Level Navies- these are regional navies, with no capacity for nuclear deterrence with strong capacity to operate in ocean theater. They could be navies without aircraft carriers, but they have abundant and good quality squadrons and submarines, and also navies with aircraft carriers supported by a respectable fleet. Coutau-Bégarie points to the existence of 6 navies in this category; 4 – Fourth Level Navies - are called sub-regional with less means than those

of 3rd Level, but can intervene on the high seas. They do not have aircraft carriers and have a limited number of surface ships or submarines. Many of these navies adopt the so-called opportunity purchases which put them on a lower level; 5- Fifth Level Navies - are the coastal navies, but with good military capability, each adapted to a type of theater and specific missions. As an example, Coutau-Bégarie indicates the Belgian navy specializing in mine warfare, as well as the Swedish and Norwegian Navies capable of efficient modern submarines. These navies have few large combat ships but are able to use speedboats armed with anti-ship missiles, a trend in the 1970s especially in what he called the Third World; 6- Sixth Level Navies - are naval police forces with no military potential. They usually have boats, patrol vessels, and mining countermeasure vessels, which can provide limited surveillance in territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone. (Coutau-Bégarie 2010)

Coutau-Bégarie (2010) points out the existence of what he called symbolic navies which have whimsy assets and can barely control its own territorial waters. Nevertheless, they play a role in representing state sovereignty in a conflicted area.

This classification, while making the effort of being more qualitative than numeric, like the one of Morris, does not identify how to classify a “good military capability”. What would that mean? Also, it is not specific regarding the time frame of action. Beyond that what a “limited number” of assets mean? Two, five or ten? What is a “respectable fleet”? He does not define. What a “few large combat ships” is supposed to mean? This is not defined either. Moreover, he does not rank these navies, only mentioning a few as members of each level, without identifying a relative position.

A fourth proposed classification of navies was presented by Eric Grove in his book *The Future of Sea Power* of 1990, published by the U.S. Naval Institute. Grove divided the navies into 10 levels according to their importance in relation to their world power. Before introducing it, he mentioned the difficulty in conducting a classification of navies because one has to take into account the type of forces employed, the sophistication of their equipment and the ability to maintain detached forces and the amount of resources available to them. Grove (1990) intended to go further than Morris by inserting in his typology the so-called Third World Marines and other strata in order to produce a “global naval hierarchical rank”.

As Level 1 the author called Major Navies with Global Force and Full Power Projection - which would be the navies capable of conducting all naval military tasks on a global scale. In that case only the American Navy would be in it; Level 2 - Major Navies with Global Force and Partial Power Projection - would be navies capable of conducting most of the naval military tasks on a global scale in a partial way. They could project power away from their territo-

ry in a limited way just like the former USSR Navy; Level 3 - Average Navies with Global Force and Power Projection - would be medium-capacity marine capable of operating aircraft carriers, amphibious units, nuclear-powered attack and ballistic submarines and adequate surface forces that could conduct a major operation outside their area of interest. In this case there were the United Kingdom and French Navy, and in the medium and long term, the navies of Japan and China could be included.

The Level 4 – Average Navies with Regional Strength and Power Projection that would be navies capable of projecting force in a theater adjacent to its strategic theater of interest. According to Grove, India, Japan, China, Italy, Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Canada, Australia, Brazil and Argentina are part of this group; Level 5 - Adjacent Navies with Power Projection - would be a navy with some possibility of projecting force away from their coastlines. Included in this group are Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Chile, Peru, Israel, South Africa, South and North Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, New Zealand, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Grove pointed out that none of these navies could conduct high-level naval operations over large ocean distances; Level 6 - Offshore Territorial Defense Navies are navies capable of conducting police and defensive operations up to 200 miles from their shores. This group includes natives from Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslavia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Cuba, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. They have frigate ships, large corvettes, and some submarine capability; Level 7 - Inshore Territorial Defense Navies - are capable of only defending their territorial waters using missile-armed boats, short range aviation and limited submarine capability. This group includes Albania, Angola, Bahrain, Brunei, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Kenya, Kuwait, North Oman, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Singapore, South Yemen, Syria and Tunisia; Level 8 - Constabulary Navies are navies that serve only with police functions, not having missiles and only small arms that could be Coast Guard. This group includes the navies of Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Iceland, Ireland, Burma, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Tanzania. Finally, Level 9 - Tiny Navies that have minimal defense capabilities with only a formal organization and small patrol vessels. Most poor countries have Tiny Navies. (Grove 1990).

The classification presented by Eric Grove is an advance in relation to the previous typologies, because, in addition to classifying them in a more precise and comprehensive way, it cites examples of navies that fit in its different nine qualifying levels. This is the first relative classification of navies, although it does not rank them by relative powers. This typology may serve as a reference for the proposition of a new classification.

The website <https://www.globalfirepower.com> annually publishes a

widely used classification to compare armed forces in the world. It is an efficient reference for those who want to access relevant information about the 110 countries listed in their ranking. The site takes into account up-to-date information on the economy, geographic features such as borders, space and population, defense budgets, among many other benchmarks. This site describes in detail the numbers of the armed forces of these countries and is able to compare relatively to two countries. Regarding the navies, the site presents a comparative ranking among these services, which although extremely useful to the researchers does not accurately point out the relative powers between these naval forces. In the ranking of 2017 is listed as the number 1 navy belonging to North Korea for possessing more number of assets than the most powerful US Navy and China. This indicator equates an aircraft carrier with a patrol vessel, which distorts the comparison altogether. The US Navy, known as the most powerful in the world, possesses 415 assets and places itself at number 3 on the scale, behind North Korea with 967 and China with 714 assets of combat. The Brazilian Navy is in the 23rd position with 110 assets behind navies that are known to be of lesser importance like the Bolivian, Colombian and Myanmar.

In the presentation of the site it is indicated that the numbers do not differentiate technological capacity, crew training and the quality of the presented assets. As a comparative reference between navies it is not satisfactory.

According to Geoffrey Till in his *Seapower Guide for the Twenty-First Century* in its second edition of 2009, the act of classifying navies is “difficult and dangerous”, however there are points that can be taken into consideration for those who wish to organize and classify them according to an objective, transparent and fair criterion. (Till 2009, 99) They are as follows:

- 1 - **Size and Nature of the Navy** in which it is taken into consideration besides the numbers the capacity to maintain large surface ships;
- 2 - **Geographical Range** that would be its ability to operate away from its own coast;
- 3 - **Function and Capability** that would be its ocean function or not and its ability to conduct certain operations;
- 4 - **Technology** that would be the ability to have access to advanced technologies; and
- 5 - **Reputation** that would translate into its power of deterrence and the perception that other navies have of it. This feature would be associated with its combat experience.

In this way, it can be deduced that there are no classifications that effectively reflect the relative powers between the navies of the world, and it is necessary to establish quantitative and qualitative criteria for classification as close as possible to reality.

As reference sources can be mentioned: the *Jane's Fighting Ships* publications, the website <https://www.globalfirepower.com>, specialized magazines such as *US Naval Proceedings*, *Naval Review and Naval Forces*, as well as UN and governmental websites and the own navies websites, in order to have a compatible and reliable database for comparisons.

The purpose of this classification is to offer the academic, business and military world a classification that is capable of measuring, relatively, naval powers within the international and regional scenarios of defense and security. In order to do this, comprehensive sources with parameters that will be determined and balanced, based on specific weights. Some factors, however, must be defined for the establishment of any consistent methodology, which are the kind of range that will be analyzed in each war navy, according to its capabilities, interests and projection? Which parameters should be quantified, taking into account determinants that interest the naval power of each state as important factors for the measurement of relative power between naval forces? What are the specific weights for each parameter set taking them into account as measures of relative power between naval forces? How to rank the world war navy according to a scoring system from 0 to 100, according to the specific weights established, starting from the most to the least powerful?

The Methodology for Classifying Navies

The methodology used was the comparative one using economic and military indicators having as reference open and respected publications in the naval environment. The parallel was indicated in the requirements necessary to compare naval powers such as technological capacity, quantity of assets and experience of combat among some. As it is not possible to confront different requirements such as quantity of assets and natural resources, we used the system of weights in which the most important requirements would have greater weights, while the smaller ones would have lower weights. Depending on the type of parameter pointed out, the quantitative evaluation was privileged when it was possible to establish numerical values for the comparison. In other cases, such as the “maritime mentality”, the qualitative evaluation was privileged because it is difficult to quantify the mentality. This evaluation occurred through discussions in the Control Group⁴ according to the eleven

⁴ Control Group refers to a research team which competed to choose the parameters selected, the relative weights and the discussions conducting the research. It was conducted by the two authors of this article with master's students from the Postgraduate Program in Maritime Studies of the Naval War School, within the scope of Pro-Defense III Project. In addition two of the members of the Group are naval officers with recognized knowledge in the naval field and

chosen parameters and then measured by weights. The parameters chosen were evaluated in quantitative terms and when impossible that way, in qualitatively terms. Weight 1 (one) was set as minimum value and weight 4 (four) as maximum value. The eleven comparative parameters selected and their specific weights were as follows:

1- **Number of assets** - weight 2 - quantitative and qualitative analysis. Whenever necessary and when there were references to this, an attempt was made to look beyond the number of assets, looking for the readiness⁵ of ships.

2- **Types of existing assets** - weight 4 - quantitative and qualitative analysis. This weight was proposed in order to differentiate an aircraft carrier from a patrol vessel, giving greater weight to the first one than to the second. Whenever possible we sought to analyze the level of training of the asset considered as both ship and crew.

3- **Naval Personnel** - weight 1 - quantitative analysis. This low relative weight considers only naval personnel without the analysis of their training.

4- **Ratio Naval Personnel / Population** - weight 1 - quantitative analysis. This number reflects the percentage of the population involved in the naval activities.

5- **Bases and Shipyards** - weight 2 - quantitative and qualitative analysis. This parameter refers to the logistical capacity of a country to support its naval assets in repairs and maintenance.

6- **Technological level** - weight 4 - qualitative analysis. This parameter refers to the technological level of a particular country and its Navy. As this parameter is difficult to measure and dependent on several factors, its analysis will be qualitative.

7- **Nuclear Capacity** - weight 2 - qualitative analysis. This parameter refers to the ability of a country to dominate the nuclear cycle and to use that energy for the benefit of the Navy.

8- **Combat experience** - weight 1 - qualitative analysis. This parameter refers to the performance of the Navy in real combat operations.

9- **Financial Capacity** - weight 4 - quantitative and qualitative analysis. This parameter refers to the capacity of a state to maintain its ships in conditions of efficient and effective readiness, being referenced to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

10- **Natural Resources** - weight 1 - quantitative and qualitative analysis.

former commanders of Navy units with many years of operation at sea.

5 The readiness refers to the ability of a naval asset to be available and ready for combat considering the training of its crew and its full material availability.

This parameter refers to a state's ability to exploit its natural resources for the sake of strengthening its naval power. It is connected to other parameters already presented.

II- Shipbuilding capacity - weight 3 - quantitative and qualitative analysis. This parameter reflects the ability of a state to build its own combat ships and export to other states. This parameter includes the production of own weapons, sensors and ammunition. It is connected to other parameters displayed.

From what was presented we have 25 weights distributed in 11 parameters to be measured. Each weight of each parameter should be multiplied by the level at which each parameter should be measured and multiplied, going from 0 to 4. Level 0 corresponds to "having no capacity"; 0.5 corresponds to having "minimum capacity"; 1.0 corresponds to having "small capacity"; 1.5 corresponds to having "small to good"; 2.0 corresponds to having "good capacity"; 2.5 corresponds to having "good to very good"; 3.0 corresponds to having "very good capacity"; 3.5 corresponds to having "very good to excellent capacity" and 4.0 to have "excellent capacity".

Thus, for each parameter presented will correspond a numerical value that will represent the capacity of the country in that specific item. For example, a state that has a good shipbuilding capacity (weight 3) will have as a numerical indicator for this item $3 \times 2 = 6$. If the Control Group considers that the shipbuilding capacity of the country is good to very good $3 \times 2,5 = 7,5$ points.

In this way, the maximum values of each parameter will be determined as follows: Number of Assets ($2 \times 4 = 8$); Types of Assets ($4 \times 4 = 16$); Naval Personnel ($1 \times 4 = 4$); Reason Personal / Population ($1 \times 4 = 4$); Technological level ($4 \times 4 = 16$); Bases and Shipyards ($2 \times 4 = 8$), Nuclear Capacity ($2 \times 4 = 8$); Combat Experience ($1 \times 4 = 4$); Financial Capacity ($4 \times 4 = 16$); Natural Resources ($1 \times 4 = 4$); Naval Construction Capacity ($3 \times 4 = 12$). It can be seen that the parameters considered most relevant were the types of means, technological level and financial capacity, all with weight 4 and the least relevant parameters were effective, personal / population ratio, combat experience and natural resources, all with weight 1. The maximum score will be set at 100 points. The minimum at 0 point. At the end the naval powers will be classified according to a decreasing classification that will go from 0 to 100 points in order from the lowest naval power to the highest naval power evaluated.

The scientific nature of the research is to identify the values pertinent to each parameter for each naval power analyzed, with quantitative and qualitative evaluations by the Control Group. It is noteworthy that the evaluations of the weights are subjective factors and susceptible to diverse interpretations,

however in the absence of a more precise evaluation in the academic universe, such methodology intends to approach the current existing reality. A Control Group was set for the weight's appraisers, composed by naval officers, academics, journalists and specialists in the area of defense.

For each parameter depending on quantification the following numerical reference shall be used:

1- Number of Assets

Points	Parameter
0	The navy does not have assets
0,5	Hold from 1 to 5 accounted assets
1,0	Hold from 5 to 39 accounted assets
2,0	Hold from 40 to 89 accounted assets
3,0	Hold from 90 to 349 accounted assets
4,0	Hold over 350 accounted assets

A survey regarding the number of assets, considering combat ships and support means for naval forces of each analyzed country was conducted to set this parameter. The Coast Guard was not considered in the survey, only the Navy. The values accounted for were debated by the Control Group taking into consideration the current available naval assets (2016) and the average projection of each level. The weight for this parameter is 2.

2- Types of Assets

It took into account the capacity of each asset and its projection of power, according to its average unit power. For example, the nuclear aircraft carrier has a numbering of 15, while a corvette has a number of 3. This does not necessarily mean that the nuclear aircraft carrier is five times more powerful than the corvette, as this "factor" is difficult to measure, since it will depend on their readiness for combat, training of the crew, availability of air wing, in the end factors of difficult counting. No account was taken of the age or combat capacity of each asset, since parameter 6 (Technological Level) will evaluate the technology capacity of the available means to each Navy evaluated. What can be said a priori is that we took into account a numerical factor to define the relative value of a more powerful means of combat, in this case the value 15 and for a more modest asset such as a corvette the value 3. Thus, giv-

ing an initial a priori indication of a value perceivable by the Control Group. The weight for this parameter is 4.

What is done in this parameter is the multiplication of the numberings indicated by the number of means available in a Navy. For example, a Navy that has 1 conventional aircraft carrier, a conventional cruiser and 4 frigates will have as numbers the values $10 \times 1 + 5 \times 1 + 4 \times 4 = 31$ points. The table of types of means and points is indicated below:

TYPE OF ASSET	ASSET VALUE
NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIER	15
CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIER	10
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP	8
HELICOPTER CARRIER	8
NUCLEAR BALLISTIC SUBMARINE	13
NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINE	9
CONVENTIONAL OCEANIC SUBMARINE	6
CONVENTIONAL COASTAL SUBMARINE	4
NUCLEAR CRUISER	7
CONVENTIONAL CRUISER	5
DESTROYER/CT	4
FRIGATE	4
CORVETTE	3
OCEANIC PATROL-SHIP	0,75
PATROL-SHIP	0,25
MINESWEEPER SHIP	1
SCANNER SHIP	0,5
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT SHIP	3
LANDING SHIP	4,5
AUXILIARY SHIPS (+ HOSPITAL, COMMAND, SAVING, TUGBOAT)	1
OTHERS (RESEARCH, SCHOOL, HYDROCEANOGRAPHIC)	0,5

For the general sum of points in this parameter, the table below describes the relationship between the partial sums of each navy surveyed and the score established from 0 to 4. From this relation, the factor to be multiplied at the end of this parameter follows:

Points	Parameter
0	Holds up to 5 points accounted for
0,5	Holds from 6 to 20 points accounted for
1,0	Holds from 21 to 50 points accounted for
1,5	Holds from 51 to 75 points accounted for
2,0	Holds from 76 to 150 points accounted for
2,5	Holds from 151 to 500 points accounted for
3,0	Holds from 501 to 800 points accounted for
3,5	Holds from 801 to 999 points accounted for
4,0	Holds over 1000 (thousand) points accounted for

As a practical example of this operation we have the following for the combat navy composed of 1 conventional aircraft carrier, 1 conventional cruiser and 4 frigates, totaling 31 points as previously pointed out. If this navy still has 10 patrol vessels and 2 tugboats it will have as total sum the following: 31 points of the previous result plus 10×0.25 and 2×1 that will add 4.5 points. There will be the final sum of 35.5 points that in the table above will correspond to 1 point in the overall sum. This point multiplied by the weight 4 will correspond to 4 points in the total sum.

3- Naval Personnel

In this parameter, the constant personnel of each Navy is accounted for without considering aspects related to training, number of assets and readiness for combat. This parameter identifies the number of individuals that compose the state's naval power. The Marine Corps is included in this force, if it is established by the Navy that its effective should be included in the final numbers. The numerical table below, with weight 1, is used.

Points	Parameter
0	Total Naval Personnel accounts for less than 1.000 (thousand) individuals
0,5	Total Naval Personnel accounts for 1.001 to 5.000 individuals
1,0	Total Naval Personnel accounts for 5.001 to 15.000 individuals
1,5	Total Naval Personnel accounts for 15.001 to 30.000 individuals
2,0	Total Naval Personnel accounts for 30.001 to 50.000 individuals
2,5	Total Naval Personnel accounts for 50.001 to 100.000 individuals
3,0	Total Naval Personnel accounts for 100.001 to 200.000 individuals
3,5	Total Naval Personnel accounts for 200.001 to 500.000 individuals
4,0	Total Naval Personnel accounts for more than 500.001 individuals

The Control Group considered that any number below 1,000 individuals was not significant. In this sense, as an example, a Navy composed of 16,000 men with a multiplier factor of 1,5. The final score would be $1,5 \times \text{weight } 1 = 1,5$ points.

4- Ratio Naval Personnel/ Population

This parameter has the purpose of verifying the existence of the maritime mentality⁶ in the population of a certain State. It is assumed that if the percentage of individuals linked to naval power is high, there will be a natural acceptance with the demands of the Navy and the people will be closer to the sea. We are aware that this parameter can be contested. However, there is no doubt that the greater the population is linked to the sea, the greater is the awareness of the people that the sea matters. The calculation will be based in the number of inhabitants divided by the naval forces of the State. There is a direct correlation with the previous parameter. It will be considered weight 1.

Points	Parameter
0	Ratio observed higher than 10.001 inhabitants per 01 (one) naval personnel
0,5	Ratio observed of 4.501 to 10.000 inhabitants per 01 (one) naval personnel
1,0	Ratio observed of 3.501 to 4.500 inhabitants per 01 (one) naval personnel

⁶ Navy mentality refers to the identification that a given society has in relation to the sea. It is a parameter based on the qualitative perception of the Control Group and is one of the factors widely discussed in Alfred Thayer Mahan's book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, a classic on the elements of maritime power of 1890.

1,5	Ratio observed of 3.001 to 3.500 inhabitants per 01 (one) naval personnel
2,0	Ratio observed of 2.501 to 3.000 inhabitants per 01 (one) naval personnel
2,5	Ratio observed of 2.001 to 2.500 inhabitants per 01 (one) naval personnel
3,0	Ratio observed of 1.501 to 2.000 inhabitants per 01 (one) naval personnel
3,5	Ratio observed of 1.001 to 1.500 inhabitants per 01 (one) naval personnel
4,0	Ratio lower than 1.000 inhabitants per 01 (one) naval personnel

5- Bases and Shipyards

This parameter measures the ability of a Navy to provide logistical support for its ships through naval bases and shipyards capable of repairing them. This is a key element in measuring the logistic capacity of a Navy. The greater the number of bases and yards, the better the Navy will be to support naval forces near its shores or in remote regions. It is one of the parameters pointed out by Alfred Mahan in his formulation of the elements of maritime power. The weight of this parameter is 2.

Points	Parameter
0	No base or yards accounted for
1,0	Between 1 and 2 bases and/or yards accounted for
2,0	Between 3 and 6 bases and/or yards accounted for
3,0	Between 7 and 10 bases and/or yards accounted for
4,0	More than 11 bases and/or yards accounted for

6- Technological level

It is a qualitative empirical evaluation. However, some elements were considered for the establishment of this parameter. Consideration was given to the ability to dispose of ships with nuclear propulsion which requires a higher level of technology than the conventional ones which a priori requires lower levels. In a second point, the type of missiles that these equipments are able to carry and operate. Ranked by the sophistication of the state of the art, we began with point-defense missiles, followed by area, medium range and long range missile, and ballistic missiles. The weight of this parameter by its importance was established as 4.

Points	Parameter
0	No assets for naval power
0,5	Operates coastal ship with low embarked tech
1,0	Operates conventional propulsion asset and point-defense system
1,5	Operates conventional propulsion asset and area defense system
2,0	Operates conventional propulsion asset and medium-range cruise missile
2,5	Operates conventional propulsion asset and long-range cruise missile
3,0	Operates nuclear propulsion asset
3,5	Operates nuclear propulsion asset and cruise missile system
4,0	Operates nuclear propulsion asset and ballistic missile

7- Nuclear Capacity

This is an important parameter for the measurement of naval power. The navy, which has the ability to master nuclear propulsion technology and carry nuclear devices has a deterrence power that differs from the others. There may be intermediate classifications for this parameter. For example, India has the ability to dominate the atomic cycle and is developing its nuclear propulsion submarine but does not have the same full capacity as the United States of America but is in the process of acquiring capability. The weight set for this parameter is 2.

Points	Parameter
0	Does not master nuclear technology, neither for propulsion nor nuclear artifacts
2,0	Master nuclear technology but does not has nuclear propulsion.
3,0	Master nuclear technology and has nuclear propulsion, but does not have nuclear artifacts
4,0	Masters the nuclear cycle, has nuclear propulsion and nuclear artifacts

8- Combat Experience

It is a question of verifying whether the State has been involved in a conflict with the use of naval power in the last 70 years, post-World War II, a timeframe in which is believed that the experience can be related for future generations. The capacity of a country to take part in peace operations with naval means and the engagement in regional and extrarregional conflicts with

small, medium and large effectives were taken into account. The weight for this parameter will be 1.

Points	Parameter
0	No combat experience
1,0	Holds experience in Peace Enforcement Operations
2,0	Holds experience in Regional Wars (considering the country's location)
3,0	Holds experience in Extrarregional Wars with medium and small effectives
4,0	Holds experience in Extrarregional Wars with major effectives

9- Financial Capacity in relation to its Gross Domestic Product

For this parameter, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) factor was used, which indicates the ability of a country to generate wealth in its transactions. Although GDP itself does not indicate greater financial strength, it may indicate the ability of a state to generate resources to develop its naval power in case of need. Theoretically, the larger the GDP, the more capacity the state will have in sponsoring its Navy. The weight established for this parameter is 4. The Defense budgets were not considered since many of them consider the payment of personnel and non-related Defense activities.

Points	Parameter
0	GDP below U\$ 30 billion
1,0	GDP accounted for U\$ 30 billion up to U\$ 200 billion
2,0	GDP accounted for U\$ 200 billion up to U\$ 1 Trillion
3,0	GDP accounted for U\$ 1 Trillion up to U\$ 3 Trillion
4,0	GDP above U\$ 3 Trillion

10 - Natural Resources considering oil production

The daily production of petroleum was taken into account for this parameter. Oil is the key element in maintaining credible naval power. In case of conflict the ability of a state to produce oil for its own use will be paramount. The weight for this parameter is 1.

Points	Parameter
0	No proved oil reserves or production
0,5	Up to 250.000 bbl/day
1,0	Between 250.000 and 500,000 bbl/day
1,5	Between 500,000 and 1.000,000 bbl/day
2,0	Between 1.000.000 and 2.000.000 bbl/day
2,5	Between 2.000.000 and 5.000.000 bbl/day
3,0	Between 5.000,000 and 8.000.000 bbl/day
3,5	Between 8.000,000, and 10.000.000 bbl/day
4,0	More than 10.000.000 bbl/day

II- Shipbuilding Capacity

In this parameter the capacity of autochthonous shipbuilding will be considered. The ability to build vessels, oceanic combat ships and submarines will be considered. The weight for this parameter is 3.

Points	Parameter
0	Does not build relevant naval asset
1,0	Produces coastal ships and watercraft
2,0	Capacity to build Conventional Submarines and/or Surface Oceanic Ships
3,0	Capacity to build Nuclear Submarines and/or Large Surface Ships
4,0	Capacity to build Nuclear Ballistic Submarines and/or Nuclear Aircraft Carriers.

In possession of these eleven metric parameters with their specific weights we can already prepare a classification of Navies ranking them from the most powerful to the least powerful. At no time, this classification will define that a 90-point Navy is twice as superior as a 45-point one. This punctuation will only rank Navies, according to values with no relation to its power, only with its relative position regarding its geographical area in the final table.

This research purpose is to rank these navies more precisely than the ones that currently exist that only take into account the qualitative question. We attempted to use ranking numerical parameters as a factor closer to reality in terms of relative power.

When determining a ranking, we tried to correlate this listing of rel-

ative power with a qualitative typology in relation to the geographic reach of each naval power evaluated. The following table will correspond to the ranking listed below:

- Level 10 - Naval Power with Global Reach and Full Power Projection.
- Level 9 - Naval Power with Global Reach with partial power projection
- Level 8 - Naval Power with Global Reach without power projection.
- Level 7 - Regional Naval Power with full power projection in the region.
- Level 6 - Regional Naval Power with partial power projection in the region
- Level 5 - Regional Naval Power without power projection.
- Level 4 - Local Naval Power with full power projection in its territory.
- Level 3 - Local Naval Power with partial power projection in its territory.
- Level 2 - Local Naval Power without power projection.
- Level 1- Constable or Police Naval Power.

This evaluation is fully qualitative and is presented after the analysis conducted by the Control Group. In this way, the ranking by power of each navy in a given geographic environment can be presented from a quantitative point of view and then indicate the level at which each naval power is positioned, and this evaluation is an eminently qualitative assessment. This classification by levels was based on the one formulated by Eric Grove.

In the case of a point-tie between two evaluated navies, the tiebreaker standard was the geographic reach by levels as presented above, as level 10 is considered the highest level (Naval Power with Global Reach and Full Power Projection) and the lowest level Constable or Police Naval Power.

The case of the Americas and the application of the model

Taking as a reference the navies of the Americas, a total amount of fifteen countries have naval forces in place. The United States Navy stands out, as expected, as the most powerful on the American continent. It's position is number one with 99 points out of 100 possible. The naval power that follows them is that of Brazil with 49.5 points. This means that there are 49.5 points that separate them, but that does not mean that the US Navy is twice as powerful as the Brazilian. The points separating the two naval powers indicate the considerable distance between the two navies. The greater the difference between scores the higher the differences between the powers compared, without correlation with absolute values.

In the comparison with the parameter “Types of Existing Assets” one has an approximation with the reality of the naval powers, when compared to each other currently. The values obtained by the US in this parameter (Type of Assets) reached 1758.8. Brazil obtained 129.8 points, that is almost fourteen times lower. This parameter already demonstrates a close valuation of reality only considering the types of means in the actuality. One can even infer without great corrections that the US Navy is fourteen times the Brazilian Navy in terms of military power. By means of this valuation the following score of the American navies is reached, considering only the types of means available: USA (1758.8 points), followed by Brazil (129.8), Canada (114), Argentina (103), Peru (97), Chile (77.8), Venezuela (67), Mexico (62), Colombia (48), Ecuador (44.3), Uruguay (18.8), Paraguay (4), Bolivia (2.5). The other naval powers of the Americas are expressionless and do not score.

The other parameters considered in the methodology indicate not only the present situation among the navies considered in terms of numbers, but also the total capacity that a given country has in developing its naval power fully in comparison with other powers, that is the potential available capacity for growth. In this case we have as first naval the US with 99 points, followed by Brazil (49.5), Canada (48.5), Mexico (45.5), Argentina (43.5), Chile (42), Venezuela (40), Colombia (39), Peru (38.5), Ecuador (30.5), Uruguay (20), Paraguay (10) and Bolivia (9.5).

When comparing the two analyzed parameters, the “Type of Assets” and “Final Result” we have almost a coincidence of ranking, USA, Brazil, Canada, and Argentina, with Mexico being placed as potentially more capable to develop its naval power compared to Argentina, but less powerful nowadays than the latter. Then five South American countries, Peru, Chile, Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador, appear. The case of Peru is emblematic, since in the first parameter occupies the fifth place, falling in the ranking when faced with its potential capacity to develop its naval power (ninth place) with 38.5 points. The other countries analyzed are far from these.

Classifying based on its reach, the US reaches Level 10 with a Naval Power with Global Reach and with Full Power Projection. Then follows Brazil with Level 6, Regional Naval Power with Partial Power Projection in the region. Canada is at the same level as Brazil with score 6. Argentina, Chile and Mexico are placed in Level 5 - Regional Naval Power without projection of power. At the next level the 4, Local Naval Power with full power projection in its territory are Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. In Level 3, Local Naval Power with projection of partial power in its territory, Uruguay. Both Bolivia and Paraguay are placed in Level 2, Local Naval Power with partial power projection in its territory.

This classification was based on discussions conducted by the Control Group, composed of naval officers with extensive experience in offshore operations, specialists in maritime power studies and students of the Postgraduate Program in Maritime Studies. It was essentially a qualitative assessment based on the operations conducted by naval powers assessed over the last ten years.

One of the perceived points was the deterioration of the Venezuelan Navy that, in continuing the current state of budget shortages, will certainly fall into the ranks and move to Level 3, Local Naval Power with partial power projection in its territory. Two others naval powers may fall into the classification. The Brazilian one being among them that due to continuing budgetary restrictions, may fall to Level 5 and the Argentinian one who may fall to level 4 on the same level as Colombia, Peru and Ecuador.

Another perceived point is the distance between the US Navy and the other American navies. It can be predicted that in the next ten years there will be an even greater increase in the comparative scores between the US and the other countries and the gap between these naval powers and the North American will be increasing, due to the fact that the US technological-financial level is going to be more and more distant from other American countries.

Final remarks

The main purpose of this research is to establish a method as close to reality as possible to classify war navies at the present time. Eleven parameters considered relevant in the evaluation of a naval power were established and specific weights were indicated for each of these parameters according to their importance one in relation to the others. The choice of each of these parameters was the product of a wide debate with experts in the field of Security and Defense. As we can see the decisions of each of these factors and the weights were a product of consensus after extensive deliberation.

Because they are perceptions motivated by the collective experience of the Control Group formed by specialists and because it is a comparative method that travels in the field of Human Sciences it can be improved. Like any process in this field it may be subject to criticism which in no way makes its application unfeasible.

The great novelty in this process is that it lowers the uncertainties motivated by the perception of a particular specialist or scholar of a classification based only on "his experience." Thus, we sought to rank naval powers and establish more reliable parameters when classifying navies, greatly reducing

the “individual perception” of each analyst or academic in the area of Defense.

In order to maintain the reliability of the information that is based on the comprehensive sources applied in the eleven parameters, it must be continuously updated by taking into account reliable and known platforms in order to keep its relative final result unsuspected.

The annex is the presentation of the model for the case of naval powers of the Americas, as discussed, within a current regional scenario with data extracted from the beginning of 2018 from reliable sources.

Annex

Número de meios				Tipos de Meios existentes				Efetivos Navais			
Qtd Meios	Nível alcançado	Parametro	Pts. Obts	Valor	Nível alcançado	Parametro	Pts. Obts	Efetivo	Nível alcançado	Parametro	Pts. Obts
EUA	390	4	2	8	1758,8	4	4	16	326546	3,5	1
Brasil	88	2	2	4	129,8	2	4	8	60000	2,5	1
Argentina	52	2	2	4	103	2	4	8	19884	1,5	1
Bolivia	3	0,5	2	1	2,5	0	4	0	4983	0,5	1
Chile	32	1	2	2	77,8	2	4	8	18307	1,5	1
Colômbia	26	1	2	2	48	1	4	4	32056	2	1
Equador	24	1	2	2	44,3	1	4	4	9127	1	1
Guiana	0	0	2	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	1
Paraguai	4	0,5	2	1	4	0	4	0	1992	0,5	1
Peru	35	1	2	2	97	2	4	8	21665	1,5	1
Suriname	0	0	2	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	1
Uruguai	14	1	2	2	18,8	0,5	4	2	4672	0,5	1
Venezuela	29	1	2	2	67	1,5	4	6	48000	2,5	1
Canadá	57	2	2	4	114	2	4	8	8500	1	1
México	44	2	2	4	62	1,5	4	6	56000	2,5	1

Efetivos/População				Bases e Estaleiros				Nível Tecnológico			
Razão	Nível alcançado	Parametro	Pts. Obts	Quantidade	Nível alcançado	Parametro	Pts. Obts	Nível	Parametro	Pts. Obts	
547,297	4	1	4	11	4	2	8	4	16	8	
3.450,000	1,5	1	1,5	6	2	4	2	4	8	4	
2.212,834	2,5	1	2,5	5	2	2	4	2	4	8	
2.207,506	2,5	1	2,5	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	
720,000	4	1	4	7	3	2	6	2	4	8	
1.380,571	3,5	1	3,5	5	2	2	4	2	4	8	
1.724,554	3	1	3	1	1	2	2	2	4	8	
7.996,130	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	
3.414,659	1,5	1	1,5	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	
1.402,262	3,5	1	3,5	2	1	2	2	2	4	8	
5.392,760	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	
604,211	4	1	4	1	1	2	2	1	4	4	
666,667	4	1	4	4	2	2	4	2	4	8	
2.647,059	2	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	4	8	
2.214,286	2,5	1	2,5	5	2	2	4	2	4	8	

Annex 1

Capacidade Nuclear				Experiência de Combate				Capacidade Financeira			
Nível	Parametro	Pts. Obts	Nível	Parametro	Pts. Obts	Nível	Parametro	PIB	Nível alcançado	Parametro	Pts. Obts
4	2	8	4	1	4			\$17.914.000.000,00	4	4	16
0	2	0	1	1	1			\$2.346.000.000.000,00	3	4	12
0	2	0	3	1	3			\$540.200.000.000,00	2	4	8
0	2	0	0	1	0			\$34.180.000.000,00	1	4	4
0	2	0	1	1	1			\$25.810.000.000,00	2	4	8
0	2	0	3	1	3			\$37.770.000.000,00	2	4	8
0	2	0	2	1	2			\$10.050.000.000,00	1	4	4
0	2	0	0	1	0			\$6.155.000.000,00	0	4	0
0	2	0	0	1	0			\$30.980.000.000,00	1	4	4
0	2	0	2	1	2			\$202.900.000.000,00	2	4	8
0	2	0	0	1	0			\$91.880.000.000,00	0	4	0
0	2	0	1	1	1			\$57.470.000.000,00	1	4	4
0	2	0	0	1	0			\$51.000.000.000,00	2	4	8
0	2	0	3	1	3			\$1.787.000.000.000,00	3	4	12
0	2	0	1	1	1			\$1.200.000.000.000,00	3	4	12

Recursos Naturais				Construção Naval			
Produção Diária	Nível alcançado	Parametro	Pts. Obts	Nível	Parametro	Pts. Obts	Pts. Totais Obts.
8653000	3,5	1	3,5	4	3	12	99
2255000	2,5	1	2,5	2	3	6	49,5
532100	1,5	1	1,5	1	3	3	43,5
51130	1,5	1	1,5	0	3	0	9,5
6666	0,5	1	0,5	1	3	3	42
989900	1,5	1	1,5	1	3	3	39
556400	1,5	1	1,5	1	3	3	30,5
0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0
0	0	1	0	1	3	3	10
69300	0,5	1	0,5	1	3	3	38,5
17000	0,5	1	0,5	0	3	0	0,5
100	0,5	1	0,5	0	3	0	20
2500000	2,5	1	2,5	1	3	3	40
3603000	2,5	1	2,5	2	3	6	48,5
2459000	2,5	1	2,5	1	3	3	45,5

Annex 2

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ABSTRACT

Classification of navies according to their relative power has been a challenge for the academic area that works with issues in the field of Security and Defense. Qualitative ratings have been presented by renowned researchers such as Colin Gray, Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and Michael Morris, however these attempts have stumbled in its simplicity and little scope. From studies based on open access sources, this paper tries to develop a comparative methodology that would not only take into account qualitative but also quantitative factors. This innovative method was used to classify the navy of the different states in a ranking of power taking into account parameters such as the number of means, shipbuilding capacity, number of bases and arsenals, naval assets and availability of resources, among others, in order to rank naval powers. This methodology aims to reduce uncertainties in the classification of navies and serve as a reference for future works in the academic area that are dedicated to the fields of Security and Defense.

KEYWORDS

Methodology; Maritime Studies; War Navies

Translated by Eduardo Tomankiewicz Secchi

MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND THE ARMED FORCES ACTIONS IN SOUTH AMERICA: AN APPRECIATION ABOUT THE REGIONAL DEFENSE CONVERGENCE

Graciela De Conti Pagliari¹

Introduction

Almost a decade after the formation of the Defense Council (SADC²) under the auspices of the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) it is now possible to analyse it since its formative condition and to consider the impacts of this arrangement among the countries of the region. Several studies (Villa 2017a, 2017b; Nolte 2018) have been carried out in order to balance regional institutionalization and the regular trend to maintain military and political crises. The SADC was created with the aim of “implementing defense policies in military cooperation, humanitarian action and peace operations, defense industry and technology, training and capacity building”³. The dimension of defense, therefore, is the guiding element of the Council’s actions and the reason why the Council was designed as a forum for consultation, cooperation and coordination.

Considering its main objectives such as consolidating a South American peace zone, building a common vision for defense and generating consensus to strengthen regional cooperation in this area, this article proposes to analyze SADC and its capacity for regional regimentation in defense matters. Therefore, whether the creation of the SADC reduced the costs of regional

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² SADC, as in South American Defense Council in English (CDS in Portuguese).

³ Presentation and objectives listed on the homepage of the SADC website. Available at <http://www.unasursg.org/es/consejo-defensa-suramericano>. Accessed June 12, 2017. Our translation.

transactions as it allowed for greater institutionalization of regional cooperation.

When the SADC was established, Brazil was an active country in the quest for seeking regional consensus for its creation. The conjuncture presented conditions conducive to a greater development of regional institutionalization – what was perceived and used as an asset by the government of President Lula –, which used this condition to bring the South American countries together in this new regional enterprise. The occasion seemed to indicate that the non-participation of the United States in the newly created body revealed a positive scope for building a region that clearly had concerns about the same security issues but had not yet jointly constructed propositions for answers as it ran into disparities essentially about militarizing them or not.

The limited capacity of action of the hemispheric mechanisms in relation to the problems that South America presented, as well as the focus of the United States to other regions of the world⁴, were associated with a positive period of economic growth and a decrease in regional political instabilities. But this threshold between regional stability and internal instabilities can be seen as a truly changing condition in South America.

The propelled peace ring⁵ does not hold up as an image of the situation of the region, which can be highlighted in important – but not exhaustive examples: since 2001 Plan Colombia was used to put an end to the guerrillas whose contestatory movement challenged the instability of Colombian institutions; in 2006 the Media Luna crisis occurred in Bolivia⁶, with Unasur playing a prominent role in this concertation; in 2008 the invasion of the Colombian armed forces into Ecuadorian territory highlighted the historical

4 Cepik (2009, 76-77) points out that the sources of insecurity in the region are predominantly domestic, and the United States – even though focused especially on the counter-terrorism agenda – does not neglect its status as a regional hegemon. In addition, the author, looking at the overall picture of the South American security complex in that period, points out to a moment of advance in the development of “a growing institutionalization of dispute settlement processes through a multiplicity of organizations, such as the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO), Mercosur, Andean Community (CAN) and, as the main challenge, the Union of South America Nations (Unasur)”.

5 In a speech at the announcement of the national defense policy on November 7, 1996, the then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso asserted that “The priority that the Government has been giving to the stabilization of the economy and the attendance of social programs, without attending fully meet the needs of reequipment defense bodies, it is largely due to the true peace ring built around the Country.”

6 Citing the example of Media Luna, Serbin (2009) highlights Brazil’s strategy of dealing with regional stability turbulence.

rivalries in the Andean arc – Operation Phoenix extrapolates the bilateral dispute especially since the consequences indicate a growing tension and a securitization of the region; in 2015 Venezuelan troops, in an apparent ambush, were attacked in San Antonio del Táchira, which led to the closure of the border by the Venezuelan government, further damaging the already fragile relations between both countries.

Concerning the international system, the moment pointed out to a scenario in which the intermediate powers enjoyed a broader capacity for action than it was possible in the Cold War decades, especially in South America, since the region is separated from the main theaters of operations and the remaining superpower has developed a low profile of performance in this area.

The recations towards the creation of Unasur affected the sensitive conflict-cooperation threshold for the second path when, in response to the Colombian invasion of Ecuador, Unasur and later the SADC come into play. The multilateralism generated by Unasur placed regional relations at a different level, which forms a favorable scenario for the rapprochement and for the development of multilateral cooperation on defense issues, traditionally relegated to a bilateral or trilateral level.

Brazil's most assertive international performance at that time highlights the role that Buzan and Waever (2003) have placed for Brazil as a link between the north and south of the region, one that, due to its dynamics – whether in the Southern Cone or in the Andean North – made the Regional Security Complex (RSC) of South America stand as one, with two security sub-regions. Thus, nothing more natural than assuming a decisive role in the process of approximation that aimed at regional defense, but also reached the international projection of the country in a broader way.

The proactivity highlighted by Villa and Viana (2010) and the assertiveness defined by Soares de Lima (2010) are demonstrated in issues such as the mediation with Turkey over the Iranian nuclear program⁷, the formation of the National Defense Strategy document (2008), but also by the leadership in the Unasur proposal and the SADC. The formation of a Defense Council to strengthen defense dialogue and consensus through the promotion of confidence and transparency measures and to promote the reduction of asymmetries between the defense systems of the member states⁸ and a deci-

7 It generated the Tehran Declaration in 2010 between Iran, Turkey and Brazil.

8 According to the Consultative Statute of the South American Defense Council, item II – principles, article 3, paragraphs d and i.

sion-making process defined by consensus⁹, is an unprecedented creation in terms of cooperation and coordination in South American defense. Solidifying the convergences would allow an approximation with regard to defense, which could reduce the disparities that generated regional crises.

Thus, the purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether the cooperation proposed by the SADC is in the positive direction of its implementation. Methodologically the work will address the development of defense cooperation through confidence-building measures, especially in relation to military expenditures and missions assigned to the armed forces. Both variables will allow for a special focus on one of the four actions proposed by the SADC with regard to the implementation of defense policies on military cooperation. The first is justified because the promotion of dialogue and consensus on defense by increasing confidence and transparency measures is one of the objectives of the SADC; and the second, because it is also intended to reduce asymmetries between Member States' defense systems. For the sense of mission of the forces is an important foundation for analyzing the progress in defense cooperation, since it is assumed that the security issues facing the region reflected in different expectations about what the role of the armed forces should be when combating such threats.

The text is divided into an introductory presentation section of the discussion, a second section that examines military spending and confidence-building measures through SADC as a way of minimizing the possibility of security dilemmas and, on the other, to produce a regional instance of defense. In the third segment, we can observe the attributions of the armed forces of the region in the post-Cold War period in order to observe if the differences in security are being solved by the actions adopted from the SADC, since this is a hindrance to be overcome. The final remarks try to return to the points worked to see if the consensus has advanced to the detriment of the divergences. That is to say, if the costs of regional institutionalization in defense were overcome through SADC in order to test the hypothesis that the South American countries only tend to approximate insofar as their costs are less tied to the change of their individual policies tending, therefore, to superficial consensus to the detriment of the adoption and incorporation of joint policies.

A Measure to strengthen cooperation: military spending

This section tries to evaluate an important point in the construction of

⁹ According to article 13 of the Consultative Statute.

a regional institutionality, which is based on the military expenses and their effects in terms of regional defense. In an area that has traditionally been marked by force demonstrations, even if not through war, military spending and its purposes are essentially important.

The regional agenda has focused on investments in confidence-building measures¹⁰ to increase cooperation as a way to mitigate suspicions and thereby to modify the relations between the dyads and triads in order to change the calculation of the actors on the basis of tension relations, traditional frontier conflicts, and demonstrations of force, for distensions that would allow forming relations of proximity. Only with them is it possible to aim for regional institutionalization in defense. By acting in this way, countries accumulate an asset on the regional agenda that will serve to increase the degree of transparency and trust needed to coordinate defense policies.

Defense expenditures are a good measure of whether actions on defense will create a security dilemma between states. Even though expenditures are much smaller in Latin America in general than in other regions of the world, suspicions and rivalries are exacerbated by every movement of military investment. The *Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa en América Latina y Caribe* (2016), produced by RESDAL, presents the values of defense expenditures in Latin America for the period 2006 to 2016, showing that the average defense budget in the region was 3.7% in relation to the State budget. This percentage is not insignificant, quite the opposite. Therefore, we intend to show in this work the destinations of these resources and their uses among different items.

It was decided to consider confidence-building measures as an indicator of the rapprochement and consensus among States, following the objectives outlined by the SADC. The discussion on the adoption of measurement measures of military expenditures has developed more assertively in the Americas since the mid-1990s. An important outcome of these discussions was reached at the 2004 Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, when it was reiterated that “budget transparency is a key factor in security and defense cooperation, which is conducive to the implementation of methodologies for measuring defense spending as an optimal mechanism of mutual trust” (CEED 2017, 58).

In 2010, the countries established *Procedimientos de Aplicación para las Medidas de Fomento de la Confianza y Seguridad* which considers (I) the exchange of information and transparency regarding (A) defense systems and

¹⁰ A discussion on confidence-building measures and their use in the region can be seen in Rojas Aravena (1996); Flames (2005); and Saint-Pierre and Palacios Junior (2014).

(B) defense spending; as well as those related to (II) intra and extra-regional activities, in addition to (III) security measures and (IV) guarantees on the proscription of the use of force, a nuclear-weapon-free zone, respect for international law in defense cooperation agreements and assurance of non-use of those against sovereignty, security, stability and territorial integrity of members; and (V) compliance and verification measures to be carried out through the voluntary mechanism for visits to military installations, contact and military cooperation programs and verification of situations in border areas, to be developed with the collaboration of an international organization.

With respect to defense spending, they agreed to inform them and subsequently to approve the information provided and to set up a standard for standardized measurement of these expenses. The Centro de Estudos Estratégicos de la Defensa (CEED) began to consolidate data on defense spending and, to the moment, has released three documents with the relative information: “¹¹Registro Sul-Americano de Gastos Agregados em Defesa (2006-2010)”, published in December 2014; “Registro Sul-Americano de Gastos Agregados em Defesa 2011-2013”, published in May 2016, and “Registro Sul-Americano de Gastos Agregados em Defesa 2006-2015”, published in January, 2017.

The establishment of a common methodology since 2011 for the measurement of defense spending is established considering a definition of spending that includes

all the resources allocated by the State to finance the activities that make up the Nation's external security. It also includes the foreign aid received for this purpose (monetary and non-monetary). From the institutional point of view, this means considering the expenditures of the Armed Forces and its agencies, and all other public sector bodies whose main role is to defend the country against external challenges (central government added to decentralized entities).

It is excluded from the concept of defense expenditure those carried out by the State to protect its internal security, including the use of the Armed Forces, i.e. the costs of police, gendarmerie, coast guard, civil aviation control bodies and maritime safety control bodies (CEED 2017, 61).

The methodology adopted defines the main axes of measurement of the Registry to (I) classification by object of expenditure and by agency of execution of the same and (II) guidelines for the presentation format of the series. The executing agency has also been classified independently and these

¹¹ South American budget in Defense (translation note).


are the Ministry of Defense, the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces; the Army; the Marine; the Air Force; and, if applicable, Others.

In relation to the object, defense expenditure is divided as follows:

- 1) personnel (remuneration);
- 2) operations and maintenance (consumer goods and services);
- 3) investments (weapons systems, physical infrastructure and other equipment);
- 4) research and development.


During the period with tabulated data that starts in 2006 and goes until 2015, regional defense expenditure can be observed as a percentage of regional GDP with an average of 0.98%, as can be seen in the table below. As already pointed out, these figures are substantially below the world average and may be an indication that the countries of the region consider unlikely disputes between regional or extra-regional state actors. But another indication that may help to understand the military spending percentages is that, broadly, the countries of the region are very concerned about problems within them, such as high rates of violence, and the figures presented do not include figures for public safety through civil and military police.

The challenge of shaping the region as a zone of peace is not only due to low military expenditures, but also through confidence relations that the expenditures – even if in a small amount – are not created to threaten other countries in the region, as regional rivalries embodied by means of balances of power.



If during the 2006 to 2014 period there were constant increases in

relation to the values¹² of the military expenditures, it is observed that in the year 2015 there is a considerable reduction (of more than 14%), returning to levels at the beginning of the decade. Many factors may explain such a reduction as the economic crisis plaguing several states in the region – a crisis that also reflected in the reduction of military expenditure in Europe and the US –; the political crisis and institutional instability in Brazil and Venezuela; the demobilization of the FARC in Colombia that impacts on the allocation of US military assistance values to that country.



Consolidated defense spending shows that personnel costs represent the largest destination. While regional investment expenditures show considerable variation over the period, as will be discussed below, personnel expenditures remain constant, with a pronounced upward trend ranging from 62.76% in 2006 to 67.49% in 2015.

The investments contribute to an average of 17.18% of the resources, being the third¹³ object in expenses during the period. Included in this item are:

(I) weapons system – acquisition and modernization of military equipment for defense, such as tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft and helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers, among others;

(II) physical infrastructure (which includes the cost of building facilities and acquisitions of movable property), and

(III) other equipment such as acquisition and modernization of vehi-

¹² Considered in dollars.

¹³ First is the personal item, followed by percentages of operation and maintenance.

cles, aircraft, logistical support ships, machinery and equipment (transport, health, communications, computing ...) and intangibles (licenses, special licenses ...).

GASTO REGIONAL ANUAL EM DEFESA EM PORCENTAGENS POR OBJETO DO GASTO DURANTE O PERÍODO 2006-2015

ANO	PESSOAL	OPERAÇÃO E MANUTENÇÃO	INVESTIMENTOS	PESQUISA E DESENVOLVIMENTO
2006	62,76%	22,80%	13,58%	0,35%
2007	57,91%	23,83%	17,61%	0,33%
2008	55,89%	23,15%	20,18%	0,61%
2009	58,46%	24,17%	16,48%	0,72%
2010	57,31%	23,38%	18,40%	0,75%
2011	61,34%	23,63%	14,51%	0,43%
2012	56,53%	21,60%	21,54%	0,23%
2013	57,03%	21,14%	21,57%	0,17%
2014	60,96%	20,88%	17,72%	0,35%
2015	67,49%	21,44%	10,19%	0,77%
MÉDIA	59,57%	22,60%	17,18%	0,47%

TABELA 2 // Fonte: informações oficiais fornecidas pelos Ministérios da Defesa dos países membros do CDS/UNASUL. // Elaborado pelo CEED.
 Nota: A soma das porcentagens dos quatro objetos de gasto não inclui o reportado no conceito de "auxílio externo extra-orçamentar", valor equivalente a 0,18% do gasto regional em defesa durante a década.

Research and development, in turn, presents percentages less than 1% of the amount invested, as shown in the table above. In other words, the actions essential for obtaining new knowledge and / or research of their applications based on technological development initiatives, innovation for production for the defense and generation of new knowledge, is relegated to the lowest level among the destinations of the resources.


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One of the important percentages to be analyzed refers to investments. Regarding defense spending, there is a decrease in relation to this percentage over the years. In 2006, the percentage in that item was 13.58%; in 2013 was the year with the highest percentage invested with 21.57% and in 2015, the last year of the consolidated data, the percentage was 10.19%, totaling an average of 17.18% in the period 2006-2015 which show a variation quite important in a period of a decade and a half of sampling.

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As it can be seen in the graph below, the percentages disaggregated in relation to the subcomponents reflect this same trajectory of variation. The weapons system presents a percentage of 51.86% in 2006 (by the way its highest percentage) then is reduced to 25.36% in 2012 and ends 2015 with 33.21%. On the other hand, the Other Equipment subcomponent ends the period with an increasing trend. In 2006 it represents 36.99%, in 2010 (the lowest percentage) is at 33.33% and ends 2015 with the percentage of 51.77%.



In a first evaluation, there can be an inconsistency of values that demonstrates how countries are susceptible to change the values of the expenses from the financial limitations/constraints. Long-term projects, such as weapons systems, require investments over a number of years until they are consolidated. Even though, in terms of GDP, regional military expenditures do not show large variations, nominally the impact is significant since the non-growth of GDP or its fall represents a nominal reduction of investments. Another significant issue to think about in this respect is that after the Colombian invasion of Ecuadorian territory in 2008, the region did not present any more significant regionalized securitization situation, but this should not necessarily reflect immediately about it because what is significant here are long-term projects.

Considering the results that the reports themselves represent, some conclusions can be highlighted, especially in relation to the units that spend the most

The Army stands out as the most important unit of expenditure, spending (sic) 42.48% of the total regional expenditure of the decade; however, from 2006 to 2014 there has been an increase of more than 600% in the execution of expenditures by the Ministries of Defense (CEED 2017, 53).

Also worth mentioning is the unprecedented methodological design of the expenditure record in defense, a factor that demonstrates the building of trust and transparency among States, since – after numerous meetings and negotiations – the measurement parameters outlined were agreed upon. Here there is a clear example of concerted action on defense issues, which could demonstrate that the SADC is in a position to be an effective regional governance mechanism, in spite of all the divergences to be overcome. The Report highlights

According to the characteristics of the methodological design, the South American Register of Spending in Defense is an unprecedented instrument that does not count on parallels at the global level. Indeed, while the defense spending reports of some of the international organizations (governmental or non-governmental) dedicated to the matter are constructed on the basis of budgetary projections, the South American Registry elaborates on the defense expenditures effectively executed by each Member State and officially informed annually to the South American Defense Council (CEED 2017, 53).

The political will and consensus that Unasur members have reached in terms of verification of military expenditures is highlighted by the CEED (Annex 4, Preliminary Report) that cooperation in the defense sector respects national differences and particularities, but also uses the coincident elements to advance the strategic complementarities. In this sense, the costs linked to the approximation should be reduced.

It is not possible to present more conclusions regarding the values themselves in the sense of their representativeness in relation to the formation of regional balances since the data are integrated for all countries. However, for purposes of this article, it can be said that the purpose of verifying defense spending contributes to building trust in South America.

In the next section, consideration will be given to the rapprochement in terms of defense from the verification of the assignments that the countries assign to their armed forces. It is hoped, therefore, to verify whether this point of divergence has also been modified for greater thematic and mission convergence.

Armed forces attributions in the post-Cold War and their defense role in South America¹⁴

Latin America in general and South America in particular, had come back to democratic regimes in the period coinciding with the final years of the Cold War, which greatly influenced relations between the armed forces and political systems. Thus, while the South American area was affected by the systemic changes, changes within the region and the states also took place, significantly impacting both the expectation of the armed forces' procedure and the region's security and defense concerns.

The consolidation of democratization processes crystallizes politico-military relations. And it starts to question both the military investments and the need for the States to have such large equipment. According to the postmodern post-Cold War military trend, the country's armed forces and decision-makers are faced with this change that is taking place in various parts of the world to assign to militaries the tasks that are not traditionally theirs as well as putting them on international missions under the auspices of organizations such as the UN or even acting in combined organizations – such as Eurocorps (Garcia 2002).

During this period, the constitution of an atmosphere of disbelief or almost impossibility of a conflict between national States was presented. The region's armed forces had lost the domestic role played during the bipolarity, and they also encountered the absence of an external enemy. Thus, it was difficult to justify robust military apparatus. Although it has traditionally been one of the least areas in the world in terms of military investments, the questioning of resource allocation to the forces was present, based on motives such as internal political changes, resentment and economic problems (Aguilar 2008).

The previous dictatorial period and society's perception of the armed forces greatly influenced such questions, which were also based on the low or scant transparency of military procurement processes¹⁵. In the immediate

¹⁴ A preliminary version of this section was published in the chapter "Armed Forces and their Importance for the La Plata Southern Region", in the book *Contemporary Comparative Frontiers: International Relations and Regional Security in Brazil and the European Union*, 2016.

¹⁵ The elaboration of White Papers aims to modify this scenario, but it will be seen that Brazil only establishes its LBDN in 2012 (White Book on National Defense, in English). Even though National Defense Policies and the National Defense Strategy have been created before, it is the White Paper that represents the transparency in defense matters and progress in the process of consolidating civilian power over the military. The LBDN update published in 2012 was

post-Cold War period, military investments experience a percentage reduction in GDP, as shown by the percentages¹⁶ below.

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Argentina	2.0%	1.8%	1.4%	1.4%	1.3%	1.3%
Brazil	2.1%	2.7%	2.4%	2.0%	1.5%	1.9%
Chile	4.3%	3.5%	3.4%	2.8%	2.6%	2.7%
Paraguay	-	1.9%	1.7%	2.1%	2.0%	1.5%
Uruguay	3.2%	3.5%	3.5%	2.4%	2.8%	2.8%

Source: elaborated by the author based on data from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2015.

With this reduction, it is possible to change the situation of distrust that persisted among the countries of the region, as well as to create the conditions for military forces to participate in joint meetings that are the basis for military confidence-building exercises between the countries of the Southern Cone (Pagliari 2004).

Otherwise, despite the pressure to act on the so-called new threats, the military did not incorporate such a mission. Donadio (2003, 8 – our translation) states that “... the armed forces of the region have remained in general (with the obvious exception of Colombia) distant from pressures to engage in tasks such as the fight against drug trafficking”¹⁷. Whether this internal action was strongly opposed by the Latin American and South American forces themselves, the proposal to employ them in international situations such as UN blue helmets did not find the same resistance. On the contrary, the countries began to allocate contingents for this preparation and performance that became very constant thereafter¹⁸.

prepared in 2016 and submitted to the National Congress for consideration.

¹⁶ The SIPRI database uses both percentages of GDP and current and constant dollar values. It was decided to use the table based on the GDP because these data show a proportion in relation to the amount of the expenditures of the State, which the values in dollars do not always show, since they appear isolated from the whole.

¹⁷ In the original: “... las fuerzas armadas de la región se han mantenido en general (con la obvia excepción de Colombia) apartadas de presiones para introducirse en tareas tales como la lucha contra el narcotráfico”.

¹⁸ The Brazilian defense documents prepared in 2016 underscore the importance of

Diamint (2006) points out that democratization was designed with the central task of regaining control of military structures, but whether this purpose has been somewhat achieved, the same cannot be said of the rational and planned organization of defense. The author presents that

The deficit in the production of security policies (considering the term in its expanded conception), contradict efforts to strengthen the democratic system. This lack of leadership and management is reinforced by the exponential growth of public insecurity, which produces a possible overlap between defense functions and police functions, contrary to the necessary republican separation between external defense and internal public order (Diamint 2006, 59 – our translation)¹⁹.

With an exterior that presented almost no prospects of conflict, but with internal situations that showed a growing challenge in terms of public security with an increasing impact on the daily lives of its citizens, the region uses the armed forces as an institutional response. Saint-Pierre and Donadelli (2016, 89) assert that

in some cases, either because of institutional deficiencies, due to urgency of the electoral agenda, due to fatigue of democracy or even because of the lack of preparation of civilians to carry out political conduction in the areas of public security and defense, the governments of the region were, in a more and on a wider variety of missions, using its Armed Forces as the only available, efficient, and reliable institution. In some cases, this generalized use of the Forces promotes dangerous constitutional changes to their legitimation; in others, it is promoted in clear disagreement with the constitutional precepts, leaving the military to fulfill these functions in a legal limbo and without any legal coverage.

In the young democracies of the region, it is interesting to observe how in most of them (the greatest exception being Argentina) the armed forces are identified as the institution linked to the State that generates the most confidence. The 2016 *Latinobarómetro* report shows that confidence in institutions decreased from the previous period, with the exception of the armed

peacekeeping operations in a significant way, with the intention to continue assigning contingents to this task.

19 In the original: “Este déficit de conducción y gestión se refuerza por el exponencial crecimiento de la inseguridad pública, que produce una eventual superposición entre las funciones de defensa con las funciones policiales, contrariando la necesaria separación republicana entre defensa externa y orden público interno”.

forces and the police, with slight increases, from 36% to 38%, and from 66% to 69%. The average confidence on the armed forces in the period 1995-2016 is 47%, being the public institution best placed in terms of confidence²⁰. This demonstration of confidence is not due to its role in wars, as the same report stresses “without wars, Latin America accuses violence, corruption and inequality as the most powerful phenomena that hold back democracy²¹” (Latinobarómetro 2016, n.d. – our translation).

However, despite regional convergence on the intensification of military subordination to civilian power²², neither the security and defense issues were adequately defined nor the question of what, in fact, permeates the national interest of the countries. Soares de Lima (2010, 409) points out that “if civilian control is one of the necessary conditions, it is not sufficient, since it lacks the political definition of the State that establishes objectives of its autonomy at the international level.”

In South America, considering the constitutional forecasts, all the countries of the region assign the national defense to the armed forces, on the other hand, only Brazil, Colombia and Bolivia, have as attribution the guarantee of the constitutional order. The guarantee of internal order is constitutionally attributed to the military in Brazil, Peru and Venezuela, while the guarantee of government stability is constitutional attribution in the Paraguayan and Bolivian constitutions.

Such predictions of mission may also be defined in laws complementary to the constitutions, such predictions of mission can also be defined in complementary laws to constitutions²³, as is the case of cooperation with respect to order (or internal security). In this case, it is observed that there is a predictability of this attribution in all the states of the region, except that, in the case of Argentina, this role only occurs in situations of state of exception

20 In turn, the data show that democracy had difficulties in consolidating itself because only 22% (a number that has fallen for several years) has the perception that incumbents govern for the whole population.

21 “Sin guerras, América Latina acusa violencia, corrupción y la desigualdad como los fenómenos mas potentes que retienen a la democracia” in the original.

22 Opposed to this trend to intensify the treatment of the civil-military issue, the Brazilian LBDN, in the 2016 version – currently being discussed in the National Congress – fails to address this relationship. In the previous document there was a clear statement “emphasize that the obedience of the Armed Forces to the constitutional political power is presupposed of the republican regime and guarantee of the integrity of the Nation, being under the authority of the President of the Republic, through the Ministry of Defense” (LBDN 2012, 56).

23 For a more precise analysis of the infra-constitutional legislations and internally employed situations of the armed forces in South American countries, see Saint-Pierre and Donadelli (2016).

because its performance is directed towards the external – whether traditional threats or even participation in peace operations. Saint-Pierre and Donadelli (2016: 94) point out that the South American legislations referring to military employment not related to national defense present distinct nomenclatures as allowing internal actions such as “1.) Guarantee of Constitutional Order/ Stability Legal Government; 2.) Internal Order/Internal Security Guarantee; 3.) Participation in National Development; 4.) Support for electoral processes and 5.) Support in the event of a disaster”.

According to data from the *Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa en América Latina y Caribe* (2014), over time, the spectrum of actions developed by the Armed Forces has been expanded, in addition to maintaining peace, they have incorporated tasks related to cooperation in public security. In that year, 94% of the countries of the region carried out, on a regular basis, some activity or operation linked to public security, whether to combat drug trafficking, urban patrols, permanent border control, security of major events and pacification in violent zones. In the *Atlas* 2016, public security issues remain prominent within the security situation in the region. The 12th Conference of Ministers of Defense of the Americas held in Trinidad and Tobago from October 10 to 12, 2016, was aimed at strengthening hemispheric defense and security cooperation in an increasingly volatile global environment. Its thematic axes revolved around the evolution of the armed forces’ function, protection and responsiveness to environmental problems, and the cooperation and strengthening of humanitarian emergency assistance, as a clear demonstration of concern for public safety.

With regard to border operations, which are always highlighted and emphasized by Brazil²⁴, they are much more linked to crimes such as guarding the border to restrict the entry of arms and ammunition, related to drug trafficking and guerrilla warfare than to eventual threats that other countries may pose in terms of traditional border threats, especially since traditional threats are latent rather than heavily securitized in the region. Since drug trafficking is one of the issues that has preoccupied countries²⁵, even though the armed forces have not been employed in its fight – as Colombia does – there are operations in which they are employed due to their logistics and

24 Speaking at the opening of the IIX Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas (CMDA), Defense Minister Raul Jungmann stressed the need for countries in the region to increase regional cooperation at the borders as a preventive way to combat transnational crimes. Available at <<http://www.defesanet.com.br/defesa/noticia/23783/XII-CMDA--Ministro-Jugmann-defende-cooperacao-regional-nas-fronteiras/>>. Accessed on Feb 25, 2018.

25 According to the documents of the consultations held by the OAS during the discussion of hemispheric security mechanisms, which culminated in the 2003 Declaration of Security of the Americas.

training²⁶.

From the above, it can be inferred that the armed forces are assigned, more and more comprehensively in terms of the number of countries, non-primary missions. Battaglino (2015) considers that in Argentina there was a low and supervised expansion, therefore, with a high level of civil control and with low political power of the military; in the case of Brazil the level of civilian control is low, but with an average expansion and with incipient civilian supervision, which leaves the political power of the military high. It is therefore inferred that neither the convergence of the role of the military or its missions was achieved because of the lack of definition or limitation of the themes of internal security and national defense.

The CEED in the Preliminary Report (2014) emphasizes that “the objectives of a possible conformation of a **sub-regional defense system** [emphasis in the original] are linked to the characterization and hierarchy of threats and risks of regional dimensions and impacts, which require cooperation and joint action by countries to address them collectively²⁷” (CEED 2014 – our translation). It recognizes that the classic defense issues are more coincident among States, and that the greatest discrepancies are in relation to the definitions of public security, which are urged to be remedied through processes of revision and redefinition of security policies and systems, but also related to defense.

While the classic defense issues are already consolidated, and the countries have not only been confronted with them for a long time, they are at a time when discrepancies have less room to develop because of non-imminence or, at least, of the low probability of consolidating a threat in these terms, security was impacted by the strong growth of the presence of non-state actors and the transnational dynamics resulting from it.

Final remarks

Over time, the countries of the so-called Latin America and, more recently, the countries that are part of the subcontinent of South America, have sought to integrate in a very broad way, including the defense area more re-

²⁶ Only Chile and Uruguay do not envisage the use of the armed forces for such operations (Atlas 2014).

²⁷ In the original: “Los objetivos de la posible conformación de un sistema de defensa sub-regional, están vinculados a la caracterización y jerarquización de las amenazas y riesgos de dimensiones e impacto regionales, que requerem de una cooperación y acción de los países para enfrentarlos en forma colectiva”.

cently. If during the 20th century integration did not reach the conditions to consolidate, at the beginning of the 21st century the conditions of the international system seemed to converge to a scenario that would allow a more definitive approach.

In addition, there was a regional convergence of several governments demonstrating the desire for rapprochement and consensus building. Even if it was not possible to completely de-characterize its historical paradox of region with external stability and internal instability (Medeiros Filho 2010), confidence-building was advancing positively, especially in the Southern Cone sub-region, but also to some extent in the Andean northern portion with the ideological proximity of a number of political leaders, the formation of a regional defense mechanism – not of collective defense – was not viewed with suspicion or with clear intentions of detachment from the United States, actually, promoting a relative detachment.

Brazil adopted a position of proximity to its South American neighbors – in a moment of emphasis on regionalities²⁸ –, it acted to consolidate its international position as an emerging country, and as a medium power with capacity to regiment the region, as well as the costs of the approach processes. Promoting political dialogue, a quest for multilateralism – from a discourse that propagated a cooperative multipolarity, as highlighted in the 2012 LBDN –, the country demonstrated South America's leading role in its foreign policy and the priority that the region had in its international relations.

The creation of the SADC without identifying common opponents, without aiming to be a collective defense body, but aiming to consolidate the region as a zone of peace, create a South American defense identity and create consensus for the strengthening of regional cooperation in defense, because due to the possibility of a rapprochement that emerged after the change of relationship based on the projection of power between Brazil and Argentina in the late twentieth century, showed that in that ex-complex conflict the conditions for thinking about identity in defense were now placed.

However, over the years, consensus-building has not allowed the incorporation of joint regional policies. In countries with markedly traits of sovereignty and which formed an institution with a minimalist structure (Medeiros, Teixeira Júnior and Reis 2017), the intergovernmental form of SADC prevents a more comprehensive character in its conduct.

Another regional institutional challenge lies in the non-overcoming of border disputes, especially in the northern region. This shows that it is not

²⁸ Especially with regard to this work Buzan and Wæver (2003), but also Adler and Barnett (1998).

yet possible to think of a region that can converge in terms of defense. Note that even if these disputes are not completely resolved, they have a low securitization, but remain latent. However, it seems fair to say that they are less securitized – as in the examples of Colombia and Venezuela – more due to the internal situations of each of these countries than properly resulting from the constraints arising from regional institutionalization. Villa (2017, 95) shows the hybridism of security governance in Latin America, asserting that in the region the logic of the balance of power and the security community stands side by side, and these conditions impact both within the region and in individual countries, motivating or constraining militarized behavior.

The broad and comprehensive understanding of security or the concept of multidimensional security established in 2002²⁹ within the framework of the OAS leaves, on the one hand, an open space about what is meant by security and, likewise, by defense; but on the other hand, given such breadth of themes, it results in restrictions on the possibility of policy coordination.

Brazil plays a key role in the development of defense and security relations in the region, however, after its prominence in the creation of these institutions and a very defined position on the region being an important space in the search for a prominent and autonomous international insertion of the country in the world, in the last years this protagonism was left aside. Brazilian foreign policy did not follow the proactive action that resulted in the formation of this South American institutional framework.

A very significant question to consider is that Westphalian characteristics are quite significant in the region where countries are traditionally more often impacted by internal issues, turning to themselves quite frequently. This factor is very preponderant nowadays where Brazil has a low profile of foreign policy because it returns to its own problems of governability and political representativeness, leaving little or no space for the continuity of the implementation of the policies directed to the regional arrangements. In this sense, Unasur is no longer a priority for Brazil as a political project. Venezuela, in turn, with serious economic difficulties and social and political contestations faced by the government of Nicolás Maduro, has not relied on regional support for the resolution of the worrisome social and economic situation that the country has faced.

29 “...they recognize the threats, concerns and other challenges to security in the hemispheric context of diverse nature and multidimensional reach, and that the concept and traditional approaches should envision to comprehend new and non-traditional threats, that included political, economic, social, health and environmental issues.”, according to the Declaration of Bridgetown: Multidimensional Approach to Hemispheric Security. Available in <http://www.oas.org/juridico/portuguese/2002/agdec27.htm> (our translation).

In the same sense, in observing the new defense documents, one can notice that Brazil neglects South America by not giving prominence to Unasur as a political project, which shows that the country, as the driving force of regional institutionalization, does not maintain a linearity and, to some extent, its current conduct dissociates itself from the policy of building a common defense vision and generating consensus to strengthen regional cooperation in this area.

In view of these conditions, some scenarios may be considered for the future of security and defense relations in the region. In the first, in an international context of expansion of multilateral spaces, the region may continue to invest institutionally in order to deepen cooperation agreements in defense and solidifying the regional space for its international insertion. On the other hand, if Brazil maintains a low foreign policy profile due to the maintenance and/or deepening of the internal economic and political instability – which will have serious regional institutional costs – the regional rapprochement will be very punctual, with only some bilateral relations going forward, strongly depending on the selective use of regional institutionalization.

Concertation visions led by measures such as the formation of mutual trust, especially to create rules for military procurement, and for military training and training, have been developed towards a cooperative vision, respecting the coexistence of different political and economic definitions besides of defense and security conceptualizations. This safeguard to the coexistence of different definitions produces a significant impact in relation to the limits that the possibility of convergences will present.

Distinct employments of the armed forces, as noted in the previous section, are a direct consequence of both the confusion between public security and defense, and the imprecise and broad definition of security. If national constitutions are less declaratory in this sense, infra-constitutional legislations – in most countries – define such actions. In the absence of strengthening of internal public security instruments, even with increasing levels of insecurity resulting from violence, but also from drug and arms trafficking, the solution has been presented as ambiguous. It was not achieved the convergence of the missions of the armed forces, nor has a possible change been produced, however the character of their actions is more and more related to security than to defense. This characteristic, however, does not become an innovation in the region since the fight against internal subversion was its focus for a long time. Even the creation of the SADC had only limited effects in generating an enough positive agenda to coordinate issues and perspectives of action in defense.

The results of the SADC approach were insufficient to modify bilateral

relations patterns, since ambiguity – especially not precisely defining security and defense issues – and the complexity of regional relations did not disappear. The costs of the regional operation are maintained and even if the levels of consensus and confidence have been advanced, they are not linear for all South American countries.

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ABSTRACT

It is investigated the approximation in defense and security in South America. The hypothesis tested considers that these countries just tend an approximation whereby the costs are less linked to a changing in their individual policies. In this way, they propose just a superficial consensus rather than incorporate joint policies. Therefore, the analysis focuses on the confidence measures in relation to the military expenditures adopted since the SADC foundation, as well as the military forces functions to verify if – in that instance – the measures served to empower the convergences in defense, and – in the case of these – if, in the face of the highlighted common defense problems, the attributions have converged.

KEYWORDS

South America; South American Defense Council; security and defense.

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REGIONAL COOPERATION IN PUBLIC SECURITY: ASSESSMENT OF UNASUR'S NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK

Juliana Viggiano¹

Introduction

The study on international security has been the subject of intense discussions in the political and academic environment in the last decades as a consequence of the systemic transformations that took place in the international arena, which effectively started in the 1970s and was consolidated with the end of the Cold War. In particular, the debates sought to understand how to adapt the theoretical-methodological instrument of the discipline to the nature of the new security phenomena that emerged as threats in a world increasingly interconnected in its domestic activities, intensifying the porosity of national boundaries and, consequently, questioning the meaning and characteristics of interstate warfare in the context of this new configuration of power.

Thinking about public safety in a coordinated and common way at the regional level is behind the initiative to build regional public policies in other areas, especially in the social, health and education area. Many other areas flirt, with more or less assertiveness, with regional experiences, although it seems appropriate to state that all are still in relatively early stages.

Contemporary academic debates in International Relations leave two thought-provoking aspects open associated with a concern for regional public security. The first concerns the systematic introduction of the regional scope as a level of analysis of international security studies. From the perspective of the Regional Security Complexes (Buzan and Waever 2003) and the Security Communities (Adler and Barnett 1998), the regional dimension assumes a

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priority role in defining the security status of most of the countries of the world, with the few exceptions of the great world powers, whose interests are potentially also affected by regional and global issues. The security of States, and their populations, are closely related to regional dynamics. When one considers the nature of the contemporary threat phenomena faced by South American countries, however, the contours attributed to the concept of security seem insufficient. Traditionally, the object of study of international security has as reference the security of the State - its functions, population, territory and diverse resources. Therefore, understanding the (in)security motivated by regional instabilities as an aspect of international security, without violating the frontier of internal and external action in the use of force, implied in accepting the need for securitization of regional security issues - in the terms proposed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1997): raising the issues of the political agenda to the threat level through discursive practice, authorizing the use of extraordinary measures to solve them. Indeed, this concern, both with the limits of the use of force and the relevance of the regional scope for State security, has motivated, to a certain extent, the militarization, or securitization, of themes on the regional agenda, especially drug trafficking. What these conceptual frameworks do not contemplate is precisely how to deal with the impact of regional (in)security dynamics on the structures of domestic (in)security beyond the construction of a discourse that implies a threat to the survival of the State and/or the violation frontiers.

The second point in the debate deserving attention is the prominence of discussions and processes on regional integration. The revitalization of the processes of regionalization of political, economic and commercial relations, driven by the dissolution of the structuring pillars of relations between states characteristic of the Cold War, accompanied the intensification of the debate about the relevance of the regional dimension in the different parts of the globe. It was no different in South America. With a long history of building initiatives aimed at promoting regional integration, the 1990s witnessed the flourishing of a number of new cooperative arrangements. Special emphasis is given to the subregional arrangements of Mercosur and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN). In the 2000s, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and, with less prominence and more recent in its creation, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) stand out. Although the strategic relevance and operational reach of these organizations vary from one government to another, it can be said that these projects serve the shared interests of the countries of the region to create mechanisms that facilitate cooperation between states in different thematic areas, influence positively in the redefinition of the terms of the global projection of these

countries and give a greater degree of autonomy in the conduct of regional affairs. Disparities in resources, structures and foreign and national policy objectives between the various States in the region certainly impose different meanings and functions for these arrangements in the particular context of each of the agents that make up these blocs, which means that these statements are identified by each of the South American countries with equally different assertiveness.

Because of their diversity and quantity, multilateral cooperative arrangements in South America present a series of functional and thematic overlaps. In itself, these convergences do not have positive or negative meaning for coordinated action among regional actors; in cases, reinforce or complement each other (Perrotta 2016, Hartlapp 2016). In terms of scope and ambition of purpose, UNASUR places itself as the most important actor in the processes of cooperation among South America countries as a whole. In addition, it establishes among the normative precepts of its Constitutive Treaty the intention to create the bases for the construction of a common regional citizenship and, in this sense, to foment the emergence of mechanisms able to guarantee the set of obligations of rights and duties associated to it.

Specifically, in the case of security and defense, until the creation of the South American Defense Council (CDS) of UNASUR in December 2008, the main political coordination body of the area at the regional level consisted in the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, a body attached to the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the Organization of American States, created in 1995. With bi-annual meetings and constrained in defining common objectives for the South American region by the presence of the United States, this Council nevertheless began a history of building mutual confidence measures among its member countries, in parallel to bilateral initiatives that were taking place in the same direction among the States of the region. The CDS, as in general to the institution to which it is linked, UNASUR, proposes to lay the foundations for a more far-reaching integration. In addition to encouraging the strengthening of measures of mutual trust between countries, it seeks to facilitate the exchange and cooperation of the defense industry, reduce asymmetries between the defense systems of the region, create a common defense identity and a shared vision between the countries of the region on the subject - it is worth mentioning, as a normative proposal (UNASUR 2008b).

Regardless of the advances towards the objectives and general principles established in its statute, the CDS has been one of the most active and central organs of UNASUR's activities. Discussions within the Council have generated some important institutional developments, such as the creation of

the South American Council on Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Transnational Organized Crime. If we cannot state here that such Council was born exclusively of the concerns raised in the CDS, it is safe to say that the South American Defense Council's perception of the need to establish a clear conceptual and institutional distinction between security and defense contributed for this unfolding. The preliminary study commissioned by the CDS to the Center for Strategic Defense Studies, published in 2012, offers a conceptual distinction between defense and security, highlighting, on the one hand, the CDS as an inappropriate locus for thinking about public security issues, and the need to think about transnational issues, such as drug trafficking, from the perspective of public security with regional coordination, in which the Council on Citizen Security works (UNASUR 2012b).

The goal of this article is to evaluate the normative framework of cooperation in the area of regional security, with special emphasis on the activities carried out by the South American Council on Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Transnational Organized Crime (CSS-CJDOT), institution of UNASUR that focuses efforts on this issue. The first section of the text discusses the differences and approximations between the conceptions of cooperation and public policies, grounding the debate in the production on regional public policies, with greater diffusion in the social area. The second part of this paper is devoted to analyzing the documents produced by the South American Council on Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Transnational Organized Crime. The third section, as final remarks, offers a diagnosis of the limitations, obstacles and opportunities identified from the analysis of the documents with respect to the construction of public policies of regional security.

Discussion on regional public policies

Accompanying the phenomenon itself, analysis of regional public policies are quite recent. In part, the incipience of this literary body results from the contemporary historical development of such policies, which arise with the maturation, or perhaps more accurately, of the adjustment of the integration processes in adapting the demands of States and societies impacted by the transformations unleashed by the dynamics of globalization and the inefficiency of democratic regimes in offering satisfactory answers to a set of them. On the other hand, the State still shapes itself as the privileged locus of policymaking. The shifting of decision-making power, even in a small proportion, to the external arena comes up against the difficulties of building consensus and/or institutionalized mechanisms of negotiation when referring

to instances of intergovernmental composition, or repositioning of citizen loyalties, backed by acceptable criteria that give decision-making legitimacy to supranational bodies. Therefore, the advance and deepening of the production of regional public policies depends on the composition of a series of factors that can combine with different forces, forms and orders: political will of government officials and government bureaucracy, involvement of non-governmental actors, governmental and intergovernmental interagency coordination, and the existence of a minimally established institutional structure.

Of course, regional public policy, although new in the more traditional sense of the term ‘public policy’, finds convergence with international cooperation practices. Broadly speaking, international cooperation also demands a high degree of political commitment and coordination. What is expected is that practices classified as public policies reach a greater degree of institutionalization, considering intergovernmental cooperation as a milder form of political activity (Yeates 2014). In this sense, it is important to understand how regional institutions “contribute to the regulation and provision of public policies” (Bianculli and Hoffmann, 2016, 1). In the case of social policies, for example, Yeates (2014) suggests that the activities of the exercise of public policy be categorized in redistribution, regulation and provision of rights at the regional level, which would go beyond the purposes of cooperation.

Several definitions of public policies have been formulated since the creation of this field of study. Souza (2007) briefly suggests that some perspectives favor the problem-solving role of public policies, while critics of this overly rationalized reading of the issue emphasize the dynamics of conflict between ideas and interests, and of cooperation and commitment between governments and other governmental and non-governmental organizations. In any case, it suggests that “public policy definitions, even minimalist ones, guide our gaze to the locus where clashes around interests, preferences, and ideas develop, that is, government. The definitions of public policy generally assume a holistic view of the subject, a view that the whole is more important than the sum of the parts and that individuals, institutions, interactions, ideologies, and interests even when there are differences in the relative importance of these factors (Souza 2007, Chapter 2, heading 1135).

Evidently, although it is possible to draw parallels between conflicts of interest and ideologies between governmental and intergovernmental actors, these are very different arenas in terms of decision-making dynamics, ability to act based on programs and projects derived from designed policy proposals, and limitations imposed to actors involved. It is still undoubtedly a game in two spheres, which may or may not be articulated simultaneously. Therefore, what we apparently have in several areas, public security still in

its early stages in South America and a little more widespread in the area of social policies, are intermediate attempts between international cooperation and public policy. However, regional organizations have an important role to play as an additional, potential or effective, instance of contestation and political conflict, and provide a more permanent coordination space between governmental and non-governmental actors.

A more restrictive and operational definition of regional public policy in the case of intergovernmental organizations was elaborated by Perrotta (2016, 187):

“Regional public policies [are] the political actions and decisions taken by regional government bodies to achieve goals motivated by the exercise of political power. Such political powers are both nation-states that have signed regional integration agreements, as well as regional governance institutions, which may or may not have decision-making authority, but have been self-executing. Regional policies are the result of the complex interaction of various actors positioned at different levels and scales of action and who have different resources, interests, ideals and values.”

For this reason, an important dimension of the analysis of regional public policies rests on the processes of diffusion of these policies from the regional level to their adoption at the governmental level (Bianculli and Hoffmann 2016), together with the determinants for the adoption of such policies. With respect to supranational institutions, as in the European case, Radaelli (2003) states that public policies are initially defined and consolidated within the European Union, and then absorbed by the participating States. Moreover, it would not be a one-way street: that is to say, in their constitution process, preferences are exposed in complex negotiation processes within the European Union, and States also select, from a wide range of options, the policies to be adopted at the national level. The experiences in South America, whether in Mercosur or UNASUR, suggest less space for negotiation and political options for the construction of common policies. In part because the greater involvement of the regional level in national policies accompanies the increasing allocation of competences in the bodies of the European Union (Hartlapp 2016). In the case of the South American institutions, although there is some equivalence if we consider the constraints imposed by legal norms produced at the regional level, the distribution of competences of these organisms is extremely limited. The very structure of intergovernmental organizations, in this sense, stands as an obstacle in that they are heavily influenced by the executive of the participating governments, with little autonomy of the parlia-

ment when it exists, as in the case of Mercosur².

However, the institutional development of these organizations, with the creation of specialized bodies in thematic areas, of greater or lesser scope, appear as an important evolution in the construction of public policies, or at least for the institution of common norms within the sectors of politics, in Mercosur and UNASUR. This was the case, for example, of the dissemination of the Accreditation and Quality Assurance policies of higher education through the Mercosur Education Sector (Perrotta 2016), the institution of the Mercosur Social Institute, the Commission for the Coordination of Ministers and Social Authorities of the Mercosur High Representative, responsible for the Social Participation Unit, the Mercosur Institute for Public Policies for Human Rights and the Citizenship Statute, which, coordinated, allowed the creation of the Guide for Action to Incorporate the Perspective in Mercosur policies (Espino 2016). This in itself is not a policy, but an important reference framework for the development of labor policies in the region, which, although generally as a rule, must take into account the minimum standards of regulation stipulated in the Mercosur: “prohibition of night work by children, [prohibition] of forced labor [and] introduction of safety nets [for workers] in all Member States” (Hartlapp 2016, 96).

This was also the case with the case of public security in the context of UNASUR³. Although Mercosur has anticipated inserting the issue of security as a topic of common interest in the region, initially through the “Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Regional Security between Mercosur States Parties, the Republic of Bolivia, the Republic of Chile, the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Ecuador, the Republic of Peru and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”⁴, emphasizing the need for increased interaction and coordination of actions to deal with the transnational character of the crimes that afflict the countries of the region⁵, it was in the context of UNASUR that a specific

2 For more details, see the discussion presented by Perrotta (2016, 188).

3 In the case of Mercosur, no specific body has been established for the treatment of public security policy issues, although some cooperation agreements of this nature have been signed, such as the creation of joint investigation teams in the fight against organized crime under the Agreement Cooperation Framework between the States Parties of Mercosur and Associated States, of August 2010.

4 This agreement replaces the previous “Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Regional Security between MERCOSUR States Parties” and “Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Regional Security between the MERCOSUR States Parties, the Republic of Bolivia and the Republic of Chile”, of 2004.

5 The document states: “Aware that the growing transnational dimension of criminal activity entails new challenges that require simultaneous, coordinated and / or complementary action throughout the region with the common aim of minimizing the negative impact of these

body was created to address the issue, in addition to explicitly addressing the issue of public security⁶. Likewise, UNASUR recognizes the common challenges imposed by transnational threats. Although its constitutional treaty neglects to explicitly mention the issue in terms of public safety, the specific objective (q) makes clear the intention to treat security matters without the concern of distinguishing them between security or defense purposes⁷. The one responsible for clarifying the need to establish a clear distinction between purposes and definitions of matters relating to public security and defense was the South American Defense Council, through a report commissioned to the Center for Strategic Defense Studies of the same in 2012 “The diverse and varied impacts of cross-border crime and the increase in organized crime have generated a strong social demand at the regional level for better levels of public security” and “does not correspond to the South American Defense Council the treatment of public security matters, “and” there is a need to make progress in the study of a possible mechanism for regional cooperation in the area of public security “(UNASUR 2012). The South American Council on Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Transnational Organized Crime was created in 2012 with the mission of addressing regional policy coordination issues related to public security.

In addition to sectoral institutionalization, the process by which a policy is incorporated by all the members of an organization also plays an important role in understanding the development of regional public policies. This process of diffusion from the regional to the national, in a more sophisticated reading, can be exerted by direct mechanisms (coercion, manipulation of calculations of utility, socialization and persuasion) and indirect (competition, learning and normative imitation, all by who absorbs these policies) (Biancul-

crimes on the people and on the consolidation of democracy in MERCOSUR and Associated States “(MERCOSUR 2006, 3), and in its Article 1 - Purpose: The objective of this agreement is to optimize the security levels of the region by promoting the widest cooperation and mutual assistance in (MERCOSUR 2006, 4) and in its Article 2 - Scope: The cooperation and assistance mentioned in the previous article will be provided, through the competent bodies of the Parties that formulate and implement policies or participate in the maintenance of public safety and security of persons and their property, in order to make every day more efficient the tasks of prevention and repression of illicit activities in all its forms “(MERCOSUR 2006, 4)

6 The next section will deal in more detail with the content of UNASUR documents on the subject.

7 Specific objective (q): “Coordination among the specialized agencies of the member states, taking into account international standards, to strengthen the fight against terrorism, corruption, the world drug problem, trafficking in small arms and light weapons, transnational organized crime and other threats, as well as promoting disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and mass destruction and demining”. Also, specific objective (t): “cooperation for the strengthening of citizen security” (UNASUR 2008a, 4).

li and Hoffmann 2016, 10). The definition of diffusion adopted by Bianculli and Hoffmann (2016, 9), in which it is a “process by which particular ideas and practices, institutions, rules and regulations diffuse over time and space” despite recognizing interdependence in the process, accepts differences of results in the final practices of States (*ibid.*). This certainly provides greater flexibility to study a phenomenon as incipient as the production of regional public policies, allowing the identification of very specific, small-scale mechanisms and approaches such as innovations and regional influence. Its implementation, the actors involved, the resources available and the expected results may vary, although they derive from the same approach to the policy area. This is an important issue on policy design, a central aspect of public policy, but opens the door to understanding how the regional perspective can influence the convergence of public policy objectives among the governments involved.

For intergovernmental bodies which do not have supranational authority and therefore have a reduced power of formal coercion over the Member States, dissemination therefore becomes an essential aspect of the possibility of building policies that can be considered regional. It is not a body that concentrates decision-making and implementation at the regional level, but rather a set of common policies that ideally share normative and informative instruments and cooperate operationally to achieve a common purpose, built on ideological, interests and power struggles in these institutions set up at the regional level⁸.

A key element in the process of policy diffusion is the existence of an agreed normative basis, capable of providing a common goal, purpose, objective and / or operative mechanism for addressing the issue addressed by public policy. Treaties, protocols, resolutions, declarations and/or decisions elaborated at the regional level are necessary conditions for the construction of regional public policies, in parallel with a committed leadership, clarity regarding definitions and approach of the problem and articulation of the policy, in its objectives and implementation, with other agencies and regional arrangements (Van Langehove and Kingah 2016)⁹. The next section is devoted-

8 In the case of the Education Policy for Accreditation and Quality Assurance of Teaching in Mercosur, for example, incorporated in different degrees by the member countries, the regional debate was dominated by Argentina, a country that is more advanced in terms of academic culture and regulatory framework, structural asymmetries (Perrotta 2016).

9 These observations were made on the basis of regional social policies, but it seems reasonable to consider them generally as a minimum framework for the construction of regional public policies if it is accepted that public policies, whether they result from a rationalist reading or from a dispute, serve to a purpose from certain conceptual and material determinations and limitations.

ed to analyzing the normative documents elaborated by the South American Council on Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Organized Crime, seeking to offer subsidies to think about the advances and limitations for the construction of regional public security policies.

Normative forecasts of the South American Council on Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Transnational Organized Crime of UNASUR

Directly related to issues of a transnational nature in the field of security, two UNASUR bodies should be mentioned. The first is the South American Council on Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Organized Crime (CSSCJDOT), and the second refers to the South American Council on the World Drug Problem (CPMD). As will be discussed below, the CSSCJDOT becomes a protagonist in public security policy issues, with the CPMD addressing the problem of drugs from a more multidisciplinary perspective, which includes, but is not limited to, public security issues.

The CSSCJDOT was created in 2012 and, in 2013, prepared a 5-year Action Plan, expected to end in 2017. It is a permanent body for consultation of UNASUR and the discussion held in that part of the article was supported by the normative documents available in the UNASUR's Digital Repository¹⁰, using 'security' as a search term. A significant volume of documents found consists of Minutes of meetings - of the Working Groups, the Executive Body and the Meetings of Ministers, supplemented by Resolutions, Declarations and Reports. The Council's discussions were divided into working groups - one for Citizen Security, one for Justice and a third for Transnational Organized Crime. The deliberations of these groups were subsequently forwarded to the Executive Body of the Council and, when appropriate, to the Council of Ministers.

In its Statute of Creation, it establishes as principles "(d) [the] promotion of social inclusion, citizen participation and gender equity, taking into account citizens' right to security and the State's obligation to provide it" and "(F) [the] full coordination in the planning and execution of actions against Transnational Organized Crime" (UNASUR 2012a). In its general objectives, it proposes to "(c) promote relations of friendship, trust and dialogue among the member states through regional, integral and coordinated cooperation between the respective specialized institutions in order to elaborate joint crim-

¹⁰ Available at <http://docs.unasursg.org/latest-documents>, accessed November 24, 2017.

inal policy strategies, cooperation and exchange of information on citizens' security, justice and transnational organized crime "(ibid.). All these actions, the Statute affirms, do not obviate the sovereign autonomy of countries to define their priorities in matters, "as well as to define policies and adequate measures to face these challenges" (ibid.).

The scope of the issues addressed by the CSSCJDOT is reflected in the Action Plan prepared for its first years of operation (2013-2017). In all, it comprises a framework with 11 thematic axes, 32 strategic challenges and 137 lines of action / objectives. In general terms, the thematic axes seek to strengthen the institutional capacities of the national bodies involved in the themes of citizen security, justice and transnational organized crime, as well as creating opportunities to improve citizen participation and attention to human rights principles in security and justice public policies. They seek to address, in accordance with the strategic challenges identified in the scope of institutional capacity building, training of professionals working in the area, technological modernization of crime and violence prevention mechanisms, systematization of intelligence data and intelligence, equal access to international cooperation and strengthen specific policies for prevention, control, investigation and sanctions of transnational organized crime, with a focus on cooperation and information sharing (UNASUR 2013c).

In terms of encouraging greater citizen participation and appreciation of human rights, the strategic challenges are broadly focused on promoting citizen participation in programs and policies to prevent crime and violence, strengthen institutions responsible for human rights, promotion of policies of the same nature, effective responses to serious violations of human rights, encouragement of a culture of non-violence, as well as a careful look at penitentiary policies and the reintegration and rehabilitation of persons deprived of their liberty, adults and young people. In addition, there is a particular interest in the citizen security of border populations, for which the document suggests strengthening the bodies responsible for citizen security and encouraging "citizen participation and collaboration in the design, implementation and evaluation of prevention plans, programs and projects against "organized transnational delinquency of border area populations (UNASUR 2013b, 20).

With the purpose of thinking about what kind of support the normative framework developed by the CSSCJDOT provides for political cooperation and the development of regional public security policies, it is worth highlighting the strategic challenges whose language suggests the construction of convergent mechanisms to deal with situations, especially involving the transnational organized crime. The strategic challenges 1.4 ("Promotion of the creation of mechanisms for the exchange of information and intelligence

referred to DOT, in accordance with the Principles of Reciprocity and Confidentiality of the information exchanged”) are highlighted; (“Promotion of Mechanisms for Border and Transnational Coordination and Cooperation”) and 2.2 (“Promotion of a South American Mechanism for Police Cooperation to Facilitate Joint Action and Coordination of Transnational Organized Crime Actions”) of the Coordination Actions against Transnational Organized Crime. (UNASUR 2013c, 20).

The lines of action/objectives of these selected challenges also open opportunities for regional management of operational issues and dissemination of information related to transnational organized crime. Thus, they propose, among other points, “to generate a South American system of information exchange and criminal intelligence to map routes, *modus operandi*, financial structures and trends of DOT, among other aspects” (*ibid.*, 18); “To develop integrated procedures for action against DOT in general and in border areas in particular, including: (a) common operational and investigative actions; b) action guides for the early detection of delinquent situations in border areas; c) technical assistance activities; d) to adopt reciprocal cooperation agreements to be taken against DOT “(*ibid.*, 19) and” to promote the formation of a South American police cooperation body that coordinates the joint action against DOT at a strategic and operational level “(*ibid.*, 20).

The centers responsible for Citizen Security and Justice also formulated objectives with the potential to be transformed into public policies of regional security. With regard to the first, it is proposed to develop common principles to strengthen institutional policies for the promotion and protection of human rights and to give priority attention to cases of violence against women, against LGBT populations, intrafamily violence and against people with physical or mental disability (*ibid.*, 7-8). The Justice Working Group, in turn, foresees the elaboration of a guide for the implementation of legal aid services (1.1.1), build tools for democratization to legal knowledge (1.2.2), establish minimum standards of legal advice to citizens of Member States who are prosecuted or sentenced in other Member States (1.4.3) and to transfer them if so requested (1.4.4), to promote the implementation of memory policies as a means of redress and promote the culture of non-violence (3.2.3), promote the implementation of policies to protect groups in vulnerable situations (3.3.1), share and implement experiences of new models of penitentiary management (4.1.1.), identify common principles for the compilation of records of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (4.1.5) (*ibid.*, 10-15).

These proposals, however, are exceptions in this set of 137 lines of action objectives elaborated in the Council's Plan of Action. In general, the

activities are aimed at exchanging experiences and information, professional training seminars, elaborate national diagnoses on matters of interest and promote cooperation and technical assistance actions. There is, of course, merit in these actions, especially due to the potential for socialization and imitation that the exchange of experiences and information offers. None of these dynamics, however, guarantees the incorporation, adequacy or alteration of the policy of other countries; this process depends on the combination of a set of factors, as suggested in the previous section. Certainly, most of the actions are directed towards the strengthening and improvement of the functioning national institutions and their professionals.

The attempt to standardize indicators and practices reflects the complicated reality of the scarcity of systematized information in the area of public safety in particular and the diversity of methodologies adopted to categorize the data of the areas in question. In any case, it is undoubtedly a necessary first step for (future) attempts to adopt policies aimed at common purposes to be achieved. And, in fact, perhaps the most relevant achievement of the CSC-JDOT in the period studied here was the approval of the UNASUR Network against Transnational Organized Crime on November 24, 2016. This network consists of “a mechanism for coordinating and exchanging information for (UNASUR 2016a, Article 1), and although it has been approved by the Council of Ministers, it still lacks implementation.

Most of the proposed actions, however, were considered to be fulfilled by the Council. These are timid actions, in their great majority of punctual activities, that do not enjoy continuity in the approach of the content. Almost all activities are originally offered by the responsible Member State to its nationals, and open space for the participation of one or two members of the other States of UNASUR. A single action also contemplates a series of lines of action in several occasions, which reduces even more the number of activities directed to answer a certain question. Interpreted in the minimum limit suggested by the words, in fact the actions performed fulfill the objectives outlined, but the terms “foster”, “strengthen” and “promote” require more continuous and structured actions around the themes. The language used suggests that the Member States have produced a pragmatic Action Plan, effectively considering how much time and resources they could have in these actions, and the recognition of the difficulty of agreeing on assertive priorities in the areas of public security and justice among the members of UNASUR.

Again, it should be emphasized that this is a first step towards the socialization and exchange of information and experience that is so necessary for any model of more ambitious joint policy response, either through the implementation of policies with a common focus at national level, or from

some type of regional coordination. The UNASUR Network against DOT is a promising proposal as it may eventually lead to the formation of shared procedures by the agencies involved, above all the police force, to meet established standards for collecting and recording information. Its developing stage still raises many doubts about its operation and potential results, but its normative proposal demonstrates interesting possibilities in the deepening of the cooperation and, possibly, deepening of common policies.

An obstacle to a better understanding of the opportunities offered by the normative framework created under the CSCJDOT is limited access to substantive content information of actions. The instruments used to diagnose and collect information on crimes and violence, for example, were included in the original documents as annexes, not available to the public¹¹. The annex would be only the project of activity, or the proposal of a questionnaire in its original, that, although it was of much greater analytical value if the access to the answers were publicized, in itself, exclusively the choices about the subjects to be treated in the questionnaires and content of the workshops and workshops offered would significantly contribute to understanding the possibly preferred priorities in terms of themes and treatment of public safety matters in the regional context. Access to the answers would identify the degree of convergence among countries in terms of procedures, policy design and strategic priorities for the area. Perhaps this reflects the very immaturity of the political systems of the South American countries in the construction and transparency of their activities and decisions involving the public safety area coordinated at the federal level.

Associated with the lack of transparency about the content that was appreciated in the discussions and instruments used by the CSSCJDOT, another little democratizing facet of the Board processes is the participation of the actors in the debates and meetings. Two characteristics can be verified: the first one, regarding the absence of participation of the civil society; the second concerning the disparity of decision-making authorities in the meetings. In none of the meetings in which the participants were disclosed during this period of 2013-2017 non-governmental actors were present (UNASUL 2014d). Curious, since several of the initiatives at the level of lines of action / objectives and strategic challenges are aimed at strengthening or promoting greater citizen participation in policies and programs to combat crime and violence. Not only this reinforces the previous hypothesis that openness to the debate for society still lacks institutional and political incentives in the

¹¹ These are the first, second and third meetings of each of the thematic groups, all of which were held in 2016, where the Council was divided up: the Coordination Group for Action against Transnational Organized Crime, the Justice Working Group and the Group of Citizen Security. Available at <http://docs.unasursg.org/all-documents>, accessed November 24, 2017.

area of security, as it inhibits a mechanism that has proved relevant for the dissemination and incorporation of regional policies in the national arena: of civil society groups as agents of interest, who pressure and influence local authorities to discuss and define public policies.

The second question, referring to the governmental actors indicated to participate in the meetings, has two dimensions. First of all, it is worth mentioning the diversity of the institutional origin of the actors participating in the meetings of the Executive Body. The Brazilian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Police, the Ministry of Planning, the State Attorney General's Office, the Ministry of Human Rights and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency UNASUR (2013a, 2013b, 2013c). It is therefore a complex context of coordination by the number of agencies involved at the intragovernmental and intergovernmental level. In addition, the positions held by the participants in each of these institutions differ greatly. Some Member States - which vary from meeting to meeting - send representatives with greater authority to the meetings, while other representatives occupy lower positions on the hierarchical scale, making the decision-making process and procedure time and procedures more time-consuming. Another fact is that not always the same institutions of the same country participate in the meetings. There is less that there is consistent interagency communication, there is a good chance there will be a lack of knowledge about the development of the activities carried out within the Council.

However, it should be noted that the number of documents that the participants of the meetings are disclosed, both in relation to the working groups and the Executive Body, is very low.. After 2014, none of the documents available in the UNASUR digital repository has annexes, a space in which the name and position held by the representatives were listed in the documents up to that year. For the working groups, only two documents are available with the mentioned information between 2013-2017; for the Executive Body, only three. They are, therefore, inferences based on considerably limited information.

Although the Plan of Action contains significant activities to be developed and has been developed over a period of 5 years, meetings of both the working group and the Executive Committee are relatively scarce. According to the documents available to date, the Executive Body met on eleven occasions. The Working Groups varied greatly from year to year. In 2014, for example, the Justice Working Group produced three minutes of meetings, the same for 2016; the Working Groups dedicated to Citizen Security and DOT produced one each for the year 2014 and three for the year 2016. There

is no doubt that meetings have occurred without any registration. The year 2015 is exceptional because there is only one meeting record: the III Meeting of Ministers of the CSSCJDOT. The document addresses three proposals for coordination and adoption of common policy practices; only one of them was approved according to the available documents: the UNASUR Network against DOT¹² (UNASUR 2015).

The reduced number of meetings and the diversity of actors and agencies participating in the meetings suggests, at a first glance, a low priority for the organization and the States in the treatment of regional cooperation in the area of public security. This contributes to the fact that several of the questionnaires sent, mainly related to the diagnosis of local policies that would allow a deepening of the dialogue, were not answered by all States when requested, often on more than one occasion formally. As mentioned previously, none of the requested questionnaires is in the public domain, but considering the diversity and scope of the topics covered (for example, Regional Diagnostic Questionnaire 1.1.1 Status of the DOT: State mechanisms for prevention, investigation and sanction; 1.4.1 Questionnaire on the South American Criminal Intelligence Information Exchange System; Questionnaire on the Guidelines for the Preventive Detention of Persons in Border Areas, among others (UNASUR 2016b), “obtaining adequate information on the subject should not be in fact an easy task since it requires a considerable number of actors, good inter-agency coordination, available systematized data on the issue, and these would be bureaucratic obstacles, even if there is political will.

Before we move on to the next section, two final aspects should be mentioned with regard to the performance and construction of the normative framework of CSSCJDOT. The first concerns the attempt to articulate initiatives aimed at dealing with transnational organized crime with the South American Council on the World Drug Problem. The overlapping of functions and interests is evident, and the CSSJDOT since its initial discussions pointed to the need to establish coordinated action with this body, by determination of the Council of Chiefs and Heads of State and Government of UNASUR when 2012¹³. A meeting between the Pro-Tempore Presidents of the two Councils

12 The other two proposals are the creation of UNASUR Minimum Rules on Access to Justice and the creation of the Center for Strategic Studies against Transnational Organized Crime (UNASUR 2015).

13 The common thematic areas defined were 1) “[r]eduction of the supply of drugs, including trafficking, cultivation, marketing, distribution, production and manufacture of illicit drugs that affect citizen security or are manifestations of Organized Delinquency Transnational; (2) Actions against related offenses and activities linked to the world drug problem such as the diversion of precursors and chemical inputs and money laundering that affect public safety or are manifestations of Transnational Organized Crime” (UNASUR 2013c, annex V).

was held in July 2014, in which it was agreed on the creation of *ad hoc* groups to carry out actions according to their singularities, in order to guarantee the complementarity of efforts in the themes coincident of interest and made explicit in the specific objectives of each of the Councils. They revolve around the promotion of judicial, police and financial intelligence units, promote the exchange of experiences and good practices, contribute to the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the relevant bodies and the training and capacity building of actors involved (UNASUR 2014c). There was no further mention of joint actions between these two bodies. The other suggestion of institutional approximation was with bodies of similar function of the European Union (UNASUR 2015), also without further indications about its progress.

The last issue to be discussed here refers to the definition of concepts, rather, the absence of a clear definition of the concepts that support the delimitation of the Council's field of action and interest. At no time, neither in its statute nor in the other documents produced in the last five years, the Council presents a definition of what "Citizen Security" or "Transnational Organized Crime" mean. Based on the indications of the reasons for the creation of the CSSCJDOT and the Council positions on drugs as independent and autonomous instances, one can infer that these concepts are supported in the formulations adopted by the United Nations, that defined the mentioned terms, and considered prudent to create distinct agencies to deal with the drug and DOT problems.

In general terms, the activities of the Council can be summarized as relatively pragmatic, as it establishes lines of action/objectives that may be, in their most minimalist interpretation, attended by activities already developed at the national level, without demanding excessive resources, human capital and changes in institutional or national policy design; diffuse because it covers an excessive number of themes, the scope of which makes its realization, satisfactorily on all fronts, virtually unreachable within the stipulated time period; and as a consequence of these last two points, an action with little memorable advances, except, perhaps, the decision to create the UNASUR Network against Transnational Organized Crime. It is worth remembering, however, that the specifications of the operation of the network are still open, as well as the amount of resources to be allocated for its maintenance.

Final Remarks: perspectives and scenarios for regional cooperation in the area of public security in South America

To what direction does the normative framework built within the

framework of the CSSCJDOT indicate the possibility of political cooperation in the area of regional public security, in the first instance, and the construction of common public policies, coordinated regionally or nationally, for the same theme? We would like to speculate in three directions.

The first point refers to the substantive content of the policies and actions suggested by CSSJDOT. As we have seen in the section above, these are propositional actions that focus on strengthening institutions, promoting programs and projects and training professionals from national governments, with few initiatives that are really focused on initiatives that require political and institutional adjustments to meet conceptual precepts established in the region. The maintenance of this standard of action will allow, on the one hand, the continuity of the institution with a minimum of relevance in the regional context, offering opportunities, although apparently very limited, of socialization and transfer of knowledge on the issues at hand. The possible continuation of this institutionalized and permanent contact may allow specific points of convergence to arise between a smaller number of Member States, which may enter into coordination agreements and definitions of common political designs independently of UNASUR. In fact, the large number of actors involved, with considerable structural asymmetries, may hinder cooperation at a deeper level.

On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that, as far as public safety hazards are concerned, there is considerable convergence between the countries in the region. A growing increase in the number of homicides in most of them, allegations of excessive use of force by the police, little involvement of civil society in public security processes and decisions, significant portions of the population in vulnerable situations, the impacts of transnational organized crime in social violence, bankruptcy of the criminal justice system; in other words, a dynamic with a strong structural component (Cerqueira, Lobão and Carvalho 2005). Clearly defining the concepts involved in the elaboration of public security policies, and their attempt to make them compatible, appears as a necessary condition for any consistent and significant progress at the national and regional levels. Thus, the effort to contextualize the definition of "Transnational Organized Crime" and "Citizen Security" is a very important step in the process.

No doubt this is a very challenging task. In fact, before the very creation of CSSCJDOT, in 2011, there was an initiative to discuss and define conceptually the terms Regional Security and Defense, as well as to create a Protocol of Peace, Security and Cooperation in UNASUR. (UNASUR 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). The venture was not successful and discussions have not advanced - at least there is no public record that they have continued. But addressing the

issue is essential. If it is not possible to determine holistic conceptual definitions of security, subitems and specific topics can be the subject of discussion and consensus, allowing some of the various areas covered by CSSCJDOT to contribute to better conceptions of joint and / or common action. It seems unpromising to deepen regional relations for public security if the CSSCJDOT chooses not to engage in such a dialogue, as it has apparently done so far.

This is reflected in the fact that central issues in the discussion of public policies at the regional level have been left out or treated at least marginally by the thematic axes, strategic challenges and lines of action / objectives of the Council. Irrespective of the possibilities (or impossibility) of establishing ambitious lines of action, difficult to achieve, these themes could be included in the proposals for the exchange of experiences and good practices, seminars or activities to promote knowledge of the same nature. Two call attention. The first is the theme of police reform; the second, “an integrated management approach, based on scientific planning, focused on the prevention and treatment of the causes that lead to crime” (Cerqueira, Lobão and Carvalho 2005, 13). In addition, a third issue, central to the discussion of transnational security threats, can be mentioned: the particularities of the relationship between the homicide rate and Transnational Organized Crime. In this way, there is a mismatch between the concerns of public security policies at the local level, in addition to the national level. But undeniably, the local sphere, as suggested by the Council’s own concern for participation, cannot be neglected, especially if it is to identify the real impact of DOT on citizen security.

Regarding the last one, the CSSCJDOT, at the October 2013 Ministerial Meeting, determined the crime of money laundering (UNASUR 2013c) as the thematic priority¹⁴. However, the documents did not show any differentiated treatment for the issue, either with regard to actions or discussions about particular procedures and/or dynamics.

The second perspective to be considered is the evolution of the information exchange system, which is very promising in the project of the UNASUR Network against DOT. The systematization of information and the standardization of data collection is now a hindrance to more accurate assessments of the characteristics and status of public security in Brazil, for example (Cerqueira, Lobão and Carvalho 2005). If there are differences due to the autonomy enjoyed by the federal units in determining their criteria and procedures for registering crimes and crimes of violence, the discrepancies between the countries promise to be considerable. The CSSCJDOT recogniz-

¹⁴ See also: <http://www.justica.gov.br/sua-protecao/cooperacao-internacional/atuacao-internacional-2/foros-internacionais/uniao-das-nacoes-sulamericanas-unasul>, accessed December 4, 2017.

es this to a large extent by instigating the development of a set of diagnoses on local realities associated with citizen security, justice and transnational organized crime. If there is investment in this type of practice, the possibilities of standardization for more effective exchange of information sounds very promising. Successful initiatives in this direction will require collective efforts within national governments and, therefore, the political will to bring them about. But they can contribute so much to the creation of policies aimed at common ends among the countries of the region, as well as to identify new explanations for crimes of transnational nature, their impact on the domestic security of the South American countries and models of violence prevention in these circumstances. New methodologies for data collection and storage for prevention, as suggested by the international literature on public safety (Cerqueira, Lobão and Carvalho 2005), however, tend to benefit from citizen participation in the various stages of the policy management and definition process public policies. It is not clear whether the Network will be an instrument of public access, at least in part of its information, but would be an important element for the effectiveness of standardized information exchange activities. Civil society functions as an instrument for the legitimation of processes, as the holder of specialized knowledge and proximity to the demands of society, at least on behalf of society¹⁵. As argued throughout the text, CSS-CJDOT's history in publicizing the disputed content of discussions between members participating in the meetings is restricted. This may be due to bureaucratic deficiencies, but in some cases, as in the case of the preparation of the Primer on Good Practices in Social Reintegration of Persons Deprived of Liberty and Penitentiary Policies, deliberately defined as an activity without public dissemination by the Executive Body of the Council (UNASUR 2014b).

Finally, the third perspective to be discussed refers to the regional institutionality around public security, that is, it deals more broadly with the institutionality of the processes of regionalization itself. Historically, in South America, the incorporation of themes other than trade in integration processes had its greatest impulse with the wave of left-wing or center-left governments that took power in the countries of the region. Although other themes have been subject to appreciation in the past, as in the case of Mercosur, it was in fact with this movement that the institutionalization of the region was intensified. The creation of UNASUR in 2008 is perhaps the most evident example of this acceptance and recognition of the relevance of the regional

¹⁵ It is not intended here to suggest the absence of disputes about political perceptions among the various actors of civil society, nor to disregard disagreements about the concept of civil society and the plurality of its manifestations. Only to raise the point about a kind of institutionalized representation of societal interests.

dimension as a legitimate sphere for the treatment of matters previously less likely to be on the agenda of the external world. The future of more committed engagement with regional cooperation in the area of public security and possibly with the construction of regional public security policies and the way in which these policies will take place therefore appear to be somehow linked to the direction and broader characteristics printed by the governments to the processes of regionalization.

The analysis of normative instruments sheds light on a very modest part of the process of regional public security cooperation. As discussed in the second section of this text, a large universe of variables is combined in complex arrangements to explain the results of interactions permeated by disputes of interests, ideas, resources and actors that may lead to the formulation of a public policy or a cooperation agreement with common purposes. However, the normative framework within which these actors establish their struggles - itself the subject of disputes - is the starting point for understanding the limits and possibilities offered by circumstances. The future of regional public security is uncertain, but the disappointing numbers of increased crime and violence in the region's countries over the last decade leave hope that regionalization is an efficient alternative to starting to address the problem.

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ABSTRACT

This paper considers the normative framework that support regional cooperative practices in public security based on the activities carried out by UNASUR's South American Council on Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Transnational Organized Crime. The article discusses differences and similarities between the conceptions of cooperation and public policies, analyzes the documents produced within the Council and presents limitations, obstacles and opportunities identified from the reading of these documents with regard to regional cooperation in public security.

KEYWORDS

Regional Cooperation, Regional Security, UNASUR.

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LOW-COST TERRORISM OR THE INVISIBLE THREAT: TERRORISM AND BRAZILIAN ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES

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Introduction: Terrorism in the XXI century as a complex phenomena

Terrorism gained political significance during the nineteenth century as an instrument of political demand used by nationalist, anarchist, and revolutionary groups. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was a sharp increase in the use of terrorism as an instrument of political action. Violence ceased to be a type of action by States and was commonly practiced also by non-state actors (Schmid 2004, 399).

Among the main features of contemporary terrorism, we can list decentralized organization, the use of state-of-the-art technologies, drawing resources from flaws in the international financial system, and the use of means of communication in real time. If at the beginning of the 20th century, most terrorist attacks were assassination attempts using firearms or explosives in the 21st century the phenomena of terrorism can only be limited by the sophistication and resources of the perpetrators and conversely sophistication and resources of authorities responsible for counterterrorism policies. These include biological terrorism, nuclear terrorism, symbolic terrorism, chemical terrorism.

Bauman (2002) developed an argument highlighting the perennial character of the assumption that territory grants security. The attacks on 9/11 showed how fragile this assumption is, as the states were largely incapable of detecting features that could lead to the prevention of such attacks. This

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fallibility has an intrinsic relationship with the growing access societies have on sophisticated means of communication and the fluidity of the new frontierland:

“The global space has assumed the character of a frontierland. In the frontierlands, agility and cunning count for more than a stack of guns. In the frontierlands, fences and stockades mark intentions rather than realities. The efforts to give the conflicts a territorial dimension, to pin the divisions and mutual enmities to the ground, seldom bring results. Suspected from the start to be ultimately ineffective, they tend to be half-hearted anyway: wooden stakes signal the lack of self-assurance manifested by stone or concrete walls. Capturing the territory, they occupied yesterday does not mean today's victory over the adversaries, let alone the ‘termination of hostilities’. Most certainly, it does not assure a secure tomorrow. In the course of interminable frontierland warfare, trenches are seldom dug. The adversaries are known to be constantly on the move. Their might and nuisance-making ability lie in their speed, and the inconspicuousness and randomness of their moves. For all practical intents and purposes, in a frontierland adversaries are extraterritorial” (Bauman 2002, 83)

Conflicts ultimately develop in a territory, but Bauman refers to fluidity that inherently derives from technological advances and faster flows of people, information and finance in globalization. It is hard to distinguish allegiances, hard to separate combatants from non-combatants and alliances between groups are matters of convenience (2002:85). Additionally, insecurity that stems from contemporary is amplified by the sense that attacks with chemical, biological and nuclear weapons can occur at any time in states that cannot keep everyone safe given the territorial fluidity aforementioned.

Kaldor (2003), reacting to the post-9/11 attacks questions the motivations under which the British government adhered to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) efforts. The author mentions that there was limited interest in sharing information with Parliament or the population. Terrorism is defined as technique increasingly used by religious extremists and/or nationalist movements as part of a set of forms of violence directed primarily at civilians. The individuals who make up the ranks of these groups are young people who do not find their place in modern societies, unable to insert productively into society because of their low financial income, and sometimes need to legitimize semi-criminal activities through which they derive their benefits. These young people who would find themselves in a gap between tradition and globalization, in which they cannot clearly recognize their space and their social roles. Terrorism is seen by Kaldor as a form of Regressive globalization.

Transnational terrorist groups use the technical amplitude provided by globalization, that is, they use the media such as television and the internet to share in their ideology, tactics, and strengthen their organizations. To Kaldor (2003), transnational terrorist groups have four main characteristics:

A) Their goal is political power, generally aiming towards controlling the State.

B) Groups see themselves as opponents of modernity.

C) Emphasis on the need to regenerate and unify a corrupt society.

D) They believe to be part of a great war against the other³:

To sum up, contemporary terrorism is not only directed against targets indicated as strategic of the opposing state and is a complex phenomena that draws from vulnerabilities of technologically globalized world. It presents indiscriminate violence against anyone, not just state agents and such violence is not merely symbolic and likely to occur on what Kaldor (2003) calls the “black holes of lawlessness”, that is, places where a culture of violence is created. Aside from this first section introducing terrorism in the XXI century as a complex phenomena, the this paper will proceed as follows. The new section frames the issue of anti-terrorism policies as a macros securitization process, drawing from insights of critical security studies. The third section describes and defines an important tactical change in the terrorist attacks, by which one can perpetrate such acts with causing considerable damage with limited resources. We label it “low cost terrorism”, provide descriptive data of this growing trend and briefly narrate some of these events that happened in European cities in the last five years. The fourth section reviews a recent literature in political science addressing a tradeoff between security and freedom in the context of democracies facing the challenges of crafting counterterrorism policies. The fifth section discusses Brazil’s counterterrorism policies relying on brief historical narrative and analysis of legislation, pointing out the tensions between the recently crafted framework and its potential uses for non-terrorism related activities, as well as highlighting its inadequacy to tackle “Low Cost Terrorism”. The last section concludes this paper and addresses some implications of our arguments.

Anti-Terrorism policies as macros securitization process

Twentieth-century terrorism after World War II could be summarized

³ The idea of the “other” acquires meaning not merely the other as non-self, but as someone who with whom groups do not share core beliefs.

according to the tactics that were used in each attack: the 1960s were the time of bombings, the 1970s were the time of airplane hijackings, and the 1980s and 1990s were the time of both. On September 11, 2001, however, something new happened in New York City when two commercial airplanes were used as missiles against two of the most famous buildings of the city, and another plane was deliberately crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, DC.

What did these attacks demonstrate to the world? Several answers to this question are possible, but we would like to stress that the primary objective of the terrorists was not only to spread fear among the American public, but to demonstrate that world's most powerful military power was vulnerable to attack from 'unexpected weapons'. Pandora's Box was opened on that morning, and counterterrorism became the most pressing issue on the international security agenda.

The extreme violence used by al-Qaeda in the 9/11 attacks mobilized the entire international community to question how such attacks were possible. The answer to that question can be analyzed if we understand what took place that morning. The terrorism of global reach differs sharply from previous terrorist attacks and other forms of violent struggle.

When we take into account the political environment, we have to regard the nonlinear relationship imposed by multiple scenarios, which means that we are analyzing different states, each one with its interests, regional and global status, population, and so on. The definitional problem of terrorism arises as one of the central issues in political science because the essence of this research question does not lie with the most familiar aspects of terrorism, like violence, tactics, and objectives, but with a broad understanding of the political sphere.

Terrorism is also related to the issue of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as the technological capability to produce them does not exclusively belong to the great powers anymore, but has also been achieved by small and weak states and potentially non-state actors. This increases the difficulty of reaching a broad agreement about the definition of terrorism. It is necessary, then, to account for different political environments and the possibility of unpredictable scenarios.

The very process of defining terrorism after the 9/11 attacks can be characterized as troublesome because it started to embrace too many different types of violence that populated the imagination of the entire international community—biological, chemical, nuclear terrorism, to name a few. Since the possibilities of terrorism were boundless, the concept became as broad as possible. In that sense, what the US government called Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) could be considered as a part of a process of macrose-

curitization of a security issue on the global agenda. According to Buzan and Weaver (2009: 257), macrosecuritization can be understood as a securitization process on a larger scale, in which the level of aggregation is higher than the nation state:

Macrosecritizations are defined by the same rules that apply to other securitizations: identification of an existential threat to a valued referent object and the call for exceptional measures. The key difference is that they are on a larger scale than the mainstream collectivities at the middle level (states, nations) and seek to package together securitizations from that level into a "higher" and larger order.

They present a more inclusive logic and seek more decisively to convince the general public of the need to protect themselves from a threat. Examples are the GWOT, the Cold War, or global warming. One condition for processes of macrosecuritization is the availability of universalist ideologies. Buzan and Waever (2009) categorize four types of universalism, which function as a cohesive and inclusive element to occupy a privileged position in the global security agenda. 'Inclusive universalism's refers to beliefs on how to optimize the human condition (whether by religious means or not - for example, Liberalism, Marxism, Christianity, Islam). They are universalist in the sense that they apply to all humankind. In turn, those ideological beliefs that claim superior rights and status for one group over the rest of humankind are called 'exclusive universalism'. Examples include European imperial doctrines and Nazism. 'Existing order universalisms' are political claims about threats to one or more of the institutions of international society, which are universalist in the sense that they refer to the global level international social structure. 'Physical threat universalisms' have as referent object the physical future of the humanity, with potential damage on a global scale due to terrorism, nuclear weapons, infectious diseases, or global warming (Buzan and Waever 2009: 260-1).

To Bigo (2006), the post-9/11 international security environment is marked by the upsurge of electronic surveillance of individuals and the use of security rhetoric to legitimize practices of exception. It is a period, which reinforces a permanent state of exception or emergency, strengthening the discourse that the insecurity is the central feature of the global environment. One of the solutions that became spread out was the use of surveillance technology to prevent terrorist attacks, with the worrying downside of an potential harm to fundamental rights of privacy and human dignity(Bigo 2006, 49).

The riskiest consequence of GWOT (besides torture and preemptive

war) is the ongoing process of normalization which allows these emergency measures to be widely perceived as solutions to tackle security issues in the post-9/11 context (ibid, 63).


[...] to focus on governmental antiterrorist policies alone, on Guantanamo Bay and torture in Iraq or elsewhere, without seeing the relationship to the daily treatment of foreigners at the borders and the suspicion concerning any deviant behavior, is misleading. We need to insist on this normalization of emergency as a technique of government by unease, and on the success of the differentiation between a normalized population which is pleased to be monitored “against danger” and an ‘alienation’ of some groups of people considered as dangerous “others”. The surveillance and monitoring of the movement of each individual is growing, but effective controls and coercive restrictions of freedom are concentrated on specific targets. These targets are constructed as “invisible and powerful enemies in networks” and the narratives concerning these threats predate September 11 and even the end of bipolarity[...]

Drawing from insights provided by authors like Bigo (2006) and Buzan and Waever (2009), we can notice that terrorism is presented as an existential and perennial threat to the whole international system – according to the government of United States. Such securitization process, in turn, provides countries with considerable incentives for adopting counterterrorist policies that rest on exceptional measures (i.e. beyond the spectrum of democracy).

Low-cost terrorism: the threat of the invisible terrorism

We have witnessed in the beginning of 21st century terrorist groups acting in the international arena using some combinations of well-known methods of attacks and organization (e.g) using fire arms, bombs, etc. However, Low cost terrorism means violent attacks which use a minimum amount of organization and technical requirements from the method or even from the perpetrator.

The consolidated databases on terrorism do not specifically classify events as “low cost terrorism”. Therefore, it is necessary to look for events that could be roughly included in our definition in order to have an estimate of the size of this problem. Graph 1 shows the number of terrorist attacks classified by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) under three rubrics.



Graph 1 – Number of Attacks of “Low Cost” terrorism (1970-2017)

Source: Global Terrorism Database (2018).

Under the rubric “melee”, the GTD coded attacks perpetrated using knives and attacks perpetrated using vehicles as a weapon of choice (excluding, car-bombs). A melee attack targets people and does not involve a projectile in which the user and target are in contact with it simultaneously. The weapons used in melee attacks are usually blunt objects, hands, feet and fists, knives and sharp objects, rope and strangling device and suffocation (GTD Codebook:29). Vehicle attacks happen when automobile that is used in an incident that does not incorporate the use of explosives such as a car bomb or truck bomb (GTD Codebook:27).

In total, from 1970 to 2016, 3338 melee attacks took place, 307 in Western Europe, 60 in North America, 188 in South America, and 1160 in the Middle East and North Africa. The Global Database compiled 116 events for terrorist attacks perpetrated using vehicles, with a radical spike in the occurrence of such events: 50% of all attacks in this modality happened after 2013. 10 of these attacks happened in Western Europe, 12 in North America and 60 in the Middle East and North Africa. Such attacks still represent a small percentage of the total number of terrorist attacks documented since 1970 but it is important to stress both its growth tendency and the intense media coverage they have been receiving.

Aside from showing some aggregate data from a well known database of terrorist events, the approach we have chosen to advance our argument is to demonstrate the relevance of the concept of low cost terrorism by examin-

ing more closely the recent attacks in western developed democracies, which have received tremendous attention from news outlets. Let us analyze, albeit superficially, the attack on the Charlie Hebdo newspaper.

Brothers Said and Chérif Kouachi killed 12 people on January 7, 2015, at the headquarters of the French satirical newspaper in Paris. Among the victims were the director of the publication, some of that country's most renowned cartoonists and two police officers. The Kouachi brothers were French of Algerian origin, orphans, who grew up in an educational center in Treignac, in the Limousin region of central-western France. Both Said and Chérif, accused of the acts against the headquarters of Charlie Hebdo, were part of a group of young French Muslims indoctrinated during the 2000's in Paris.

Another emblematic recent case of terrorism was the actions that resulted in 129 deadly victims in Paris, just ten months after the attack on the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo. The terrorists carried out a series of attacks on the French capital, killing more than 120 people, 70 at the Bataclan concert hall. The investigations reached the terrorists who were between 20 and 31 years old, most of them of European nationality. In addition to the Bataclan, the bombers attacked caused explosions in the vicinity of the Stade de France, north of Paris, in which there was a friendly game between the French and German team. The Bataclan terrorists were killed during the police raid, but more than 100 people had been held hostage, and 70 of them were killed.

The forms of grooming have taken on new contours since the launch of the Telegram application, which has an encrypted messaging system that has gradually become the preferred platform for members of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State. Previously the online actions of terrorists have come up against barriers imposed by censorship on violent content on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. In this sense, the Russian-based app has helped to facilitate contact between those who co-opt and possible new jihadists thousands from miles away.

Another factor, equally crucial, beyond the platforms used, is undoubtedly what Farhad Khosrokhavar (2015)⁴ calls "charisma at a distance". To that end, the presence of a convincing and popular leader is enough. In at least eight cases between 2016 and 2017 perpetrators used their vehicles as weapons. These include attacks in cities like Edmonton, Barcelona, Paris, Stockholm, London, Berlin, New York and Nice. In all of these cases, there seems to be a pattern of violence: the use of automobiles as a way of carrying

4 French-Iranian Sociologist, researcher at the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'homme – FMSH. Paris.

out terrorist acts. Such attacks are relatively low cost and almost impossible to prevent, as agglomerations of people are a part of everyday life and so is the use of automobiles. Although this terrorist tactic is not exactly something new, its employment is a growing reality in the international scene. In an era where diffusion of information happens at the speed of light – and so does recruitment for terrorist groups – it is fair to expect that such attacks will keep happening, as their occurrence might fuel others. This trend, we argue, will be reinforced in the future years as counterterrorist policies enforce since 9/11 have substantially restricted the means by which individuals can perpetrate terrorist actions. For instance, it is considerably harder to take control of planes or be in a position to set an explosive device where there are large agglomeration of people.

Tradeoff between freedom and security

A recent literature in political science has been trying to assess empirically the causes and effects of counterterrorist policies and their relationship with democracy. In an analysis for the period between 1990 and 2010, Chenoweth (2012) shows that Terrorism is a phenomena prevalent in democracies and it has increased on “anocracies”. On review of the literature on the relationship terrorism and democracy, the author has highlighted that “If there is a common message emerging from recent research, it is that a country’s best defense against terrorism is to enhance its legitimacy, not only through democratic practices but also through genuine liberal practices both at home and abroad”(Chenoweth 2013:375). Ash (2016) shows that democracy and representation might be a way to deal with terrorism in the long run because it galvanizes political actors and creates broad consensus to fight these threats. The problem then seems to be when democracies adopt illiberal practices.

Review of cross national quantitative evidence shows that occurrence of terrorist attacks weakens civil liberties and political rights considerably in democracies. The effect of terrorist attacks on weakening democracy is more preponderant in less consolidated democracies, but a word of caution is necessary in comprehensive counterterrorism policies, as there is always the possibility of generating a pervasive effect in for democracy (Hunter 2016, 187).

Potential solutions to the pressing problem of dealing with international terrorism while balancing interests of national security and individual rights are vary from not adopting such intelligence gathering practices at all to ignoring individual rights in the name of “protecting the realm”. And intermediate solution is building up solid judicial institutions that apply pro-

portionality on a case by case bases evaluating the merits based on need and evidence (Lowe 2016).

Aside from the tradeoff between security and freedom, states should then identify principle to establish and ethical approach to intelligence gathering. There, the methods, the context and the target need to be evaluated to navigate between privacy and security (Walsh and Miller 2016). Garcia and Geva (2016) empirically assess the tradeoff between liberty and security in the United States using experimental evidence. The authors provide evidence that the public is more willing to accept greater reductions in civil liberties under a greater threat of terrorism only when the perceived effectiveness of those policies to prevent future acts of terrorism is high.

Attacks that can happen anywhere under the premise that perpetrators do not need resources or high levels of organization imply a substantial rise on the sense of uncertainty about the occurrence of such attacks. The literature points to a debate on prioritizing security over liberties in the context of security threats, states are compelled to enact security policies that prioritize surveilling individuals within their territories in order to prevent the occurrence of attacks. The endpoint of this process is the system of states normalizing practices of surveillance and exception by which control is a priority of security policies.

Counterterrorism Policies: the Brazilian Case⁵

How about the potential Brazilian responses to the terrorist threat? When analyzing the concept of terrorism and its frequent use in the international political environment, it is necessary to emphasize that its importance has risen considerably. One could thus say that terrorism has gone through a process of securitization. This process in South America is marked by the absence of a precise definition of terrorism, which makes room for the flexible use of this political concept, allowing the states to give it the meaning that is best suited to their political interests. Brazil's counterterrorist policy, by way of an "anti-terrorism" law was only passed in 2016.

In order to understand Brazil's delay in reacting to such "Macro-securitization process", one needs to acknowledge the meaning of the terrorism in South American countries. Terrorism has had a unique character in South American politics, especially during 1960s and 1970s. During this period, both state and non-state actors used tactics to employ political violence.

⁵ This section is an updated version of our previous writings. For a more detailed version of the adoption of counterterrorism policies in Brazil, see Suarez, Brancoli, and Acácio (2017)

After 1959, year of the Cuban Revolution, and in the context of the Cold War, the government of the United States was keen in lending systematic support to the rise of right-wing military regimes in the Americas. Terrorism in South America was mainly meant, on this key, state terrorism, by which authoritarian regimes repressed brutally the citizens they regarded as political opponents. In this context, resistance groups against the military regimes emerged. Examples include MR-8 and ALN in Brazil; the Montoneros in Argentina; the Tupamaros in Uruguay; the MIR in Chile; the FARC and ELN in Colombia. These groups were regarded as terrorists by the governments of such countries while they might have been called insurgents or guerrillas abroad.

In Brazil, the securitization of terrorism occurred in a complex manner. This is especially true if one takes into consideration Brazilian history and the ambiguity with which the term 'terrorism' was used in policy and law. During the period of the military dictatorship that ruled the country from 1964 to 1985, 'terrorists' were members of left-wing armed groups who opposed the government. The government carried out major armed campaigns against 'terrorist' groups both in urban and rural terrain. In this sense, the military labeled national groups opposing the regime as potentially destructive elements of society, an 'existential threat', and employed the armed forces against them despite their status as citizens. Actions against these groups were characterized by disregard of fundamental human rights. The existence of those 'enemies of the motherland' constituted a state of exception in which the military confronted the opposition by means of torture, unlawful killings, and disappearances. The discursive annexation of 'terrorist groups' thus authorized state agents to operate through extremely coercive measures.

This historical detour is insightful to explain why the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, approved after the military left power, condemns acts of terrorism, without actually defining what they actually are. The new civilian government wanted to repeal the discursive uses of domestic terrorist threats by the previous regime, while also distancing itself from the human rights violations committed in the past. Additionally, part of the new political elite (left-wing politicians, journalists, lawyers and social activists) was arrested under terrorism charges during the dictatorship and are very careful in referring to this term to frame any violent behavior.

The post-9/11 context in Brazil is unique for three specific reasons. First, Brazil sought to increase its projection in the international system. Second, the macrosecuritization of terrorism as a global threat. Third, the consolidation of Brazilian democracy and the lack of legitimacy of an anti-terror framework that was created during the authoritarian regime. After the 11

September 2001 attacks, legislative panic swept many countries, and under the guidance of the United States' Global War on Terrorism efforts, criminal laws were changed to give strong responses to terrorism. As a result of this process, even countries that had never been victims of terrorist attacks adopted draconian laws against terrorism. By all indications, Brazil faced a very complex problem to try to respond to international demands for an anti-terrorist framework. The country needed to update its policy, legal and strategic perspectives to handle the situation of being a potential target for major terrorist attacks. Lafer (2003) provides an overview of the Brazilian status in the midst of the rapid adjustments that the securitization process of terrorism as a global threat required in the post-9/11 context. In this period, Brazil quickly adopted a set of international standards. The country bandwagoned this global process of securitization of terrorism in a mimetic way. It must be pointed out that the country did so without having a profound domestic debate that would allow an adaptation of the international norms to Brazilian domestic and foreign policy goals and interests. Domestically, Brazil at first resisted the pressures to adopt new anti-terrorist legislation and did not succumb to the trend of using terrorism as a justification to restrict individual rights. Immediately after 9/11, Brasilia managed to express its rejection of the attacks against civilians, while at the same time it kept its distance from the US-sponsored GWOT. Washington repeatedly asked Brazil for support to deal with individuals suspected of being part of Islamic terrorist groups in the its shared border with Argentina and Paraguay. Besides illicit activities, the biggest issue there is that the area is home to a growing Muslim population of about 30.000 – about 10% of the local population –, mostly of Syrian and Lebanese origin. This caught the attention of US security policy after 9/11. The Bush administration argued that members of the Lebanese Hezbollah group operated in that area without control. In this sense, we agree with Villa (2014) when analyzing the impact of the macrosecuritization process carried out by US foreign policy on South America. Yet, the refusal of the Brazilian government to label such groups as terrorists demonstrated that the country was not completely entangled in the US sphere of influence.

Brazil's Federal Constitution (article 4, paragraph VIII) names the condemnation of terrorism as one of the principles governing Brazil's international relations, and Brazil has a significant participation in international counterterrorism instruments. The need to absorb international counterterrorism legislation is undisputed. On 19 February 2001, Brazil adopted via decree the UN Security Council Resolution 1333, passed in 2000.⁶ The coun-

6 The UN Security Council Resolution 1333 from the year 2000 was, among other penalties, aimed at blocking the financial and organizational resources of Osama bin Laden.

try also moved firmly in the fight against money laundering, corruption and criminal organizations. While Brazil repudiates international terrorism, it has an extremely cautious stance on the use of military force to address such threat, highlighting the need for peaceful resolution of conflicts and addressing economic and social “root causes” of the phenomena.

The Brazilian Constitution does not offer a definition of terrorism, and the development of specific domestic legislation on the issue of terrorism has largely been irregular or unclear. Brazilian laws that had some anti-terrorist content were the ones passed during the authoritarian period and its the chief example is the National Security Law 7.170/83, which allows for sanctions against terrorist acts. Initially, no changes were made in reaction to 9/11 and Brazil refrained from creating a legal framework to deepen counterterrorism.

The transformation in Brazil’s legal framework to address terrorism had its roots in the country’s substantial economic growth, after the election of President Lula da Silva (2003). Brazil benefited from rising commodity prices and China’s economic growth, taking advantage of the financial wind-fall to try to drum up symbolic capital in the international arena. It is mainly due to these developments that the country started to host a series of major events, including the Environmental Conference Rio + 20 (2012), the Soccer World Cup (2014) and the Summer Olympics (2016).

The intention to internationalize the country by hosting international delegations with an increasing frequency clashed with a lack of operational capabilities to deal with the threats that such events eventually lead to. The absence of Islamic terrorist attacks in the country meant that the military and national security agencies did not possess expertise or structure to deal with terrorist acts. Also, as mentioned before, the very speech act of naming ‘terror’ a threat made some sectors of the society recall the criminal actions of the military dictatorship, which increased the political cost of changes in security policy with regarding terrorism. Two events exemplify the problem of denominating situations of violent upheaval: In 2006, PCC, a criminal organization in São Paulo, undertook attacks that ended up killing 86 people; in 2010 attacks by the Red Command gang in Rio de Janeiro were also regarded as ‘terrorist’ by parts of the public opinion. The institutional response, however, has always been not to treat those events as terrorism, but as common crime.

The security forces’ response to the Brazilian protests in June 2013 was particularly violent⁷. During these events, young people in several cities

⁷ Even the UN Human Rights Council expressed concern about the Brazilian security forces’ turn towards more repressive practices. On 10 June 2015, an addendum to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (UN Human Rights Council 2015) referred to the episodes of political violence: ‘The Special

resorted to the strategy of closing off large avenues as acts of social contestation. Images of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro using excessive violence against protesters quickly spread on the internet, which encouraged certain segments of the protesters to also operate violently. The manifestations were accompanied intense debates in public opinion, with the front pages of newspapers filled with pictures of protesters attacking banks and buses. Conservative politicians and the press began to employ the word 'terror' to describe those actions.

Meanwhile, some international bureaucratic structures that had gained strength during the Bush era continued to exert influence over countries to prioritize counterterrorism on their security policies. One of these structures is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). That group, created to improve international cooperation in combating money laundering, gained super powers in 2001 to be also responsible for financial measures to combat terrorism. The FATF makes a number of recommendations and publishes a blacklist of countries that do not implement them. Being on the blacklist can seriously affect the credit of a country. During the Lula administration, FATF bureaucrats tried to pressure Brazil to create specific legislation to criminalize terrorism.

The combination of external pressures for an anti-terrorist framework for the mega-events and conservative forces' discourse against the protests ultimately made the country update its anti-terrorism law. In this process which one can define as a securitization bandwagon, Brazil started to accelerate the development of its legal framework on anti-terrorism through Presidential Decree 7606 of 17 November 2011. This piece of legislation expressed the Brazilian commitment to fight terrorism and to implement Resolution 1989 of the UN Security Council, adopted in 2011⁸. The process became more narrowly focused on domestic security threats after the June 2013 protests. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, then Senator Crivella proposed bill 728/2011, which sought to increase security by limiting access to areas around the stadiums for the Confederations Cup and World Cup matches to those individuals who had tickets. This bill was not approved, among other things because of the vagueness of the concepts used.

Rapporteur remains disturbed by allegations of excessive use of force by the police against peaceful protestors in a series of assemblies and at the allegations of mass arrests of individuals aimed at intimidating critics and discouraging participation in public demonstrations.'

8 This Resolution reaffirms an extensive set of earlier counterterrorism resolutions: 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1363 (2001), 1373 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1624 (2005), 1699 (2006), 1730 (2006), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009) and 1988 (2011).

On the national level, the bill 2016/2015 was a first attempt to establish a definition of the crime of terrorism in the country. It is highly controversial and was subject to numerous modifications. In its original version it characterized terrorism as follows (Brazilian National Congress 2016):

Terrorist organizations are those whose preparatory and executory acts occur for ideological and political reasons, for reasons of xenophobia, discrimination or prejudice based on race, color, ethnicity, religion or gender, and whose purpose is to cause terror, endanger people, property, public safety or public peace, or coerce authorities to do or not to do something.

When the bill afore mentioned was finally approved by the Brazilian Congress – and after considerable societal pressure - it eliminated from its content ideological and political reasons among the motivations for terrorism. There was considerable controversy about what would be considered acts of terrorism, especially since the law project listed a number of tactics frequently employed by demonstrators, such as sabotaging or seizing control of the means of communication or transport, ports, airports, railway or bus stations, hospitals and places that carry out public services. The contested nature and fragility of the concepts used is also manifest in the exclusionary clause foreseen in the third paragraph of draft bill 2016/2015, which stated that certain types of political activity could not be classified as terrorism. This brings to light the problem of vagueness in the definition of terrorism. This article was vetoed by then President Dilma Rousseff on sanctioning the law.

Terrorist acts are defined by Brazilian law as “use or threaten to use, carry, store, carry or carry explosives, toxic gases, poisons, biological, chemical, nuclear or other means capable of causing damage or causing mass destruction” (Brazilian Government, 2016).

Additionally, the language to define terrorist acts as potentially disruptive to critical infrastructures of the country was kept, as a terrorist act means to “obstruct the operation or seize, with violence, serious threat to the person or using cybernetic mechanisms, full or partial control, even temporarily, means of communication or transportation, ports, airports, railway stations health facilities, schools, sports stadiums, public or local facilities where essential public services operate, power generation or transmission facilities, military installations, exploration facilities, refining and processing of oil and gas, and banking and your service network” (Brazilian Government, 2016). The penalties imposed, pending on the violation, range from five to thirty years in Prison and fines to be established by a judge.

It is important to highlight that the definition of terrorism adopted by

Brazil's current anti-terrorism law is already outdated to deal with actions that would fit the description our definition of "Low Cost Terrorism". If an individual, motivated by political reasons decides to stab someone or drive a car into a crowded area such as in the attacks briefly narrated in the in this paper, that is simply not considered a act of terrorism under Brazilian law. Perpetrators would have to be trialed under other articles of Brazil's penal code.

The anti-terrorist law 13.260 of March 2016⁹ clearly responded to the urge to tackle 'international terrorism' as the 2016 Summer Olympics approached the horizon. At the same time, it leaves sufficient definitional gaps that open the possibility of its application to domestic groups and social protest. There is an excess of emergency discourse in this context. The speech act of pointing to protesters as terrorists ultimately authorizes a series of emergency measures. By understanding the process of securitization as the displacement of a broad political process into a political agenda dominated by security discourse, one can consider that Brazil is belatedly adhering to the macrosecuritization process described by Buzan and Waever (2009).

Conclusions

When democracies need to address the threat of terrorism, they must also reflect carefully about the implications that the application of such policies might have for the necessary protection of human rights of individuals that inhabit such territories. More often than not, counterterrorist policies grant the executive power with a heavy dose of discretionary power under the premise that in the tradeoff between security and freedom the former trumps the latter. With low cost terrorism on the rise, the international community has limited alternatives other than boost efforts on surveillance of individuals and information-sharing, possibly with limited effectiveness – as it is virtually impossible to prevent attacks that rely employ tactics such as an individual pulling a knife or racing a vehicle on an open crowd.

As we understand the implications of the growing threat of Low Cost Terrorism is, we will be able to clearly think and see what the issue is. Our point is to explore the new profile of some violent non-state actors, embedded in high-tech societies and how they use all possibilities to take technological advances against those societies.

Aside from this conceptual discussion, this paper has sought to contextualize Brazil's counterterrorist policies, briefly narrating how it was craft-

9 Available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2016/lei/l13260.htm, accessed June 8, 2018.

ed in a context of both macrosecuritization and domestic needs. The output of our proposed debate is that Brazilian state faces a permanent challenge of setting a legal framework to address the issue of terrorism without resorting to legal and political emergency measures. The ‘state of emergency’ environment that can be enacted by wrongful application of counterterrorist policies is a risk which Brazil incurs without having a profound debate about the issue of terrorism. There are potential problems of adopting a legal framework largely based on international norms and perceptions which are not adequate to new forms of terrorist attacks and that are not able to grasp a new kind of political actors perpetrating violence. Additionally, the vagueness of concepts in the laws adopted might create a gray area in which social protest – which is entirely reasonable in a democracy – could be framed as terrorists which is particularly troublesome in times of social and political unrest with which the country has had to deal with since 2013 and which include street protests, impeachment procedures of a president, military intervention in the public security of one of Brazil’s major states (Rio de Janeiro) and a general strike of truck drivers which caused major disruption to the flow of goods, people and the deliverance of public services in most of the country.

The process of securitization of international terrorism raised a broad range of issues with regards to its implementation by domestic legislation. In the case of Brazil, it can be seen that this process moved the adoption of anti-terrorist legislation onto the Brazilian security agenda. It remains to be seen whether it will leave further marks in the country’s institutions, particular regarding the future application of the recently created legal framework. As with regards to Low Cost Terrorism, Brazil’s belated adoption of anti-terrorist laws is largely unable to address such problems and if they happened in Brazilian soil the courts in the country would probably have to trial perpetrators for other common crimes present in Brazil’s penal law.

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ABSTRACT

We propose to study a tactical change into the violent political action of terrorist attacks: in addition to the car bombs and the attacks on public spaces performed by organized terrorist cells, attacks can growingly be pursued at a lower organizational and material cost. We propose to define such attacks as “low cost terrorism”, referring to recent events (Paris, London, Brussels, and Barcelona). Aside from the theoretical discussion and characterization of terrorism as a macrosecuritization process, we discuss Brazil’s anti-terrorist legislation in this context and highlight inconsistencies and inadequacies of the country’s to address the phenomena of terrorism, especially when referring to “low cost terrorism”.

KEYWORDS

Low-cost terrorism, Brazilian anti-terrorism, Securitization.

FRENCH GUIANA AND THE FALKLANDS: THE MILITARY PRESENCE OF FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN CONTINENT

Marcos Valle Machado da Silva¹

Introduction

The continental dimensions of the Brazilian territory, with borders with 10 countries, as well as the 3.5 million km² of Brazilian Jurisdictional Waters (BJW)² are factors that configure South America and the South Atlantic as the area of priority interest of the Brazilian State, on issues related to national defense.

The South Atlantic allows access to the main ports of entry and exit of Brazilian foreign trade and is increasingly linked to national economic development, whether through the exploration of oil, gas and fishing, or as a way of national and international trade. The waters of the South Atlantic have the singular characteristic that, except for the Falklands³, they are usually perceived as free from the traditional threats arising from interstate military

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² The term “Brazilian Jurisdictional Waters (BJW)” is used in this article in line with the concept presented in the White Paper of National Defense (WPND), which is transcribed below: “It comprises the inland waters and maritime areas in which Brazil exercises jurisdiction, to some extent, on living, non-living activities, persons, facilities, vessels and natural resources found in the net mass, in the seabed or in the subsoil, for control and inspection purposes, within the limits of international and national legislation. These maritime spaces comprise the 200 nautical miles from the baselines, plus the waters overlying the extension of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, where it occurs” (Brazil 2016b, 15).

³ In Argentina, the term used to refer to those islands is “Malvinas”, in the English version “Falklands”. Both are accepted and refer to the same geographical set of islands in the South Atlantic. (translation note).

conflicts⁴.

Among the South American states, there are no disputes over sovereignty or jurisdiction over the South Atlantic. However, two exogenous states are present on both the South American continent and islands in the South Atlantic. These are: France and the United Kingdom.

France maintains a colony on the South American continent, with the *status* of an Overseas Department, with contingent and military facilities, usually ignored in the analysis of the military presence of extraregional actors in South America. The United Kingdom, with its island possessions on the north-south axis of the South Atlantic, including the islands of Ascension, St. Helena, Tristan da Cunha, Falklands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, emerges as the causal state of the main source of tension in the South Atlantic due mainly to the question of sovereignty over the Falklands with Argentina.

In this context, it is worth questioning: does the military presence of these extraregional actors generate current and potential tensions about the Brazilian vision of regional defense?

In order to answer the proposed question, this article aims to highlight the military presence of France and the United Kingdom in America and South Atlantic and to analyze the tensions arising from this presence, in relation to the Brazilian view of defense for the region.

The central argument developed and defended is that France's military presence in French Guiana and the United Kingdom in the Falklands have the potential to generate tensions and crises, in opposite to the Brazilian defense vision for South America and the South Atlantic.

The text is divided into three sections in order to answer the question raised and to support this argument, as well as to achieve the proposed objective. In the first one, what is the Brazilian defense vision for South America and the South Atlantic is identified. For this purpose, the highest level defense documents of the Brazilian State were analyzed, in its several updates, such as the National Defense Policy (NDP) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS).

The next two sections focus on the analysis of the military assets and facilities of the United Kingdom and France, their possession in South Amer-

⁴ The term inter-state conflict is used here in its broadest sense, as presented in the University of Peace *Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies* (Miller 2005, 22): "Interstate conflicts are disputes between states or violations of system of alliances between states" (Our translation). In the original: "Interstate conflicts are disputes between nation-states or violations of the state system of alliances." The term interstate military conflict is used here to mean this type of conflict in which military force is used or there is a threat of using it by one of the states involved in the conflict.

ica and the South Atlantic, as well as the purposes declared by these States to justify their presence in the region. In these two sections are also identified the existing and potential tensions arising from the British and French military presence in the Brazilian strategic environment. In Final Remarks it is evident how the tensions arising from the military presence of the two extraregional players analyzed interfere with the Brazilian defense vision for the region.

The Defense Vision of the Brazilian State for South America and the South Atlantic

Brazil has a set of documents related to defense policy and strategy emanated from the executive branch, approved by the Congress and periodically reviewed with the participation of politicians, military personnel, academics, diplomats and other representatives of civil society. In order of precedence, these documents are: the National Defense Policy (NDP), the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Defense White Paper (NDWP).

As stated in the 2016 edition, “NDP is the country’s highest level document on defense issues, based on constitutional principles and aligned with aspirations and the National Fundamental Objectives, which consolidates the Brazilian state’s position and establishes the higher objectives in this theme.” (Brazil 2016c).

The document was originally conceived in 1996, and named Defense National Policy (DNP), and was updated in 2005 and 2012. In 2012, its title was changed to National Defense Policy (NDP). In 2016, the NDP, in accordance with current legislation⁵, had a new update. This version was sent in November 2016 for congressional appreciation, and was open to public consultation by the Ministry of Defense⁶.

The National Defense Strategy guides the segments of the Brazilian State regarding the actions that must be implemented in order to achieve the National Defense Objectives.⁷ Its first version was elaborated in 2008, being

5 Complementary Law (CL) nº 97/1999, as amended by LC nº 136/2010, in the third paragraph of its ninth article, requires that the Executive Power forward to the National Congress, every four years, from the year of 2012, the updates of the NDP, NDS and NDWP (Brazil 2010).

6 See Brazil 2016c

7 The NDP 2016 in its item 4.1, points out that the National Defense Objectives “must be interpreted as the conditions to be achieved and maintained permanently by the Brazilian nation in the sphere of defense” (Brazil 2016c).

updated in 2012 and in 2016.⁸

The White Paper on National Defense is the document that broadly contextualizes the National Defense Strategy, in medium and long term perspective, also allowing the monitoring of budget evolution and multi-year planning of the main defense projects of the Brazilian State (Brazil, 2010).

Having made these initial considerations on the main public domain documents concerning the Brazilian national defense, we will proceed to the analysis of the NDP and NDS editions, seeking to identify the Brazilian defense vision for South America and the South Atlantic. The central analytical axis consisted in identifying how South America and the South Atlantic are perceived in these documents, what are the National Defense Objectives for that region, and whether there are Defense Strategies to achieve them. In its four editions (1996, 2005, 2012 and 2016), in its respective chapters dedicated to the analysis of the international and regional environment, South America and the South Atlantic integrate the so-called Brazilian strategic environment.⁹

South America is perceived, in all four editions of the document, as a continent without serious interstate and relatively peaceful conflicts, as summarized in Table 1.

NDP Edition	Perception Relative to South America
NDP 1996 (Section 2.6)	“South America, far from the world’s stresses of tension, is considered the most demilitarized region in the world. [...] Regional disputes have been administered at tolerable levels. “
NDP 2005 (Section 3.2) and NDP 2012 (Section 4.2)	“South America, far from the main global stresses and free from nuclear weapons, is considered a relatively peaceful region.”

⁸ See Brazil 2008, 2012a and 2016a.

⁹ NDP 2016, in its second chapter, sub-item 2.1.6, delimits the Brazilian strategic environment as follows: “[...], without disregarding the global sphere, establishes as a priority area of interest the Brazilian strategic environment, which includes America South Atlantic, the countries of the West African coast and Antarctica (Brazil 2016c).

<p>NDP 2016 (Section 2.3.9 and 2.3.10)</p>	<p>“At the regional level, the period without serious conflicts and the convergence of interests could contribute to increased cooperation between the South American countries ...”</p> <p>“On the other hand, South America, the South Atlantic, Antarctica and West Africa hold significant natural resource reserves in a world already struggling with the scarcity of these assets. Such scenario could intensify the occurrence of conflicts in which the use of force prevails or its support for the imposition of political and economic sanctions, with eventual militarization of the South Atlantic, an area whose consolidation as a Zone of Peace and Cooperation proves fundamental to safeguard interference with unlawful interests. “</p>
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Table 1 - Perceptions Relative to South America Expressed in the Three First Editions of the NDP.

It should be noted that the latest update of the NDP (2016) continues to point to South America as well as to the South Atlantic as stable regions, without serious inter-state conflicts and with the possibility of increasing regional cooperation. However, the document, unlike previous NDP editions, contains the caveat that this stability situation can be broken as a result of conflicts involving the use of military force originated by the dispute over the significant reserves of abundant natural resources in the region and scarce in other parts of the globe.

With regard to the international and regional scenarios presented in the editions of NDP 2005 and NDP 2012 and 2016, it can be seen that, from these scenarios, the National Defense Objectives (NDO)¹⁰ were formulated. In the three documents, regional stability is identified as one of the NDO of the Brazilian State, as evidenced in Table 2¹¹.

¹⁰ As already mentioned, NDP 2016, in its item 4.1, points out that the National Defense Objectives “must be interpreted as the conditions to be achieved and maintained permanently by the Brazilian nation in the sphere of defense” (Brazil 2016c).

¹¹ The 1996 NDP does not have regional stability as one of the National Defense Goals. However, it establishes, as a guideline:

“f. Contribute actively to the strengthening, expansion and solidification of regional integration;
g. Acting in the maintenance of a climate of peace and cooperation along national boundaries, and for solidarity in Latin America and the South Atlantic region “(Brazil 1996).

NDP Edition	Regional Stability as NDO
NDP 2005	"Thus, from the assessment of the environments described, National Defense objectives emerge: [...] IV - the promotion of regional stability."
NDP 2012	"Thus, from the assessment of the environments described, the National Defense Objectives emerge: [...] IV - contribute to regional stability."
NDP 2016	"They are National Defense Objectives: [...] V - Contribute to regional stability and to international peace and security."

Table 2 - Regional Stability as NDO.

In summary, regional stability is part of the defense vision of the Brazilian State for South America and the South Atlantic. In this sense, it is pertinent to observe how the National Defense Strategy (NDS) establishes strategies, guidelines and actions to achieve this National Defense Objective.

First, however, it is worth noting the perception that the 2008 NDS is not a document directly aligned with the 2005 NDP and, therefore, does not present Defense Strategies and its subsequent Strategic Actions of Defense, specific to the Objectives National Defense Commissions listed in the 2005 NDP. Even so, its Guideline number 18, has as its theme the integration of South America and the construction of a South American identity as factors that would contribute to the defense of the Brazilian State.

National Defense Strategy Guidelines.

[...] 18. Stimulate the integration of South America.

This integration will not only contribute to Brazil's defense, but will also foster regional military cooperation and the integration of defense industrial bases. It will ward off the shadow of conflicts within the region. With all the countries, progress is being made towards **the construction of the South American unit**. The South American Defense Council, in the region's debate, will create a consultative mechanism that will prevent conflicts and foster regional military cooperation and the integration of defense industrial bases, **without involving a country outside the region**. (Brazil 2008). (emphasis added).

The NDS updated in 2012 presents, in its Directive number 18, almost the same content as the 2008 document, continuing to highlight the relevance of integration and the creation of a regional identity as part of the

Brazilian State's defense project.

One point to be highlighted is that in both the 2008 and 2012 NDSs, the aforementioned Directive makes explicit that the integration and identity construction project excludes countries exogenous to the region.

In this sense, the creation of the South American Defense Council (SADC), within the framework of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), represented a significant milestone in the consolidation of the Brazilian defense vision for the region. A brief reference to the creation of these two bodies is therefore appropriate.

UNSAUR had its constitutional treaty approved by the representatives of the 12 member states during the Extraordinary Meeting of Heads of State and Government held in Brasilia on May 23, 2008 (Brazil 2012c).

The Treaty presents, in article 3, the specific objectives of UNASUR, which stipulates in paragraph "s": "the exchange of information and experiences in the field of defense."

According to this Specific Objective, UNASUR member states created the South American Defense Council (SADC), whose Statute was approved on December 16, 2008, during the Special Summit of UNASUR held in Salvador. The Statute, in its Article 4, defines the General Objectives of the SADC in the following terms:

- a) Consolidate South America as an area of peace [...].
- b) To build a South American identity in defense, taking into account sub regional and national characteristics and contributing to the strengthening of Latin American and Caribbean unity.
- c) Generate consensus to strengthen regional cooperation in defense.¹²

With this brief reference to the creation of UNASUR and the SADC, the content of the revised NDP should be observed in 2016. This edition of the document is the one with the greatest adherence to the NDP that gave rise to it, that is, that revised in 2016. This follows from the clear alignment of the Defense Strategies (DS) presented in NDS 2016, in relation to the National Defense Objectives set forth in the NDP 2016. In addition, NDS 2016 presents the Strategic Defense Actions (SDA), deriving from each Defense Strategy, in order to guide the actions to be taken to achieve this Strategy and

¹² UNASUR. Archivo Digital de UNASUR. "Estatuto Del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano de La UNASUR". Available at:

<https://repo.unasursg.org/alfresco/service/unasursg/documents/content/ESTATUTO_DEL_CONSEJO_DE_DEFENSA_SURAMERICANO_DE_LA_UNASUR.pdf?noderef=ddb8870e-73fa-4573-bd12-ee3aaf67f55, accessed April 21, 2018

consequently the National Defense Objective to be achieved.

In this sense, for the National Defense Objective 5 (NDO 5) - Contribute to Regional Stability and for International Peace and Security - NDS (2016) presents three Defense Strategies (DS)¹³, of which we highlight the number 11, as well as the Strategic Defense Actions (SDA) to be undertaken to achieve them, summarized in Table 3.

Defense Strategies (DS)	Strategic Defense Actions (SDA)
DS-11 - Promoting regional integration These actions are aimed at consolidating a self-defense mentality in South America , aiming to increase the level of commitment of the countries of the Region in the joint efforts to solve common problems in this area. (emphasis added).	SDA-44 - Stimulate the development of a South American defense identity. (emphasis added). SDA-45 -Intensify strategic partnerships, cooperation and military exchanges with the Armed Forces of the countries of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). SDA-46 -To increase Brazilian participation in the South American Defense Council - SADC / UNASUR.

Table 3 - Defense Strategies (DS) and Strategic Defense Actions (SDA) to achieve NDO-5 “Contributing to Regional Stability and International Peace and Security”.

In the light of the documents analyzed, it is clear that the defense objectives for the Americas and South Atlantic expressed in the various editions of the National Defense Policy, as well as the strategies for achieving them, expressed with greater or less precision and alignment in the editions of the Strategy have remained constant since 1996.

In summary, it can be inferred that the defense vision of the Brazilian State for South America and for the South Atlantic, has as its objective the increasing integration and maintenance of the peace and stability of this region, being also associated to the creation of a “South American identity”.

¹³ DS-11 Promotion of regional integration; DS-12 Promotion of international cooperation; and DS-13 Performance in international organizations (Brazil 2016a).

The project is embedded in the context that its consolidation will boost the autonomy and development of the states of the region, through cooperation and a perspective of its own, anchored in a convergence of historical, economic, social, political and military factors. On the whole, the desired final effect in terms of defense is to minimize the possibilities of inter-state military conflicts in the Brazilian strategic environment.

However, such a project has and will have to deal with States exogenous to the region that have territories, continental in South America and islands in the South Atlantic. France and the United Kingdom are the states that have these territories, in which are present military contingents that already cause tensions in the region, in the case of the Falklands, as they may generate future tensions in the case of French Guiana, as will be discussed below.

The United Kingdom and the South Atlantic

Throughout the 19th century, the United Kingdom built a strategic network of island possessions in the South Atlantic through the islands of Ascension, St. Helena, Tristan da Cunha, Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Considering these set of islands, three of them are the subject of a sovereignty dispute with Argentina, being the main focus of inter-state political-military tension in the region.

The Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands were part of the Spanish colonial possessions and have been claimed by Argentina since its independence in 1816. However, the British have dominated and colonized the Falkland Islands since 1833.

In April 1982, the Argentine government, then a military dictatorship, invaded and militarily occupied the islands, triggering the British military reaction and the conflict known as the Falklands War. After 73 days of military conflict (2 April to 14 June 1982), the islands returned to British rule.

A brief reference is made to the support that the United Kingdom had received, directly or indirectly, from certain States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The following events may be highlighted:

- the government of Portugal was willing to authorize the use of the Lajes base in the Azores, should the UK Government requested (Anguera, Ayuso, Toledo 1985, 44);
- the United States authorized the use of its aerodrome on Ascension

Island as well as providing *Sidewinder* (AIM-9L)¹⁴ air missiles for *British Harrier* and *Sea Harrier* aircraft even before declaring its unrestricted support to the United Kingdom (Woodward 1997, xviii, 82, 87 and 126); and

- the French government embargoed the delivery of the AM-39 *Exocet* Air-Surface missiles purchased by Argentina¹⁵ (Woodward 1997, 224).

In short, support from some NATO members was instrumental in enabling the UK military campaign during the Falklands War.

In the years following the end of the Falklands War, the two states began a slow rapprochement and normalization of diplomatic relations. However, relations between the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom undergo recurring periods of political tensions. The governments of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner have staged several of them. However, the most recent were the British initiatives to exploit hydrocarbons in the Exclusive Economic Zone associated with the islands. It is also pertinent to recall that in 2012, with the 30th anniversary of the 1982 conflict, the two states began a diplomatic offensive defending their respective sovereignty rights in the islands.

In this context, even with the recurring tensions produced by both Nestor Kirchner and his successor Cristina Kirchner, Brazilian diplomacy clearly supported the claim of Argentine sovereignty, but maintained the prudent posture of not being involved in any crisis arising from positions assumed by the Argentine government. An example of this position occurred in 2011, when Itamaraty denied permission for the ocean patrol vessel *HMS Clyde*, which operates in the Falkland Islands, to be refueled in Brazilian ports. However, according to news published in the Brazilian¹⁶, Argentine¹⁷ and British¹⁸ media, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry clarified that permission

¹⁴ These last-generation missiles, then state of the art, were decisive in British aircraft engagements against Argentine attack aircraft, as their new infrared sensors allowed their launch, without the need to position themselves behind the target aircraft, providing a tactical advantage to the its user (Author's note).

¹⁵ It should be recalled that the five *Exocet* AM-39 missiles, which had already been received by the Argentine Navy, were used throughout the conflict and resulted in the sinking of *HMS Sheffield* and the *Atlantic Conveyor* (Author's note).

¹⁶ Folha de São Paulo. "In support of Argentina, Brazil Bar British vessel" (January 12, 2012), Available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/mundo/ft1201201102.htm>, accessed April 30, 2018.

¹⁷ La Nación. "Confirman que negaron el ingreso a un buque inglés" (13 de enero de 2011), Available at: <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1341022-confirman-que-negaron-el-ingreso-a-un-buque-ingles>, accessed April 30, 2018

¹⁸ The Telegraph. "Royal Navy's Falklands ship turned away by Brazil" (10 Jan 2011), Available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/falklandislands/8251130/>

for UK vessels to dock in Brazilian ports would be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. In other words, it was clarified that there was no determination for the decision on HMS Clyde to be extended to all Royal Navy vessels operating in the Falklands. The event had no major repercussions with the British government and a spokesman for the *Foreign Office* reported that the British government respected the Brazilian decision and the two countries continued to have positive relations.

In short, for the British government the Malvinas Islands are the Falkland Islands and have the status of “*overseas territory*”, being part of the United Kingdom and therefore protected by the armed forces of that State¹⁹. It is in this context that the *British Forces South Atlantic Islands*, a joint command with contingents of the army, navy and air force, are inserted. After the Falklands War (April - June 1982), successive British governments invested in the defensive apparatus of the islands, including the construction of an Air Base - *RAF Mount Pleasant* - about 40 km west of Port Stanley, which is operational since 1985.²⁰

The *Royal Air Force* (RAF) has four *Eurofighter Typhoon* aircraft, a C-130 transport aircraft and a VC-10 aircraft for in-flight refueling permanently deployed there. *Rapier* Surface-Air Missile (MSA) batteries are positioned by the two main islands and the British military contingent on the islands ranges around 1,200 men.²¹

Royal-Navys-Falklands-ship-turned-away-by-Brazil.html, accessed April 30, 2018.

19 The British government's website for British forces overseas: *Falkland Islands and Ascension Island* provides the following explanation for the British military presence on those islands: “Forces are based in the Falklands to demonstrate the government's continued commitment to the security of UK overseas territories in the south Atlantic. They include air defense assets, maritime patrol capability and infantry forces. There are also regular naval deployments to the region and temporary deployments for routine exercises. The exact force levels are kept under constant review and maintained at a level consistent with this policy.” (United Kingdom.Gov.UK) “British forces overseas: Falkland Islands and Ascension Island” Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/british-forces-overseas-falkland-islands-and-ascension-island>, accessed April 22, 2018.

20 United Kingdom.Gov.UK. “Mount Pleasant Defence Aerodrome Manual 2017,” Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/657078/20170427-Mount_Pleasant_DAM_V1.0.pdf, accessed April 22, 2018.

21 The following sources allowed a basic compilation of the British military presence in the Falklands: United Kingdom. Royal Air Force (RAF). *RAF Mount Pleasant*. “The Station”. Available at, <https://www.raf.mod.uk/our-organisation/stations/raf-mount-pleasant/>, accessed April 21, 2018; - BBC. “Britain to boost Falklands Islands defences,” Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32031342>, Accessed April 21, 2018; BBC. “Where are British troops deployed overseas?” Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34919954>, accessed April 21, 2018.

The *Wideawake* air base makes Ascension Island a valuable logistical support point for the British military deployed in the South Atlantic. In conjunction with the *Mount Pleasant* air base, the UK is in a position to militarily reinforce the Falklands at the slightest sign of movement or hostility by an eventual Argentine military force.²²

The *Royal Navy* maintains a patrol vessel, a logistical support vessel and a frigate or destroyer permanently patrolling the region. Occasionally, news surfaced in the British press that a nuclear submarine (SSN) is also kept on patrol in the South Atlantic.²³ Even without this last means, the military apparatus maintained in the region to defend the islands is significant and certainly acts as a deterrent to any Argentine claim of a new attempt to retake the islands by military force.

The UK Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly and repeatedly stated that the reason for the British military presence on the islands is to respect and ensure the self-determination of its inhabitants who wish to remain British citizens. This commitment was once again reiterated in the *Foreign Office Minister's* message - Sir Allan Duncan - on the 35th anniversary of the end of the 1982 military conflict. The minister said: "We remain committed and committed to upholding the right of the Falklanders to determine their own future and to remain British, according to their desires."²⁴(Our translation).

It is worth remembering that on March 10 and 11, 2013, a referendum was held among the inhabitants of the islands to express their views on the continuity or change in status of the "*British Overseas Territory*". Of an electorate of 1,653 people, 1,517 exercised their right to vote and only three voted against maintaining the current status. In other words, 99.8% of the votes were in favor of maintaining the islands as part of the United Kingdom.²⁵

22 United Kingdom. Royal Air Force (RAF). "RAF Ascension Island". Available at, <https://www.raf.mod.uk/our-organisation/stations/raf-ascension-island/>, accessed em June 8, 2018.

23 Daily Mail Online. "British nuclear submarine sent to Falklands in show of strength as tensions rise ahead of 30th anniversary of conflict". Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2147045/Sub-way-Falklands.html>, Accessed April 21, 2018.

24 "We remain committed to upholding the right of the Falkland Islanders to determine their own future, and to remain British in line with their wishes" (United Kingdom.Gov.UK.gov.uk. Press release published 14 June 2017. "Foreign Office Minister Statement on the 35th anniversary of end of the Falkland Islands conflict," Available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-minister-statement-on-the-35th-anniversary-of-end-of-the-falkland-islands-conflict>, accessed April 29, 2018).

25 Falkland Islands Government. "Results of the referendum on the Political Status of the Falkland Islands". Available at <https://www.falklands.gov.fk/results-of-the-referendum-on-the-political-status-of-the-falkland->

Thus, for the British government, the military presence on the islands is a commitment to the security and defense of the islanders, resulting from the self-determination of those who have legitimately and democratically opted to remain with the status of *British Overseas Territory*.²⁶

The cost for the maintenance of this military apparatus in the Falklands Islands corresponds to approximately 0.5% of the defense budget of the United Kingdom.²⁷ An advantageous “cost-benefit” ratio in any respect, given that the islands have a lucrative fishing industry as well as significant hydrocarbon reserves in their Exclusive Economic Zone. In addition, they constitute an important position in relation to the Antarctic continent, both in the present and in future negotiations involving that region.

In the light of the above, it can be seen that the British military presence in the South Atlantic is expressive and mainly based on economic, political and strategic interests, not configuring the possibility of changing this *status quo* in a short-and-medium-term time frame. In this context, the crises escalated by the two States involved, notably those possibly involving Argentina in relation to the sovereignty of the islands and / or exploration of the exclusive economic zone, may lead to a greater United Kingdom military presence in the region. At the limit, an active program of modernization of the Argentine Armed Forces, associated with discourses of recovery of the islands, can lead to a similar response of the United Kingdom, implying in a militarization of the South Atlantic and instability in the South cone of the South American continent. Such a scenario would be in direct disagreement with the Brazilian defense vision for the region.

The Falklands issue is a unique case for Brazilian foreign policy, since the Brazilian State supports the Argentina claims to sovereignty over the islands, but has as constitutional principle regulating its foreign policy the self-determination of peoples.²⁸ The situation poses a potential dilemma for Brazilian foreign policy since refuting support for a claim of sovereignty from its largest neighbor and regional economic partner would commit the NDO to

islands/, accessed April 22, 2018.

26 United Kingdom.Gov.UK. Policy. “Falkland Islanders’ right to self-determination”

Available at:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/supporting-the-falkland-islanders-right-to-self-determination>, accessed April 22, 2018.

27 United Kingdom.Gov.UK. Policy Paper. “2010 to 2015 government policy: Falkland Islanders’ right to self-determination”. Available at:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-falkland-islanders-right-to-self-determination/2010-to-2015-government-policy-falkland-islanders-right-to-self-determination>, accessed April 22, 2018.

28 Article 4, item III, of the Federal Constitution of 1988 (Brazil 1988).

maintain stability in the region, as well as the Defense Strategies related to the integration project regional and creation of a South American and South-Atlantic mentality without states exogenous to the region. On the other hand, the aforementioned constitutional principle, as well as the strong economic ties with the United Kingdom, allow us to point out that maintaining the *status quo* is what, at the moment, least undermines the Brazilian State's defense vision for the South Atlantic.

France in South America

France is another European State present in South America, in a privileged position on both the continent and the South Atlantic, through the possession of French Guiana. This territory, with an area of approximately 86,000 km² and with a population of approximately 260,000 inhabitants²⁹, has the status of Department Overseas (*département d'outre-mer*)³⁰. Its strategic location, close to the Equator, provided France with the construction of an extremely profitable rocket launch base, as well as access to the region's natural resources.

The proximity of the French Guiana to the Equator line enabled France to begin the construction of the Kourou Center (*Centre Spatial Guyanais* – CSG) in 1964, approximately 500 kilometers north of the Equator. This position allows the use of satellite launch vehicles in an economically competitive way, since the closer to the Equator line the less fuel is required (for the same mass to be transported) for a rocket to leave the Earth's atmosphere. The European Space Agency is the main customer of the CSG, but other users also pay to use the facilities of the Center. Ukraine, Russia, Japan and China have already launched their respective rockets Zénith, Soyuz, H2 and Long March.³¹

Brazil is also a customer of CSG. In May 2017 the first Brazilian geostationary satellite was launched, destined for communications, including those in the area of defense. The satellite was launched from the CSG by an *Ariane 5* rocket and positioned in geostationary orbit at a distance of approxi-

29 France. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE). "Recensement de la population en Guyane." Available at <https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/3309060>, accessed April 28, 2018.

30 Collectivité Territoriale de Guyane. "Guyane française: situation géographique." Available at <http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/amsudant/guyanefr1.htm>, accessed April 29, 2018.

31 France. Centre Spatial Guyanais. "Politique Spatiale." Available at: <http://www.cnes-csg.fr/web/CNES-CSG-fr/9778-politique-spatiale.php>, accessed April 29, 2018.

mately 36,000 kilometers from the Earth's surface.³²

The CSG materializes the French ability to launch rockets for their own scientific and commercial purposes. In addition, it provides France with an excellent source of resources from the deployment of satellites in orbit to other States using the launch vehicles of the Ariane series or the temporary leasing of facilities for the launching of rockets from other States holding such means. These factors give French Guyana a unique political, strategic and economic importance. This perception is present in the content of the latest White Defense Paper of France, which is published in 2013 and presents the following insight regarding French Guiana:

The Antilles - Guiana area is a crossroad where multiple influences are expressed. The United States is very present, but also the countries of Central and South America (Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela...) and some European countries that retain interests in the region (Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom). **This area represents a strategic challenge not only for France, but for Europe, because of the location of the Kourou Space Center in Guiana.** It is also an area of significant uncertainty that has seen the growth of transnational illicit trafficking: **drugs** (the region is the source of half the world's cocaine production), **money laundering, mining, immigration and illegal fishing**, etc. [...]. In addition, the risk of natural disasters is particularly high in the Caribbean. Finally, the presence of many French and European citizens in the neighboring countries reinforces the **need for France to be able to quickly locate means of escape and security.** Therefore, in addition to questions of sovereignty and protection of the French population living in these territories, **France must assume the responsibilities inherent to its presence in this complex region**³³ (France 2013, 50). (Our

32 The satellite operates in the X and Ka communications bands, the first being for use by the Ministry of Defense, corresponding to about 30% of the satellite capacity (Empresa Brasil de Comunicação - EBC.) "Launched in the Brazilian satellite space that will be used for communications and defense" Available at:

<http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/pesquisa-e-inovacao/noticia/2017-05/lancado-ao-espaco-satelite-brasileiro-que-sera-usado-para>, Accessed April 29, 2018).

33 La zone Antilles-Guyane est un carrefour où s'expriment de multiples influences. Les États-Unis y sont très présents, mais aussi les pays d'Amérique centrale et du Sud (Brésil, Mexique, Venezuela...) et certains pays européens qui y conservent des intérêts (Espagne, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni). Cette zone représente un enjeu stratégique non seulement pour la France, mais aussi pour l'Europe, du fait de l'implantation en Guyane du centre spatial de Kourou. Il s'agit également d'une zone d'insécurité importante qui voit se développer de très nombreux trafics illicites transnationaux : drogue (la région est à l'origine de la moitié de la production mondiale de cocaïne), orpillage illégal, blanchiment d'argent, immigration clandestine, pêche illégale, etc [...]. Par ailleurs, le risque de catastrophes naturelles est particulièrement élevé aux Antilles. Enfin, la présence de nombreux ressortissants français et européens dans les pays voisins renforce le besoin de pouvoir y mettre rapidement en oeuvre des moyens d'évacuation

translation and emphasis added).

Consonant with the perception clearly expressed in its Defense White Paper, France maintains in French Guiana a military presence constituted by units and means of the three singular forces. This total makes a total of approximately 2,100 soldiers.³⁴

The French Navy is present through two patrol vessels of the P400 class, and two *Gendarmerie Maritime* vessels operate from the naval base of *Dégrad-des-Cannes*, located near Cayenne³⁵. The main tasks of the French Navy are focused on the monitoring of the territorial sea and jurisdictional waters, focusing on combating illegal fishing³⁶, as well as the maritime protection of the CSG.³⁷

The land force consists of two regiments: the *9th Regiment d'infanterie de marine* (9th RIMa) and the *3rd Regiment étranger d'infanterie* (3rd REI).

The *9e Régiment d'infanterie de marine* (9e RIMa), based in Cayenne, has the following missions: “to serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ground forces in Guyana; and to guarantee the exercise of French sovereignty over the western half of the department [...]”³⁸ (Our translation).

ou de sécurisation. Dès lors, au delà des enjeux de souveraineté et de protection de la population française vivant sur ces territoires, la France se doit d'assumer les responsabilités que lui confère sa présence dans cette région complexe (France, 2013, 50).

34 France. Ministère des Armées. “Les Forces Armées en Guyane,” Available at <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/forces-prepositionnees/guyane/dossier/les-forces-armees-en-guyane>, accessed April 23, 2018.

35 France. Marine Nationale. “La Marine en Guyane,” Available at <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/operations/zoom-sur-la-marine-en-oultre-mer/annee-de-l-oultre-mer-la-marine-en-guyane/la-marine-en-guyane>, accessed April 22, 2018.

36 In 2016, the French Navy's action against illegal fishing in French Guiana resulted in the seizure of 35 vessels and about 270 km of nets, in addition to 110 tonnes of fish (Brazil Ministry of Defense). “Brazil and France discuss possibilities for new cross-border cooperation actions” Available at <http://defesa.gov.br/noticias/30245-brasil-e-guiana-francesa-discutem-possibilidades-de-novas-aco-es-nas-fronteiras>, accessed April 29, 2018.

37 France. Marine Nationale. La Marine en Guyane. “Trois missions essentielles pour la Marine en Guyane,” Available at: <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/operations/zoom-sur-la-marine-en-oultre-mer/annee-de-l-oultre-mer-la-marine-en-guyane/trois-missions-essentielles-pour-la-marine-en-guyane>, accessed April 22, 2018.

38 Le 9e RIMa, dont le PC est basé à Cayenne, assure une double mission : un soutien au profit de l'état-major interarmées (EMIA) et des forces terrestres en Guyane, et une mission de souveraineté sur la moitié ouest du département [...]. (França. Armée de Terre. “9e régiment d'infanterie de marine,” Available at: <https://www.recrutement.terre.defense.gouv.fr/regiments/9e-regiment-dinfanterie-de->

The *3rd Régiment étranger d'infanterie* (3rd REI) has as its main missions the protection of the CSG and the fight against illegal mining in French Guiana³⁹. It is interesting to note that until January 2018, in the official page of this military unit, where the “The 3rd REI is a Pre-positioned Operational Force capable of intervening at any time in the region of South America and the Caribbean, as was the case in 2004, when the *Carbet* operation in Haiti was launched”⁴⁰ (Our translation).

The Air Force operates from Air Base 367 - *Capitaine François Massé* - located next to Félix Eboué International Airport. The Transport Squadron 68 is based in this air base, having as means three *CASA CN 235* aircraft, five *Puma* helicopters and four *Fennec* helicopters. In addition, the Air Force operates the *Mont Venus* Radar station.⁴¹

According to the France Ministry of Defense, the military forces present in Guiana are intended to “contribute to the exercise of French sovereignty and the preservation of France’s interests in this region.”⁴² In this sense, France seeks a growing cooperation with Brazil, mainly in the actions aimed at dealing with mining and illegal fishing in French Guiana. In April 2017, for example, the Commander of the French Armed Forces in Guiana, Major-Brigadier Pierre-Jean Dupont, was on an official visit to the Ministry of Defense (MD) to discuss possibilities for expanding military cooperation in the border region.⁴³

marine, accessed April 22, 2018).

39 Illegal mining, particularly the extraction and smuggling of gold in the region, is a problem that has been actively faced by the land forces of the French Guiana. In 2016, for example, Operation Harpie, which represses this type of illicit, seized about 6 tons of gold (Brazil, Ministry of Defense. “Brazil and France discuss possibilities for new cross-border cooperation actions.” defense.gov.br/noticias/30245-brasil-e-guiana-francesa-discutem-possibilidades-of-new-actions-in-frontier, accessed April 29, 2018).

40 Le 3e REI est une force opérationnelle prépositionnée. Il est en mesure d’intervenir à tout moment dans la zone Caraïbes-Amérique du Sud, comme ce fut le cas en 2004, lors de l’opération Carbet, en Haïti (França. 3e Régiment étranger d’infanterie. “Les missions du 3e régiment étranger d’infanterie,” Available at http://www.legion-etrangere.com/mdl/info_seul.php?id=463, accessed January 22, 2018).

41 France. Ministère des Armées. “Les Forces Armées en Guyane,” Available at <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/forces-prepositionnees/guyane/dossier/les-forces-armees-en-guyane>, accessed April 23, 2018.

42 The original text says: “Les FAG font partie des forces de souveraineté françaises basées sur les territoires d’outremer. A ce titre, elles contribuent à l’exercice de la souveraineté française et à la préservation des intérêts de la France dans cette région” (*Ibid*).

43 Brazil. Ministry of Defense. “Brazil and France discuss possibilities for new cross-border cooperation actions,” Available at: <http://defesa.gov.br/noticias/30245-brasil-e-guiana-francesa-discutem-possibilidades-of-novas>

The French interest in greater cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries, in actions against cross-border crimes, comes at a time when the Brazilian Army expands its presence in Amapá. The creation of the 22nd Jungle Infantry Brigade, with the command in Macapá, reflects the priority given by the Brazilian State to that border region and the greater military cooperation in that region could benefit both countries.⁴⁴

In summary, based on the analysis of the strength and composition of the forces present in French Guiana, it is clear that the military presence of France in the region is primarily intended for the defense of its overseas department. However, the existence of an European colony, in the XXI century, with a land, air and naval military presence, does not seems to generate discomfort for South American States.

A relevant point in relation to French Guiana and its status of overseas department of France refers to the question of autonomy and eventually independence. Although incipient, there is a political movement that defends the independence of Guiana.⁴⁵ As a way of demonstrating that it is not a colonial metropolis in the classical sense of the word, in 2010 France promoted, for the first time in French Guiana, a referendum to verify if the population wanted greater political and administrative autonomy.

In the referendum held on January 10, 2010, voters in French Guiana were asked to answer “Yes” or “No” to the following question: “Do you agree with the transformation of Guiana into an overseas community governed by Article 74 Constitution, with a particular organization that takes into account its own interests in the Republic?”⁴⁶ (France 2009). (Our translation).

acoess-nas- borders, Accessed April 29, 2018

44 The Brigade is subordinate to the Northern Military Command being constituted integrated by the Command Company of the 22nd Jungle Infantry Brigade; by the Amapá Border Command / 34th Jungle Infantry Battalion, both in Macapá; by the 2nd Jungle Infantry Battalion, in Belém, Pará; and by the 24th Jungle Infantry Battalion, in São Luís, Maranhão (Brazil, Ministry of Defense, Brazilian Army, Army News, January 26, 2018. “With the inauguration of the Foz do Amazonas Brigade, Brazilian military presence in the region is reinforced” Available at: http://www.eb.mil.br/web/noticias/noticiario-do-exercito/-/asset_publisher/MjaG93KcunQI/content/id/8569649, Accessed April 29, 2018.) .

45 See, for example, the following references that point to this movement: Fontes, Yuri Martins. “Guyana-Cayenne insists against French colonial exploitation,” Available at: <https://alemdarena.blogspot.com/2017/03/guiana-caiena-se-insurge-contr.html>, accessed April 29, 2018; BBC. “French Guiana: The part of South America facing a total shutdown”. (10 April 2017). Available at <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39557670>, Accessed April 29, 2018.

46 “Approuvez-vous la transformation de la Guyane en une collectivité d’outre-mer régie par l’article 74 de la Constitution, dotée d’une organisation particulière tenant compte de ses intérêts propres au sein de la République?” (França 2009).

The official results of the referendum computed a participation of 48.16% of the electorate with 70.22% of the votes responding “No”, that is, refusing greater administrative and political autonomy.⁴⁷

The point to be highlighted is that, in fact, there is a movement, still minority, in favor of a greater autonomy with respect to France. If in the future, this movement gains strength, Brazil will be urged to position itself, supporting this eventual movement or being in solidarity with the possible interests opposed to this autonomy by France.

It should be recalled that, in the first decade of the 21st century, France became the main Brazilian strategic partner in the area of defense. However, as already mentioned, our foreign policy is constitutionally regulated to support the self-determination of peoples. Thus, the eventual realization of this scenario of a movement for greater autonomy in French Guiana can be configured as a focus of a potential future problem with France. In the limit, an opposition or denial of the metropolis the greater autonomy of French Guiana may result in a local conflict with unfolding about the Brazilian defense vision for South America, given that it may be a source of instability in part of the South- which runs counter to the already considered NDO, contained in the 2005, 2012 and 2016 issues of the NDP, regarding peace and regional stability.⁴⁸

Final Remarks

The research carried out is part of the field of international and regional security studies, from a Brazilian perspective.⁴⁹ The objective, as outlined in the Introduction, was to highlight the military presence of France and the United Kingdom in America and South Atlantic and to analyze the tensions arising from this presence, in relation to the Brazilian view of defense for the region.

The starting point was to identify and emphasize that the Brazilian State has a defense vision for South America and the South Atlantic. This view, which excludes the participation of exogenous players in the region, is embodied in the main documents related to the themes of defense powers

47 França Sénat. “Projet de loi relatif aux collectivités de Guyane et de Martinique.” Available at <http://www.senat.fr/rap/l10-467/l10-4677.html>, accessed April 23, 2018.

48 See Table 2 (Author’s note).

49 The collection published by Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), entitled *International Security: Brazilian Perspectives* (Alsina, Etchegoyen, Jobim 2010) is an example of texts produced by Brazilian academics, military and diplomats and focused on international and regional security.

emanating from the executive power, and approved by the Brazilian legislature: the National Defense Policy; and the National Defense Strategy.

Based on the analysis of the editions of the NDP and the NDS, it was possible to infer that the defense vision of the Brazilian State, for South America and for the South Atlantic, has as objectives the maintenance of regional peace and stability, as well as its integration in the area of defense, and is also associated with the creation of a South American identity.

The project resulting from this vision of defense is embedded in the perception that cooperation will boost the security, autonomy and development of the States of the region. On the whole, the final desired state in terms of defense is to minimize the possibilities of inter-state military conflicts in the Brazilian strategic environment.

However, this project has and will have to deal with exogenous states to the region that have territories, continental in South America and islands in the South Atlantic. France and the United Kingdom are states that have these territories, in which are present military contingents that already cause tensions in the region, as in the case of the Falklands, as they may generate future tensions in the case of French Guiana.

French Guiana is a colonial enclave on the South American continent, where France maintains a military contingent, mainly terrestrial, capable of being projected in specific interventions in the Caribbean as well as in South America. The presence of the Space Center in Kourou confers even more political, economic and strategic value to French Guiana, as outlined in the French Defense White Paper.

The possibility that a movement for greater autonomy and even independence of French Guiana in relation to its colonial metropolis is a scenario that cannot be ignored in prospective analyzes. This possibility, if it materializes, constitutes a future challenge for the Brazilian vision of regional defense, since the Brazilian State has as a constitutional principle regulating its foreign policy the self-determination of the peoples and may find itself in the position of having to choose between supporting a movement of this nature and supporting the interests of France, which is now one of Brazil's main partners in the area of defense.

The British presence in the Falklands already emerges as a potential case of inter-state military conflict in the region, involving the United Kingdom and Argentina. As explained, the Brazilian State supports the claims of Argentine sovereignty over the islands, but there is also the constitutional principle regulating Brazilian foreign policy related to the self-determination of peoples. In this case, the inhabitants of the Falklands clearly expressed the

desire to remain British citizens. The situation poses a potential dilemma for Brazilian foreign policy, as refuting support for a just claim of sovereignty from its largest neighbor and South American economic partner would jeopardize the project of regional integration and the creation of a South American mentality without exogenous states to region. On the other hand, the aforementioned constitutional principle precludes a more assertive position on this support. This is a complex issue and for which, at the moment, maintaining the *status quo* seems to be the option that least undermines the Brazilian project.

One point to highlight is the fact that the two extraregional states analyzed are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. If the interests and causal factors of the military presence of France and the United Kingdom are distinct, there is a strong defense link between the two states, namely: NATO, the largest collective defense organization currently in existence.

Since its creation in 1949, NATO never had one of its member states militarily challenged, without the other members of the Organization directly or indirectly supporting the challenged ally. During the Falklands War this support was essential to the UK war effort.

Exceptions to such support between NATO member states occurred only when the military employment initiative was unilaterally started by one or more of its members, such as Suez in 1956 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In that sense, the military presence of France and United Kingdom constitutes an even greater challenge to the Brazilian vision of regional defense, and it should be remembered that the issue of the Falklands is still the greatest potential for inter-state military conflict in the South Atlantic.

Finally, it is hoped that the research carried out will stimulate and contribute to new studies on the military presence of exogenous players in the region and its reflections on the defense vision of the Brazilian State for South America and South Atlantic. Extraregional players and their present and prospective interaction with the Brazilian National Defense Objectives are presented as promising academic challenges in terms of research and potentially relevant to the constant improvement of the Brazilian defense vision.

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ABSTRACT

The issue of the Falklands catalyzes the attention of researchers in studies of the military presence of extraregional actors in South America. However, France, a state equally exogenous to the South American nations, is present in the region, keeping a colonial territory, where contingents and military installations are located, almost always ignored in regional security studies. In this context, this paper aims to highlight the military presence of France and the United Kingdom in America and South Atlantic, and to analyze the tensions arising from this presence in relation to the regional Brazilian view of defense.

KEYWORDS

Refugees, Syrian Civil War, Orientalism.

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ARMAMENT MODERNIZATION IN SOUTH AMERICA: EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL PRESSURES ON THE DUALISTIC VIEWS OF REGIONAL SECURITY

Rafael Duarte Villa¹

Introduction

Almost all theoretical production that has somehow dealt with the South American security system is unanimous in observing two aspects: first, the scarce existence of military conflicts between its states – the last substantive war in South America was the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay). Redemocratization, which begun in the 1980s, is seen as the key variable to explain the transformation of the region's relations into something close to a security community (Hurrell 1998) or of a “long peace” (Kacowicz 2005). The second aspect is the emergence of two different security subsystems. On the one hand, that of the Andean countries, with issues related to drug trafficking, the existence of non-state armed groups and of intra-state armed conflicts, and in Colombia and Peru's case unresolved territorial disputes and the existence of States with traditional military behavior. On the other hand, the subsystem in the Southern Cone, which often is identified in the literature as a security community².

This differentiation of security subsystems has contributed much to fueling the argument of a dual outlook of South America, in which even perspectives influenced by critical theory, such as Ruth Diamint's, have noted by highlighting the relationships between the military, civilians and security in

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² Karl Deutsch defined the security community (pluralist) as “a transnational region in which two societies have expectations that conflicts between states will not be settled through the use of force” because those states form a security community (Deutsch 1957).

South America “[...] civil-military relations are reconverted at two different speeds: in the Southern Cone, despite the various difficulties, there is a hegemonic recovery, while in the Andean countries there is a deep crisis of state institutions”. (Diamint, 2001, p. 24).

This article stresses these theses in order to show: first, that contemporary developments and concerns about the purchase of sophisticated weaponry by South American countries, especially Chile, Venezuela and Brazil, in the first two decades of this century are a critical point for the idea of a permanent (democratic) peace zone in the region. Critical moments in South America are not wars, because of their absence, but the times when an arms build-up is operated. Second, the arms build-up questions the rigidity of the dual vision with two safety subsystems. In fact, arms purchases transform the region into a single regional security complex, since it is operated not only in the Andean system and in the Southern Cone, but by countries from both subregions.

Methodologically, aggregate military investments of the countries of the region at the beginning of the millennium are taken as an empirical basis to try to demonstrate the tensions of theses based both on security community perspectives and on dualistic analysis, and to show the new political goals of countries such as Brazil, Chile and Venezuela – taking into account medium-term trends that began to consolidate in the period 2003-2007, when the South American region underwent a vigorous economic expansion. The article is divided into four parts: the first presents what I call dualistic theses; in the second part, the empirical developments of the South American arms build-up are discussed, especially the cases of armament purchases in Brazil, Chile and Venezuela between 2003 and 2007, when the main weaponry purchase contracts were signed. The third one, in the light of the empirical data and theoretical discussions questions the dual theses. In the final remarks one takes stock of the tensions in the dual theses on the South American arms build-up.

The Dualist Theses on Regional Security Systems in South America

Several theories of International Relations, be they of realist, institutionalist or constructivist inspiration, agree that Latin America has a historical process of limited, or close to zero, military conflict. The classical realist perspective of security dilemmas had been absent from regional inter-state relations. This absence has been favored by the long periods when wars be-

tween states disappear from the region's military history and, above all, by the strong conviction of the political class that their neighbors are not threats to the existence of their states or that they do not modernize their military capabilities with offensive goals in mind. As Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas have pointed out, "Civilians do not believe that their neighbors are threats because history has shown that their neighbors rarely attack, so they pay little attention to defense policy and avoid strongly funding militaries". (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007, 70). Added to this is the fact that although there are territorial disputes³, these do not seem sufficiently intense in South America to originate an inter-state security dynamic that would generate perceptions of threats as, for example the emergence of an expansionist State. There are no similarities between South American and European historic experiences regarding the emergence of expansionist states.

A variety of bibliographical production has advanced security analysis on South America based on the dichotomy of the Andean region (traditional security complex based on power policies) versus the Southern Cone (security community). Aligned with these analysis, Hirst (2006), commenting on the fragmentation of the security agenda in Latin America, has underlined the same dual vision of the South American complex when drawing attention to the fact that there are in South America an "[...] Andean sub-region weakened by the fragility of its state institutions and with few means to contain the push of drug trafficking and armed groups; and a pacific area in the Southern Cone committed to regional integration and mutual subregional confidence, particularly in the cases of Argentina and Brazil". (Hirst 2006, 6). Bonilla and Cepik (2004, 86) have pointed out that in the "Subregional space, military and political issues are subject to very high securitization due to the character of the Colombian conflict and its evident regionalization [...]".

Going even further than the realist perspectives, institutionalist – English School production, like that of Kakowicz (1998), has developed a thesis of the emergence, in South America as a whole, of a peace zone in which the South Cone's cooperation has approached something similar to a pluralistic community of security, or zone of peace, in which its member states no longer have expectations of resolving their conflicts through war. In the same direction, David Pion-Berlin (2000) has argued that the integration process of Mercosur has contributed to generate expectations of peaceful resolution of intra-state conflicts between members. A more nuanced view of this thesis has been developed by Hirst (1998) who, working from concepts of democratic peace and pluralistic security communities, has pointed to the conclusion

³ At least until 2017, five unresolved territorial disputes remained in South America (Bolivia-Chile, Colombia-Venezuela, Guyana-Venezuela, Uruguay-Brazil, Colombia-Paraguay).

that, “Democratization is an important but insufficient condition to intensify cooperation in the Southern Cone [...] In fact, security cooperation and democratization have not led to security integration, they have been effective in diminishing previous mistrust and animosity among Southern Cone societies and States – especially between Argentina and Brazil”. (Hirst, 1998).

Within this same liberal perspective, the scarce inter-state conflicts in Latin America have also made the region a case for studies surrounding the theory of democratic peace. Dominguez’s work has reinforced the strong links between the strength of democratic institutions in the Southern Cone and the peace and security process that the subregion lives as a product of “democratic peace” (Dominguez 1998). Dominguez himself, working with Shifter in introducing the discussion on “post-consolidation” and “de-consolidation” points to the high fragilities and vulnerabilities of Andean democracies (Dominguez and Shifter 2003).

In the empirical arena this type of argument has been reinforced by the emergence in the inter-American system of an institutional regime of democratic clauses, and even in some integration institutions such as Mercosur. Also, Dominguez’s (2007) liberal perspective has supported this same argument by emphasizing how firmly entrenched in Latin America’s international law is the legal principle of *iuris possidetis iuris*, whereby countries in the region concede that their limits and of its neighbors correspond, to a greater or lesser extent, to those of the era of political emancipation in the first decades of the 19th century.

Constructivist arguments in research such as that of Andrew Hurrell (1998) and Villa (2007) have also supported the idea of a low propensity for conflict in the post-Cold War Southern Cone countries, pointing to the emergence, in both works, of a loose security community⁴, especially between Argentina and Brazil in the South American sub-region. For Hurrell, a fundamental aspect to be considered in the construction of this security community was the process of democratization in both countries. The process of redemocratization could have provided Argentina and Brazil with a common vision of interests and identities and, above all, made them understand the vulnerability and fragility of the redemocratization process and the impor-

4 In the definition of Karl Deustch (1957), or authors such as Adler & Barnett (1998), a security community is a transnational geographic space, contiguous or not, between states and whose societies have expectations that conflicts between them will be solved by peaceful means. The key point of a security community are the values that the “community” shares, be they in a political, economic or cultural sense. Authors like Hurrell (1998) believe that in the Southern Cone a security community based on the re-democratization that has operated since the 1980s is emerging. And Deustch (1957) himself believes that there is a North Atlantic security community based on liberal values and culture.

tance of their joint defense. Thus, bilateral cooperation has come to play a role as a common shield against domestic threats to the process of redemocratization. Although these threats were greater in Argentina – where the military movement of Painted Faces attempted to break democratic institutionalization in the late 1980s –, the Brazilian government realized that the maturing of democracy in the country depended heavily on the consolidation of democracy in neighboring Argentina. “Believing in redemocratization was important in redefining interests, identities, and a common sense of purpose” (Hurrel 1998). In the same direction, but addressing the variable “impact of democracy” on Brazilian foreign policy in relation to Argentina, Hurrel credits the institutionalization of a system of norms on disarmament and confidence building between Argentina and Brazil to the dismantling of geopolitical phantoms and the beginning of a cycle of military cooperation in the years of democratization. As a result, a successful set of self-governing norms and monitoring of the reciprocal mechanisms of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between both countries was created, which allowed for the stability and continuity of cooperative ventures. The institutionalization of military cooperation agreements has included permanent exchanges between the staffs of the larger military states of the two countries and the continuation of bilateral working groups on nuclear matters. The rules of mutual trust between the two countries also include the institutionalization of channels of communication between the presidents, senior officials (following the European path of the second post-Cold War period), consultations on participation in peace missions and the establishment of the triple frontier (Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay) to deal with drug trafficking, smuggling and terrorism (Villa 2007). In the Brazil-Argentina case, actions have also included the joint development of the “Gaúcho” light combat vehicle for the Brazilian and Argentinean Armed Forces, which is in its final phase of operational evaluation by both countries, before the start of series production (Military Power Review 2008).

An intermediate thesis is presented by Buzan & Waever (2003). These authors have supported the idea that in South America there are two well-differentiated subsystems of security: the Andean countries, with emphasis on the military aspect and territorial conflicts; and the Southern Cone, where there is a security community. Some situations of different preferences among the South American countries sometimes seem to come in support of the theoretical dichotomy of Buzan and Waever. At the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Conference on Security in 2003, “when the solution adopted – the notion of multidimensional security⁵ – [South America] could

⁵ One should remember that the OAS institutionalized the concept of multidimensional security that year. By this concept the organization assumes that the sources of threat to the

barely conceal the conceptual distance between, for example, the emphasis of Brazil and Argentina on poverty as a security threat and the much more traditional concerns of Ecuador and Venezuela with state military threats" (Cepik 2005). This same thesis is supported by Monica Hirst (2003) to whom the two major developments in security and defense at the beginning of the new millennium in South America were the diversification of security options and priorities and the differentiated patterns of military evolution in the South Cone and the Andean region.

In this way, International Relations theory has pointed in two directions: either South America as a peace zone, or a partial security community, or South America as a mixed region in which coexists a subregion more tied to traditional principles and another that sees the emergence of a weak security community. Both views emphasize South American dislike for the violent resolution of conflicts and the attachment of the region to the principles of international law.

But what happens when some of the states in South America began to carry out an armament build-up unusual to its security system in the first two decades of this century? In order to face this question, which will stress the thesis of duality in security and defense systems in South America, the armaments build-up is next presented.

The Armaments Build-up in South America at the Beginning of the Millennium

Although it is not a theoretical argument, but an empirical one, the low military investment of South America has been used either to present the little concern of the political class with the re-armament and modernization of the South and Latin American armed forces; or as an argument to illustrate that South America is an atypical region, or exceptional in that military capabilities or geographic proximity are not perceived with such concern among neighboring countries. Among the regions of the so-called periphery of the international system, the annual South American spending percentage is only superior to Central America (which has the lowest world spending) and Africa. It is important to realize, however, that South American spending is relatively low compared to other regions of the periphery of the international system, such as Asia and the Middle East. However, regional military spend-

states, governments and societies are plural: they can be military, but they can also come from hunger, poverty, natural disasters, climate change, terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime, corruption in national states, ethnic rivalries, and so on.

ings fell between 2014 and 2016, and are

[...] 13 per cent lower compared to 2008, South American military spending grew by 4.1 per cent to \$ 57.0 billion [between 2016-2017], the first annual rise since 2014, (by 15 per cent to \$ 5.7 billion) and Brazil (by 6.3 per cent to \$ 29.3 billion). The rise in military expenditure in South America between 2016 and 2017 is mainly attributed to the increase by Argentina (by 15 per cent to \$ 5.7 billion) and Brazil (by 6.3 per cent to \$ 29.3 billion). The increase in Brazil's military expenditure, the first annual increase since 2014 and the largest since 2010, comes as a surprise given the country's current economic and political turmoil. However, in 2017 the Brazilian Government loosened its budget deficit targets to 2020 and released additional funds (\$ 4.1 billion) for all major sectors, including the military. Venezuela, amid a year of social and political unrest, increased its military spending in 2017 by 19 per cent compared with 2016, since 2013. However, the ongoing economic crisis in the country meant that for all major sectors, including the military, military spending in 2017 was still 75 per cent lower than in 2008. (Nam 2018, 4-5).

Latin American countries with the largest real increases in military spending in the period 2003-2007 all belong to South American: Venezuela (with 78.53%), Chile (53%) and Ecuador (49%). Also, in the region were the three countries with the highest military budgets: Brazil (accounting for 46% of expenditures, Colombia (accounting for 15%) and Chile (13%) (Stalenheim et al 2008, 200). Of the US\$ 44 billion that Latin America invested in military spending in 2007, only South American countries were responsible for US\$ 39.6 billion.

Since 2005, Chile and Venezuela – and to a lesser extent, Brazil – have been the two countries that have increased the imports of arms in South America, raising the delicate question of whether the excessive concern to modernize the armed forces by these countries could be fueling an arms race in the region. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released in mid-2008 the balance of the previous year, with regard to the exports, imports and transfer of arms around the world. In the medium-term analysis, SIPRI found a percentage increase in arms transfers to South America: “South American states accounted for 5% of the volume of international transfers of conventional arms imported for the period 2003-2007 – that is, 47% higher than in 1998-2002” (Holtom et al 2006).

The increase coincides with the fact that between 2004 and 2006 South America had three consecutive years of strong economic growth (grow-

ing at an average rate of approximately 5.3%) (ECLAC 2006) something that was not recorded since the 1970s when growth was close to average rates of 7.0%. Although growth in South America dropped to 4.9% in 2007, some of its strongest economies, such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela, respectively, maintained growth dynamics at rates of 8.7%, 5.3%, 5.1% and 8.4%,⁶ respectively. On the other hand, economic growth was accompanied by improvements in the main macroeconomic indicators in almost all the countries of the region (inflation, fiscal adjustment and reduction of public debt – and even some sources have interpreted the increase in South American military spendings in the last five years as a result of economic growth; a weak dollar, that stimulates different types of imports; and the political will to modernize the Armed Forces of the region, which are largely confronted with the obsolescence of armaments inventories (IISS, 2008, 59).

Could such acquisitions be transforming South America into an emerging market for sales of sophisticated conventional weapons? For example, in the case of Chile, in short-term analysis the country appears as the main South American arms importer of Great Britain, occupying in 2007 the second place in its global exports of armaments to the world, tied with Romania – for both countries the United Kingdom exported 9%, only lower than the 17% it exported to the United States market. The dynamism of imports of Chilean armaments was reflected in the fact that the military budget grew by 23% in 2007 (Ibid 60-61). Venezuela was, in 2007, the third largest market for arms exports from Russia to the world (with 5% of total Russian exports, although this percentage is well below the 45% Russia exports to China and the 22% exported to the Indian market (Ibid). “Not surprisingly, arms exporting countries – Russia in particular – have pointed out that with economic success and the aging of Latin America, its markets offer relevant opportunities for the sales of new military equipment” (ibid. 59).

In the Andean security sub-complex, the case that has attracted the most attention, however, is that of Venezuela. Although some sources acknowledge that until 2006 Venezuela was not the main investor in arms in the region (Latin America Security & Strategic Review 2006, 1-2), the fact is that “Venezuela has dramatically increased its arms imports from position 56 in the period 1998-2002 to the 24th position in the period 2003-2007 as the largest regional importer”. (SIPRI 2007). Only in 2007 did Venezuela

6 Estado de São Paulo Online, “PIB da Argentina cresceu 8,7% em 2007, diz Cristina Kirchner”, 12 feb. 2008, available at <http://www.estadao.com.br/economia/not_eco122970,o.htm>, consulted in 27/08/2008; Dinheirama, “Alta do PIB, a Selic e o crescimento do Brasil”, available at <<http://dinheirama.com/blog/2008/03/14/alta-do-pib-a-selic-e-o-crescimento-do-brasil/>>, accessed 27/08/2017.

increase its defense budget by 78% (reaching US\$ 887 million), becoming the largest spender in real terms in South America that year (Holtom et al., 2008). Although the amount of arms imports is lower than that of Chile for the period 2003-2007 (US\$ 1.417 billion from Venezuela versus US\$ 2.283 billion from Chile), oil prices are steadily rising for several years, the presidential will to improve military capabilities of the country and the search for improvement in the Venezuelan regional political position have led the country to increasing its military budget. It should be noted that Venezuela has been consolidating, over the years, a tendency that shows Russia as the main supplier of armaments. Thus in the period 2003-2007 Russia supplied 93% of the arms purchased by Venezuela, while China supplied 3% and Israel 2% (Ibid 306). This may explain why, in 2006 and 2007, Venezuela ranked 8th and 4th among the developing countries that received the most arms deliveries and that signed arms transfer agreements the most (IISS 2008, 449). Venezuelan governments also have legal mechanisms to allow additional funds to be added to the military budget in the fiscal year. The main mechanism is the so-called *Lei Paraguas* (Umbrella Law), which allows the government to negotiate external loans to finance extra military spending, not always included in the original military budget, although the Venezuelan government has announced its intention to use this less frequently and even eliminate such mechanism (Ibid 2008).

In the Southern Cone subsystem, Chile is the country that stands out in its efforts to acquire modern technology weapons to (re)capitalize on its armed forces. In the period 2003-2007, Chile became the largest importer of conventional weapons in South America. The country ranked 36th in the world ranking of recipients of armaments in the period between 1998 and 2002, and in the period 2003-2007 it became the 12th position (the first position among Latin American countries) (Holtom et al., 2008, 305). Chile has also been the only Latin American country capable of maintaining a military expenditure/Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio above 3.5% throughout this first decade of the 21st century, with the exception of 2007, when it was exceeded in real expenditures by Venezuela, by approximately US\$ 2, 109 billion.

This constant level of spending was possible due to two factors: first, because Chile has performed very well in recent years. For example, between 2004 and 2007 the Chilean GDP grew at an annual average rate of 6.2%. Second, the Chilean armed forces continue to benefit from the permanence of the Copper Law that dates back to the 1950s⁷ and was modified in the days of


7 In fact, the Copper Law (*Ley del Cobre*) dates from 1958, but it was modified in 1998, still during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet.

the military government of Augusto Pinochet, whereby 10% of copper exports were directed to finance operational military expenditures and equipment purchases⁸. The fact is that Chile is the main world exporter of copper and the international prices of this commodity have had a very high increase in recent years⁹. For many years the Copper Law contributed an annual average of US\$ 200 million per year to the military budget but, due to the unprecedented increase in international prices, the Law would be responsible for financing alone almost US\$ 1 billion, which led to strong pressures from Chile's political and social sectors to revise or extinguish the law.

Brazil represents a transversal State, or bridge, between the two South American security subsystems. Although in the medium term Brazil had not shown the same level of spending, in comparative terms of GDP, as Venezuela and Chile, any inclination in terms of military expenditures must include Brazil, due to the greater complexity of its economy, the fact that it represents half of the region's GDP (around 56%), and the greater complexity of its regional and global policies. It is true that between 2003 and 2007 Brazil reduced its international weight as an importer of conventional armaments – from position 32 in the period 1998-2002 it fell to position 33 – this decrease was offset by the important increase of the military budget in 2007 by more than 33%, which was by far the most important change in a decade. This explains why Brazil ranked 14th among the countries with the highest military spending until 2006, moving to the 12th place in 2007 (Stepanova 2008, 12).

8 According to The Economist, the money allocated for the "Ley del Cobre" concept has already brought to Chile 340 tanks from Germany, eight frigates, two new submarines and 28 F-16 fighter jets. See The economist, "South America defense: speak fraternally but carry a stick", 05/29/2008.

9 Chile is the world's largest copper producer – with 25% of the world's production – and by 2005 the mining industry will contribute US\$ 6.1 billion to the country, or about 25% of total tax revenues expected by 2005, a number that may be higher today because international copper prices, which averaged US\$ 1.7 a pound that year, doubled as of 2006, and continued to grow in 2007. In addition, international copper price growth had a significant impact on the economies of other South American producers, mainly Peru, and to a lesser extent Argentina and Brazil. For this information consult: : UniversiaKnowledge@Warten, "Preços do cobre aliviam cofres da América latina", 21/09/2005, <<http://wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=1028&language=portuguese&specialId=>>, consulted in 05/09/2008 ; *Último Segundo*, "Com preço maior, roubo de cobre no Brasil cresce 11% 2em 2007", 06/05/2008, <http://ultimosegundo.ig.com.br/brasil/2008/05/06/com_preco_maior_roubo_de_cobre_no_brasil_cresce_11_em_2007_1300233.html>, accessed 05/09/2008.



Fonte: Elaborado com base em dados do SIPRI e IISS

However, we must pay attention to the fact that Brazilian military expenditures of almost US\$ 70 billion in the period 2003-2007 is diluted in the size of its economy, whose GDP reached close to R\$ 2,5 trillion (or US\$ 1.5 trillion) in 2007 (IBGE 2008). As a result, in the military expenditure/GDP ratio, Brazil is a country that spends little when compared to Colombia or Chile, and only slightly more than Argentina and Peru (see graph above). In the period 2003-2007, Brazil spent an average of 1.5% of its GDP on military expenditures. However, it should be borne in mind that, although the defense budget increased by an average of 15% between 2004 and 2007 – and despite the 33% of 2007 – only 4% of the budget is available for investment in new acquisitions and weaponry upgrade. The remainder of the military budget sheet is spent primarily on staff pay, including military retirement and pension expenses. In this way, the actual expenditure of US\$ 818 million in purchases and upgrades of arms in the period 2003-2007 was lower than those of Chile and Venezuela.

Between 2003 and 2007 Brazil imported most of its armament from the European Union (64%), followed by the United States (17%) and Canada (7%) (Holtom et al 2008), and the imports of these and other countries is mainly possible through the purchase plans of the Navy and the Aeronautics. Some analysis have suggested that Brazil, like Chile, has given preference to Western suppliers, especially those belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and not to Russia or China, not by chance, but by a ra-

tionality that involves a “strategic choice”: in its emergence, the South American regional power does not predict a relationship of rivalry with the West (Stratfor 2008), but rather a partnership for its plans to develop an important role in regional security. This spending evolution is expected to be completed by the signing, in 2013, of the super modern Swedish fighter Griphen, thus concretely starting the largest modernization program of the Brazilian armed forces.

Empirical and Conceptual Tensions Putting Pressure in the Dualistic Perspectives

How have the analysis reacted to this increase in the South American arms build-up? The truth is that analysis that are more realistic, whether they are academically elaborated or of a conjunctural nature, have strongly recovered, at least until 2011, the idea of the vitality, and even a certain dynamism of perceptions of threats between neighboring states, especially Chile and Venezuela. Thus, in recent years, it has been heard with some frequency that Latin America, and especially South America, would be entering an arms race. Frequent media reports and strong statements by political figures have fueled these fears¹⁰. Also, some academic production has come to the same conclusion, as Malamud and Garcia argue: “The famous arms race in Latin America, led by Venezuela, is no longer just a speech” (Malamud and Garcia 2006). However, this argument does not seem very consistent: “[...] It is doubtful that events in the region can be described exactly as an ‘arms race’ in classical terms. Acquisitions have been primarily motivated by efforts to replace or upgrade military capabilities in order to maintain existing capabilities; respond to major threats to domestic security; strengthen links with supplier governments; boost the domestic military industry; participate in peace missions; or improve the international or regional profile of the country”. (Holtom et al., 2008, 305).

One result of this type of analysis is that there is, in principle, a recovery of the state as a strong security actor; secondly, analysis based on the conceptual assumptions of security communities and democratic peace, and even those that, as Buzan and Weaver (2003), visualize a mixed regional security system – a traditional half in the Andean countries and a security com-

¹⁰ By the end of 2006, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, in reaction to arms purchases by countries such as Venezuela and Chile said the region was entering an “arms race”. See for journalistic references: Downie, Andrew, *Time World*, “A South American Arms Race?”, Friday, december 21, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1697776,00.html>; accessed 23/07/2017.

munity in the Southern Cone.

However, the realistic dramatization of the arms race in South America from the beginning of this century was important because it identified and recognized certain difficulties, images and mistrust among South American States arising from the upgrade and recapitalization cycle of the military park. Above all, as a conceptual result, it questions the dualistic assumption of the Andean subsystem (traditional security relations) versus the Southern Cone (security community).

Constructivist and liberal studies have tensioned this dual perspective given the political conditions in which the build-up occurs: in the first decade of this century there was a group of countries that intended to improve their position and regional and global political profile, regardless of their regional sub-complex – Andean region or the Southern Cone – especially Brazil and Venezuela, and, to a lesser extent, Chile. In this sense, two options appear: to modernize their military capabilities and to strengthen strategic partnerships with governments seen as global suppliers of advanced military equipment.

In this sense, there is a political condition that feeds the arms build-up of the South American security system which has little to do with strictly traditional concerns, understood as military ones. The South American regional security system has been going through a new phase in which broader political and military objectives shift traditional concerns. These new objectives are related to the improvement of the regional and even global political position of some South American countries especially Brazil, Chile and Venezuela. Certainly, there are domestic motivations that also encourage the build-up in the case of these three countries. However, both the domestic security goals arising from the build-up and the regional policy goals, by their latent nature are not explicit, they generate fears in several neighboring countries. Being in the presence of the classical problem of information asymmetry, poor communication, and even the low institutionalization of trust measures between actors, creates conditions for the resurgence of distrust, which fuels false representations of facts or misrepresentation of neighbors in relation to the countries leading the build-up. And given that the three State actors that are the source of these false representations are located throughout the South American region, we question the dualistic theoretical fragmentation that sees a more traditional subsystem of security in the Andean countries and a security community in the Southern Cone.

In this logic of regional and global ambitions in the Chilean military build-up, regional goals and motivations are present. One motivation of the Chilean governments, as well as the high military command, is the transformation of Chile into a regional military power capable of achieving, by the

end of this decade, what is technically known as “NATO military standard” (Gonzales 2005), status not reached by any South American country until our days. During the period 2003-2007 Chile’s main import markets for arms were the European Union with 82%, the United States with 15% and Israel with 3% (Ibid). This choice of Western, or with strong ties to the West, countries as suppliers could be related to the fact that, as some analysis suggest, Chile has ambitions to acquire that military status (Ibid).

However, Chile’s participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions has also been highlighted as one of the main reasons for the modernization of the Armed Forces and the investment in the purchase of military equipment. Chile, which until 1990 had participated in only three UN peacekeeping missions, has increased its participation to 15, and is the only South American country since 1996 to have a “State [Chilean] policy for participation in peace operations” (Ramirez 2007).

Also, in Venezuela’s case strategic motivations have been present in arms purchases: the improvement of the country’s regional political position. The Venezuelan government believes in the possibility of Venezuela’s leadership in South America. One way to improve the political position towards this goal is to improve military capabilities and the regional influence that comes from that. Improving military capabilities in order to improve its regional political position vis-à-vis competitors with the Brazilian dimension has also been linked to the strengthening ties with Russia. Some analysts believe that if the alliance between Venezuela and Russia bothers the United States, the modernization of the Venezuelan arsenal also displeases Brazil, not so much for the military threat itself, but for the political improvement of the Venezuelan position in the much-speculated dispute for the South American leadership between both countries¹¹. Thus, it is argued that Brazil, as well as Chile, would be preparing a strategy to reduce the influence that Venezuela has acquired in relation to some South American countries (Latin America Security & Strategic Review, 2007). Chile would be indifferent to the fact that the Venezuelan government would be trying to transform Venezuela into a regional power since the country would at present have the capacity to reach this condition considering the high foreign exchange derived from the oil sales¹².

11 “Hugo Chavez achète de nouvelles armes en Russie”, *Le Figaro*, 24/7/2008, <<http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2008/07/24/01003-20080724ARTFIG00004-hugo-chavez-achete-de-nouvelles-armesen-russie-.php>>, consulted in 13/8/2009; see also, BBC-Brasil, “Compra de armas da Venezuela causa ‘inveja’ ao Brasil”, 24/7/2008, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2008/07/080724_pressvenezuela_pu.shtml>, accessed 13/01/2018.

12 “Chávez busca ‘armas e liderança’ em Moscou”, *BBC-Brasil*, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/>

In Brazil, on the other hand, the modernization plans of the Brazilian Armed Forces raise certain warnings in some sectors of neighboring countries regarding the possibility of Brazil following the same route of Chile and Venezuela (Gosman 2007). Like most South American countries, one reason strongly given for the purchase of new armaments is the technological lag of the Armed Forces, especially the Air Force. To bring the Armed Forces up to date, especially the Aeronautics, super-modern French Rafale fighter planes would need to be bought.

But in fact, the project of modernizing Brazilian Armed Forces overcomes possible concerns with the modernization of those of any neighboring country. The great Brazilian motivation is more strongly related to its projection as a hemispheric and global Brazil, that is, the adequacy of Brazil to its emergent global political player position (emergent global political actor). Analysis have drawn attention to the fact that although Venezuelan purchases have received more attention (mainly by the “Chavez factor”), Brazil is the only South American country with the capacity to make a long-term investment. “Brazil is better positioned to start a constant arms build-up supported by its own domestic industry [...]. The choice of the three [airline companies], significantly two from NATO countries [and one that could become a member] suggests a point of crucial importance on the way Brazil views its future. Despite the changing geopolitical realities in the world, Brazil in its emergence to a regional prominence in the next decade does not seem to foresee greater conflicts or even a relationship of rivalry with the West” (Stratfor 2008).

Perhaps in this context of regional and global motivations can be understood the elaboration of the Strategic Plan of National Defense. In September 2007 President Lula, avoiding referring to any motivation that had to do with Venezuela, or any other South American country, announced the creation of a working group, under the direction of the Ministry of Defense and coordinated by the intellectual Mangabeira Unger, to formulate the guidelines of a plan for the modernization of the Armed Forces (National Defense Strategic Plan, or Growth Acceleration Plan in Defense – PAC in Defense, as it has also been called, that takes into account three general and five concrete objectives. The first refers to: 1) the review of defense strategies; 2) reactivation of the domestic arms industry; 3) autonomy of defense policy. The concrete concerns are addressed to answer the following questions: 1) which are the best strategies for times of peace and war; 2) organization of the Armed Forces, endowed with the technological and operational vanguard; 3) reactivation of the national armaments industry, directed to the goal of autonomy in defense;

portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2008/07/080722_chavezmoscou_mp.shtml,
13/04/2018.

accessed

4) identification of the Armed Forces with the nation, especially regarding borders defense, where the Amazon appears as a priority, compulsory military service and social tasks; 5) establishment of lines for the Armed Forces in situations of order and rule of law¹³.

The armament build-up in South America, however, also tensioned middle-ground analysis, such as that based on the regional security complexes of Buzan and Waever (2003). The South American arms build-up reveals tensions between a movement that pulls toward traditional (neo)security assets, seeking broader political goals through military means – in cases such as Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela –, as we explored in the previous section, and another that seeks to generate a certain social capital through the design of CBMs. However, both movements are not geographically limited, as the analysis of regional security complexes implies. That is, it is not only the Andean region that behaves in a neo-traditional way, nor is it just in the Southern Cone where the CBMs are present. What we have here called neo-traditional behaviors are present in Andean countries, such as Venezuela, and are also welcomed in Southern Cone countries, such as Brazil and Chile. The same can be said of the CBMs, they are contiguous, in the sense that they cross both geographical spaces. Although it should be recognized that levels of adoption and application of CBMs are unequal, with the Southern Cone having a stronger participation in those than the Andean region (Holtom 2008, 305).

The previous can be illustrated by the reactions generated by arms modernization in sectors of Peru and Bolivia. In a typical problem of misrepresentation, the purchase of modern military equipment by Chile has raised hypotheses in Peruvian and Bolivian political and academic sectors that the modernization of Chilean Armed Forces would have the immediate consequence of opening a wide gap in the quality, sophistication and available technology of the Chilean arsenal in comparison to the first ones. Chilean military spending has also been particularly concerned with Peru and Bolivia, with which Chile still has territorial disputes that date back to the end of the 19th century and are very sensitive to all of them. According to a study by Carlos Gutiérrez, “[...] the evidences that demonstrate Chile’s military spending and the acquisition of modern weapons systems have been a determining factor in the neighbors type of arms race, which would bring back the ghosts of historical conflicts (Gutierrez 2007, 309). However, it is the scarcity of accurate exchange of information that leads to this kind of image (fear). Even the possibility of using the modernization of Chilean stocks for potential settlements in border contentious can eventually create burdens for Chile and

13 For all these inquiries, see “Lula launches preparations for superpower status”, *Latin America Security & Strategic Review* (2007).

other countries. Arms suppliers may refuse to sell because it is unclear to them whether their sales can generate conditions for future regional conflicts or more structural problems such as regional military imbalance. In 2005, for example, Switzerland canceled the sale to Chile of 93 modern Leopard II tanks (later bought from Germany) and some sources suggest that the reason for this was the Swiss government's distrust regarding the real Chilean motivation for such purchases¹⁴.

In the case of Chile and Peru, that dispute maritime areas since the late 19th century, as sustained by a work of Farih Kahhat, although the advances in cooperation between the two countries, a certain mistrust persists and is fed in reserved official documents in which are projected (unofficial) hypotheses based on inaccurate information or incoherent arguments (Kahhat 2006).

However, from Chile's side, there has been an effort to improve the quality of information through the construction of security regimes (CBMs) with their Peruvian and Bolivian neighbors given the concerns raised by the increase in arms purchases. Especially after the Chilean acquisition of the F-16 fighter planes (Higuera 2005), at the beginning of this decade, the tensions derived from this fact were alleviated by the beginning of trust-generating agreements. During the governments of Ricardo Lagos in Chile and Alejandro Toledo, in Peru, tensions and suspicions increased sharply, but were attenuated from the beginning of the second government of Peruvian President Allan García. The CBM measures between Chile and Peru have included meetings among defense ministers, trying to reactivate a mechanism called the 2 + 2 Meeting, which is a permanent commission for consultation, policy coordination and information exchange, which includes the ministries of defense and Foreign Affairs of both countries, whose activities had been suspended since the time of Alejandro Toledo (Latin America Security & Strategic Review 2007, 9).

Regarding Chile-Bolivia relations – which have been frozen for several years in this decade and despite tense bilateral declarations at the beginning of the Evo Morales administration – there have been great improvements since 2007 and a series of CBMs were announced by the governments of both countries, including the destruction of landmines that Chile disseminated in the years of Pinochet dictatorship along the border with Bolivia, as well as the sending of Bolivian soldiers to Chile to be trained in: 1) mine activities; 2) exchange of Bolivian students in Chilean military academies; (3) permanent consultation mechanisms and anti-drug cooperation efforts (Ibid, 9).

14 "Chile teme que conflicto con Perú afecte compra de armas", 22/11/2005, <<http://www.gatoencerrado.net/store/noticias/35/35249/detalle.htm>>, consulted in 22/9/2017.

In both South American geographic spaces, the possibilities of an arms race are attenuated by formal and informal confidence-building measures (CBMs), which have played an important role in reducing the impact of arms procurement in South America (Holtom et al 2008 304-305) or attenuating the deepening of conflicts arising from border disputes that have not yet been resolved. The CBMs aim to create transparency, monitoring mechanisms in military procedures and operations, reduce asymmetries of information among member states of a regime of rules in the treatment of security and disarmament problems¹⁵. If armament purchases suggest a movement towards (neo)traditional patterns in the South American system – since they stimulate eventual and historical “enmity” – this movement is problematized, or somewhat attenuated, by patterns of “friendship” based on the search for CBMs, which generate conditions for the stretching of the weak security community, in the sense described by some theorists (Adler and Barnett 1998) of the security community, specifically in the countries of the Southern Cone such as Argentina and Brazil (Oelsner 2009).

Final Remarks

Returning to the theoretical argument, the analysis that we had been defined as dual, argue that South America has two different security sub-systems: one of the Andean countries (with emphasis on the military aspect and in territorial conflicts), and another in the Southern Cone, where there is the emergence of a security community. Analysis such as those made by Hirst (2006) have argued that the two major developments in security and defense at the beginning of the new millennium in South America were the diversification of security options and priorities and differentiated patterns of military evolution in the Southern Cone and the Andean region. On the other hand, analysis based on concepts of security community and democratic peace have emphasized the development, in the Southern Cone, of communities of values and the impact of the democratic nature of their political systems in the consolidation of cooperative relations. However, South American military expenditures for the 2003-2007 five-year period show that there are no two complexes in the strict sense. Regional and global goals of countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela, which are goals of a political rather than military nature, however, suffer from the problem of misrepresentation, since

¹⁵ Regarding CBMs in Latin America see the excellent work of Bromley, M. & Perdomo (2005), C. “CBMs in Latin America and the effect of the arms acquisition by Venezuela”, Working Paper 41/2005. Available at <<http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/216.asp>>, accessed in 05/09/2008.

it is not clear to some of their neighboring states what are the motivations behind their build-up. Thus, what for Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela could appear as political goals are interpreted as traditional goals by neighbors, or even among them, as in the case of Brazil-Venezuela. That is, reflecting on events, misrepresentation is common to the South American complex as a whole.

While it is correct to say that South America has built a historic zone of peace, if it is understood by that the absence of wars, or few wars since the formation of the modern system of South American states, it is also true that dualistic analysis have provided little attention to the problems stemming from information scarcity in the South American build-up process, which has the consequence of increasing fears about intentions, capacities and actions projected on state actors. Somehow this draws attention to the precariousness of CBMs, the main tool of security regimes in South America, through which it is possible to take “accurate information to calm false rumors” (Lindle, 2007, p. 1), which allow reciprocal knowledge of the actors and their intentions among themselves. CBMs have played an important role in mitigating the impact of the acquisition of arms in South America (Holtom et al., 2008, 304-305) or of mitigating conflicts arising from unresolved border disputes.

More than an arms race, almost all South American countries began a recapitalization of their obsolete military inventory, dating mostly from the 1950s and 1960s, and the most modern ones from the 1980s. At the beginning of the millennium, this re-capitalization means an upgrade and replacement of military equipment (Hodge, 2008). However, there is much asymmetry in re-capitalization. Chile and Venezuela have benefited from two conditions. First, there is a strong tendency in both countries to use their export commodities (oil and copper) to finance military spending and support their plans for modernizing the Armed Forces; second, both countries rely on original extra-budgetary mechanisms (Chile’s Copper Law, Paraguayan Umbrella Law) to finance military spending, such that the original military budget for each fiscal year rarely coincides with real military spending; the end of the economic crises in Latin America between the years 1997 and 2000 also provided financial conditions for the re-emergence of projects to modernize the armed forces (Martin 2006, p.3). In such a way that re-capitalization, in the form of upgrades or new purchases, regardless of actual or latent motivations, can be considered as a sign of resumption and normalization of civil-military relations in South America. In Brazil, the purchase of the Griphen fighters constitutes the highest point of that recapitalization and modernization of arms.

Although there are possible pressures arising from the correlation that some neighboring countries to Chile and Venezuela can make between

arms modernization and border disputes or historical rivalries, fundamentally the build-up seeks to improve the position and regional political profile, especially in Brazil, which has more global objectives among the South American countries, and Venezuela, with its commitment to build a space for its regional leadership. In this sense, two paths appear as fundamental to achieving these goals: modernizing their military capabilities and strengthening strategic ties and partnerships with governments as global suppliers of advanced military equipment. Even so, there is no necessary relationship between political objectives and military conditions. The case of Chile illustrates this well: even with an accelerated modernization of its Armed Forces, which has included strong purchases of sophisticated weapons, its political objectives for regional leadership are very limited and discrete.

However, a unique theoretical consequence of the South American arms build-up is that it also puts pressure in conceptual contributions that separate the two South American subsystems. As most of these dual analysis are based on a relationship between the nature of the political system (the impact of domestic redemocratization especially, which is quite clear in the case of liberal and constructivist analysis) and a type of cooperative security relationship that tends to derive from the democratic nature of the system, they lead not only to a securitization of relations in the Andean regional sub-complex, but also tend to empty the democratic agenda as a tool for security and foreign policy. The truth is that by splitting the South American system, that type of analysis does not realize that the debate on this item is all over the South America “For these reasons the changes that happened beginning in the late 1980s and that have continued in the 21st century are truly remarkable. In a little more than a decade, democracy has gone from being an internal matter to a subject of intense deliberation in regional forums” (Arceaneaux and Pion-Berlin 2005, 87).

In fact, if we look at the contemporary South American arms build-up, there are characteristics in common with both geographic spaces that, instead of fragmenting them theoretically, end up giving them certain contiguity. Both spaces have actors concerned with military goals; although these goals do not have strong traditional ambitions; in both spaces, State actors that have deepened the modernization of their Armed Forces – Chile and Venezuela – however, eventually raise concerns among neighbors, due to perceptions of threats that go back to the past; both security subsystems have developed CBMs with their neighbors, although it may be stressed that these are more consistent in the Southern Cone than in the Andean region. The difference between South American security subsystems seems to be more related to political stability than to regional security aspects. Certainly, the

Andean subsystem, since the 1990s, shows a greater degree of political instability than political systems of the Southern Cone.

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ABSTRACT

Research that focuses on security systems in South America usually identifies the existence of two regional security subsystems: one in the Andean countries of the North, with more traditional characteristics such as militarized tensions at the borders and intense drug trafficking problems; and a second one located in the Southern Cone, with security and integration regimes, which could qualify as a security community. This is what we call a dualistic view of security. This paper challenges this thesis to show that contemporary developments and concerns about the purchase of sophisticated weaponry by some South American countries, especially Chile, Venezuela, and Brazil in the first two decades of this century are critical points for the idea of a permanent (democratic) peace zone located only in the Southern Cone. In fact, arms purchases transform the South American region into a single regional security complex with tensions and militarized representations in both the Andean system and the Southern Cone.

KEYWORDS

Dualistic view. Weapons. South America. Security.

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RUSSIA, CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA IN THE SOUTH-AMERICAN DEFENSE MARKET

Ricardo Borges Gama Neto¹

Introduction

The present article addresses two interconnected subjects. The first one is the relation between political ideology and the purchase of defense armaments, while the other is the opening of markets, which has occurred in South America in the last few years. The significant changes in the economy and politics of the subcontinent, which started in the end of the last century and continued until the first decades of the present one, brought about deep impacts, not only in the political environment, but also in what concerns the purchase of defense equipment. Political changes in key countries such as Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil and the growth of economies with the commodities' boom have propelled the acquisition of defense material, at the same as opening markets for new sellers. Russia, as a descendent of the Soviet Union, has maintained its restricted buyers and, with the end of the Cold War, started to broaden its market by selling equipment that was vetoed by the North-American policy, such as the BVR *Vympel R-77* missiles and the MANPAD Igla missiles type.

Other important suppliers of defense material also have further entered in the South-American market. Certainly, the most important ones are China and South Korea. The former uses its economic and political power of negotiation, acquired in the period of strong economic growth and enhancement of trade relations, to enter in both Russian and other countries' markets. The Chinese *portfolio* is vast and goes from cannons to training jets. Another important Chinese advantage is the capacity of its state banks of financing

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such purchases. South Korea, for its turn, attempts to enter into the market by using aggressive commercial strategies and high-technology weapons' systems, such as planes and missiles.

This article utilizes specialized bibliography as well as resources from the statistical database of the Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (CEPALSTAT)² and from the arms trade register of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)³, which contains official data of arms' buyers and sellers worldwide.

The article is composed by this introduction, a main section divided in two chapters and the final remarks.

South America, Economic and Political Changes in the Beginning of the 21st Century

The redemocratization process that took place in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s occurred alongside a strong and persistent economic crisis, mainly characterized by high inflation rates and deep public indebtedness. The imbalances that Latin American economies have shown were mainly a consequence of the increase in the public debt in the last decade and of the aggressive expansion of the financial charges, derived from the increase in the international interest rates. In the 1970s, during and after the first petroleum crisis, when developed countries implemented macroeconomic policies with the aim of reducing the economic activity and, thus, controlling the increase of inflation, South American countries, in face of the necessity of legitimizing non-democratic political regimes, adopted a strategy of greater external indebtedness as a mechanism of compensating the lack of internal savings – necessary to enhance the development and growth projects.

The answer to the fiscal and economic crisis through which the first democratic post-transition governments have passed, in the 1980s and 1990s, were plans such as the Cruzado (Brazil), Inti (Peru) and Austral (Argentina). These actions were interposed by many through heterodox, structuralist measures, such as price-freezing, control of the exchange rate and the deepening of the imports' substitution strategy. The aim was to achieve the macroeconomic stability without recession, thus providing the necessary political support to the implementation of fiscal reforms needed

2 Available at http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp. Accessed June 8 2018.

3 Available at http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php. Accessed June 8 2018.

to stability. Such opportunity was lost in Argentina, Brazil and Peru. The initial honeymoon with the price-freezing was mistaken for success, and the fiscal consolidation was avoided. The programs, therefore, were lost (Cardoso 1989, 40. Our translation).

The failure of these heterodox politics was, in many cases, embodied in situations of hyperinflation (rates above 50% per month), such as in Argentina (1989), Brazil (1990), and Peru (1988/1990). Bolivia, for its turn, was the most extreme case, with an inflation rate of 12.000% in the year of 1985. The inflation average in 1989 for Latin America was superior to one hundred per cent.

After the failure of heterodox economic control policies, a new set of reforms was implemented by the new Latin-American governments, being such set within a context of changes that had been occurring in the Welfare State's framework of developed countries. These new reforms became generically known as the "Washington Consensus" and advocated: (i) a Rigid Fiscal Discipline; (ii) a Reduction in the Public Spending; (iii) Tax and Tributary Reforms; (iv) the Financial Liberalization; (v) a Market-determined Exchange Rate; (vi) the Liberalization of the Foreign Trade; (vii) the Liberalization of Foreign Direct Investment; (viii) the Privatization of state enterprises; (ix) the Deregulation of the economy and the Flexibility of relations; and (x) the Legal Security for Property Rights. In spite of being regarded by its opponents as a prescription of fixed reforms, the "Washington Consensus" was perceived by its defenders as a *minimum minimorum*. Each country should implement its adjustment solutions based in their realities.

Bolivia was the first country to adopt macroeconomic control policies with strong liberal content. In 1985, the president Paz Estenssoro adopted a pro-market economic program, the so-called New Economic Policy (NEP), based in the ideas of the economist Jeffrey Sachs. The stabilization program laid its basis in restrictive fiscal and monetary policies, trade opening, prices' and exchange rates' liberalization and flexibility in the labor market. The inflation rate fell from 23.000% to 10% a year. The country has presented a moderate recession in 1986, and, later on, had several years of low growth rates.

Argentina, in 1991, during Carlos Menem's government, adopted an adjustment model (Convertibility Plan) with strong similarities with the one implement in Bolivia, comprising, for instance, privatizations and a rigid fiscal policy. The Argentinian plan, nonetheless, had a fundamental difference: the establishment of a *currency board* (which obliged the government to back all issuance of local currency by the international reserves in dollars, in the

Central Bank), thus contrasting with the prescription of floating exchange rate. “The annual average inflation rates were reduced from 84%, in 1991, to 3,9%, in 1994; during the same period, the GDP grew in an annual average rate of 7,7%, the consumption, in an annual rate of 8,6%, and the real investment in an annual rate of 22%” (Wise 2001, 173. Our translation).

During the 1990s, other countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil and Peru had also adopted macroeconomic control plans based on pro-market measures, such as privatization, exchange liberation, tax increases and restrictive fiscal policies. In general terms, the result was the same: a significant cutback in the inflation rates and macroeconomic stabilization.

With redemocratization, there was an intensification in economic integration processes, with the creation of customs unions. There has been the formation of MERCOSUR with Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay – as well as the posterior integration of Paraguay. The Andean Pact, comprising Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador Peru and Venezuela, was transformed into the Andean Community and established, in 1993, a Free-Trade Area (FTA). However, in defense matters, regional integration had no practical effect, in such a way that the relations between the armed forces of the region’s states remain centered in reduced joint military maneuvers, such as the operations COLBRA (Colombia/Brazil), VENBRA (Venezuela/Brazil) and “Cruzeiro do Sul” (CRUZEX).

In the last decade of the 20th century, most countries that adopted economic stabilization programs through pro-market measures – with the exception of Chile – presented as a major visible collateral effect a low economic growth and an increase in inequality. In some cases, such as in Bolivia and Venezuela, the popular reactions against the measures of economic austerity have generated important popular uprisings. In this latter, the social manifestations that occurred in the capital Caracas and which came to be known as *Caracazo* paved the way to an attempt of a *coup d’état* in 1992, commanded by colonel Hugo Chávez.


If from the mid-1980s on there has been the election of governments with pro-market economic programs, from the end of the decade on, governments strongly identified with left-wing and center-left ideals began to be elected. Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela in 1998, and then, successively: Nestor Kirchner in Argentina (2001), Luís Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil (2002), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2005), Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay (2005), Michele Bachelet in Chile (2006)⁴, Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2007)

4 In Chile, despite Michele Bachelet’s election, the policy of defense purchases had not been altered. The country remains giving preference to products produced in the West, particularly in the United States.

and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2008).

The South-American “turn to the Left” (or Pink Tide) occurred at the same time as the *boom* of the rise of commodity prices in the international market. From the beginning of the 2000s until approximately 2008, Brazil and other countries of the subcontinent were strongly influenced by the abundance of resources brought about by the international rise in the prices of goods such as oil, copper, soy and iron ore. The growth of the Chinese economy, around 10% a year, was a major responsible for this phenomenon, alongside the low interest rates practiced by the developed countries.

Graphic 1: Growth of the South-American countries (2000–2010)



Source: CEPALSTAT

The growth in world trade and the increase in the commodities' prices produced a strong rise in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of South America's economies during the period between 2000 and 2008, with important variations, such as significant declines in the economic activities in Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela in 2002. Nevertheless, in general terms, the growth rates of the economies of the subcontinent were significant, being its average around 4%. The dynamism of the South-American economies had an important impact in the poverty rate, which has fallen from 44,5%, in 2000, to 33,0%, in 2008, and the per capita income grew from 3,886 dollars to 4,597. “The existing number of poor and indigent in 2002, of 221 million and 97 million, respectively, was reduced to 180 millions of poor and 71 millions of indigent” (Prado 2011, 16. Our translation).

The conjunction of left-wing governments and the increase in the

importance of the emerging countries, especially China, envisioned by the growth of the South-South trade⁵, and the creation of forums as the ones known by the acronyms BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and IBAS (India, Brazil and South Africa) had been politically materialized in the formulation of more independent foreign policies – when not completely opposed to those advocated in Washington.

Within the South-American subcontinent, the formation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the South American Defense Council (SDC) are the main outcomes of the social, political and economic integration politics of the left-wing governments of that time. Nevertheless, one shall highlight that the creation of integration organisms dates back to the 1980s and 1990s, as it is the case of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community. Even though the idea of forming an institution that could politically unite the South American countries in a forum for the resolution of political and security issues arose in Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government, in 2000⁶, one of the main reasons for UNASUR's and the SDC's con-

5 “(...) from 1995 to 2004, the amount of money that has circulated due to the trade of goods in the South-South axis went from US\$ 222 billions to US\$ 562 billions. In 2007, this amount already represented 16,4% of the total US\$ 14 trillions moved by worldwide trade – number which, in 2000, corresponded to 11,5%. The flow of foreign direct investments (FDIs) among these countries has shown an increase: in the same period, they went from US\$ 14 billion to US\$ 47 billion. The driving forces of such growth were the great emerging economies, more precisely, Brazil, Russia, India and China – group of countries well-known for the acronym BRICS”. Available at <https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/pontes/news/comércio-sul-sul-no-contexto-da-crise-econômica-oportunidades-e-desafios>, accessed August 10 2017.

6 In 2000, during the 32nd General Assembly of the OAS, Ambassador Osmar Chofli highlighted the difficulties in the formation of a hemispherical defense policy. Nonetheless, the creation of a subcontinental policy was not regard as completely divergent from joint options with other international actors. “We believe, however, that the convergence around a single and comprehensive conception of security, fully applicable to the three continental masses of the Americas to the Caribbean, is difficult. South America, continent in which Brazil is geographically inserted, possesses its own strategic identity. Far from the main global tension axes, free from nuclear weapons and with low indexes of military expenditures, the South American countries conduct a well-succeeded process of regional integration, fostered by MERCOSUR and the Andean Community. The geographical circumstance of a same immediate neighborhood leads us to work a common agenda of subjects, opportunities and concerns. Democracy, regional integration, our growing community of values contribute to the consolidation of South America as a zone of peace, where cooperation and the joint pursue of stability and prosperity led to the definitive overcoming of past rivalries, thus creating an irreversible net of interests and opportunities. Together with all the hemisphere, we uphold convergent positions in what concerns the great issues of the international agenda, such as, among others, the promotion of defense and democracy, the respect for the human rights, the protection of the environment, the overcoming of poverty, the combat against organized

stitution was a strategy of some governments, especially Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela, of institutionally restricting the spaces of action of the Organization of American States (OAS) as an organism of conflicts' resolution. Through UNASUR, the South-American problems would no longer be treated as inter-American ones.

From Brazil's point of view, the creation of the South American Defense Council, in December 2008, is connected to the objective of strengthening cooperation in defense and security matters, and also refers to the intention of establishing a counterpoint to United States' interference in South America, more precisely, in the Andean region. (...). The countries in the region did not have a history of cooperation in defense and security – a great part of it was due to the different perspectives about each other – and would subordinate the discussion of these questions to their relation with the United States or to the regimes and institutions created under this country's hegemony, such as the Organization of American States (OAS). In the formation of the South American Defense Council lays the idea of using Unasur's own institutionality to solve controversies and tensions in the region, as it has occurred in Bolivia's institutional crisis, in 2008, in the reaction to the utilization of military bases of the United States in Colombia, in the tension between Colombia and Venezuela, in 2010, e in the deposition of Paraguay's president, Fernando Lugo, in July 2011 (Vigevani and Ramanzini Junior 2014, 538. Our translation).

Political Changes and the South American Defense Market

As we have already stated, from the beginning of the 20th century's first decade on, Latin America countries witnessed a deep renovation in national political leaderships. Among such leaderships, the most controversial and most charismatic one was certainly president Hugo Chávez. Being a lieutenant colonel of the Venezuelan army, Chávez had emerged in the Latin American scenario as the leader of an attempted military coup against Carlos Andrés Pérez's government, in 1992. Due to the failed attempt of carrying out a military coup, Chávez was arrested and, later on, granted amnesty by President Rafael Cal-

crime and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Regional and sub regional initiatives should not be interpreted as obstacles to the construction of a hemispherical security perspective. On the contrary, they constitute important reinforcement and complementarity steps for hemispherical-range settles, since they facilitate, through "building blocks", the identification and the inclusion, in the general context, of those aspects that may have a common applicability" (Our translation) Available at http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/speeches/speech_brasil.htm. Accessed in August 10 2017.

deira. In 1997, Chávez created a political party, the Fifth Republic Movement, which, one year later, elected eight out of twenty-three of the states' governors, thus obtaining 1/3 of the total chairs in the national parliament. Following its trajectory as a politician, Chávez was elected president in 1998, with 56% of the votes, by a coalition of left-wing parties. Benefiting from his enormous popularity, as soon as he took over, the president convened a referendum for a new Constituent Assembly, which has obtained great approval. The coalition of support for the Venezuelan president managed to elect 120 of the 131 constituents. The new Constitution was approved in a popular referendum in December 1999 and has produced deep changes in the Venezuelan political game rules: it has amplified the powers of the executive, allowed a larger intervention of the state in the economy, extinguished the Senate and convened new presidential elections in 2000, when Chávez was once again reelected.

In the beginning of the 2000s, Venezuelan foreign policy had as its aim turning Hugo Chávez into Latin America's most important political leader. Its action strategy had, at least, three axes: a vigorous speech praising Latin American unity against the 'North-American imperialist threat'; a declared support to left-wing politicians across the region in electoral periods; and financial aid to allied governments and political organizations, including guerillas.

In April 11 of 2002, Hugo Chávez suffered a coup attempt. Rebel military have deterred the president, extinguished the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly and the Court of Justice and abrogated many decrees and laws. The businessman Fernando Francisco Carmona Estanga took over the presidency. The coup lasted less than 48 hours. The opposition of the Venezuelan population, of military factions, especially from the National Guard, and of the Catholic Church led the coup to fail. Across the subcontinent, the region's governments have denounced the interruption of democratic normality in the country. Notwithstanding, the United States government's behavior – which has not only not condemned the coup, but also provided an implicit recognition to the illegal government – displeased the great majority of the countries in region and deeply shook the already complicated relationship between Venezuela and the U.S.

Relations between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Venezuelan government were also a factor that produced intense instability in the subcontinent's northern region. The FARC is a guerrilla group, currently in disarmament process, of Marxist-Leninist ideology, which had emerged in the mid-1960s and which had fought against all the Colombian governments aiming at establishing a socialist regime in the country⁷. The

7 In 2004, as a result of Hugo Chávez's consolidation as Latin American left-wing leader and of his support to the guerrilla fight in Colombia, FARC also adopted Bolivarianism as

Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez stressed that the Latin American countries should not classify the Colombian guerilla as terrorist, but rather as a “belligerent opposition force” (the FARC is considered as a terrorist organization by the governments of the United States and Canada, as well as by the European Union).

The unfriendly relations between the U.S. and Venezuela worsened when, in the beginning of 2006, the United States prevented Hugo Chávez’s government from having access to more recent military technology. First, by preventing the Venezuelan Air Forces from reforming, through a *Mid-Life Update* (MLU)-modernization type, its old attack aircraft F-16 *Fighter Falcon* (models A and B Block 15, which were already obsolete when received in 1983). And after, by forbidding armament manufacturers to export any sort of equipment with North-American technology and using the Arms Export Control Act’s⁸ legislation. Both Brazil and Spain were prohibited to sell training (A-29/*Super Tucano*) and transport (C-295) planes⁹ (Villa and Viggiano 2012).

This was the political background in which Venezuela started a strong process of acquisition of non-western defense material. Venezuela’s policy of increasing its military capabilities began with the purchase, in significant quantities, of Russian belligerent material, first with the acquisition of 24 fighter aircrafts Sukhoi – 30MK2 *Flanker*, 100.000 assault rifles AK-103 (and manufacturing license) and 53 helicopters from *Vertolyoty Rossii*, totaling an estimated amount of US\$ 3 billion (Oliker et al. 2009).

U.S. and regional officials fear that Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez is seeking to foment revolution throughout Latin America and that he will

its political ideology. Ricardo González, member of FARC’s military staff, affirmed that “we are also constructing the Bolivarian Movement for the New Colombia, which is also a clandestine movement strongly rooted in the students’ and laborers’ sectors, in the peripheral neighborhoods of the big cities, in the university sectors and in the intelligentsia. What occurs is an eminently clandestine work, and people cannot reveal to others what they are doing from the point of view of their ideological, political and organizational work”. Available at <http://www.rebelion.org/hemeroteca/plancolombia/040407urbano.htm>. Accessed June 8 2018.

8 Available at http://www.pmdtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/aeca.html.

9 Villa and Viggiano (2012, 33) stress that: “In 2006, the US State Department imposed an embargo that prevents Venezuela from importing goods and services of Defense nature. In the same year, Venezuela was certified by the US government, under Section 40A of the Arms and Control Act (AECA), as a country “not fully cooperative” in the fight against terrorism. The AECA certification was renewed in 2007 and 2008. By this mechanism, Venezuela is not allowed any assistance, sale or financing by the US military. In practice, the US embargo on arms sales has led representatives of the Venezuelan armed forces to pressure the executive to look for alternative import markets. Several arms-producing countries are alert to Venezuela’s air force plans to buy other types of aircraft attached to the Sukhois purchased from Russia”.

use his new Russian-made arsenal for this purpose. Chavez's first target could be Colombia, where Venezuelan-made AK-47s might end up in the hands of the Colombian rebel groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (Oliker et al. 2009, 182).

The Venezuelan armament purchase process had three objectives, being the first one reinforcing its foreign policy by demonstrating full independence of the United States; the second one, enlarging and consolidating the internal support of the military – essential for preventing new attempts of a *coup d'état*; and the third one, modernizing the armed forces.

The acquisition of a large amount of defense material has brought about the unquietness of many political leaderships in South America¹⁰. By that time, the quality of the Latin American countries' military equipment, especially from the Amazon region, was still very inferior to the countries' necessities. In the end of the 1990s and in the beginning of the 21st century, the majority of the armed forces found themselves with their military capacity very reduced. Bolivia, for instance, barely had military aviation – which was reduced to few and obsolete jets Lockheed T-33 Shooting Star) –, and its ground forces were completely unequipped and untrained. Ecuador's air forces, which in the 1990s were capable of competing with the Peruvian one, were almost on the verge of collapsing, being reduced to over a dozen of Israeli fighters KFIR C2 and TC2. Its army, despite well-trained, had few hundreds of AMX 13 light tanks, with low availability. The Peruvian Air Force has probably been the subcontinent's second most powerful one, standing only behind the Chilean one (which had bought dozens of F-16 fighters in 20020. Formally, the Peruvian Air Force had a good combat capacity with its MIG-29S *Fulcrum* and Mirage 2000 C/D, however, it did not have financial means to keep all of its fighters in operation con-

10 One example of this is an interview made by Brazil's ex-president, José Sarney: "South America is the most pacific of the continents. It has been more than one hundred years since we do not have a war. Democracy is consolidated across the whole region. We never allowed the occurrence of an arms race. At the slightest sign, we all react. (...) Thus, Chávez's plan of spending US\$ 60 billions in weapons, transforming Venezuela into a military power, is a threat to the continent. (...) What is this for? For facing the United States? Well, to the superpower, this does not mean anything, but, for us, it is a movement that makes us tremble. One of each: either Brazil enters in the arms race in order to ensure its defense, withdrawing the scarce resources of its budget that has been serving to our social programs, or, then, in order to survive, the country finds itself coerced into taking cover in NATO's umbrella, tragically bringing back Menen's thesis as the only way of defending ourselves. Menem was against Brazil; now we are all uniting to defend ourselves from the "new military power" that will dominate South America" (Folha de São Paulo, 14/07/2006).

ditions¹¹. The army, for its turn, had as its main combating vehicle the old soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks. With the exception of Colombia – where the government used to receive significant material and financial support from the U.S. due to its fight against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –, all of the other Amazon regions' military institutions presented signs of true operational decay.

The last cycle of military equipment's restoration in the South American continent occurred in the first years of the 1970s and lasted until the beginning of the following decade. The subcontinent's countries acquired equipment mostly from its traditional suppliers, namely, the United States, England, Germany and France, while Peru preferred Soviet Union's weaponry rather than the North-American one. Israel, for its turn, has become an important defense equipment's supplier: fighters (IAI Dagger and IAI ARAVA), compact submachine-guns (UZI), non-guided bombs, diverse electronic systems, air-to-air (Shafir and Python) and anti-ship (Gabriel) missiles and missile boats (Sa'ar class).

The purchase of military equipment is a political decision. It is not possible to develop a general theory about what reasons motivate a country to acquire more apparatuses. In general terms, the motivations may be classified as internal (connected, for instance, to the regime's protection, the pursue of the military's political support or even subsidies to the modernization of the defense industry) and/or external (for example, the expansion of the capacity to defend itself from an offensive or to carry one out and the increase in the regional or hemispheric political influence). In the case of South America, the purchase of fighters, tanks, machine guns and ships was inserted with the Cold War's political logic. In the subcontinent, the first country to ever buy Soviet/Russian military equipment was Peru. In 1968, general Juan Velasco Alvarado deposed the then president Fernando Belaúnde Terry and implemented a nationalist administration, with left-wing reformist policies. The political choices of the new military government, such as the nationalization of oil companies (and the posterior creation of the state enterprise PetroPeru) and the increase in the Peruvian territorial sea to 200 maritime miles, automatically put it in collision with Washington. The social and economic policies of the Peruvian military regime and the tensioning in its relations with the U.S. led the Soviet Union to support the Velasco government.

The Velasco regime's anti-imperialist rhetoric and its policies of economic nationalism drew praise and interest from Moscow. Soviet analysts viewed these policies as politically encouraging and capable of shifting the balance

¹¹ Available at <http://larepublica.pe/amp/28-03-2005/los-aviones-de-fujimori-no-servian-para-atacar-ecuador>. Accessed in June 8 2018.

of power in favor of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union gained significant goodwill after a devastating earthquake in the Callejón de Huaylas near Chimbote in northern Peru, killed seventy thousand people and left 500,000 homeless on 31 May 1970. Soviet medical teams gave valuable assistance to the injured and loaned Mi-8 helicopters to be used in relief efforts (Masterson 1991, 258).

In an attempt to become more independent from Washington and return the solidarity of the Iron Curtain countries' governments, the Peruvian military government started to purchase Soviet military material. In 1973, Peru bought 36 Sukhoi-22 *Fitter* fighters (the country has already been operating French Mirage 5 fighters since 1968), 16 transport planes Antonov AN-26, 350 tanks T-54 and T-55, anti-aircraft missiles SAM-3 and SAM-7, rocket-propelled grenade launchers RPG-7 and helicopters MI-6 and MI-8, among other equipment. Nonetheless, the purchase of military apparatuses was restricted to the army and the air force; the navy refused the offer of Russian ships and submarines, preferring Italian ships (Lupo-class frigate) and German submarines (IKL-209). From 1973 to 1985, the military acquisitions from the USSR costed more than 1,6 billion dollars (Clayton 1999).

In the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)'s database, it is possible to identify few purchases of Soviet military material during the 1980s, and only by two buyers, Peru and Guyana (helicopters, missiles and aircrafts)¹². In spite of the economic crisis in the country, the Peruvian governments, in light of the necessity of fighting guerillas, continued to buy military equipment, especially for the air force. The expansion of the defense market for Russian products occurred only after the end of the Cold War. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela began to acquire equipment as diverse as training and maneuvers fighters Sukhoi-29 AR, MANPAD missiles of Igla type and even attack helicopters.

The opening of the South American market after the end of the Cold War was an important fact to the Russian military industry, which suffered from a severe crisis in light of the economic difficulties derived from the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact, in 1991 (Oliker et al. 2009). For the countries of the South American subcontinent, the purchase of Russian material, besides being cheaper than the Western one, also allowed them to avoid the restrictions to the acquisition of more technologically sophisticated defense material, as it is the case of the Igla/SA-18 surface-to-air missile and the

12 In 1983, Argentina bought SAM-7 missiles from Bulgaria and Peru. In 1970, Guyana declared itself as a cooperative republic with strong socialist character. Following this, the country began to purchase transport helicopters 120mm mortars.

Beyond Vision Range (BVR) R-77 air-to-air missile. In an attempt to avoid losses in the South American market share, Bill Clinton's administration abrogated, in 1997, the Presidential Directive 13 (PD-13), instituted by president Jimmy Carter and which almost prohibited the transferring of high-technology armament¹³.

Until 1995, U.S. defense contractors paid little attention to Latin America. In a good year, Latin American generals bought no more than \$1 billion worth of weapons, small change as long as aerospace giants had hundreds of billions of dollars in aircraft sales to the Pentagon and the Middle East. But with the Defense Department shrinking weapons buys and Arab countries no longer placing large orders, the billion-dollar Latin American market suddenly looked attractive.

(...)

Getting the Pentagon to lobby for lifting the restraints was easy. Then Defense Secretary William Perry had met with Latin American generals, and was convinced their days of overthrowing governments was over. If the Pentagon was lucky, it might even be able to unload some of its older model F-16s south of the border and use the proceeds to restock its air wings with newer versions of the Falcon. Industry executives and Perry aides began publicly plugging the idea of lifting the restrictions: the countries of Latin America save for Cuba were now democratic, their economies were rebounding, and the jets their air forces flew in many cases were 1950s vintage, went the spiel. "We treat the Latins like children when we say they can't have new planes," says Joel Johnson, the Aerospace Industries Association's international vice president, implying that to have fully adult relations with other countries requires supplying them with sophisticated armaments¹⁴.

The economic crisis and the expense restriction policies that reached South America during the 1990s translated themselves into a small reduction in the defense expenses, which fell from 2,2% to 1,8% in 1999, in GDP's percentage¹⁵. The reduced decline in the South American countries' expense also occurred in global terms, however, for another reason: the end of the Cold War. From the fall of the Berlin Wall on and during all decade, the global military


13 Available at <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd13.pdf>. Accessed in June 8 2018.

14 Available at <http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/04/07/time/arms.html>. Accessed in June 8 2018.

15 Often, there was an evident wish of purchasing Russian material, but the financial incapacity made the negotiations unfeasible. Even though there has been information about a Brazilian interest in acquiring attack helicopters from Russia in the mid-1990s, in was only in 2010 that such purchase happened (Glinki and Nutenko 1998 *apud* Zubelzú de Bacigalupo 2000).

expense decayed from 3,2% to 2,1% of the GDP.


Graphic 2: Defense Expenditures by Gross Domestic Product



Source: SIPRI

The increase in the economic growth in the 2000s came along with a reconstitution and a modernization of South American countries' military arsenals, particularly Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Among these cases, two may be highlighted due to their strong political content, especially in what concerns the North-American foreign policy and South America: Colombia, which has received North-American investments through the Plan Colombia (provision of U.S.' military aid with the double goal of reducing the production of cocaine and helping the Colombian armed forces to fight against left-wing guerilla groups) and Venezuela, with its policy of purchasing Russian armament. The defense-related expenditures in the subcontinent, which were of approximately US\$ 24 billion in the beginning of the century, increased up to US\$ 32 billion in 2007¹⁶, reaching US\$ 57 billion in 2015 (SIPRI 2016). However, if one observes this increase in GDP percentage terms, it becomes possible to notice that the expenses with defense fell from 3,5 (1985) to 1,9 (2002) and 1,7 (2014).

¹⁶ Data from "Nueva Maioria – Balance Militar de América del Sul (2004)": <http://www.nuevamayoria.com/ES/BIBLIOTECA/?file=resenas/041116.html>. Accessed June 8 2018.

Graphic 3: Defense Expenditures by Per Capita Income

Source: SIPRI

If the defense expenses, in GDP terms, had no increase, in per capita terms, it raised from U\$ 3,674,00 (1985) to U\$ 3,800,00 (2002), reaching U\$ 6,251 (2015 data). One may highlight the increase in the per capita expenses of Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador and Colombia. The South America's countries low expense in GDP terms, when compared to the rise in per capita terms, shows that part of the strong economic growth of the period was transformed into defense expenses.

The most impressive case in the period regarding the increase in defense expenses was the one of Ecuador, whose spending went from 1,5% to reach its maximum of 3,1% of the GDP between 2009 and 2011, falling 0,03% until 2014. In per capita terms, the increase reached 240%.

Within the framework of the South American Defense Council, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) publicized the so-called South American Defense Expenditure Registry. The document has revealed that Ecuador is the region's country that directs the largest percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to military expenses: 2,74% in 2010. Colombia directs 1,89%, while for Brazil this amount is of 0,77%. During the meeting held yesterday in Quito, UNASUR identified four main objects of the defense expenditure. The major part of the investments in the area focuses on personnel, followed by resources to operations and maintenance. In third place, there are the investments in weaponry and infrastructure and, finally, investigation (Our translation)¹⁷.

¹⁷ Available at <http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/seguridad/ecuador-destina-mayor-porcentaje-del.html>. Accessed June 8 2018.

According to the Russian state company of defense equipment's' exports, *Rosoboronexport*¹⁸, the country exported, between 2001 and 2017, more than US\$ 10 billion in military apparatuses to Latin America's countries¹⁹. Despite the apparently high volume, it represents only 4,6% of the total number of Russian weapons exported across the world, whose main market is the Asian one, which accounts for 70% (2000 – 2016). Venezuela is by far the major Latin American purchaser, representing 80% of Russia's sales (Connolly and Sendstad 2017). Besides the Bolivarian regime, other countries that, since the beginning of the century, have acquired Russian equipment are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay²⁰. Chile does not possess any defense equipment manufactured in Russia.

Venezuela and Peru are the countries with the largest number of Russian military equipment in their inventories; the other countries of the subcontinent have acquired more North-American and European equipment, especially Chile. The variety of Russia's weapons sold in South America comprises, mainly, rifles (AK), many calibers cannons, transport and attack helicopters (Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Mi-35), anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles and transport vehicles (BMP and BTR). There is no data in SIPRI regarding Russian manufactured ships and submarines acquired by South America's navies. Researches in the Venezuelan and Peruvian armed forces' websites also do not indicate the incorporation of Russian warships. Interestingly, the main naval equipment of both forces are very similar: Italian frigates, German submarines and other smaller ships from diverse countries. In 2002, Venezuela established an agreement with Cuba for the construction of coastal patrol boats (Damen Stan 2600) in the country, through the state-owned shipyard Ucocar²¹, and acquired eight landing ships (Damen Stan Lander 5612), built in Vietnam by the Ha Long Shipbuilding shipyard. Both are models of Dutch design.

Russian-manufactured planes fly under the insignias of many of the subcontinent's air forces. Nevertheless, Russian aircrafts for fighter and bombing purposes are only used by Peru and Venezuela. The situations in which each country has purchased this material were very distinct, however. The Sukhoi -22 Fitter were incorporated into the Peruvian Air Force in the 1970s, as part of a broader agreement for the modernization of the armed forces. In 1996/8, the Peruvians acquired, in a purchase from Belarus, 18 fighters MiG-29 *Fulcrum*, without previously consulting Russia. The acquisition has

18 Available at <http://roe.ru/eng/>. Accessed June 8 2018.

19 Available at https://br.rbth.com/defesa/2017/04/24/americ-latina-comprou-mais-de-us-10-bilhoes-em-armamentos-russos_749491. Accessed June 8 2018.

20 In the mid 1990s, Uruguay bought from Czechoslovakia transport vehicles BMP-1.

21 Available at http://www.ucocar.gob.ve/ucocar_jo/.

created some tensions between diplomatic and military authorities in Moscow and Lima, given *Mikoyan-Gurevich* (MIG)'s refusal in offering the plane's maintenance – issue that has been overcome by Peru's purchase of three more MIG-29, directly from the manufacturer²².

In the case of Venezuela, already mentioned before, the acquisition occurred as a response of Hugo Chávez government to the U.S.' prohibition on the access to technology for the modernization and purchase of military equipment. However, there has always been a strong questioning about the operational availability of the Sukhoi-30 Flanker MK2²³ in the Bolivarian Military Aviation.

(...) after 8 years [2014] of its incorporation, it is not very common to see the Su-30 fulfilling their task of intercepting aircrafts raiding the Venezuelan airspace, as in the incidents with the North-American P-3 Orion. In these cases, and also in the interception of narco traffic-related flights, the employed aircrafts have been the already old F-16A/B Block 15 OCU.

After a few years since the incorporation of the Su-30 MK2, all of the fleet had to stay on the ground for three months due to the lack of pieces for its operation. In this particular case, these were pieces that were not manufactured in Venezuela and which the Russian supplier had taken long to send to Venezuela.

In the branches of the Venezuelan Military Aviation, there is a lot of dissatisfaction with the customer service of Russian enterprises, especially for being a non-reliable supply and for having an inadequate technical support. This issue has been overshadowing the much appreciated qualities of the Su-30 MK2 in Venezuela, forcing the Venezuelan Military Aviation to depend on the F-16 as first line fighters, despite the embargo problems that reduce the F-16 fleet and hamper its modernization.

The Flankers's incorporation in Venezuela has created many expectations for the Venezuelan Military Aviation, however, the Russian post-sale service has been bringing about many problems and, alongside a very low average of monthly flight hours, the Flanker has converted itself into an unreliable system for Venezuela, thus creating a gap in the Venezuelan air capacities²⁴ (Our translation).

In spite of the problems that may have occurred during the incorporation process of the Russian aircraft fighters, the Venezuelan government actually had a reduced maneuver space for the purchase of combat aircraft from other manufacturers, as in the case of the European deltas (Eurofighter Typhoon or

22 Available at <http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/peru/mig.htm>. Accessed June 8 2018.

23 At Cruzex 2013, the Bolivarian Military Aviation was represented by four F-16 jets.

24 Available at <http://www.planobrazil.com/a-reduzida-operatividade-dos-sukhois-venezuelanos/>. Accessed June 8 2018.

JAS Gripen) or even Chinese fighters (J-10 or J-17). In 2015, President Nicolás Maduro announced the order of more 12 Sukhoi-30 MK2 in order to replace two models that were lost in accidents and to totally abandon the use of the F-16 *Fighting Falcons*. The cost of the new jets was estimated to be around half billion dollars.

The concentration of Russian sales to Venezuela and the increase in the competition with military equipment from other countries has been obliging Russia to introduce a more aggressive exporting policy of armaments for Latin American, especially in the countries that ought to modernize their armed forces and which are big *commodities'* exporters, particularly Peru, Ecuador and Argentina. Another important fact is the attempt to enter in modernizing programs of military equipment from the Soviet era, such as in the case of the Peruvian T-55.

China has been the major commercial partner of South America since the beginning of the 21st century. The Chinese economic dynamism, which, throughout many years, had translated itself into growth rates around 10%, had a reflection in the rise of trade relations with the subcontinent's countries. From 2000 to 2015, the commercial expansion increased 22 times. According to Holland and Barbi (2010), the relations between China and Latin America occur in four ways: (i) as an importer of natural resources and energy; (ii) as an exporter of industrialized products, manufactured in Chinese territory; (iii) through the formation of *joint-ventures*²⁵ partnerships; and (iv) as a loan provider²⁶.

In 2015, China became the third global weapons' exporter, standing only behind the United States and Russia. The Chinese weapons' largest buyers are Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, representing almost 70% of the total amount (Fleurant et al. 2017). Despite the increase in the Chinese weaponry's importance in the global trade, a question arises: what is the technologic development level of the Chinese armament? Apparently, China has developed a le-

25 "In 2008, the state company *Petróleos de Venezuela* (PDVSA) established a *joint venture* with China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) in order to develop the fourth bloc of the Junin field, in the Orinoco river. Within this project's framework, the Chinese corporation will have a share of 40% in the participation. PetroChina, for its turn, established with the PDVSA a *joint venture* to build and operate an oil refinery, with a capacity of 400 thousand barrels per day (B/D) withdrawn from the Junin 4 well. PetroChina has a share of 60% in this project" (Holland and Barbi 2010, 22. Our translation).

26 In May 2009, "(...) the China Development Bank (CDB) loaned US\$ 10 billion to Petrobras. The agreement postulates that the company shall export 150 thousand barrels of petroleum per day to Unipac Asia, Sinopec's subsidiary, China's state company of petroleum, from 2009 on, and 200 thousand barrels per day between 2010 and 2019" (Holland and Barbi 2010, 22. Our translation).

gal strategy of importing high-technology weapons to posteriorly introduce innovations with the aid of industrial espionage, as it is the case of the Nanchang Q/A-5 *Fantan* (a modernized version of the Mig-19 *Farmer*/Shenyang J-6, with an intelligent *retrofit* of the air entrance and of the radar's radome) and the Chengdu F-7 (Chinese replica of the Mig-21 *Fishbed*, which was equipped with Western avionics – radar Type 226 Skyranger from the English BAE System).

From the 1950s on, China began to import defense material from the Soviet Union and to assemble – with or without license – many equipment, from the AK-47 rifle (Norinco Type 56), to tanks as the T-54 (Norinco Type 59) and T-62 (Norinco Type 69) and to many types of aircraft. In almost all of the cases, the Chinese began to construct the equipment under license in order to posteriorly introduce modifications, until managing to build apparatuses with the maximum number of components developed in the country. With the economic opening of the 1980s and the 1990s and the *boom* of the Chinese economic growth in the 2000s, China began to receive and invest more in defense technologic research, however, without abandoning its traditional strategy. As shown by the cases of the Sukhoi-27SK – Shenyang F/J-11²⁷.

If, on the one hand, the Chinese have demonstrated a high industrial espionage capacity (as, for instance, in the strong design similarities between the fighter F-22 *Raptor* and the Chinese -20, as well as between U.S.' drone MQ-9 *Reaper* and China's CASC CH-5 *Caihong*), on the other, there is a deep questioning about the current quality of Chinese equipment's production²⁸. The IAI Lavi/Chengdu J-10 case, the licensed construction of the French helicopter AS365 *Dauphin* (Harbin Z-9), the extensive utilization of Russian engines (Saturn AL-31) in the main combat aircrafts, the utilization of Ukrainian engines in the main Chinese tank (MTB2000) and in advanced training aircrafts (Ko8 and L-15), as well as the employment of Western technology in the missiles' guiding systems and other sensitive technologies²⁹ show that the country still is not capable of producing high-quality military equipment without any sort of external aid³⁰.

27 Available at <https://sputniknews.com/russia/2008022199765686/>. Accessed June 8 2018.

28 Available at <https://www.epochtimes.com.br/armas-da-china-real-guerra/#.WcmS6ozOqu4>. Accessed June 8 2018.

29 Available at <https://www.newsweek.com/chinese-military-power-us-might-643022>. Accessed June 8 2018.

30 When analyzing Chinese armed forces' difficulties in coping with the XXI century's transformations, Li Xiang (2013, 26-27) affirms that "it is urgent to enhance the independent innovation of defense-related science, technology, and industry. Scientific and technological progress is essential for implementing key information technologies, consequently improving the information level of weapons and equipment. However, there are still many problems to be solved in the national defense science and technology industry of China. For example, the

(...) China has made considerable headway in modernizing its defense science, technology, and industrial capabilities and has achieved impressive results in a number of areas since the turn of this century. Generational improvements have been made in the development and production of a growing array of weapons, from warships to combat aircraft, although the Chinese defense industry overall still lags technologically one or two generations behind the global frontier. Sharply increased funding for research and development, sustained high-level leadership attention, and the absorption of advanced foreign technologies, especially from Russia, are some of the major reasons for these gains” (Chase et al. 2015, 126).

Argentina³¹, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru and Venezuela possess military equipment of Chinese production in their arsenals. The first weapons were bought in the beginning of the of the 1990s by the Bolivian, Ecuadorian and Peruvian government. The former two acquired mainly cannons and howitzers (D20 and M30), portable missiles MANPADS (HN-5A) type and anti-tank missiles (Red Arrow-8). The latter one, for its turn, bought Harbin Y-12 light transport aircraft. There is a gap of almost 10 years in the purchase of Chinese weaponry by the countries of the subcontinent. From the 2000s on, there was a significant increase in the purchase of defense material from China, either in terms of volume and embarked technology. Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela started to acquire many types of equipment that outstand for its employed technology rates, such as infantry fighting vehicles (VN16 and 18), diverse types of radars (JY-1, JY-11, YLC-18, YLC-2), helicopters (H-425 and Z-9), advanced training aircraft (Honddu JL-8/K-8 Karakorum³² – an aircraft very similar to the English jet BAE Hawk) and the short range air-to-air PL5E missile.

The purchase of Chinese military material seems to occur mainly due to their prices, given that they are cheaper than the Western and Russian ones, and to political reasons, since China does not establish any restriction to a country

structure is irrational; enterprise reform has not been deep enough; competition and capacity still need to improve; and there is also a lack of strategic planning and institutional building of integrated military-civilian development. These prominent contradictions should be solved in the second decade of this century”.

31 Besides acquiring Chinese military equipment, Argentina has acquired a license to manufacture the CZ-11 light utility helicopters, a reproduction of the European AS 350B Ecureil.

32 Bolivia had established an agreement with the Czech jets’ manufacturer Aero Vodochody in order to purchase L-159 ALCA advanced training jets. However, the North-American government vetoed the sale in light of the intense utilization of U.S.’ technology in the Czech jet, as, for instance, the Honeywell F124-GA-100 engine. Due to this, Evo Morales’ government chose the K-8 jet, which was the one that has been bought by Venezuela. Available at <https://moraisvinna.blogspot.com/2009/08/chance-para-os-l-15-ou-yak-130-eua-nao.html>. Accessed June 8 2018.

because of its political regime. An important factor for the rise in the sales has been the offer of financing through state banks, especially the China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure) and the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank)³³ to the purchase of this material³⁴. Another element that shall be highlighted is the fact that the main Chinese weapons' buyers in South America are all countries with strong left-wing governments. In such cases, besides the Chinese financing, one may notice that probably some governments have been attempting to escape from the dependence of the Russian armament, especially Venezuela.

In a similar way to the Russian defense equipment, it was not possible to find any information regarding South American countries' purchase of ships or submarines manufactured in China or which use Chinese technology. Although countries as Venezuela and Uruguay have shown interest in acquiring new offshore patrol vessels derived from the P-18N model, a likely reason for a disinterest may be the scarce contact between South America's navies and the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), as the one that occurred in 2013, when a small Chinese flotilla composed by the Lanzhou (Type 052C) destroyer and the Liuzhou (Type 054A) frigate participated in maneuvers with the Chilean army and the Brazilian navy. Furthermore, in spite of an excellent stealth design, the new Chinese ships intensely employ Russian technology.

In what concerns training ships and other types of warships, the first of these visits was made by the Chilean navy's training ship, Esmeralda, which reached the port of Shanghai in 1972. Until 2009, Esmeralda had visited Chinese ports in 10 different occasions. As a reciprocity, China's first naval flotilla visited Latin America in April 1997. It included destroyers (missiles) Harbin and Zhuhai and the logistic ship Nancang. The flotilla docked in Mexico, Peru and Chile, as well as in the North-American base of Pearl Harbor. The most recent visit of this kind, in the moment that this article was being redacted, occurred in 2009 – a naval flotilla from China, which included the destroyer Shijazhuang and the feeder ship Hongzhehu docked in Valparaíso, Chile; Callao, Peru; and Guayaquil, Ecuador. In spite of having a pacific character, those visits benefited the PLA, allowing them to identify the conditions for a future utilization of Latin American ports for maintenance, replenishment and other purposes (Evans 2012, 32. Our translation).

33 Available at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-17/china-s-easy-money-flows-abroad-as-credit-squeeze-hurts-at-home>. Accessed June 8 2018.

34 From 2013 on, China also began to donate military equipment to Ecuador, Bolivia, Guyana, Colombia and Peru.

Besides the Asian giant, other Asian countries have been trying to enter in the subcontinent's defense market. Since 2012, South Korea had been rising as a new actor in the South American trade of defense equipment³⁵. Colombia and Peru have been the first buyers of Seoul. The South Korean strategy is partly similar to China's and other countries' strategy: donation of secondhand equipment and posterior sale of new ones³⁶. Accordingly, the Koreans have donated to the Peruvian and Colombian navies old corvettes; to the former, of the *Pohang* class, and, to the latter, of the *Donghae* one. As an outcome of the negotiations, the Koreans also established *joint-ventures* between the company STX and the enterprises COTEMAR (Colombia) and SIMA (Peru) looking forward to the construction, transferring of technology and development of new offshore patrol vessel's models. The Peruvians are constructing 14 patrols, and, the Colombians, 16.

The Korean strategy had already been used in the country's entrance into other defense markets, especially the Asian one, dominated by the U.S., Russia and China. From the year 2000 on, the South Korean government donated to the Philippines, Kazakhstan, Bangladesh, Ghana, East Timor and Trinidad and Tobago many patrol vessels from the class *Chamsuri*. These donations allowed the establishment of new negotiation processes for the posterior sale of other equipment, as advanced training/attack aircrafts KAI T-50, landing ships and the purchase of corvettes for the Philippines (which has bought for 100 dollars a *Pohang* class corvette), rifles and machine guns manufactured by Daewoo to the navy of Bangladesh, and munitions of many types to East Timor's Defence Force.

South Korea's main sales in the South American market has been twenty KAI KT-1 basic trainer aircrafts for the Peruvian air force – alongside technology transferring, the modernization of aircraft assembly facilities and the development of a specific flight simulator – and two marine landing ships (class *Makassar*) constructed in the country. Moreover, sixteen anti-ship C-Star SSM-700K missiles were sold to the Colombian navy in order to replace the Exotec French missiles.

35 Formerly, the country had sold less sophisticated equipment. "Korean Aerospace Industries aims to expand its market in South America as well. Since 2006, Latin American countries have imported \$48.9 million worth of ROK defense gear including trucks, flak vests, ammunition, and communication devices". Available at http://www.sldinfo.com/the-evolution-of-south-korean-defense-industry-an-emerging-global-player/#_ftn60. Accessed June 8 2018.

36 Available at https://idsa.in/idsacomments/decommissioned-military-hardware_sbmaraj_100117. Accessed June 8 2018.

Conclusion

The aim of this text is to discuss how the political changes occurred in South America during the first years of the 21st century influenced the purchase of modern military equipment by some South American countries. Deep economic and political changes took place in the subcontinent. Many left-wing governments took over the power at the same time as there was occurring an expressive increase in the growth rates of the developing countries' economies. The rise in the *commodities'* prices enhanced not only welfare programs, but also the purchase of defense equipment.

The purchase of defense material is a political decision. The motivations for a country to acquire defense material derive both from international (such as the character of the political regime) and external issues (possibility of conflict). In 1968 and 1973, Guyana and Peru, respectively, started to acquire Russian armaments as a result of their political approximation with Moscow, thus leaving U.S.' military equipment aside. Even with the end of the Cold War, the Peruvians continued granting preference to Russian-manufactured aircraft. Other countries began to acquire other equipment that were not supplied by the U.S. or that were possibly subjected to vetoes, such as the Igla-S missiles bought by Brazil in the mid-1990s.

Venezuela certainly is the most emblematic case. The political positions of president Hugo Chávez have put him in collision with Washington. George Bush's and Barack Obama's administrations have blocked Caracas' attempts to modernize U.S.-manufactured equipment and have established vetoes to the sales of other apparatuses using North-American technology, produced by Europeans or by Brazil, for instance. The result was the institution, by the Venezuelan government, of a policy marked by extensive armaments' purchase from Moscow. Posteriorly, China also became an important supplier, alongside Cuba and Vietnam. The Venezuelan government's decision also had a strong influence in the defense equipment's purchase made by Bolivia, which also suffers from U.S.' veto.

The biggest threat to the sale of Russian equipment in the region seems to come from China. With an enhancement in the economic and political relations derived from the Chinese expansion, Beijing began to invest in the sale of military equipment through the financing of state banks to many governments. Ecuadorians, Bolivians, Venezuelans and Argentinians started to purchase various types of Chinese equipment, ranging from cannons to advanced training aircrafts.

Another important competitor that has been entering into the South American market is South Korea. With an already tested selling strategy in oth-

er countries (donation of ships and posterior offer of products), the Republic of Korea has been attracting South American countries that aim at diversifying their suppliers of high-technology equipment, such as aircrafts, ships and missiles.

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ABSTRACT

The article tries to discuss if the impact of the political changes, which occurred in South America from the first decade of the century, influenced the purchase of military equipment by some countries of the region. The emergence of new governments, with a strong left leaning, occurred concurrently with a clear change in the classic pattern of buying defense equipment. European countries and the US have come to be preferred, as opposed to Russia and China, as suppliers of arms to the various South American armed forces.

KEYWORDS

Politics, Defense, Russia, China, South Korea.

Translated by Rafaela Elmir Fiorezi

THE MOBILIZATION OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE IN SOUTH AMERICA THROUGH THE BRAZILIAN ADMISSION IN THE NATO CATALOG SYSTEM

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Introduction

Modernity has brought the progress of science and technology applied to the instruments of use of force. Before they were simple manufactures of shields, swords, and spears, the greater complexity of weapons required increasingly sophisticated production systems, able of handling the multiplicity of subsystems, parts, and components, in the scale of thousands and, in some cases, millions of items. The management of so many components, whether to obtain weapons systems or to maintain them, has become the object of concern and systematization and control efforts.

The improvement and use of cataloging systems is increasingly needed amongst industrial defense bases and complex markets, with products considered strategic and a chain of supplies directly or indirectly related to the bases, and of great impact in the global economy. Therefore, cataloging systems can allow the entrance in markets of producers and buyers that sharpen partnerships in other sectors of the economy, at the same time as they end

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up obliging the standardization of a series of procedures related to the quality and international demands of standardization of production.

Thus, the impact caused by the entrance of a country into a system gives it access to a relevant number of subsystems within and outside the defense product chain. If the impact of this market on economic growth has already been studied without having guaranteed reliable results in relation to this proportional relationship, the tendency to make markets more efficient has been translated by grouping more actors into common systems, with a corresponding increase in confidence.

The changes that are in progress are associated with the project established by the defense documents, after the creation of the Ministry of Defense. The National Defense Policy (Decree No. 5.484, dated June 30, 2005), updated in 2012 as the National Defense Policy (PND), was followed by the National Defense Strategy (NDT), which would assume the commitment to handle the implementation of the guidelines of the previous document. The White Paper on National Defense, under review in 2017, as well as the other documents, also notes the commitment to structure the Armed Forces “around capabilities, equipping them with personnel and material compatible with strategic and operational planning; and develop the potential of defense logistics and national mobilization.”

Among these guidelines are strategic partnerships, the integration of South American defense industries, capacity for power projection, and provision of the appropriate level of security to the country. The protocols that established this standardization and which are under the scope of the NATO Codification System (NCS) have been developed over the last few years and have made Brazil one of the emerging countries of the Global South outside NATO to join this regime evolving from Tier 1 country for Tier 2³, which allows you to disclose your cataloging or management data to the NCS database. Other countries such as Singapore and Malaysia have evolved in this direction before Brazil; Austria, Australia and New Zealand did after.

The purpose of this article is to describe and analyze the determinants and repercussions of Brazil's entry into the NATO Codification System (NCS) for the National Defense and Development National Base (agreed in April 1997). The central hypothesis is that, through this process, there was a progressive conditioning of the national defense industry, and correlates, in favor of protocolization, which extended the internationality and scope of national agents, both as buyers and sellers, within this system and subsystems. The

³ Typically Tier 1 companies offer the most advanced supply chain processes. In Tier 2 cases, companies are smaller and have fewer technical advantages than Level 1 companies and, while no less vital to the supply chain, are more limited in what they can produce.

analysis of the process of inclusion of Brazil in the NSC and the characteristics and purposes involved and the analysis of the repercussions for Brazil. To do this, before the analysis of the repercussions, there is an explanation of the method used, once the objectives of the article consolidate through a medium-term prospective vision.

The cataloging system adopted by NATO

Brazil started to have a greater demand for managing defense systems from the end of the Second World War, when an extensive number of products and partners were included in the market along with the demands of post-war reorganization. Nevertheless, the cataloging system that began in the United States was incorporated by Brazil only in the late 1960s, with the creation of the “Permanent Commission for the Cataloging of Materials” by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces (EMFA). Already in the 1980s, efforts were directed to the creation of the catalog management system, which came into operation in 1982, under the name of Military Cataloging System (SISMICAT). The standardization of this system in accordance with the precepts of organization of the catalog adopted by NATO takes place in 1986, but between 1987 and 1994 the Armed Forces develop their own systems of administration of defense products.

The cataloging model gained institutional status with the creation in 1998 of the Armed Forces Cataloging Center (CECAFA), one year before the creation of the Ministry of Defense (MD). From this, understandings were developed with the main member countries of NATO so that the CECAFA could act based on regulations already practiced. Changes in the management of CECAFA occurred during the consolidation period of the Ministry of Defense until it was renamed CECADE (Defense Cataloging Center), as well as the SISMICAT renamed SISCAD (Defense Cataloging System). In 2017 the prioritization of the theme motivated the creation of CASLODE, namely, the Support Center for Defense Logistics Systems, where cataloging is one of the tasks. These latest changes occurred in compliance with the new legal framework of the Industrial Defense Base⁴.

The *NATO Codification System (NCS)* represents, in addition to a product catalog, a logistical planning object that has the scope to modify national systems of purchase and sale, given the requirements of payment, membership and standardization, intrinsic to participation in this system. The collection method associated with the catalog can be divided between collecting

4 Law n. 12.598, that establishes development mechanisms to the brazilian defense industry.

data, sorting, identifying, coding and establishing the NATO stock number. In this system, operators identify Brazilian companies and products by the letter “K” (companies) and by the number “19” (products). The classification system derives from the *NATO Codification System (NCS)* of the U.S., improved after World War II, introduced in NATO in 1958 (Hunter 2009). What used to be a platform for international operations to ensure that the military in operation has the required item in the right time, has gained more scope today (Hunter 2009).

The extent of products in the catalog is large and offers service providers and users greater clarity of item availability and possible windows of opportunity for the development of derivative and / or complementary technologies (Taylor 1982). For the purposes of autochthonous defense development, availability ensures visibility in commitments whose amounts are relatively high and long term, due to the aggregated technological factor. The main concept attributed to the evolution of the on-screen system is that of rationalization, since it unites efficiency of the product to the efficiency related to the cost of production and its logistic chain (Taylor 1982). The model in question is governed by the *NATO Group of Directors on Codification* (AC / 135).

The ongoing processes that are the subject of this study are endowed with a system that had adherence to the defense sector known as “*Enterprise Resource Planning*”. ERP is not only a data integration model for organizational management efficiency but, in the defense economy sector, it allows the interpellation of public and private individuals to build a more efficient logistics base than before. It is therefore necessary to observe the current model in the case of the NATO cataloging system with regard to processes, logics and expectations of results that matter to both defense economics studies and Brazil’s inclusion in this scenario for the coming years.

Although we recognize that certain options in this theme have an intrinsic political character, the interest in being in the catalog derives from the search for greater projection and efficiency of Brazil’s industrial defense base (IDB), whose variables are predominantly commercial, technological, and economic. Embraer is an example of a company that, being in the European market and having branching in Portugal, had to adapt itself to the requirements contained in the catalog system and to the life cycle of the products (for the sale of the KC390).

Thus, this admission ends up widening the interests of NATO members, and can bring positive results for Brazil in the coming years. A country can make use of the catalog, but it must make the request to be a member and insert its industrial base, having access to the logistical management system that allows organizing the life cycle of its base of defense. It is important to

emphasize that the essential thing is to evaluate the importance of the cataloging system undergoing for the IDB, regarding the determinants of this process and the expected results. The political implications will be the result of speculation of the expected results of economic origin here exposed to the end, in the form of four scenarios derived from the combination of expectations of growth or crisis in Brazil and the NATO System.

The so-called *Master Reference Catalog for Logistics (NMCRL)* is a project coordinated by the NATO Procurement and Support Agency and represents a large base of inventories of defense products and services in the world. The existing system has about 28 million units and more than 17 million items numbered, revised and expanded every two months (here considering companies registered by governments). The software services available for cataloging between NATO partners are categorized as *commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)*, for those whose use can be exercised immediately and in any conditions they are, or *government off-the-shelf (GOTS)*, made especially for governments⁵. The first one has commercial use only, and the later has access to softwares developed by the governments of Australia, Spain, Bulgaria and Italy, already used by other actors of the NATO system.

Other indexing programs are part of the NATO structure, such as those linked to the *NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA)*. Under the control of the NSPA, the *NATO Logistics Stock Exchange (NLSE)*, for example, functions as the exchange of assets that are in excess; reports on the military to improve asset management; management of common stock and virtual stocks; the processing of emergency support from NATO, including the liquidation of financial transaction in progress. The issue of examples is an element of differentiation because the catalog enables the mobilization of items that are available to eventual groups that are considered virtual, given that they are able to anticipate solutions based on exceeding stocks from multiple actors (Koch Rodoseck 2012; Barbarello et al., 2000).

In turn, the services included in the Catalog - where Brazil is inserted now, and precipitously, a platform based on a cataloging method - are divided into weapons systems, logistical services such as projects, softwares and operational logistics.

The Brazilian option for the MC Catalog (*Material Codification Catalog*), one of the three of the COTS categories of commercial base, is the most adopted option (19 out of the 47 catalog members), and deals with a trading system developed by the Czech company AURA, with friendly and web-

⁵ See presentation of the Ministry of Defense to ABIMAQ - <http://camaras.org.br/Arquivos/Download/Upload/2025.pdf>, accessed June 8, 2018.

based⁶ interface. After Brazil's implementation of the system, the country participates with access to the products and services offered, but also as a classifier agent of Brazilian industries for services and products included in the catalog. Such a system obliges Brazil to record production, information and supply standards for the defense and security market, making the country a "quasi-complete" participant, since it is not a member of the NATO system.

If this inclusion in the Catalog is the object of interest in the aspect of the economic diversification and internationalization of Brazil and its industrial base, as foreseen in the defense documents, the scope of this representation can have effects in other important areas such as interoperability between Armed Forces, regional integration and relations with neighboring states, bilateral and multilateral relations with NATO actors, among other aspects not yet estimated.

In the United States, a report addressed, in 2002, to the *Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support Committee on Armed Services* of the Senate, by the *United States General Accounting Office* focused on efforts to manage competition and raising prices by the Agency of Defense Logistics (DLA). At that time, the key concern was the decline of the NATO system and the possibility that efforts at innovation could continue at the same pace as in the Cold War, since in the ensuing period the effects of disarmament could be felt by the US in terms of development (Cooper 2002).

The visible concern in the report was that prices could reach a reasonable range between cost and return of the development (*ROI – Return on Investment*) (Cooper 2002), by updating the logistics base for linking producers and buyers. Criticism of earlier systems was directed at low upgradeability and thus little reflection on the price patterns of the ordinary world. In addition, an information system that would ensure exposure and competitiveness could be highly productive for the United States purchasing system. As it is one of the most complex systems in the world involving producers and buyers, including multilateral and bilateral relations, the cataloging system adopted by NATO has implications for inside and outside the structure of that organization.

Brazil is inserted in the system for different reasons. With the end of the Cold War, the role of the actors in the international system was being reviewed, even, of the regimes with military effect. The North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) Treaty, as a regime shaped by the East-West conflict, was also reconditioned to the demands of the late twentieth century, beginning with

6 To access the countries and catalog types used, go to http://www.nato.int/structur/AC/I35/main/links/tools_codification.html

the Bosnian War, where the imperative was already focused on peacekeeping missions (Gaddis 1992).

The Brazilian case is particular for several reasons, some of them expressed previously. As a consequence of the National Defense Policy (PND), the National Defense Strategy (NDT) and the National Defense White Paper (LBDN), the IDB regulatory framework, in which Law 12,598 / 2012 is featured, regulated by Decree 7.970 / 2013, consolidates the second structuring axis among the three established in the NDT. The translation of this commitment can be simplified by (1) the promise of making the defense system more autonomous, (2) increasing efficiency, reducing costs, and (3) ensuring greater interoperability among the armed forces. In this sense, the cataloging and mapping of this system, with a view to its internationality, can accelerate this process.

All of these conditionalities, expressed in the three defense documents (PND, NDT, LBDN), reinforced by the IDB regulatory framework, show interest in developing a model that combines the aspirations of expansion and growth with the already present features of strengths in fields like natural resources, population, territory. Although the project of participating in international fora with proportional resourcefulness has been affected by the advance of the domestic economic and political crisis, the Brazilian participation in the NATO cataloging system seems to have been a low cost investment, provided by the opportunity to defend the permanent seat in the Security Council, which would normalize the Brazilian system vis-à-vis most board members.

It should be noted that the NATO Cataloging System is composed of member and non-member countries and this configuration also changes by the time that more or less stable relations between partners in the system and outside it.

Recently, the Crimean Crisis (2014) led to the split of this system between the Russians and NATO, when Crimea was annexed by Russia and ceased to be an autonomous unit with possibilities of narrowing with the European Union (Pereira 2010). On that front, the European Union and the United States strongly supported Ukraine in facing the decision related to Crimea, which may have contributed to the Russians ceasing to join the system as supplier of a large group of items and services, now recaptured by other members of the system. But it is important to note that the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, which are now part of NATO, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, among others, and which have developed industrial defense bases with origins or support in Russian technologies, maintain relationship with the Russian defense industry. There are also the large number of countries that belong to the SOC and that employ Russian material -

Brazil is a case and India is perhaps the most relevant.

While increasing tensions in relations lead to a high degree of uncertainty about the supply and mutual trust generated by the common system of supply of defense material - another possible consequence of the degree of transparency of the system - the interdependence between these actors is hardly broken by a single system. The fact of the departure of a major actor does not imply the disruption of the system, since ties of another nature remain.

This case allows us to consider that the dynamics related to the defense economy are directly associated with the degree of proximity and trust between partners, which leads to an understanding about the system that is even more particularized (Sandler & Hartley 2001; Sandler & Hartley 2007; Mesa 2012). This is not to say that there are no relevant tensions among actors in the system. The popular maxim that says "if not against them, join them" is also paralleled in defense economics studies of cooperative arrangements that are disproportionately formed between actors, both in terms of strength and economic robustness (Olson 1966).

Faced with the withdrawal of a major supplier and the process of new cataloging as the responsibility of other actors in the system, new dynamics are incorporated, just as productive rearrangements also reflect relationships in the international system. It is relevant, therefore, to highlight that, despite the Brazilian defense documents between the first and second decades of 2000 reinvigorating the autonomous and developmental platform of Brazil (Dagnino 2008), in terms of foreign policy, the autonomist relations had a relevant political contribution from the last decades for both the autonomy project for integration and the autonomy project for diversification (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007).

In the same way that the South-South proposals took place in the different political projects of Brazil of the last decades, the North-South relations also happened circumstantially by the continuity, solidity or absence of alternative, in the same period. At the same time, it is possible to defend the presence of a dominant foreign policy paradigm present in the last governments - which represented priority waves of action and distinct models of development, at a time focused on openness and pragmatic relations, and other focused on horizontal relations (Vigevani & Cintra 2003; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007).

In this case, relations derived from SOC insertion can fit into the scope of North-South relations, whose dependence weights cause an expectation of disproportionality and limited ability to change status by smaller actors. On the other hand, non-insertion into universal systems such as NATO can

leave these same actors out of competition with any portion of that system. Moreover, with respect to tensions, they continue to exist and occur despite the participation of these and other systems of cooperation which, depending on individual actors and interests, are constantly under review. While the 29 NATO countries are present, there are 13 countries in the Tier 2 category, and another 21 in Tier 1⁷, making a total of 34 non-NATO countries.

Challenges of the Cataloging System for Brazil

Within this context, one of the initiatives had as an objective to seek the knowledge of the productive chains so that a project of knowledge management on the Industrial Base of Defense (Knowledge of the Business Base of Interest of the Defense) was proposed. This project is currently underway between the Ministry of Defense and companies, whose applied development model sought, among other objectives, the resumption of the surface ship industry, providing an efficient relationship between the Brazilian Navy, Ministry of Defense, on the one hand, and suppliers on the other. The initiative did not target only naval assets, it focuses on all products classified as strategic and defense (PED / PRODE) of companies within the Joint Commission of the Defense Industry as a defense company (ED) and strategic defense company (EED). The Defense Equipment and Articulation Plan (PAED) has in cataloging a mechanism to boost Brazil's technological and logistic capacity, mobilizing knowledge about: exports, imports, identification, companies, production chain, relations with other agencies such as Federal Revenue Service, applicability data, standardized technical data, related economic activities, among others. The regulatory framework of the Industrial Defense Base (IDB) provides this obligation for cataloging.

The context in which the defense documents were made pointed to the growth of Brazil in the scenario of emerging countries, in a period favored by both economic cyclicity and greater political stability than before (Dagnino 2008). From this context emerged the need to project new opportunities through possible international partnerships.

In 2013, Decree 7970⁸ established the creation of the Joint Commission of the Defense Industry - CMID, "with the purpose of advising the Minister of State for Defense in decision-making processes and in the proposal of

7 Available at <https://www.nato.int/structur/AC/I35/main/links/contacts.htm>, accessed May 10, 2018.

8 Available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2013/decreto/d7970.htm, accessed May 10, 2018.

acts related to the national defense industry". With this in mind, referring to the provisions of Law 12.598 of 2012, the Joint Committee was characterized by treating the matter for the first time on the basis of the interministerial relationship. In coordination with the SISCICAT (Military Cataloging System of the Armed Forces), the current Defense Cataloging System (SISCADE), the NATO catalog strengthened compliance with the metrics, since the expansion to this market could meet demands previously focused on the monopsony of the government (Sandler & Hartley 2007). In addition to the Catalog, compliance with the normative foundations of the Product Life Cycle, developed by AC327 within NATO, would ensure the IDB's internationalization standards required by NATO.

By means of the aforementioned Decree, standards were established where companies registering defense products and strategic defense products enjoy the *special bidding term*, as part of the federal promotion to the sector, for the purpose of the acquisition system.

The mapping and control of the IDB, coupled with the opportunity of the catalog, can provide an integrated model with repercussions on the optimization of uses between the Forces of the same objects in a way not previously seen. From the frameworks created in Brazil, the concepts of product, defense base, differentiated system of bids for strategic companies, through the creation of a special tax system. The catalog system of defense industries (SISCADE - System of Defense Cataloging) refers to this development.

The system in question was also implemented with a focus on the alignment of the supply chain with the industry system, so as to also enable the articulation of a logistics plan for the defense system. The main problem arising from possible misalignment is that systems and subsystems can create high dependency when there is no cataloging, so that an asset can become inoperative if a product is not available to the planning at the exact moment of demand. Thus, cataloging can fill this role by giving visibility to the planner (Taylor 1982; Ourts 2003). This includes processes related to product lifecycle management, in which Brazil participates more recently.

The visibility of defense industrial bases is the main task of the NATO catalog database. Sixty-three (63) countries are part of the catalog, among those in the NATO system and elsewhere. Depending on the type of participation, countries outside the system may have access as registrars or may only be consultants. On this basis there are currently about 34 million items cataloged through the scheme described above. Of the users, about 28 million participate in this system.

Among the registering countries, Brazil has about 1.1 million items cataloged. Currently, there are 3000 companies that exist in the system, from

mobilization companies, logistics, to defense products⁹. A set of agreements (as a cataloging clause) benefits the system, which is controlled by the NSPA, a NATO agency located in Luxembourg. The requirements for a country to participate in this system begin with the creation of its own system, just as Brazil did through SISCAD. The cataloging systems of the Armed Forces remain under SISCAD, where the participating companies were authorized by law to participate in the system, as is the case of EMGEPRON and AVIBRAS.

Brazil is part of the National Cataloging Directors Forum of NATO that happens twice a year, the Brazilian director of the catalog being responsible for communication with NATO. In addition to participating in the NATO cataloging system, it allows continued access to the most diversified and secure supplier base in defense matters, Brazil is allowed to register Brazilian and partner country products and services, which significantly increases the use and possibilities to the national IDB. From the institutional point of view, it is the Logistics and Mobilization Office and the Secretariat of Defense Products that work more directly for the benefit of the catalog. There is a governance structure for the SOC: forum of national directors of cataloging (in the case of Brazil, the director of CASLODE that answers by the Brazilian NCB - National Codification Bureau); Pannel A - system evaluation; TSG, Transformation Steering Group - conceptual and technological transformations in the system; and Strategy and Business Committee, BSC. Brazil participates in all forums.

The most relevant feature of the process is, of course, Brazil's capacity to be present in the NATO Catalog through its companies and, in particular, as a lever of companies from partner countries. A recent example was Sweden, until recently a NATO Tier 1 country that used services from Norway, a member of NATO, to enter its products into the SOC. The process of evolution from Sweden to country TIER 2 in the SOC, considering the view of the Gripen fighters to Brazil, can also be cited as a chain effect.

For regional initiatives, the issue of cataloging has been discussed in detail, involving countries present or not in the Cataloging System - such as the regional *Pacific Area Cataloging Seminar* (PACS), where several countries of the Pacific Basin participate, and Australia and New Zealand have more initiative coordinating; we can also mention the *Nordic Defense Cooperation* (NORDEFECO), formed by Nordic countries. Therefore, it had been suggested that South American countries be convened by CATSUL (Permanent Forum on Cataloging of Countries of CDS UNASUL), where cataloging responsibility would be from Brazil (as Tier 2 country) and Chile would assume the first presidency. Since the creation of the group, the South American Seminar (the

⁹ Available at https://www.egn.mar.mil.br/arquivos/cepe/seminario-3-2016/CPLP_Workshop_26OUT2016.pdf, accessed May 10, 2018.

first in Buenos Aires, 2014) had the role of promoting the development of logistics in the creation of common axes of discussion¹⁰. From this, a reference term was set up to establish the basis of group work. Among the central objectives are the expansion of logistics interoperability, the integration of industrial bases, and the establishment of a single cataloging base for a common language among South Americans.

The expected economic momentum with this type of initiative is the possibility of creating a common base of investments, which was observed by the study of the Brazilian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (ANV) production model and the construction of aircraft by Brazil and Argentina. One possibility for the development of this integrated model is related to the manufacture of Patrol Ships.

Nowadays, Peru, Chile, Colombia and Argentina are also part of the UNASUR group of catalog standardization, where Brazil is a mobilizer and inducer of cataloging. Brazil manages its base through the cloud of the Cataloging System that is located in the Brazilian Army, where the cyber defense function is concentrated. The accessibility of the catalog over the internet makes the catalog consultable and manageable between partners, although the care with this deposit is high.

As a tool for the knowledge of the defense industrial base, the subsystem that integrates the NATO Catalog enables the dissemination and knowledge of the products and services available, laying the foundations of a platform for the IDB's knowledge management. In this case, as well as in the existence of particular Forces management systems in the 1990s, the creation of integrated subsystems specializes in supply and qualifies defense demand. An example of this is the effort to create a proper subsystem between Embraer and the Air Force. The Guide for Defense Products and the Catalog of Companies of Strategic Interest in Defense are by-products of this database system, and this contributes to the national mobilization system - linked to the same Secretary of the MD, which subordinates the cataloging system. Another initiative that may be cited as a correlative was the creation of a working group for the entry of the Ministry of Defense in CAMEX (Foreign Trade Chamber), which in turn is part of the Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services (MDIC), having spent one year under the scope of the MRE (Itamaraty), between 2016 and 2017¹¹.

¹⁰ See Termo de Referência do Fórum Permanente dos Países do CDS UNASUL sobre Catalogação.

¹¹ Available at <http://www.mdic.gov.br/noticias/2431-camara-de-comercio-exterior-volta-para-o-mdic>, accessed May 10, 2018.

One of the cases cited in meetings promoted by the Federation of Industries of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FIRJAN) is the formation of clusters focused on the Economy of the Sea, since one of the challenges brought about by the formation of the Catalog was its use for the construction of patrol vessels. In the case of maritime clusters in a large coastal country and considerable economic activity, clusters involving research institutes, fishing industry, hydric basin, waterway transport, water sports and leisure industry and repair industry may justify the incentives to make these investments.

The Sea Economy is one of the booming sectors and its organization has been derived from studies that point to a redirection for investments associated with maritime capacity associated with naval (Stavroulakis & Papadimitriou 2016). Such incentives have been revealed by the readaptations in the defense industry, where both the assets must increasingly be associated with diversified performance, as well as their effects-based constructions and overflow to related and indirect sectors where more sectors can be included as participants in this basic economy of the NATO Catalog.

Thus, the warlike naval industry can be benefited by the Economy of the Sea in Rio de Janeiro, for example, where these ideas were concentrated, through the participation of the State and private capital. The PAED encourages this interaction, regarding the resumption of the naval industry. The “Tamandaré” corvette project points in this direction and encourages the participation of the private sector in this industry. It is a new class of ships that takes advantage of the experience of corvettes previously produced in Brazil, especially the Barroso class.

One of the incentives associated with the construction model of a maritime cluster around the construction of patrol vessels or the Tamandaré corvette can be explained by the Input-Output Analysis model. This model was used to assemble a matrix of products, dividing the economy into economic sectors (about 110 sectors) and calculating the flows between sectors based on the technological and production intensity. As an example, the “Tamandaré” corvette would use 34 economic sectors, which means a high impact on other economic activities. In this case, they are determining variables for the project to be framed with socioeconomic impact: product, product value and employment level. In this case, the corvette, whose current price would be about 1.5 billion reais, would return the investments¹². The multiplier effect

¹² Available at <http://defesaeseguranca.com.br/marinha-vai-investir-us-r8-bi-nas-novas-corvetas-classe-tamandare/>, accessed May 10, 2018. On the input-output matrix and impacts on the cluster economy see: <http://defesaeseguranca.com.br/marinha-vai-investir-us-r8-bi-nas-novas-corvetas-classe-tamandare/> http://defesaeseguranca.com.br/wp-content/uploads/alte_edesio_apresentacao_grande_abc_dez2012.pdf, accessed May 10, 2018.

on salaries, maintenance and facilities, also happens for each ship, generating about 7000 jobs.

Nowadays, two clusters are worth mentioning in Rio de Janeiro: the one associated with the Itaguaí complex, aimed at the construction of conventional submarines and with nuclear propulsion; and the older Navy Arsenal, which has faced challenges stemming from limited investment opportunities.

Thus, they can be identified as processes associated with the cataloging system: organization and governance. As a result, the biggest desired effect of the catalog is the expansion of the potential of product registration for supply chain control and the management of the media maintenance system. This would make it possible to create a doctrine on life cycle management, based on the integrated knowledge provided by these initiatives.

International Political Economy, Defense Economics and the model for analysis of the repercussions for Brazil of the admission in the NCS.

The study presented here requires the detection of the cataloging model developed by NATO, and of the processes that allowed the insertion of Brazil into the system. For the principal axis of the research, the method chosen is the case study that, although it offers limitations as a method to consider an ongoing system, it would not be appropriate to make this a comparative study, since there are no similar significant cases regarding their variables. The main confrontation of this problem occurs because the proximity between the dependent variable - the catalog as representative of a process of amplification and strengthening of partner actors - and the independent - the system and how it happens, are too close.

“(…) Such biases can occur when the researcher selects cases that represent a truncated sample along the dependent variable of the relevant universe of cases (…). In statistical research, the standard presentation of selection bias suggests that a truncated sample typically understates the strength of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables (…).”
(Bennett 2004, 48)

Although such proximity is referred to as a possible bias on the object - the NATO Catalog - the opportunities to emphasize institutions, through processes and routines that have an impact on the international system and its actors - are not reduced, inside and outside the aforementioned object.

On the other hand, if the case study can offer us the process, the economic and political impact cannot be observed only in light of its institutional constraints, in general, too bureaucratic. The main element to be considered here is the hypothesis that microprocesses create routines and institutions that, conversely, recondition larger political relations. This effect on foreign policy has been observed through technical cooperation, horizontal cooperation or incremental institutionalism in international relations (Bevir 2008). Otherwise, it is also important to consider the constraints of a hegemonic actor such as NATO.

In these conditions, it seems pertinent to use the International Political Economy taking into account institutionalist arguments. Although the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) model can provide starting elements that strengthen the particularity of the NATO case, it should be recognized that there is a limiting role in institutions created under a functionalist model. The point of contact between these methods can be explained by: 1) the fact that the model of the NATO Catalog has the sign of a project constituted in the form of a complete military alliance and whose hegemony is expressed by the economic robustness of that partnership and of its members; 2) by the need to apply consensus of institutionalist theory and cooperation, in which architecture and processes matter, and cooperative ambience generates roles that increase the cost of exit from the project (Gulati and Singh 1998; Moravcsik, 1999). That is, if there are elements of hegemony in action with cooperative and institutional elements, the environment is defined as hybrid and therefore observable through methodological spectra also hybrid or combined. You can find this proposal in Moravicsik:

Still, if the most important binding restrictions in efficient international cooperation are indeed national and transnational, not interestatal, it seems plausible to conjecture that an important source of self-sustaining international cooperation, even when faced by “inconvenient” compromises, it’s not power concentration only, as proposed by the Hegemonic Stability Theory, nor the construction of strong international institutions per se, once that the theory of function regime tends to emphasize, but the social and political changes, national and transnational, that “block” cooperation, encouraging social adaptation that is hard to reverse - an consistent argument with liberal international relations theory (Moravicsik 1999, 302 – own translation).

Therefore, following this choice, the theoretical option is determined by the presence of a cooperative environment, observed under the leadership of some - with predominance of one of them, the USA - and other states con-

sidered to be carpool (Olson 1966). It is important to observe this system as part of the choice, since the apprehension of the case seems to be strengthened by an empirical analysis that holds this premise. And through it, it is possible to understand the dynamics and resonances of the process, including, for Brazil, through this insertion as a quasi-actor of the cataloging system (not being a member or associate of NATO).

The main consideration of the HST theory regarding the stability of the system as based on hegemonic power can also be considered, but as a method, it is important to conduct the process as part of the system where this driving force ponders and where the other states have lower chances and options. Having said that, knowing the lack of mobility in relation to the alternatives, Brazil, constituting a possible and external actor, is an unprecedented experience that should be better observed if considered such conditions previously explained.

International Political Economy, in this case, allows us to observe the object without the precise definition of a dependent variable and independent variables, so that the relations between the markets and the political conditions of the case matter (Milner 1998, Milner 2004, p.285 Gilpin 2016). However, another relevant aspect that can subsidize us is cluster economics and what network policy teaches us about creating exponentially important relationships from early links (Porter 2003).

Although the economic and political conjuncture is marked by a variable and unstable dynamics, it is possible to start from possible conjunctures that weigh both the Brazilian scenario and the international scenario in which NATO is inserted, once endowed with the previous premises based on uncertainty. In this case, our proposal is to combine the two scenarios, in the combined formulation that allows us to conduce the driving forces in relation to the scenarios that we highlight as most relevant to this study. Thus, as a result of this combination, we will highlight four possible scenarios that we will present to the respondents of this study, in view of the driving forces resulting from our observation about the NATO Codification System (NSC) and the Brazilian incidence of this movement.

Exactly because, at the time of 2017, the Brazilian scenario for the coming years is of low expectation of growth and, in addition, there are doubts about the health of the NATO model as a balance of contribution among actors, the insertion of Brazil in this system under conditions of low competitiveness and low level of investment may be different than planned. Certainly, the alignment between planning and future scenarios is even more decisive in the case of defense systems, because the long-term imperative is more affecting the defense economy than other highly variable and short-term econo-

mies (Mesa 2012; Sandler & Hartley 2001; Sandler and Hartley 2007).

Since our task is to highlight a case of relevance and try to propose possible scenarios that have implications for Brazil's defense policy, our proposal starts from the cross between:

At NATO: (1A) a revitalization of the system with increased trust and redistribution of costs more proportional to stakeholder participation and size; (2A) the decay of the military alliance model, with increased dissatisfaction with NATO and the crisis of cooperative regimes, with skyrocketing costs.

In Brazil: (1B) a scenario of frank recovery associated with the growth rates of developing countries from the next years; (2B) a scenario of continued crisis in the coming years with low growth.

Considering the literature relevant to NATO (Olson 1966, Sandler and Hartley 2001) and the recent political-economic crisis in Brazil, respectively, the manifestation of these themes through these scenarios can help, in conjunction with the driving forces highlighted by this research and presented then, in the construction of possible scenarios, associated with the consequences derived from them.

Indicators and results

For this work, a study was conducted aimed at the preparation and observation of possible scenarios involving the participation of Brazil in the NATO Codification for the next years, as indicated below:

Scenarios
1B + 1A = Brazil stabilizes and thrive + NATO strengthens
2B + 2A = Brazil grows little or nothing + NATO weakens
1B + 2A = Brazil stabilizes and thrive + NATO weakens
2B + 1A = Brazil grows little or nothing + NATO strengthens

Forças motrizes (<i>driving forces</i>)	
Tr	Transparency
Ot	Economic Scale Optimization
In	Internationalization
Op	Interoperability

In addition to the interviews with professionals directly related to the process in question, we used the focus groups model among specialists in the area of administration and logistics, international relations and defense and military history. The focus groups methodology has already been present in the literature from psychology and sociology for some decades as a way to gather information, impressions and opinions in a systematic and productive way, because based on the premise that respondent agents cooperate more efficiently in group than by individual interviews. (Kind 2008). The use of this methodology is largely related to public administration (Schröder and Klerin 2009) and private, especially when it is necessary to detect processes and improve them in the short and medium term, using groups of up to 12 experts or SME's (Subject Matter Experts) . Alternatively, a specific group of consumers, suppliers, employees may be considered experts, depending on the research in question. Its application in studies that call for prospection can be observed in McClure and Bertot (2001), by which possible scenarios and data were collected through this method.

Together with our interviewees - groups of up to six people with expertise or defense knowledge and experience considered high or very high in the field - we evaluated the incidence in these scenarios of elements associated with the four (4) driving forces highlighted as the leading for Brazil in the admission on this system. In political-economic scenarios of growth and stability and / or crisis and destabilization for both actors, Brazil and NATO, the driving forces indicate elements that translate the expected results, sometimes more likely to occur, and other times less likely. Therefore, it should be noted that these driving forces behave as possible gains, because they are considered motivational factors of the Brazilian admission proposal in the system.

However, there are a number of side effects that also fulfill expectations of this insertion and that can also be listed, in disposition with the expected results and proposed here. These results are listed with special focus on the expected results, such as local and regional clusters, and the incidence for the Brazilian regional performance. This is because the proposed model is part of a foreign policy proposal whose Brazilian preponderance in the regional scenario would increase regional stability. In addition, Brazilian participation in protocols and a high internationalization system would broaden the emerging qualification among the main actors of the international system (Vigevani, Oliveira and Cintra 2003; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007).

The first scenario is qualified by the good economic development of Brazil and by the revision of the NATO system with positive repositioning in the face of contemporary demands.

The second scenario is marked by the continued destabilization of both the Brazilian economy and the country's development capacity, as well as by NATO to retake itself to the demands and criticisms of its system, given the new national policies of its main actors or the international scenario.

The third scenario is marked by the recovery of Brazilian growth at reasonable rates for developing countries (from 2% to 4% pointed out by international institutes such as Oxford Economics by 2020). In the same scenario, it combines the NATO crisis with the contemporary dilemmas of costly maintenance of an alliance and the existence of other more efficient mechanisms for the effect of international security problems, more liking for the member countries.

The last of the scenarios is perhaps the most critical. In Brazil, Brazil is still suffering from the extensive economic crisis, with a small capacity to meet previously planned long-term investments and to strengthen its defense sector based on government procurement and public incentives. Otherwise, NATO still resists, however, in the face of political transitions arising from the rise of new governments less focused on collaborative strategies, the financial arrangement of its support is weakened, as the character of its missions is progressively contested.

The document *Brazil 2035*, prepared by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) in conjunction with the National Association of Planning and Budget Career Officers (ASSECOR), was launched in June 2017 and featured a work developed over the last two years, led by the researcher Elaine Marcial, who has worked for years in scenario construction. The effort, which brought together a number of institutions and researchers from various fields, including defense, has some results that may also matter to the analysis proposed here. The chapter on the Political-Institutional Dimension has, in the sub-theme "International Projection", conclusions that point to the integration of South America and the emergence of emerging countries as keys to the transition of the international system through which Brazil passes. The continuity of the cooperative dialogue is shown on the basis of four historical examples of cooperation between South American partners, bilaterally or multilaterally, such as the creation of the South American Defense Council (CDS), or, in the nuclear sector.

Considering that Brazil continues to be a "fearful leader", according to the document *Brazil 2035*, it suggests as the most relevant factor the timidity of investment by integration. In short, the assertion that the international system is in transition would cause "key uncertainty whether Brazil will benefit from an international power system" (*Brazil 2035*, 167).

Another relevant conclusion is that, despite the continuity of the lim-

ited electoral engagement of foreign affairs and defense affairs, another key uncertainty and “whether Brazil will have a development-inducing defense industrial base” in 2035, which is explained by the volatility of investments in this area and the extent of these investments in the private sector, considered fragile. Another point of uncertainty is whether the IDB will have the necessary alignment with the needs of the Armed Forces. This is because defense spending, although bulky (among the top 11 in the world) does not represent a flexible amount relevant to investments. In this case, extrabudgetary resources are usually committed, in addition to the tax incentives that end up representing other gains in this matter as well.

The results generated by the *focus group* point to the importance of the Brazilian projection, first, regarding the standardization of the defense and production system, which improves the production metrics in the medium term and increases the desire of projection with economies complementary to those already available in the NATO platform. Openness to new markets was a factor cited as being of great relevance both to the effect of the Brazilian growth scenario and to the crisis, since the breakdown of monopsony (a single buyer) seems to be the way out of the sector’s sustainability. In this case, it would weigh the positive domestic return, which could be achieved by standardization and large-scale exports. One factor cited as relevant by the group is the fact that the companies that make up the industrial base are mostly small and medium-sized enterprises with limited capital to sustain periods of crisis or long-term investments without sustainability. This element seems to be even more relevant if it occurs in a scenario of economic crisis in Brazil, where correlated expertises are identified in the national market and could be available to the external market in a systematic way.

Otherwise, the combination of Brazil’s growth scenarios and NATO crisis scenarios could shape the most compromising prospects. Having as its principle the diversification of its foreign policy model, a question that arises is whether NATO regulations serve other buyers outside this system. While the NATO strengthening and repositioning scenario strengthens the expectations of Brazil’s growth and crisis scenarios, the NATO crisis scenario prompts doubts about metrics and their varied uses for eventual exit from the system. Although Brazil is less likely to wish to disassociate itself in this scope, there are always costs associated with exit, such as the repositioning of partners and the identification of new markets.

In any case, although under the catalog as a method and database, Ministry of Defense initiatives point to this typical diversification, where not ceased, due to the catalog, negotiations with agents outside the NATO catalog China, Russia and Iran. The complexity of defense products rightly demon-

strates the need for standardization, coupled with the complexity and expansion of markets.

The intention to participate in the Security Council by obtaining a permanent seat appeared in the *focus group* as a determining factor for the option of inserting Brazil in the catalog. This seems to be an element that, even in the face of a NATO crisis scenario, could continue to be a force element for Brazil, since the catalog points to systematization and international standardization in quality, even.

Brazil's crisis scenarios and combined NATO crisis would indicate a significant and partial loss, although the process of standardization is still pointed out as necessary by the group, despite the crisis in question. It should be noted that the cost of admission into the system by companies is small compared to Brazil's investment in tax incentives and internationalization.

Thus, the driving forces characterized as transparency, optimization, internationalization, interoperability seem to be in line with this process and, according to the respondents, established as real expectations of this insertion. In this sense, internationalization appears as an initial presupposition, the transparency achieved by standardization, the interoperability stimulated in light of the registered means. The optimization seems to be a consequence of the previous processes, as well as the result. It is important, therefore, that optimization be both cause and consequence of this Brazilian insertion in the catalog, according to the respondents.

Conclusions

The adhesion to the NATO cataloging system represents a projection that carries a partnership record, with implications for international relations, due to the progressive tendency of the combination between elements in collective defense and others focused on international security cooperation (Viana 2012). Although the dynamics of a military alliance is far from the model of Brazilian foreign relations, the subsystems created by NATO can serve to organize the Brazilian defense system, especially in relation to the cataloging and management of product life cycles.

Based on the assumptions presented in Brazil 2035 (2017) and observing the scenarios chosen for the purpose of this study, it is possible to conclude that the investment and efficiency dyad seems to be central to a more stable development project linked to the internationalization of the Industrial Defense Base. The recent initiatives regarding the negotiation of Brazil's entry into the OECD point not only to a foreign policy trend, but to the interna-

tionalization of standards and metrics more linked to development indices than before.

The presence of other actors in these processes of internationalization and standardization of protocols, which are outside the own NATO military alliance, broadens the regime's uses in optimizing the defense system and enables the insertion of countries that were not previously present. It should be noted that there are 29 NATO countries, 13 non-members and Tier 2 and 21 Tier 1 countries, making a total of 34 non-NATO listed countries.

Among the new actors, as buyers and producers in the system, are South Africa and India (configuring the IBAS regime with Brazil); Chile, Peru, Argentina and Colombia; Sweden (with whom Brazil has established one of its largest recent contracts - Gripen); Israel, Australia, Indonesia and Japan, as countries of economic robustness in terms of GDP. A relevant data for future notes and possibility of prospecting is the fact that the African countries with which Brazil recently strengthened partnership could compose an important group of users through the Brazilian platform, observing the expected benefits for the defense sector. This may be one more of the objects of this investment on the Atlantic axis.

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to describe and analyze the conditionalities and side effects of Brazil's inclusion in NATO's Catalog (NATO Codification System- NCS) for the national Defense Industrial Base and the country's development (the agreement dates back to April 1997). The central hypothesis is that, through this process, there was a progressive conditioning of the national defense industry, and correlates, in favor of protocolization, which extended the internationality and scope of national agents, both as buyers and sellers, within this system and subsystems. The analysis of the process of inclusion of Brazil in the NCS and the characteristics and purposes involved and the analysis of the repercussions for Brazil. To do this, before the analysis of the repercussions, there is an explanation of the method used, once the objectives of the article consolidate through a medium-term prospective vision.

KEYWORDS

NATO; Catalog; Industrial Defense Base (IDB).

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THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN CYBERNETIC SPACE: THE (NON) SHAPING OF SECURITY POLICIES AND CYBERNETIC DEFENSE?¹

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Lucas Soares Portela³

Introduction

The so-called cyberspace is the environment where all shades of information, whether economic, social, political or military, whether classified or not, travels and connect themselves. Additionally, it is the space where agreements, purchases and sales, legal or illegal activities and varied manipulations of data or information are established.

In such a context, it is not possible to write about security and/or defense without linking these subjects to the cybernetic space and its complexity: the crimes, thefts, domains, controls and the power relations developed in such space, in other words, without paying attention to the geopolitics of the cybernetic space.

Frequently, the South American regional environment is being analyzed from several angles and themes by researchers of many countries of the region, especially in the context of the regional forums, as the Organization of the American States, when talking about a broader regionalization, or, yet, in the scope of the Union of the South American Nations (UNASUR), from the perspective of the South America continent. Diverse themes such as human rights, regional cooperation, strengthening of democracy, indigenous

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peoples, sustainable development, peace promotion, among many others, are part of the research agenda. Regarding the cyberspace specifically, there were initiatives in the OAS more recently in the late 1990s, and, at the beginning of the current decade, there was a more specific debate in UNASUR.

At the OAS, the initial concern was to fight cybercrime and the actions of the organization were linked to the Ministries of Justice of member countries. Furthermore, in the 2000s, after the 9/11 terrorist attack, the concern was to create an Inter-American comprehensive cyber security strategy focusing on crimes, attacks and terrorism.

In the sphere of UNASUR, the first movement in relation to cybernetic space took place in 2012, at the time of the formulation of a work plan by the South American Defense Council (CSD), which supported the creation of a working group to deliberate on the possibility of establishing regional policies and mechanisms to fight cybernetic or defense-related cyber threats (UNASUL 2012).

Although these regional forums present proposals to develop policies and strategies related to cyber security and cyber defense, each member country establishes its policies independently. Occasionally the definition of the concepts of security and defense regarding the cyberspace is not even similar between countries, as well as their policies and responsible bodies.

For that matter, the present article proposes to analyze the political projects and the structures aiming the cyber security and cyber defense subject in the Southern American space, employing as a case study three South American countries with the greater density of internauts - Argentina, Brazil and Colombia -, placing these policies in the context of two regional forums: the Organization of the American States (OAS) and the Union of the South American Nations (UNASUR), and, from the analysis of such policies, verify if there is a similarity and interlocation between them or if they are discordant and if it is possible to consider that it is occurring a geopolitical configuration of the cyberspace in the region that influences the conformation of regional power.

In order to develop this research, we mapped the key policies of cyber security and cyber defense from the data collected in primary sources, as laws, decrees, resolutions, declarations and minutes published in the regional forums and in the countries surveyed, as well as secondary sources through specialized bibliography.

We structured the present article in five parts. Initially, we will make a brief conceptual discussion on the geopolitics of cyberspace; subsequently, we will present some considerations on the cyberspace, security and defense;

next, we will show the initiatives regarding the cyberspace developed in the scope of the OAS and UNASUR; and the specificities of the cyberspace in the defense and security policies of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. Finally, the article will pose some considerations on the geopolitics of the Southern American cyberspace, focusing on the positioning of such countries regarding the institutional structures, spheres of activity and cooperation policies.

The Geopolitics of the Cyberspace

Before considering the potential geopolitics of cyberspace in South America, it is necessary to make clear the theoretical perspective that we are assuming, as well as the adjective proposition of the concept of geopolitics for cybernetic space. In this sense, the first question posed is about the legitimacy of the use of a field of knowledge oriented, *a priori*, to the territorial space to refer to the virtual space.

From the ontological perspective of the “geopolitical” neologism created in 1899 by the State Theory professor at the University of Uppsala, Rudolf Kjellén, it would not be possible to link geopolitics and cybernetic space considering that original meaning of the concept addressed the study of the influence of the soil (geographical situation, space occupied and territorial domain, consubstantiated in its resources to be explored) on the political phenomena. In elaborating his theory, Kjellén conceived an essentially continental space, perhaps maritime, given his concern of the state territory being an organism connected to the soil and in constant struggle for more space.

However, when we study political phenomena, we necessarily analyze relations of power and, for that matter, the field of knowledge of geopolitics carries, in its essence, analysis of relations of power and space, that is to say, not only the state space, which is the founding statement of traditional geopolitics, as it is enlightened by Heriberto Carou (2002, 2006).

Spatial reflection on power relations *cannot be limited* - as in the case of traditional geopolitics - *to those between States; It would be forgot then the numerous movements that occur on the sidelines*; it would operate in a reductionist way limiting “the political” to “the state”. Thus, although critical Geopolitics e-emphasizes the microscale analysis (which deals with the entire planet), as was the case in the traditional framework, this cannot mean the abandonment of other scales, at the risk of falling into a determinism geographical⁴ (Carou 2002, 2006, emphasis added, our translation).

4 La reflexión espacial sobre las relaciones de poder *no se puede limitar* ---como ocurría en la

For that matter, we consider that power relations perform in different scales and dimensions just as they are only understood in the spatial context, in other words, the power needs a space to exist, since it cannot operate or be exercised in the vacuum, considering also that the power is always relative. There is no power if there is no associated object, once it is always exercised in relation to something or someone.

If in Kjellén's concept of geopolitics political relations and space were implied, these two dimensions, therefore, need to be taken into account in contemporary geopolitical analysis: politics (power) and (geographic) space where it is exercised. In this sense, which spaces can be considered?

At the current scenario, new spaces present themselves as *locus* where power relations occur, as well as other actors, besides the State, participate in this game. In this way, the geopolitical analysis incorporates new spatial dimensions, other actors and diverse powers.

Thus, cybernetic space presents itself as another *locus* where power relations (political) happen. Could we consider it as another geographical space? What categories and constitutive elements does this "virtual space" exhibit so that it can be considered a geographic space?

According to Walfredo Ferreira Neto (2014, 79 - 85), the control of the virtual space is exercised by the most capable actors, despite being seen as a global and common space; due to this fact it becomes territorialized. The author goes on to say: "In the globe's cybernetic environment, States define their territories [...]. Immediate examples, but not the only ones, are the domains of the ".br", ".us", ".uk", ".it"; ..., which perfectly indicate their respective territories".

In the constitutive aspects of the cyberspace there are borders that, agreeing with Ferreira Neto (2014, 70), must be seen in the form of a point, which can be at the same time information in its "package", or a "knot" of a highway, or, still, a strategic structure or critical infrastructure selected as a result of the resources available to the State.

If we accept the existence of a cyberspace geography, then, it is possible to address cyber-geopolitics, with specific characteristics in each place, according to the actors involved and the policies that focus on it, as well as conflicts, crimes, policies and strategies elaborated with the intention of man-

Geopolítica tradicional - a las existentes entre los Estados; olvidaría entonces los innumerables flujos que ocurren al margen; operaría de forma reduccionista limitando «lo político» a «lo estatal». De este modo, aunque la Geopolítica crítica hace hincapié en la microescala de análisis (la que se ocupa del planeta entero), como era el caso en la tradicional, esto no puede significar el abandono de otras escalas, a riesgo de caer en un determinismo geográfico

age, protect, expand and attack it, that is to say, policies and power relations in and for cyberspace.

Cyberspace, Security and Defense: Some considerations

Throughout history, we found numerous examples of civilizations that valued the discourse and its study, for example, when Rome was an empire. The importance of this exercise was so significant for some civilizations that they have studied the discourse through oratory and rhetoric, as the Athenians did.

Through these studies, one could read not only the content, but also the interests and intentions of its author. Although a policy is not a discourse, in analyzing it we can understand values and interests of the agents of the political game (Serafim and Dias 2012). However, one may stress that we are addressing political analysis and not is evaluation.

Although both terms seem to be synonymous and both can be applied to policies, the focus and result generated are distinct (Serafim and Dias 2012). An evaluation consists in observing the consequences that a particular policy causes, verifying its efficacy in front of a given problem. In the case of the present article, we do not intend to look the results of the cyber defense policies of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, yet, the interests, positions and interactions of such countries, in view of this, to analyze and not evaluate.

That said, a policy analysis should address three levels:

Table 1 - Levels of Policy Analysis

Level of analysis	Descrição
Institutional	Examine the interactions within the institution(s) involved. This level looks at the decision-making process within an organization, as well as the relations it maintains.
Decision making process	In this level the interests of the agents involved are studied, as well as their reaction towards internal and external stimuli.
State-Society Relation	Considers States' rules and institutions. Power relations within them and the interaction of these structures with society. This level connects the other two levels, revealing the interests behind the policies employed.

Source: Dagnino (2002).

Defense policies generally consider the international environment as a motivator; so, the policy analysis should include a level regarding the international context. This context should consider existing power relations, at the regional and global scopes, the country's position on the international scene, especially on some issues, as well as existing conflicts, summarizing, a geopolitical analysis of the international situation. This level gains more emphasis within the issue of cyberspace that presents cross-border characteristics.

In order to apply the proposed analysis at the beginning of the topic, we must first distinguish cyber defense and cyber security. The separation of these concepts can guide the analysis of the adopted policy. However, it is worth noting that this is an analytical exercise at the ontological level, since in cyberspace the concepts interconnect (Portela 2015).

As Paulo Carvalho (2011) states, cyber defense can be described as the set of actions performed in cyberspace, aiming at the defense of systems and information. Through such perspective, cyber defense presents value in the integrity of the force, especially in the production of knowledge and intelligence. It should be emphasized that this author includes not only defensive actions in cyber defense, but also exploratory and offensive actions.

In turn, cyber security is associated, by Oscar Medeiros Filho (2014), with the dimension of public security. For this author, cyber defense is connected with the notion of war, while the cyber security one is related to an illegal sphere. Therefore, in his view, the conceptualization of cyber security and cyber defense is connected with the threat that is being fought.


Moisés Naim (2006) addresses the question in a similar way when arguing about the limits of the concepts of traditional security and defense. About these concepts, Naim (2006) states that defense is related to war, defense of national interests, guarantee of survival and sovereignty, while public security is related to issues of illicit. So to distinguish cyber security and cyber defense we need to identify what cybercrimes are.

These can be categorized in two groups: cybercrimes and cyber-attacks (Portela 2015). In agreement to McGuire and Dowling (2013), the categorization of such concepts must be performed through the analogy and applicability in the traditional environment. For example, an online extortion is a cybercrime, while a data theft from a military base is considered a cyber-attack, since it is an act of espionage and warfare.

After presenting these conceptual distinctions, we can categorize the framework of cyber defense, in a general view, through a Cartesian plan in which the axis represent a gradual scale regarding the understanding of the distinction of the concepts of cyber defense and cyber security, while the other

presents the classification of the nature of the organization. In one extreme, we observe the structures that address the themes of cyber security and cyber defense with total separation and the other edge the structures that unite the themes, to the point of approaching them as synonyms. When we classify the institutions of South America in this plan, we find the following figure:

Figure 1 - Extract of South America Cyber Defense Structures (2016)



Source: Authors elaboration, based on Argentina (2010), Justribó et al (2014), Mandarino Jr. and Canongia (2010), Brazil (2012; 2013; 2015), Conpes (2011), Chile (2010; 2014), Paraguay (2013; 2015), Ecuador (2008; 2014), Uruguay (2005; 2014), France (2013; 2015) and Ministère de la Défense (2014; 2014b), Ministerio de Defensa (2015), Télam (2015), Contardo (2015), Velázquez (2015), Bonilla (2013), Infodefensa (2015) e IITCUP (2016).

Bolivia and Peru were categorized as undefined once there is no formal characterization, through documents and structures, that take into consideration cyber defense or cyber security. Argentina, Brazil and Colombia are highlighted in the figure above since they are the objects of this research; they present similarities for treating the concepts of cyber security and cyber defense in a different way.

The greatest divergence that we can observe in this group concerns specific structures for the treatment of cybercrimes. Colombia has only military structures, while Brazil and Argentina have hybrid foundation, with military and civilian organizations, dealing with cyber defense and cyber security respectively. The distinction between Argentina and Brazil is in the interac-

tion between the two scopes. Although Brazil has agencies that communicate between themselves, interaction is limited to mutual consultations.

Cyberspace within the regional forums

In the range of the American regional forums, we will present a brief overview of how the topic of cyberspace is treated in two of them: OAS and UNASUR. Although the proposal for the analysis is mainly the South America continent, it is important to situate the region in the context of a more hemispheric forum, in view of the double linkage of the South American countries with both organizations.

Cyberspace and the OAS

Within the agenda of OAS, the first initiative to approach themes related to cyberspace was the creation of a Group of Experts on Cyber Crime, discussed in the forum called “Meetings of Ministers of Justice or Other Ministers or Attorneys General of the Americas (REMJA)”.

The goal of this group, comprised of government experts, was to perform diagnoses of illegal activities executed on computer networks, to identify national legislation, policies and practices relating to these activities and the national and international personalities experienced in the field, as well as to identify mechanisms for cooperation within the inter-American system to fight cybercrime (OEA / REMJA 1999)⁵.

After the creation of REMJA's in 1999 the meetings of the Group of Experts on Cyber Crime, were held regularly, ranging from two to three years. The ninth and most recent one took place in 2016.

In order to facilitate and to make the cooperation and the exchange of information among the governmental cyber-experts of the OAS member

5 “Because of the importance and difficulty of the issues presented by cyber crime, and the spread and potential magnitude of the problems it poses for our countries, it is recommended to establish an intergovernmental expert group, within the framework of the OAS, with a mandate to:

- 1 - complete a diagnosis of criminal activity which targets computers and information, or which uses computers as the means of committing an offense;
- 2 - complete a diagnosis of national legislation, policies and practices regarding such activity;
- 3 - identify national and international entities with relevant expertise; and
- 4 - identify mechanisms of cooperation within the inter-American system to combat cyber crime” (OEA/ REMJA 1999, official translation)

states more efficient, an online portal⁶ was created, in which the countries legislations on the subject, the recommendations from each Group of Experts meeting, and the proposition of a “24/7 High Technology Crime Contact Network” are listed, with the purpose to share and denounce cybercrime in international cooperation, involving other countries outside the OAS, such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, the OECD, the G-8, the Commonwealth and INTERPOL. However, even though the propositions in this respect go back to the recommendations resulting from the meeting of the year 2000, at the 2016 meeting, those countries that had not yet adhered to that network were still oriented to do so in the shortest possible time.

The objectives of the Group of Experts on Cyber Crime continue to be:

To strengthen the international cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime, facilitate the exchange of information and experiences among its members and formulate the recommendations that are necessary to improve to improve and strengthen cooperation among the OAS member states and with other organizations or mechanisms. (OEA 2017, our translation)

However, in parallel with the existence of this Group, which focused only on cybercrime, in 2003 the AG/RES 1939 (XXXIII-O/03) “Development of an Inter-American Strategy to Fight Threats to Cybersecurity” was published, this resolution was approved at the fourth plenary session, on June 10, 2003.

In this resolution, it was recommended to the Permanent Council that a project on strategies of cybersecurity to the member States should be developed through the Committee on Hemispheric Security, in coordination and cooperation with the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), the Inter-American Telecommunications Commission (CITEL) and the Group of Experts on Cyber Crime of the Meetings of Ministers of Justice or Other Ministers or Attorneys General of the Americas (REMJA), or another body supported by the OAS. Therefore, a comprehensive strategy project was proposed, addressing the multidimensional and multidisciplinary aspects of cyber security (OEA 2003).

In 2004, through the adoption of the AG/RES. 2004 (XXXIV-O/04) by the General Assembly, the “Comprehensive inter-American cybersecurity strategy: A multidimensional and multidisciplinary approach to creating a culture of cybersecurity” was implemented and requested that the member

6 For more information on the online portal, check <http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/cybersp.htm>.

States of OAS implemented the guidelines contained in this document (OEA 2004).

Among these guidelines was the orientation for member countries to establish or to identify national “vigilance and alert” groups, the so-called Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT). Also, the creation of an Inter-American Surveillance and Warning for the quick dissemination of information on cyber security and the response to crisis, incidents and threats to computer security, as well as seeking to promote the development of a culture that would allow the strengthening of cybersecurity in the Hemisphere.

If on the one hand the creation of the Group of Experts on Cybercrime was conceived in the 1990s and focused on the creation of a network aimed at fighting cybercrime, on the other, the proposal to create a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy in 2003 was the result of the initiatives designed in a post-terrorist world of 9/11, in 2001. The concern in that moment was not only with crimes, but also with a strategy that involved cyber-terrorist threats, attacks on critical infrastructures⁷, among other issues. It should be noted that the creation of the Group of Experts on Cyber Crime in 1999 did not mention the term “critical infrastructure”.

Both the creation of the Group of Experts on Crime in 1999 and of the Comprehensive inter-American Cybersecurity Strategy, approved in 2004, failed to guarantee the effective participation of all OAS member countries. The recommendations contained in the IX Meeting of the Group of Experts on Cyber Crime, the most recent, urged member countries to comply with guidelines established by the group, six of which had not been accomplished by states yet, for example, the creation of a network: “the States that have not yet done so, in the shortest possible time, consider the possibility of joining the ‘24/7 High-Tech Crime Network’ of the G-7”. Regarding the Comprehensive Cybersecurity Strategy, from 34 (thirty four) member countries, only 17 (seventeen), that is to say, half of them presented Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT) or Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT), bodies that the own OAS suggested as necessary and promoted their creations in the member States. From the 17 (seventeen) countries that have CERT or CSIRT, 11 (eleven) of them are members of the UNASUR: Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. The others are Canada, USA, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago.

⁷ We will develop a culture of cyber security in the Americas by adopting effective prevention measures to anticipate, address and respond to cyber attacks, regardless of their origin, by fighting cybernetic threats and cybercrime, typifying attacks against cyberspace, protecting critical infrastructure and securing the systems networks (OEA 2004, 129, our translation)

By analyzing the records and documents of the General Assembly of the OAS (qualified texts of Declarations and Resolutions), from the adoption of the comprehensive strategy in 2004, we could perceive that the issue of cyber security appeared to be linked to terrorism (2005 and 2011), to telecommunications (2006) and to strategies in the framework of the Caribbean Community/ CARICOM (2010, 2013, 2016).

We can infer that after the US government's spy scandal in Brazil, revealed in August 2013 by the former US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) technical advisor, Edward Snowden, a movement emerged in 2012, in the context of UNASUR, for the creation of a working group on the theme, with a focus on cyber defense, an initiative that occurs in parallel with those existing in the OAS, weaking initiatives that more directly involved Brazil in this regional body.

Cyberspace and the UNASUR

The first evidence of UNASUR's concern with cyberspace issues was in 2012, when the South American Defense Council (CSD) formulated a work plan for that year. Among the points provided in the plan, UNASUR highlighted the need to create a working group to evaluate the possibility of establishing regional policies and mechanisms to fight cybernetic or information-based threats in the area of defense (UNASUR 2012). The leader of this group would be Peru.

In the following year, 2013, the work plan no longer required the assessment of the possibility of establishing policy, but rather its effective establishment, as well as regional mechanisms to fight cyber threats in the area of defense (Justribó 2014). It is noted, through these two documents, that UNASUR initiated its proposals of cyber defense distinguishing cybernetic threats of computer threats. Furthermore, these documents emphasize the fight of threats in the context of defense, that is, to distinguish this concept from that of cyber security.

That same year, the need for this organization to address cyber defense increased in the face of a real threat faced by Brazil in discovering cybernetic espionage by the United States, which was mentioned earlier. This event resulted in a special mention during the VII Ordinary Meeting of Heads of States in August, 2013.

The South American Defense Council (CSD) and COSIPLAN instruct to evaluate cooperation with other relevant ministerial councils and to develop

their respective projects on cyber defense and to improve the interconnection of our countries' fiber-optic networks with the intention of making our telecommunications safer, strengthen the development of regional technologies and promote digital inclusion (UNASUL 2013, our translation)⁸.

Although there is no direct link with the Brazilian experience, the final declaration of this meeting reveals the urgency of promoting cooperation in cyberspace defense within UNASUR. In this case, the concern was not only the cooperation among the members of the organization, but it extended the proposition of collaboration to other regional organizations. It is possible to be seen that the securitization of the theme brought to the document of the VII meeting more concrete actions, such as the interconnection of fiber optic networks and the coordination of the CSD and the South American Infrastructure and Planning Council (COSIPLAN) to endorse a joint infrastructure (UNASUL 2013).

The August meeting that happened in Suriname was the initial point for the work in relation to cyber defense to become more concrete. In the working plan of 2014 it was provided the Regional Seminar on Cyber-defense (Justribó 2014). In this event, the Working Group on Cyber defense of the CSD identified the four topics below:

1. To create a regional forum of a Working Group on Cyber defense of the member States with the purpose of exchange knowledge, experience and solution procedures.
2. To establish a contact network of the competent authorities for the exchange of information and permanent collaboration
3. To define one platform and procedures of communication of the contact network
4. To deepen and systematize the thoughts of the conceptual definitions of cyber defense and cybersecurity (UNASUL 2014, our translation)⁹

8 Instruye al Consejo de Defensa Suramericano (CDS) y al COSIPLAN, evaluar la cooperación con otros consejos ministeriales competentes y avanzar en sus respectivos proyectos sobre defensa cibernética y la interconexión de las redes de fibra óptica de nuestros países, con el objetivo de tornar nuestras telecomunicaciones más seguras. Promover el desarrollo de tecnologías regionales y la inclusión digital. (UNASUL 2013).

9 1. Crear un foro regional del Grupo de Trabajo de Ciberdefensa de los Estados Miembros, a fin de intercambiar conocimientos, experiencias y procedimientos de solución. 2. Establecer una red de contactos de autoridades competentes para el intercambio de información y colaboración de manera permanente. 3. Definir la plataforma y procedimientos de comunicaciones de la red de contactos. 4. Profundizar y sistematizar la reflexión sobre definiciones conceptuales de

The result of this agenda was the creation of a network of contacts of the representatives of each country to deal with the matter, which would be communicated by electronic mail and telephony. The group also agreed on the need to create a coordination platform that would be called UNAC-ERT. Lastly, it was required that all the countries share their nomenclatures, concepts and terminologies of cyber defense and cybersecurity for a debate, compilation and conceptual standardization.

Even today, these demands and the new requests are part of the agenda of the Working Group on Cyber Defense of UNASUR. In the minutes of the I Virtual Meeting of the group of March 2017, the group listed six points of work that are still similar to the previous debates:

- Situational diagnosis by country and/or region, which will establish the common starting point for the work of the group;
- Contribution on the concept of cyber defense and cybersecurity;
- Identification of institutions, terminologies and protocols that are used at the regional level;
- Diagnosis on the context of regional threats, actors and motivations;
- Definition of spaces for discussion and of proposals: forums, networks, platforms, observatories, etc.;
- Proposal for Regional Policies and Strategies for cyber defense, which will be presented to the CSD-UNASUR for consideration and which will be raised to the highest level of the regional organization. (UNASUL 2017, our translation).

We notice that the measures and the progress of 2013 and 2014 were consequences of the momentary increasing of debates on cyber defense, which despite the results produced, did not meet the agenda of the time. Additionally, we note that the debate about the standardization of concepts and terms of cyber defense and cybersecurity is still an urgency to propose policies common to all members. Although we have not yet adequately addressed these issues, we note that UNASUR understands the two concepts distinctly, and also understands the need for standardization of cyber defense structures.

Cyberspace in the Defense and Security Policies of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia

There is no homogeneity in the South American cyberspace in terms

of institutional policies and structures, as well as in the approach to the concept of cybersecurity and the perspectives with which they are addressed¹⁰. Sometimes both cyber security and cyber defense are considered by a military defense structure, or in specific cases, there is one civil and another military structure.

In the framework of OAS, the policies and guidelines are structured with focus on cyber security and include two mechanisms: one that addresses the cybercrimes attached to the Department of Legal Cooperation of the Secretariat for Legal Affairs and the Meetings of Ministers of Justice or Other Ministers or Attorneys General of the Americas (REMJA) and another that addresses cyber security, the Integral Inter-American Strategy for fighting cyber security threats, attached to the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) and the Inter-American Telecommunications Commission (CITEL).

For that matter, the OAS focuses the cyberspace especially from a security perspective, and it seems to us that the organization's central concern is to maintain a structure to face cybercrimes and illegal activities, within the settings of terrorism, and not to use the terminology "cyber defense".

In the sphere of UNASUR, from what we have observed, the work focuses on cyber defense. The proposal, in 2012, to develop a Working Group had the intention to evaluate the possibility of establishing regional policies and mechanisms to combat cybernetic or defense-related information threats. Among the initiatives, a primary concern was the understanding and standardization of terminologies in the area of security and cybersecurity. Likewise, the execution of situational diagnoses in the member countries to identify the structural and institutional peculiarities in the cybernetic area to, subsequently, develop proposals of regional policies and strategies of cyber defense and present to the SADC-UNASUR.

Although the actions in this institution are incipient regarding cyberspace and are still at the level of diagnosis and standardization of terminologies, it is possible to affirm that the greater concern is the cyber defense, different from the initiatives within the scope of the OAS, which is focused on cyber security.

In relation to the three analyzed countries, Colombia addresses cyber-

¹⁰ Among the challenges which must be faced by the agenda of the South American Defense Council, in terms of cyber defense, are the different perceptions of the countries on the use of military and internal security resources. These conceptions on the use of the security and defense themes affect the different normative and doctrinal frameworks that rule the internal security and national defense systems among the member States of UNASUR, thus coherence in the confrontation of the questions regarding the cybersecurity and cyberdefense is difficult (Bustamante, Rivera and Cañas 2015, 112, our translation)

security and cyber defense in one particular sphere: the defense one, which can generate conceptual incompatibility when integrating a joint political strategy with other countries in the region. We believe that this fact is linked to the historical need to face local armed groups, seeking their disarticulation, as well as fighting cybercrimes.

In the Argentinian case, cyber defense is under the responsibility of the military structure, which also supports cybersecurity and it is linked to civil bodies.

In Brazil, the actions regarding cyber defense are under the responsibility of the Cyber Defense Command (CDCyber), subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, while aspects related to government cyber security are inside the structure of the Staff of Institutional Security, an executive power body, in addition to the existence of several private entities responsible for cyber security, through departments of information security or computing. These bodies cooperate with Brazilian cyber defense organizations.

Brazil and Argentina have similar agendas, essentially in terms of comprehensiveness, as their cyber defense agencies include several levels of strategic planning.

From the analysis performed, we do not notice among the three countries examined a power dispute or a cyber domain. Policies are more focused on internal issues and seek to meet the social, political and economic specificities of each country. On the other hand, there is still no effective convergence between these policies, which weakens the cooperation with consequences for the strengthening of the cyber defense and cyber security in the South American region.

Although these countries are part of two regional forums (OAS and UNASUR), the policies and initiatives in these forums seem to follow parallel scripts, with different approaches and purposes, not a conformation or convergence of guidelines and aspirations.

Regarding the cooperation between the analyzed countries, the actions are still in declaration stages and present as central characteristics the exchange of knowledge.

Argentina has shown its intention to cooperate in the cyber defense area in 2013. In Buenos Aires, during a meeting of the ministries of defense of Argentina and Brazil, Augustín Rossi and Celso Amorim endorsed a declaration on defense cooperation between the two countries. The declaration aimed to echo the need for bilateral integration to promote regional integration as a consolidator of a zone of peace (Brasil 2013).

The cyber defense was also approached in the declaration, mainly in a

beginning of bilateral cooperation between these countries for this matter, as follows bellow:

They agreed on the need to promote cooperation in cyber defense and the creation of a bilateral subgroup of work on the subject. They also agreed to organize this year a visit to Brazil by the cyber defense authorities of Argentina to learn about the Cyber Defense Center of the Brazilian Army and they also welcomed the invitation that the Brazilian Minister of Defense made for Argentina to designate participants to the Cyber War Course for Officers (2014) and for Sub-officers (2015), in Brazil (Brasil 2013a, 02)¹¹

The relation between Argentina and Brazil on cyber defense was initially designed as actions of mutual knowledge and confidence building between the two sides. They did not provide actions of joint institutions, but only visits and participation in courses. Therefore, we can state that the Buenos Aires Declaration on Defense of 2013 only allowed an approximation of the subject of cyber defense between the two countries.

This is evident when we observe the other actions provided by this declaration. The document can be divided into acknowledgments of ongoing or promoted works and predictions of future actions. In the other themes, the future actions required a deepening in the practical joint relationships that were already established, for example, the creation of Standards for Elaboration and Publication of Combined Doctrines between the two countries (Brasil 2013a).

In the following year, Argentina also signed a declaration that involved the cyber defense theme with Chile. Different from the one endorsed with Brazil, this one established joint and practical actions, with the creation of a Bilateral Group to deepen cooperation in emergency military assistance (Defensa Sur 2014). In addition, the declaration required the creation of a binational force that could be activated in emergency situations.

It is worth noting that far from attempting to increase military capabilities, Argentina uses defense agreements to get closer to other South American states. Bilateral dialogue, from this perspective, could serve as a basis for regional integration since it would promote peace in the region. However,

11 Coincidieron en la necesidad de impulsar la cooperación en defensa cibernética y creación de un subgrupo de trabajo bilateral en el tema. Acordaron además organizar durante este año una visita a Brasil de autoridades argentinas en ciberdefensa con fines de conocer el Centro de Defensa Cibernética del Ejército Brasileño y celebraron la invitación que el Ministro de Defensa de Brasil realizó para que Argentina designe participantes es el Curso de Guerra Cibernética para Oficiales (2014) y para Suboficiales (2015), en Brasil (Brasil 2013a, 02).

such declarations still do not present a practical application in the area of cyber defense besides the exchanges of information and interaction between the human resources of the countries involved.

However, this policy had been reoriented nowadays. With the departure of Cristina Kirchner from government and the beginning of Mauricio Macri term, cyber-defense cooperation efforts are directed toward the United States. This is what gives foundation for the idea that defense cooperation is used by Argentina as a tool of government and not as a State project.

In 2017, for example, during the visit of the Argentine president to the United States, these governments announced the creation of a Bilateral Intergovernmental Working Group on Cybernetic Policy (Argentina 2017). The group should identify cybernetic vulnerabilities of mutual interest to both countries, as well as the development of joint initiatives. It is important to note that the announcement does not only involve cyber defense, but also cyber security.

Another difference of this working group regarding the declarations made in the South America scope is that besides boosting this matter among the two countries, it also requires cooperation in international forums relevant to the theme. This happens because these countries understand that space security depends on other international actors (Argentina 2017).

In the Brazilian case, cooperation in cyber defense presents the two directions, intraregional and extra regional articulations. In both cases, we can deduce that Brazil presents the same model of cooperation established in the above-mentioned cooperation with Argentina. Consequently, the country tries to emphasize bilaterally the importance of this space, creating subgroups of work on the subject and establishing mechanisms for the exchange of knowledge.

Added to Argentina, Brazil had already established these categories of cooperation with Chile, Germany and Mexico (Oliveira et al., 2017). In the case of Argentina, the subgroup of work has been meeting in order to deal with aspects of cyber defense (Brasil 2015a). Despite this, cooperation still persists in human resources, this time providing for internships in the area of cyber defense (Brasil 2015a).

Brazil's extra-regional cooperation in the area of cyber defense has increased with intraregional cooperation. In 2014, the country signed an agreement with Sweden. On that occasion, these countries made a commitment to assemble working meetings to deal with defense issues. The second working meeting took place in the following year in Stockholm. Between the first and the second edition of the cooperation meetings, these countries made several

exchanges of experiences on the subject of cyber defense. In the last stage of this cooperation, a Swedish delegation visited the Center for Cyber Defense of the Brazilian Army (CDCyber) (Soares 2016).

Still following the same path of knowledge exchange, Brazil signed an agreement with India in 2015. The plan to hold an international course of Strategic Studies in 2016 with the Army was foreseen: exchange of professors and researchers in cyber security and cyber defense and doctrinal courses in these two themes. More than a declaration of intentions, it is important to emphasize that the meeting with the Indians generated proposals agreed within the framework of the three singular forces,

Another category of international cooperation of Brazil in which cyber defense has been targeted are those related to natural disasters. In 2013, for example, the country signed an agreement with Spain on this subject. The theme of natural disasters was highlighted by the Spanish side as a matter of approximation with South American nations, which was received by the Brazilian side as an issue to be dealt with bilaterally (Brasil 2013b).

At the same meeting, the Spanish Minister of Defense Morenés revealed, likewise, the Spanish concern with matters inherent to cyber defense. The then Minister of Defense, Celso Amorim, described the Brazilian experience with CDCyber and proposed the exchange of information as the initial axis of cooperation (Brasil 2013b). Consequently, in general terms, Brazil works on cyber defense with other countries within the idea of knowledge exchange, especially regarding the Brazilian experience with CDCyber.

It is also important to mention the meeting between Brazil and Colombia in 2012. At that time, the countries agreed to create a Joint Commission to review the capabilities of their forces (El Tiempo 2012). Composed of military personnel, it would also evaluate the cyber defense of both countries (El Tiempo 2012).

Colombia presents a different profile from Brazil and Argentina regarding cooperation in cyber defense. Colombian cooperation is mainly at the multilateral level, especially in the OAS forum. Within this organization, Colombia received a mission that verified the situation of its cyberspace besides evaluating its capabilities in cyber defense (OEA 2014).

In the bilateral axis, Colombia established a cooperation with South Korea, which began in 2014. Unlike other agreements and declarations already examined, the subject of this cooperation is Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). Besides emphasizing cyber security and e-government, this agreement still requires technology transfer (Mintic 2015). It should be stressed that Colombia deals with cyber security and cyber defense

in the same military sphere, so cooperation in cyber security has a direct impact on cyber defense.

Among the results of this cooperation is the Colombian electronic government portal, the electronic authentication system and the strengthening of technical capacities in response to cyber incidents and threats (Mintic 2015). Additionally, it has also led to the creation of a data storage center for the Colombian government, an advanced cybersecurity response course and a study of the strategic and operational model of the country's cyber security ecosystem (Mintic 2015).

In summary, agreements and declarations of cooperation in cyber defense are still in the early stages. Cooperation is addressed in the context of the exchange of knowledge and exchange of cyber defense agents, with the exception of Colombia, which has an agreement with South Korea with specific actions. Therefore, cybernetics is considered within a broad spectrum of national defense and is still used as a tool for approximation or as a political instrument.

Final Remarks

Cyberspace, differently from the State's one, exceeds borders and involves a global network that is shared worldwide. For that matter, in agreement with Madeiros Filho (2014), this environment demands new arrangements of global governance, among them is the discussion of an international regime to the discussion of this matter.

Although the cybernetic issue does not respect political borders, we noted that in the South American space it is still addressed primarily in the interior of the borders of the Nation States, as a domestic matter.

Through the analysis of documents, we observed that efforts have been made by OAS and by the South American Defense Council (SADC), two regional forums that the countries that were analyzed participate, in order to establish policies regarding cyberspace.

Some initiatives, such as the Action Plans of 2012 and 2013 (UNASUR), that proposed the creation of a Working Group to address the viability of establishing regional policies and mechanisms to fight cyber threats in the scope of defense, are examples; however, there is still no effectiveness in the policies promoted regarding the creation of regional convergence, although it has not been verified the rise of an old agenda in the power relations, having in the cyberspace the catalyst of possible obstacles that lead to litigation between States.

The three countries analyzed have a tendency to prioritize the national focus on their documents and this preference for domestic treatment is justified as the country needs to initially guarantee its national sovereignty. While they do not finalize the organization of cyber defense and cyber security on the national sphere, the South American countries try to acknowledge some guidelines of regional forums and seek some level of approximation through bilateral cooperation between countries.

It is important to stress a positive aspect in the policies analyzed regarding the cybernetic matter: they are relatively recent and are in the process of implementation, as well as their respective structures, which facilitates the debate on the deepening of the conformation and cooperation between countries.

To come to the point, this article sought to present a brief outline of the defense and security policies addressed to cyberspace in three countries of South America: Argentina, Brazil and Colombia and to place them within the framework of two regional forums (OAS and UNASUR). However, we did not intend to exhaust the matter, given its complexity and the need for further study.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to analyze the current cyber security and defense policies in Brazil, Argentina and Colombia, that have the higher density of internauts, placing these policies in the context of two regional forums: the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the possible existence of an interdependence among them or if a new cyberspace geopolitics is being framed in the region, that influences the organization of regional power.

KEYWORDS

Cyberspace; Geopolitics; South America.

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PEACE MISSIONS AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: REFLECTIONS ON THE BRAZILIAN CASE¹

Adriana A. Marques²

Introduction

The closure of the United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) in October 2017³ unleashed a wave of political and academic reflections on the legacy of Brazilian participation in this 13-year event which mobilized some 37,000 military personnel.

Diplomatically, MINUSTAH was considered by the Brazilian government as an important foreign policy instrument that allowed the country to play a greater role in the international scenario, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean (Amorim 2016) and to qualify itself as a peacemaker to the United Nations (Jungmann 2017). The National Congress, which expressed some reluctance to send Brazilian troops to Haiti, especially during the appreciation of the Foreign Affairs and Defense ministers' explanatory statement on this matter in 2004⁴, echoed the executive's official narra-

1 The ideas presented in this article were previously discussed on three occasions, at the XIII International Conference of Brazilian Association Studies in 2016, at the IX Congress of the Latin American Association of Political Science in 2017 and at the XI Meeting of Brazilian Political Science Association in 2018.. The Participation in both events was facilitated by the project International and Regional Scenarios of Security and Defense: a Civil Military approach, funded by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development and the Ministry of Defense.

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3 MINUSTAH was replaced by the United Nations Mission in Support of Justice in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) which will aim to support the strengthening of public institutions and the rule of law in the country.

4 Okaddo (2017) mapped out the work of the Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defense of the Chamber of Deputies (CREDN) on MINUSTAH issues and found that after an initial clash between members of the commission opposed to sending Brazilian troops to Haiti

tive about the success of the mission (Brazil 2017).

From a military perspective, MINUSTAH allowed Brazilian officers and graduates of the three Armed Forces to be immersed in a real operating environment. Organizationally, the Joint Center for Peace Operations of Brazil (CCOPAB) benefited directly from the Brazilian experience in Haiti, evolving from a structure linked to the Brazilian Army to a UN inspection body in the accreditation of peacekeeping forces (Teixeira 2017) .

Academic output on peace missions in Brazil has grown exponentially since the country took command of the MINUSTAH military contingent. Abdenur, Kuele, Folly and Macedo (2017) found from a survey in the CAPES journal portal that 35 books, articles and monographs on peace operations in Brazil were produced from 1990 to 2003. In the following period, From 2004 to 2017, the bibliographic production on the subject reached the mark of 418 works⁵.

The international literature on Brazilian participation in peacekeeping operations has also increased significantly in the last decade⁶ and, with regard to the legacy of our troops in Haiti, a particular point concerns the discussion that will be made in this article, the so-called Porto - Prince-Rio de Janeiro connection (Hirst and Nasser 2014: 04), that is, to what extent does the experience of the Armed Forces in public order control actions in Brazil influence

and the ones who supported the initiative of the Brazilian government, CREDN had little to say about the performance of Brazilian troops in Haiti.

5 According to Abdenur, Kuelle, Folly and Macedo (2017), the literature produced in Brazil about MINUSTAH concentrates on the decision-making process that led the Brazilian government to accept military leadership of the mission and in the relations of that decision with the Brazilian attempt to expand its soft power, to consolidate a regional leadership position, to strengthen the country's position in South-South cooperation, to oppose the United States, to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and to present an alternative to the principle of Responsibility to Protect present in this organization. Regarding the Brazilian military's performance in Haiti, the national literature focuses on the operational part of the mission, the activities that were carried out by the Brazilian troops and what are the possible returns of this experience, both in terms of organizational learning for new peace missions and in what concerns to the application of this learning in Brazil. This bibliographic survey also highlights some tendencies in the production of knowledge about the Brazilian Armed Forces that had already been pointed out by Marques and Fuccille (2015), that is, the Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH renewed the academic interest about the military apparatus, the new generation of studies on this subject are no longer concentrated in the universities of the São Paulo-Rio-Brasília axis and there are researchers of various levels of academic formation working in an integrated manner on international and defense issues.

6 The international literature on Brazilian participation in peace operations, as well as the Brazilian literature, is extensive and a bibliographic review on this topic would fall outside the scope of this article. Eric Cezne (2016) did a detailed discussion of the international literature on Brazil in peace operations in his master's thesis.

the performance of Brazilian troops abroad and vice versa? The answer to this question is not unanimous and is directly related to another question that is much less studied, both in the national literature and in the international literature, and which will be discussed next: the interconnections between military participation in peace missions and civil-military relations, in view of the increasingly routine participation of the Brazilian Armed Forces in Law and Order (GLO) missions and the serious political crisis that the country is undergoing.

For the elaboration of the article a literature review was carried out, concerning the literature that discusses the links between military participation in peace missions and the relationship between the Armed Forces and other sectors of the State in the domestic sphere, the literature that discusses civil-military relations in Brazil and the collection of primary sources such as government documents, articles published in newspapers and magazines of national circulation, and interviews given by the Brazilian Army commander and the Brazilian MINUSTAH commanders to press vehicles. In addition, twelve semi-structured individual and group interviews⁷ were held in Brasília and Rio de Janeiro with graduates and Brazilian officers from the three Armed Forces who participated in peace missions in Angola, Haiti and Lebanon⁸ and in-depth interviews with commanders of MINUSTAH⁹.

The article is organized into three sections besides this introduction. The second section reviews the international and Brazilian literature that discusses the connections between a country's participation in peace missions

7 All the interviews used as primary sources in this article were carried out within the project Transformations of the military profession in Brazil and Argentina: the perspective of the Social Sciences, financed by the Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Personnel.

8 The identities of the interviewees individually or in the focus group were preserved and the information obtained in the interviews were used exclusively for academic purposes in the project Transformations of the military profession in Brazil and Argentina: the perspective of the Social Sciences. The testimonies of the military commanders of MINUSTAH were donated to the collection of the Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation.

9 The military commanders of MINUSTAH were Army General Heleno Ribeiro Pereira (2004-2005), General of Division Urano Teixeira da Matta Bacellar (2005-2006), Army General José Elito Carvalho Siqueira (2006-2007), General of Division Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (2007-2009), General of Division Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto (2009-2010), General of Division Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz (2010-2011), General of Division Eduardo Ramos Baptista Pereira (2011-2012), General of Division Fernando Rodrigues Goulart (2012-2013), Army General Edson Leal Pujol (2013-2014), General of Division José Luiz Jaborandi Júnior (2014-2015) and General of Division Ajax Porto Pinheiro (2015-2017). Two MINUSTAH commanders have already passed away, the General of Division Urano Teixeira da Matta Bacellar and the General of Division José Luiz Jaborandi Júnior.

and the stability of civil-military relations, pointing out the limitations of the argument which states that the participation in peace missions would have a reforming effect on the military institutions of the African and Latin American countries that contribute substantively with troops to the UN and discusses some specificities of the Brazilian case. The third section maps the perceptions of the Brazilian military personnel on the participation in peace missions focusing its reflexes for the civil-military relations. Finally, some final remarks will be made on this topic.

Peace missions and civil-military relations in the academic perspective

Participation in peace missions is one of the main tasks performed by the contemporary armed forces¹⁰ (Matei 2012). Since the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, to date, the number of peace missions under the organization's mandate has increased exponentially, especially after the end of the Cold War. In addition, the profile of these missions has changed dramatically over the decades. From the first peacekeeping mission in 1948, when military observers were sent to the Middle East to monitor the armistice agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors, to the controversial decision of the UN Security Council that authorized the use of an intervention brigade with special forces troops and the mission to "neutralize" the armed groups in the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) in 2013¹¹, there was a significant extension in the scope of

10 Cristiana Cristiana Matei summarizes the six main tasks performed by the contemporary Armed Forces: 1-to wage and be prepared to wage wars, 2- to stand and be prepared to wage intrastate wars, 3-counterterrorism, 4-support to police forces in the fight against crime, 5 - peace missions, 6- humanitarian assistance (Matei 2012).

11 In this regard, it is worth observing the positions of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay on the mandate of MONUSCO. In the Brazilian case, it is noteworthy that at the beginning of MINUSTAH there was some critical positioning of CREDN regarding the use of force by Brazilian troops in Haiti in 2013, while the UN debated increasing the use of force by its troops to impose peace in the Congo under Chapter VII of its charter, a matter directly of concern to Brazil that under the Constitution of 1988 may only participate in peacekeeping missions, there was no manifestation of CREDN in that regard. Okado (2017) reports that there was also no substantive debate in CREDN about the deployment of Brazilian troops to Lebanon in 2010. What is being discussed here is not the convenience of the country participating in peace missions but the clear disinterest of CREDN in discussing and supervise the subjects related to this topic. The Brazilian legislative erratic behavior in relation to defense issues was analyzed by Oliveira (2005) and his diagnosis still remains current. Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas (2007) extend the diagnosis of Oliveira (2005) throughout Latin America when referring to the attention deficit of the politicians of the region in relation to the defense policy. The guidelines

mandates and substantive changes in the nature of peace operations, which need to deal with a large number of technical and care tasks in increasingly complex environments

However, despite all these changes, it should be noted that the UN General Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld's observation in the 1950s: "Peace operations are not tasks for soldiers but only soldiers can carry them out" (Moskos 1976: 139), remains current.

Concerning the participation of US and European troops in peacekeeping operations, Charles Moskos (1976) argued that military participation in peace missions, which were not primarily aimed at eliminating the enemy, would bring great benefits to the relationship between the military and other sectors of the state and society over time, since such a mission would require the military to have a bargaining power that conventional conflicts did not contemplate.

Moskos constructed his argument from the ideas exposed by Morris Janowitz in his seminal work *The Professional Soldier*. By analyzing the strategic context in which US troops could operate during the height of the Cold War, Janowitz (1967) warned that the military should be prepared to fight both in a nuclear war and in a conventional war of resistance. These two forms of war, according to the author, would require the military greater capacity of political negotiation and flexibility. As the use of force in international relations had changed significantly, it would be important for the military to incorporate into their professional requirements capabilities that until then were required only of police forces such as commitment to the minimum use of force and the search for stable relations instead of victory:

"The police conception encompasses the entire scope of power in military organizations. At the upper end are weapons of mass destruction; those of flexible and specialized application are at the lower end, where there are also specialists in military aid programs, paramilitary operations, guerrilla warfare and counter-guerrilla warfare. Equating the manipulation of weapons of high destructive power with strategy and those of small destructive power with tactics has been, and continues to be, a source of professional and public confusion. The police conception recognizes that there are strategic and tactical dimensions at each end of the scale. Tactics of strategic intimidation, for example, require daily decisions that range from

for CREDN meetings in 2013 can be found at: http://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-permanentes/credn/reunioes/pesquisa_reunioes_comissao.

The Brazilian position and of the other South American countries that contribute with troops to UN peacekeeping missions were analyzed by Mónica Hirst (2016) in the book *La Presencia de Argentina en Haití*.

community relations in overseas bases to the determination of propitious moments for political-military declarations of national leaders. On the other hand, strategic decisions regarding limited warfare involve policies of far-reaching consequences regarding the size, control, and distribution of military units.

It is no longer possible for officialdom, if it wishes to be organized effectively for strategic intimidation and for limited warfare, to operate on the basis of “war” and “peace” premises. As the conception of a police force eliminates the distinction between a military establishment of peace and war it approaches the concept of policing “(Janowitz 1967, 400).

Decades later, Charles Moskos would call this new profile-negotiating professional - whose emergence Janowitz identified during the Cold War - a military-statesman, defining him as a qualified officer to deal with the media and able to act in the complex environment of diplomacy (Moskos 2000).

In contemporary times, peace missions are the main terrain where the diplomatic skills of the military are exercised. Giuseppe Caforio (2007) presented the results of a series of surveys carried out between the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium with military personnel from the United States and some Western European countries. These studies showed that the increasing insertion of US and European militaries into multinational troops would have a double meaning for the armed forces of these countries: while coexistence and exchange of experiences with other military organizations would tend to standardize certain organizational behaviors, contact with foreign troops would tend to reinforce some traditional values in multinational teams such as patriotism, discipline, sense of responsibility and dedication (Caforio 2007).

The results of the surveys carried out by Caforio show that for the armed forces of countries with the most robust democracies, the experience of operating in multinational troops tends to reinforce some traditional military values in the members of the teams, besides contributing to the improvement of new capacities (Caforio 2007). However, one of the main characteristics of contemporary peace missions is the increasing participation of troops from Latin American, Asian and African countries, replacing US troops and their NATO allies.

At a first moment, the international literature highlighted the positive aspects of participating in peace missions in the process of socialization of these military, making them more professional and democratic. The contact between American and allied troops with troops from countries that had left authoritarian regimes and had little international experience would have a reforming effect on military institutions and individuals participating in mul-

tinational teams. This potential reforming effect would also extend to civilian-military relations, helping to reinforce the subordination of these armed forces to civilian power in their countries of origin.

According to Michel Desch, participating in peace missions would bring great benefit to countries that were undergoing a transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime because it would be easier to control the military while they were serving on missions abroad (Desch 1999, 12).

This reforming effect of participation in peace missions is also emphasized by Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, for whom foreign-oriented military would be more professional in the classical sense of the term and would tend to become less involved in domestic affairs (Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000).

In a more recent article on accomplishment of military missions in Latin America, Pion-Berlin points out that peace missions are a challenge for the military because they require them to play a variety of roles. While many of these roles are beyond their professional reach, they are still very rewarding for the Latin American military. There is a prestige factor associated with these missions. Participation in peace operations has also been associated with advanced professional training and the satisfaction of promotion requirements, and many military officials rediscover their purpose by following these missions (Pion-Berlin 2012, 637).

Magnus Lundgren elaborates on the arguments put forward by the above authors, especially those of Michael Desch, from what he understood to be a rational behavior of the military of poor countries that depend financially on participating in UN peacekeeping missions to balance their defense budgets. According to the author, these military men would avoid ostensible acts of military insubordination and coup attempts to continue participating in peace missions, since the UN prefers to rely on countries that have stable civil-military relations to form their troops (Lundgren 2018).

Maggie Dwyer, in turn, discusses the limitations of the theoretical model advocating the reforming effect of participating in peace missions in her case study of riots led by UN mission egressed soldiers in West African countries. According to the author, there have been at least 10 riots in the region since 1991 related to complaints from soldiers who had participated in peace missions. The West African countries contribute substantively with troops to the UN missions but this seems to have a rather limited effect on the reform of African military institutions. The riots studied by Dwyer result from an interaction between material grievances and a sense of injustice, and, in general, these issues are related to the corruption of officers who lead the troops and take an amount of the wage of their subordinates (Dwyer 2015).

Levin, MacKay, Nasirzadeh and Sealey propose a refinement of the democratic *peacekeeper's* hypothesis, given the difficulties of generalization in early studies discussing the reformist potential of participation in peace-keeping missions. Relating the reflexions of the participation in peace mission in the civil-military relations to the type of political regime of the studied country, the authors conclude that countries with robust democracies would benefit most from participating in peace missions, while authoritarian countries or fragile democracies would benefit little from this activity. The transfer of funds and prestige from the UN to the armed forces of undemocratic or politically unstable countries could even potentialize the possibility of a military coup in these places, destabilizing them rather than contributing to the reform of their military institutions (Levin et al. 2017).

With regard to the literature on Brazilian participation in peace missions, the analysts' expectations did not differ from those presented in the international literature until the advent of MINUSTAH. Clóvis Brigagão, in a 1999 text, argued that the new generation of Brazilian soldiers trained after participating in peace missions would have a new vision on conflict prevention and civilian governments (Brigagão 1999).

The most recent bibliography on the Brazilian case, especially the book by Arturo Sotomayor, *The Mith of Democratic Peacekeeper*, questions the possible reforming effect of the participation of peace missions. For Sotomayor, the participation of Brazil in missions of this nature did not have the effects expected by the analysts who study the subject. Their argument is that the Brazilian military not only replicates but reinforces their organizational understandings and domestic practices in the peace missions in which they participate. He analyzed the participation of Brazilian troops in Africa and Haiti to corroborate his thesis (Sotomayor 2014).

Regarding the participation of Brazilian troops in Mozambique and Angola in the 1990s, Sotomayor argues that the Brazilian military saw peace missions in Africa as an extension of subsidiary missions, mainly civic-social actions (ACISO), which they carried out in the Brazil. The author identifies in this perception the influence of the Armed Forces in the Amazon. Regarding the preparation of the troops for the missions that would be carried out under the mandate of the UN, there was the understanding that the military trained to operate in the Amazon would be able to operate in Africa, for this reason a large part of the contingent employed in the Verification missions of the United Nations in Angola and in the United Nations Operation in Mozambique was recruited in Manaus and elsewhere in the Amazon. The military, according to Sotomayor, took to Africa the practices that were considered effective in Brazil to deal with the needs of a population living in an environment where

the State is present largely through military institutions¹² and was little influenced by this international experience. (Sotomayor 2014: 82-84).

In relation to Sotomayor's argument, it is necessary to consider that in the 1990s Brazil did not have a training center for peace operations where the organizational experience acquired in Africa could be processed and disseminated in the troops. In addition, the participation of the Brazilian Armed Forces in social assistance and development support activities has deep historical roots (D'Áraújo 2010) and has grown significantly since the 2000s (Mathias, Campos and Santos 2016) making it difficult to disseminate any organizational benefit that the participation in a mission abroad could bring.

Besides, in the case of the troops sent to Haiti, Sotomayor maintains that the strategies used by the Brazilian military to pacify the favelas where they acted would be the same used in Brazil, so the performance of our troops abroad, rather than promoting some kind of institutional reform, would be reinforcing the practices adopted in the domestic environment. An example of this would be the request of military troops to pacify the favelas of the Complexo do Alemão by the governor of Rio de Janeiro Sérgio Cabral. On that occasion, Cabral used the performance of Brazilian troops in the favelas of Haiti to justify their demand for militarization of public security problems in Rio de Janeiro (Sotomayor 2014, 88).

Jorge Zaverucha also questions the thesis of the reforming effect of the participation in peace missions. Recovering the lyrics of a famous song by Caetano Veloso and Gilberto Gil, Zaverucha states that "Haiti is here" (Zaverucha 2005), that is, Brazilian troops would be training in Haiti to be employed in the fight against crime in Brazil and the routine use of military troops to combat urban violence in the country would be one of the indicators that democracy in Brazil is still fragile (Zaverucha 2008).

The Porto Príncipe-Rio de Janeiro connection is at the center of the debate over the legacy of Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH. The first analysis that deal with the intertwined experiences in the two cases dates back to 2014. Besides Sotomayor (2014), Hirst and Nasser drew attention to this phenomenon. The authors reported that approximately 60% of the military troops employed in the Maré favela in 2010 were formed by egressed from MINUSTAH and that Viva Rio projects for the Rio de Janeiro favelas were being replicated in Bel Air and Cité Soleil (Hirst and Nasser, 2014). According to Sotomayor (2014), Viva Rio was the nongovernmental organization that worked more closely with the Brazilians in Haiti.

¹² On the material and symbolic importance that the Brazilian military attributes to the Amazon see: Marques (2007).

Kristian Hoelscher and Per Norheim-Martinsen in turn warn for the possible undesirable consequences of the routine use of peacekeepers in Law and Order Assurance missions. According to the authors, the military's performance in Rio de Janeiro favelas intertwines the experience in Haiti with a long-standing Latin American military tradition of public order control and this could hinder the consolidation of democracy in Brazil (Hoelscher and Norheim-Martinsen, 2004).

Siman and Santos (2018) present a similar argument when they analyze the influence of the binomial security and development in the imaginary of the Brazilian military and how this is expressed in the performance of the Brazilian troops when they are fulfilling tasks of Guarantee of the Law and the Order and participating in missions of peace.

Haring acknowledges the synergistic effects that the two experiences, the peacekeeping mission in Haiti and the Law and Order Guarantee mission in Rio de Janeiro, have for the troops but concludes that in the near future, the organizational learning that the mission in Haiti provided to the Armed Forces should be applied in the control of public order in Brazil and not in new peace missions as diplomats and military wish (Haring 2016, 158).

An important question pervades all the analysis that discusses the connection or feedback between the Brazilian military's performance in peace missions and in subsidiary missions in Brazil: the greater involvement in peace operations did not diminish the participation of the Armed Forces in subsidiary activities in the country as predicted by the first studies on this subject, instead, there was a significant increase in the employment of the troops returning from Haiti in Law and Order Guarantee operations.

The tendency towards banalization of the use of the Law and Order Guarantee, already criticized by the army commander, General Eduardo Villas Bôas (Monteiro 2018), associated with the serious political crisis that Brazil has been going through since 2016, with the deposition of President Dilma Vana Rousseff, created the conditions for a *sui generis* situation at the end of May 2018. While the federal government for the first time enacted a Law and Order Guarantee operation throughout the national territory to unclog the federal public thoroughfares and try to resolve the strike of the truck driver's which lasted for several days with serious consequences for the whole country (Brazil 2018), part of the truckers on strike included the request for a temporary military intervention in the list of demands of the category to return to work (Betim 2018).

This episode reverberates to some extent the lessons of the international literature on the side effects of the participation of politically unstable countries in peace missions, but in the Brazilian case some considerations

are necessary. When Brazil assumed military command of MINUSTAH, the country was living in a period of political stability and the decision to participate more effectively in UN peace missions was part of a project to expand the Brazilian role in the international scenario (Amorim 2016), however, when the public security crisis intensified, the good performance of troops in Haiti came to be seen by the political class as an important asset for the control of public order and the use of Law and Order Guarantee operations became more frequent, reinforcing the process of feedback between the missions that the Brazilian troops carried out abroad and in national territory.

The deposition of President Dilma Rousseff intensified a reversal of expectations regarding the role that the Brazilian Armed Forces should play. If even the Rousseff government had at least a project of articulation between foreign policy and defense policy, in which the military would orient their missions each time to defend the interests of the country abroad (Alsina 2017), in the Temer government this tendency was interrupted and the Armed Forces began to operate routinely in operations to combat crime without the expectation of a relevant mission abroad¹³.

Within a framework of democratic stability, there were no visible indicators that the routine use of military troops in Law and Order Assurance operations could have a negative effect on the quality of Brazilian democracy, but the intensification of the political crisis placed this possibility in the agenda since the degree of political dependence of the Armed Forces in the government of Michel Temer only finds a parallel in the government of Jose Sarney (1985-1990). Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira defined the pattern of civil-military relations in this period as military guardianship:

I have employed the concept of military guardianship to designate a situation in which a government with a politically fragile partisan and parliamentary support finds in the Armed Forces the prime source of its stability at the price of preserving the basic traits of recent military experience: a high degree of political autonomy of the military apparatus in defining the national strategy; the exercise of the interventory function; a sometimes extremely dysfunctional, because extremely comprehensive, degree of interference from military ministers in extra-military matters; the affirmation of the Army as the force for regime stability par excellence (Oliveira 1994).

But if the present political conjuncture is similar to the one lived during the government of Jose Sarney, it is important to emphasize that the Army

¹³ Brazil was expected to send troops to the peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic in 2018 but the Temer government rejected the UN proposal and decided to prioritize federal intervention in the area of public security in Rio de Janeiro (Góes 2018).

today has a different pattern of behavior from that observed at the beginning of the New Republic (Oliveira 2005). The current military commander's displeasure to assume functions that go beyond the military sphere differs sharply from the resourcefulness with which General Leônidas Pires Gonçalves assumed his tutelary function over the President of the Republic in the 1980s, which raises some questions that will be dealt with below.

Peace missions and civil-military relations from the perspective of the military

In the book *The Invention of the Army* Celso Castro argues that the defense of the Brazilian Amazon against international greed had become an important identity element for the Brazilian Army from the 1990s and that implied an important doctrinal change. After decades of preparing to primarily combat an internal enemy, the defense of the Amazon was aimed at preparing against an external enemy, which had important consequences for the pattern of civil-military relations in the country (Castro 2002).

When Brazil took over the military command of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), appeared the possibility of using the Brazilian Armed Forces in an externally oriented mission and inserted in a project of the country's international insertion in Latin America and in the Caribbean. In this context, the participation in peace missions could constitute an identity element as important as the Amazon in the 1990s, acting as a symbol to mobilize military identity in the 21st century.

Brazil spent more than two decades without sending troops to UN missions. After ten years in Suez (1957-1967), the country resumed its participation with troops in peacekeeping missions sending troops to Mozambique in 1994. During this hiatus, the nature of peace operations significantly changed and the Brazilian military had to adapt to the new times in Brazil and in the international scope.

Brazilian participation in peace missions under the United Nations mandate grew substantially from the 2000s, especially when Brazil assumed command of MINUSTAH in 2004, however, until 2010, Brazil still did not have a prepared center for the training of military personnel who would participate in peace operations (Teixeira 2017). In the words of a military man who participated in the Brazilian contingent in the peacekeeping mission in Mozambique in the 1990s:

"(...) we had to relearn what a peace mission meant. We had no memory, the last mission had been in Suez in 1967, there was no such center of

peace operations today, no lessons learned, no such thing. Our activities were based on the instruction books, in what existed for the regular training of the troop, not specifically for peace operations. We had to make an adaptation of what existed for the internal training, that is, of activities that were carried out within the country and adapted for peace operations. So, it was a reinvention (...) (Interview I 2016)".

This process of reinvention in the way the Brazilian Armed Forces operate abroad was accompanied by administrative measures aimed at internalizing the procedures and norms in force in the peacekeeping missions, which led to changes in the behavior of troops on the ground. In 2005, the Peace Operations Training Center was created, which began its activities with the task of conducting the preparation of the third Brazilian contingent sent to the mission in Haiti, and finally, in 2010, the Joint Peace Operations Center of Brazil (CCOPAB), which assumed the mission of preparing Brazilian and foreign military and civilians to be sent to peace missions, was created (Teixeira 2017).

Concurrent with adapting to the existing international standards in peace operations, participation in this type of mission also allows for the ability of the military involved in them to be tested and to place them on a scale that replicates the division of power between countries in the international arena.

An officer who was in the first contingent of Brazilians assigned to operate in a Spanish brigade reports that at the beginning of the mission they were "set aside" and each day they had to prove that they were able to carry out the missions "at the European level". The military attributes the difficulties faced by the first contingent in UNIFIL to the lack of Brazilian tradition in employing troops in real war operations. And he emphasizes that the stereotype of the Brazilian abroad (linked to football, carnival, cordiality, etc.) makes it difficult at first to recognize the professional capacity of the Brazilian military by the European and American military (Interview II 2016).

The position of Brazil as an intermediate country in the international arena is evident when the interviewees compare the perception of Europeans about the professional capacity of the Brazilian military with the perception that the South American armed forces have on this attribute. A military man who headed a combat platoon in the second Brazilian contingent in Haiti reports that in the actions he participated in, the military of the other South American countries waited and recognized the Brazilian leadership (Interview III 2016).

The above accounts reveal a great affinity between the international

identity of Brazil built during the administrations of President Lula da Silva¹⁴ and the experience of the military in international troops: the Brazilian military would be representing an emerging country that sought to qualify as a peacemaker before the UN.

Regarding the reflexes of the Brazilian military's participation in peacekeeping missions for civil-military relations, it is possible to identify that, at first, the decision of the Lula da Silva government to send troops to Haiti was seen with distrust for a portion of the officers.

A senior officer working in the Army Land Operations Command (COTER) reported that when President Lula (leader of the then largest left-wing political party in Latin America) decided to accept the UN invitation to take military command of the United Nations mission in Haiti this was interpreted as an attempt to alienate the Brazilian Armed Forces from its subsidiary activities in the country, since Brazil was still participating, with a smaller contingent, in the East Timor peace mission (Interview IV 2016).

In this context, sending troops to missions in two distant places seemed to be part of a strategy of the Workers' Party government to try to control the military by keeping them on missions abroad as prescribed by Michael Desch (1999). But this initial perception soon faded. In the course of time it became clear that in the PT governments the Armed Forces would continue to act systematically in subsidiary missions in the national territory (Mathias, Campos and Santos 2016) without losing their capacity of influence and prestige with a portion of Brazilian society, as was evident during the truck drivers' strike in May 2018.

Moreover, the routine performance of the armed forces in subsidiary activities is not seen as an important asset by the Brazilian political class alone. The recruitment process of the generals who commanded the MINUSTAH military contingent shows that the prior experience of these professionals in Law and Order Guarantee operations, in combating transnational crimes and in humanitarian assistance actions is also appreciated by the UN.

With the exception of General Heleno Pereira, who was the first Brazilian force commander in Haiti¹⁵, the other generals who succeeded him went through a process of selection in the UN where the capacity to deal with situations of a police and political nature, that extrapolate the military sphere, was

¹⁴ In this regard see: Amorim (2016).

¹⁵ General Heleno Pereira was the only name indicated by the Brazilian government to assume the military command of MINUSTAH but this is not the practice in force in the UN. The organization's rules foresee that the country indicates some professionals and the UN select the one that it considers more qualified to assume the function.

measured. General Ajax Pinheiro, the last MINUSTAH force commander, reports that in his interview with UN officials, before taking command of the mission, he sought to relate the experience he had in charge of the Brigade in Cascavel with the activities he would carry out in Haiti. Pinheiro 2018).

The selective process of force commanders for MINUSTAH reveals that the very nature of the mission contributed greatly to reinforcing the Porto Príncipe-Rio de Janeiro connection. However, a point in common permeates the discourse of all the Brazilian generals who have been in Haiti. When asked if it was more appropriate for the Armed Forces to use what they learned in Haiti in Law and Order Guarantee operations or other peace missions, they all assert that MINUSTAH's learning should be replicated in other peace missions rather than in Brazil. In the view of the force commanders, the frequent use of military troops to combat crime is a sign that the country has serious problems in the area of public security and must overcome them through the improvement of police institutions.

In an interview to the *Piauí* magazine, General Villas-Bôas defined his perception of the use of the army in the favela complex of Maré, where a significant portion of the military contingent that was in Haiti was employed:

“It was eleven o'clock in the morning or noon of a normal day. And our people, very attentive, very worried, very uptight and armed, were patrolling the street where women and children were passing. I said, ‘We are a sick society. The Army is pointing guns at Brazilians.’ This is terrible (Victor 2018).”

This interview was granted after the federal government decided to intervene in the area of public security in the state of Rio de Janeiro at the beginning of 2018, so it is not possible to state that the federal intervention has modified the negative perception of the Brazilian Army regarding the banalization of the Law and Order Guarantee operations. On the other hand, it is possible to affirm that the banalization of the operations of Guarantee of the Law and the Order shows conclusively how much President Temer depends politically of the support of the Armed Forces to govern.

Final Remarks

The increasingly frequent use of the Armed Forces in Law and Order Guarantee operations in Brazil requires a more structured reflection on the existing connections between the participation of Brazilian troops in peace

operations and in subsidiary activities in the country. Recent literature analyzing Brazilian performance in peace missions offers some interesting insights into the consequences of this cross-over experience for civil-military relations.

The benefits of Brazil's participation in peace missions are undeniable. However, the way the political class has been processing this experience is troubling. There is a clear reversal of expectations regarding the role that the Brazilian Armed Forces should play in a country that intends to take a leading role in its strategic surroundings. Rather than contributing to the improvement of the articulation between foreign policy and defense policy, the participation of Brazilian troops in peace operations has contributed to the militarization of public security and the policialization of the armed forces.

The high degree of dependence of the Temer government on military institutions can also trigger a process of politicization of the armed forces, reversing a pattern of civil-military relations being built since Fernando Collor's presidency through institutional reforms such as the decrease of the ministries occupied by the military and the creation of the Ministry of Defense (Oliveira 2005).

It is hoped that the next governments will use the military apparatus more cautiously and in consonance with the interests of Brazilian society. The consequences of the political use of the armed forces have been well studied in the literature that analyzed the military dictatorship in the country (Oliveira 1994) and are known to be disastrous for the society, for the political class and for the military institutions.

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ABSTRACT

The article discusses the interconnections between the participation of the Brazilian military in peace missions and civil-military relations in the country. For its elaboration a bibliographical revision and the collection of primary sources, like governmental documents, articles published in newspapers and magazines and interviews were realized. It is concluded that, instead of contributing to the improvement of the articulation between foreign policy and defense policy, the Brazilian participation in peace operations has been instrumentalised by the political class and indirectly contributing to the militarization of public security and the policialization of the armed forces.

KEYWORDS

Peace Missions; Civil-Military Relations; Law and Order Guarantee.

Translated by Laura Schaan Chiele

ARTICLE

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EXTERNAL AGGRESSION IN LATIN AMERICA: A COMPARISON BETWEEN COSTA RICA AND ECUADOR

Marco Vinicio Méndez-Coto¹

Introduction

The study of small states is a peripheral knowledge area in international studies (Hey 2003; Murillo Zamora 2012b; Salgado Espinoza 2015). This peripheral condition is related to the domain of realist thinking which, by focusing on the great powers, relegated this States to marginality. Despite this, what is found in international relations is the predominance - by its number - of small states (Neumann and Gstöhl 2006) being the social construction of the “normality of being giant” (Baldacchino 2009) an anomaly that affects the theorization of the issues faced by a majority proportion of states.

In security studies the research agenda has been defined by traditional threats (Kacowicz and Mares 2015, 25), because of this the article seeks to understand the process by which small states construct an identity when facing an “external aggression”. The argument is that being ‘Small’ has ideational (perception and self-perception) and material (in terms of reduced capacities) consequences, which makes them more vulnerable to threats to their sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity, and needed of external support.

When Costa Rica and Ecuador confronted external aggressions they

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constituted an identity, objective and subjective interests and political responses at the domestic, bilateral, sub-regional, regional (or hemispheric) and global level. As symptomatic case studies, the crisis of Isla Portillos / Harbour Head between Costa Rica and Nicaragua (2010-2015) and the crisis of Angostura between Ecuador and Colombia (2008-2010) are compared. These crises generated discursive practices of “external aggression”; in the case of Costa Rica it involved the possibility of “reconsidering the pacifism that characterizes it ... [and] arming security forces ... [with] defense capacity against foreign armies”², while Ecuador threatened a military response against Colombia, both being situations in which regional security was at risk.

The study of this process makes it possible to understand the practices of the attacked State and the behaviors of the States interacting in the region, evidencing the security interdependencies. Since small states construct their identity in an anarchic culture, the article dialogues with the literature of the new regionalism emphasizing the security dimension in the Americas (Buzan and Wæver 2003, Kelly 2007, Battaglini 2012, Frasson-Quenoz 2014); therefore it will answer the following question: *How were Costa Rica and Ecuador identity, interests, and political actions constructed when facing “external aggression”?*

External aggression: uses and approaches

External aggression is a disputed analytical category. Its enunciation in the international context is associated with the threat of the founding principles of the Westphalian system: sovereignty, political independence and the territorial integrity of States, hence the sensitivity of political representatives, multilateral institutions and national societies. Despite its implications, in Latin America it is a category that is present both in the social imaginary and in the discourse of foreign policy, regardless of the ideological affiliation of governments. This is mainly due to the history of interventions, rivalry and conflict that has characterized the region. This presence is evidenced when political crises occur and has been internalized by both domestic and hemispheric norms, being a justification for the permanence of the military institution in several States (Dassel 1998, 140).

The value load of “external aggression” entails academic difficulties around its definition, since a wide and varied range of events can justify its

2 Murillo, A. 2011. “Canciller Castro ve necesario reconsiderar tradición pacifista”. *La Nación*. January 13th. <http://wfnode01.nacion.com/2011-01-13/ElPais/NotasSecundarias/ElPais2649848.aspx?Page=6>

enunciation; therefore it becomes imperative to understand it from the objectivist and intersubjectivist approaches. The objectivist approach is addressed, on the one hand, from the rationalist paradigm in international studies which presuming that external aggressions are objective and factual situations, offers hypotheses centered on power and institutions to understand their persistence, on the other hand the legalist paradigm analyzes the legal-norms and the moral obligations for the behavior of the States.

In contrast to the objectivist approach, the intersubjectivist approach points out that external aggressions cannot be taken for granted, being necessary to understand the shared knowledge that allows its definition, the accepted norms of behavior that enable the threat and the use of force in interstate relations, and the process of constitution of the State's identities when facing an external aggression. The process of constitution of the identity is constructed by its opposition with a pair (aggressor / attacked) and by the reproduction of practices (identity contents) which generate the expectation of stable and predictable behaviors, whose apprehension can be made through comparative studies.

This article emphasizes the intersubjectivist approach to understand the enunciation of external aggression, however, the need to complement it with the objectivist approach is recognized, considering that a necessary but not sufficient condition is that threats against sovereignty, political independence or territoriality integrity of the State, have occurred through the threat or use of armed force, and can be verified by the international community.

The objectivist approach to external aggressions

External aggressions can be analyzed as factual situations involving the threat or use of armed force in inter-State relations, and which generate the activation of defensive mechanisms by the attacked State, the international community or the international institutions. The underlying logic is that these events respond to a costs and benefits calculation for the aggressor, a situation that although constrained by international legal-norms in the dynamics of political power is presented as a reality. To understand these events the core arguments brought by the rationalist theories in international studies and the contributions of the legalist paradigm will be analyzed.

In international studies two research programs have been distinguished: the rationalist and the reflectivist (Keohane 1988, 382). The rationalist program includes realist and neoliberal institutionalism theories. These theories share a positivist philosophy of science, an empiricist epistemology and a materialist ontology; in that sense Peñas characterizes them as explana-

tory (2005) and Cox as problem solving theories (1993). The rationality refers to the presumption of the State as an unitary actor with given interests (set exogenously and pre-socially), this actors “are guided by a logic of consequences, that is, a rational act is one that will produce an outcome that maximizes the interests of the individual unit” (Fierke 2013, 190).

Realist and neoliberal institutionalism theories have divergent interpretations of the meaning of cooperation and international institutions, as well as the hierarchy of the thematic agenda (Grieco 1988), however, the centrality of the State as an egoist actor, the determinism of material capacities, the persistence of anarchy and the importance of survival in the international system are common in these theories. Therefore, external aggressions can be explained by three hypotheses: 1) to affect mainly weak States, 2) to constitute structural behaviors derived from interstate socialization and competitiveness, and 3) being the outcome of the defection in institutionalized frameworks.

Political realism has had its foundations in the thought of Thucydides for whom “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Dallanegra Pedraza 2009, 103). Weakness is a relational condition: a State will be more or less weak compared to others in material terms. Weaker States are more likely to face threats to their sovereignty, political independence or territorial integrity because other State actors, based on a calculation of costs and benefits, will consider appropriate to carry out the aggression if it derives political benefits. According to Rivera Vélez, to accomplish their interests the States must possess the necessary military capabilities to defend their integrity and sovereignty or “to assume the consequences of their weakness” (2012, 29), because they will never be certain of the intentions of others, much less when they will use their offensive capacities, and “there are many possible causes of aggression, and no State can be sure that another State is not motivated by one of them” (Mearsheimer 1994, 10).

In contrast to the power politics approach, neorealists explain external aggression as a behavior resulting from the competitiveness and socialization of States, privileging the actions toward survival and self-help, and conditioned by anarchy. Socialization and competitiveness takes place in the international structure, which is defined by the disposition of the units, based on three ordering principles: the decentralized and anarchic character of politics; the absence of formal subordination or differentiated functions, and the distribution of material capacities which affect the performance of State tasks, such as providing security (Waltz 1988, III; Barreiro Santana 2014, 30). In an anarchic and competitive world, States have been socialized in a structure that privileges maximizing power (offensive realists) or security (defensive

realists); therefore a State will take advantage of an asymmetry at the expense of the others to improve its position.

From the neoliberal institutionalism point of view, realist explanations overstate the role of anarchy and do not pay attention to the cooperative efforts expressed in institutions. External aggressions occur due to the failure of institutional mechanisms in predicting State behavior: enabling the conditions of “moral hazard” in which States act against the rules considering that the institution will distribute the costs of its actions (Domínguez 2003, 29–30), or due to high levels of legalization (Goldstein et al. 2000, 401) it may be more beneficial for a State to resolve a dispute outside of the established procedures (Sterling-Folker 2013, 122–24). As noted, States threaten or use armed force because it generates a political benefit, so when there are institutionalized frameworks defection is a possible behavior.

Finally, it must be considered that the external aggression has been present in the philosophical and legal debates regarding the use of armed violence. At the international level it has been part of the philosophical thought related to the “just war” and expressed in norms of Public International Law. In Latin America, it has been apprehended in legal thinking regarding the defense of sovereignty, territorial integrity, nonintervention in internal affairs and political independence through regional doctrines. The legalist paradigm offers a theory of aggression in the work of Walzer, which is related to the idealism in international studies because of the emphasis on the deontological. This paradigm establishes a heuristic assumption through the domestic analogy, according to which aggression would be an international equivalent of “armed robbery or murder, and every comparison of home and country or of personal liberty and political independence” (Walzer 2001, 93).

The instrumental legalist use of the external aggression is expressed in three sources of law: international, hemispheric and domestic (Cfr. Méndez-Coto 2017). In international law, the Charter of the United Nations has established in Article 39 that it is the responsibility of the Security Council to determine whether or not an event qualifies as an aggression, which, in words of Vallarta, it prevents that “any incident of ‘little value’ is used as a pretext for invasion” (2011, 442). During the 1970s, meetings were held to reach a universal consensus on the definition of external aggression, given its disputed nature. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 defined it as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”, establishing in its Article 3 a series of events as acts of aggression.

Despite this, a comprehensive review of the “Repertoire of the Practice

of the Security Council”³ has determined that Article 39, from 1946 to 2011, has been explicitly invoked only in 8 occasions, being the last event in 1990 with no reference to a Latin American State. In the practice of the Security Council, it is extremely difficult to take action on the basis of that article, since many communications or draft resolutions are vetoed because of its political character. This makes possible to argue that the instrumental legalist use is a path not very promising for States and that increasing the number of actors involved can diminish their bargaining capacity.

At the hemispheric level, the security system has its foundations on the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Organization of American States (OAS). This security system establishes in the Charter of the OAS that: “every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American States” (Article 28), and such affectation could occur “by an armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack” (Article 29). This system has been designed for the maintenance of collective security and the peaceful settlement of disputes through diplomatic consultations, intervening in at least 18 occasions between 1948 and 2008 (Herz 2008, 11). Notwithstanding the above, Mares criticized that “rather than insisting on a norm of no first use of military force in a dispute..., the security architecture is designed to become active after a government has decided that militarization is a good idea” hampering its “peace-enhancing potential” (2014, 430).

Additionally, when analyzing the domestic norms, external aggression as a threat is explicitly found in 14 of 21 Latin American Constitutions; in 8 out of 10 published White Papers; and in the absence of a White Paper it was found in 4 out of 8 National Defense Policies or Plans. This is evidence that allows affirming that traditional threats continue being a matter of concern and of State interest.

In Latin America external aggressions are present in the social imaginary; this is reflected in the articulation of domestic, hemispheric and international laws. However, the instrumental-legalist use faces challenges because the Security Council hardly accepts it, and in inter-American relations the collective use of armed force is highly unlikely although formally possible. Considering the consensus reached at the international level, external aggression is conceptualized as the threat or use of armed force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States, it is also stressed that

3 United Nations. *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council*. 1946-2011. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml>

in Latin America its use is mainly substantive-political being necessary the understanding of the context of enunciation.

The intersubjectivist approach to external aggression

In contrast to the objectivist approach that takes external aggression for granted, this section explains how the identity, interests, and political responses of the State that confronts the action named “external aggression” are constructed. To this end the theoretical contributions of the social constructivism are used. External aggression is a label which includes a set of practices and intersubjective meanings attributed to a particular state action. These actions express intentionality or motivational dispositions founded on identities; therefore it has been rationalized by the State considering the available information, norms of accepted behavior and anarchic culture. Considering that the action reflects motivational dispositions its interpretation is not controlled by the agent, since the social interaction is dialogic and intersubjective.

The action named external aggression does not pre-socially imply an aggressor identity because the State may have had a misperception assuming that sovereignty allowed the use of force in a situation considered legitimate, which will be accepted or rejected only by the *ex post* interaction. Notwithstanding the above, a State may also subjectively (*ex-ante*) constitute a preference for aggression and act in accordance with that understanding, eliminating misperception in the social interaction.

Identities have been subject of a wide academic debate which lack a consensual definition (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 399). Following Wendt (1999, 215–16) and Fearon (1999, 34) this work will refer to State identities, considering the State as an actor with a corporate agency to which identities and interests can be attributed. Steele considers that there are two bases to theorize about identity: “the collective (which engulfs or shapes the Self) or an oppositional Other against which an agent identifies” (2008, 26). In this sense Merke establishes three links between identity and state action: identity as a tool that gives meaning to the world surrounding the agent; identity by opposition with the Other, or the will to reproduce a role with its expectations of behavior (2008, 49).

Identity will be defined as

a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions. This means that identity is at base a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor’s self-understandings. However, the meaning of those understandings will often depend on whether other actors represent

an actor in the same way, and to that extent identity will also have an inter-subjective or systemic quality... Two kinds of ideas can enter into identity, in other words, those held by the Self and those held by the Other (Wendt 1999, 224).

For Lorenzini, identities refer “to the self-perception of governments according to the principles that guide their policies... [And also alludes] to the view of the ‘Others’, the way in which they are perceived by their peers” (2013, 46). Fearon considers that having “a particular identity means to assign oneself to a particular social category or perhaps just to be assigned to it by others”, defining social category as “a set of people designated by a label commonly given to, or used by, a set of people. The label must be invoked often enough or in sufficiently important situations that people condition their behavior or thinking on it” (1999, 13). Social categories have two distinctive features: implicit or explicit membership rules according to which the actors are assigned to the label, and a set of characteristics, physical attributes or “behaviors expected or obliged of members in certain situations” (Fearon 1999, 14). These distinctive features are the “identity content” (Merke 2008).

Social identities can be of two kinds: the collective identity defined as “a cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether... extending the boundaries of the Self to include the Other” (Wendt 1999, 229); and the role identity “as self-definitions deriving from peoples’ knowledge of the roles they occupy... thus people might be motivated to make behavioral decisions which are consistent with their self-concepts” (Steele, 2008, 30, citing Astrom and Rise 2001). This agents “are expected or obligated to perform some set of actions, behaviors, routines, or functions in particular situations” (Fearon 1999, 17) because “one can have these identities only by occupying a position in a social structure and following behavioral norms toward Others possessing relevant counter-identities”, but “one cannot enact role identities by oneself” they depend on shared expectations many of which are institutionalized (Wendt 1999, 227).

The reproduction of a role identity implies the identification of a specific situation (as an external aggression) and the internalization of the identity contents, which means “to understand their requirements, and to act on those understandings” (Wendt 1999, 232). There operates a causal mechanism between identity, interest and actions. The internalization is accompanied by its social legitimating process, because “an actor is not even able to act as its identity until the relevant community of meaning... acknowledges the legitimacy of that action” (Hopf 1998, 178–79); if “those parameters are breached, or absent..., then role identities are contested” (Wendt 1999, 227).

As Hopf argues “the identity of a State implies its preferences and consequent actions”, and the social practices “that constitute an identity cannot imply interests that are not consistent with the practices and structure that constitute that identity” (1998, 175–76). In this sense Wendt points out that interests, as the motivations that explain behavior, presuppose identities; being the objective or national interests the imperative needs or functions for an identity to reproduce, and the subjective interests or “preferences” are beliefs of the agent on how to accomplish those needs considering their experience, the norms in which they have been socialized and their position in the structure (social or material) (1999, 231–32). Political responses are the empirical evidence from which identities and interests are inferred, so could be synonymous with “actions” or “ordinary and extraordinary measures” that shape foreign policy behavior.

Small States and Foreign Policy

In international studies, Small States have been object of limited academic interest; it is related to a negative view where the “small” is synonymous of vulnerability, weakness and even irrelevance. Despite this, there is no consensus on its essential attributes (Hey 2003, 3; Salgado Espinoza 2015, 26), considering that its study reflects tensions between rationalist theories, whose contributions have been the foundation of this category, and constructivist theories that fail to transcend this legacy.

The small state is defined ontologically by its lack of resources, evidenced in the fact that the first works sought to determine the material characteristics that separated it from the most influential, being usually defined by what they are not: materially or ideationally powerful (Steinmetz and Wivel 2010). However, Neumann y Gstöhl argue that “any precise definition can only be arbitrary” (Neumann and Gstöhl 2006, 6; Baehr 1975, 459), therefore Hey considers that “no strict definition is necessary” appealing on contingency and contextualizing case studies (2003, 2).

For Baldacchino, smallness is relational (2009, 23), but fails to characterize also as systemic, without which analytical accuracy would be lost since asymmetry in a dyad does not presuppose smallness. This work considers that smallness is a systemic attribute; therefore its relational character refers to its position in the (material or social) structure. The material structure gives territorial foundation to the corporality of the State, but reinforces the problem of the ‘normality’ of being giant (Baldacchino 2009, 21) privileging the study of Superpowers (Cold War), Great Powers or Regional Powers (post-Cold War) despite the predominance of Small States in contemporary international rela-

tions (Neumann and Gstöhl 2006).

The social structure allows understanding smallness as intersubjective knowledge. Hey affirms that “if a State’s people and institutions generally perceive themselves to be small, or if other State’s peoples and institutions perceive that State as small, it shall be so considered” (2003, 3), and Salgado Espinoza defines the Small States as “the social construction of a sovereign political entity based on the shared understanding and collective recognition of the State category of small within the national and international community” (2015, 63).

The Small State must be identified by its lack of resources as an ontological, systemic and relational attribute; complemented with the perception (Self-Other) of smallness, integrating the objective-subjective and endogenous-exogenous dimensions proposed by Vayrynen (1971, 93). Its identification was made following the “Index of Powers” of Murillo Zamora (2012b), which exhibit the material potential of the States based on the main variables of mainstream theories. Regarding to the perception it could be asked “what it entails for a State to think of itself as, and be thought of by others as being, generally ‘small’?” (Neumann and Gstöhl 2006, 8), a possible answer is characterizing its main regularities of foreign policy behavior: a reduced geographical projection, fundamentally to its own region and neighboring States, “low levels of participation in world affairs..., high levels of support for international legal norms, frequent use of moral and normative positions..., and avoidance of the use of force as a technique of statecraft” (East 1973; Hey 2003; Bonilla 2008; Braveboy-Wagner 2008; Murillo Zamora 2012b; Méndez-Coto 2017a).

In relation to agency, it is reductionist to assume that all its foreign policy behavior is structurally predetermined, as the rationalist theories argue, considering them as policy-takers whose options are alignment or free-riding. Some of its behaviors may be “voluntarist” (Vogel 1983, 54), derived from experiences and future expectations as base of the identity, and from the opportunities created by the power balances (Mares 2001).

External aggressions occur in a social structure in which intersubjective knowledge, and therefore culture, enables States to project armed force into their mutual relations. In Latin American the anarchic culture has been defined as Lockean considering that States ensure their right to exist by norms that restrict the use of force, and the intersubjective recognition of sovereignty (section 1.1), but there are concerns about asymmetries as motivations to threat or use of force to resolve a dispute (Buzan and Wæver 2003; Kelly 2007; Frasson-Quenoz 2014; Méndez-Coto 2017b). Taking into account the intersubjectivist approach to external aggression (section 1.2) and the expected for-

eign policy behavior, it is affirmed that when facing this kind of threat, two interests are constituted: an objective or national interest in the reproduction of the State (sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity), and a preference or subjective interest in the mobilization of external support, given its lack of resources.

Methodological considerations

This work follows a reflexive and integrative methodological approach. In that sense, a circular logic has been used where there is a constant dialogue between material and ideational dimensions, improving the relevance and academic consistency. Considering the methodological approach of Lamont (2015), the research strategy was organized in two levels: the process of data collection and data analysis. The process of data collection entailed a deep documentary research in Ecuador, Argentina, Costa Rica and Nicaragua (pending Colombia); including the systematization of 450 pieces of the main newspapers of each State and the conduction of 19 academic interviews with experts.

The process of data analysis was performed with two methods: case study research and qualitative content analysis. The case study research is multiple or collective kind, it means that: “a number of cases may be studied jointly in order to investigate a phenomenon... They are chosen because it is believed that understanding them will lead to better understanding, and perhaps better theorizing, about a still larger collection of cases” (Stake 2005, 445–46). For Yin the multiple case study research is different from the comparative method, being used in studies with more than one singular case, which evidence “is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust” (2009, 53).

According with the constructivist approach privileged in this research, the positivist comparison is not sought, however as Bennett & Elman argue “just as language and concepts are inherently comparative, all single case studies, even when not explicitly comparative, are implicitly so” (2008, 505). The cases selected fulfill necessity but no sufficiency condition, given the complexity of international affairs (Liebersohn 1991); the non-plausibility of deterministic studies on international security (Kacowicz 2004), and that the Latin American historical record on security and conflict does not support simple explanations (Mares 2001; Domínguez 2003; Martín 2006).

Taking into account the objectivist approach that calls for the verifiability of external aggressions, cases were selected with the following criteria: consist on Militarized Interstate Disputes; the State enunciating the external

aggression is a Small State based on the “Index of Powers” of Murillo Zamora (2012b), interacting in a Lockean anarchic culture. The crisis of Portillos Island / Harbour Head between Costa Rica and Nicaragua (2010-2015), and the bombing of Angostura in Ecuador by Colombia (2008-2010) meet these criteria; evidencing violations of borders in which the sub-regional stability was at risk (Mares 2014, 2015). Both Costa Rica and Ecuador denounced having been attacked, which highlights the political use of categories since the construction of an attacked State identity is part of a process of social interaction, and its meaning is subject of interpretation.

In relation to the qualitative content analysis, a universe of study was defined which allowed the systematization of newspaper articles to find evidence on the articulation of identity, interests and actions. This universe was analyzed with ATLAS.ti, beginning with a deductive logic but flexible to apprehend inductively emerging issues and codes.

Ecuador and Costa Rica: Small States confronting external aggressions

One main contribution of social constructivism is the “notion that State identity fundamentally shapes State preferences and actions”, and in its constitution lies a causal mechanism (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 394; 398). These social identities enable “predictable patterns of behavior” (Hopf 1998, 174), hence “a subject’s desire to interpret a role... presupposes knowing the content of the identity being ‘interpreted’ therefore the footprints and expectations of that role” (Merke 2008, 49).

Comparative Table 1: Ecuador and Costa Rica foreign policy behavior when confronting and external aggression

Behavior	Ecuador	Costa Rica
<i>Domestic</i>		
Border fortification	Yes	Yes
Alignment and domestic cohesion	Yes	Yes
Agenda setting by Aggressor State (media)	Yes	No
Judicial prosecution against responsible agents	Yes	Yes

Trade & Migratory restrictions	No	No
<i>Bilateral</i>		
Diplomatic relations	Suspended	Temporally Frozen
Binational Commission	Suspended	Suspended
<i>Sub regional</i>		
Kind of threat	Irregular armed groups	Border delimitation issues
Militarized Interstate Disputes (1992-2010)	23 (conflictive)	19 (conflictive)
Sub regional institutional mechanism (interest)	No (CAN)	No (SICA)
<i>Regional</i>		
Alignments/Political affiliation of governments	Socialist/Left	Liberal/Right
Inter-American Court of Human Rights	Withdrawal	No
Rio Group Meeting	Yes	No
Organization of American States	Yes	Yes
Permanent Council	Yes	Yes
Meeting Of Consultation of MFA	Yes (25 th)	Yes (26 th)
Was the fact (aggression) fully demonstrated?	Yes	No
Was the attacked State identity fully accepted?	Yes	No
<i>Universal</i>		
International Court of Justice	No	Yes
Was the fact (aggression) fully demonstrated?	-	Yes
Was the attacked State identity fully accepted?	-	Yes

Source: prepared by the author.

The central argument is that the identity of the attacked State consists on a set of stable behavioral expectations; this implies that the Small State interpreting that role identity assume a set of interests and actions consistent with that identity. It was pointed out that the interests are the reproduction of the State and the mobilization of external support. In the cases studied, as the Comparative Table 1 demonstrates, these interests were evidenced in political actions such as: domestic political alignment as expression of nationalism as an identity foundation; the fortification of frontiers and the “frozen” or suspension of bilateral diplomatic relations; a refusal to the activation of the sub-regional political mechanisms; the search for a multilateral condemnation to the aggression based on regional political alignments, and in case that it failures, to resort in the United Nations mechanisms; among others explained below.

Ecuador and Colombia: the crisis of Angostura

The attack of the Colombian armed forces to a camp of the irregular guerrilla group of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which was operating illegally in the Ecuadorian territory of Angostura in 2008, was one of the tensest episodes of Latin American politics in XXI century, representing a threat to sovereignty and territorial integrity. The first thing to note is that the case study represents a situation in which a Latin American State (Colombia) uses armed force *in the territory* of another Latin American State (Ecuador), but *not against its agents*⁴. This precision is critical considering that the case reflects the new political dynamics on the use of force at the international level by involving irregular armed groups as targets.

According to the new regionalism theories the security interdependencies enables to acknowledge the different threats and security concerns in a region and compare them with others that are adjacent or distant. Therefore, it is possible to understand and distinguish the patterns of conflict present in the regions and sub-regions, which are socially and historically constructed. In this sense, Angostura is a case that reflects the most pressing security problems in the Andean zone due to its porous borders allowing the regionalization of an intra-State armed conflict and its implications in terms of drugs, arms and human trafficking.

The Colombian bombing in Angostura occurred on March 1, 2008, and aimed to the “FARC camp... located 1,800 meters from the border in Ecuadorian territory... in the province of Sucumbíos” (Vallejo and López 2009,

4 Francisco Carrión Mena and Alejandro Suarez, interviewed in Quito, Ecuador in 2016.

21). According to Torres, this sensitive attack to the guerrilla was made possible by an “interception of calls from a satphone... used by Raúl Reyes” who served as a relevant leader of the irregular armed group. In the bombing were used “five A-29B Super Tucano... also three subsonic A37 aircraft were deployed... [which] crossed the border and from the Ecuadorian airspace began the bombing from South to North” (2009, 140). In this bombardment a report of the “Transparency and Truth Commission Angostura” (2009) indicates that “ten GBU 12 Paveway TI 500-pound bombs” were launched.

The bombing of Angostura generated suspicion on the participation of a third State, the United States, due to its accuracy and technical characteristics. In terms of human consequences, the bombing resulted in the death of approximately 26 people, the main target being Luis Édgar Devia Silva known as “Raul Reyes”, a leader of the guerrilla, and therefore the attack was a severe military and political setback for the organization.

The Colombian military operation was named “Operation Phoenix”; it was endorsed and planned by high military and political authorities, including the Minister of Defense Santos as well as President Uribe. In front of the emerging information, Ecuador initially sympathized with Colombia and investigated the attack. Subsequently, the Colombian Ministry of Defense alleged that the camp was attacked “from the Colombian side, always taking into account the order to not violate Ecuadorian airspace”, and Uribe expressed gratitude to Ecuador for “its understanding of the moment of determination that Colombia lives to defeat terrorism” (Torres 2009, 154–55).

Considering the above, Ecuador raised questions in terms of non-application of the procedures defined in the Security Card for Border and Military Units, established as one of the measures of mutual trust between Colombia and Ecuador, according to which these armed forces had to surrender (Bermeo and Pabón 2008, 15). A high level meeting was held at the Carondelet Palace, presidential seat, with the objective of analyzing the events reported by Colombia and the Ecuadorian intelligence, and to verify information from the on-site inspection carried out by armed forces in the Area of the bombardment.

For Larrea Cabrera, who served as Minister of Internal and External Security, it was “clear that it was not a hot pursuit, but an incursion into Ecuadorian territory by a planned action, in which... Ecuadorian sovereignty had been violated” (2009, 156). As a result of these presumptions, Ecuador adopts an “attacked State identity” being its interest the defense of its internal and external sovereignty. Heuristically this could be apprehended by its domestic and bilateral actions, as well as at the external level through the activation and denunciation of “external aggression” in multilateral forums and with rele-

vant partners in order to obtain political support.

As a result of the qualitative analysis of content, the “external aggression” in Ecuador’s perspective came to represent a “war event” with the seriousness of having “violated”, “outraged”, “bombed” and “invaded” the “Homeland” in an “wicked”, “intentional” and “planned” manner which was considered “unacceptable” and “intolerable”. This “verified” “act of aggression” deserves “a severe condemnation to Colombia” that “the worthy States of the continent cannot let pass”, and if this happens at the expense of “sacrificing international law”, can constitute an “unforgivable” omission, hence the Organization of American States should be thrown “into the trash can”. This “external aggression” was due to “the lack of communication between the delegates of the [Binational Border Commission] of Colombia to the delegates of Ecuador [which] impeded an immediate reaction” to dismantle the guerrilla camp; and the use of “lies” by President Uribe to “justify the act of aggression” and “hide its nature”, which was “to impose the theory of being able to act in any State for the national security of Colombia”.

The bombing of Angostura was not an isolated fact; it was the result of a chain of events (Jaramillo 2009, 15). First, there was a change in anti-drug policies on the US agenda, specifically in the perception “that Colombian guerrillas are actually drug armies so the anti-narcotics strategy became an anti-guerrilla strategy” (Bonilla 2006, 175). Second, the Plan Colombia, which was the spearhead in the war against drugs in the Andean zone and began “to attack heavily the zones administered by the guerrillas, with special emphasis on the southern territories”. Third, the Uribe’s democratic security strategy and ‘Patriot Plan’ transferred “15,000 troops to the regions occupied by the guerrillas... [the] intention was to push and beat the insurgents to the south, through mobile actions, with strong air support and intelligence” (Moreano 2005, 114). This pressure on irregular armed groups had consequences for Ecuador, which Bonilla categorizes as four: 1) the illegal armed actors began to operate from Ecuadorian soil, leading to increases in crime and armed incursions, 2) the increase in forced displacement and Colombian refugees as a result of hostilities, crime and fumigation, 3) the increase in defense concerns for bordering States regarding the substantial military spending of Colombia, and 4) the environmental damage resulting from fumigations with glyphosate on the Colombian South border (2006, 176–77).

In the Colombian perspective the bombing was a legitimate target considering that the camp was part of the dynamics of the armed conflict. There was “proportionality” since “collateral damages, if any, would have been inferior to the military gain obtained”; and the principle of distinction was kept “because it was a camp dedicated exclusively to a group of FARC combatants”

(Torrijos Rivera 2009, 180). However, conducting the bombing during the night made it unfeasible to differentiate human targets. On this logic, Nieto Navia raised a justification on the legality and legitimacy of the actions, specifically stating that they “did not violate the sovereignty of Ecuador” because “an attack against a non-State actor such as terrorist forces operating from foreign territory... not followed of occupation... does not constitute an attack on the territorial integrity or political independence of the State in question” (2011, 47).

The positions of both Ecuador and Colombia about the bombing of Angostura show divergent subjectivities on the notion and content of sovereignty. Ecuador defined its State identity based on a “classical” notion of sovereignty because it was part of the consensus in the international system and in Latin American legal tradition. Meanwhile, Colombia sought to reproduce a State identity based on a “flexible” notion of sovereignty guided by the practice of international politics that the United States was deploying in the War on Terrorism. One of the risks for the Colombian operation consisted of a military retaliation, which could have implied a confrontation of the regular forces of both States as a result of the illegal incursion. Regarding the possibility that Ecuador could have carried out an armed response, experts were consulted and unanimously considered that this was not viable as it was counterproductive for Ecuador’s foreign and security policy in front of the international community (ideas), and because of the substantial military gap (material), which recursively enabled the Colombian attack.

The qualitative content analysis allowed identifying the actions developed by Ecuador in reproducing the identity of the attacked State. These actions were organized analytically between the domestic and the external level. In terms of domestic actions, the fortification of the border with Colombia was found as a first step in response to the illegal incursion of both regular and irregular Colombian forces. The second action consisted in the alignment and domestic cohesion in both Ecuador and Colombia, which responded to the political management of the crisis and its correlation with nationalism as the basis of the State identities, where public opinion and relevant political actors within the States tended to endorse the actions of their authorities.

The third action, unpredictable and emergent, allowed Colombia to move the discussion around the bombing towards the alleged Ecuadorian and Venezuelan collusion with the irregular Colombian groups. Colombia announced to the international community that it had found computers allegedly belonging to Raúl Reyes in which links were demonstrated between the FARC and the governments of Ecuador and Venezuela. This would later lose relevance when the Court of Criminal Cassation of the Supreme Court

of Justice of Colombia declared its content as “illegal” due to non-compliance with the due process in its collection. The fourth action was the judicial prosecution in Ecuador against Juan Manuel Santos, the Colombian Minister of Defense, responsible for Operation Phoenix and its material and human consequences, this issue generated tensions and would later be dismissed by the judicial authorities. Finally, there were concerns about potential trade and migration restrictions as bombardment responses, which did not succeed.

At the bilateral level, political relations between States declined. Ecuador suspended diplomatic relations with Colombia and therefore, technical mechanisms like COMBIFRON lost their validity. The reestablishment of diplomatic relations evidenced demands from both States. Ecuador requested reparations for the bombing, the transfer of the technical and military information of the case, the cessation of the media dispute about its alleged link with the FARC and the increase of the Colombian responsibility with its refugees or displaced migrants in Ecuador. While Colombia required the termination of the judicial prosecution of Juan Manuel Santos, the withdrawal of the Case in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Aisalla Case) and the International Court of Justice (fumigations with glyphosate), in addition to not cooperating until these relations were reestablished, until December 2010.

The Andean zone was characterized during the post-Cold War period as a highly conflictive sub-region, with 23 militarized disputes between 1990 and 2010 (Méndez-Coto 2017b). This historically constructed dynamic of conflict and mistrust is evidenced in the rivalries on the Venezuela-Colombia-Ecuador-Peru axis. For example, Ecuador when reproducing an attacked State identity, had a lack of interest in the activation of the sub-regional political mechanism due to its reduced legitimacy, considering that the Andean Community (CAN) was concentrated in economic and commercial issues and therefore Colombia as aggressor State would have more leverage if Ecuadorian regional allies did not take part in the dispute. As mentioned, the subjective interest or preference of the Small State consists in obtaining external support, so it is imperative to broaden the actors involved, especially their allies (in this case the ALBA members and regional leaders such as Brazil and Argentina).

In the regional and multilateral context, Ecuador brought the Colombian attack to the Rio Group Meeting held in the Dominican Republic, and to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States. During the Meeting of the Rio Group, the divergent visions between Ecuador, the ALBA States (Venezuela and Nicaragua had suspended their diplomatic relations with Colombia) and Colombia were evidenced: differences regarding the notion of sovereignty as well as the border management around the operation of

irregular armed groups. This Meeting was mediated by the President of the Dominican Republic with the leadership of Brazil and Argentina, obtaining an apology from President Uribe and a promise not to repeat this type of armed incursions in the future, stated in the Final Declaration. The Meeting should have reduced the conflict, however, the personalities of the leaders and the management of the crisis continued generating political capital, therefore it remained active (Montúfar 2008).

At the regional level, the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States was activated with the objective of finding solutions to the crisis and restoring order and security. For Ecuador as an attacked State, a multilateral “condemnation” against Colombia was sought, for the breach of public international and inter-American law, especially regarding sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful resolution of disputes. The Permanent Council directed the Secretary-General to issue a report after an on-site inspection, and worked on the preparation of a resolution. For Ecuador, this mechanism was an opportunity to obtain external support, evidenced in the ALBA block, from the South American States and other nations concerned about the practice of flexible borders implemented by Colombia. This was the legitimating process of the identity. For Colombia the diplomatic strategy for its defense consisted in accepting the facts while denouncing the alleged involvement of Ecuador and Venezuela with the FARC, calling for greater commitments in the fight against terrorism.

The Resolution prepared by the Working Group in the Permanent Council was prevented from “condemning” Colombia because of the practice of consensus, since Colombia and allied States such as the United States or Canada would not support it. Finally, it reaffirmed “the full applicability of the principles enshrined in international law of respect for sovereignty, abstention from the threat or use of force, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other States”, adopted at the Twenty Fifth Meeting Of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

For Ecuador as an attacked State, the multilateral resolutions were a support to its identity, considering that it was reaffirmed that Colombia broke the international law: this was the intersubjective knowledge that enabled its role identity, reinforcing the accepted norms of behavior related to the threat or use of force; and therefore creating the opportunity for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. This case clearly shows the practices of the attacked State, the way it prioritizes its interests and the inter-American institutional capacity to deal with regional crises. From the point of view of “moral hazard”, the costs for Colombia of its aggression were reduced considering that the military tactic generated domestic gains, and at the bilateral level the dispute

was contained in the political level without affecting the commercial and migratory dynamics.

Costa Rica-Nicaragua: the crisis of Portillos Island / Harbour Head

Political and diplomatic relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua over the last decade have been explained by a “pendulum” approach (Stagno Ugarte 2013), defined by the beginning of each Costa Rican administration. During the government of Pacheco de la Espriella (2002-2006) a policy of “appeasement” and “fraternity” with Nicaragua was maintained, but resulted in a Case in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on navigation rights of Costa Rica in the San Juan River. During the government of Arias Sánchez (2006-2010) a policy of “containment” and distancing was followed, which generated stable relations. In the Chinchilla Miranda Administration (2010-2014), a policy of “appeasement” and “good neighborly” was sought, but resulted in the questioning of Costa Rican sovereignty over one end of “Isla Portillos” (Harbour Head for Nicaragua) and three new Cases in the International Court of Justice; which required a return to the policy of “containment” and distancing during the Solís Rivera government (2014-2018).

This approach to the bilateral relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua evidences the lack of continuity and stability, causing that the interests, experiences and images of each President shape their foreign policy. Therefore, it is important to understand bilateral relations as “strategic” or “durable” rivalries (Colaesi, Rasler, and Thompson 2008), characterized by interstate competitiveness, recurrent episodes of conflict as incompatibility of interests that can lead to enmity, which varies in a spectrum from: disagreements relative to sovereignty and territorial integrity, escalation through “microphone” diplomacy to the militarization of disputes. These rivalries are intensified by each actor’s negative perceptions of the other, worsening situations that could be solved through diplomatic consultations, or creating disagreements on peripheral issues. These negative perceptions are socially and historically constructed, so they have a foundation in nationalism, generating cohesion and domestic consensus.

The crisis between Costa Rica and Nicaragua begins in October 2010 when Managua, during a process of dredging of the San Juan River creates an artificial channel with the objective of diverting the talweg of the River to allegedly justify changes in the border, claiming the area of Isla Portillos / Harbour Head. The dredging began with the approval of the Costa Rican Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, without reviewing the environmental impact

studies, accepted the verbal explanations of the Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs indicating that Costa Rica would not be affected. The dredging of the San Juan River was fully acknowledged as a Nicaraguan right; however it should respect the principle of no significant harm to the environment of another country.

The dredging, the opening of channels by military forces in Costa Rican territory and the environmental damages in the riverbank were considered for Costa Rica as an “invasion”, “occupation” and “external aggression” by Nicaragua, in which its territorial sovereignty was at risk. Therefore, Costa Rica adopts an “attacked State identity” being its interest the defense of its sovereignty through domestic, bilateral and external actions. Considering that the reproduction of a role identity implies the identification of a specific situation, the internalization of the identity contents which requires a social legitimating process, Costa Rica denounced this perceived threat to the international community and its relevant allies in order to obtain political support and intersubjective recognition.

For Costa Rica obtaining the regional support was paramount considering that due to the lack of armed forces its external defense relies on the diplomatic and legal mechanisms provided by international institutions. In the other hand, the Nicaraguan perspective on the controversy was guided by the idea that it is “the State in the region that has lost most territory throughout its history and that Costa Rica maintains the goal of appropriating the San Juan River” (Murillo Zamora 2012a, 22), embedding the problem in the field of divergent meanings and legitimacies over the territory. Also, Nicaragua’s foreign policy during the Sandinistas governments was shaped by socialist and ideological principles (Close 2011) encountering support to its positions in the ALBA block.

The qualitative content analysis allowed identifying the actions developed by Costa Rica in reproducing the identity of the attacked State, in the domestic level five actions were exhibited. The first was the border fortification through the deployment of public forces; which was criticized as “militarization” due to the alleged contradiction with Costa Rican pacifism. This process had relevant moments including public statements by Minister of Foreign Affairs Castro about the possibility of creating security forces, the raising of a Costa Rican flag in the disputed area which was taken by the Nicaraguan army generating more tension, and the creation of the Border Police. The second action was the construction of Route 1856 along the San Juan River as an “extraordinary” and urgent measure, which implicated that it was not necessary to carry out or socialize environmental impact studies.

The third action consisted in the judicial persecution of Edén Pastora,

a Sandinista former leader, as responsible of environmental crimes due to the damages of the dredging and the opening of channels in Costa Rican territory. The fourth was the alignment and domestic cohesion in both Costa Rica and Nicaragua, which responded to the political management of the crisis and its correlation with nationalism as the basis of the State identities, where public opinion and relevant political actors within the States tended to endorse the actions of their authorities. Finally, tax measures to the importations of each State were proposed due to the costs of the Cases in the International Court of Justice, which were refused by the productive sectors.

At the bilateral level, political relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua declined. Costa Rica withdrew its ambassador as a protest measure and therefore, the Binational Commission as a technical coordination mechanism was suspended. At the sub-regional level, the Central American zone was characterized during the post-Cold War period as highly conflictive, with 19 military disputes between 1992 to 2010 (Méndez-Coto 2017b). This pattern of conflictivity in this sub-region is related to border delimitation issues and armed incursions, resulting in controversies, mistrust and rivalries. Therefore, the case of Portillos Island evidences this kind of security problems in Central America.

When reproducing an attacked State identity Costa Rica had a lack of interest in the activation of the sub-regional political mechanism such as the Meeting of Presidents of the Central American Integration System (SICA) considering that Nicaragua would have had leverage. For Nicaragua, the other institutional possibility at this level was the Central American Court of Justice (CCJ); nevertheless Costa Rica does not recognizes its jurisdiction and in its view the crisis was political not juridical, as Nicaragua stated. Despite this, Nicaraguan non-governmental organizations denounced Costa Rica in CCJ by the construction of Route 1856 along the border of the San Juan River and obtained a favorable sentence in 2012, increasing the tensions and the criticism to its impartiality and non-jurisdiction.

At the regional level, the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States was activated with the objective of finding solutions to the crisis and restoring security. This Council directed the Secretary-General to issue a report after an on-site inspection and to work on a resolution, being this the opportunity of Costa Rica to obtain external support to its identity and to seek a condemnation of Nicaragua for the “invasion” of its territory and the violation of its sovereignty. Nevertheless, there was a lack of consensus regarding the contents of the resolution, in which Nicaragua made its case stating that the controversy should be processed in a juridical not political mechanism, such as the International Court of Justice due to its nature.

However, Costa Rica called the voting process, breaking the practice of consensus implemented in the precedent decades. The resolution, adopted with 21 votes in favor, 2 against and 4 abstentions, required the withdrawal of security personnel from the disputed area and endorsed the Secretary General's report. The Twenty Sixth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs recommended the implementation, simultaneously and without delay, of the provisions of the Permanent Council. Nevertheless that lack of consensus enabled the conditions of "moral hazard" when Nicaragua rejected the applicability of the resolution evidencing the weakness of the attacked State identity and its legitimating process. Hence by November 2010 Costa Rica had escalated the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), through the Case: "Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area".

The security pattern in Central America regarding border delimitation problems is correlated with its judicialization (Cfr. Cascante Segura 2014, 166), which reflects the incapacity of governments to found solutions by political means. The Case studied followed this path; since the next stages would be carried out in the International Court of Justice. In 2011 Nicaragua filed the Case "Construction of a road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River" related to the Route 1856, which was joined by the Court with the first Case in 2013. At the beginning of 2014 Costa Rica initiated a third Case: "Maritime delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean", reaffirming the judicialization of the bilateral relation.

The International Court of Justice delivered its judgment on the joined cases in November 2015, and was considered more favorable to Costa Rican position. As a prelude to the judgment Nicaragua had violated several precautionary measures relating to the suspension of activities, withdrawal of personnel and the violation of Costa Rican right of navigation over San Juan River. Regarding the first case, the Court by majority ratified Costa Rica's sovereignty over Portillos Island / Harbour Head. As a result, it was unanimously established that both the construction of artificial channels and the Nicaraguan military presence in the area consisted of illegal occupation of territory. Also Nicaragua was condemned by the violation of the Costa Rican right of free navigation on the San Juan River, and was ordered to compensate for environmental damages caused by the artificial channels. Regarding the second case, Costa Rica was found guilty for failing to carry out environmental impact studies relating to Route 1856, but it was not determined that it caused serious damage to the San Juan River.

For Costa Rica as an attacked State, the political regional mechanism did not resolve its concerns related to the sovereignty over Portillos Island, neither condemned nor forced Nicaragua to withdraw the security personnel.

The legitimating process implies shared understanding of the meaning of the identity (on whether other actors represent an actor in the same way) and the state action (illegal incursion) which did not happen at the Organization of American States. Therefore, Costa Rica which lacks armed forces, found the escalation to the International Court of Justice an imperative foreign policy decision. This course of action showed the practices of the attacked State, the way it prioritizes its interests and the international institutions responses to the crises. From the point of view of “moral hazard”, the costs for Nicaragua of its incursion were reduced considering that the regional mechanisms did not condemn it, and bilaterally the dispute was contained in the political level without affecting the commercial and migratory dynamics.

Conclusion

The value load of “external aggression” entails academic difficulties around its definition, since a wide and varied range of events can justify its enunciation, therefore this paper has analyzed “external aggression” as a disputed analytical category, whose enunciation in the international context is associated with the threat of the sovereignty, political independence and the territorial integrity of States, being sensitive to political representatives, multilateral institutions and national societies. In Latin America this category is present both in the social imaginary and in the discourse of foreign policy, mainly due to the history of interventions, rivalry and conflict that has characterized the region, it is evidenced when political crises occur and is embodied by domestic, hemispheric and international norms.

The central argument was that the identity of the attacked State consists on a set of stable behavioral expectations; this implies that the Small State interpreting that role identity assumes a set of interests and actions consistent with it. The interests were the reproduction of the State (objective) and the mobilization of external support (subjective). In the cases of Ecuador and Costa Rica these interests were demonstrated in political actions such as: domestic political alignment as expression of nationalism as an identity foundation; the fortification of borders and the “frozen” or suspension of bilateral diplomatic relations; a refusal to the activation of the sub-regional political mechanisms; the search for a multilateral condemnation to the aggression based on regional political alignments, and in case that it fails, to resort in the United Nations mechanisms such as the International Court of Justice.

In comparative terms, it can be found that the cases show a *sui generis* Latin American culture for the processing and resolution of conflicts, which is delineated by shared norms and values in the region, that seek to reduce tensions and prevent further escalation in terms of the use and projection of armed force. Furthermore, there is an intermestic character presented in the bilateral relations that cannot be left aside, because despite the divergences that can be catalyzed from the capitals, in the border areas there are persistent social flows. In this way, it can also be interpreted that the use of the category “external aggression” hinders the possibility of dialogue at the political level because it significantly reduces trust and tends to deepen the bilateral gaps. A particularity of Latin America that stood out was the tendency to “contend” the disputes thematically, without spilling consequences in the commercial field.

Both Ecuador and Costa Rica as Small States reproduced practices, interests and identities of “attacked States” when confronting “external aggressions” from Colombia and Nicaragua, respectively. The study of each crisis was chosen considering that they exhibited different sub-regional security patterns, explained by the new regionalism in terms of interdependencies. Therefore the cases provide empirical knowledge to the social constructivist premise regarding the causal mechanism between identity-interest-actions to explain Small States foreign policies, and supporting a research agenda on comparative studies, especially across regions.

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ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the social construction of “external aggressions” by small Latin American states. A comparative study between Costa Rica and Ecuador enables to understand the regularities in their behavior when facing such kind of threat, in terms of their role identity, objective and subjective interests and consistently their foreign policy actions at the domestic, bilateral, sub-regional and regional level. It is argued that the small states are more vulnerable to the external aggressions because of their lack of material resources and their need of external support, compromising their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and requiring the activation of multilateral mechanisms such as the Organization of American States and other regional and sub-regional institutions.

KEY WORDS

External Aggression, Small States, International Security Studies.

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ARTICLE

SUBNATIONAL EXPERIENCES IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY PROMOTION POLICIES: THE CASE OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL

Christiano Cruz Ambros¹

Initial considerations

This article has as its main objective to present initiatives of the Government of the State of Rio Grande do Sul for the promotion of the defense industry of Rio Grande do Sul in recent years. Subnational entities have an important role to play in strengthening the national defense industry and, through the formulation and implementation of well-defined public policies, are able to act as facilitators and catalysts for national initiatives at the local level.

The construction of strategies for the development of the defense industry, as well as the ability to instrumentalize themselves to carry out the planned actions, is not exclusive to the states and provinces of rich and industrialized countries. On the contrary, there are several examples of how subnational entities in developing countries work together with the National State to strengthen the country's defense industry.

In this sense, this article seeks to provide examples that demonstrate the various public policies that can be implemented by subnational entities in developed countries (Australia, Canada and France) and developing countries

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(South Africa, India and Mexico), comparing them with what has been made in the Brazilian case. It is not intended here to make a systematic and delineated comparison to identify causal or correlational relationships between variables. Much less ambitious than this, our goal here is simply to illustrate the main argument proposed.

For the choice of cases, we use the pyramidal model of Bitzinger (2015) as an analytical tool of the international hierarchy of the defense industry. Thus, the exemplified cases represent distinct portions of the organizational pyramid proposed by the author, fulfilling our intention to bring examples with quite different reality to each other for the study. France is included in the second group in a classification of the capabilities of the national defense industry, which comprises six major categories, where the United States is isolated in the first group. The French technological capacity would be close to that of the US, but its industrial base and R&D expenditures are relatively smaller. Australia and Canada would be in the third group because they are considered advanced economies with a technologically consolidated military industrial fabric, but focused on specific niches, unlike France that dominates a much wider range of defense technologies. India would be in the fourth group, as it is a country with expanding industrial and technological capabilities and seeking to achieve as much independence as possible in arms supply, creating a broad technology base for its defense industry. South Africa and Brazil would be in a fifth category because they have a relatively small industrial base of defense with limited technology but at the same time they maintain pretensions of having capacities in several segments to sustain their regional power status. Finally, Mexico would find itself in the sixth and last group because it has very limited production capacities in the defense industry and low technological intensity, concentrating its efforts on specific niches, such as the licensing of less complex foreign weapons systems.

The theoretical premise of this article is that the defense industry, in addition to being essential for national defense, can aid in the strategy of endogenization of advanced technologies, a fundamental pillar for the economic development of a country. We consider that the Defense Industry is strategic for any country that wishes to maintain its sovereignty and its autonomy in the 21st century and is a key variable for the composition of National Power (Tellis et al., 2000). Thus, “state support for the defense industries is strategically justified because a developed Industrial Defense Base (IDB) enables the State to master its own technological capabilities, giving it additional power in the international system” (Mota and Rodrigues 2012, 3).

However, the IDB is also important in its aspects of economic and technological structuring “which are related to the domain of sensitive tech-

nologies, many with a dual character, and to the generation of innovation, high-skilled jobs and high value-added exports” (Melo 2015, 26). In this way, it makes sense that the defense industry is one of the priority axes of the economic and technological development strategy of a region. For the State to act in a transformative way in the industrial fabric of a country or a subnational region, it is necessary to develop a robust industrial policy. It is in this sense that the public policies directed to the development of the IDB must be aligned with the broad industrial policy of the State.

This article, in addition to this brief introduction, is divided as follows: i) in the first section, we discuss the concept of industrial defense policy and the dimensions of its implementation; ii) Subsequent examples of subnational experiences are presented in the formulation and implementation of initiatives to promote the local defense industry; and iii) in the third section, we point out the initiatives of the Government of the State of Rio Grande do Sul to strengthen the defense industry in Rio Grande do Sul. Finally, the last section is for the final remarks.

Industrial Defense Policy

According to Hall, Markowski & Wylie (2010), defense industrial policy complements procurement policies in the sense that it is designed to encourage or direct investments in the necessary domestic industrial capacity if procurement is to demand local supply. A country may pursue a state policy that deems it necessary for local industry to be able to produce the defense materials either to maintain the operational sovereignty of its armed forces or for broader economic reasons. Therefore, industrial defense policies are focused primarily on establishing and maintaining national supply and support options for the Armed Forces.

Industrial Defense Policies become relevant if there is a strategic decision to rely on national suppliers to manufacture or support domestic defense capabilities to a greater or lesser extent, either now or in the future. The major goal of a defense industrial policy is to ensure the availability, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of national sources of defense supply. However, according to Hall, Markowski and Wylie (2010), these objectives can be conflicting, since the availability of national suppliers may depend on large investments in new factories and skills, diverting national resources from other areas. The small scale of production in some countries can be very costly and the availability of defense-related businesses will depend on high barriers to importing foreign defense products. These issues impact the cost-effectiveness of local production. On the other hand, relying on imports impacts on the reliability

of supply sources in times of crisis and conflagration.

Functionally, an industrial defense policy establishes guidelines on how to (i) establish, maintain and protect the required industrial domestic capabilities; (ii) ensure sufficiently reliable supply chains for the required industrial capacities; (iii) maintain the viability and readiness of national preferred suppliers to meet military demand requirements - and develop safeguard arrangements if there is a danger of supplier failure; and iv) manage costs related to local content policies.

In addition to guaranteeing the maintenance of the industrial capacity for production of defense materials in a country, an industrial defense policy is often also used to achieve broader economic purposes such as employment, innovation and the balance of payments. In relation to the use of defense industrial policies as a strategy for economic development by governments, there are several arguments, especially in relation to the spin-off processes of military technologies for civilian markets, the spillover of knowledge of technicians and scientists linked to military innovation, and the direct impact of the defense industry on GDP and exports.

Since it is decided to develop an industrial defense policy, i.e. if it decides politically to bear the costs of not necessarily seeking the most competitive price options in the international market in order to guarantee a certain participation of the national industry, the acquisition strategies vary in four basic possibilities (Hall, Markowski and Wylie 2010, 176-180): i) substitution of imports with margins of domestic preference, where it is admitted that local companies ensure that their products are acquired even if they are above the international price up to a certain percentage; ii) import substitution with local content policies, whereby the foreign supplier company is required to produce a certain fraction of the value of the contract in the national territory or to subcontract domestic companies; iii) replacement of imports with offset, where a certain portion of the contracted value requires counterparts from the country of the foreign company, whether from technology transfer, trade agreements, etc.; and (iv) division-of-labor agreements in multinational acquisitions, which seek to exploit competitive advantages among partner countries or demand high demands for economies of scale.

According to Berkok, Penney and Skogstad (2012), there are three main rationales among countries for designing their defense industrial policy: (i) on the one hand, import substitution logic seeks to develop domestic industry to reduce strategic dependence and economical for defense products from foreign countries. The most efficient tool for this would be the Armed Forces' own procurement policies, which would serve as on-demand promoters. Governments can purchase military equipment directly from the national

industry, or use offset agreements to require domestic co-production or licensed domestic production. In addition, robust coordination between government and domestic industry would facilitate import substitution as companies can make long-term adjustments and adaptations to address the needs of the National Armed Forces; ii) on the other hand, the logic of development of export capacity seeks to enable the domestic industry to enter the global value chains, and its core is in policies to promote supply. These policies are designed to allow domestic firms to be more easily integrated into the global marketplace, giving them competitive advantages in disputes over foreign Armed Forces contracts. Among the main instruments are the dissemination of information, coordination, development and retention of talent, support to small and medium-sized enterprises, and often direct support (subsidies, political lobbying, diplomatic bargains) of the government to promote its defense industry in other countries; and iii) finally, it is pointed out that a combination of both logics is possible.

Within these two approaches, Berkok, Penney and Skogstad (2012) identified six major dimensions of public policy that governments use to achieve their goals: 1. Coordination dimension between government and the Defense Industry; 2. Dimension of promotion and support to Research and Development (R&D); 3. Size of support for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs); 4. Dimension of Support to the insertion in the global chain and value (GCV)²; 5. Dimension of creation of environments to promote competitiveness; and 6. Offset³ size.

2 According to Oliveira (2015, 38), “international trade has grown by an average of 5.4% annually during the last twenty years, at the same time as it undergoes profound transformations due to the new forms of organization and coordination of industrial production. The productive chain of goods, which previously was concentrated within a given country and most often in the hands of a single company, is now dispersed geographically and fragmented in several stages, called “global value chains”. The internationalization of value chains has also influenced the structure of defense industries. According to Dunne (2009, 27), “In addition to cross-border purchases of final products, companies are also shifting their supply chains, as is the case of BAE System purchases in South Africa. Increased offset agreements encouraged this development and gave the importing countries the opportunity to consolidate niche markets by being part of the supply chain of the major international producers. “ The author also argues that governments are increasingly recognizing the high costs of R & D for advanced defense technologies and that the viability of small country production goes through economies of scale that are only possible through international collaboration and cooperative industrial arrangements (2009, 27).

3 When countries decide to make a purchase for their military from a foreign supplier, it is relatively usual that some form of compensation, also called an offset, is required. According to Normative Ruling No. 764 / MD / 2002, offset is “any compensatory practice agreed upon by the parties as a condition for the importation of goods, services and technology, with the intention of generating industrial, technological and commercial benefits “(Brazil 2002, 12).

Dimension of Coordination between Government and Defense Industry

Regarding the policies of coordination between government and the defense industry, it is important to point out the difficulties that the government may encounter in acquiring equipment within the required deadlines if there are no national companies ready to meet such demand. Companies, on the other hand, it is a challenge to keep employees and capital efficiently in a market in which the demand for military equipment is often not steady but sporadic and unstable. According to Berkok, Penney and Skogstad (2012, 55), policies that increase coordination between government and industry can alleviate these pressures and ensure a more stable defense industry. These policies can assist in import substitution, since it may be more attractive to buy from the domestic industry, as domestic firms may be better prepared to meet the demand of the country's military. In addition, this type of policy helps to build a base of information about the domestic industry itself, so that procurement policy makers and strategic project managers can more effectively target the demands for domestic firms.

As an example, the authors mention that the coordination between the Government of Israel and its Defense Industry is given much from the R & D systems in a permanent way, that is, independent of having a great anchor project. South Korea, in turn, has established an Integrated Project Team, composed of civilian and military personnel, to oversee and coordinate procurement initiatives and provide suggestions for improvement in planning, budgeting, and reliability of the project. The UK already has a program to pre-qualify some companies for future bids, preparing them to deal with their demands.

Dimension of Promotion and Support to R&D

R&D promotion and support policies are usually justified by the perception that many technological advances result from investment in the defense industry and that there would be overflows to other sectors of the economy. More than that, according to Berkok, Penney and Skogstad (2012, 57), a country that systematically invests in companies that develop new technologies hopes to penetrate the global market and position its industry in the

In this way, the determining factor of the offset possibility is the buying power of the importing country.

global supply chain. There is a growing demand for high-tech goods, and a country that reaches certain technological frontiers can sustain a strong export sector. In addition, if domestic firms do not have the technological and industrial know-how to develop and produce advanced armaments, the government will need to import from other countries. Thus, R&D investments respond both to the import substitution approach and to export promotion.

South Korea's R&D support policy focuses heavily on defense co-production agreements in order to secure technology transfer, seeking to develop domestic productive capacities in areas that do not have comparative advantages. Australia, on the other hand, provides subsidized financing for innovative and high-risk small and medium-sized enterprises that contain a high degree of technology and are aligned with the Industrial Capacity Priorities Program.

Dimension of Support to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)

Policies to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) begin to be developed from the diagnosis of an issue already debated in this thesis: the consolidation of the global defense industry in the few multinational prime contractors and the restrictions of entry to the international market. Considering that it is very difficult for companies of this size to be noticed by large integrators, thus making it difficult to enter the global supply chain, policies that promote assistance to SMEs can help them become exporters. According to Berkok, Penney and Skogstad (2012, 58), by becoming more efficient and ensuring greater sustainability, they can either provide for the national Armed Forces or secure space in the global chain from strategic partnerships, either with prime contractors or with foreign SMEs. In addition, the incentive to SMEs is related to the strategic imperative of mobilizing the economic and social fabric of a country in situations of national emergency, given the greater capillarity that SMEs have in society compared to large companies.

Australia has developed the Capability and Technology Demonstrator Program that enables SMEs to showcase their potential to large national and international companies and to contact foreign governments. In South Korea, there are a number of incentives for SMEs to enter the defense market, provided that, in return, they have the long-term goal of being internationally competitive. In Israel, most of its defense industrial base is made up of relatively large companies and the defense sector has few new entrants. In general, when there is some specific support for SMEs, it is through subsidies

for R&D.

Dimension of Support to the insertion in the global chain of value (GCV)

The policies to support the insertion in the GCV include initiatives to SMEs, as well as incentives to large companies, since sales directly to other countries is usually done in gov-to-gov negotiations. Thus, these policies generally deal with the regulation of exports of defense products, with domestic product marketing initiatives, with facilitation of negotiation with foreign governments and multinational companies, and with special lines of credit for exports.

Approximately 70% of all weapons systems produced in Israel are exported, and this is made possible partly by strong government support in the international marketing of Israeli defense products, by international government-led missions and by the pro-activity of Israeli embassies in prosperous defense markets. Already the UK government acts more in the moment before the act of export. In defining the specific technologies that they intend to produce domestically, the English create specific research funds that allow the creation of technologically advanced products. From the purchase of the English products by its Armed Forces, the English government implicitly affirms the quality of the products, significantly facilitating their exports.

Dimension for Creation of Environments for the Promotion of Competitiveness

An important step in sustaining a national defense industrial base is the establishment of an environment in which companies wish to invest. For this, it is necessary to consider four factors: i) development of technical and specialized manpower; (ii) clear market access regulations (standards and certifications); iii) competitive tax regime; and iv) adequate financing lines for the defense sector.

The defense industry is usually very technical, requiring a highly specialized workforce. Thus, public investments are necessary for the development of technical schools, vocational courses and higher courses directed at the area of defense. According to Berkok, Penney and Skogstad (2012, 59), entry barriers in the defense market need to be diminished, since dealing with extensive and obscure regulations may alienate entrepreneurs. In addition,

fiscal architectures that enable defense companies to be more competitive in the international market and lines of finance that understand the special logic of the defense sector are also important for establishing a thriving private investment environment in the area.

Australia has a special workforce training project in areas that seek to maintain industrial and technological capacity to stimulate a competitive environment. Called “Skilling Australia’s Defense Industry” (Skilling Australia’s Defense Industry), this program offers scholarships pursuing three objectives: to improve workers already employed in the Defense Industry; increase the quantity and quality of workers focused on priority areas in defense; provide funds for the defense companies themselves to offer training activities in areas where there is a lack of human resources with technical, business or management skills. The Israeli policy to promote a competitive environment for investment, especially foreign investment, in the country is to allow foreign investors to buy up to 49% of domestic companies, with incentives especially for the reduction of the value invested in counterpart requirements.

Offset dimension

Offset policies have been widely used by many countries. While some use offsets to create jobs or trade-offs for balance of payments balance, most countries see technology transfer opportunities there. Some governments have been requiring offsets for all contracts above a certain amount, usually as a fraction of the value of the purchase agreement.

The South Korean offset policy states that 50% of the total value of the contract should be subject to compensation, 60% of which should be of a technological and industrial nature, such as co-production, technology transfer, R&D investment and technical development. Sweden’s policy is narrower, requiring 100% of the contract value in technological offsets, mainly co-production elements, with indirect offsets such as investments in the domestic industry or commercial counterparts being ineligible.

In the next section, we will exemplify subnational experiences in defense industry promotion policies both in countries with an advanced industrial and technological development degree and those with an industrial fabric and a system of innovation still in development. In studying the cases, we will use the conceptual framework presented above, identifying the defense industry promotion policies presented by Berkok, Penney and Skogstad (2012).

Subnational Experiences in the Defense Industry Promotion Policies

Subnational entities have played diverse roles in terms of industrial policies and promotion of business competitiveness in their territories. With specific regard to the promotion policies of the defense industry, several examples are possible to be quoted in various parts of the world, with various actions, focused both on supporting the development of regional clusters and the promotion of R&D, among others. In this section, we will cover cases of states and provinces of countries with an industrial fabric and developed technological capabilities (specifically, Canada, France and Australia), as well as subnational experiences in countries whose development conditions are more similar to those in Brazil South, India and Mexico).

Canada, home to one of the largest aerospace companies in the world - Bombardier has an industry in the aerospace industry that generates \$ 27.2 billion in revenue and about 90,000 jobs⁴. The concentrated aerospace industry in the province of Quebec accounts for about 50% of industry revenue in Canada, with \$ 14.4 billion in annual sales, 40,000 jobs and 190 small, medium and large companies⁵.

Created in 2006, Aero Montreal is an organization that brings together the leading companies, research and educational institutions, associations and unions in the Quebec aerospace sector, with the objective of supporting the development of the aerospace value chain and promoting the region as a hub for international excellence⁶. In addition to being funded by its associate members, Aero Montreal also has resources from the Government of the Province of Quebec and the Government of Canada. In 2014, Aero Montreal secured three-year financial assistance of approximately 1.5 million Canadian dollars from the Canadian government in order to develop related projects to increase productivity in the aerospace supply chain and strengthen competitiveness and networking actions in the sector⁷. Likewise, Aero Montreal is also supported by the Government of the Province of Quebec: the 2016-2021 Quebec Aerospace Strategy allocates \$ 250 million over five years to support

4 Aerospace Industries Association of Canada (AIAC). Industry Statistics. <http://aiac.ca/industry-statistics/>. Accessed on July 11, 2017.

5 Aero Montreal. Reports and Documents. <https://www.aeromontreal.ca/reports-and-documents.html>. Accessed on July 11, 2017.

6 Aero Montreal. Institutional site. <https://www.aeromontreal.ca/>. Accessed on July 10, 2017.

7 Market Wired. "AeroMontreal Receives \$ 1,584,150 in Funding from Government of Canada". <http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/aero-montreal-receives-1584150-in-funding-from-government-of-canada-1906355.htm/>. Accessed on July 10, 2017.

the development of the aerospace industry, diversify the industrial cluster, accelerate the expansion of SMEs and support innovation projects, in particular related to green aviation technologies⁸.

The French aerospace industry is undeniably a global powerhouse, with the Airbus Group being the leader in the manufacture of civil aircraft in the world. Ranked second in the world in terms of revenue, behind US alone, annual French aerospace sales reached \$ 66.2 billion in 2013. This amount accounts for 2.42% of national GDP, the highest percentage among countries leaders in aerospace production. In 2008, France exported 75% of its aerospace production, accumulating US \$ 49.7 billion in exports (Gardes et al. 2015).

Since mid-2000, France has been reshaping its industrial policies and instituting, within a national financing program, the Competitiveness Poles, explicitly inspired by Porter's model for the formalization of links between local authorities, research organizations and companies with a view to economic development through innovation (Gardes et al. 2015). Thus, in 2005, the Aerospace Valley was created, a bi-regional competitiveness hub (Midi-Pyrénées and Aquitaine) dedicated to the aeronautics, space and embedded systems sector. With the aim of promoting internationally local industry, shared innovation and supply chain competitiveness, Aerospace Valley has tripartite governance and funding: 1/3 is from the French government; 1/3 of the regional governments; and 1/3 of membership fees. Currently, the cluster has more than 840 members, including 80 prime companies, 500 SMEs and a number of universities and research establishments. Thus, one third of the French labor force allocated in the aerospace sector is concentrated in this cluster, totaling about 125 thousand workers⁹.

South Australia, self-styled the State of Defense in Australia, is home to some of the top Australian defense companies responsible for the largest and most complex projects in the country, as well as having a large military presence and defense infrastructure installed. Owning large yards, South Australia has conquered A \$ 50 billion from the Future Submarine program for construction at Techport, plus A \$ 35 billion from the Frigate of the Future program.

Due to the importance of the defense sector for the State of South Australia, Defense SA was created, a government agency responsible for dealing

8 Aero Montreal. Québec Government's 2016-2017 Budget. <https://www.aeromontreal.ca/release-quebec-government-2016-17-budget.html>. Accessed on July 10, 2017.

9 Aerospace Valley. Institutional site. <http://www.aerospace-valley.com>. Accessed on July 11, 2017.

with all matters relating to the defense industry in the State. Thus, the agency articulates the main actors of the defense, both nationally and regionally, in its Steering Committee, and, working closely together with local industry, aims to attract investments, expand opportunities, support the training of skilled labor and establish infrastructure. In addition, the Agency formulated and is implementing the South Australia Defense Strategy 2025, which sets out the main guidelines for strengthening the defense industry in the state¹⁰.

The South Australia State Development Department is committed to enhancing innovation and collaboration through specialized clustering dynamics. From 2013 to 2017, the state government invested A\$ 5 million Australian dollars in six projects, two of them in the aerospace and defense sector¹¹: the Australian Aerospace Alliance (AAA) and the Alliance for Specialized Vehicles Vehicle Alliance - SVA). The first is a collaborative project between the Defense Teaming Center¹², the defense industry and the Development Department, with the aim of promoting state enterprises internationally and working with key actors in the production chain to disseminate advanced manufacturing practices in productive processes. The second deals with the South Australian Defense Industry Automotive Integration Project (SADIAIP), which prospects and facilitates the diversification of automotive companies in the region to also offer in the defense market, with the objective to design specialized military vehicles for export, especially focusing on the Southeast Asian market.

Subnational entities from countries with a less developed industrial fabric or a relatively poor technological innovation infrastructure are also capable of developing specific industrial policies for defense. We can see that, in these cases, the policies are enough to attract new investments in the productive chain of the sector and for the absorption of technologies, especially through offset programs.

In South Africa, Gauteng, the country's main industrial province, has a strong program of attracting investment and supporting exports, participating in fairs and supporting the international marketing of local businesses. The City of Tshwane, formerly called Pretoria, is the administrative capital of South Africa and one of the largest cities in Gauteng Province. It is considered South Africa's aerospace and defense technology development hub,

¹⁰ Defense South Australia. South Australia Defense Strategy 2025. <http://www.defencesa.com/about-defence-sa/south-australias-defence-strategy-2025>. Accessed July 10, 2017.

¹¹ Australia. Department of State Development - Clusters. <http://statedevelopment.sa.gov.au/industry/innovation/clusters>. Accessed on July 10, 2017.

¹² The Defense Teaming Center is a non-profit association representing the defense industry of South Australia. <http://www.dtc.org.au>. Accessed on July 10, 2017.

hosting South African industrial giants like ARMSCOR, DENEL Dynamics and Aerosud. In August 2013, the City of Tshwane, through its Economic Development Agency, signed a partnership agreement with the Aerospace Industry Support Initiative (AISI), a body linked to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) of South Africa to promote the aerospace and defense sector, in particular the development of SMEs to supply the region's prime prime contractors. Among the projects covered by this agreement is the Centurion Aerospace Village (CAV).

Centurion Aerospace Village (CAV) is a DTI initiative for the development of a specific cluster for the defense and aerospace industry around the city of Tshwane. Its goal is to increase the competitiveness of installed companies to provide global value chains through the physical location close to major players such as DENEL and AEROSUD. The idea is to create an attractive space for international and national defense companies and transform the CAV into a global export platform. The improvement of the competitiveness of companies would come especially from the logistic efficiency resulting from co-location, sharing of services and facilities, the possibility of training SMEs and stimulating shared R&D¹³. However, there are strong criticisms of the project, since its inauguration in 2008 were spent almost US \$ 10 million and obtained very little results. Currently, Parliament has been investigating possible irregularities in the bidding for earthmoving of the land and fraud and corruption in relation to the only company installed¹⁴.

Another case is the state of Punjab, India. Strongly aligned with Indian industrial policy, called Make in India, Punjab has guided its public policies of innovation and investment attraction to the aerospace and defense industry. One of the great attractions used by the state is its strong base of small and medium-sized engineering firms, which contribute more than 15% of Punjab's total exports, as well as its leading universities for aircraft maintenance engineering. The most interesting instrument they have are specific programs of federal offset programs, that is, they can identify, from their local capillarity, the companies that are able to absorb that offset, that technologi-

¹³ South Africa. Department of Trade and Industry. CAV Presentation: Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry CAV CEO, 2015. <https://www.thedti.gov.za/parliament/2015/CAV.pdf>. Accessed on October 5, 2016.

¹⁴ See in The Citizen. "R9om spent on Centurion Aerospace Village, nothing on site". September 17, 2015. <http://citizen.co.za/775690/r9om-spent-on-centurion-aero-space-village-nothing-on-site/>. Access on October 5, 2016. Also see in Helfrich, Kim. Nothing happening at Centurion Aerospace Village DA maintains. DefenseWeb, September 18, 2015. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=40786:nothing-happening-at-centurion-aerospace-village-of-maintains&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107. Accessed on October 5, 2016.

cal transfer that is being caused by the big contracts the country is doing. In addition, they use competitive tax incentives to attract investment, promoting opportunities especially in the aircraft repair and maintenance sector¹⁵.

In recent years, an aeronautical cluster has emerged in the state of Querétaro, Mexico. In 2013, the aeronautics industry in Querétaro represented 10% of the state's gross domestic product and employed 5,000 people. The Aerocluster de Querétaro has an average of 17% annual growth in the last ten years¹⁶, and between 1999 and 2016, Foreign Direct Investment (IED) for the manufacture of aeronautical equipment in the state amounted to approximately US\$ 1 billion¹⁷ and counted with investments from Bombardier, Airbus, Safran and Aernnova. The cluster, which unites national and international companies, academy and state and federal government, developed from integrated actions between the Government of Mexico and the Government of Querétaro focused on the promotion of foreign investment, regional technological development, strengthening of local suppliers and training of human capital¹⁸. Currently, the cluster already maintains its governance in a sustainable way, with government support for specific projects¹⁹. Based on a robust articulation among the actors of the cluster, including cross-shareholdings between companies, an environment conducive to R&D investment was created, bringing a level of sectorial expertise and positioning the cluster as the first to attract aeronautical investments in Mexico.

Finally, in Brazil, we also have experiences in the defense sector of development policies implemented through subnational initiatives. In the dimension of organization and industrial optimization, one of the main poli-

15 Punjab. "Invest in Punjan Aerospace and Defense Sector". Available at: http://investpunjab.gov.in/Content/documents/Collateral/AerospaceandDefence_Col.pdf. Accessed on August 3, 2017. See also HINDUSTAN TIMES, "Young entrepreneur to set up Punjab's 1st defense, aerospace parts unit". <http://www.hindustantimes.com/punjab/young-entrepreneur-to-set-up-punjab-s-first-defence-aerospace-parts-unit/story-FfWVpk8vllacU2dXfw61K.htm>. Accessed on August 3, 2017.

16 Índice Político. "Ubican a Querétaro como el Paraíso para la Industria Aeroespacial de México". <http://www.indicepolitico.com/ubican-a-queretaro-como-el-paraíso-para-la-industria-aeroespacial-de-mexico/>. Accessed on August 11, 2017.

17 El Financiero. "Crece 170% la IED de equipo aeroespacial em Querétaro". <http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/bajio/crece-170-la-ied-de-equipo-aeroespacial-en-queretaro.html>. Accessed on August 11, 2017.

18 Aerocluster Queretaro. "Mapa de ruta del sector aeroespacial de la región de Queretaro". http://aeroclusterqueretaro.mx/images/PDF/Mapa-de-ruta-del-Sector-Aeroespacial-de-la-Regin-de-Quertaro-c_portada-10022016.pdf. Accessed on August 11, 2017.

19 El Financiero. "El cluster aeronáutico de Queretaro ya vuela solo". <http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/economia/el-cluster-aeronautico-de-queretaro-ya-vuela-solo.html>. Accessed on August 11, 2017.

cies developed are those of integrated support to the local productive arrangements. Local Productive Arrangements (APLs), a term that means something similar to the cluster, are agglomerations of companies, located in the same territory, that present productive specialization and maintain links of articulation, interaction, cooperation and learning among themselves and other local actors, intensifying the relationship networks and link the participants' competitiveness. In August 2004, the Permanent Working Group for Local Productive Arrangements - GTP APL was established through Interministerial Ordinance No. 200, of August 2, 2004. Involving dozens of governmental and non-governmental institutions, the GTP APL is coordinated by the Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services, through the General Coordination of Local Productive Arrangements and has the "attribution of elaborating and proposing general guidelines for the coordinated action of the government in supporting local productive arrangements throughout the national territory"²⁰.

Public policies for the development of APLs tend to be fairly federalized, sometimes fostering the Union, sometimes states or municipalities. Specifically with regard to the aerospace and defense sector, we find in the example of Aerospace and Defense APL, centered in São José dos Campos / SP, the consolidation of a historical cooperation movement between companies, universities and Armed Forces that dates back to the origins of the Brazilian aerospace sector with the establishment of the Department of Aerospace Science and Technology (DCTA) and the Institute of Aeronautical Technology (ITA) within the Brazilian Air Force respectively in 1945 and 1950. Having an APL format, the BAC was formed in 2009 and brings together about 120 companies from six Brazilian states, but most of them (60%) are based in São José dos Campos, including within the Technological Park of São José dos Campos. The anchor company of the project is Embraer and, in all, there are almost 25 thousand jobs with annual revenues of US\$ 7 billion²¹. There are a number of benefits offered to companies associated with the APL to increase their competitiveness and opportunities, such as internationalization programs, training and certification, as well as participation in national and international fairs, trade missions, business roundtables and consortium formation. This APL is an example in which the entity supports the Union, through programs of APEX Brazil and ABDI, being the articulator the Center

20 Observatório Brasileiro de APLs. Site institucional. http://portalapl.ibict.br/menu/itens_menu/gtp_apl/gtp_apl.html. Accessed on November 22, 2016.

21 Technological Park of São José dos Campos. Institutional Site. <http://www.pqtec.org.br/conheca-o-parque/quem-somos.php>. Accessed on November 23, 2016.

for Competitiveness and Innovation of the Cone Leste Paulista (CECOMPI)²².

ABDI has an interesting project in partnership with the Technological Park of São José dos Campos and EMBRAER, the Aeronautical Chain Development Program (PDCA). The program helps Embraer's supply chain companies to become technically and technologically capable of securing their space in the domestic supply chain and integrating into international value chains. PDCA, started in 2014, was able to increase the productivity of companies, reduce costs and waste, reduce business risks and raise the level of exports of products. New technologies dominated by the program allowed companies to participate in the KC-390 military jet transport chain and the new E-Jets E2 commercial jet family. In 2010, the industry produced about 32,000 different types of parts and, by 2015, this portfolio of parts more than doubled²³.

APL Polo de Defesa (*Defense Pole* in English) de Santa Maria/RS, in turn, is an APL whose financial resources come from the State Government. Through the State Program for Strengthening Local Production Chains and Arrangements, coordinated by the Gaucho Agency for Development and Investment Promotion (AGDI), resources are transferred to the Santa Maria Development Agency (ADESM) to manage the joint actions of the APL²⁴. The main actions of the APL are articulation between local authorities and the Federal Government and the Armed Forces, in order to promote the initiatives of the Defense Pole, as well as participate in fairs and national and international missions for the commercial promotion of companies in the sector and of actions of mobilization of the IDB of the State²⁵.

Finally, as an example of an initiative fomented by municipal entities, we have the APL of Defense of the Great ABC, coordinated by the Economic Development Agency of the Great ABC, whose main sponsor is the Intermunicipal Consortium of the Greater ABC, composed of the municipalities of Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, São Caetano do Sul, Diadema,

22 CECOMPI. Aerospace Cluster. <http://www.cecompi.org.br/aero/en/aerospace-cluster>. Accessed on November 23, 2016.

23 Agência Brasileira de Desenvolvimento Industrial. "Programa estimula inovação na indústria aeronáutica". http://www.abdi.com.br/Paginas/noticia_detalhe.aspx?i=4097. Accessed on December 1, 2016.

24 A Razão. "Polo de Defesa de Santa Maria é reconhecido como APL". <http://www.arazao.com.br/noticia/70693/polo-de-defesa-de-santa-maria-reconhecido-como-apl/>. Accessed on November 23, 2016.

25 Observatório Brasileiro de APLs. "Plano de Ação do Polo de Defesa de Santa Maria". http://portalapl.ibict.br/export/sites/apl/galerias/Biblioteca/APL_de_Defesa_-_Plano_de_Axo_do_Polo_de_Defesa_de_Santa_Maria_2015.pdf. Accessed on November 23, 2016.

Mauá, Ribeirão Pires and Rio Grande da Serra²⁶. Since the severe crisis that the region's automotive sector has been experiencing, local governments are looking for alternatives for regional development. Thus, they identified in the defense sector the possibility of resuming the growth of the local industry, focusing the APL for the diversification of production and complementation of lines in nontraditional defense industries.

Rio Grande do Sul: initiatives to promote the defense, security and aerospace sector

Due to its geographical position frontier, historically Rio Grande do Sul counts on numerous concentration of military in its territory. In the city of Rio Grande, in the south of the state, is located the headquarters of the 5th Naval District of the Brazilian Navy, with jurisdiction to operate in the maritime area of the coast of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Paraná. Porto Alegre, capital of the state, hosts the Southern Military Command (CMS) of the Brazilian Army, whose mission is to maintain sovereignty in the Southern Region of Brazil. To this end, it has about 50,000 military personnel (25% of the Brazilian Army) and 75% of the mechanized means that exist in the ground force. In Canoas, in the Metropolitan Region of Porto Alegre, there is the headquarters of ALA 3, a military organization in charge of the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) in the States of the South - Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. are accompanied by many military organizations scattered throughout the state.

The defense industry of Rio Grande do Sul, in turn, is quite diverse, participating in different strategic projects of the Armed Forces. Rio Grande do Sul is the third state in billing and in number of companies in the Defense sector (FIPE 2014). The State counts on important companies suppliers of the Armed Forces, like the Strategic Companies of Defense Taurus (light armament), Axur (cyber defense) and Agrale (military utilities). In addition, AEL Sistemas is the main Brazilian supplier of avionics for the FAB, being part of the Gripen fighter project, being responsible for Wide Area Display (WAD), Head-Up Display (HUD) and Helmet Mounted Display (HMD). In turn, KMW Brasil is responsible for the maintenance and modernization of armored vehicles of the Leopard and Gepard family acquired by the Brazilian Army.

Given the competencies already established in Rio Grande do Sul and

26 Agência de Desenvolvimento Econômico do Grande ABC. Site Institucional. <http://www.agenciagabc.com.br/>. Accessed on November 23, 2016.

its vocation for military affairs, the State Government has been emphasizing the strategic importance of the defense, security and aerospace industry in the technological and economic development of the state. The political foundation of this conception is rooted in the National Defense Strategy itself (2008), in which the decentralization of the strategic productive chains is seen as a matter of national sovereignty.

In this sense, the Gaúcha Agency for the Development and Promotion of Investment (AGDI), between 2013 and 2015, and subsequently the Secretariat for Economic Development, Science and Technology (SDECT), sought to establish an increasingly collaborative partnership with Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) and other ministries and federal entities to capillize and catalyze the actions of the Federal Government in the State with regard to the defense and aerospace sector. As an example of this approach, it is possible to cite a joint project between MDIC and AGDI to prospect European partner companies in the manufacture of small satellites for both civil and military applications²⁷.

Likewise, the articulation with relevant entities that deal with the promotion of the defense industry in Rio Grande do Sul, such as ADESM (Santa Maria Development Agency) and COMDEFESA/FIERGS (Defense and Security Industry Committee of the Federation of Industries of Rio Grande do Sul), is one of the focuses of the State Government, through the SDECT. At the end of 2014, an agreement was signed between ADESM, COMDEFESA/FIERGS, Santa Maria Tecnoparque and the State Government with the objective of creating an institutional and financial framework that would enable actions to be taken to promote the local defense industry²⁸. Through this agreement, the brand was created “Defense and Security Sector Rio Grande do Sul-Brazil”, developed promotional graphic material and established a joint strategy.

A wide range of actions was implemented in 2015 in the institutional umbrella created by the agreement. In April, there was an institutional stand at the LAAD Defense & Security Fair, the most important defense sector fair in Latin America, held every two years in Rio de Janeiro²⁹. Between July and

27 Diálogos União Europeia e Brasil. “Brasileiros visitam Escócia e Itália para conhecer projetos de fabricação de pequenos satélites”. <http://www.sectordialogues.org/noticia/brasileiros-visitam-escocia-e-italia-para-conhecer-projetos-de-fabricacao-de-pequenos-satelites>. Accessed on September 27, 2017.

28 DefesaNet. “Polo de Defesa de Santa Maria”. <http://www.defesanet.com.br/bid/noticia/18289/Santa-Maria---Polo-de-Defesa--um-ano-de-atuacao-e-muitos-desafios-pela-frente/>. Accessed on September 27, 2017.

29 Diário de Santa Maria. “Representantes do Polo de Defesa de Santa Maria participarão de feira internacional no Rio de Janeiro”. <http://diariodesantamaria.clicrbs.com.br/rs/economia-politica/noticia/2015/03/representantes-do-polo-de-defesa-de-santa-maria-participarao-de->

September, the Cycle of Mobilization Lectures of the Defense Industry of Rio Grande do Sul took place. During three events, held in Santa Maria (with a focus on simulators and cyber defense³⁰), in Porto Alegre (Aerospace³¹) and Caxias (supplying to the Armed Forces³²), 40 lectures were held, with about 340 participants. Finally, in November, the II International Seminar of Defense (SEMINDE) was held in Santa Maria. The event brought together some 250 participants, including businessmen, military personnel, representatives of public authorities and institutions linked to the sector, researchers and specialized press to discuss opportunities in Brazil's defense sector³³.

An important mechanism for fostering R & D and innovation are the Science and Technology Briefing of SDECT. Since 2015, defense and aerospace have been a priority theme in these notices. In 2015, more than 14 million reais were fomented in several projects. Specifically, in this year, there was no contemplated defense project. Meanwhile, in 2013, Santa Maria Park was awarded R \$ 2 million to build a high-tech structure for the development of simulators focused on the defense industry³⁴.

There are also public policies in Rio Grande do Sul relevant to the creation of a business environment more conducive to cooperation, innovation and competitiveness of local companies, such as the Local Productive Arrangements (APLs) program. The State has a strong history of policies to promote cooperation between companies, which is a well-established program to promote local economies. Currently, the State Government, through the SDECT, foments about fifteen APLs, with more than 40 already estab-

feira-internacional-no-rio-de-janeiro-4726946.html. Accessed on September 27, 2017.

30 Rio Grande do Sul. "Indústria de Defesa gaúcha promove ciclo de mobilização em Santa Maria". <http://www.rs.gov.br/conteudo/221330/industria-de-defesa-gaucha-promove-ciclo-de-mobilizacao-em-santa-maria>. Accessed on September 29, 2017.

31 Agência de Desenvolvimento de Santa Maria. "Setor de Defesa e Segurança do Rio Grande do Sul promove workshop aeroespacial no Tecnopuc". <http://adesm.org.br/noticias/setor-de-defesa-seguranca-rio-grande-sul-promove-workshop-aeroespacial-tecnopuc>. Accessed on September 29, 2017.

32 DefesaNet. Seminário de Fornecimento para as Forças Armadas. <http://www.defesanet.com.br/bid/noticia/20106/COMDEFESA-FIERSG----Seminario-de-fornecimento-para-as-Forcas-Armadas/>. Accessed on September 29, 2017.

33 Infodefensa. Seminário Internacional de Defesa de Santa Maria. <http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2015/09/26/noticia-seminario-internacional-defesa-santa-maria.html>. Accessed on September 29, 2017.

34 ADESM. Convênio destina mais de 2 milhões de reais para implementação de centro de desenvolvimento de simuladores no Santa Maria Tecnoparque. <http://adesm.org.br/uncategorized/convenio-destina-mais-de-2-milhoes-de-reais-para-implementacao-de-centro-de-desenvolvimento-de-simuladores-santa-maria-tecnoparque>. Accessed on September 29, 2017.

lished in Rio Grande do Sul. The Santa Maria Defense APL was recognized in 2015³⁵ and was granted with resources for improvement of its governance, in the amount of R \$ 150 thousand, in order to: hire a manager and assistants to manage the APL; acquire infrastructure for the management team; obtain subsidies for articulation meetings, lectures and company training events; and participate in business fairs, such as the 2016 IDB participation.

Finally, SDECT, through its Commercial Promotion and International Affairs Board, has three important business support programs that can be used by the local defense industry. The Support Program for the Participation of Gaúcho Companies in International Fairs, created in 2000, has a long history of support to thousands of gaúcho companies that seek to internationalize and expand their exports. In 2016, the program supported four defense companies in Rio de Janeiro to exhibit their products at the Military Simulation and Technology Conference (CSTM, in Portuguese) in Brasília³⁶. In addition to the fair program, there is also the InvestRS program, an agreement signed between SDECT and FIERGS to carry out joint investment attraction activities for Rio Grande do Sul. Among the strategic sectors listed for proactive actions to attract investment is the defense, aerospace and security. In addition, the program has as its goal the support of companies from Rio Grande do Sul that are seeking international partners, both to raise financial resources, to joint technological development and to establish commercial partnerships.

Conclusion

This article had as its main objective to demonstrate the initiatives of the Government of the State of Rio Grande do Sul to promote the defense industry of Rio Grande do Sul. Therefore, we seek to briefly review the main concepts and theoretical aspects that involve the industrial policies of defense, as well as to exemplify public policies promoted by other subnational entities around the world. This methodological path was traced to reinforce the idea that it is possible and necessary that the subnational entity (states and municipalities, in the Brazilian case) be involved, together with the National State, in promoting the defense industry, both serving as a facilitator and catalyzer

35 ADESM. "Mais um APL para Santa Maria". <http://adesm.org.br/noticias/mais-um-arranjo-produtivo-local-para-santa-maria-apl-polo-de-defesa-reconhecido-pelo-governo-estado>. Accessed on September 29, 2017.

36 Rio Grande do Sul. "Conferência com foco em simulação termina nesta quinta-feira em Brasília". http://www.rs.gov.br/conteudo/240889/conferencia-com-foco-em-simulacao-termina-nesta-quinta-feira-em-brasilia/termosbusca=*. Accessed on September 29, 2017.

of national initiatives in the region as acting as protagonist in the execution of specific public policies for the local reality.

The examples presented in the second section of the paper have sought to demonstrate that public policies aimed at strengthening the defense industry at the subnational level are not exclusive to developed countries, not even those of the select group with the leading global prime contractors. France is the only example we have brought from a developed and traditional defense products manufacturer. Canada and Australia are already countries with well-developed and technologically advanced industrial arrangements, but they do not fit into the categories of defense industry leaders. Although with different realities, there are cases of success that can be replicated, with due adjustments, to the Brazilian reality.

The South African, Indian and Mexican cases, closer to the context of Brazil, show that the activities of the states and provinces can play a very important role in the consolidation of the national defense industry. The articulation between national defense strategy and subnational development projects needs to be close in order for the defense industry to find an environment conducive to flourishing.

Rio Grande do Sul has great potential to strengthen itself as a relevant subnational actor in the defense industry. Certain states of the Federation exist for the attraction of large industrial and technological projects, and, in the specific case of defense, the states of the Southeast are the natural candidates to receive such investments. However, the current changes in the policy of SUDENE (Southeast Development Superintendency) and SUDECO (SUDECO) authorizing the financing of defense industries with the constitutional funds of the Northeast and Midwest, put the states of these regions in an advantageous position. Against this background, the State Government, in partnership with regional actors, must quickly articulate public policies focused on specific funding for defense and on encouraging research and innovation, to attract new companies, but mainly to in the state are already.

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ABSTRACT

This article has as its main objective to present initiatives of the Government of the State of Rio Grande do Sul for the promotion of the defense industry of Rio Grande do Sul in recent years. Subnational entities have an important role to play in strengthening the national defense industry and, through the formulation and implementation of well-defined public policies, are able to act as facilitators and catalysts for national initiatives at the local level. This article seeks to bring examples that demonstrate the various public policies that can be implemented by subnational entities in developed countries (Australia, Canada and France) and developing countries (South Africa, India and Mexico), comparing them with what has been done in the Brazilian case.

KEYWORDS

Defense Industry; Subnational entities; Rio Grande do Sul.

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PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) was the first Centre in Southern Brazil to focus its study and research exclusively on the field of International Relations. It was established in 1999 at the Latin American Advanced Studies Institute (ILEA) of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and is currently part of the university's Center of International Studies on Government (CEGOV). Its objective has always been the critical and innovative study of the international system's transformations after the end of the Cold War, from the perspective of the developing world. In parallel, NERINT has also sought to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options for the autonomous international insertion of the country.

The exploratory studies developed by NERINT on the new emerging countries since the threshold of the 21st Century experienced remarkable expansion. Cooperation with state, business, academic and social institutions was intensified, as well as the direct contact with centres in Latin America, Africa and Asia, in addition to the existing ones in Europe and North America. An outcome of the Centre's activity was the creation of an undergraduate course in International Relations (2004) and a Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI, 2010). Two journals were also created: the bilingual and biannual *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* and the bimonthly journal *Conjuntura Austral*. In addition, since 2016, NERINT offers a bilingual Research Bulletin, published quarterly by graduate and undergraduate students and researchers of the Centre. NERINT is also partnered with UFRGS's Doctoral Program in Political Science (PPGPOL), established in 1973. Thus, besides the advanced research and intense editorial activities, NERINT is also the birthplace of innovative undergraduate and graduate programs.

PPGEEI

The Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) started in 2010, offering Master's and Doctorate degrees, both supported by qualified professors and researchers with international experience. It is the result of several developments on research and education at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Its roots can be traced to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT), established in 1999. Other main partners are the Centre for Studies on Technology, Industry, and Labor (NETIT/FCE) and the Center for International Studies on Government (CEGOV). In 2004, an undergraduate degree in International Relations was created at the Faculty of Economics/UFRGS; in 2005 the Center for Studies on Brazil-South Africa (CESUL), recently renamed as Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA), was created. All these actions enabled the rise of an independent line of thinking propped by specialized bibliography.

The research tradition that gave rise to PPGEEI was based on a prospective analysis of the trends of the 1990s. The remarkable expansion of Brazilian diplomacy and economics from the beginning of the century confirmed the perspective adopted, which allowed the intense cooperation with the diplomatic and international economic organizations in Brazil. The course is already a reference in the strategic analysis of the integration of emerging powers in international and South-South Relations.

The Program's vision emphasizes strategic, theoretical and applied methods, always relying on rigorous scientific and academic principles to do so. For this reason, it has been approached by students from all over Brazil and several other countries, and it has established partnerships in all continents. Thus, the Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies is a program focused on understanding the rapid changes within the international system. Alongside NERINT, it publishes two journals: *Conjuntura Austral* (bi-monthly) and *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations* (biannual and bilingual). PPGEEI has three research lines:

International Political Economy

It focuses on the international insertion of the Brazilian economy and other major developing countries in South America, Asia and Africa; discusses the characteristics and effects of globalization; and develops comparative and sectoral studies concerned with the effects of the internationalization of companies and productive sectors. Special attention is paid to international financial crises and its effects on Brazil and other countries of the South.

International Politics

It emphasizes the analysis of the process of formation, implementation and evaluation of foreign policy. It seeks to confront patterns of international integration of strategic countries in South America, Africa and Asia, considering institutional patterns, trade policy, structures of intermediation of interest, governance, International Law and the role of actors of civil society in the South-

South axis of contemporary International Relations.

International Security

It approaches the defense, strategy and security issues in the international system from a perspective that takes into account the most powerful states at the global level, but systematically introduces the question of the regional balances of power, the South-South axis, the existence of regional security complexes, military issues and the impact of information technology in the Digital Age.

CEBRAFRICA

The Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) has its origins in Brazil-South Africa Centre of Studies (CESUL), a program established in 2005 through an association between the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and the Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG) of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its research activities are developed in cooperation with the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT).

In March 2012, CESUL was expanded into CEBRAFRICA in order to cover the whole of Africa. At the same time, the South African series, which published five books, was transformed into the African Series, with new titles. The Centre's main objectives remain the same as before: to conduct research, to support the development of memoirs, thesis and undergraduate works, to congregate research groups on Africa, to organize seminars, to promote student and professor exchanges with other institutions, to establish research networks and joint projects with African and Africanist institutions, to publish national and translated works on the field, and to expand the specialized library made available by FUNAG.

The numerous research themes seek to increase knowledge of the African continent and its relations with Brazil on the following topics: International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations, and Schools of Thought. CEBRAFRICA counts among its partners renowned institutions from Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Cape Verde, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Portugal, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, India, and China. Current researches focuses on "Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian Presence in Africa", "Africa in South-South Cooperation", "African Conflicts", "Integration and Development in Africa", "African Relations with Great Powers", and "Inter-African Relations".

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1. AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations publishes only Scientific articles;
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5. Contributions must be original and unpublished, and can be submitted in Portuguese, English or Spanish;
6. Contributions must contain the full name of the author, their titles, institutional affiliation (the full name of the institution) and an e-mail address for contact;
7. The complete filling of the submission form by the authors is mandatory;
8. Contributions from undergraduate or graduate students are allowed, as long as in partnership with a Professor or PhD, which will appear as the main author of the paper;
9. Manuscripts from only one author must be written by a Professor or PhD;
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11. Contributions must be accompanied of: three keywords in Portuguese or Spanish and three keywords in English; title in English and in Portuguese or Spanish; abstract in English and in Portuguese or Spanish, both with up to 100 words.
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