BRAZIL’S FOREIGN POLICY, DEFENSE POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT MODEL: FROM THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE TO THE LOGISTIC STATE (1930-2017)

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Introduction

This work aims to analyze the relationship between Brazil's Foreign Policy³, Defense Policy⁴ and Development Model⁵ under a historic perspec-

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³ Foreign Policy is defined here as the interaction of the state with other actors of the International System in three main scopes: political-diplomatic, military-strategic and economic (Oliveira 2005, 7-14). There is an important debate in the International Relations literature, and particularly among the authors of the research program on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) regarding the definition of which indicators and actors should be taken into account in the analysis of capabilities, intentions and the process of formulation and implementation of a country’s Foreign Policy. The works of Hudson and Vore (1995), Putnam (1988), Smith, Hadfield and Dunne (2012), Milani and Pinheiro (2013), Salomón and Pinheiro (2013), Pinheiro (2000), Sennes (2003), Cervo (2008), Figueira (2011), among others, are examples of such attempts of systematization. Among the indicators utilized, a relative unanimity can be considered regarding the central role of the economic, military and political-diplomatic aspects as fundamental to the countries’ international insertion Grand Strategy.

⁴ Even though there are divergences in the literature, the concepts of security and defense are treated here as analogues: it is about the preservation of Brazil’s sovereignty in the International System through the use or threat of use of force (dissuasion). Ergo, in this work Security and Defense Policies relate to the area of Strategy and of the Grand Strategy, in other words, relate to the use of force by the state towards politically determined objectives (Diniz, Proença and Raza 1999).

⁵ From the works of Fonseca (2015), Bresser-Pereira (2006), Herrleine Jr. (2014) and Coronel, Azevedo and Campos (2014), it can be affirmed that the Development Strategy or Model relates to a political project of overcoming underdevelopment by seeking technological moderniza-
tive (1930–2017). In this sense, the research used an approach based on the works of Cervo (2010), Sennes (2003), Silva (2010) and Oliveira M.F. (2005) that seek to analyze the characteristics of the phases of the Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP) that cross the limits of the presidential mandates, being also linked to the political, economic and military constraints of the International System. From its permanent objectives – sovereignty, citizenship and regional integration –, the frameworks for international insertion were outlined, as well as the ways in which the Brazilian state sought to connect the three areas of its Grand Strategy.

The justification for this work can be summarized in two scopes: (1) academic and (2) political-social. In academic terms, the research seeks to fill a gap between two research programs in Brazil: (1) the study of the relations between the Foreign Policy and the Defense Policy, and (2) the area of Defense Economics. In the first case, the researchers seek to identify the interactions between, in the words of Raymond Aron (2002), “the soldier and the diplomat”, leaving in the background the needs of the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), of the productive sphere and technological modernization, or even adopting an exclusively institutional, cultural, and internally organizational approach. On the other hand, the proponents of Defense Economics look away from the political and International Relations sphere, in the words of Sandler and Hartley (2007), seeking to “apply the instruments of economics in the study of defense”, particularly in the area of the economic globalization. This work is an attempt to articulate these three areas of Brazil’s Grand Strategy – Politics, Economy and Security – aiming to underline its importance in the execution of the national project, the regional integration, the extra-regional partnerships and the International Technical Cooperation (ITC).

The political-social justification is the increase of international position, the increase of the industrial productive capabilities and those of economic support to the country’s foreign and defense policies in the International System.

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6 According to the Brazilian Armed Forces Glossary, Strategy means the “art to prepare and apply power to conquer and preserve objectives, overcoming obstacles of all order”. Grand Strategy, on the other hand, is similar to what is called “National Strategy”, that defines the synergy of the Military Strategy with the other areas of the National Power: “Art of preparing and applying the National Power to, overcoming the obstacles, reach and preserve the national objectives, according to the orientation established by the National Politics” (Brasil 2007).

7 From the systematization of the debate about the concept realized by Silva and Martins (2014), it can be affirmed that International Technical Cooperation (ITC) is characterized by the exchange of knowledge and management in order to increase the technological capacities of institutions and people and is closely related to the generation of development and to the increase of state capacities.
itical, economic and military competition⁸, that demands from the Brazilian state the formulation of a Grand Strategy that articulates these planning spheres. Internally, the economic stagnation is added to the uncertainties regarding the country’s political institutions. Externally, Brazil’s new defense documents, sent to the congress in the beginning of 2017, reflect the retraction of the Brazilian foreign policy, even though they maintain some of the characteristics of its predecessors, such as the prioritization of the strategic surroundings (South America and South Atlantic) (Brazil 2017). Besides, there is a gap regarding the economic development project, formerly guided by the revitalization of the country’s DIB.

After the historical analysis, the article concludes that the Brazilian state reacted systematically to the political, economic and military changes of the International System and sought to achieve a synergy between the Foreign Policy, the Defense Policy and the Development Strategy. The Developmental State (as of 1930) and the diplomatic bargaining sought to enthrone the Center of Economic Decision⁹ of the 2nd Industrial Revolution, through the creation of national companies, the substitution of imports and the search for a relative autonomy of a Brazilian military-industrial complex, sought to benefit from international strategic partnerships. This process had continuity in the government of Juscelino Kubitschek, and also in the military governments of the years 1960 to 1980. Driven by the I and II PND, the Brazilian DIB began to appear as an exporter of military equipment.

After the economic crisis of the 1980s, the advent of the Liberal State retracted investments in the national DIB, prioritizing the fight against inflation, economic and financial opening and adherence to international regimes. The strategic projects were paralyzed, giving priority to purchases of

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⁸ Such a scenario is exemplified by large interregional economic agreements such as the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Donald Trump’s election in the United States of America expresses a reaction to the economic and military rise of regional power poles such as Russia and China, which have gradually acquired extra-regional capacity. The contradictory actions of the North American country in Asia and the Middle East demonstrate the framework of an International System, although asymmetrical, multipolar.

⁹ The concept of “decision center” is central to Celso Furtado’s work: it means the ability of a country, through the mastery of core technologies at a certain stage of capitalist development, to make choices in terms of development, foreign policy and security (Oliveira L. K. 2012). According to Furtado (1962), the Brazilian industrialization that began in the 1930s had the effect of “transferring to the national territory the main center of decisions related to the country’s economic life” (Furtado, 1962). In the first half of the twentieth century, the conquest of the center of economic decision had as a prerequisite the domination of the steel industry and the petroleum industry (Furtado 1962).
war material. From the late 1990s and early 2000s, in the wake of the reforms of the Brazilian Public Administration\textsuperscript{10}, the Logistics State, once again sought to acquire productive and military capabilities from the 3rd Industrial Revolution\textsuperscript{11}. It can be said that the Logistics State sought to synthesize the demands of autonomy (Developmentalist State) and modernization (Liberal State) by attracting infrastructure companies for the defense industry and forming South-South, South-East and South-North partnership, later guided by the National Defense Strategy (NDS 2008) and the National Defense White Paper (2012). The crisis of this model occurred from 2013, already in the Government of Dilma Rousseff, and was consolidated in 2015, with the beginning of the process of impeachment and the rise of Michel Temer to the Presidency of Brazil in 2016.

The Developmental State, the 2nd Industrial Revolution and the Defense Industrial Base (1930-1985)

The 2nd Industrial Revolution demanded the creation in Brazil of several mechanisms of protection of the nascent industry, of the country’s mineral resources, tax reforms and a process of import substitution. The first Getulio Vargas government (1930-1945) encouraged the import of capital goods and the production of final goods instead of importing consumer goods and exporting raw materials (Fonseca 2003). Considering the institutional

\textsuperscript{10} Since the 1990s, the Brazilian state has undergone a new process of reform in its Public Administration. This process is based on the promulgation of Constitutional Amendment No. 19 (1998), which established the associated management of public services through public consortia and cooperation agreements between federated entities (article 241 of the Federal Constitution). To date, consortia are used by municipalities and states of the federation in the area of health and by the Federal Union for security at major events, but can also serve as Federal Union instruments to optimize resources, infrastructure, personnel, among others, with a view to leverage productive civilian and military investments in partnership with states and municipalities.

\textsuperscript{11} The development of the computer can be seen as the center of the Scientific-Technological Revolution (or 3rd Industrial Revolution): in 1970, the American company Intel launched the first microprocessor, and in 1975 IBM inaugurated the IBM 5100, the first personal computer produced in large quantities (Conti 2006). It is also in the 1970s that the Nimitz Class of Super Aircraft Carriers was created, the nucleus of North American naval power that gathers until today all the achievements of the 3rd Industrial Revolution. The so-called aerodrome (NAe) synthesizes the accumulation of scientific and technological capabilities in areas that cross space, air and sea and from repositories ranging from the propulsion plant to the embedded systems. Thus, strategic autonomy has also been linked to the domain of the production of communication networks (satellites, telecommunications, radiofusion) and computers (semiconductors and superconductors).
framework, the Ministry of Labor, Industry and Commerce (1930), the Brazilian Bank’s Agricultural and Industrial Credit Portfolio (1937), the National Oil Council (1938), the Plan of Public Works and Defense Equipment (1939), were created among others. On the educational level and the qualification of the workforce, Francisco Campos’ reform started in 1931, aiming to create technical and vocational courses focusing on production-oriented areas such as engineering, agronomy and accounting (Fonseca 2003).

The Developmentalist State aimed to enthrone the Center of Economic Decision of the 2nd Industrial Revolution through the creation of national companies, import substitution and the quest for autonomy of a Brazilian military-industrial complex. Thus, several mechanisms were created to protect the nascent industry, the country’s mineral resources and tax reforms. As an example, the creation of the National Steel Company (NSC), the Volta Redonda Plant (1941) and the Vale do Rio Doce Company in 1942 can be mentioned. Not surprisingly, these companies were born in the context of World War II, and were the result of Vargas’s and the Brazilian Army’s view of the need to nationalize strategic national mineral wealth and the manufacture of weapons and projectiles that required the production of iron and steel (Fonseca 2003).

This challenge was present throughout the history of Brazil, and was explained, for example, in the 1930s by the work of Góes Monteiro called “The Political Purpose of the Army.” Then, the Army General emphasized the primacy of the security and military sovereignty of a country, that is, the “force instrument of national sovereignty as the backbone of the national organism” (Monteiro 1932). In addition, he affirmed that the Defense Policy has an intrinsic relationship with the other spheres of state planning:

- General policy, economic policy, industrial and agricultural policy, the communications system, international politics, all branches of activity, production and collective existence, including instruction and education of the people, the political-social regime - everything, finally, affects the military policy of a country (Monteiro 1932).

In the strategic plan, Góes realized the need to modernize and expand productive capacities at the levels of the 2nd Industrial Revolution, based on steel and oil. This is because “the era of universal peace is still a myth for humanity and nations continue to prepare feverishly for the next war” (Monteiro 1932). The increase of military capabilities would demand of the Brazilian state a greater readiness for military mobilization. Hence the importance of the defense industry and its synergy with society and the development strategy: “in the event of a war, we will have to have the national mobilization feasible under the best conditions, including the economic aspect” (Monteiro
Here we can identify a foundation of the current Brazilian National Mobilization System (SINAMOB), established by Law 11,631/2007 and regularized by Decree 6,592/2008. Góes Monteiro strongly emphasized the preparation and formation of a broad reserve and a Defense Industrial Base:

> It should not be ignored the question of preparation, training and employment of reserves and supplementary frameworks, by the education and systematic instruction of the population, and by the eventual use of industries applied to war (Monteiro 1932).

Thus, the Getulio Vargas government from 1930 on would have as one of the axis the search for military modernization and the constitution of a defense industrial base allied to the development strategy. Simultaneously with the Pan American Conferences, in the late 1930s, the Brazilian Foreign Policy began to seek economic and military advantages through bilateral negotiations with the United States. The inauguration of Oswaldo Aranha as Foreign Minister in March 1938 was one of the milestones of this approach, as was his visit to the United States in the following year, known as the “Aranha Mission”. The agenda of the meeting between the ministers revealed the US intention to establish partnerships with Brazil including the military issue (Carvalho 2014).

In relation to military cooperation, meetings were held between the Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces (George C. Marshall) and Brazil (Góes Monteiro) in May 1939. The “Mission Góes”, in this sense, was essential for the advancement of negotiations that would lead to the construction of US bases in northeastern Brazil in exchange for US assistance in retrofitting the Brazilian Armed Forces, hitherto largely supplied by Germany. The demands for military equipment included “156 pieces of heavy artillery, 196 anti-aircraft guns, 41 combat vehicles, 252 armored vehicles and 722 automatic weapons” (Mccann 1995 apud Carvalho 2014).

In September 1939, simultaneously with the declaration of Brazilian neutrality before the World War II, the US Congress passed the law sent by President Franklin D. Roosevelt that allowed the country to sell arms to allies (Carvalho 2014). In the midst of the German advance on French territory, Vargas gave speeches indicating a possible maintenance of Brazilian neutrality and trade relations with Germany (Cervo and Bueno 2010). Brazil had a strategic position in the Atlantic defense system: the United States wanted to operate in North Africa from bases in northeastern Brazil, which was seen by

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12 Germany surpassed the US in exports to Brazil in 1936, 1937 and 1938, accounting for up to 25% of Brazilian imports, while US participation fell from 30% to 24% in this period (Cervo and Bueno 2010).
Vargas as an opportunity to bargain the financing of the steel industry and the equipping of the armed forces (Cervo and Bueno 2010).

After the declarations of the Brazilian president, the United States was prepared to finance the Volta Redonda Power Plant and the National Steel Company (NSC) projects, the first steps of the 2nd Industrial Revolution in Brazil, the reequipment of its Armed Forces and the origin of the Defense Industrial Base (Cervo and Bueno 2010). The agreement was signed on September 26, 1940 and involved a $20 million loan from the US Export-Import Bank (Carvalho 2014).

After World War II, the US took the lead in the international economy, consolidating the Bretton Woods system, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and being responsible for rebuilding Western Europe (to contain the Soviet Union) and Japan (in front of the Chinese Revolution of 1949). Due to the abundance of foreign capital in the context of the Cold War, several regions became centers of national development based on monopoly enterprises with the contribution of the state and the mediation of the working classes (Costa 2008). The Third World sought to carry out its 2nd Industrial Revolution, based on steel metallurgy, petroleum and electricity (Visentini 2003) Brazil became the preferred US ally in South America, which would lead to Brazilian adhesion to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the Organization of American States (OAS), created in 1947 and 1948 respectively. Strategic alignment would be translated into the 1952 US-Brazil Military Agreement, signed in the context of the Korean War (1950-1953).

However, in the 1950s the South Atlantic gradually lost strategic value compared to the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, which directly affected Brazil’s bargaining capacity compared to that of the 1930s. According to Penha (2011) and Luis (2013), the danger of a confrontation between the superpowers in the South Atlantic became unlikely, and the main points of passage and bottleneck were already controlled by the Western powers, resulting in a worsening of the situation of marginalization of the South American region in relation to politics world.

In this sense, the Developmental State13 begin to demand a foreign policy favorable to the protectionism of the national industry in negotiating

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13 In the context of foreign policy, Cervo (2003) defines the following objectives of the developmental state: “a) to introduce economic diplomacy in foreign negotiations; b) to promote industry in order to meet the demands of society; c) to move from subservience to decision-making autonomy in order to achieve reciprocal gains in international relations; d) to implement a national assertive development project to overcome inequalities between nations; e) to cement the whole by economic nationalism, imitating the conduct of the great powers “.
forums such as the GATT and UNCTAD and the defense of a differential treatment to developing countries (Third World) regarding trade rules (Oliveira M. F. 2005). At the regional level, it was sought to open markets for the promotion of exports of goods and services in Latin America, as well as the opening of new lines of credit for the purchase of Brazilian products and technical and economic cooperation with Third World countries, especially in Africa (Soares de Lima and Santos 2001 apud Oliveira M.F. 2005).

In this context, the second Vargas government (1951-1954) reaffirmed the national developmentalist project. Thus, it became necessary to expand the industrial and defense infrastructure capacities: the National Bank of Economic Development (BNDE, future BNDES) was created in 1952 and the Brazilian Oil Company (Petrobras) in 1953. This project would be continued by the Plan of Goals (Planos de Metas, in portuguese) of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) and subsequent development plans in the military regime. Brazil, in this context, could not only think of a process of import substitution, initiated in Getulio Vargas’ first government (1930-1945), but also of expanding markets and partnerships. Also, since then, the Brazilian state had realized that its alliance with the US was not yielding the previously expected benefits, and transfers of military equipment to Brazil no longer met its real needs (Amaral 2013).

In the military scene, it is possible to emphasize the acquisition in 1957 of the Aerodrome Ship (NAe) Minas Gerais (A-11), of British origin. The naval acquisitions during this period demonstrate an important step in the diversification of international partnerships14 to be carried out by Brazil in the following decades. In addition, the purchase of NAE Minas Gerais constituted a major innovation in the strength profile of the Brazilian Navy, since it aimed to enable the country to carry out air support missions15 (Amaral 2013).

From the government of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) onwards and with continuity in the 1960s and 1970s, Brazil recognized the need to expand the foreign market to increase exports, attract foreign capital, and increase dollar reserves for the importation of machinery and equipment. In

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14 According to Vidigal (1985), “the enormous difficulties created by the Americans to supply upgraded ships and sophisticated equipment were the main cause of this change of orientation.”

15 Here, it is worth mentioning the differences between the Navy and the Air Force over responsibilities for naval aviation, which was intensified with the acquisition of A-11 Minas Gerais. Such an impasse would be solved only in January 1965, when it was established that the FAB (Brazilian Air Force) would be responsible for the anti-submarine war, while the Navy could have helicopters for any purpose “(Vidigal 1985). The solution adopted did not entirely please both parties, but allowed that “the aerodrome ship could operate normally since then, with FAB planes and Brazilian Navy helicopters” (Vidigal 1985).
terms of foreign policy, there was a need for agreements to support national companies, such as the Pan-American Operation in 1958 and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960 (Cervo and Bueno 2010). Companies previously focused on the domestic market started to export goods and services and even carry out external investments: Petrobras, Vale do Rio Doce, WEG, Embraer and Sadia are some examples. In relation to shipbuilding, for example, with the 1st and 2nd National Development Plan (NDP), Brazil came to occupy the second position in the world scene, and employed in this sector about 39,000 workers (Moura 2008).

The defense industry was an essential sector for the Developmental State and its Foreign Policy guidelines. Examples include the creation of Engesa Specialized Engineers SA (1958) for the production of tanks and fighting vehicle, AVIBRAS Aerospace SA (1961) for the production of rockets and missiles, and EMBRAER (1969) in the segment of aviation. In 1970 the Rio de Janeiro Navy Arsenal (AMRJ) was granted a license from Great Britain (Vosper Thornycroft shipyard) for the production of the Niterói class frigates (project Vosper Mk10). In addition, the country acquired Mirage III supersonic fighters from the French company Dassault, and Engesa began production of reconnaissance armored vehicles (EE-9 Cascavel) and transport (EE-11 Urutu). In 1971, under the license of the Italian company Aermacchi, Embraer started production of Xavante jet training aircraft, and in 1972 the first Integrated Center for Air Defense and Air Traffic Control (CINDACTA I) was deployed with technology from the French company Thompson -CSF and participation of the Brazilian company Esca Engineering. In 1973, Brazil acquired F-5 Tiger II supersonic fighters from the Northrop company, and in 1975 the Brazilian War Equipment Industry (IMBEL) was created (Abdi 2011).

Even within the context of the Carter Doctrine (1978), the New Cold War with the Government of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) in the USA, and the Falklands War (1982), Brazil maintained investments in its defense industry until the middle of the 1980s. In 1978, HELIBRAS was created (for making helicopters), and Embraer began production of the Tucano turboprop airplanes basic training. In 1979 the Navy’s Nuclear Program was initiated and, two years later, the development and local production by the AMRJ of the Inhaúma class corvettes, with technical support from the German shipyard Marine Technik. In 1981 Embraer, together with the Italian companies Aeritalia and Aermacchi, began the development of AMX subsonic fighters; a year later was created the Engineering of Naval Projects (ENGEPRON), responsible for naval military orders, and in 1982 CINDACTA II was also implemented. In 1983 Avibras began production of the Astros II saturation rocket artillery system; two years later, the AMRJ began production of the Tupi-class subma-
rines, under license from the German shipyard HDW (Abdi 2011).

According to Sennes (2003), the international partnerships described, particularly in the governments of Geisel (1974-1978) and Figueiredo (1979-1985), are based on the principle of diversification of international partnerships: (1) the approachment with European countries (Germany, France and England) and with Japan, to bargain with the United States of America (USA), but without breaking with the “Western System”, and (2) increasing economic and political relations with Latin American, African and the Middle Eastern countries, mainly from exports of industrialized products (Sennes 2003). However, in the transition from the 1980s to the 1990s, this process would be interrupted with the rise of the Normal/Neoliberal State and the internal and external economic crisis.


The economic crisis of the 1980s - interest rate shock, oil crises, rising inflation and rising external debt - led to the retraction of Brazil’s national developmental model and foreign policy. According to Halliday (1989), there was a sharpening of the Cold War from the beginning of the Reagan administration in the United States. This is demonstrated by several indicators: first, the increase in military expenditures for the modernization of the Armed Forces, mainly directed towards employment in the Third World; in addition, there was a strong concentration on the production of strategic nuclear missiles, which intensified strategic competition with the Soviet Union (Halliday 1989). The second characteristic was the Third World offensive, i.e. the 1982 Lebanon War, the 1983 invasion of Grenada, and support for paramilitary groups in four countries: Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan and Cambodia (Halliday 1989). This political-military offensive was accompanied by an economic offensive: raising interest rates on international loans and intensifying the US subsidy and trade protection policy (Sennes 2003). Emerging countries - especially those with greater external debt - were the most affected in the process, which put them on the diplomatic defensive.

In the case of Brazil, as a reaction to the “New Cold War”, the historic relationship of enmity and competition with Argentina would come to an end in the early 1980s. Visentini (2013) states that the Falklands War and the international interest rate shock impacted directly on the Brazilian perception of the new conjuncture:

the way Argentina’s defeat and implosion of its military regime were artic-
ulated and executed reinforced the perception of the Brazilian government and diplomacy that a strongly negative rearticulation of the international system was being carried out harming the autonomy of the middle-sized countries of the Third World (Visentini 2013).

In 1988, the Federal Constitution consolidated the fundamental objectives of Brazilian Foreign Policy, strictly related to Defense Policy and the Development Model: (1) sovereignty (article 1, subsection I), (2) citizenship (article 1, subsection II), and (3) regional integration (sole paragraph of Article 4). Sovereignty is the guarantee of the security of the country in the International System, and its defense is carried out, ultimately, by the Armed Forces. The second foundation, citizenship, aims to ensure the population’s access to social, political and economic rights. Finally, the sole paragraph of article 4 of the Federal Constitution established regional integration as a permanent objective of the Brazilian Foreign Policy, and whose current base is the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). In 1985, at the same time, that Brazil endured US retaliation due to its National Informatics Policy, a commission was established to study the integration between Brazil and Argentina, which culminated in 1991 in the creation of Mercosur.

However, the integration was shaped by a new matrix of Brazil’s foreign policy, conditioned in a moment of “triumph” of neoliberalism: “the Brasilia-Buenos Aires axis of the 1980s, with a relatively autonomist and developmentalist bias, gained neoliberal colorations” (Visentini 2013). The

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16 Since the beginning of the 20th century, Brazil has sought to secure peace in South America through the means of security cooperation, economic integration and diplomacy. An example was the “Treaty of cordial political intelligence and arbitration between the United States of Brazil, the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic” in 1909, which gave rise to the ABC Pact of 1915 (Heinsfeld 2009). Other initiatives followed: the 1958 Pan American Operation, the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) in 1978, the Latin American Integration in Latin America (ALADI) in 1980, and the negotiations in the 1980s for the signing of Mercosur in 1991. These initiatives institutionalized a type of collective hegemony in South America, which is associated with the concept of hegemony, in which both coercion and the conviction - mediated by the means of payment - play a stabilizing role in the state and therefore also at the continental level (Arrighi 1996).

17 “The Union of South American Nations aims to build, in a participatory and consensual manner, a space of integration and union in the cultural, social, economic and political context among its peoples, prioritizing political dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing and the environment, among others, with a view to eliminating socio-economic inequality, achieving social inclusion and citizen participation, strengthening democracy and reducing asymmetries in the mark of strengthening the sovereignty and independence of states “(Unasur 2008).
new foreign policy\textsuperscript{18} matrix, based on neoliberal economic policy, replaced “autonomy by distance” with “autonomy for integration”. According to this strategy, the country should integrate itself into the global economy, solving its development problems through “active adherence to the development of norms and guidelines for the conduct of world order management” (Oliveira M.F. 2005).

Though, the internal demands for foreign policy varied: the agricultural sector advocated the liberalization of international markets and the opening of new ones; the industrial sector if, on the one hand, demanded support for its insertion in markets such as Mercosur, South America, Africa and Arab countries, on the other hand, wanted to protect itself from the competition from producers such as China, the United States and the European Union, besides being against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The financial sector (banks and rentiers) demanded alignment with the guidelines of the international financial system, strict monetary and fiscal policies regarding the payment of domestic and foreign public debt. According to Oliveira M.F. (2005), it can be affirmed that the Brazilian foreign policy in the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) governments, to a great extent, corresponded to the demands of the financial sector, mainly since the Real Plan.

Nevertheless, at the end of the 1990s, both the international and the Brazilian situation had been modified, and the strategy of autonomy by integration (neoliberal) fragilities have become explicit. In 1999 there was a financial crisis in the country, caused by the abandonment of the exchange rate anchor and consequent devaluation of the Real. This demonstrated the external vulnerability of the Brazilian economy, leading President FHC to adopt a diplomatic stance critical to asymmetric globalization (Silva 2010). Added to this were the failure of the WTO meeting in Seattle, the UN drainage and US unilateralism, the securitization of the international agenda post-11 September 2001 and the successive financial crises and volatility, as well as the economic protectionism (Silva 2010). On the other hand, the devaluation of the real increased the competitiveness of Brazilian products, and there was a productive restructuring in several sectors, which increased the productivity of companies as well as the modernization of the export-oriented agricultural sector (Oliveira M. F. 2005).

\textsuperscript{18} The main guidelines of this agenda were the liberalization of imports, the deregulation of capital markets, and privatizations (Oliveira M. F. 2005). This consensus was consolidated following the election of Collor in the 1989 elections, and also had as instruments the attraction of foreign capital, external financing, the end of subsidies, adoption of new legislation on intellectual property and the renegotiation of external debt (Oliveira MF 2005).
State Reform, Logistical Paradigm and the construction of the National Defense Policy (1996-2013)

The 1990s corresponded to the crisis of the paradigm of the normal state\(^\text{19}\) and to the test of the logistic state in Brazilian Foreign Policy (Cervo 2003). While the normal state refers to the strategy previously designated as a quest for autonomy through integration into the rules of the international system, the logistic state paradigm may be related to the quest for autonomy through assertiveness:

> the reinforcement of the national hard core presupposes, in the logistic pattern, the transfer of responsibilities from the business state to society. However, it does not dislike the state enterprise, although it elevates its performance to the level of global systemic competitiveness. But its focus is precisely on providing logistical support to enterprises, public or private, preferably private, in order to strengthen it in international comparative terms (...) protecting companies, technology and national capital, stimulating their internal strengthening and its global expansion, taking care of the work and the good salary of the workers, increasing the well-being of the consumer (Cervo 2003, emphasis added).

The origin of the logistic paradigm is related to the Management Reform of the Brazilian Public Administration, which began in the mid-1990s. Under the leadership of Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, the guideline for this document was the Master Plan for the Reform of the State Apparatus (PDRAE), formulated in 1995 within the Ministry of Administration and State Reform (MARE). The PDRAE’s main objective was to modernize the Brazilian bureaucratic apparatus based on the principles of managerialism based on efficiency, effectiveness and the quality of public services (Bresser-Pereira 1995). As a result, the Constitutional Amendment No. 19 (1998) was enacted, which established the associated management of public services through public consortia\(^\text{20}\) and cooperation agreements between federated entities (article 241 of the Federal Constitution).

On the economic front, the State Reform would be accompanied by the

\(^{19}\) According to Cervo (2003), the paradigm of the normal state is characterized by: submission to the hegemonic center of capitalism, dissolution and alienation of the central core of the national economy, as well as transferring income abroad.

\(^{20}\) To date, consortia are mostly used by municipalities (in the area of healthcare) and by the Federal Government (for security at large events), but can also serve as instruments for the country to optimize resources, infrastructure and personnel of the states and municipalities with a view to leveraging productive investments and generating employment and income (infrastructure and defense industry).
adoption of the New Macroeconomic Consensus, characterized by inflation targets, floating exchange rates and public fiscal surpluses (Resende 2010). The reason for this lies in the fact that the implementation of the PDRAE occurred in a context of reaction of the Brazilian State to the internal and external economic crisis that began in the 1980s: oil crises, high inflation and unemployment, low economic growth, significant external debt growth, and the intensification of protectionism in developed countries (Sennes 2003). According to the preamble itself, “state reform has become an indispensable instrument to consolidate stabilization and ensure sustained economic growth” (Brazil 1995).

In this sense, in order to reduce costs and increase its capacity to carry out public policies aimed at serving the citizen, the document proposed a new vision about the structure and functions of the state, based on four levels: (1) the Strategic Nucleus, (2) the Exclusive Activities, (3) the Non-Exclusive Services, and (4) the production for the market (Brazil 1995). The Strategic Nucleus and the Exclusive Activities would remain under state control; production for the market would be left to the private sector, and Non-Exclusive Services, such as universities, hospitals, research centers, museums, among others, would be part of a third type of public property: the Non-State Public Sphere.

Thus, from the principles of efficiency, professionalization of public management and competitiveness, the State Reform sought to “transform social and scientific services provided by the state into social organizations, that is, non-state public organizations financed and supervised by management contracts” (Bresser-Pereira 2001). In addition to Law No. 8.666/1993, which is responsible for bidding, the main instruments for conducting, implementing and supervising these contracts would be the Regulatory Agencies, Executive Agencies (public autarchies and foundations), public companies and Social Organizations. In addition, priority would be given to the strategic careers of the state, which comprised the Strategic Nucleus (Bresser-Pereira 1998).

In the context of foreign policy, in the late 1990s and early 2000s a new international insertion matrix was implemented, (1) deepening regional integration (with a change of focus), (2) resumption of the multilateral tradition, (3) a new critical profile of asymmetric relations between states, (4) the pursuit of strategic partnerships with similar countries on all continents, and (5) a rapprochement with underdeveloped countries, and (6) maintaining relationships with developed countries (Silva 2010). The Brazilian government opted for the creation of diversified political and economic partnerships, such

21 Examples: National Petroleum Agency (ANP) and National Telecommunications Agency (ANATEL).
as the one with China, which in 2002 already ranked second as Brazil’s trading partner, as well as India, Russia and South Africa (Oliveira M. F. 2005). The transition from the strategy of autonomy through integration to “autonomy through assertiveness” had already begun in the 2nd FHC government, but will be consolidated in the Lula Government, starting in 2002.

It is in this context of reorganization in the International System - with the end of the Cold War - and in the Brazil’s foreign policy - the advent of the Logistics State - that there was a progressive resumption of defense and security affairs in Brazil, a process that was reflected in the creation of the Ministry of Defense in 1999 and the promulgation of the National Defense Strategy in 2008. As will be seen below, this is not only a momentary impulse, but the recognition that military capabilities are a prerequisite for the country’s strategic autonomy in the International System and for the consolidation of its development model. In this way, Brazil seeks to combine its security training with the formation of a robust national economy capable of dealing with possible external instabilities, as foreseen in the National Defense Strategy (Brazil 2008b).


During the 1990s, there was a relative dismantling of the operational capabilities of the Brazilian Armed Forces, resulting from the sharp decline in the defense budget (Abdi 2013). However, in 1996, with the publication of the National Defense Policy (NDP), the Brazilian state recognized the need to “set the objectives for the defense of the nation, as well as a guide for the preparation and use of national training in all levels and spheres of power, and with the involvement of the civil and military sectors “(Brazil 1996). Despite the recent end of the Cold War, an “indefinite and unstable multipolar international environment” was identified because of the “lack of correspondence between strategic-military, political and economic power centers” (Brazil 1996).

Thus, in order to deal with the new international situation, Complementary Law 97 was approved, which “provides for the general norms for the organization, preparation and employment of the Armed Forces” (Brazil, 1999). One of the main achievements of CL No. 97 was the creation of the Ministry of Defense, as a result of the perception that civil society must be an active part of the strategy to defend the country’s sovereignty. The authority of the Minister of Defense as part of the Executive Branch was included in the
Federal Constitution by Constitutional Amendment No. 23 of the same year. It was in this context that the purchase of the new Brazilian aircraft carrier, A-12 São Paulo (32,000 tons), belonging to France and incorporated into the Brazilian Navy in 2001, took place.

Considering the Ministry of Defense, the fundamental principles of the Constitution began to gain force of law and institutional structure. Item II of article 14 of CL No. 97 relates the guarantee of state sovereignty to the socio-economic development of the country: “The preparation of the Armed Forces is guided by the following basic parameters: (...) II - search for increasing national autonomy by means of continuous nationalization of its resources, including research and development and the strengthening of the national industry” (Brazil 1999). Likewise, Article 16 states that “it is for the Armed Forces, as a general subsidiary assignment, to cooperate with national development and civil defense” (Brazil 1999).

The use of the Armed Forces to safeguard sovereignty and citizenship is a prerequisite for national logistics. Clausewitz theoretically separates the use of force, on the one hand, from the preconditions to conducting the war itself, that is, logistics. Logistics refers to the creation, movement and maintenance of forces in combat: “all warfare activities that are preconditions for the use of the fighting forces” (Proença Júnior and Duarte 2005). Brazil initiated this formulation in its doctrinal and legislative system with Complementary Law No.117 in 2004, and with the creation of the National Mobilization System (SINAMOB)\(^{22}\) by Law No. 11.631, of December 27, 2007.

The LC No.117 (2004) included in article 13 of LC No. 97 (1999) a specific paragraph that relates the logistics and the national mobilization in Brazil:

> the preparation [of the Armed Forces] includes, among others, the permanent activities of planning, organization and articulation, education and training, development of doctrine and specific research, intelligence and structuring of the Armed Forces, their logistics and mobilization (Brazil 2004).

Likewise, both CL No. 97 (1999) and CL No. 117 (2004) reaffirmed the role of the Armed Forces in the formation of the DIB. In 2007, through Law No. 11.631, the National Mobilization System (SINAMOB) was implemented, which aims to carry out “the set of activities planned, oriented and undertaken by the state, complementing the National Logistics, designed to enable the country to carry out strategic actions, in the field of National Defense, in the face of foreign aggression” (Brazil 2007).

\(^{22}\) SINAMOB was subsequently regulated by Decree No. 6.592, of 2008.
In 2005, the National Defense Policy (NDP, Decree No. 5.484/2005) was approved, with three main points: (1) the need for restructuring and reorganization of the Armed Forces; (2) the search for synergy between defense policy and Brazil's socioeconomic development project; (3) South America and the South Atlantic as priority regions for the country’s security” (Brazil 2005). The NDP “is based on the foundations, objectives and principles set forth in the Federal Constitution and is in line with the Government’s guidelines and foreign policy” (Brazil 2005).

The vision of the insecurity of the International System was highlighted: “In this century, disputes over maritime areas, the aerospace domain, and increasingly scarce sources of fresh water and energy may intensify. Such issues may lead to interferences in internal affairs, configuring conflict frameworks” (Brazil 2005). In this way, the document recognizes the importance of South America and the South Atlantic as strategic priorities of Brazil's Foreign and Security Policy:

Among the processes that contribute to reduce the possibility of conflicts in the strategic environment, we highlight the strengthening of the integration process, based on Mercosur, the Andean Community of Nations and the South American Community of Nations; the close relationship between the Amazonian countries, within the framework of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization; intensified cooperation and trade with African countries facilitated by ethnic and cultural ties; and the consolidation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone. The expansion and modernization of South America’s infrastructure can make the connection between its productive centers and the two oceans easier, facilitating development and integration. (...) prioritizes the Amazon and the South Atlantic for the wealth of resources and vulnerability of access by land and sea borders (Brazil 2005).

On the other hand, since the 1990s, Brazil has realized the need for advanced defense from South America and the South Atlantic, which may influence events in other regions. In the 1996 NDP, the objective of national defense is described as “the attainment and maintenance of Brazilian interests abroad,” safeguarding of Brazilian persons, goods and resources or under Brazilian jurisdiction,” and “Brazil’s projection in the concert of nations” (Brazil 1996). More directly, the 2005 NDP aims to “defend national interests and people, Brazilian assets and resources abroad” (Brazil 2005). Such a strategy would be regulated by Decree No. 6.592/2008, which regulated the National Mobilization System (SINAMOB), to be used in cases of foreign aggression. In this decree, “foreign aggression” was defined as “threats or acts prejudicial to national sovereignty, territorial integrity, the Brazilian people or national institutions, even though they do not mean an invasion of the national territory”
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Similarly, NDS is based on “the foundations, objectives and principles set forth in the Federal Constitution” and seeks to fulfill the constitutional objectives of guaranteeing national development, as well as democratizing the market economy and deepening democracy, by organizing economic growth socially inclusive (Brazil 2008b). This is also demonstrated by the restructuring of the Brazilian defense materials industry, the integration of the industrial defense bases of UNASUR countries, and the search for dual civilian and military technologies (BRASIL, 2008b). The 18th guideline of the NDS specifies the integration of South America, under the auspices of UNASUR, as one of its objectives:

The South American Defense Council, under discussion within the region, will create a consultative mechanism that will prevent conflicts and promote regional military cooperation and the integration of industrial defense bases, without being involved in a country outside the region (Brasil 2008b).

In this sense, Constitutional Amendment (CA) No. 45 of December 31, 2004 presented a doctrinal innovation by elevating the treaties and conventions on human rights approved by the National Congress to the character of Constitutional Amendments, in addition to submitting Brazil “to International Criminal Court jurisdiction, whose creation has expressed its support” (Brazil 2004). In this way, the country prepares its internal juridical framework for regional integration, seeking to comply with the sole paragraph of Article 4 of the Constitution, which deals with the integration of South America, one of the priorities pointed out by the NDS.

Whereas considering the problem of regional inequalities of defense and development, the NDS seeks to emphasize the presence of the state in the large river basins of the Amazon and Paraguay-Paraná. With this purpose, the NDS had foreseen the elaboration of the Articulation and Equipment Plans, in which each Force would present its priority investment demands. The Plans aims to “contemplate a proposal for the spatial distribution of military installations and the quantification of the means necessary to effectively meet the Employment Hypotheses” (Brazil 2008b). The National Defense White Paper (NDWP), published in 2012, detailed the requirements of the Articulation and Equipment Plans of the three forces (Army, Navy and Air Force), which can be summarized in Table 1 below.
Defense Policy: Major projects planned or in progress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Astros 2020</th>
<th>SISFRON</th>
<th>SISDABRA</th>
<th>Armored vehicles</th>
<th>IA2 rifles</th>
<th>Cyber Defense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Duplication of the Fleet</td>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>Surface Vessels (500, 1,800 e 6,500 ton)</td>
<td>Aerial, logistical and amphibious vessels</td>
<td>Anti-ship missiles</td>
<td>SisGAAz – Surveillance of the Blue Amazon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeronautics</td>
<td>FX-2 -Gripen NG fighters</td>
<td>HX-BR Helicopters</td>
<td>VANTs – Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</td>
<td>KC-390 – Transportation Aircraft</td>
<td>Air-to-air, air-to-ground and anti-ship missiles</td>
<td>Geostationary Satellite</td>
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</tbody>
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In this sense, in March 2013, the Federal Government issued Decree No. 7970, which regulated Law 12.598 (2012), establishing “special rules for procurement, contracting and development of defense products and systems” to “increase the technological and productive capacity of the industrial defense base” (Brazil 2013). This law consolidated the search model of partnerships between national and foreign companies for the development of so-called Defense Products (PRODE)\(^\text{23}\) and Strategic Defense Products (PED), identified as “all Prode that, due to the technological content, the difficulty of obtaining or for its indispensability, is of strategic interest for national defense” (Brazil 2012a). For example, the use of naval missiles by the Army, Navy and Air Force is a viable alternative in the short term, with less significant financial costs and capable of generating a technological spillover in the country’s economy (Brites, Martins and Silva 2013).

To sum up, the National Defense Policy (1996, 2005 and 2012), the NDS (2008) and the White Paper on National Defense (2012) cover the three spheres of war: Strategy (political objectives of military preparation), Operations (hypothesis of advanced defense employment) and tactics (weapons systems). In this sense, it had defined that the Executive Branch will forward to the National Congress every four years these three documents with their updates. In 2013, the three were approved in the National Congress by Legislative Decree No. 373. In 2017, the Presidency forwarded to the Legislature the updating of the NDP, the NDS and the NDWP, whose changes are related

\(^{23}\) Defense Product (PRODE) is “any good, service, work or information, including armaments, ammunition, means of transportation and communications, uniforms and materials for individual and collective use used in defense finalist activities, with the exception of those for administrative use “.
to the changes in the External Policy and in the model of development post-2012.


Since the international financial crisis of 2007/2008, the internal and external political and economic situation has deteriorated. In Brazil, the beginning of oil exploration in the pre-salt layer (2010) followed the upsurge in the economic and military competition of the great powers, and the development model hitherto adopted began to show limits, reflected in the fall in GDP growth in the Brazil from 2.7% in 2011 to 0.9% in 2012. The internal political crisis from 2013 onwards, with the start of protests against corruption and the launching of Operation “Car-Wash” (Lava-Jato in Portuguese) in 2014, which would disorganize the bases of the Dilma Rousseff’s government, led to the impeachment in 2016.

Simultaneously, as of 2011, the Strategic Defense Planning System (SISPED) was structured to systematize the updating of Brazil’s defense documents (Brazil 2012). This procedure for reviewing the documents is provided for in the Supplementary Law 97/1999 (article 9, paragraph 3) within a four-year interval, when the Executive Branch (Presidency of the Republic and Ministries) forward the new version for consideration of the National Congress. However, even with SISPED is in its initial phase, the updating of the documents in 2016 showed a relative lack of commonality in some areas, such as the diagnosis of the current economic situation of the country, which is presented as stable, and the contradiction between the belief in internal investments (without budget basis) and international technical cooperation as solutions to the DIB’s stagnation.

The preliminary version of the 2016/2017 documents provided clear elements of the continuity of the Brazilian Defense Policy, such as the prioritization of the strategic environment (South America, South Atlantic, West African coast and Antarctica), the importance of the relationship between defense and economic development, particularly through dual-use technologies, the pursuit of the aerospace and cyber environment, the expansion of the energy matrix and participation in UN peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, there are some changes and absences in the documents that draw attention, especially in relation to the diagnosis of the current international situation (multipolarity), the view on the characteristics of war in the 21st century (the concept of Hybrid Warfare), and the budget forecast for the major
strategic projects of the National Defense Strategy, which is related to both the internal economic recession and the lack of stability of defense investments by the Executive Branch.

In the military sphere, it can be observed that, despite the legislative and investment advances to boost the DIB, there is still a great distance between Brazilian military capabilities and that of the great powers of the International System, as shown in Table 2 below, which compares the naval power of ten countries. Naval military capabilities are an important indicator of the polarity of an International System, especially if we assume that a great power must be able to influence events beyond its own region (Buzan and Waever 2003).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2 -Submarines, Surface Media and Amphibious Ships (2016)</th>
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<tr>
<td>ENG</td>
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<td>SUB</td>
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<td>SUP</td>
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<td>ANF</td>
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Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS 2016).

* + 46 corvettes capable of launching anti-ship and / or anti-aircraft missiles.

** + 115 corvettes and patrol vessels capable of launching anti-ship and / or anti-aircraft missiles.

*** + 24 corvettes and patrol vessels capable of launching anti-ship and / or anti-aircraft missiles.

In this way, both the NDP and the NDS and the White Paper of 2016/2017 maintained the Brazilian military preparation based on capabilities and not on specific employment scenarios, in order to overcome the existing asymmetries. This is the reason why the strategic projects of the three Forces (PAEDs), which have not undergone significant changes, are important. One difference is that the outline of the new NDWP does not indicate a long-term budgetary forecast for its implementation (which occurred in the 2012 document). Nevertheless, one can observe the maintenance of the strategic projects, such as the beginning of the process of conclusion of the conventional submarines of the Riachuelo Class (Ports and Ships 2018).

In addition to the conceptual changes, another major inflection in Brazil’s Defense Policy seems to be related to the Foreign Policy. After reaffirming the prioritization of South American integration and the strategic environment, the NDP refers to North America and Europe as traditional relations...
that constitute areas of interest to the country. At the same time, no document mentions the BRICS, which was part of the 2012 NDS. However, the question remains: the relative downgrading of the BRICS and South-South relations - which is contradictory in itself, since the country depends economically on these regions - will necessarily allow Brazil to achieve a higher relevance in relations with the US and European countries? Twentieth-century experience indicates that this never occurred unless Brazil became strategically important to the United States in World War II, and Getúlio Vargas knew how to seize the opportunity to bargain for the financing of industrialization in the 1930s and 1940s.

In fact, the adoption of a supporting role in the major world decisions derives from the absence of an external policy strategy that makes the country important for other major powers. The recent attempt by the Michel Temer-José Serra alliance to build a “New Foreign Policy” meant only a political change at the regional level to isolate Venezuela, the abandonment of multilateralism (apparently rescued by the current management of Aloysio Nunes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and frustrated attempt to boost the Mercosur-European Free Trade Union Agreement.

Finally, we can highlight the sustainability of the DIB, a challenge that is already present in the current Brazilian defense documents, but which response was adjusted in synergy with changes in foreign policy. The new NDP seeks cooperation with the most technologically advanced nations in synergy with national projects but aims for a low budgetary impact and positive developments for the national economy, such as through exports. On the other hand, in a contradictory manner, the new NDS affirms that “the state must use its purchasing power to ensure minimum conditions for sustainability and to improve the DIB’s capacities, so that the production chain is relatively independent of the policy of export and marketing of dual products” (Brazil 2016).

Despite this particular contradiction, a positive aspect is the Armed Forces’ quest to boost joint research and development (R&D) in areas of common interest. There is at this point an opening for new legal forms for the management of these projects, which opens space for the interaction between the civil and military sector, involving state enterprises, non-state public organizations and private institutions. Joint research between Army, Navy and Aeronautics can yield good results, such as those obtained, for example, in the development of Tomahawk and Harpoon missile cruisers in the US (Werrell 1985).
Conclusion

The Brazilian state reacted systematically to changes in the international context, seeking new ways to consolidate the principles of its Grand Strategy: sovereignty (security), citizenship (development) and regional integration. It is important to note that regional integration did not mean the abandonment of extra-regional partnerships, but rather strengthened Brazilian bargaining power within the South-North (United States and Europe), South-East (Northeast and East Asian), and South-South (Africa, Middle East and Southeast Asia) alliances (Visentini 1995). These become essential, especially at a time of uncertainty and political, economic and military crisis in the International System, where tensions are increasing in various parts of the world, such as in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia, where involved strategic partners from Brazil such as the United States, China, among others.

The National Defense Policy, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Defense White Paper were responses by the Brazilian state to the political and economic restructuring of the post-Cold War International System in a context of uncertainty as to its polarity, and polarization (alliances). NDS synthesized the demands of Brazilian society for the deepening of its industrial capacity, technological level, employment and income generation, and regional disparities (for example, in the duplication of the navy squadron towards the north-northeast region of the country). Thus, it is the assumption of NDS that the guarantee of citizenship is related to the capacity to maintain the sovereignty of the Brazilian state, and that the academic, industrial, military and governmental sector are indispensable for the continuity of these investments.

In this sense, it is interesting to note that at the same time as the structure of the Ministry of Defense (1999) and later the National Defense Policy (2005) and the National Defense Strategy (2008), there was also a great democratic consensus backed by a development model based on the increase in consumption, the expansion of the state as a service provider and the search for an increase in citizenship (Abrucio, Loureiro and Pacheco 2010). Since the Lula administration, this model gained a developmentalist framework, mainly in relation to the investments in infrastructure and in the naval industry around the exploration of the Pre-Salt.

This consensus persisted while external conditions - economic globalization, high commodity prices and high growth in China - were favorable, but from 2013 onwards this picture has changed dramatically. The resurgence of international economic, political and military disputes revealed the shortcomings of the Brazilian development model adopted (Logistic State),
mainly in relation to the sustainability of investments in the DIB, which were directly curtailed. The current reassessment of Brazil’s defense documents (NDP, NDS and NDWP) occurs at a time of uncertainty regarding the country’s internal and external situation, a challenging scenario for the formulation of the national strategy. Internally, the economic recession and the rise in unemployment, which doubled in the last three years to 13.7%, occurred simultaneously to a political-institutional crisis.

At the international level, Barack Obama’s unwillingness to withdraw the US from the Middle East and the subsequent rise of Donald Trump represented the return of the Monroe Doctrine assumptions to US foreign policy. In February 2018, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson made visits to five Latin American countries and evoked the Monroe Doctrine as one of his references (Gramer and Johnson 2018). This visit to the continent represents a turning point in US foreign policy for the region, which hitherto was guided by a relative “diplomatic drift” from the region24.

In this context, the Brazilian Foreign Policy is similar to the one of the late 1980s and 1990s: a new process of economic openness aimed at compensating for the growing public deficit and the absence of a strategy to deal with an increasingly hostile international environment to the pretensions of the country. There are, therefore, two important shortcomings to be met in the coming years: the lack of definition of foreign policy, which has been ineradicable since Dilma Rousseff’s second government, and the lack of a concrete response to the problem of the sustainability of investments in the DIB.

Enabling strategic mobility capabilities - especially in extra-regional operations - is incompatible with a development model that wants to cut government spending and rely on the domestic market to buy DIB products. Brazil does not only need an effective Defense Policy, but one that it is in synergy with the Foreign Policy and a development model that seeks technological modernization and productive scale with international competitiveness. Institutional creativity to boost military investments, the generation of spin-offs and dual-use products is foreseen in the new strategic documents, and it is incumbent upon policy makers to create synergies between Defense, Diplomacy and Development.

As indicators for future work, it is necessary to study the possible effectiveness and efficiency of the possible instruments of the Logistics State to obtain a synergy between the Foreign Policy, Defense Policy and the Model

24 By 2013, then Secretary of State John Kerry had stated that the hemisphere was no longer US-dominated, accepting the multilateralization of relations in the region, what Khana (2008) had termed the “end of the Monroe Doctrine” (Johnson 2013).
of Development of the country: (1) Hybrid Institutional Arrangements, and 2) Public-public and public-private consortia as a cornerstone of Cooperative Federalism and International Technical Cooperation (ITC). One hypothesis to be developed is that public-private and public-private consortia could be the mainstay of this new model, carrying out Cooperative Federalism and generating an effective association between state, private sector and third sector for development (modernization and scale productive) and jointly with regional and extra-regional partners. For the sustainability of this new model of development, alliances of variable geometry are essential for obtaining (1) modernization through technology transfer and ITC, and (2) the scale of production through the opening of new markets.

Donald Trump’s apparent freezing of major international agreements, Russia’s successes in the Middle East, and the slowing of Chinese growth may give Brazil opportunities to enter into strategic and economic agreements beneficial to its DIB. Technical Cooperation will bear fruit only if Brazil obtains good bargaining conditions and institutions (whether public or private) are able to absorb the knowledge acquired for the local DIB. Finally, it is important to emphasize the need for diplomacy and the proactive Executive Power to open markets to Brazilian defense products, something that can scale to national production (ships, missiles, armored vehicles, aircraft, among other equipment). The attraction of investment also requires state support to win partners, as exemplified in the case of the agreement with the French company DCNS for the construction of submarines, and with Sweden for the acquisition of the Gripen NG fighters.

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25 The hybrid institutional arrangement is a set of rules, mechanisms and processes that define the particular way in which actors and interests are coordinated in the implementation of a specific public policy (Gomide and Pires 2014; Fiani 2014). The term hybrid designates an institutional arrangement formed by state, private and service sector actors articulated by a Strategic Center. Hybrid institutional arrangements can take various forms, such as joint ventures, strategic alliances, supplier chains, franchises, public-private partnerships (PPPs), technology parks, among others.
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ABSTRACT
This article presents an analysis of the relationship between Brazil’s foreign policy, defense policy and development model in a historical perspective. A paradigmatic approach is used, trying to identify the phases of the Brazilian Grand Strategy that cross the limits of the presidential terms, being also linked to international political, economic and military constraints. The period covered begins in the 1930s, with the rise of the Developmental State, addresses the 1980s turning point (Normal/Neoliberal State), and examines the defense investment’s rise and crisis of the 2000s and 2010s (Logistic State).

KEYWORDS
Brazil; Foreign Policy; Defense Policy.

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