CHINA’S GLOBAL POWER AND DEVELOPMENT: THE MADE IN CHINA 2025 POLICY

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Introduction

In the immediate post-Cold War scenario, there were many enthusiasts of neoliberal globalization and its effects. (Kumar 1997, Ianni 1996). In this aspect, Kenichi Ohmae (1996) was one of many authors who diagnosed the weakening of nation-states while others clung too heavily to the post-industrial societies theses, from Bell (1970) to Demasi (2000). While it is imperative to recognize the profound systemic changes that have occurred since the late twentieth century, it is still impossible to dissociate national development and power. Moreover, it should be acknowledged the interdependence of the internal and international dimensions, given that state capacity and economic dynamism are preconditions for countries to act worldwide - although it seems insufficiently addressed in the context of International Relations.

Zakaria (1999) analyzes how rich nations become world powers focusing his study on the path of the United States rise, which began in the last decades of the nineteenth century. His approach converges with realist theory, demonstrating how the increase in economic power has enabled the country to leverage its influence on international relations, in parallel with the strengthening of its state apparatus (military and diplomatic) and effectively its interference for opening markets and access to international sources of resources. In the same perspective, Kennedy (1989) defends the thesis that the increase of productive capacity provides military capability both to support the acquisition and to guarantee the protection of wealth, but may generate hypertrophy of military power and a consequent weakening of national power

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in the long run.

Realist approaches, however, do not capture the complex economic and institutional formations of each country, the nature and motivations of its expansionist projects, nor the synergy between state-territorial power and the power of capital. In this sense, a critical approach - though historically very restricted to the critique of the capitalist system - can help illuminate the different natures of imperial development and expansion processes as well as state-capital interaction in shaping the modern international system. In China’s case, it is necessary to understand its unstoppable rise, its impact on systemic reordering changing its power settings, as well as the uniqueness of its cosmology and its political-economic system.

Thus, this article aims elucidate the process by which the success of China’s development project drives the assertiveness of its engagement on major issues on the international agenda. To this end, the goal is to discuss the role of Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) in the rise of the Asian country. This is a government policy launched in 2015 aimed at promoting 10 strategic sectors of smart manufacturing, internalizing complex supply chains and driving innovation. Increasing Chinese production complexity has widened the country’s participation not only in global production and trade, but in FDI innovation, issuance and reception activities. Naturally, its development recreates the parameters of China’s engagement and assertiveness globally, putting the level of tension and competitiveness inherent in its relations with the hegemon (United States of America) to another level.

**Brief Notes on Global Power and Development**

A critical approach about development and insertion in the international system must overcome the existing cleavages in both modernization theories, grounded in the analysis of the inexorable process of overcoming traditional societies and boosting the enrichment of nations, as well as the theories of dependence, at least in those versions that crystallize the center-periphery relations. In those relations, both commodity exports and industrialization recreate, in different ways, dependency through lack of access to state-of-the-art technology and/or through the expansion of transfer profits and debt, among others mechanisms of stagnation (Mamigonian 2000).

Lenin himself (1979) offered an alternative analysis that goes beyond these cleavages. From the conformation of financial capitalism (monopolies), the expansion of the system is driven by the exportation of surplus capital in advanced countries. Capital globalizes to peripheral countries in search
for more lucrative investments. Indeed, in the center, the parasitic rentism causes some stagnation; yet in the periphery it generates conflicting plundering tendencies to loot the weak links of imperialism and to unevenly promote new dynamic regions from their competitive advantages (Lenin, 1979, p. 621-23; 646-7). Thus, the global development of capitalism accentuates the contradictions of the world economy by creating, through colonial policies, large monopolies, which recreate their conditions of existence from the very reproduction of these colonial policies.

In the same line of thought, Arrighi also seeks in history the root of the great systemic changes, analyzing the process of displacement of the dynamic areas of capitalism. Stages of material expansion give way to phases of financial expansion, shaping systemic cycles of accumulation and transitions of power. From Genoa (from the 15th to the 17th) to the Netherlands (end of the 16th to the 18th), then England (from the 18th to the beginning of the 20th) and the United States (late 19th to the present), more and more comprehensive and complex governmental and business structures were formed - imposing limits on system expansion (Arrighi 1996)².

With emphasis on production or systemic circulation, the fact is that development results from the combination of global processes with national policies suited to conjunctural opportunities. Regarding the domestic sphere, the history of developed countries teaches, on the one hand, that there is no single model or path, but, on the other, that there are parameters and prerequisites which without no country has historically developed. The South Korean Chang (2004) points out that absolutely all countries now considered developed have made extensive use of industrial, trade and technology (ICT) policy. That is, they all mobilized the state apparatus to boost development, rather than uncritically adopting liberal policies and models driven by major powers and international organizations whose historical goal has been to ‘kick away the ladder’ (Chang 2004) for the rise of new power poles.

According to Reinert, state policies are crucial in breaking the limitations of ‘perfect competition’ in primary goods and their consequent ‘diminishing returns’, which imprison a number of countries to a static productive specialization. It is public emulation that promotes ‘imperfect competition’ and ‘rising incomes’ through technological change, dynamism in production chains and mechanisms of value addition to production, wage increases, market densification, profit expansion and increase of the tax base. That is, the economies of scale, the technological changes and synergistic effects of ag-

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² This historical sequence proposed by him underestimates the importance of other civilizations, taking on too Eurocentric features, and greatly broadening his understanding of what defines the capitalist system. But this debate escapes the aims of the text.
glomeration are part of these development processes. Thus, either the country seeks to insert itself in the capital-intensive links of international value chains or accept colonialism due to the comparative advantages of a given international division of labor (Reinert 2016).

The organization of the Atlas of Economic Complexity gives empirical substance to these notions that relate development with productive sophistication (Hausmann et al. 2011). In other words, economic complexity drives an intricate network of interactions and knowledge mobilized for production, whose increased productivity is linked to the addition of value, knowledge, innovation and, in effect, development. Productive complexity can be measured by the ability to produce non-ubiquitous and diversified goods3, as well as other variables such as increased HDI and reduced social inequalities for example (Hausmann et al. 2011, Gala 2017).

Gullo (2014) also points out that the ‘state impulse’ is not only faced with domestic challenges as it is a phenomenon that can challenge the world power structure, which he calls ‘founding insubordination’. Any national project faces the limits imposed by the hegemonic structures of power, formed by complex mechanisms of domination, created by some countries and international organizations, as well as public and private actors that impose their interests as well (Guimarães 2000, p. 28). In fact, escape these mechanisms involves the articulation between anti-colonial struggles and the national issue as the basis of emancipationist movements on the periphery of the system - a question underestimated by ‘Western Marxism’, with its exalted and abstract internationalism and anti-capitalism notions (Losurdo 2018, p. 44).

The overcoming of the productive-technological gap is decisive both for national development and for the country’s position in the international division of labor, especially after the technical transformations resulting from the 3rd Industrial Revolution. Mazzucato (2014) demonstrates that even in the United States - a country presented as the bastion of liberalism and self-made entrepreneurship - the state is at the center of technological innovations, through the combination of public spending and governmental fostering of university-business interaction. Defense spending (military-industrial complex), operated through government agencies, has played a central role in generating innovation for the economy. Recent technological advances in the computing, jets, nuclear power, lasers, biotechnology and drug sectors, as well as the shape of Silicon Valley itself, cannot be understood without the consideration of these heavy government investments. Even the notorious

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3 The case of Mexico is sui generis, given that the economy specialized in terms of Maquila characteristics and, in effect, inhibited the internalization of production chains and their chain effects (Gala 2017, p.80-1).
case of the Iphone was only possible due to government research that previously enabled the creation of the internet, microprocessors, lithium battery, GPS, touch screens and communication technologies (HTTP and HTML) among other tools - an event not much different from the algorithm case that led to the creation of Google’s search mechanism. (Mazzucato 2014, p. 111; 136).

In short, although unrecognized in liberal rhetoric, the dynamics of the international system have been the result of dialectical state-power and market-capital relations. Arrighi (1996) points out that since the Indian Companies, capital and power act synergistically - and Washington today has been particularly emphatic in promoting and defending its strategic sectors⁴. Instead of the supposed antagonism between state-centered and transnationalist views, which is prevalent in international relations, it is appropriate to bet on critical approaches capable of understanding the intertwining between state territoriality and global processes of capitalist accumulation⁵. In other words, it is not possible to understand national development by dissociating it from the complex process of displacement of global decision-making centers, which, in turn, interact with national integration strategies, determining their respective autonomy and place in configurations (hierarchical) of power in the world.

China’s development and power

To understand the Made in China 2025, it is necessary to recover the trajectory of China, emblematic because of the tense and contradictory relationship between development and international insertion. The sophisticated Middle Kingdom enters what they call the ‘century of humiliation’ between the Opium War (1839) and the Chinese Revolution (1949), combining internal disorganization with international subordination to different imperialist powers. The revolution, therefore, intertwined the anticolonial character with that of national reconstruction, while at the same time facing upsets such as the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and international isolation after the Sino-Soviet rupture. Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Openness policy aimed at overcoming these contradictions by adjusting strategies for both national development and international insertion, taking into account Chinese

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⁴ Some notorious cases of banning the sale of US private companies for strategic reasons are Unocal (oil) that would be sold to China’s CNOOC in 2005; Lattice Semiconductor Corporation by the Chinese Canyon Bridge Fund in 2017; or Qualcomm (semiconductors) by Singapore-based Broadcom (but with the ancestry of Chinese investors) in 2018.

⁵ In-depth discussion in another article, see Pautasso & Fernandes (2017).
internal and external dimensions.

This policy triggered by Deng Xiaoping fits into a framework of the restructuring of both of capitalism and of US global power. On the one hand, the 3rd Industrial Revolution began, with new mechanisms of production organization (Toyotism) and an emerging international division of labor. On the other hand, the hegemon (United States) sought to restore control over the international monetary-financial system through the flexible dollar standard, combined with the 1980s military escalation (Reagan) against the USSR, the trade offensive against Japan and Germany (Plaza Accord - 1985) and its rapprochement with Communist China - in a scenario of US withdrawal from Vietnam and the intensification of both China and the US rivalry with the USSR. The Chinese case is symptomatic of the capacity to formulate national policies appropriate to systemic changes, demonstrating the possibility of overcoming domestic and international vulnerabilities.

That is, the construction of the Sino-American axis articulated US financial globalization with the embryonic Chinese economic miracle, driving significant changes in the international division of labor and, consequently, in the world’s power configurations. It is a productive integration between the United States and China based on US FDI and the shaping of globalized industrial production chains, including companies from Asian countries or regions. In other words, this new Sino-American axis of accumulation, although increasingly filled with geopolitical contradictions, has synergistic trade (broadening the trade chain), productive (articulation between US and Chinese companies in the global production chain), and financial (foreign reserves of China and US Treasuries) (Pinto 2011).

To some extent, the process described above converges with Arrighi’s (2008) analysis. For him, the financial expansion of the US cycle has driven the shift of the global economic epicenter from the North Atlantic to East Asia, resulting in the Asian revival under the leadership of the reemerging Chinese civilization and the rebuilding of the sinocentric system (Arrighi 2008). In this direction, China’s leadership has been promoting regional integration processes, both through organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and initiatives such as the New Silk Road, while proposing the country’s repositioning in the global arena as well as the redefinition of key elements of the international order.6

China’s trajectory of national development and international insertion stress the hegemonic power structures centered on the United States and its allies. As Belluzzo (2013) points out, in the West financial deregulation drives

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6 In-depth discussion in another article, see Pautasso & Ungaretti (2017).
capital into the speculative spiral of account creation (fictitious) to the detriment of production. Thus, large corporations are increasingly immersed in practices aimed at increasing financial assets, tied to the immediate logic of their shareholders - a sign not of the detachment of the fictitious appreciation of the stock of wealth, but in more advanced, socialized and contradictory ways of value creation in capitalism (Belluzzo 2013, p. 111-123).

Therefore, it remains to be seen how China will offer alternatives for shaping new global power configurations. China’s systemic impact has been significant in many dimensions, illustrated both by the profile of its exports and the performance of its companies on a global scale. Exports rose from US$ 16.8 billion in 1980 to US$ 82 billion in 1990, US$ 370 billion in 2000, US$ 1.68 trillion in 2010 and US$ 1.98 trillion in 2016. Between 2007 and 2017 China’s accumulated trade surpluses totaled nearly 3.5 trillion dollars. In the 1980s Chinese exports were practically restricted to oil and its derivatives, food and other primary products; during the 1990s they were made up of footwear, clothing, toys and other low value-added manufactured goods; nowadays, predominate electro-electronic equipment, motors, vehicles, building materials, among other sophisticated goods.

In a detailed study, it became clear that in 1962 China had only export competitiveness of 105 products; by 1980, when the transition began, China was already achieving such performance for a total of 234 items; in 2006, the export basket was already highly sophisticated and one of the most diversified in the world with around 270 goods (Felipe, Kumar, Usui, Abdon 2013). According to the aforementioned Atlas, China had an economic complexity index of 0.143 in 1995 and 1.16 in 2016, rising from 50th to 18th in the world ranking - in the same period the United States went from 1.86 to 1.55, or from 7th to 10th position. In 1992, just over 6% of Chinese exports were high-tech goods, reaching over 25% in 2016 - while the United States fell from 32.5% to 19.9% in the same period the share of goods with high added value in its export agenda. China’s performance is even reflected in asymmetries in its relationship with the United States, whose bilateral trade reached US$ 505.4 billion in 2017 with surpluses of US$ 375.5 billion in favor of the Chinese. Beyond the values, Chinese exports of high-tech products reached, in 2016,  

8 View data by volume, destinations and export component from China available at: https://atlas.media.mit.edu/pt/profile/country/chn/  
9 View the excellent dataset available at: http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/  
the figure of 496 billion dollars, compared to 153 billion dollars of the US economy\(^\text{11}\).

The performance of Chinese companies globally reflects the expansion of the power of the eastern country in the international sphere. This fact can be well illustrated by the rapid expansion of the number of its multinationals among the world’s major corporations. Notwithstanding the difficulties of measurement, variable data such as stock control and company profile, this is a significant rise from 18 companies in 2005 to 120 companies in 2018, listed among the 500 largest, according to Fortune - while in this the same period the United States went from 176 to 126\(^\text{12}\). During the Opening-Up Reform Policy of the late 1970s, the Chinese emphasis was on developing national productive capacity, attracting foreign investment directed for internalizing capital and technologies; from the 1990s onwards, China was already testing the projection of its foreign investments, prioritizing peripheral countries; since 2005, however, China has been expanding its investments abroad in a clear qualitative transformation of its business expansion (ZHU 2018). In line with this dynamic, the Going Global strategy was developed in 1999, precisely in the context of the country’s entry into the WTO (2001), oriented for increasing security in natural, alimentary and energetic resources, through the control of the value chains of these sectors in other countries. China is currently developing Going Global 2.0 with the central objective of driving demand into the national economy by leveraging it through the New Silk Road\(^\text{13}\).

The intertwining and mutual strengthening of China’s national development and foreign insertion is also expressed in the diplomatic sphere. Chinese diplomacy has become more assertive, surpassing the low profile foreign policy advocated by Deng Xiaoping. This change stems from Beijing’s new objective conditions of power, which are essential for the country to assume commitments and responsibilities commensurate with its new status (Zhao 2013, Tianquan 2012). Chinese assertiveness can be observed in promoting a new global financial architecture\(^\text{14}\), building regional integration processes (SCO, ASEAN + 1, New Silk Road) and/or more emphatically defending regional security issues.

\(^{11}\) View official data from the United States Census Bureau, available at: https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2016.


\(^{14}\) See debate in Pautasso (2015).
Development and power in Made in China 2025 policy

Given the above, it is possible to understand the Made in China 2025 as a sign of the deepening synergy between national development and enhancement of China’s global insertion. This is an exemplary case of state capacity to promote what Chang (2004) calls STI policy in favor of the nascent industry. In other words, the Chinese government has been promoting interaction between the state and the private sector, financing the merger of sectors, shaping oligopolies (national champions) with a view to deepening the productivity and socialization of investment. State planning includes cheap financing through national public banks, production of low-priced basic inputs, and stimulating demand through government procurement. Diverging from the prevailing rentism in the neoliberal agenda, the State directs investments to chosen sectors capable of generating innovations and thickening supply chains while capital markets are regulated, avoiding the bubbles and collapses inherent in speculation cycles (Belluzzo, Sabbatini 2017).

In fact, state science, technology and innovation (ST&I) policies have historically been crucial to the development processes of nations, although later combined with liberal rhetoric (kicking the ladder) to undertake actions aimed at monopolizing their domains (patents) and even the inhibition of these same public policies, which gave rise to them in third countries. It is, therefore, a strategy of the world powers to reaffirm their advantages and, in full, the global asymmetries expressed in the international division of production processes - or in the place that each country occupies in the value and wealth chains. Indeed, development combines a national project with capabilities to break hegemonic international structures aimed at crystallizing global configurations of wealth and power.

In China’s case, the policies of reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national reconstruction of the Mao Era are intertwined with the modernizing reforms triggered by the Deng Era. According to Gala (2017, 91-2), there were several governmental public policies aimed at promoting China’s economic complexity, encompassing gradual trade opening, with a complex tariff system, non-tariff barriers and licenses; the attraction of conditional investments on technological transfers, joint ventures, chains to national industries; strong incentives for reverse engineering and weak enforcement of intellectual protection laws; the creation of national clusters through local content requirements; besides an economic policy capable of combining devalued exchange rate, low interest rates, capital control, among other mechanisms.

Its macroeconomic policy has as its vector public financing, driven
by a bank structure reorganized with the Reform and Opening Policy\textsuperscript{15}. At the turn of the 1970-80, financial reforms were conducted aiming to create specialized operations for the various sectors of the economy, starting with the separation of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). Firstly, China Construction Bank (CCB) for construction, Bank of China (BOC) for foreign currency transactions and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) for rural credit emerged - and also the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) to undertake the industrial and commercial control tasks of PBC’s banking activities in 1984. In the 1990s, the three political banks that would focus Chinese development finance emerged: the China Development Bank (CDB), the China Exim Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC). In addition, multilateral financial institutions, whose ancestry in China are central, were formed, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New BRICS Development Bank, the China-Africa Development Fund, the New Silk Road, among others.

The banking system is also behind the accelerated internationalization of Chinese companies, especially the state-owned enterprises (SOE). (Nicolas 2017). These companies have been working in synergy with Chinese foreign policy to achieve goals ranging from food security, natural and energy resources, to demand creation strategies for the domestic market. Cai (2017, p. 17) highlights three sectors that have emerged in the Chinese high-tech industry, notably high-speed rail, power generation equipment, and telecommunications equipment. In fact, all these sectors are linked to Beijing’s initiatives to promote infrastructure (communication, transport and energy).

Innovation is structuring to increase the productive complexity of the country and guides all ICT public policies. According to the World Bank’s\textsuperscript{16} China 2030 document, Chinese innovation has been based on remarkable support for the specialization of productive activities; the integration of companies with the national innovation system; the building of national research networks; the improvement of the quality of higher education; the qualification of labor aiming at increasing labor productivity; increased spending on R&D and S&T; the promotion of new companies (start-ups); government procurement aimed at stimulating innovation, etc. Notwithstanding the uniqueness of the trajectory of each country, what is observed is that there is no

\textsuperscript{15} In a recent report, the United Nations recognized the role of long-term development banks, according to a report available at: https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdseidc2016dr1_en.pdf.

development without ICT policies and state emulation.

In this scenario of intensifying interstate and corporate competition, China has been targeting what is conventionally called industry 4.0 - a concept created in 2011 at the Hannover fair in Germany to refer to advanced manufacturing\(^7\). These are technological innovations such as artificial intelligence, robotics, IoT, Big Data, autonomous vehicles, 3D printing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, energy storage, new materials (graphene) and quantum computing.

The Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) policy, inspired by Germany’s “Industry 4.0” plan (discussed in 2011 and adopted in 2013), was approved by the State Council of China in 2015, focused on the development of smart manufacturing. This is a deepening of another 2010 study, entitled China’s Drive for Indigenous Innovation, which aimed to use the powerful Chinese regulatory regime to force the reliance on foreign technology to be promoted by promoting national innovations. The MIC 2025 aims to boost China’s leadership in global production and innovation networks, giving efficiency and quality to domestic products. The plan was prepared by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) with the inputs from 150 experts from the China Academy of Engineering.

This government document highlights 10 priority business sectors: 1) new advanced information technology; 2) automated machine-tools and robotics; 3) aerospace and aeronautical equipment; 4) maritime equipment and high technology transportation; 5) modern railway equipment; 6) new energy vehicles and equipment; 7) power equipment; 8) agricultural equipment; 9) new materials; and 10) biopharmaceuticals and advanced medical products.

To this end, the Chinese government is not only focused on innovation, but on the entire modern production and service chain. The central objective is to increase the national content of national components and materials first to 40% by 2020 and then to 70% by 2025. To this end, the Chinese government’s strategy includes policies aimed at accelerating technology transfer efforts and licensing requirements, acquisition of strategic foreign companies, as well as various of reverse engineering activities\(^8\). It is interesting to observe

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\(^7\) In Germany the Recommendations for implementing the strategic initiative Industrie 4.0 was produced in 2013; and in the US, Report to the President Accelerating U.S. Advanced Manufacturing in 2014.

\(^8\) The Trump Government had placed Chinese Fujian Jinhua on a list of entities that cannot buy products from US companies, a move similar to that taken against China’s ZTE. Note that Fujian Jinhua is at the heart of MIC 2025, as it is one of China’s largest chip makers. View news at Reuters on October 29, 2018, available at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-semiconductors/u-s-restricts-exports-to-chinese-semiconductor-firm-fujian-jinhua-idUKKCN1N328E
the goals in the automotive industry, a sector that link together information technologies, autonomous vehicles, new forms of energy and others.

Made in China 2025 is definitely an ambitious plan to affirm China’s industrial and technological leadership along with a robust import substitution process. According to Xinhua agency, MIIT and the China Development Bank foresee funding programs - including loans, bonds and leasing - for major projects, with funding estimated at over $ 45 billion for the 2016-2020 period. It is a productive escalation that tends to intensify interstate and inter-company competition, typical of the contexts of reorganization of world power. And that is why neither the ‘trade war’ unleashed by the United States

Inphographic 1. Source: MIIT ( http://english.gov.cn/policies/infographics/2015/06/02/content_281475119391820.htm)

against China in 2018, nor the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, chief financial officer of Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, boils down to displaced disputes within this broader geopolitical framework.

Final Remarks

There is no doubt that a country’s national development and global projection intertwine and strengthen each other - and China’s trajectory is emblematic of this synergy. The MIC 2025 is the cause and consequence of this process, the origins of which date back to the national reconstruction began in 1949 and revitalized after the reforms undertaken in the 1970s. If it is a fact that the 3rd Industrial Revolution and the so-called Industry 4.0 will bring structural changes to production and production work, they do not dissociate themselves from the development and power of nations and, in effect, from their public policies toward the production of wealth (complex and tangible).

Getting back to the starting point. If, in the mid-nineteenth century, the eastern country was the object of capitalist expansion and succumbed to British hegemony, from the 1980s onwards, systemic changes and national policies have driven China’s rise. Deng’s reforms depended as much on rapprochement with the United States as on the opportunities arising from the new international division of labor, and on its flows of production, investment, and trade. None of this would be virtuous without the Chinese elite being able to perceive these changes and formulate public policies capable of meeting their challenges, overcoming several vulnerabilities and contradictions, both internal and external. As the world economy succumbed to the liberalizing narrative, China pursued development with consistent ICT policies and publicly emulated development banks. The growing economic complexity has been revealing of national performance, reflected in factors as diverse as HDI or patent registration.

Naturally, China’s greater geo-economic power requires greater geopolitical assertiveness. The Chinese rise tenses the hegemonic power structures led by the United States in several dimensions. It is undoubtedly from this result that new configurations of power will emerge, with greater or lesser violence and with or without central war.
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China’s Global Power and Development: The Made in China 2025 Policy


ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to analyze the relationship between development and global power of China. And, more specifically, how the Made in China 2025 policy is designed to deepen China’s development by driving strategic sectors of smart manufacturing and other innovations. To do so, it needs to understand how China has taken advantage of systemic changes since the 1970s to unleash a cycle of comprehensive reforms mobilizing industrial, commercial and technological (ICT) policies. That is, without state emulation there is no economic complexity or expansion of the country’s presence in the world. The proposed argument is that the interweaving between the internal and international dimensions compose the key of the rise of the powers - imperative underestimated by the narratives of liberal globalization - whose epicenter remains the national development.

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