MANUFACTURERS AND SECURITY PROVIDERS: A CONCEPTUAL ESSAY

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Introduction

To say that every state pursues its national interest has become a truism. Still it is difficult to rationally define that interest, so as to take into account the will of the majority or the resources or the geographical position. The average states and also the developing states and those whose international status has recently risen have to solve a special dilemma: while a small country first wants to keep its independence and the big one to possess a sphere of influence as extensive as possible, an intermediate actor is tasked with cautiously navigating through the requirements of world diplomacy.

Such a desideratum cannot be realised if those medium-sized powers do not possess a methodology to steer. In the absence of methodological milestones the elites of a medium-sized nation risk either underestimating the potential they have or overbidding it with unhappy consequences. A recent example that can be raised is that of Georgia. Lilliputian territory located in the vicinity of the Russian Federation, Georgia took advantage of the climate of NATO enlargement. His intake of 2,000 soldiers in Iraq (the third contingent after the US and the UK!) prompted the diplomacy in Tbilisi to hope for the Alliance membership. But such intentions were considered unacceptable for the Kremlin, determining the intervention of the summer of 2008, a reminder that Russia greatly cherishes the former Soviet sphere³.

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The present article argues that a prudent drafting of the sphere of national interest must consider the political actors as part of an international labour division in security field. On the verge of consequence, the authors propose to define and operate with five concepts, as follows: security producers; intercessors and mediators; consumers and marginals. Each term will be explained at the right time.

From a theoretical point of view, this study will use a modified version of the world system theory developed by Immanuel Wallerstein illustrating its superiority to the Copenhagen school.

Therefore our article will support two premises:

1. The notions of producer, supplier, mediator, consumer and marginal in the security field are relational; it presumes the existence of a regular contact between at least two states;

2. Notions of security producer, supplier and consumer must specify what the type of security it is referring to (politics, military, social, economic, environmental).

State of art

The birth of security studies as a subdomain of military history was marked by the specific conditions of the end of the Cold War, when direct confrontation was replaced by other issues on the public agenda. Although the historians of the field believe that the golden age of security studies was in the 1950s and 1960s (apud Dungaciu 2012), the specificity of that period was tributary to the hard-security sphere, focusing primarily on nuclear war and nuclear disarmament.

This period also marks the rift between classical sciences and the field of international relations on its way to autonomy. We can talk about a process of mutual legitimacy between theory and practice. The bipolar confrontation imposed statehood at the centre of scientific concerns, and the latter found its reason to be studying the security dimension of politics, its ability to ensure sovereignty. From here it was concluded that all States are equal, having the obligation to master their own borders and populations. However, being presumed as equal, there are a number of differences that need to be taken into account. According to Kenneth Waltz:

Although states are functional similar units, they differ to a large extent on
their capabilities. From such differences arises something like division of labor. (..) The Division of labour between nations is, however, meaningless, compared to the extremely articulate process of division of labour within them. (..) Although it is often discussed about the integration of nations, it rarely happens. Nations could enrich each other, dividing further not only the work that the production of goods involves, but also some of their other tasks, such as political leadership or military defence. Why couldn’t be produce their integration? The structure of the international political system imposes limits on member cooperation... (Waltz 2006, p. 150)

This judgment was considered by the neorealists (with Waltz as their parent), the environmental dimension can be counterbalanced by the status of consumer security on the military dimension; e.g. Japan comes to mind. An inequalitarian perspective on the states belongs to critical theories, many developed under the sign of Marxism or under the upgraded versions of it. Critical theories see things rather relational, the political map of the world being organized by the hierarchy of power linking the developed world with the underdeveloped regardless the official political boundaries.

Two authors have become predominant: Johan Galtung and Immanuel Wallerstein. The norwegian Johan Galtung (born 1930) condensed his work around the PRIO Institute and the University of TRANSCEND (Whitehead 2013, Almeida 2017). Although his initial profession was medical doctor, Galtung developed an impressive philosophical construct, describing the conflict and peace not as two completely opposite states, as type 0 and 1, but rather as a continuum with graduations. For Galtung, peace is more than the absence of battles, representing the situation in which human beings are released from discrimination, poverty, financial debt, stress (Galtung 1969; 2013).

Galtung’s ideas opened the way for an entire literature on peace studies, being also incorporated into the United Nations language and in the organization’s documents, such as Boutros-Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for peace in the 1990s. In the structural theory of imperialism in the early 1970s, Galtung defines imperialism as a relationship of domination between two communities, a central one and the other peripheral (Galtung 1971). A similar point of view is revealed by the doctrine of Immanuel Wallerstein that we are going to examine below, being very useful for the differentiation we have proposed as a stake in this article.

In conclusion, we can say that the concept of security is currently being addressed in a generous manner, offering a wider conceptual umbrella

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than defence, which allows specialists from several sciences to contribute to shaping and conceptualizing the domain. Unfortunately, with the widening of the sphere of significance, the new term is also even more vague, exposing unclear or contradictory formulations from a logical point of view. The diagnosis must not induce pessimism, but on the contrary, the impetus to link once again the concern for <international> with sociology and the great family of social sciences.

Methodology

From a theoretical point of view, our attempt to delimit the concepts of security producer and consumer will primarily use the world system theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, illustrating its advantages compared with the perspective of the Copenhagen School.

Our choice respects the methodological principle of matching between a theory and the case study or the empirical universe on which it will be applied, so that it is possible to achieve results that satisfies the principle of popperian falsifiability.

It is true, that in order not to venture into a risky land, calloused ways are often preferred, so that the already consecrated explanatory models are used in situations that do not require too much effort. In international relations, we find such methodological convenience:

- If you want to study the balance of power, you use the neorealist grid;
- Interdependence is associated with institutional liberalism;
- The identity is read only through the constructivist grid, considered the best for such an approach.

The real question arises when the researcher tries to proceed unconventionally, using a theory beyond its comfort zone. We have to be aware of what we can ask from the critical apparatus with which we work.

Aware of these risks, we propose to combine several theories and schools of thought, as we maintain the primacy of the world system theory which we will connect with the ideas of the Copenhagen school, but also with a number of concepts of economic origin, such as broker, producer, consumer, profit and so on.

Of course, the approach we propose is not entirely new. Dissatisfied with the study of international relations through the lens of a single paradigm, Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein proposed analytical eclecticism, in an effort to: “complete, engage and selectively use in the theoretical constructs already existing in recognized research traditions in order to develop complex arguments that support substantive issues of interest to both researchers and practitioners.” (Sil & Katzenstein 2010b, pp. 411-431) Therefore, analytical eclecticism does not mean a new theory, another “-ism” but a method that brings together theories to solve the same problem. Concerned about the same dilemmas, Ali Mazrui and Samuel Makinda talked about theoretical eclecticism defined as: „...a process through which theorists construct coherent analytical frameworks by evaluating, synthesizing and reflecting on insights from disparate paradigms” (Makinda 200, pp. 205-216)

Certainly, such a journey is necessary to be guided by Sil and Katzenstein’s observation that warns us against two temptations: 1) to believe that eclecticism means a new synthesis; 2) that anything goes with anything (i.e. schools of thought can be combined without regard to possible contradictions or mismatches) (Sil & Katzenstein 2010a, pp. 14-17).

An Application of the World-System Theory

The choice of the world system theory as the main methodological and conceptual guide of this approach is based on the concern the authors had for understanding international relations from the perspective of the hypothesis of unequal status of states.

Determining the conceptual sphere of the notions producer vs. consumer security is only possible by reporting them to the economic area from which they originate. That is why we believe that only by addressing security in close interdependence with the economic sphere, we will be able to build valid conclusions for the formulated questions.

Unlike other traditional explanations that operate a clear distinction between political-economic-social, the sociological Annales School from which Braudel and Wallerstein are claimed considered these three dimensions as interconditional.
The hypothesis Braudel-Wallerstein proposes a historical-geographical explanatory perspective for the development of capitalism. From this point of view capitalism developed from Western Europe and expanded into concentric circles until it filled the whole world. This development proved uneven, hierarchical, having the richest country in the center, flanked by semi-periphery, and in the outer inner circle, the most needy:

There is no economy-universe without a space of its own, meaningful from many points of view. It involves a centre, for the benefit of a city and of a dominant capitalism, whatever its form. The multiplication of the centres is either a form of youth, or a form of macular or mutation...; this space is a somme of local economy, some being poor, modest others, and only one in its center, being relatively rich. Inequalities and voltage differences follow from here and ensure the operation of the assembly.” (Braudel 1989, p.19)

Any economy-universe is a nesting, a juxtaposition of linked areas, but at different levels. On the ground, there are sketched at least three “areas”, three categories: a limited center, regions of second importance which are quite developed and, to conclude, huge marginal areas. [...] The center, „the heart” brings together everything advanced and diversified. The next ring has only part of these advantages, although they participate in them: this is the area “second degree brightness”. The vast, sparsely populated periphery represents, on the contrary, the oldness, the underdevelopment and easy human exploitation. This discriminatory geography catches on its race and explains the general history of the world although from time to time, through complicity, it is creating its own race. (Braudel 1989, p.37)

The graphical representations of the theory can be seen below:
Center, Semi-periphery and periphery: 1800, 1900, 2010:

The Braudel-Wallerstein model emphasizes the continuous dynamics of capitalism, created by the continuous accumulation of capital. Consequently, the Center of the system holds primacy, producing the most sophisticated items that are then imported from the rest of the units of the system, i.e. the other national economies. Also the Center impose an international division of labour, therefore the semi-periphery and periphery are allocated with those activities considered unprofitable by central economies. But this hierarchy is dynamic because it does not stay stuck in time: central states can fall, and become semi-periphery or even the periphery, as the above schemes highlight.

The concept of semi-peripheral state has been rafistolated by other authors, especially after 1990-2000, when the importance of superpowers has left room for analyses related to regional powers, geostrategic pivots, emerging nations and their alliances.

A generational fellow of Wallerstein, the Italian Giovanni Arrighi (1937-2009) defines semi-peripheral states according to their contribution to world capital, in particular to transnational corporations (CTN). Arrighi concludes that the central areas are notable for hosting the management structures of CTN, while the peripheral areas contain mainly executive mechanisms while the semi-periphery may contain intermediate elements of a corporation (as regional directors).

In order to provide a quantitative basis for Wallerstein’s original idea, the three hierarchical regions are defined according to the GDP per capita, as it had been calculated by the World Bank in the early 1980s:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>GDP/capita 1981 (dollars)</th>
<th>Number of states</th>
<th>Percentage of world population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Less than 800</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/II</td>
<td>800-1,500</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>1,500-4,500</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II/III</td>
<td>4,500-9,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>More than 9,000</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Giovanni Arrighi (ed), Semi-peripheral development. The politics of Southern Europe in the twentieth century, Sage, London and New Delhi, 1990, p.246

The states he chose to exemplify the theory were: Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey, which had cycles of democracy/political dictatorship, associated with recession/boom on the economy plane. In another work, Ar-
right together with Jessica Dranghel lists three traits of semi-peripherals:

a) export the most diverse products;

b) the levels of income are very different (in other words, large financial inequalities);

c) their trade policies towards in the international environment are also very diverse (Ruvalcaba 2011, p.146).

The role of semi-peripheral units is, for José Ricardo Martins, the buffer, so as to absorb the tensions that could endanger the hard core of the system:

A semi-periphery does not have a residual effect, but it does not appear to be an embarrassing phenomenon. As a contrario, it is possible to use the same type of service as a shock, as it is the same as the problem of the periphery for the directives of the center. Countries such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and China have such functions of “buffers” in relation to the periphery (Martins, 2015).

In his later writings, Wallerstein added a geopolitical component to the economic radiography describing the international system. It draws our attention that inter-state rivalry must be read on two axes: between the great powers and also between the strong and the weak:

Such states are by definition rivals, bearing responsibility to different sets of rival firms. But as in competition between large firms, the competition between strong states is tempered by a contradiction. While each is against the other in the sort of putative zero-sum game, they have a common interest in holding together the interstate system, and the modern-state system as a whole. So actors are pushed simultaneously in the opposite directions: towards an anarchic system and towards coherent and orderly interstate system. (Wallerstein 2004, p. 56)

Semi-peripheral states become useful to those located in the center as a buffer in front of the potential resentment of the third world (periphery): “...so that they operated as unpopular spaces in the contention of pressure coming from the periphery towards the core” (Ruvalcaba 2011, p.153).

According to Christopher Chase-Dunn, the characteristic of semi-peripheral units is the weak government indicated by a) poor capacity of penetration in society, b) modest ability to collect taxes and c) corruption. Also, in their case, development policies come from above, in a top-down manner (Ruvalcaba 2011, pp.147-148).
Also, semi-peripheral actors can act to “depolarise the center-periphery hierarchy” for the inequality not to be feel so strong as to constitute a cause for conflict. Still these places are where big revolutions and the most explosive social movements are happening (see the Arab Spring that started from North African States, relatively close to the European Union, and not from sub-Saharan Africa) (Chase-Dunn 2011)6.

Wallerstein considers that such antisystemic movements occur when the buffer no longer works7. Once we get here we can open an parenthesis and we can think of another connection between the field of of international relations and sociology: theory of relative deprivation, a very useful tool to explain ample mass movements that have geopolitical consequences, such as the situation in MENA since 2011 (Anderson 2011, Bassinger et al 2012, Idris 2016, Farooq, Saiqa & Ahmed 2017).

In our research we consider that GDP can be a very good indicator of the degree of development of a nation. Without being a perfect analytical tool, it can provide information about other indicators such as: income equality, social stratification, child mortality and life expectancy, corruption or innovation (Bai et al. 2014, Correa & Jaffe 2015, Farzanegan 2017).

The other reason for choosing GDP as the classification criterion of the countries is considering the creative reading of theory of world system, as we have assumed from the outset. Immanuel Wallerstein does not provide clear indicators during his work for the inclusion of a political actor in any of the three categories (center, semi-periphery, periphery). He does not distinguish between great power and rich country, realizing that any wealthy country is necessarily an exploiting imperialist one.

Map and table below on the classification of the world according to GDP:

7 In a change of emails with Silviu Petre (the 20th of March 2011), Immanuel Wallerstein considers that Arab Spring is the expression of another antisystemic movements against the center, similar with the one from 1968.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP 2013</th>
<th>GDP 2014</th>
<th>Annual variation</th>
<th>Continent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>145,538.6</td>
<td>143,427.0</td>
<td>-2,111.6</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>90,298.2</td>
<td>92,048.5</td>
<td>1,750.4</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>80,295.2</td>
<td>82,762.1</td>
<td>2,467.0</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>73,823.1</td>
<td>73,233.0</td>
<td>-590.1</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>71,028.7</td>
<td>71,020.3</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>65,295.2</td>
<td>66,937.5</td>
<td>1,642.3</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>63,180.8</td>
<td>64,478.7</td>
<td>1,297.8</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td>60,358.2</td>
<td>60,664.3</td>
<td>306.1</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>56,839.3</td>
<td>58,087.2</td>
<td>1,247.9</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>53,022.8</td>
<td>54,722.1</td>
<td>1,699.3</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>52,939.1</td>
<td>54,596.7</td>
<td>1,657.6</td>
<td>North America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>50,934.0</td>
<td>52,183.4</td>
<td>1,249.4</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>49,633.0</td>
<td>51,713.7</td>
<td>2,080.7</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>46,441.3</td>
<td>49,194.8</td>
<td>2,753.5</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>46,434.5</td>
<td>47,354.5</td>
<td>920.0</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>45,093.5</td>
<td>46,433.3</td>
<td>1,339.8</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>45,788.8</td>
<td>46,420.1</td>
<td>631.4</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>44,849.3</td>
<td>45,986.4</td>
<td>1,137.0</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank and International Monetary Fund, april 2015 (translated and adapted by authors)
The table above is highly consistent with the global mortality rate index:


And with the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is used to measure the diversity of exported goods:

Source: Thorvaldur Gylfason, Per Wijkman, Double diversification, VOX-CEPR’s Policy Portal, 06 February 2017
And with the innovation index:

The First Ten Centers of Innovation

Discussion: World system theory as an analytical tool

As we have assumed from the beginning, this article intends to give highlights for the concepts of security producer, supplier and consumer, and also to enrich the existing taxonomy with new notions that could reflect properly the reality of the contemporary security environment.

A brief glance at the literature reflects a surprising reality. The security producer and the security consumer have, from a semantic point of view, an axiomatic status. International relations specialists have lent the meaning of the economic field without reflecting on the appropriateness of the loan and without questioning themselves: Do readers have a common key to understanding such concepts in the absence of an appropriate definition?

Our objective is to understand the notion of semi-periphery and to apply it to the security producer-supplier-consumer scheme according to the triptych of the World System Theory: center – semi-periphery - periphery.

While realism or liberalism consider the international system as an additive one, summing up several states, WST emphasis on political institutions as a response to the dynamics without borders of capital:

The expansion implies its own imperatives. The ability to manage to expand is based both on the ability to maintain a relative social cohesion inside (...) and on the arrangements that can be made to use cheap work at great distance...

In this point, it is important to formulate a definition of security which can satisfy the philosophy of the world system. In this key, we propose defining security so as to emphasize both the political institution and the socio-professional classes: “Security is the state of safety that the individual lives as a result of the relative harmony between social classes and internal and international division of labour.”

Corollary: “Inter-state security represents that state of safety that arises between several states as a result of a mutually satisfactory division in the defence issue.” This formula satisfies the criterion of legitimacy that Wallerstein spoke of. In other words, as long as collective inequality is bearable and implies certain satisfaction of the lower, then the dominated classes will not revolt, but will be integrated within the division of labour. Division can be, as we have seen, at both domestic and international level. On the second level, a win-win alliance is likely if the national interests of the actors involved are synchronized.
As stated above, the superiority of WST to the ideas of Copenhagen School is that, while the second fragments the collective reality in different dimensions, the first seeks to understand them in an integrated manner. Thus, for Buzan and Weaver, and also for Kenneth Waltz, the units of the international system are equivalent: they are all sovereign, claim their legitimate right to use force on their own subjects, seek for security and prosperity. Instead, WST describes the internal dynamics correlated with international ones as landmarks for the flow of capital.

Security producer and consumers: a conceptual approach.

In the previous subchapter we understand how security can be defined in crossroads between sociology, economics and internal relations. Further it is important to analyze how a state or its ruling elites can localise itself within the framework of the international security division. The evolution has much in common with a firm that has to maximize its profits by entering a certain niche of the market. While economic agents typically provide goods and services for daily living, in the same way states try to have profit in terms of the realization of national interest whose product is survival. Such an entity is even more competitive as it can better secure its own survival - beneficiaries of survival means individuals, groups, material goods, patrimony, cultural values.

Having in mind Wallerstein grid (center, semi-periphery, periphery) and the fact that the notions listed below are relational (having value in interaction with someone else), we develop the following taxonomy based on three criteria:

1. The resources states allocate for security;
2. The will of the state;
3. The need of state for security.

A. Security Producer = is a state that has the necessary resources and the will to increase the degree of security of another state or of other states without having cardinal security needs that it can not satisfy by itself.

B. Security Supplier = is a state with security needs that primarily has the will and possibility to mediate the relationship between a security producer and an environment in need of security.

C. Security Mediators = is a subtype of the vendor and is considering an honest broker who does not actually provide any security resources but brings together the producers and consumers, thanks to the prestige they
have in international community.

D. Security Consumer = represents a state that needs the help of others to resolve threats to its own security.

E. Marginal state = refers to those states of the world that do not fit into any of the above categories. Here we can include the political actors of liliputan territory who do not take part in the existing tensions, the balance of power, humanitarian interventions or arms transfers. Their status should not be seen as immutable, as it can change.

Through the “necessary resources” we understand a set of institutional, financial, technological, demographic, geographic factors necessary to attain the national interest. It is important to underline that the status of a security producer does not mean the political actor is invulnerable (i.e. the terrorist attacks on September 11 in the US or those in the Russian Federation, France and the United Kingdom). Our sintagma <cardinal security needs> should be read in terms that the country can not be kneeled by another state or by a non-state actor without the attacker suffering massive retaliation. This is primarily the case for the five permanent United Nation Security Council members holding nuclear arsenals (and, eventually, Israel and India).

The described taxonomy can be illustrated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Resources allocated to security</th>
<th>Political will</th>
<th>Need of security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security producer</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security supplier</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security broker</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security consumer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal/neutral state</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Case studies for discussion:

Once the methodological guidelines are drawn, we are now going to see how the political actors of the world integrate into the proposed grid. Each
category in the table will be exemplified.

Note Bene: we should not deduce that the security producer’s attribute is an intrinsic characteristic of a state. It only has value in a relationship. Of course, it can be argued that the states from the center, having the highest scores on GDP, large defence budgets, low index of corruption, high innovation have the likelihood of being more frequent in a security producer position, but this equation is not always valid. For example, we can refer to the efforts of Americans to replace the A10 Thunderbird, which is in use for forty years. A solution could be its change with the new F-35. Another one would be to buy the Supertucano from the Brazilian firm Embraer. The second choice will make Brazilia a security producer for the US. Of course, we are not in a position to read these relationships in commercial terms. It is not about selling and buying but about some complex relationship and agreements within the alliances – this is why we should understand it as a security producer situation.

**Security suppliers - security consumer relation.** A good example would be the relationship between Japan and the United States after 1945, when Washington was the one who secured the safety of Japan from a military point of view, while the former imperialist nation had been banned from investing in defence; still from a financial point of view, Japan helped the first Gulf War through its banks. Therefore, the US played the role of security supplier on military dimension, while Japan became a security supplier for the US on the economic dimension.

Tokyo also assumed the role of one of the most substantial international donors, with Japan contributing $5 billion to the reconstruction of Iraq by 2013 (Kohno 1999, Lincoln 2003, Matsunaga 2013). This is how Japan consistently practiced the status of an economic security supplier. The contrast between the huge Japanese financial and technological potential and its war capabilities were condensed in the expression ‘Japan, a military dwarf and an economic giant’ (Brînză 2012, Višniec 2015), but this phrase is about to become history. In the last few years have been discussed and written about the remilitarization of the country of the rising sun. The Prime Minister Shinzo Abe directs the country to a military status able to discourage what it is perceived as the interference of China and North Korea (Stratfor 2007, Jacoby 2014, Chellaney 2015, Wright 2016, Jon 2016, Jennings 2017, Orchard 2017). We are the witness of a process of transforming the north-east Asian monarchy from an economic security supplier into a potential military security producer – one more reason to assume that the wealth of a country is a predictor

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of its security capabilities.

In addition, it remains to be discussed to what extent the dyad Washington-Tokyo still embodies a win-win relationship since lately street protests have asked the dismantling of US military bases, starting with the one of Okinawa (BBC News 2016). 

**Security producer – security consumer relation.** Another interesting example brings together the United States and Saudi Arabia. From an energetic point of view, the Saudi nation is an energy security producer at planetary level, with the ability to influence the oil market, as it did, in the early 1970s. From a military point of view, Riyad manifests a special interest in acquiring american weapons, having a status of semi-peripheral consumer or even the broker of security in case of American interventions in the area (operations against Saddam Hussein (1990, 2003) started from Saudi territory). Lately, the monarchic state is trying to move to a new stage, that of a military security producer. In May 2017, the country’s Public investment fund announced the creation of a government-owned armament company with an initial capital of 14 billion riyals (3.7 billion $) which will provide 40,000 jobs by 2030. The new company will be called Saudi Arabian military Industries (SAMI) and it is hoped that it will create around it a constellation of new dependent firms. As part of its vision Saudi Arabia 2030, the prince and also defence Minister Mohammed Bin Salman announce an additional 6 billion riyals that will be invested in research and development of new technologies (Renton 2017).

**A potential security producer turns into a security consumer.** The third dyad refers to the confluence of the political economy with security within the EU-NATO relation. A reminder of what bad practices mean is Greece’s behaviour. Having a tourism based economy, Greece had an unsustainable economic behaviour after 2000. For many years Greece has been one of the biggest arms importers in the world: in 2008 Greek imports represented 3% of the global military imports market while China had 4%! – while Greek troops carry out usual missions within the North Atlantic or UN. See below

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10 UPDATE 2-Saudi Arabia launches military industries company, Reuters, May 17, 2017. Saudi Arabia launches national state company for military industries, Al Arabiya English, 18 May 2017
11 Tipping Point North South, https://tippingpointnorthsouth.org/5percent/report-5percent/appendix/
the defence spending of Greece, Turkey and the NATO average for the 1990-2009 range:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>NATO European</th>
<th>NATO Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>1990-94</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<td>1996</td>
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<td>1997</td>
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<td>1998</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.74</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
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</table>


After the outbreak of the crisis, France and Germany have conditioned the money to Greece for the purchase of expensive military equipment from them (Taylor 2010, Tatje 2012, Waterfield 2012). So we have the story of the risky behavior of a semi-peripheral nation that, in an attempt to become a military security producer, has turned into an economic security consumer, which thus jeopardizes its national solvency. In the same time, critics could point to Paris and Berlin, which has turned out to put their own interests above the EU as a whole.

**Security Suppliers.** In the field of military security, the F-16 fighter aircraft, produced by the United States, was bought by Romania, but not directly from the strategic partner, from the Americans, i.e., but from the Portuguese who had already used those planes. Therefore, Lisbon played the role of a supplier between Washington and Bucharest (Tudor 2017, Reuters 2016).

**Security brokers.** At international level there are very difficult files such as civil wars. Although local, they end up in the attention of the public opinion. Of particular importance in solving these dossiers are a certain type of countries that can play the role of brokers, honest states easily accepted as referees. Brokers can be big power or poor states.

One example is that of the Nordic countries, which are models of prosperity and respect for human rights that have taken seriously the posture of good Samaritans, to cite the title of a book by Alyson Brysk (Brysk 2009).
Norway involved in the Sri Lanka Civil: opposing the Sinhalez majority to the Tamil minority, the inter-ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka (1983-2009) lasted an entire generation. The mediator’s involvement led to a ceasefire agreement (February 2002) and the Oslo communiqué (December 2002) that explored the idea of a federal division of the island. The failure of Norwegian mediation can be interpreted according to our criteria as an example when a political player does not necessarily have the resources to stop a conflict, but it possesses the will to change a crisis. To be an honest, but unarmed intermediary, can be an advantage or not (Al Jazeera 2009, Dayaratn 2011, Molakkattu 2005, Norad 2011, Sørbø 2009).

Another notable example involves Romania behaviour after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, when Nicolae Ceausescu thought to take advantage of international events to depart from Moscow and seek new allies. Observing the Sino-Soviet rift and the American attempts to have good offices with Beijing, Ceausescu and Bucharest diplomacy have offered to intermediate between the two poles of power. Beyond the external prestige, Bucharest was considering two goals: a) the friendship of the United States and b) obtaining nuclear technology.

The analyzed dyad meets all the criteria: communist Romania was a developing state and became a mediator on the security issues between two geopolitical giants. Compared to the conflict situation in Vietnam, Bucharest has helped to reach a peace agreement between the US and North Vietnam. At the same time, it hoped to obtain as a reward the status of security consumer status of American nuclear technology, initially for civilian purposes and then defensively. If he had managed to fabricate the nuclear weapon, then Romania would have increased its status inside the Warsaw Pact and the region, becoming perhaps a security producer for the smaller countries that would want to break away from Moscow.

**Marginal/neutral states.** Neutrality can be a subject of fertile discussion, especially because states can be classified in several categories. At first glance they play the role of zero among the natural numbers, but their existence cannot be defined as a negation.

A nation can have the role of marginal state for several reasons:

1. It has completely isolated itself from the world: China after the expedition of Admiral Zheng in the 15th century or Japan Shoguns until he was forced to open to the world after 1854;

2. The stage of its development is not of interest to the dynamics of the rest of the international community: very poor areas that did not participate in the game of colonialism and capitalism (different regions in Africa, South
America, the Amerindian or Australia tribes until they were discovered by the British). After the 19th century these regions will be integrated into the world system. Today we can talk about isolated tribal communities, which are the subject of anthropology more than political science;

3. It is already in an alliance but for some reason it decides to maintain a low, insignificant profile: those nations or governments which do not participate in the decisions taken within the framework of which they are located. We can find examples of NATO or UN countries that do not take any positions repeatedly, do not formulate interpellations, do not participate in common and so on policies. In the globalized contemporary universe such actors are still hard to find - even the Lilliputian states of the world can play an important role either through the fact that some are tax havens or refugee places of known criminals. Maybe Switzerland can be an example which by the financial resources they store has managed to obtain permanent neutrality status.

Final Remarks

The impetus to write this article comes from a dissatisfaction of the two authors regarding the imprecise and even abusive use of some terms, which was found both from the reading of the press and their didactic activity. The generalization of nouns such as freedom, democracy, security, and so on has led to the franchise of their denotation or, simply said, a situation of conceptual anarchy in which each individual uses them as they see fit. It is also the case of the dyad security producer – security consumer. Both academic and journalistic language, cold analyses or political discourses use them assuming that a definition is no longer needed. Problems arise when the two terms are subject to specific case studies and even political decision; without a prior definition it is not possible to explain or understand how the same country can be both producer, supplier, consumer.

Trying to bring together literature from sociology, economics and international relations our study synthesized some definitions for the above terms.

We believe that the role of this article is dual:
1. brought greater conceptual clarification on the subject;
2. to use a more rare theoretical framework, namely a modified version of Wallerstein’s world system, instead of Buzan and Weaver’s Copenhagen school. In our argument, WST has a superior functionality because it considers states to be part of an international division.
The theoretical part was followed by several case studies that could illustrate the taxonomy already stated. The authors themselves see a possibility of developing the proposed terminology by building an index that measures the benefits of a relationship. Gathering data about the economy, demography, resources of two states that want to enter into a security relationship (as producers, mediators, suppliers, consumers, etc.), the index in question could predict whether that alliance would function as a win-win game or as a null sum.

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ABSTRACT
This article aims to contribute to the theoretical clarification of certain widely used terms in scholarly literature as well as in public statements made by policymakers, pundits, media people but insufficiently explained, namely security producers and security consumers. Although frequently present, neither political science nor international relations literature have grappled with them, therefore rendering scholars incapable to grasp the complexity of inter-state position.

KEYWORDS
Security Providers; Security Consumer; Romania.

Received on February 11, 2019
Approved on October 9, 2019