


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## About the Journal

*AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations* was the first Brazilian journal in the area of International Relations to be fully published in English (2012). It is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT) and the Doctoral Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI) of the Faculty of Economics (FCE) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing world.

The journal publishes original articles in the area of Strategy and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and South-South Cooperation – its security problems; the political, economic and diplomatic developments of emerging countries; and their relations with the traditional powers. *AUSTRAL* is published semi-annually in English and Portuguese. The journal's target audience consists of researchers, experts, diplomats, military personnel and graduate students of International Relations.

The content of the journal consists of in-depth analytical articles written by experts (Professors and Doctors), focusing on each of the great continents of the South: Asia, Latin America and Africa. Thus, the debate and diffusion of knowledge produced in these regions is stimulated. All contributions submitted to *AUSTRAL* are subject to rigorous scientific evaluation.

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### Contact

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul  
Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas  
Av. João Pessoa, 52, sala 18E - CEP 90040-000 - Centro  
Porto Alegre/RS - Brazil  
Phone: +55 51 3308.3963 | Fax: +55 51 3308.3963  
E-mail: [austral@ufrgs.br](mailto:austral@ufrgs.br)

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## EDITOR'S NOTE

Paulo Visentini<sup>1</sup>

The United States, after labeling many challenging foreign leaders as “populists”, now have their own, Donald Trump, whose erratic actions at the international level cause uncertainty even among some of its supporters. In his last interview, before passing away, Zbigniew Brzezinski lost his usual elegance when addressing President Trump’s foreign policy: “I don’t understand Donald Trump’s foreign policy. I don’t see any sense of direction and a set of goals that need to be achieved, any warnings against some potential dangers that have to be faced [...] his speeches don’t provide any overview. And his subordinates are I think thereby very limited in their ability to exercise constructive influence”.

So when even the United States doesn’t have a defined global strategy, the crisis that has been shaking the world for almost a decade has gained a new, qualitatively more serious dimension. But there’s a logic behind the rise of Donald Trump and what he represents. According to analyst André Araújo, “he has an offbeat and abnormal approach, [...] he is not part of the establishment, [...] he has no experience or political intelligence, and will cause much confusion before being overthrown for affronting the Constitution. However, he exists for a concrete reason. Globalization has brought benefits to one American social layer but great harms to another. Contrary to what the Washington Consensus anticipated, globalization is an unbalanced and inefficient process. Trump is the result of the end of a dream, but not the solution to revive it.”

In short, he is an anti-globalization president ruling the world’s superpower, with all the contradictions that this implies. Curiously, rupture processes usually occur where least expected: an anti-globalist approach coming from the White House, with erratic policies and guidelines.

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<sup>1</sup> Editor, Full Professor of International Relations at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and Coordinator of the Brazilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT). E-mail: paulovi@ufrgs.br

In this context, the 11th edition of AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, focuses on International Security in Oceania, Africa and Brazil, with articles addressing also Theory and History of International Relations. The Brazilian Armed Forces, for instance, has sought an intense dialogue with the academic world and the society in general, which is represented here in a few articles.

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# AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC: REFLECTIONS ON PEACEKEEPING IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA (BOUGAINVILLE)

Isiaka Alani Badmus<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

Armed conflicts pose challenges to national, regional and international peace and security. Conflicts are threats to economic development, especially for countries of the Third World regions as the Asia-Pacific. Evidences from empirical studies established that conflicts can retard and contract economic growth. Often, post-conflict economies suffer from this challenge as the spin-offs of armed conflict continue to retard economic growth and development (Collier 1998). Many of the conflicts in the world today are no longer international. Starting from the end of the Cold War, the majority of conflicts that pose threats to international security are fought within states (Straus 2012). The nature of the post-Cold War conflicts is opposed to that of the Cold War period, whose conflicts were interstate in character. Intrastate conflicts involve non-state armed groups. Such internal conflicts involve resistant groups aim at overthrowing the central government as witnessed in such places as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola and Tajikistan. Also involve in these conflicts are ethno-linguistic movements, especially among minority ethnic groups fighting for total independence or regional autonomy. Most often, such minority ethnic groups as Mohajirs of Pakistan; Ogoni and Ijaws of the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria and Dayaks of Indonesia assert that they are fighting for their rights in a country where they are victims of discrimination by the state (represented by the government) in areas such as employment, land use, property rights or language use. As well, they

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<sup>1</sup> Senior Lecturer at Afe Babalola University, Nigeria.

are fighting against inequity and unequal distributions of national wealth (de Varennes 2003, 153; for the Nigerian case, see Badmus 2010). Thus, in this kind of situations “violence is necessary to secure or maintain a slice of the pie. In this manner, disorder becomes a necessary resource and opportunity for reward while there is little incentive to work for a more institutionalised ordering of society” (Cilliers 2004, 26; see also Chabal and Daloz 1999, 5-6).

The Pacific (and the Asia-Pacific region broadly) is not an exception to the nature and pattern of conflicts explained above. Efforts to resolve some of these conflicts have, on a number of occasions, triggered regional and international peacemaking and peacekeeping interventions, and in most cases these efforts prove daunting. Regional and international conflict resolution interventions/efforts have resulted to solution or de-escalation of some conflicts, thanks to the implementation of power-sharing arrangements or regional autonomy that are embedded in peace accords. These are the cases of Bangladesh (Chittagong hill tribes), Papua New Guinea PNG (Bougainville) and the Solomon Islands (Guadanalcanese). In some cases, protracted conflicts have led to complete independence as the cases of Eritrea in 1993, Bangladesh in 1971, and East Timor in 2002 (de Varennes 2003, 156; Turton, 1997). In the Pacific, regional powers, Australia and New Zealand, in partnership with regional arrangement, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), other international actors such as the Commonwealth and the United Nations (UN) and a ‘coalition of the willing states’ have proved relevant to the world that they are forces to be reckon with on how regional organisations, driven by regional powerful states might contribute to and maintain regional security by preventing mass atrocities; thereby implementing pillar two of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (Bellamy and Davies 2011, 156).

In light of the above discussions, this paper examines security management in the Pacific. Specifically, it examines conflicts in the region, their causes and narrows its investigation to two countries in the region, PNG (Bougainville), and the Solomon Islands. The purpose is to document their peacekeeping experiences. My main objective is to interrogate whether peacekeeping missions in the region (either under the auspices of the UN or regional actors, such as the PIF, pivotal states, or a coalition of the willing states), especially in the two countries under focus, were successful or otherwise. And, if successful, then key questions are posed: (1) What factors/conditions were responsible for their achievements and also, whether their experiences and lessons learnt can be factored into and/or offered as possible lessons that could be useful in developing a useful peacekeeping model for other regions of the world, especially in Africa where the continent’s foremost organisation, the African Union (AU), is developing a comprehensive security mechanism

(the African Peace and Security Architecture or APSA) to address African conflicts and the challenges to human security of the African people. I specifically explore Australia and New Zealand's peacemaking and peacekeeping roles in these conflicts and uncover the motives of these states, either benign or benevolent. Since it is impossible in this brief paper to examine case by case basis the triggers of conflict, I adopt a regional analysis approach to explaining the etiologies of conflicts in the region.

## Explaining the Triggers of Armed Conflicts in the Pacific

The roots of conflicts in the Pacific are multidimensional ranging from ethnicity, underdevelopment and poverty, weak state structures, effects of a long period of colonialism and, by extension, neo-colonialism, international power politics, environmental problems, effects of modernisation and globalisation, inequity and injustices, among others (Edstrom 2001; Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004; Henderson 2005; Henderson and Watson 2005; Jenkins 2005). In the Asia-Pacific countries more broadly, interstate wars have given way to predominantly intrastate conflicts and as such, many studies have established that, between the late 1980s and late 1990s, the region is home to higher incidences of ethnic conflicts and have witnessed the emergence of more ethnic motivated political groups challenging the authority of the states in the region than anywhere else on the globe (Gurr 1994). The Asia-Pacific region had the largest number of major armed conflicts of any region in every year between 1989 and 1997, and virtually all of these conflicts were intrastate conflicts (Reilly and Graham 2004, 10). The roots of many of these conflicts are interrelated as there is no meta-theory or a mono-causal explanation to the eruption of any civil war. This implies that they are always intertwined with diverse political, socio-cultural and economic factors.

Ethnicity and other kinds of identity issues have been defining factors in the Pacific conflicts. This is going by the highly intermixed and fragmented sociological configurations and ethnic demography of the region. Ethnicity has been cited as one of the principal causes of conflicts in such places as PNG, Fiji and the Solomon Islands, as well as in Indonesia and Burma in the wider context of the Asia-Pacific (Bennet 2002; May 2005; Pollard and Wale 2004). In fact, PNG is regarded as the most ethnically diverse country in the whole of Asia-Pacific with over 800 ethno-linguistic groups within its borders. Doubtless, the manipulation of ethnicity by the political elites is central in explaining the causes of most conflicts in divided societies (Ellingsen 2000), but we must understand that ethnicity or ethnic animosities have to

be linked with other issues before they can become manifest. It has been established by many studies that ethnicity or ethnic pluralism do not always lead to conflict except it combines with other elements (Turton 1997). This is probably why Teaiwa (2005, 271) argues that ethnic conflicts are only manifesting themselves where socioeconomic gaps and inequalities already exist. In relations to the Pacific, Teaiwa (2005, 271) contends further that:

[E]thnic diversity alone does not cause bloodshed or bitterness. Every major conflict in the Pacific over the past 30 years has had at its heart inequitable access to resources. The resulting competition for limited resources has often been converted into antagonism played out along the latent social fracture lines etched by ethnic, class, gender, and religious identities. In turn, these have provided the basis of many of the conflicts in the Pacific Island region.

Ethnic divisions are likely to lead to ethnic interest conflicts in all societies. Moreover, the greater the degree a society is ethnically divided, the more political and other interest conflict tends to become channelled into ethnic lines. Therefore, in the Pacific, ethnicity is important but conflicts based on ethnicity are a subset of a larger whole of the instabilities that the region faces. This is because “ethnic animosities are also convenient cloaks for mobilising support around political and economic issues, such as control over resources, changing social relations, increasing group inequalities and the tensions created when traditional lifestyles and power bases are confronted by the inexorable forces of modernisation” (Reilly and Graham 2004, 10). This assertion explains the conflict in the Solomon Islands between the Guadalcanal people (Guali) and Malaita ethnic group where economic factor (underdevelopment and absolute poverty) ignited tensions between the two ethnic groups.

Also, economic factor cannot be explained in isolation of land and natural resources in the Pacific Islands since the three factors provide the push for conflicts. The existence of conflict is a function of the level of socio-economic development in a particular state. This means that the more economically developed a state is, the less such a state is prone to conflict. This supposition seems correct in explaining the conflict in the Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands is a very poor country, nearly bankrupt but kept solvent with Australian aid and budget subsidies. In recent times, political conflicts and ethnic violence have been part and parcel of the island’s features. However, the same supposition fails to give nuanced and convincing explanations as to why an economically underdeveloped and impoverish state like Kiribati has been able to avoid political conflicts. Paradoxically, however, in Melanesia, Fiji, in relative term, has one of the most developed economies in the region,

but the country is prone to ethnic conflicts between the indigenous Fijian and Indian immigrant population, intra-tribal conflicts among indigenous Fijians as well as frequent military coups. The political instability in Fiji supports the assertion that relative affluence is not sufficient to surmount the roots of political cataclysm, including ethnicity, tribal and regional differences (Scarr 1988).

As I stated earlier, in the Asia-Pacific, land and, by extension, natural resource endowments play key roles in fathoming the roots of the region's armed conflicts. In the Pacific for example, land is mostly owned by communities and retains deep spiritual values. This is why most countries in the Pacific prohibit the further sales or alienation of land. It also explains why land is pivotal in understanding much that takes place in Pacific politics (Henderson 2005, 11). The adoption of free market policies by most post colonial Island's governments attracted foreign direct investments (FDI) into their economies. Consequently, plantations and foreign entrepreneurs, especially the Multinational Companies (MNCs) and local compradors dislodged small land holders and peasants, thereby aggravating the problem of unemployment. Local lands were used to develop industries (especially, tourism). This apparently favoured foreign entrepreneurs to the disadvantage of the local populations and in most cases alienated indigenous people from their lands and water because it played down their culture. This scenario explains the reason for the 2000 coup d'état in Fiji. In the Solomon Islands, the people of Guadalcanal resented the influx of immigrant Malaitan people, while in PNG, the Nasioi people of Bougainville that own the land on which the Panguna Copper and Gold Mine was developed resented the influx of immigrant workers brought in to work in the mine (Bellamy and Davies 2011; Rolfe 2001). In the same vein, there is a correlation between internal conflicts in the region and mineral resources as most of the lands that were forcibly taken away from the local people are endowed with mineral resources. Examples of these include Bougainville (Panguna Mine), West Papua (Freeport Mine), New Caledonia (Nickel Mine), the Solomon Islands (Gold Ridge Mine), and Gold mining in Fiji. Issues such as inequity and injustices and lack of adequate compensation to local landlords and more importantly environmental despoliation resulting from mining activities, have all accounted for conflicts in the region.

While underdevelopment and absolute poverty, rampant and endemic corruption, and marginalisation are contributing factors to the ignition of conflicts in the Pacific, the nature of the state and its structure also serve as variables and add to the complexities of the region's problems. Like other regions of the world that had experienced colonialism, most Pacific states are artificial creations of European colonialism characterized by frequent

frictions between the dominant cultures and that of ethnic minorities. The Pacific Islands, in particular, were home to strong traditional societies prior to colonialism and was forcibly put together for the purpose of international statehood into a weak modern state (see Badmus 2006 in relation to Africa). This scenario has negative consequences on these modern states as it denies the post-colonial states the opportunity to command the allegiance of its people where there is a clear-cut dichotomy between the dominant culture and that of minority ethnic groups. Unfortunately, many modern Pacific states have weak structures and some even lack the capacity to fulfil the minimum state functions such as the delivery of basic services to their people. The failure of the state to enjoy the loyalty of some segments of the population and its weak structures explain the frequent resurgence of ethnic nationalism (especially from the minority cultures) demanding autonomy or separation from the dominant culture at the centre. This is the situation in the wider context of the Asia-Pacific in Malaysia (Sabah, Sarawak), PNG (Bougainville), and Indonesia (Aceh, West Papua) to mention but few examples. Thus, the weak state structures often deny a number of Pacific countries the wherewithal to address these contemporary intrastate conflicts.

Furthermore, globalisation and modernisation have strong impacts on the socio-economic structures of the Pacific Islands. Most of the countries in the region are in the process of socio-economic transformation from a traditional one to modernity and the process is itself conflict-generating. For, economic modernisation creates winners and losers. Aware that social divisions have provided a way to mobilising coalitions of common interests to be part of the winning side—for example, in competition for scarce natural or economic resources.

The above-discussed factors conjoin to explain the genesis of different kinds of the conflict in the Solomon Islands and PNG (Bougainville). In this regard, the rest of this paper examines these two conflicts in the Pacific to understand the rationale for and appreciate interventions by regional actors, especially Australia, New Zealand and the PIF, and supported by the international community. I explore the background to each of these conflicts, the motivations and rationale for interventions by Australia and New Zealand in particular, and factors that explain their successes or otherwise. I highlight lessons learnt from these missions and, examine whether these lessons can be of relevance to other regions of the world, especially Africa.

## ***Peacekeeping in the Pacific with Reference to the Solomon***

## ***Islands and Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)<sup>2</sup>***

### **Case 1: The Solomon Islands' Conflict and RAMSI**

#### **Brief Background**

While an impressive number of scholarly monographs and journal articles<sup>3</sup> have explored different aspects of the Solomon Islands conflict, we need not expand here with what is already known about the origin and dynamics of the conflict. Here, a snapshot of the conflict will provide a better understanding of the reasons for international interventions. Different interpretations have been provided in the literature regarding the sources of the conflict. Watson (2005) locates its origin in colonialism. In his analysis, Watson believes that the motive of British colonial policy was to exploit the island nation and this is to the detriment of its future. Although, plantations were developed but this did not translate into physical and socio-economic development. Furthermore, the movement of administrative capital from Tulagi, on the Florida Islands, to Honiara on Guadalcanal Island in 1946 by the British created tension between ethnic Guali of Guadalcanal and migrants to Honiara. This is because “administration and resources became concentrated in the capital at the expense, it was often alleged, of other regions, including rural Guadalcanal” (Watson 2005, 401). For his part, Henderson (2003) is of the view that the unsuitability of the Westminster-style constitutional system is often responsible for the weak structures of the Solomon state. This scenario, in the Solomon Islands context, exacerbated tensions among different ethnic groups where corruption, poor governance and exploitation of natural resources flourished. Furthermore, Stratford (2005, 1) contends that many years of conflict exposed the mismatch between inherited Western institutions and ‘indigenous micro-polities’<sup>4</sup>. This uncovered the inability of the national government to manage the pressures of urbanisation and internal migrations.

The third explanatory variable can be located within the context of underdevelopment of the island state. Again, Watson (2005, 402) provides a graphic account thus:

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<sup>2</sup> *Model with Australia and New Zealand Inputs*

<sup>3</sup> For incisive analysis on the origin and dynamics of conflict in the Solomon Islands, see among others: Bennet 2002; Fraenkel 2004; Fry 2000; Moore 2004; O'Connor 2003; Wainwright 2003a&b.

<sup>4</sup> See Hegart and May 2004.

With annual population growth rates averaging above 3 percent for much of the period after independence, 3 percent, the aspirations of the large youth population could not be met. This disaffection was compounded by the concentration of young settlers and their families in newly urban areas such as Honiara, where they were cut off; there was regular contact with people of other ethnic groups, some of whom were evidently doing better economically.

Following independence from Britain in 1978, the above-discussed factors exacerbated ethnic tensions in Solomon Island's post-colony. Furthermore, rampant corruption, especially among political elites, mismanagement, neopatrimonial character of political governance of the Solomon state, and, to some extent, its rentier economy, primitive accumulation and global factors combined, forced local economy to deteriorate, while absolute poverty and low living standards of majority of the population ensued, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. The increasing economic hardship resulted in the influx of migrants Malaitan people from Malaita Island to Guadalcanal Island where the capital city, Honiara is located. The influx of migrants became highly unbearable to the ethnic Guali people. For, at that time the Solomon Islands was pressured by high population growth rate and employment opportunities were insufficient. The domination of the Malaitan islanders of the labour market in Honiara and in the country's Police Force became a source of apprehension to the Guadalcanal people. With the Malaitans economic and financial wherewithal, the Guadalcanalese were disposed from their lands. Consequent on the in-built frustrations, the mid-1990s saw the armed Guali gangs', the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM)/the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA), attacks the Malaitan settlers, forcing more than 20,000 from their homes.

The Malaitan men, responding to the situation, formed a rival militia known as the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) and the clashes between the two groups in 1998 claimed over 100 lives while over 30,000 people were displaced. The MEF demanded compensation for the destruction of ethnic Malaitan owned property. Fighting between the two groups continued unabated until 15 October 2000 when the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) was signed under the auspices of Australia. Central to TPA was the conduct of provincial elections to be monitored by a low-level International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT). Under TPA, Sir Allan Kemakaze was elected Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands. Australia and New Zealand increased aid to the island nation and contributed to IPMT that was to secure peace in the Solomon for 18 months. Dishearteningly, IPMT was unable to restore



peace because it lacked instruments of coercion and the TPA's reliance on the goodwill of the parties proved lacking. Although, TPA was able to douse ethnic tensions, the agreement failed to secure the surrender of weapons by both parties to the conflict and allow the situation to continue as a 'low-grade' insurgency. Therefore, the IPMT withdrew in June 2002. During this period, the Solomon Islands faced a serious economic crisis because the sources of revenue became dwindled as a result of the closure of SIPL and the Gold Ridge Mine on which the government of the Solomon depends for money while lawlessness flourished.

## **Regional Choruses of Disapproval and Responses: Peace Processes and the Deployment of RAMSI**

How can the interventions in the Solomon Islands conflict be explained? Are regional responses an attempt by regional leaders/states (Australia and New Zealand in particular) to secure a peaceful Pacific and/or to safeguard their own national interests? What lessons does the intervention provide for future operations, either within the context of the UN, regional organisations, or coalitions of the willing states? These are some of the questions that I answer under this intervention. Before I proceed, I emphasise that the intervention known as the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands or RAMSI is a good example of how regional institution, the PIF in this case, might contribute to the prevention of mass killings. The intervention, as Bellamy and Davies (2011, 156) noted, is a "clear example of how consensual capacity-building spearheaded by the commission of atrocities, RAMSI demonstrates both the utility of regional arrangements and highlights areas where they may [be] in need of augmentation".

In January 2003, Australia's Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer ruled out his country intervention, arguing that Australia did not have the necessary capacity and that the conflict was an internal affair of the Solomon state which should be resolved by the people of the island nation (Downer 2003, 11). As the conflict intensified, Prime Minister Kemakaze asked Canberra to assist his country to restore order, stem violence and disarm the IFM militias (McMullan and Peebles 2006, 5). Following Honiara's request, Australia and New Zealand jettisoned their 'Pacific Way' non-interference in state's internal affairs postures and became more involved. As Bellamy and Davies (2011) contend, the drive for RAMSI intervention came from Honiara itself. Its request was predicated on the acceptance of the fact that it needed international assistance to maintain law and order, and protect Solomon Islanders. Aware that the volte-face in foreign policies of these regional pow-

ers is explained by the growing waves of insecurity that pervaded the Pacific region following three incidences of major security threats: the 9/11 tragedy in the US, Bali bombing in Indonesia, and instabilities in Melanesian states such as PNG and Fiji (Foukona 2005; Stratford 2005; Watson 2005). Based on the aforementioned incidents, Australia refocused its attention to regional security issues. Foukona (2005) asserts that Australia's attention and policy shifted to, and focused on terrorism. Canberra became worry because of the possibility of failed states becoming targets of, and even sanctuary for, terrorist groups. Therefore, Canberra considered the conflict in the Solomon a major regional (and, by extension, international) security concern. This position could be heard in the words of John Howard, Australia's Prime Minister, who says: "failed states present a dangerous breeding ground for crime and terrorism"<sup>5</sup>. Aware that the main reason for Canberra's decision to work with the PIF in helping the Solomon was based on the June 2003 report of Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) warning that the conflict posed threats to Australia's security (Wainwright 2008a). Following the release of the report, Canberra proposed the establishment of a regional peacekeeping force to be deployed to the Solomon, raising security threats that the conflict pose for Australia and the Pacific. To enhance RAMSI's capability and legitimacy, Canberra called for multinational peacekeeping mission, comprising troops from New Zealand and other Pacific Islands states, especially Fiji, PNG, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu (McDougall 2004, 218-219).

Also what reinforced Australia's policy reversal was the adoption of the famous Biketawa Declaration by PIF in October 2000 that authorised regional responses to domestic problems. The Declaration provided for a collective Pacific Islands Solution to the Pacific Problem on the request from a member state, this did not preclude the efforts of the international community in mediation. The Biketawa Declaration established a mechanism for regional security cooperation among PIF member states and this included the promotion of democratic ideal and processes and, good governance, recognitions of indigenous rights and a process for addressing armed conflicts. The mechanism was operationalised by PIF in relations to Nauru (the Pacific Regional Assistance Programme in Nauru PRAN) in 2005, as well as in Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Bougainville in respect of election observation missions deployed to these states (Bellamy and Davies 2011, 157). Relating the Declaration to the principle/norm of 'Responsibility to Protect', Bellamy and Davies (2011, 157) stated:

(...) through the Biketawa Declaration, the Pacific Islands Forum has estab-

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5 World Socialist Web Site: <http://www.wsws.org/artiscles/2003/august2003/solo-ar15.shtml>.

lished a regional mechanism for providing assistance to states and addressing emerging crises in a consensual fashion, creating a regional capacity for exercising pillar two of Responsibility to Protect. The Australian government recognised that more forceful measures undertaken under pillar three would have required the authorisation of the UN Security Council, as set out in the World Summit Outcome Document.

It would appear that the Australian government sought to avoid the complexities of, and the cumbersome processes as well as political intrigues that are associated with securing the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorisation of peace operations. In assisting the government of Solomon Islands, third party intervention was visible. The Commonwealth sent a special envoy to Honiara to assess the situation on ground. Amid deteriorating security situation and Honiara's request from Australia a strong peacekeeping force, the regional peacekeeping force was approved by the PIF Summit in Auckland, New Zealand, on 24 July 2003 with strong backing of the UN, the US, the UK, and the Commonwealth. The agreement stressed that the intervention was at the request of the Solomon and authorised by PIF. Also, RAMSI's mandate and rules of engagement were outlined in the agreement which received the support of majority of Solomon Islanders.

Led by Australia<sup>6</sup>, RAMSI<sup>7</sup> was mandated to reinforce and uphold the legitimate institutions and authorities. RAMSI intervention officially began on 24 July 2003 and was tasked with, first, restoring law and order, and, second, much longer challenge of restoring core government functions. RAMSI was a robust multidimensional regional peace operation that involved a mix of civilian, police and military components in which Australia was the foremost contributing country, supported by PIF's member states. In composition, RAMSI initially composed 2,225 military, police and civilian personnel. This number included 325 police officers. RAMSI was under the headship of a Special Coordinator, Nick Warner from Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). He was assisted by a New Zealand Deputy Special Coordinator, Peter Noble, and a Fijian Assistant Deputy Coordinator, Sekove Naqlolevu. The mission planners operated RAMSI on two primary phases. In phase one, RAMSI was to restore and maintain law and order, which involved

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6 This is not surprising because there is the perception of division of responsibilities in the Pacific with Australia playing leading roles in Melanesia while New Zealand has primary role in Polynesia. Generally, the antipodean powers, the UK and the US, expect both Australia and New Zealand to primarily deal with situations in the South Pacific.

7 RAMSI was code named Operation Helpem Fren (The Solomon Islands Pidgin English for Helping a Friend). The Australia Defence Force's (ADF) participation in RAMSI is known as Operation Anode.

putting a halt to criminal impunity as well as disarming and demobilising militias. In analysing RAMSI, Bellamy and Davies (2011, 157) assert that despite the fact that RAMSI was a 'police led', the reality is that during this phase, different parts of RAMSI were led by different agencies. The military component was responsible for disarmament of criminal gangs and armed groups. The cost of RAMSI operation, estimated at \$200 million in the first year, was mostly met by Australia while New Zealand, the Commonwealth, the UN, the World Bank, European Union, Asia Development Bank also contributed. RAMSI restored law and order within the first 20 months of its operation. During the first 120 days, 3,040 weapons were collected, excluding 660 sophisticated and modern weapons. August 2003 saw the surrender of one of the well-known criminal leaders, Harold Keke to RAMSI. The surrender of Keke, who was considered a destabilizing factor in the Solomon, effectively removed the risk of conflict. RAMSI police officers also performed creditably in the areas of crime investigation and others. The reasons for this feat are many. RAMSI's police contingent initiated street patrols. These were conducted with their Solomon Islands counterparts (the Royal Solomon Islands Police or RSIP). RAMSI police officers and RSIP set up collection centres to confiscate and destroy surrendered arms and ammunitions, and also provided transport to remote areas of the rebels. By the end of the first five months of its operation, RAMSI had arrested 733 people on 1,168 charges. RAMSI's police contingent also involved in conducting training courses for officers of RSIP and justice sector. These efforts were to enhance the capacity of local police to maintain law and order. They investigated crimes committed by militias and criminal gangs, helped RSIP officers to issue indictments including Harold Keke for murder. There were also continuous consultations between RAMSI and officials of the Solomon with the aim of setting up a long-term reform strategy, and provided professional and governmental advice (Bellamy and Davies 2011; Hoadley 2005; McMullan and Peebles 2006).

The second phase of the operation (the most complex and protracted) was to strengthen the Solomon government institutions. With Australia and New Zealand's assistance, RAMSI also made substantial progress despite the fact that this is a long-term process. During this phase, the police component shouldered huge responsibilities, for there was a draw-down of the military component. Also, RAMSI recorded some remarkable achievements because many cases of impunity were tried, while RSIP took the responsibility for policing their country from RAMSI. However, the socio-economic roots of the conflict, the problem of contracted economic growth and that of inadequate employment opportunities for the increasing population were difficult to address. Thus, the post-conflict nation-building aspect of RAMSI's mandate

was not achieved. This problem was compounded by the riots that broke out following the April 2006 general elections.

On 18 April 2006, riots broke out in Honiara following national elections. The riots were sparked off by the allegation that the elections were fixed and manipulated with financial assistance of Chinese business men. This led to racial tension which saw Honiara descended into a state of lawlessness. The riots exposed the weakness of the RSIP, as it was unable to contain it, while the responsibility to protect government officials and restoring order fell on international police contingent. The RSIP, with international assistance, eventually prevented the spread of the riots beyond Honiara. RAMSI's relative success is seen as providing a model for future intervention and lessons learnt in the Pacific. In this context, the questions that need scholarly attentions become: What are the conditions necessary for RAMSI's relative success? Is RAMSI's model feasible or an appropriate mechanism for addressing conflict in other regions of the world? I answer the first question in the next section. The answers to the second question will be provided in the concluding part of this paper.

## Factors in Success and Lessons Learnt

(...) the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) made serious efforts to adhere to the central tenets of successful peace-keeping: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self defence (Rees 2006, 15).

The RAMSI experiences demonstrate some of the conditions for successful peacekeeping and the advantages of regional assistance in helping states exercise their responsibility to protect, thereby strengthening their sovereignty and capacity. RAMSI's relative success is a function of a cluster of factors. First, the operation enjoyed the cooperation and consent of the host government and local populations; that is the Solomon Islands and its people. This factor, together with the strong political support from the Australian, New Zealand, and other regional governments, and PIF as a regional arrangement gave RAMSI the latitude to perform its duties without hindrances and fear. This support made it possible for the mission to easily win the hearts and minds of the local populations. The Australia-led intervention was based upon request from the government of the Solomon, in line with the law passed by the Solomon Parliament mandating RAMSI's presence. What this portends is that, the host state's cooperation is fundamental to a successful peace operation. Furthermore, the timing of international intervention also

helped tremendously in the case of the Solomon Islands. RAMSI's Special Coordinator concurred: "RAMSI has been a success because it was the right plan at the right time and we had the right team with the right approach with the right level of political backing and resources" (Warner 2004, 7). The timing of RAMSI intervention is fundamental in that the mission got involved in the Solomon at a time when ethnic tensions had been relatively dampened, otherwise, this would have heightened the division of the community along ethnic fault-lines (Warner 2004, 8).

Contributing to RAMSI's relatively successful operation is the roles played by its police component. Although RAMSI was a military intervention, its reliance on a regional police component cannot be overlooked. For, the regional planners believed that the type of conflict/violence in the Solomon Islands was a low-intensity and localised one which did not require a full-scale military operation. Hanson (2003, 258) agreed that meeting small-scale, localised conflict/tribal infighting with heavily-armed combat soldiers is inappropriate and it is likely to cause/provoke a reactionary escalation of the conflict. At another level, preference for robust and highly visible policing roles is less provocative and less expensive as well. 'Operation Helping a Friend' may be said to find solace in Mary Kaldor's (2001, 124-131) model of 'cosmopolitan law enforcement' which is more or less a compromise between the UN classical peacekeeping approach and peace enforcement. Kaldor's model encourages the creation of a new 'soldier-cum-policeman'. According to Stratford (2005, 9) the success of such undertaking is a function of a serious rethinking of issues ranging from equipment and tactics to command and the transformation of doctrine and training.

RAMSI's rapid deployment capacity is also an important factor for its relative success, for because the mission was deployed rapidly. This factor enabled RAMSI to, as rapidly as possible, remove would-be trouble makers. The April 2006 riots did not spread outside the capital city because the international force provided timely support to the RSIP.

Doubtless, RAMSI's reliance on the police component has the tendency to contribute to the Pacific Islands states' own policing capabilities, benefiting from the experiences of well trained and established Australian and New Zealand's police contingents. This can form the basis of a solid, reliable, and efficient regional unit for future operations. All factors considered, it is important to emphasise that RAMSI was not a transitional administration since its deployment was based on request from the Solomon Islands government and the host country retained its status as a sovereign state. RAMSI's activities were coordinated with Honiara and also with regard to the international assistance to the island nation. Essentially, Operation Helpem Fren was

an effort to insert a backbone into the Solomon government administration (Rees 2006).

## Case 2: Securing a Peaceful Pacific: Secession and Peace-keeping 'the Pacific Way' in Bougainville

### Historical Introduction and Puzzle

An island to the east of the main PNG's groups of island, Bougainville is politically an autonomous region of PNG. In 1899, both Bougainville and Buka were separated from the rest of the Solomon Islands and became part of the German New Guinea as a result of the British and German agreed border delimitation agreement. Thus, the boundary creation by European colonialism arbitrarily separated ethnically homogenous people into two jurisdictions. This situation represents one source of contemporary secessionist unrest on the island. For, as Rolfe (2001, 41) stated, the people of Bougainville are ethnically much more close to the western Solomon Islanders and feel little if any kinship with the remaining parts of PNG<sup>8</sup>. The island of Bougainville was occupied during the First World War by the Australian forces and in 1920, the League of Nations mandated Australia to administer the island. PNG became an independent state in 1975, and both the Islands of Buka and Bougainville became parts of PNG and formed its 19th province.

Although Bougainvilleans voted massively for total independence in 1978, their wishes were ignored by the governments of PNG and Australia. The demographic and sociological configurations of the Island are well captured by Rolfe (2001, 41) when he says: "There are 19 main language groups on Bougainville in a population of between 160,000 and 200,000. These are small and largely independent societies, without any central political authority. There are significant cultural differences between language groups". Although ethnic variations<sup>9</sup> between Bougainville and the main PNG, the so-called Polynesia and Melanesia dichotomy, is visible as a trigger of the age-old conflict and insecurity on the island, underdevelopment and perceived marginalisation of the minority ethnic groups are the proximate causes of the conflict that ignited in the late 1980s (May 1990; Regan 1998; 2004; Smith 1992). The dispute between local landowners and the PNG government

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8 Bougainvilleans refer to other PNG as 'red skins'. This description is in relations to their lighter skin colour when compared with the Bougainvilleans' colour that is black.

9 There are two types of differentiation in Bougainville. The first is the differentiation of Bougainvilleans from 'red skins' and the second is the internal differentiation among Bougainvillean groups.

centres on the issues of royalties from the Panguna Copper Mine (operated in Bougainville by the Bougainville Copper Limited or BCL, an Australian mining company) and compensation from environmental despoilment downstream. Right from its inception in 1972, the copper mining activities have been opposed by the traditional landowners and the people of Bougainville who have been adversely affected by the impacts of mining activities at Panguna. Historically, ethnic Nasioi social arrangements were disrupted by missionaries and plantation owners, especially in the 19th century. New patterns of economic activity and new forms of spiritual worship that were not compatible with, and difficult to incorporate in Nasioi life were introduced. There were also strong Nasioi resistance against European colonialism and its practices. They refused to work on plantations (especially in the 1950s and 1960s) and this saw the influx of people from other parts of PNG and beyond the country to work. The Nasioi ethnic group also refused to partake in such government-sponsored political-economic projects as local governments and producers' cooperatives. Rolfe (2001, 41) said, "[i]n 1962, when a UN fact-finding mission visited, some Nasioi publicly asked that Australia be replaced by the United States as the colonial power. Distrust of Australia has been another strand in the successions thread and, more importantly, a strong determinant of the shape of subsequent peace processes". Dissatisfied with the situation, a group of Bougainville nationalists unilaterally proclaimed independence for the North Solomon in September 1975. Tensions were doused with pacification by an agreement to grant Bougainville a degree of autonomy. With this new development, Bougainville became one of the 19 provinces of PNG and Port Moresby paid royalties from the mine proceeds to the North Solomon provincial government.

In the late 1980s (1989 precisely) violence erupted in Bougainville out of perceived inequality in the distribution of the proceeds from Panguna Copper Mine, loss of traditional lands, and the devastating environmental impacts of the mine, among other issues. Aware that, with the passage of time some Nasioi that were employed by the mines were given education and trainings but this did not evenly distributed throughout the community. Unfortunately for the mines owners, such trainings had unintended consequences because it gave young, educated Nasioi the socio-cultural resources to politically confront the BCL. This violence was championed by the Nasioi ethnic group that owns the land on which the mine was developed. Dissatisfied with their inability to gain adequate compensations, disgruntled landowners formed the Panguna Landowners' Association (PLA) under the leadership of Francis Ona. The PLA was formed to represent the interests of landowners in negotiations with BCL. The PLA eventually transformed into



a militia known as the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) (under the headship of Sam Kauona, an erstwhile junior officer of the PNG Defence Force or PNGDF) to resist marginalisation, and also aimed at succession. The Nasioi people formed the core leadership and personnel of the BRA in the region. In November 1988, there were small skirmishes/attacks by the BRA to disrupt operations via sabotage in which the mine was closed. The clashes between the BRA and PNGDF and PNG Police Mobile Squad in November 1988 signalled the birth of a period of alternating conflicts. In 1989, excessive force was used by PNGDF against the BRA, the result of which led to the closure of the Panguna Mine. The PNGDF operation resulted to impunity against the Nasioi people and their villages were burnt down and a state of emergency was declared in the province, while the provincial government was suspended. Consequent on the prevailing tense political-security situations, large segments of the North Solomon population became alienated, and they eventually developed sympathy with the BRA across and beyond Bougainville.

In 1990, the PNG authority withdrew all its support to and security forces in Bougainville and instituted a blockade of the island with the intention to undermine the BRA activities. In May 1990, an Independent Republic of Me'ekamui was declared and the establishment of the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) followed. The BIG was the political arm of the BRA. The blockade of the island had catastrophic socio-economic effects on Bougainvilleans and it eventually weakened the glue that cemented them. For, there were divisions between and among Nasioi people and other ethnic groups that did not support them. Negotiations between the PNG and BRA doused tensions but the BRA violently attacked other ethnic groups that they believed did not support their cause. This was followed by the growing waves of inter and intra-communal conflicts which saw the formation of a local opposition group, known as the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF), to the BRA. The BRF allied to the PNGDF to fight the BRA. During this period, Australia's DFAT estimated that about 15,000 people lost their lives to war, hunger and diseases, while about 70,000 people were displaced<sup>10</sup>. Throughout the late 1990s, arms skirmishes between the BRA and the combined forces of BRF and PNGDF continued unabated, a situation that made any third party peaceful resolution to the conflict an arduous task.

## The International Dimensions of Civil War: Australia, New Zealand and 'Peacekeeping the Pacific Way' in Bougainville

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<sup>10</sup> See "Bougainville Peace Process". Retrieved from [http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/bougainville\\_peace\\_process.html](http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/bougainville_peace_process.html).

Here, I undertake a quick review of international peacemaking and peacekeeping interventions to highlight the factors for the successful or failed peacekeeping in Bougainville. In 1990, PNG's neighbours and regional powers, New Zealand and Australia showed interests in resolving the conflict. Both Canberra and Wellington's involvement in Bougainville was because of regional security concerns. Although, national interests cannot be ruled out as Australia was not trusted by the BRA but the security concerns of the Pacific as a region, and South Pacific in particular and that of the intervening states are central in understanding regional responses to the conflict. Besides, the protagonists were tired of armed confrontations, a situation which Zartman (2003) regarded as the ripe moment and conducive for a successful peace intervention since the conflict has reached a mutually hurting stalemate. According to Zartman (2003, 19), when parties are mired in conflict and it is apparent that victory is not insight and the deadlock is painful to the parties, they tend to look for alternative way out or policy. Thus, in August 1990, peace talks between the BRA and PNG commenced on New Zealand warships, HMNZS Endeavour. Aware that the PNG is in Melanesia which Australia supposed to play a leading role, but New Zealand, a Polynesian state led the peace process because Canberra's neutrality in the PNG/Bougainville conflict is doubtful. Australia was compromised given its identification with PNG.

During the talks, New Zealand mediators adopted the 'Pacific Ways' of negotiation in which Papua New Guineans were allowed to run the negotiations at their own pace rather than imposing any established peacekeeping/peacemaking theoretical model. The talks resulted in a truce known as the Endeavour Accords. The accord sought to restore services to Bougainville and resolved that the protagonists will meet in the future to discuss the island's constitution future. Unfortunately, the accord effectively collapsed. In January 1991, at the invitation of New Zealand, the belligerents, met in Honiara in which the famous Honiara Declaration was signed. The declaration sought to annul BRA's unilateral declaration of independence. Also central to the declaration were, amongst others, renunciation of violence, PNGDF's disengagement from the province. Unfortunately, the declaration failed and sporadic fighting resumed. In fact Francis Ona declared the Honiara Declaration rubbish. The Commonwealth while visiting Bougainville contended that there was an absence of unanimity and common ground between the PNG government and the BRA and resolved that there was no opportunities at that point for the organisation to get involve (Rolfe 2001, 45). Despite New Zealand and Australia's efforts, nothing significant happened except sporadic

fighting until 1994 when PNG Foreign Minister, Julius Chan, determined to resolve the crisis with the proposal for the deployment of a regional peace-keeping force. In August 1994, the BRA and PNGDF discussed the mission's concept of operation. A month later, a ceasefire agreement was signed by the new Prime Minister of PNG, Julius Chan, his Solomon Islands counterpart Billy Hilly, and Kauona and it was resolved that another peace conference will be held in October at Arawa. Troops from Tonga, Fiji and Vanuatu would provide security for the meeting; with New Zealand and Australia providing necessary training, administrative and technical support. Unfortunately, the BRA senior leaderships failed to attend the conference for fear of insecurity. Internal squabbles/wrangling within the BRA splitted the movement in which the moderate group and its leaders decided to partner, or better still work with Port Moresby. In November 1994, the PNG and the moderate group signed the 'Charter of Mirigini for a New Bougainville' that paved the way for the formation of Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG) in 1995. The newly constituted BTG was to function as intermediary between PNG and radical forces. By June 1995, Bougainville witnessed positive changes as normalcy was gradually returning to district centres and villages, and ceasefire was holding. Thus, with these achievements and the functioning of BTG, Bougainville leaders met in Cairns, Australia in September-December 1995 for discussions. These efforts were insufficient to restore peace to Bougainville as the PNGDF and BRA were at dagger-drawn opposition when they returned home. Inflamed the conflict that made peace a distant aspiration was that Australia's mediations were viewed with suspicions especially by the BRA radicals. This is going by Australia's colonial history in PNG and its support for Port Moresby. Therefore, this scenario made New Zealand the lead nation in the peace process, as I have explained above.

New Zealand's Foreign Minister, Don McKinnon, led the peace process. In May 1997, prominent and influential Bougainvilleans met in Auckland at the invitation of McKinnon. The meeting laid the foundation for the July 1997 meeting at Burnham Military Camp (Burnham I Talks) in Auckland among all the protagonists, with the exception of PNG government. As Rolfe (2001, 45-46) writes:

At Burnham there was a 'plethora of informal contacts between individuals, working groups and other meetings. The process is very Melanesian and to a "western observers" it is very disorganised without obvious leadership or focus (there was) universal positive comment about the lack of pressure on participants'.

Aware that there were no established procedures by New Zealand and

the peace process continued until all participants were satisfied. By contrast Canberra favoured a top-down strategy. The peace process led to the famous Burnham Declaration signed by Joseph Kabui and Gerald Sinato of BIG and BTG respectively. The Declaration called for reconciliation, demilitarisation and deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Bougainville. It also called for talks with Port Moresby before the end of September 1997. Of note, there was a semblance of unanimity among the Burnham I participants as they wanted peace in their land. The success of Burnham I encouraged McKinnon to invite all the protagonists, including this time, Port Moresby and the PNG military in October 1997. At Burnham II, just like its predecessor, the 'Pacific Way' of peacemaking was strongly underlined and in fact, it was put into practice where the Maori cultural practices were visible. The Maori cultural practices obviously helped the peace process because:

At the beginning of each meeting, for example, there was a formal Maori welcome, which include a 'hongi' or touching of noses by participants. One of the PNG participants at Burnham II commented to a New Zealand official: the 'Pacific' style of welcome had allowed PNG officials at the meeting 'to shake hands, touch noses and exchange breath' with Bougainvilleans with whom they had been fighting for 10 years. The Pacific Way enabled participants to walk through glass walls without thinking about what they were doing<sup>11</sup>.

The Burnham II meeting produced a truce and the establishment of an unarmed international Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) to be led by New Zealand<sup>12</sup>. It is unfortunate that, at the start of the operation, the TMG, in its operation, was beset with internal squabbles, especially between the ADF and New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). Furthermore, there was the problem of insufficient preparation and tension between and among different institutional culture as well as lack of trust between the TMG and local groups. Also there difficulties in integration of Fiji and Vanuatu military personnel. Fijians and Vanuatu find some NZDF and ADF personnel rude, hedonistic and lacking cultural sensitivity (see Breen 2002 for details). In 23 January 1998, the 'Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville' was negotiated by McKinnon and signed by the belligerents (the PNG government, the BIG, BTG, BRA, and Bougainville members of Parliament) at Lincoln, a university campus near Christchurch. Under the terms of the Lincoln Agreement, PNG withdrew its troops from the island and steps were taken

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<sup>11</sup> Cited in Rolfe 2001.

<sup>12</sup> On Bougainville peace process and Australia's role (and New Zealand's to some extent), see various chapters in Wehner and Denoon 2001.

to disarm the armed groups (Breen 2002). The agreement was to be monitored by the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG). The PMG was ADF-led TMG in practice with Australia cultural approach that was at variance with New Zealand's. The Australian government approach was highly institutionalised and result-oriented instead of process. The Australia-led PMG was to encourage long-term nation-building and the mission received the supports of New Zealand and other Pacific Island Governments (Hoadley 2005). The peace process made extraordinary progress. Following the Lincoln Agreement, the parties stalled in their internal discussions, a situation that led to another round of negotiations in New Zealand in which the participants were exposed to:

Maori approaches of being a nation within a state, to dealing with a 'foreign' government and to dealing with internal tribal divisions. The process introduced the immersion of Maori culture and living under the same roof. The Bougainville leaders simply could not ignore each other, especially as guests of another Pacific 'village'. Negotiations resumed and the groups that had signed Lincoln Agreement now signed the Matakana and Okataina understandings to promote reconciliation (Rolfé 2001, 49).

Based on this success, there was minor UN involvement through the UN setting up a mission in Bougainville (the United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville or UNOMIB). With the successful completion of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and order restored, the PMG team left in 2003, while Bougainville became an autonomous province within PNG, in June 2005. This is based on the PMG's facilitated negotiations that led to an agreement that Bougainville would be recognised as PNG's autonomous province. And as part of the current peace settlement, the UN is expected to conduct a referendum on the island's future between 2015 and 2020.

## **Factors in Success and Lessons Learnt**

I pose key questions: What are the factors/conditions responsible for successful peacekeeping in Bougainville? What are the lessons learnt for future peacekeeping operations in the Pacific or elsewhere? The first thing to realise in the Bougainville peace process is that the planners, especially New Zealand, considered the 'Pacific Way' to be the appropriate model rather than relying on any established peacekeeping theoretical consideration. The term 'Pacific Way' connotes Pacific solutions to Pacific problems and advocates for the norm of non-intervention and abhorrence of the traditional western way

of conflict resolution<sup>13</sup>. Rolfe (2001, 39) provides the essence of the Pacific Way by arguing that it (the Pacific way) requires:

‘[U]nanimous compromise’ which means that ‘some are expected when possible to ensure personal sacrifices so that the community as a whole will have harmony’. There is an underlying intention that nobody will get left out in a process that inevitably involves long discussion and many involve frank disagreements, but in which no resentment will be felt.

Therefore, negotiations, compromise and patience, flexibility, consideration of other points of view, inclusiveness and reconciliation activities form the basis of the ‘Pacific Way’ to the resolution of conflicts within or between nations in the region. The Bougainville case study established the importance of the thorough analysis of the environment in which the operation will take place, that is, context specific for would be peace planners rather than relying on any peacekeeping theory (Rolfe 2001; Mortlock 2005). Furthermore, the success of the peace process/operation in Bougainville unmask the importance of letting peace proceeds at a measured pace. May (2005: 466) asserts that “peacemaking on Bougainville after 1997 was a long drawn-out and frequently frustratingly protracted affair, but...the slow pace of the process allowed the various parties—BRA and BRF, Bougainville and national government—to gain a measure of trust in one another, and to explore the limits within which concessions might be made on all sides.” Probably this is the main reason why Wellington did not impose any solution or time limit.

In discussing the success of the Bougainville peace process/operation, we should not forget the fact that the approach to the peace process was ‘bottom-up’ which means that the process was owned by the belligerents and local population themselves with external supports. The local people contributed greatly to the restoration of social harmony, which facilitated the acceptance of the outcomes. The peace process in Bougainville is very Melanesian in the sense that the facilitator’s (New Zealand) applied an approach that had no intention of driving the process. New Zealand believed that the decision on how to resolve the problem in Bougainville must be handled in the Melanesian way and, Wellington and Canberra (despite its reservations) were just to play supporting roles.

## Concluding Reflections

The case studies examined in this paper established that the peacekeeping operations have/had some successes and regional powers

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<sup>13</sup> For a comprehensive analysis of the “Pacific Way”, see Haas 1989.

(Australia and New Zealand) working with the PIF (in the particular case of the Solomon) and other international actors were able to maintain regional security in the Pacific. A number of endogenous and exogenous factors explain the relative successes associated with these peace missions. Are there any lessons for peacekeeping in Africa or elsewhere? Although, most Pacific conflicts are low intensity compare to the situation in Africa, but some lessons from the region are vital for Africa, especially at this critical time when the AU is yearning towards creating its comprehensive, self-sufficient peace operation capacity with emphasis on military and civilian inputs.

In the Pacific, peacekeepers enjoys the support of the host state as in the Solomon Islands and also these peace missions benefited from the interaction that emerge from the nexus of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The peacekeeping experiences learnt in the Pacific serve two purposes for future peace operations in Africa and elsewhere. First, as I stated earlier, the success of peace mission depends on the degree of support of the local population and second, the partnership between the peace mission and the local population must be based on solid trust and sincerity. Although such local support, more often than not, is not easy to come by, future peace operation planners must strive to achieve some degree of semblance to them, because without them it will be difficult if not impossible to achieve its mandate, especially in a hostile environment. This is the present situation in Somalia where the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is facing hostilities from the al Shabaab and other militant groups rejecting the presence of 'foreign' troops on their land. In addition, the mandates of a peace mission, which provide legitimacy to intervention, must be feasible and achievable. A feasible and achievable mandate is interpreted to be the one with provisions that is based on a worst-case threat assessment and more importantly reflects the political reality on the ground. Such a realistic mandate should state clearly the mission's purpose and tasks, the roles of the Special Representative of the peace mission's authorising institution, conditions under which force may be used, among others. And such a mandate becomes achievable once it is well-matched with the political realities of the situation, mirroring the stakeholders' commitment (which includes the parties to the conflicts) and sufficient resources that are needed to be allocated to such a peace force to achieve its mandate. Doubtless, feasible and achievable mandates are a prerequisite for a successful peace operation. For, feasible and achievable mandates rooted in pragmatic worst-case planning have a higher propensity to secure peace and save human lives. Any intervention without an achievable mandate is tantamount to self-immolation, suicidal and could be regarded as morally irresponsible. This was not the case in the Solomon Islands as

RAMSI's mandates were pragmatic and achievable. This is a lesson learnt for the future peace operation, especially in Africa.

It is doubtful whether RAMSI will be an appropriate model in such conflict-ridden settings as Africa in that, as opposed to the type of conflict in the Solomon Islands, African conflicts are more complex and are full-scale military actions involving heavily armed combatant soldiers that do not follow international humanitarian law. In such conflict settings, reliance entirely on policing functions will absolutely resolve nothing. Probably this is why Warner (2004) warned that RAMSI does not provide a model for future operations; rather it may provide an 'index' by which future challenges can be gauged.

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## ABSTRACT

This paper examined conflicts and regional security in the Pacific. The paper has as its focus the roles of Australia and New Zealand (and the Pacific Islands Forum) in managing security in the Pacific using Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) and the Solomon Islands as case studies. It documented their peacekeeping experiences, and interrogated whether these operations were successes or not and why. Furthermore, the author explored whether the peacekeeping experiences in the Pacific and lessons learnt from these operations might be applicable to, and/or be helpful in developing a useful peacekeeping model for other regions. The argument of this paper is that, although Australia and New Zealand regional security management role is based on security concerns of the region but the national interests of these dominant states are also at play and a key factor that shape the nature and direction of interventions. As well, the dynamics of these operations have revolved around interaction between and among local, regional and global political factors. The author argued that peacekeeping in the Pacific (especially in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands) may not offer an appropriate peacekeeping model in such-conflict ridden settings as Africa where armed violence are more complex, protracted and involve full-scale military actions as opposed to low-intensity and localised conflicts in the Pacific, but some of the peacekeeping lessons from the region may be helpful to other peace operations, especially Peacekeeping the 'Pacific Way'.

## KEY WORDS

Regional Security, Peacekeeping, The Pacific, The Pacific Islands Forum, The Solomon Islands, RAMSI, Papua New Guinea, Bougainville, Australia, New Zealand.

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# THE LOGISTICS OF A PEACEKEEPING MISSION: A CASE STUDY OF WESTERN SAHARA<sup>1</sup>

Sylvio de Souza Ferreira<sup>2</sup>  
Eduardo Xavier Ferreira Glaser Migon<sup>3</sup>

## Introduction

The present communication of results is the consequence of a broader conceptual frame. It is the product of a joint effort that converges with the attempt to better insert the Defense issues on the agenda of public policies (Migon 2011), to support the construction of an integrated agenda of research and discussion on these issues (Migon 2013) and to contribute to the strengthening of the Brazilian planning associated to Defense (Migon 2014). It also represents the dialogue and exchange of ideas associated with the reunion of individual researchers into the same research agenda (Visentini, Pereira and Migon 2014) which allowed the spillover of individual research (Migon and Santos 2013; Vaz and Migon 2013; Pereira 2014; 2016a; Visentini 2014; 2016a) into a collective project, with results that are progressively being perceived in the scope of defense studies (Ferreira 2014; 2015; Pereira and Migon 2014; Visentini et al. 2014), including abroad (Rodrigues 2017a).

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<sup>1</sup> The research on which the present article is based was conducted in the scope of the project **The importance of Africa to the Security and Defense of Brazil**, sponsored by the Álvaro Alberto Program of Incentive to Research into International Security and National Defense (Pró-Pandiá), a joint initiative of CAPES - Ministry of Defense.

<sup>2</sup> Military Sciences Doctoral Program, Brazilian Army Command and General-Staff School (ECEME), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. As author, he participated in the conception of the research, bibliographical research and the initial and final essay of this article. E-mail: sylvio98@hotmail.com.

<sup>3</sup> Military Sciences Doctoral Program, Brazilian Army Command and General-Staff School (ECEME), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. As co-author, he participated in the conception of the project, oriented and supervised it, as well as collaborated in the writing and final revision of this article. E-mail: eduardomigon@gmail.com

Still, as a conceptual framework, it should be emphasized that this brief text is convergent with the objectives of (i) strengthening the partnership between two graduate programs in the area of Defense, the Graduate Program in International Strategic Studies (PPGEEI/UFRGS - <http://www.ufrgs.br/ppgeei>) and the Graduate Program in Military Sciences (PPGCM/ECEME - <http://www.eceme.ensino.eb.br>), and (ii) to increase scientific disclosure in the Defense area, especially through the strengthening of the Meira Mattos Collection (<http://portal.ecene.ensino.eb.br/meiramattos/index.php/RMM>), of Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations (<http://seer.ufrgs.br/Austral>) and of the Brazilian Journal of African Studies (<http://www.seer.ufrgs.br/rbea>).

In specific terms, it is worth to point out that this article represents the continuation of research efforts synthesized in a trilogy of articles<sup>4</sup>, which sought to inform about aspects of Brazil-Africa cooperation in matters of Defense (Ferreira and Migon 2016), as well as to provide a specific look at the dynamics of Security & Defense of Western Sahara (Ferreira and Migon 2015; 2017).

Thus, it is important to note that the Logistics of Peace Operations has great relevance for Defense and Military Sciences studies, for a number of reasons. Logistical planning and execution, normally conducted in harsh environments, as well as interoperability between military and civilian components from various countries of the world can bring diverse lessons. In this sense, it is worth noting that the peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara is the oldest active operation in the African continent.

The case of Western Sahara is the most recent and long-lasting case of unresolved decolonization on the African continent in the 21st century. A departure from the poorly run metropolis, the war waged between 1976 and 1991 and the longest intervention by the United Nations are part of the historical trajectory of the “last colony of the world” (Ferreira and Migon 2015). Thus, this article deals with the case of Western Sahara, studied from the perspective of Defense Logistics.

Western Sahara is a non-governed territory, currently under the custody of the UN, located in the northwestern portion of Saharan Africa. It is one of the most inhospitable and less livable places in the world, with arid climate and extreme temperatures ranging from 50 to 60 degrees Celsius in

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<sup>4</sup> The presentation of these results is linked to the organization of a book (Visentini, Migon and Pereira 2016) and to make the contents of the research results in the scope (Ferreira 2016; Migon 2016; Pereira 2016b; Rodrigues 2016; Visentini 2016b) available, as well as the cooperation of the research group with two PhD efforts based on the issue (Ferreira 2017; Rodrigues 2017b).

summer and falling to 1 degree in winter. The territory has land borders with Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania and is bathed by the Atlantic Ocean to the west (Rézette 1975; Pointier 2004; Estrada 2014).

The purpose of the case study is to analyze the logistics applied in the case of the Western Sahara peace mission, from three different perspectives: Morocco, Western Sahara and the UN Mission itself. To achieve the purposes of the present study, this article will be divided into sections, which aim to achieve the historical and conceptual setting of the issue, as well as the achievement of the case study itself. In the end, considerations will be made regarding the subject.

## The Theoretical-Empirical Basis

### The Issue of Western Sahara: A Historical Review

Spanish colonization in Western Sahara dates back to 1884 and occurred in the coastal region between Tarfaya, south of present-day Morocco, and Villa Cisneros, the current town of Dakhla, south of Western Sahara. Such colonization lasted until 1976, when Spain left the territory (Shelley 2004; Estrada 2014).

The borders of Western Sahara were defined by Spain and France in 1934. However, as of 1956, the newly independent Morocco proceeded to claim the territory, which culminated in confrontation, the war and a stalemate that lasts until the days (Rézette 1975). The UN-led decolonization initiatives began in 1965, when the organization declared Western Sahara a non-governed territory. As a result, there was the United Nations positioning in favor of decolonization and the exercise of self-determination of the Saharawi people, which should occur through a referendum (Pointier 2004; Shelley 2004; Estrada 2014; Ruiz Miguel 2014).

In 1973, a movement with effective leadership and well-defined political and military components emerged, called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro, also known as the Polisario Front (F Pol). From then on, this organization undertook a war against Spain (Pointier 2004; Shelley 2004; Estrada 2014).

In 1974, Spain was ready to hold the referendum and conducted a population census as a preliminary measure. The UN then asked the International Court of Justice for an opinion on the state of Western Sahara, which pointed out that neither Morocco nor Mauritania could establish any bond of sovereignty with the territory. The decision of the International Court of

Justice, contrary to Moroccan interests, prompted a reaction from the Moroccan king, who on the same day announced that he would lead a “peaceful” march of 350,000 Moroccans towards Western Sahara, an event known as the “Green March”. This movement entered Western Sahara on November 6, 1974, supported by the Moroccan Royal Army and began the conflict with the Polisario Front thereafter. On November 14, 1974, in the face of the climbing of events, Spain quickly signed the so-called Madrid Agreement with Morocco and Mauritania, which provided two-thirds of the northern territory to Morocco and one-third to the south To Mauritania. The UN considered this agreement null and carried in consultation only with part of the local leaders in Western Sahara (Pointier 2004; Zoubir 2007; Estrada and Ricci 2012; Estrada 2014).

In 1976, it can be said that the war was already waged in two fronts by the Polisario Front, a military-political component of Western Sahara, against the Armed Forces of Morocco and Mauritania. This conflict provoked a large exodus of refugees to the city of Tindouf, Algeria, outside the Sahrawi territory (Ammour 2006; Estrada 2014). On February 26 of the same year, the Spanish colonial presence came to an end. Djemma, a sub-Saharan tribal advisory council of leaders (“sheikhs”), created by the Spanish authorities, voted for integration with Morocco and Mauritania. However, on February 27, 1976, a group of former members of Djemma and other pro-Polisario sheikhs proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, with the leaders of Polisario Front appointed to their government.

The war followed and, after three years of conflict, Mauritania, despite its notorious military superiority, signed a peace agreement with the Polisario Front, renouncing its supposed part of the Western Sahara after suffering considerable defeats and casualties in the clash with the polisario troops (Zoubir 2007; 2010; Estrada 2014).

Between 1985 and 1988, the UN began to make greater efforts to appease the issue, when Morocco and the Polisario Front came to accept proposals from the UN and the Organization of the African Union (OAU) to resolve the conflict (Zunes and Mundy 2010). The solution included conducting a referendum, through which the people of Western Sahara should choose between independence or integration with Morocco, as well as a cease-fire and the creation of a peace mission. Both parties agreed, and on 6 September 1991 hostilities ceased. Thus, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was created, which has as main points in its original mandate the creation of conditions for the holding of the referendum, its proper conduct and the guarantee of the achievement of its results, in addition to monitoring the ceasefire between the parties (Estrada and Ricci



2012).

## Military Logistics

Logistics plays a key role in the success of military operations. To do so, it must be consistently planned and executed from the outset of the operation, as well as being synchronized with all planned actions, being inherently linked to joint and national logistics, or, in certain situations, to the logistics of multinational operations in which a country is participating. In all these situations, it must be meticulously coordinated to ensure that resources are made available to users at all levels (EME 2014).

The Logistics organization should provide the necessary support to sustain the forces in the continuity of operations, whether in a war or non-war situation as in a peace operation, for example. Therefore, this logistics should be guided by principles such as flexibility, adaptability, modularity, elasticity and sustainability (EME 2014).

In this way, Military Logistics is understood as the set of activities related to the forecasting and provision of the resources and services necessary for the execution of the missions of the Armed Forces. The logistic combat function encompasses functional areas of material support, staff support, and health support. At the strategic and operational levels, it conditions the planning and execution of operations, while at the tactical level it adapts to the planned maneuver to make it viable (EME 2014).

The logistic cycle is a permanent, continuous and ordered process in interrelated phases that organizes the support system. In accordance with the specificities of each of the Functional Areas, it comprises three phases: determination of needs, obtaining and distribution. The integration of the logistics chain through information systems from the consumer user to the source of procurement is fundamental for the accuracy and speed of the logistics cycle in all levels of Logistics execution, making it possible to increase the level of service to the supported force (EME 2014).

The operating environment can be characterized by long distances, difficult terrain, a hostile climate, and the lack of basic services and support from the host country. Meeting demands is therefore a complex and demanding process, requiring careful planning. The combat support service usually dictates the main aspects of the conduct of the forces involved in operations, being present from the beginning of the planning process and included in the reconnaissance. Whenever possible, units should be employed in operations with a minimum of armaments, ammunition, personnel,

organic transportation, communications, equipment and medical support, as well as sufficient reserve levels of all basic supplies to last at least 30 to 90 days (Wilkerson and Rinaldo 2008).

## A Case Study in Analysis

### The Logistics of the Royal Army of Morocco

The Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) is the first actor to be studied in this case. It is a professional armed force, well armed, equipped and motivated to carry out its mission. Since 1991, at the time of the ceasefire and the establishment of MINURSO, about two Army Divisions remained “frozen” on the ground in a static defensive position, with all units in the same place. This fact has a profound relationship with the way the logistics of the operation is conducted by RMA (United Nations 2007).

At the strategic level, RMA develops its logistics activities within the territory of Morocco and with its traditional suppliers. Much of the material is of European or North American origin. Its military expenditures showed a slight growth between 1988 and 2008, starting to have a slightly more significant increase since 2009. This relative constancy or soft growth occurs due to the impossibility of strengthening the units used in MINURSO's operations area with personnel or material. In other words, since 1991, there is practically the same, or less, number of troops and armaments on the ground, all in line with the terms of the peace agreement. The increase since 2009 correlates with acquisitions or expenditures directed at its Armed Forces outside the area of operations of the peace mission, which may, and should, be used in case hostilities return (IISS 2015).

At the operational and tactical levels, logistics take place in a very peculiar way, given the impositions of the cease-fire. The reinforcement of troops is vehemently prohibited and all movement, even for maintenance or replacement of material or troops, takes place with authorization from the UN (United Nations 2007). Another very relevant condition is the desert and all the implications that stem from this.

As far as transportation is concerned, the area is poorly served by asphalted roads for the use of modal road. In 284,000 km<sup>2</sup> there are only two paved roads and few side roads, which make up about 2,000 km of connections. These roads basically connect the area of operations from north to south and enter some of the operation areas of the Army Divisions. There is no modal ground rail and the modal waterway is limited to operate on the

coast, with restrictions imposed by the peace agreement. The air modal is used but it also suffers restrictions, imposed by the cease fire.

As for the personnel, there is an aeration plan that allows the military who work in rigid working conditions to leave the area of operations every 3 months. This aeration policy is fundamental for the maintenance of the good progress of the works, given the total isolation imposed by the mission and the inhospitable conditions of life of the soldier in the desert. The peace agreement imposes on both sides of the conflict that there is no reinforcement of personnel in the operations area.

Regarding health concerns, there are few hospitals in the area of operations. Most health facilities are concentrated in the town of Laayoune, where MINURSO headquarters are located, and there is a large concentration of RMA troops. In addition to that city, there are health soldiers scattered throughout the Moroccan units in the desert to support the troops more closely on the ground.

The maintenance of all material must be carried out on-site or outside the area of operations, but in this case it only occurs with UN authorization. Normally during monitoring of the ceasefire, UN patrols are responsible for monitoring the permanence of the material at each facility and if the non-existence of each item has been authorized by the organization. In relation to the supply, all of it arrives at the end of the line by the terrestrial modal. Even though there is the use of air and sea modalities, it is possible to reach the RMA units only by land.

Thus, one can come to the conclusion that the physical constraints imposed by the desert terrain and their implications, together with the impositions of the peace agreement, presents a series of obstacles and restrictions to the logistics in practice by the RMA, which are overcome on a day to day basis of the accomplishment of its mission.

## **The Logistics Applied by the Polisario Front**

The Polisario Front (F Pol) is the political-military representative of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and will be the second actor to be studied in this case. It is a unique Armed Force that operates only in the terrestrial vector, because its country has neither Air Force nor Navy. It is poorly armed and endowed with obsolete equipment, all from the Cold War era. Regardless of that business card, its men are motivated and know the terrain very well.

At the strategic level, F Pol suffers from all restrictions resulting of

the fact that its country has no defined status in the international community. Although the African Union recognizes Western Sahara as a country, a part of the world's countries does not see it like this. In most of the bibliographical sources, Sahara is a colony and, for the UN, the status of the country is still "non-governed" (Pointier 2004; Shelley 2004; Estrada 2014). With this, the weaknesses of national institutions or even their lack of existence means that there is no systematic formulation of Public Policies, although there is a pressing issue in the defense sector. It can be summarized that all F Pol's logistical support comes from the government of Algeria, where most of the military means remains and the population lives nowadays, in refugee camps in the region of Rabouni (United Nations 2007).

At the operational and tactical levels, F Pol maintains a minimum operational base in the operations area of the mission, practically reduced to some military units and observation posts in the first line of defense against the Moroccan troops. Like these, their units were forbidden to move and receive reinforcements after the establishment of the cease-fire.

As far as transportation is concerned, there is only land use on desert trails, which are considered safe in relation to the threat of mines and explosives. There are no asphalted roads in the part of Western Sahara controlled by F Pol.

With regards to personnel, F Pol employs very young military personnel in its area of operations, who remain in critical conditions of permanence in the mission. There are no hospitals or health facilities in the area and all this support is provided in Algeria, near the refugee camps.

The maintenance of the Polisario material is carried out in the position and follows the same rules imposed by the UN. If it is necessary to remove certain material for maintenance outside the area of operations, the UN must grant authorization to do so. Correspondingly to the other functional groups, the supply usually comes from Algeria and is another critical item in the logistics implemented by F Pol in the MINURSO area. An example of this is the supply system of the Observation Points facing the Moroccan defensive line. These stations are operated by a pair of soldiers, who have a light vehicle, armed with some type of machine gun or anti-tank weapon and radio equipment, and who remain in position for a period of 3 to 10 days. As supply, these military men carry a small amount of water and one living goat and chicken, into position. In a first phase, the soldiers feed on the milk of the goat and the eggs of the chicken; and then slaughter the animals in poor hygienic conditions and consume the meat. At the end of this cycle, the military acknowledge by radio that they should be replaced.

Thus, it is concluded that the logistics applied by F Pol in MINUR-

SO's area of operations, besides receiving the restrictions imposed by the desert and by the rules of the mission, presents serious structural deficiencies at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

## The Logistics Applied by MINURSO

The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) is the longest-running operation on the African continent. This gives great expertise to the logistics component of the mission, both in its planning and execution.

Within the mission structure, logistical elements grouped under the civilian and military components of the mission can be identified, which determine the needs of all parts of the mission and obtain the means. Thus, a correlation can be made that the civilian logistic component performs the functions of the strategic level, through the Administrative Chief (CAO) and its members (budget section, finance section, personnel section, procurement section, procurement and contracts and the general services section), and the Technical Services Chief and its members (logistic support section, joint logistics operations center, communications section, surface transportation section, engineering section, aviation section). On the other hand, the operational and tactical levels are performed by the military component, through its Logical Command (CLO) and the 4th Joint Operations Center (JOC) and Team Sites, that are considered the "end of the line" of the mission or the "Plant floor" (United Nations 2007).

MINURSO explores transportation by all modalities, with many means, thus overcoming the restrictions imposed by the desert, the climate and the terrain. The aviation section has regular flights of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft for a variety of purposes, such as transport of personnel, equipment, medical staff, aeromedical evacuation and operational recognitions, which are very important for monitoring compliance with various points of the peace agreements signed between the parties. The air modal is still responsible for the arrival and departure of personnel and material from the mission. The maritime modal is already partly responsible for the arrival of genders and other items for the mission. Finally, the road land modalities are very important for MINURSO's operational missions, since most of the patrols of the operation are conducted by land.

Considering staff, there are very clear rules for staff turnover and re-completion is carried out in accordance with the rules laid down by each contributing country. The civilian personnel are hired or volunteer, being, in both cases, submitted to a selective process.

With regards to health, there is a military hospital within MINURSO's headquarters, conducted by one of the national contingents of the operation. The structure of this hospital is modular and allows the accomplishment of several basic procedures. More complex procedures depend on hospitals located in Morocco, where there is a structure suitable for more complex problems.

The maintenance of the material is performed on the own Team Sites, by civilians hired for this, when it comes to the mechanical part of the vehicles. The other items, such as communication and computer equipment, are maintained at the headquarters and, for such a procedure, a patrol is conducted on a monthly basis from each Team Site for this purpose.

In relation to the supply, the acquisition is made by the civil component of the mission and comes from different parts of the world. A large part of the items comes from Morocco, due to the proximity and reduction of acquisition and transport costs. The exchange rate between the US dollar used by the UN and Moroccan local currency Dirhan also has a favorable role for the purchase of items in Morocco itself. However, other items come from the most distant parts of the world, such as chicken meat from the Brazilian company Perdigão.

Finally, it is concluded that the logistics applied by MINURSO bring together favorable aspects, which reduce the difficulties imposed by the conditions of the conduct of a peace operation in 284,000 km<sup>2</sup> of desert.

## Final Considerations

Logistics has been present in wars, from antiquity to the present day. From its planning to actual execution, its systematic study is not as old as the war itself, but its importance was noted many centuries ago.

In summary, it can be concluded that the logistics of a Peace Operation assume unique characteristics, directly related to the environment in which it develops and to the actors that operate it. Nevertheless, each of the parties analyzed has been fully successful in conducting these activities and proof of this is the very duration of the mission.

It may be noted that in the case of the Western Sahara peace operation, the RMA, a Moroccan military ground component, applies the logistics favored by its condition as a country with a reasonable economic structure and with a constant priority for the Defense sector. As a result, the constraints imposed by the environment and the peace agreement are partially reduced through the application of flexible logistics, planned with forecast and carried

out in an integrated way.

It was found that F Pol, a military-political component of Western Sahara, applies survival logistics with maximum flexibility, but without conditions to apply principles such as forecasting and integration. These facts are due to the fragility or the lack of structures in the State that allow the conduction of appropriate logistics.

MINURSO has a very well-established logistics structure through more than 20 years of its mission. The integration of the civil and military logistics components, which allow planning and execution of a very efficient logistics, based on flexibility and forecasting, is particularly noteworthy.

Finally, the importance of logistics in achieving the objectives proposed by a peace operation must be reaffirmed. This importance enables the parties to devote themselves to the purposes of the UN, so that the organization can enforce the mandate items of each mission around the world.

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## **ABSTRACT**

This is a case study that reflects on the complexity of logistics activity in the context of a peace operation. A preliminary synthesis is made on the Western Sahara issue, as well as a brief theoretical review of the concept of Military Logistics. The logistics of the main participants of the conflict are analyzed: the Royal Army of Morocco, the Polisario Front and MINURSO. The approaches are essentially different: national logistics, “survival” logistics and international logistics.

## **KEYWORDS**

Military Operations; Peace Operations; Logistics.

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# THE SECURITY VECTORS IN AFRICA

Zeferino Cariço André Pintinho<sup>1</sup>

## The African Context

The analysis of African security has been taking on a crucial role in the theoretical and empirical development of the science of African International Relations. This intensity is due, in large part, to the growing of the so-called “critical” approaches. However, these changes appear in the scope of expanding the reach of analysis, but also in introducing an important qualitative leap, regarding the paradigm of the African security vector.

Even though its positioning in the international context does not represent a significant influence regarding economic development, Africa is seen as a strategic actor in International Relations in different areas of action.

Since the African continent is defined as the cradle of mankind, scarred from one side by a colonial past imposed by Western powers, that divided and crushed it, leaving it with a heavy colonial legacy, and from the other side carries in itself the weight of the biggest conflicts balance ever seen in the history of humankind, added to the volume of the poverty index, illiteracy, chronic diseases and a precarious catalog of political models of governance that converted itself into a competition of “dictatorial” political administration by most states.

Even though, 54 African states represent a set as actors of the international society, out of which 53 are members of the African Union. They are an integral part of a paradigmatic systemic plurality that guide the continent and keep it in the context of African security.

Thus, it can be said that contemporary Africa, in a specific manner, “emerged from a group of states delimited by borders created by colonialist states for their administrative convenience without considering the ethnic re-

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<sup>1</sup> Professor at the Private University of Angola (UPRA) and at the Higher Polytechnic Institute Inocência Nanga (ISPIN) and member of the Center for Investigation in Political Science at the University of Évora. E-mail: zecapri@yahoo.com.br

alities or pre-existing states” (Tshiyembe 2014, 11). In this case, the colonizing states treated it, ultimately, as an “empty territory that they partitioned according to their interests” (Action 1998, 287).

Therefore, it continues to be the field of competition among other powers and mining and oil companies, but the direct territory occupation has disappeared. The competitors and the forms of competition have diversified. Under a realist understanding, there is no lasting prosperity without military power or strategic influence (Action 1998, 287).

Under this point of view, the feeble geoeconomic indexes join the fragility of the military indexes (army organization, lack of nuclear and diplomatic weapons, weak relative weight of votes in international organizations) to turn African states into less significant powers, secondary or quasi-powers<sup>2</sup>. However, in the context of modernity it is presented with an abysmal deviation of the infrastructures in view of the multiplicity of scarcity of strong institutions capable of competing and elevating a different image of the continent.

This colonial activity left underlying damages in the positioning of the African continent that was unable to surpass this stage with the formulation of a conscious strategy for development, related to the reordering of the world’s new geopolitics. So far, since obtaining autonomy, the fragmentation remains unaltered and all attempts of regrouping and creating a huge unity resulted in failure.

Thus, Ruth B. Collier defends that independency represented an administrative crisis to the new political leaders, that were confronted with the need to consolidate their position through the creation of cohesion among different factions of disputing elites and the need to obtain popular support. In this context, the multiparty regimes were substituted by single party or military regimes that allowed for a better satisfaction of the interests of the new African ruling elites (Collier 1982).

Then, a new identity for establishing a different Africa began to be built where “the cultural issues and the history, the fight for wealth and prestige and the vicissitudes related to poverty and resource scarcity contributed to the formation of authoritarian models of governance in Africa” (Fatton 1990, 445).

While the co-called winners of the War of 1939/45 immediately created a requalification project for Europe and developed democratic models as societal pacifying instruments, in Africa, a solidarity profile had no effect. The

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2 Power: relational and dynamic concept, that integrates the material resources (army, finances, population, resources, and immaterial ones (ideology, information) available to the states.

dream of progress and of infrastructure was materialized into oblivion and true abandonment. It began to be disregarded as the cradle of benevolence to the continent of the “last thousand million of the poverty” as said by Paul Collier (2007, 5).

It is important to consider the complexity and reach of the recently installed regimes. Diamond points out that this is mainly due to the fact, that these new regimes faced a weakness State authority, deepened by another set of historical and structural obstacles, among which ethnic divisions, the weak sense of belonging to the nation, the fragility of the political institutions established with little experience, the absence of technical and administrative capabilities at the local level, the extreme economic dependence and the revolutionary popular expectancies created by the independence struggles can be mentioned. (Diamond 1988, 32).

However, norms of all kinds were developed, from dictatorship to successive coup d'états, to the absence of the rotation of universal suffrage or of the political power. Alternatively, and in permanence, the promotion of peace and sustainable development, constitute a challenge to African security (Diamond 1988, 32).

In this context, on one hand unfavorable conditions for democratization were created and, on the other, favorable ones for the emergence of authoritarian regimes in the post-independence African states (Chabal 1999, 20).

Almost the whole of sub-Saharan Africa faced similar problems in relation to the proposals of nation-states in the republic that formed during their emancipations. In a condensed way, Feliz Gaeta observes that:

With the exception of Mauritius, from Mali to Madagascar, including the countries of Western Africa Niger, Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Senegal, Chad, and the former Belgian Africa, Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi, the countries of Eastern Africa and Indian Ocean Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Comoros and Madagascar, and the countries of Southern Africa Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho, South Africa and Angola, as countries, are being able to manage their political-parliamentary and liberal systems left by their former colonial power although in all this countries there can still be verified identical forms of contestation (Gaeta 1994, 713-729).

Since the end of the political pluralism of the beginning of the 1960s, several coups d'état occurred in Africa, that created a geostrategic map shaped by the Cold War, a factor of destabilization of the wills of the African peoples in the building of their models of nation-state and, therefore, “turned the

surroundings of the political power into governing States” (Tshiyembe 2014, 15).

Effectively, the continent began to be characterized by inescapable paradoxes of a system blocked in its transition, marked by some distancing between the institutional-normative structure and the concrete materiality; by conflicts and tensions between the traditional and the contemporary and between the real and the apparent; by the opposition between the charming fortress of the “*Leviathan*”<sup>3</sup> and its inherent fragility; and by a bidirectional projection of the local and of the external (Cilliers and Dask, 2013).

This image of Africa is justified, among other reasons, because the same paradigms that legitimized the slave trade and the European colonization, still reside in the thinking of many scholars of those sciences (Hugon 2009).

However, Gilberto Veríssimo examines this anachronistic context as the result of factors considered of:

[...] archetypes, spread by the most relevant international media and generally presenting the African peoples as: the barbarian, the inferior against which is necessary to protect or whom is necessary to civilize, importing the benefits of the revealed religions, of the science and of the institutions; the child, that must be educated, behind in the evolution of humankind, before which the motherland has an educational role, or that is not yet ready for democracy; the noble savage, of the “superior” that lives in caring communities, in harmony with nature, and must be preserved; the brother, our equal, with whom it is necessary to cooperate; the foreign that we cannot comprehend and whose difference makes us, in the last case, indifferent; the chained slave that must be freed from its owner and its bonds; or the poor that requires assistance or help to develop (Veríssimo 2013, 30).

The way Gilberto Veríssimo theorizes the fulcrum of the African image is indeed interesting, with peculiarity of its instrumentalization. In this attractive analysis by Gilberto it is interesting to us to stress the role of the media of the main international agencies that contradict power management in Africa and its underdevelopment index, characterized as insufficient to express the current paradigm of modern times. The image defined as vision or perception of Africa remains in the respective consciousness necessary related to a true representation of the African reality.

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3 *Leviathan* or *The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, commonly called the *Leviathan*, is a book written by Thomas Hobbes and published in 1651. The title refers the biblical *Leviathan*.

This conflicted scenario, added to the endemic underdevelopment of some regions and countries in Africa, accentuates the frailty of the states and societies themselves, representing a greater challenge to lasting peace, sustainable development and human rights, situations that risk the accomplishment of the Development Objectives of this continent in the current millennium (Nação e Defesa 2012, 6).

However, it is not strange that the security issues more autochthonous to Africa, even though similar to those of other region, are added, through the global connection projected over the continent, to the great security issues from the world and a panoply of questions covered by its expanded concept (Moller 2009).

Currently, these issues cover not only the traditional security of the state regarding its counterparts, but also the security of its citizens, many times forcing them to counter one vector with another as a way to prevent the damages each could cause<sup>4</sup>.

However, when African people states, in its saying, that even “as hot as the fountain waters are, they do not cook your rice”, it articulates with shocking simplicity a fundamental principle of physics as well as a political science one. We are aware that the guidance of development of a dynamic event, whatever its external constraints are, depends mainly on its internal characteristics to transform its own reality, based on its concrete knowledge and its own efforts and sacrifices (Cabral 2008, 174).

In fact, the geostrategic insertion of African security appeals to an articulation between the internal and external options of cooperation, which is translated into the development of relations with the neighboring countries and the strategic partners.

In view of the series of varied and incalculable conflicts in a dissimilar political and cultural argument, the attempt to build a security policy that justifies the mobilization of individuals and means raises debates on their political, legal and moral bases that allow to sustain action and lead to some measure of success beyond the subjective analysis of the advantages of pacification and security. That, for instance, is not clearly shared by those who are part of the conflicts or so ingrained in a dynamic of violence, that they cannot perceive any way out. (Nação e Defesa 2012, 16).

Admiral A. Sanguinetti recognizes that the fusion of internal and external antagonism generates confusion about the legitimate concerns of de-

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<sup>4</sup> See the perspective adopted and the themes stressed in William, Paul. 2008. *Security Studies: An Introduction*. London: Routledge, and in the classic study by Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1997. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.



fense and security, about the responsibilities of the army and the police, thus causing the progressive transformation of the police forces into armies, and forming, at the same time, armies meant to intervene internally, violating its normal ethics, under the excuse of the defense of the nation (Sanguintetti 1985, 498).

In other terms, by associating the national security to the promotion of this nefarious doctrine at the systemic level of fundamental values, African power lost track of intelligences, patriotisms and intense devotions (Tshiyembe 2014, 19).

For decades, the harvesting of violence and death could be seen. In other words, the perception that makes violence a declared norm of individuals and groups and that functions as an addiction, now and foremost, to justify the need for a despotic governance, through force, to the political and social stabilization and the contention of conflicts, a horizon that people exhausted by catastrophes and violence, and, we dare say, the prevalence of belligerent discourses and attitudes. (Nação e Defesa 2012, 16).

The attempt to understand current reality, allows one to agree with the argument of some theorists that the central problem relies on the state in Africa. The application of the theoretical conceptions of the state to Africa posed issues that blocked the place of the continent in the theory of International Relations (Veríssimo 2014, 31).

The question of the neo-patrimonial state, of the debility of civil society, that was characterized during the debates of the post-independence period, overall during the 1980s/90s, until the question of the governance regime of the 2000s provoked serious issues to states in Africa. It influenced the implication on how to understand the theories of African international relations and the place they occupy (Veríssimo 2014, p.31).

In this context, the efficacy of the whole African regional security system is affected by the frailty of the state and the lack of legitimacy of many rulers, bringing as consequences the excessive use of means of social control, disseminated corruption in many groups of society, incapacity of providing goods and basic services, such as health, education, social security and housing, stagnation of the economies, without any perspective of evolution and creation and distribution of riches; and sometimes, appropriation of the public structure by ethnic, political or economic factions (Delgado 2016, 329).

Definitely, it is this structural and institutionalized insecurity that the post-colonial state classifies as national security, in the absence of the creation of conditions for an objective security, defining as “a confident and calm state of spirit resulting from a countries capacity of using force to repress a foreign

aggression and also to promote civil peace and national concord thanks to the satisfaction of political, economic, social and cultural needs of the citizens, including the physical protection of men and their belongings and the guarantee of the exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the men and citizens” (Robert 1985, 265).

However, according to Luís Saraiva (2010, 106), “the threats to the African security may be reduced if its countries in greater risk search for the path of development. For that, security structures are necessary, capable of guaranteeing the minimum conditions to the success of the development programs”.

Nevertheless, the vulnerability of some of the most fragile African countries is reflected, still in accordance to the author, “in their incapacity to face the drug trafficking networks, the scarcity of naval means to oppose the clandestine migration networks and to protect the riches of their waters, and also in the difficulty to succeed in adapting their laws and systems to the monitoring and combat of the terrorist phenomenon, preventing them from collaborating with greater efficiency in the international community’s combat efforts” (Saraiva 2010, 106).

Even though, it is considered that the security and defense paradigm are one of the most important fronts on which Africa will have to make efforts for its development, both in relation to the African military capabilities, to the technical-military level, and to, in general, the capabilities in the scope of peacekeeping and security. In this way, a number of theorists, as well as analysts and politicians, have been unanimous in the idea that those are far from the needs of Africa (Saraiva 2010, 107).

We can consider that historical factors, such as the decolonization processes, the Cold War, the crises and the civil wars that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall were factors that created obstacles to the development of the military capabilities in sync with world processes (Saraiva 2010, 107).

In this sense, it allowed that the frailty observed in the African institutions, spread even to the African Union. Considered the biggest political center of the continent, it was seen as an institution without much prestige in the level of the continent itself, representing a number of problems of both material and organizational order.

In this context, it can be considered that after the bipolar period, the African continent lost its relevance, the military advisors and specialists abandoned the region and the military means and financial help started to decline. Politically, since the independence from their European colonial managers, Africa brings to our mind the idea of civil wars, famine, generalized corrup-

tion, incapable governments, coup d'états and human rights violations (Thaker 2006, 10).

According to Augusto Trindade (2006, 7), “the limited development of the African military capabilities is directly linked to the issues of development in Africa”.

Although he considers that the signals of rupture in Africa are positive, and that many countries benefited from foreign debt forgiveness in the most recent years, and also that the year of 2005 was dedicated to the accomplishment of the Millennium Development Objectives, the truth is that Africa failed to achieve these same goals by 2015. So, “the next years will continue to struggle against some contradictions: between the marginalization and the political emergence; between the global recovery and the failure of many states; and between the opposing trends of reducing conflicts or dealing with the shadow of their continuity” (Trindade 2006, 7).

It is the instability that spreads through most of the continent that can bring forward a discussion over the pacification efforts, of democratization and of economic recovery in the respective regions (Trindade 2006, 8).

From this point of view, it is considered that without peace, without the exercise of democracy by the states, it will be difficult to look at the dream of integration, of a united Africa, characterized as one United States of Africa.

In this scope, the rebuilding of the state, of the institutions, and the overall increase of the human capital is imperious, as we are dealing with states on the verge of failing because of war, or for having recently left highly destructive conflicts.

In order to fight against systemic debilities, one of the greatest priorities must be the correct mobilization and management of the resources available in the continent then. In this sense, the first priority must be the establishment of peace and security, because the economy can only thrive in environments free of crisis or war (Trindade 2006, 11).

Another priority is related to the investment on human capital through the professional capacitation, through schooling and the promotion of the health sector (Trindade 2006, 11).

## The dialectic of political power in Africa

One of the most relevant issues that is being discussed in the context of Africa International Relations, is the interdependence of the security vector previously analyzed. It assimilates the policy patterns of governance of the

African “political” man, as if the answer to find extraordinary solutions to the problems of the continent were in the same exact measure as the concentration of its command. Constantly, the issue of power in Africa receives special relevance in concealed local zones of conflict, mainly in areas of current added strategic value, in which one can notice a proliferation of regional and intrastate conflicts, leading to a serious structural underdevelopment and, to a certain measure, to the failure of the states that lead them (Bernardino 2001, 133).

Following the emancipations, that led the states to political uniformity, but not to their citizens liberty and citizenship, African leaders suppressed the divergences, ruling in a despotic, if not cruel, way.

Therefore, “instead of being the will of the people that creates and legitimates power, it is force that creates power, legitimating it and engendering the will of the people” (Tshiyembe 2014, 18). The incapacity or impossibility to coexist with adversity led to conflicts. It could be said that this was the inclination of the leaders in face of the covert obstacles and the cultural heterogeneity.

Originated from unequal institutions, this diversity resulted in different understandings of values and laws, and of procedures and rights related to the human life. However, these anathemas of the conquered power, continue to be exclusive property of their owners, even though they are not shared and have no tendency to change their holder (Tshiyembe 2014, 18).

The fierceness of this reality, raised the challenge of the rulers to a current model according to which “the ideal is the preservation of power, and such preservation became the main national interest, if not the only one” (Tshiyembe 2014, 18).

Thus, since then, according to the view of the rulers, the highest objective of the state is neither economic and social development, nor the national unity, but power (Tshiyembe 2014, 18).

In our perspective, this security ideology leads to national insecurity, since it considers political power as the only constitutive component of the State and a fundamental condition for social peace and national harmony.

In this way, even if in a purely empirical way, the same author adds that, this truth is applied as the result of two motives, in which the first “lays the African power as a dialectic relation of external dependence that escapes the control of the post-colonial state” (Tshiyembe 2014, 18).

In the second place, the “true enemy, if not the exclusive one of African power, is not this hypothetical external enemy, so vilified. The true enemy of African power is effectively the organized people, refusing to grant its po-

litical legitimacy” (Tshiyembe 2014, 19).

Defending the same idea, George Balandier presents his theory crafted from the power and image of domination in Africa, in a generic way, comparing the power with the theatrical assembly. And characterizes Africa in this way:

In Africa, there is an image that conveys power. In my book, *Le pouvoir en scène*, I intend to show how the political is constantly fabricating its own image to exert what is called power... There is an author (a poorly known one) that makes some notes regarding Shakespeare’s proposed concept of theatrical drama (...) that suggest that beyond regimes or specific constitutions (...) there is one commonality in all regimes, the «mise en scène», the geo-theatrical regime: the true regime is that politics are also actors.... The political order favors the representation of images (...) This is the case of traditional power, therefore powers are potentially images (...) there is a scenario and the actors play a role, in which the famous, and the political, are present, (...) and it is cyclical. (...) It is the case of Benin, where the sovereign dies, it is said: darkness has fallen over the country, justice, order, has disappeared [...] Thus, the need to reestablish light, justice or order [...] There is a whole structure, a machinery, whose actors intervene to reestablish the lost light or order (Balandier 1989, 19).

By bringing more complexity to the analysis of this political circumstance of Africa, we can consider that all repressive forces (or most of them), namely, the army, the guard, the police, the popular militias and the secret services, are created, trained, equipped and financed by eastern and western countries, these foreign powers have both the ability to protect the power, to destabilize it, or yet to invert it, in service of its own main national interests (Bernardino 2001, 133).

The battalion chief *Le Seigneur* uses the same kind of argument: “These armies materialize new sovereignties in enormous spaces, sovereignties over which it is necessary to inflict political orientation, and that play a fundamental role in the survival of their acting rulers, or those who believe to be their rulers. These Lilliputian organs are then revealed to be essential political forces of black Africa, which must be controlled” (Guillermin 1979, 8).

The political power, as a manifestation of public force, and whose prerogatives the colonial authorities had used, affected African leaders even more deeply. In this scope, the idea of political power as a common good did not take root in the minds of the leaders of humankind. In contrast, it was understood as the force of a man or a group that imposes its world conception

to the whole of the society it governs (Tshiyembe 2014, 26).

This politization of differences may seem, at first sight, incoherent or contradictory with the fact that many African leaders defend as their first task the development of a national unity and an idea of standardization to the building of the Nation. However, these are processes that happen simultaneously and are interconnected (Ferreira 2014, 18).

However, as perceived by P. F. Gonidec, this everyday reality does not mitigate the constitutional democratic appearances that proclaim the principle according to which the “sovereignty belongs to the people” (Gonidec 1983, 70).

As an example, the constitution of Gabon declares the institution of the “government of the people, by the people and for the people (article 2nd)”. Profitable in the same sense, the Constitution of Guinea-Bissau stresses that the national sovereignty of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau resides in the people (article 2nd) (Constituições 1986, 145). While the Nigerian constitution indicates that the people has the power to define the rules of the political game by the adoption of a constitution, the supreme law of the state (article 1st of the Constitution of 1979).

Within a context of expressive long-term perspectives, it can be observed that African constitutions are seen as mere paperwork in accordance to the political will of the group in power at that time.

In this way, Y. Faure proves that, the constitution is not established with the intent of simplifying power in accordance with the will of the people or the of the diverse juridical or intellectual fictions underlying it (the nation, the country, the homeland, the common good, the general interest). But it is exercised in order to immobilize the political functions, of the definitive location of agents in the relation [...] (Faure 1981, 34).

The African constitution is a technic of political supremacy, as stated by the “lifelong holder of the power” (that must last through the life of one person, and not beyond it). When, because of crises, the military take over power, they do not demand the free consent of the people to exercise it. They assume that it is in a childish condition and decide to replace it, alleging that their revolts were dictated by the will to protect the people against the violence of the overthrown rulers (Faure 1981, 35).

However, the difficulties to deal with the social asymmetry and heterogeneity derive from the dysfunctions and conflicts in the core of the state, overtaken by groups and actors, who would be important to identify and name. Without it one could speak endlessly about the predatory role of the states, while it loses significance. On the other hand, pragmatically, to identify

the owners of the state, ethnic chiefs or of any other affiliation or allegiance, may force a dialogue with them in order to achieve a possible commitment in the built of policies to prevent conflicts (Nascimento 1992, 20).

These questions lead us back to the problems of the political architecture in Africa. In a viable time frame, projects of political integration or refoundation in Africa will probably not erase the states and the national identities created in the period. For some time, however, states will be, mostly, the external link that works against the closer interdependence with the social fabric. The development and protection of this social fabric is, and should have been, its main commitment. (Nascimento 1992, 22).

This is the framework in which the management of political power in Africa is idealized: it figures out as a mere utopic instrument in defining the partition of security, that benefits some and not others, marginalized from the process of political values distribution and the recognition of internal conflicts, that bring a deep division all over Africa.

## **The Action of the Organization of African Unity on the Security in Africa**

The creation of the African Union, in 2002, was an important step change the pattern of action in the landscape of African conflicts and to abandon the rigid conception of sovereignty and no intervention defended by the predecessor Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Thus, the African Union defends a more interventionist regime of a regional organization, affirming in its constitutive act the right of intervention in grave circumstances, which include war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (African Union 2000).

In this context, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity of 1963 did not include a well-developed mechanism of collective security, despite being considered one of the Security Council's collaborating regional organizations in matters of regional peace and security (Delgado 2016, 326).

Although one cannot argue that these juridical limitations were the cause of the three types of conflicts that erupted in Africa before the end of the Cold War (namely interstate conflicts, internal and anticolonial ones), on the long run the main contribution of the OAU was precisely the positive support it provided to the concretization of the national liberation processes (Dugard 1967). It remained conservative in the matters related to intervention in internal affairs, adopting an almost absolute non-intervention principle (Murithi

2005), and ineffective in the resolution of the regional conflicts.

However, it is observed that security in Africa is considered, by almost everyone, a strategic priority, for without security there is no sustainable development. Not the classic security of the state or its organizations, but the “real” security dimension, felt by and focused on the human person<sup>5</sup>. Such dimension abandons the stereotyped concept of identity of national security, focused on the state, and replaces it for that of human security, focused on the societies, in the populations and the human beings (Bernardino 2008, 80).

This new paradigm of human security is seen as the one comprising multiple security issues, that affect the world’s peace and security, defined as:

Human security means to protect fundamental freedoms. It means to protect people from critical and omnipresent threats and situations. It means to use processes based on the people’s qualities and aspirations. It means to create political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that can together guarantee the bases for the survival, sustenance and dignity of people (United Nations 2003, 4).

The concept of security reaches in this way a third dimension<sup>6</sup> that comes to prioritize the human population as object, widening the scope of the application of collective security<sup>7</sup>, and includes an even greater number of situations in the list of threats to international peace and security.

The African capabilities also face a varied group of challenges, among which the materialization of the AU’s new plans related to African peace and security can be highlighted. These challenges represent an important part of the weaknesses Africa must learn to overcome (Saraiva 2014, 108).

Indeed, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, initially called Organization of the African Unity, in its 3rd article, called “Objectives”, in the subheading f, states that it is the obligation of the signatory countries of the

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5 Human security consists in the way as the people lives and breathes in a society that freely makes their own various choices and has access to the market and social opportunities.

6 Considering that, up until now, there were three dimensions of the security concept the history of the contemporary world: a first traditional view that was limited to the protection of the territory of a state against external military threats known as the national security (see Kelsen, Hans. 1957. *Collective Security under International Law*. Washington: United States Government Office); a second notion that, as we have already demonstrated, through the development of a collective security system, transformed a limiting definition of the concept of state sovereignty into an idea of international security; and, lastly, the coming of sustainable human security, the last stage of development of the concept, and adopted by the UN in its last official documents and operational strategy that followed.

7 These principles were already defined in the directives of the Responsibility to Protect.



Constitutive Act of the African Union “to promote peace, security and stability in the Continent” (African Union 2000).

This new model of security was developed to grant higher protection and consistency level, close to the populations, for these are constantly affected by the many regional conflicts.

Luís Bernardino defends the need to adopt an understanding of security that surpasses the security of the state, focusing on the security of the individual, the person, and creating security systems that directly protect the populations (Bernardino 2008, 81). That leads us to stress that the intervention of the human security constitutes the nuclear core of stability of any nation.

Couto Lemos apud Saraiva (2014, p. 179) states that “the security and development processes must be intimately connected, for one depends on the other. If security is not omnipresent, if citizens notice, people will be more inclined to accept the entrance of stabilizing factors for it to be an acquired condition”.

Focusing in the interests of the African security, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, in its 4th article (Principles) of the same document, in the subheading “e” through “j” alerts for the need to create means for the peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states of the Union through appropriate means that must be decided by the Conference of the Union (e); prohibits the use or the threat to use force among member states of the Union (f); declares that the AU has the right to intervene in a member state in accordance with a decision of the Conference in grave situations, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (h); defends the pacific coexistence of member states of the Union and their right to exist in peace and security and to seek help, through the AU Conference, as well as the right of non-interference through a member state in the internal affairs of another member state (i) as well as the right of the member states to require the intervention of the Union, aiming to reestablish peace and security (j) (African Union 2000).

In this sense, it is understood that these fundamental principles of the African Union, in the account of peace and security for the African continent, provided for the creation of juridical or political norms or instruments, such as the cases of the (Delgado 2016, 326):

- Protocol that establishes the Peace and Security Council (PSC) (2002) (Gumedze 2011, 327);
- Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defense (2005);
- African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance

(2007);

- Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (1977);
- African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (1996);
- Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999);
- African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981);
- Regional instruments on the protection of refugees (1969), children (1990), women (2003), youth (2006) and internally displaced persons (2009).

In the same line, the regional instruments of promotion of economic integration do not falter to justify this presence, through the creation of the African Economic Community (1991), combat to corruption (2003), promotion of public service values (2011), and the one related to the protection of the African culture(s) (2006) (Gumedze 2011, 327).

Stephan Klingebiel, a German political scientist specializing in matters of development in Africa developed by himself how the dynamics currently involved with foreign assistance in Africa is in large scale related to the military capabilities (Klingebiel 2007, 71).

The institutions created in Africa or by the international community have not been competent or have not had sufficient will to military intervene in situations of extreme emergence to protect the civilian populations (Klingebiel 2007, 71).

However, many doubts were expressed on the reason of being of some military actions, and the motives that led to military initiatives and actions by foreign actors in Africa. Thus the reason for the main problems of the former African organization, the "OAU", which would be derived of the inhibiting principles of sovereign equality and the non-interference on the affairs of other member states (Klingebiel 2007, 71).

Nicollé Gnesotto<sup>8</sup>, a specialist in African security, defends that "the growing poverty in Africa is seen as one of the gravest phenomenon, constituting itself as an obstacle to the combat of the weakness of the African capabilities in matters of peace and security. And, in truth, without a strong state, capable of taking over the regulatory functions, the African countries will not be able to escape the economic fragility" (Gnesotto 2017, 17).

However, Charles Goerens stresses that the built or rebuilt of this capacity of providing peace and security should not be a synonymous of exces-

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<sup>8</sup> Nicollé Gnesotto was the director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies between 2002 and 2007.

sive bureaucracy (Goerens 2007). Such a scenario contributes to a regional system with inefficiency indexes still not sufficient to guarantee the continent's security through the African Union.

Said Djinnit, Algerian ambassador and politician, when he was the acting Commissioner to the Peace and Security of the Commission of the African Union (AU), stated, as his opinion, before the parliamentarians of the WEU, in a plenary session in December 2005, that "the new determination illustrated the ambitions of the continent, but also the limits of what Africa can do. In other words, alone it did not have the human resources necessary to the execution of this immense peace and security mandate", he stated, referring to the challenge of Africa conducting its own destiny (Assembly of Western European Union 2005).

It can be noted that one of the greatest issues the African continent continues to face is the attempt to consolidate peace and security. In this sense, we can affirm that African states must seek to uphold and support its actions in the recommendations and resolutions adopted on the summits of the African Union, the Executive Councils, the Specialized Committees, which, in the present case, are the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, as well as the African Regional Organizations, political, economic and military (Gnesotto 2007, 17).

In spite of its weakness, the African Union fits in a context of relative stability and learning, and is still considered the main regional organization of the African continent. Despite being in a context of clearly and permanent ongoing armed conflicts, that coexist with a number of current instability situations, the security theme in the African continent is being highlighted (Gnesotto 2007, 17).

Because of this, it is observed that despite the AU's constant efforts and its specialized committees, the political-military peace and security in the continent constitute an apathetic embryonic tool, allowing to the projecting of some scenarios that facilitate the predisposition to conflict, in which the functioning of institutional schools of prevention, management and resolution of conflicts become core, aiming an approach that is at the same time preventive and simultaneously has capabilities for the management and resolution of crises (Gnesotto 2007).

However, the future of global action of African security will be based on methods of strategic revision founded on successful practices, more than in the creation of new security functions or new military capabilities that are often created to protect certain groups.

In this way, despite the fact that some of the security problems that

affect the continent do not constitute conventional and direct threats to its continental counterparts or to the international security, the internal conflicts and the reduced territorial control capabilities, on one side, and the corruption and financial fragility of the state, on the other, make it able to become a problem with potential externalization risks, and that poses a direct threat to the security of its neighbors, through the indirect promotion of people's flight to border states to conflict zones or the acceptance of the use of its territory as base for criminals or political-military groups hostile to a third party (Delgado 2016, 324).

## Final Considerations

The dialectic of the comprehension of the security vector, which we inferred in this paper, constitutes an unprecedented issue for the African continent. It puts into evidence that the efficacy of the entire African regional security system is affected by the frailty of the state and the absence of legitimacy of many rulers, with the consequent use of excessive means of social control, widespread corruption in a number of sectors of the society, lack of ability to provide basic health, education, social security and housing goods and services, stagnant economies without perspectives of evolution and creation and distribution of riches; and at times the appropriation of the public structure by ethnic, political or economic factions (Delgado 2016, 329).

However, all these aspects contribute to a regional system with efficiency indexes still too low to guarantee security in the continent. In this way, the ambitious mechanisms planned and the robustness they possess in comparison to the universal system cannot still be fully explored for a number of reasons, as stated by Delgado (2016, 331), "related to the availability of financial and logistical-military means, the hesitant support to the grandiloquent and progressive values and principles, organizational issues, lack of economic articulation, natural particular national and strategic interests, among others".

Another fundamental aspect, which is related to the surprising paradox of the security vector in Africa, resides in the fact that it is not the will of the people that creates and legitimates power; instead, it is force that creates power, legitimates it, and fabricates the will of the people (Tshiyembe 2014, 112). Thus, security is characterized as fragile, scarce, because of the failure to follow the norms created by the constitutions to an effective management.

Thus, the power obtained in this way remains a private property of its holders, is not shared, and does not contemplate a change of owner; it can be

perceived that in a certain way it is a key vector of the political violence in the continent, among other factors.

Despite this, the negative chain reaction of the phenomena in the political space led us to define the post-colonial state as an autocratic and feudal power of a monarchic tendency that, however, rules over a slave republic and whose goodbye is configured in a utopia.

In relation to the small contribution on the African Union, it is visible that its remarkable inefficiency is, ironically, criticized by the member states, sometimes with an excess of naivety. Effectively, it is curious to observe that a number of African Heads of State ignored that the AU represented an inter-governmental organization and that, in this sense, its field of action is limited by the powers that member states grant it.

However, it is the same to say that these member states still had not yet understood that they are, themselves, the agents of this paralysis, and that despite what they say or do, the failure of the AU represents their own failure. Thus, it is necessary that the continent creates a combination of the wills and actions of the individuals with the aim to pursue determined objectives or to accomplish certain ends in order to obtain the urgent change into a new paradigm. It is necessary that the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) be activated with special determination, having it been elaborated based on the structures, objectives, principles, values, decision making processes in matters of prevention, administration and resolution of crises and conflicts, post-conflict rebuilding and development in the continent, as well as the Protocol related to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union<sup>9</sup>, which describes the many components of the APSA and its respective responsibilities to make it a more present organization in the leading of the continent.

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<sup>9</sup> Approved in July 2002, in Durban, and came into force in 2003.

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## ABSTRACT

Since the early times, security has always been a permanent feature, a fundamental condition and a concern of people living in society. However, in seeking this goal, people have established alliances, agreements, partnerships and multiple forms of cooperation to solve their specific security problems, which in certain historical contexts were decisive for the course of their own history and for the survival of societies. In this context, the African continent presents itself as the cradle of mankind, where the level of insecurity qualifies as critical, which in our opinion allowed studying the vectors of these events. In turn, we try to articulate and explain in the light of African International Relations, the strategic vectors that embody a differentiated approach to security in Africa, revealing the roots of the problems that plague the continent, scrutinizing the situation, identifying the constraints and threats before bringing a set of proposals for the solution of various problems that arise on the continent.

## KEYWORDS

Security; Foreign Policy; Cooperation, Africa and Armed Forces.

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# DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES AND FOREIGN POLICY ARTICULATION OF THE BUHARI ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

Tola Odubajo<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

The foreign policy behaviour of a state is a function of the underlying principles of the national interest. However, the approach towards achieving the aims and objectives of the national interest is conditioned by variables within, and external to the state. While the internal determinants can be shaped by the authorities, there is limited influence by any state to determine the external variables of the foreign policy arena. Like all other states, the approach to Nigeria's foreign policy has always been guided by conditions in the two environments. For the Buhari regime, the character of the domestic environment is the driving force of the foreign policy pursuits. This paper therefore undertakes an assessment of the domestic environment against the purpose of Nigeria's foreign policy under President Buhari. In addition, the paper highlights the need for the Buhari administration to play a visible leadership role in Africa in order to keep alive, Nigeria's silent aspiration of achieving the status of Africa's hegemon.

For analytical convenience, the paper is divided into seven parts, commencing with the introduction before a framework that highlights the importance of both the internal and external environments for the purposes of foreign policy initiation and articulation. The remaining analyses dwell on establishing the linkages between the dominant issues in the domestic environment and the Buhari administration's foreign policy agenda.

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<sup>1</sup> Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the South African Research Chair Initiative (SARChI) on African Diplomacy and Foreign-Policy at the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, South Africa.

## Framework of Analysis: Domestic and External Environments Nexus

Despite the various transformations that have occurred in the nature of relationships, the state remains the basic actor in the international system. With the advent of globalisation, the relative rigidity of power, applied by realist scholars as the basis of international relations, continues to loosen, hence, the realisation of a more liberal nature of relationships within the international system. Even within the context of globalisation, the state continues as the main focus of analysis in international relations. Central to a state's international life however, is a coherent and presumably well thought-out foreign policy agenda.

Foreign policy can be described as the purposive activities of government, informed by both circumstances at home and abroad, but aimed at gaining advantages in the international system. Wilkenfeld et al. (1980, 22) elaborates further:

(...) foreign policy may be viewed as those official actions (and reactions) which sovereign states initiate (or receive and subsequently react to) for the purpose of altering or creating a condition (or problem) outside their territorial-sovereign boundaries.

The main objective of foreign policy is to project, promote and protect the national interest of the state. In order to actualise the mandate, there are usually underlying principles that highlight the substance of the national interest. A number of these principles are generally fixed, with possibilities of infrequent reappraisal that may be caused by remarkable changes for or around the state. For instance, the post Second World-War guiding principles of the US national interest was reappraised after the cold-war, in order for the US to pursue a foreign policy agenda that is relevant to the emergent unipolar New World Order.

For a respectable status in international relations, a state must conduct its foreign policy against the backdrop of influences from two critical environments. The foreign policy environment is "occupied by a range of significant actors, issues and interests, all of which give it a dynamism and life" (Webber and Smith 2013, 30). Wilkenfeld et al. (1980, 40) poignantly notes: "It has become a virtual truism to point out that an actor's foreign policy actions and reactions are linked to a complex structure of internal and external factors". In effect, the environment is made of a two-edged sword driven by the circumstances around both the domestic and external environments

of states (Breuning 2007, 117; Modelski 1962, 106). On a general note, the crux of foreign policy activities is to serve the purposes of the state essentially at the domestic level and in its interactions with the rest of the world. Both environments play key roles in determining the actions and inactions to be taken in serving the primary constituency (the domestic environment). It is however imperative that states place higher premium on the influences from the external environment because of the limited capacity to control conditions out there. In contrast, it is relatively easier to direct the domestic environment in favour of the government, thus, leveraging on conditions in the domestic environment for the pursuit of foreign policy agenda.

There are numerous variables that impact on the conditions of the internal environment of foreign policy making. These include; psychological factors, socio-political and economic conditions of the state, the foreign policy machinery at the level of bureaucracy, military capability, character of informed public, among others. The psychological factor deals essentially with the quality of leadership at the helm of decision-making. In most governmental systems, this is composed of a large pool of an admixture of professionals and political office holders that deliberate, and presumably decide on the best policy options for the state. However, within the large pool, the personalities of the Head of the Foreign/External Ministry (Minister/Secretary of State) and the Head of State (President, Prime-Minister, etc) are crucial in very many circumstances. The idiosyncrasies of the Head of State, especially with the executive powers attached to the office, play a massive role in the country's foreign policy direction. The Executive Order signed by President Trump shortly after assumption of office relating to immigration in general, and the status of the citizens of some select majority Muslim states in particular, is a clear exhibition of the import of leadership idiosyncrasy on foreign policy direction.

Of equal importance is the issue of domestic political, social and economic conditions, in respect of foreign policy initiatives. The extent of the impact of these conditions are most felt when a state does not measure to acceptable standards among the comity of nations. Hypothetically, a state contending against issues of political instability, social disharmony and economic underdevelopment, would not have the capability to extract concessions and make meaningful impact on the international system. This is the situation with perpetually war-torn countries of South Sudan and Central African Republic (until recently), whose capacity for equality in the international system has been greatly diminished by the subsisting conditions of their domestic environments. In effect, a state's status on the international arena is largely a function of the domestic conditions.

At the level of externalities, states may be compelled to fashion their

foreign policy direction in line with circumstances beyond their control. The international system as the external environment of states is a vast space in which both state and non-state actors exist. Indeed, "all states are regarded as being fundamentally captured by the imperatives of the international system" (Clarke and White 1981, 62). Thus, each state may be compelled to respond to stimuli generated by any of the actors in the system. For instance, the phenomenon of international terrorism has informed radical reactions from presumed target states that are determined to protect their homelands. In the case of the United States and some European countries, especially France and Germany, have for sometime beamed their foreign policy searchlights on ISIS and all other terrorist organisations around the world. Similarly, Nigeria has intensified cooperation with other members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission in order to end Boko Haram terrorist activities. Another example is the Brexit vote of 2016, which triggered a reassessment of relations with Britain by a number of states in the light of the development, and how this would impact on the overall relationship with the European Union. The hazy nature of both conditions in, and the consequences of foreign policy actions on the external environment poses grave difficulties for decision-makers. As noted by Weber and Smith (2013, 13):

The attempt to influence behaviour across national boundaries where there are none of the supports provided by national law, culture or habits of obedience, where knowledge is restricted and where the consequences of actions are very difficult to estimate, gives a fundamental element of delicacy and risk which is absent from any other areas of policy making.

For foreign policy decision-makers therefore, the two environments play critical roles in foreign policy formulation and implementation. According to Webber and Smith (2013, 30):

One of the key tests of an effective foreign policy is thus the ways in which the foreign policy makers can appraise the shifting array of forces in the arena, respond to those forces and use the opportunities they create.

Nigeria's case has been a tortuous journey of juxtaposing the underlying principles of the national interest, against the demands of internal and external pressures on foreign policy formulation and implementation.

## Historicising Nigeria's Foreign Policy

Nigeria came into the world stage with a relatively intimidating stature.

With the country's numerical preponderance over all other states in Africa, and the quantity of natural resources within the state, it was presumed that Nigeria had the potentials to dominate global politics in favour of Africa in general, and for its own benefit in particular. Kolawole (2005, 873) elaborates on this position thus:

By her resources and size, Nigeria was expected to be at the front seat of Africa providing with others, the necessary leadership and weapons to fight the clutches of colonialism, neo-colonialism, under-development, poverty, famine and racial discrimination.

From the benefits of hindsight, Nigeria's foreign policy record is a mixed bag of successes and failures, dynamism and moderation.

During the First Republic which lasted between independence in 1960 and early 1966, "the Nigerian government pursued modest foreign policy aims" (Meierding 2007, 6). While some remarkable actions were taken to announce that Nigeria had come of age with its independence and sovereignty, there were also some other pressing issues that received pacifist and moderate reactions from the Nigerian government. The Nigerian government was a core member of the Monrovia Group that embraced the gradual approach to African unity, while some other states, led by Ghana were vociferous in their belief in the immediate political unification of African states (Kumssa and Jones 2015, 16). The Nigerian policy position has variously been attributed to the Prime-Minister's personal idiosyncrasy. The pacifist and gradual orientation of the Prime-Minister was however curtailed from robbing off entirely on the foreign policy agenda of government. For instance, the informed public was instrumental to the 1961 action of the Nigerian government over the French detonation of atomic bombs in the Sahara (Stremlau 1977, 11).

Military incursion in Nigerian politics, starting from January 15th 1966 opened a new vista for the country's foreign policy behaviour. Under the circumstances, the nature of military dictatorship put paid to the hitherto democratic processes of foreign policy formulation. The political arrangement privileged the military Head-of-State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces with the executive powers, and indeed, he could cause the initiation and implementation of policies with minimal recourse to individuals or state institutions. It meant a massive reduction in the influence of both the institutions of government and the articulate public in respect of foreign policy positions. However, the impact of the new orientation was not immediately felt because the political instability caused by the two coup d'état and the subsequent civil war of 1967-1970, left little room for foreign policy adventures. For most part, the government's focus was the military security aspect of the nation's foreign

policy. At war end however, Nigeria maintained her indissolubility, thereby remaining numerically preponderant, and had also become a major producer of crude-oil, in addition to other natural resources that abound on its territory.

Thus, the post-war conditions provided the military leadership the leverage to turn Nigeria's potential greatness to real greatness through the foreign policy machinery. Nigeria's position as a leading member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) became even more pronounced; a platform that the Nigerian government used to maximum effects in the pursuit of the commitment and dedication to the cause of the black race anywhere in the world. Furthermore, Nigeria emerged as "the undisputed political leader of its sub-region" (Meierding 2007, 4). Under the Gowon administration, Nigeria worked with other West African states to ensure the establishment of a viable regional organisation that would be to the benefit of all. The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) emerged in 1975 as a result of the Nigerian government's diplomatic exertions (Anigekwu 2002). The commitment towards the emancipation of the black race continued to feature prominently in the foreign policy agenda of the succeeding Muhammed/Obasanjo regime. The personalities of the two leaders, in addition to the immense resources that accrued from the sale of crude-oil to the international market gave Nigeria the impetus to play an impressive foreign policy role at this time. After the death of General Muhammed and the assumption of office of General Obasanjo as the Head-of-State, Nigeria's foreign policy received increased momentum. The period between 1976 and 1979 is rightly described as the 'Golden Age' of Nigeria's foreign policy (Inamete 2001, 103). Landmark decisions were made, not just for Nigeria's interests, but for the interest of the black race. The Afro-centric focus of Nigeria's foreign policy was quite pronounced during the period. For instance, Nigeria nationalised the assets of British Petroleum (Genova 2010) and Barclays Bank (Osaghae 1998, 107) as a response to the British government's clandestine sale of oil to the government of former Rhodesia. In summary, "the Muhammed/Obasanjo administration (1975-79) pursued a purposeful, focussed and positively aggressive foreign policy for Nigeria" (Kolawole 2005, 873).

By 1979, a civilian government emerged at the end of a commendable transition to civil rule programme. By all accounts, the Shagari administration continued with the predecessor regime's policy of making Africa, the centre piece of Nigeria's foreign policy. However, there is a consensus that the Obasanjo regime's achievements in foreign policy pursuits pales the Shagari regime's efforts into irrelevance. It is however imperative to consider the differences in both the domestic and external settings of foreign policy making under both administrations. In the case of the Shagari presidency, there were many

more domestic variables that impacted on foreign policy making. Essentially, the dynamics of civilian politicking is distinct from conditions under military dictatorship. While decisions may be taken with fiat and under minimal consultation under military dictatorship, a democratically elected government would have to contend with numerous domestic factors (political parties, parliament, informed public, civil society organisations, etc) before arriving at the most acceptable interpretation of what stands for the national interest. The challenge was compounded under the Shagari administration by the state of the national economy. Ihonvbere (1987, 268) notes that the Shagari administration came into governance on the heels of “an economy and society that was badly distorted, disarticulated and crisis-ridden. The state, in spite of the ‘benefits’ of the civil war, was as unstable, pre-hegemonic and weak as ever”. Furthermore, “foreign policy in the Second Republic was influenced by the high level of instability generated by cut-throat and bitter politicking, waste and misplaced priorities at the centre and states, corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency and ineffectiveness” (Ihonvbere 1987, 270). In the final analysis, Nigeria’s foreign policy profile declined terribly during the period of the Shagari administration (1979-1983).

As Shaw (1987, 42) perceptively notes: “With the inevitable bursting of the bubble in the early 1980s the rentier state became a debtor state and the soldiers returned to abort the second Shagari presidency”. The return of the military in 1984 signalled the return of repression and dictatorship. Based on practical evidence of records of despoliation of the state, the Buhari administration focussed most attention on revamping the economy and changing the orientation and the value system of Nigerians. Although the Buhari regime of 1984-1985 was regarded as brutal and uncompromising in the execution of its domestic policies, it cannot however be accused of shying away from making difficult foreign policy decisions. For instance, in a repeat of the Shagari administration’s position of expelling illegal aliens (most of which were West African citizens), the Buhari military regime equally adopted a protectionist move by expelling illegal migrants, mostly citizens of neighbouring West African states in 1985 (The Associated Press 1985). One of the remarkable decisions of Nigeria’s foreign policy during the Buhari administration was the declaration as *persona non grata* and expulsion of the British High Commissioner to Nigeria, following developments after the ‘Dikko Affair’ (Akinsanya 1985).

By August 27th 1985, a new government came into existence through a palace coup d’état that ended the Buhari regime. The Babangida regime ranks perhaps amongst the most ambitious in its handling of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Though both the internal and external settings were quite distinct, yet the Babangida regime was determined to re-enact the glorious days of Nigeria’s

foreign policy by deepening Nigeria's Africa centred foreign policy agenda, and by extension, the survival and well-being of the black race. The foreign policy agenda was positioned to align with the challenges within the domestic arena. The reversal of the downward slope of Nigeria's economy received tremendous attention and formed the basis for a very strong relationship with the West. The foreign policy thrust at this time was 'Economic Diplomacy' which was essentially tied to a programme of developing the domestic economy (Salami 2014). The Babangida administration also undertook some ambitious foreign policy adventures such as, the "Technical Aids Corps Scheme" (Adebanwi 2011, 12) and the "Concert of Medium Powers" (Salami 2013). However, one of the most daring foreign policy steps of the government was the initiation of the idea, and the provision of human and material resources for ECOWAS' intervention in war-torn Liberia. The Nigerian government in partnership with other ECOWAS states, through the activation of the Protocol on Mutual Defence Assistance of 1981 set up an ECOWAS Military Observer Group, called the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene for the purpose of restoring order in Liberia (Pitts 1999). This move, and others such as supporting Nigerians in their bid to take up international responsibilities, like Rilwanu Lukman as OPEC Chairman, Joe Garba as President of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and Emeka Anyaoku as the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations, all projected Nigeria's image positively on the global stage. In a dramatic twist, all the gains recorded on the foreign policy arena were frittered with the ambition of the Military President to continue his stay in power by truncating the highly expensive and long-drawn transition to civilian rule programme. With the unsuccessful attempt at the elongation of the regime, the Babangida administration only succeeded in battering the image of the military, and indeed, the image of the government of Nigeria.

When a contrived Interim National Government (ING) was inaugurated in 1993, the international community was already displeased with the Nigerian government and all its creations. It was apparent that the world would only deal with a Nigerian government that emerged from the will of the people through the ballot box. Thus, Nigeria's relationship with the rest of the world, especially the traditional friends in the West only got worse when on 17th November, 1993, General Abacha sacked the ING and took over the reins of governance.

Arguably, Nigeria suffered the worst period of her foreign policy during the regime of General Abacha. The hostility from the international community made the government assume both a combative and defensive posture in the pursuit of its foreign policy agenda. Surely the period is remarkable for the highest regime of sanctions imposed on Nigeria, and particularly the members



of the Nigerian military by the international community (Onoja 2006, 117). The Abacha regime was determined to relate with the rest of the world on its own terms, thus, courting opprobrium for itself across the globe and eventually turning Nigeria to a “pariah state” (Ajayi 2005, 54). The government refused to budge under the pressure mounted by the West, essentially in respect of the withdrawal of the military from politics, and the handing over of government to the presumed winner of the June 12, 1993 Presidential Elections (Obadare 1999). While the face-off lasted, the Abacha government continued to pursue a core agenda of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Under the Abacha government, Nigeria made remarkable strides in peacekeeping efforts around West Africa; reinstalling the democratically elected President of Sierra Leone and intervening in the Liberian crisis, through the provision of human and material resources at the disposal of ECOMOG (Vann 1998). Nigeria was still in the state of foreign policy uncertainties when General Abacha died on 8th June, 1998. Based on records of the immediate past, the international community continued to treat the Nigerian military government with apprehension and suspicion. The succeeding General Abubakar regime had the unenviable burden of winning back the confidence of the rest of the world, starting with Nigeria’s traditional friends. For this purpose, revolutionary and unprecedented steps were taken to stabilise the domestic political arena. In this regard, most political prisoners were freed; a step that provided the enabling environment for the enthronement of democracy. On May 29th, 1999 a new democratic government was sworn-in to commence the journey of the fourth republic.

The Obasanjo administration was in office for two-terms of eight years (1999-2007). As a consequence of Nigeria’s battered image, one of the government’s first major responsibilities was a rebranded foreign policy attitude. According to Alao (2011, 6): “The desire to balance the domestic and external necessitated an initial foreign policy that required extensive outreach diplomacy during the early years of the Obasanjo administration”. Banking on the President’s immense goodwill around the globe, the era of a dynamic, flamboyant and adventurous foreign policy had surely returned to Nigeria. On the basis of domestic conditions, the government based its foreign policy thrust on four main pillars. These were; debt cancellation, recovery of stolen wealth, reintegration of Nigeria into the comity of nations, and the attraction of foreign direct investment. These policies were vigorously pursued through ‘Shuttle Diplomacy’ anchored by a peripatetic President. This agenda did not however take away from Nigeria’s regional interest and the Afro-centric focus of the country’s foreign policy. Before the end of the first term of office of the Obasanjo regime, there were impressive results from these exertions. Nigeria had once again become an important player in global politics; substantial amount of sto-

len funds were being returned to Nigeria from where they were stashed, Nigeria's debt overhang was reduced by international creditors, and foreign direct investments became visible sights in Nigeria. Similarly, Nigeria continued to play its big-brother role in the sub-region, first by helping to avert political crisis in Togo after the death of Gnassingbe Eyadema (Ebeku 2005, 22), and restoring the democratic elected government of Sao Tome and Principe to power (Mordi et al. 2003). In addition, Nigeria continued to play its self-assigned role on the continent by cooperating with other states to facilitate the transformation of the erstwhile OAU to the African Union. Furthermore, the cooperation between the two aspiring regional hegemonies led to the creation of the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Indeed, it was obvious that a new administration would have a big task in maintaining the tempo created for Nigeria's foreign policy under the Obasanjo regime.

On May 29th 2007, Umaru Yar'Adua was sworn-in as the President of Nigeria. The initial jittery steps occasioned by the uncertainty of legitimacy did not help the direction of governance until the Supreme Court affirmed Yar'Adua's election as the President of Nigeria (Shehu and Benjamin 2008). The foreign policy thrust of the Yar'Adua administration was 'Citizen Diplomacy' (Dickson 2010). In effect, this was interpreted as the unalloyed commitment of government towards the safety and protection of Nigerian citizens anywhere in the world. This focus was prompted by the outcry against the poor treatment of Nigerian citizens in Diaspora. This thrust did not however disrupt the exercise of Nigeria's traditional responsibilities at the regional and continental levels. Upon Yar'Adua's untimely death in 2010, Vice-President, Goodluck Jonathan assumed office as the President for the duration of their joint-ticket. At the expiration of the first-term, President Jonathan contested and won the Presidential Election in 2011, and thus, presided over Nigeria till 2015. Under the Jonathan administration, Nigeria made a reasonable showing on the global stage. Specifically, the administration based its foreign policy endeavours on improving the domestic challenges. The attainment of the objectives of the regime's foreign policy was embedded in the attainment of the domestic policy thrust 'Transformation Agenda' (Jaji and Ayotunde 2016). The government reached out to the rest of the world in seeking assistance for the development of the local economy. Also, strong positions were taken in respect of issues concerning the region and the continent as a whole. Nigeria sided with the West in respect of the political crises in Cote d'Ivoire (Stearns 2011) and Libya (Kalu 2011). Similarly, the government worked assiduously to ensure the delisting of Nigeria from the US terror list (Odiogor 2011). On the downside though, the inability of the government to crush the Boko Haram insurgents cast a dark cloud on the Jonathan

administration's domestic and foreign policy agenda.

Former President Jonathan lost the presidential election to Major General Muhammadu Buhari in 2015. In similar circumstances to former President Obasanjo, President Buhari now contends with issues that did not hinder foreign policy pursuits while he was a military Head of State between 1984 and 1985. Constrained by series of factors within the domestic environment, the President has limited powers to personalise the domestic or foreign policy agenda. Despite the limitations imposed by the prevailing democratic arrangement, the Buhari government has so far demonstrated the capacity for a robust foreign policy agenda. On the basis of the campaign promises, the administration's foreign policy agenda is structured to assist in the fight against Boko Haram, galvanise the domestic economy for attracting foreign direct investment, and court global cooperation in the fight against corruption.

## **State of Nigeria's Domestic Environment under the Buhari Administration**

The Buhari administration gained political power during one of the most critical times in Nigeria's history. The government is confronted with challenges built up by decades of mismanagement and maladministration (Omale 2016). Indeed, it appears that 'the chickens have come home to roost', because at this time, Nigeria is facing perhaps, the most difficult internal security problem in its history, coupled with the challenge of the worst economic recession in twenty-five years (Ishiekwene 2016). Furthermore, the challenges are compounded by limited resources, especially as a result of overdependence on income from the sale of petroleum products which is currently experiencing low prices at the international market. The problems are multiplied by the pressures exerted on the state by various groups; political, economic, religious and ethnic, struggling to attract government's attention. On the basis of these, the Buhari administration had its work cut out for it from the outset. The major thrusts of the administration's domestic policies are; revamping the domestic economy, ensuring the protection of lives and properties as a response to the spate of security issues across the country, and lastly, ending corrupt practices (prosecuting corrupt cases and preventing the art of corruption at the highest level).

On assumption of office of the Buhari administration on May 29th, 2015, the Nigerian economy had become the biggest economy in Africa (Vanguard 2016). Despite this accolade though, the conditions of the critical sectors of the economy are debilitating, causing untold hardship for the generality of

the people, who have to face rising inflation, while the purchasing power continues to reduce drastically. The Buhari administration had to contend with a great external shock induced by the heavy drop in global oil prices. As a result, "the Nigerian government faces a budget deficit of more than \$11 billion" (Scott 2016). This was compounded by the activities of 'economic saboteurs' who disrupt the flow of oil production thereby causing reduction in the daily production of Nigeria's major income earner; crude-oil. With a huge deficit inherited from the Jonathan administration (Tukur 2015), it is no surprise that the Nigerian economy entered into recession for the first time in twenty-five years. Government is unable to meet up with its obligation in terms of recurrent expenditure, while being unable to embark on capital projects. These problems have led to soaring inflation, unemployment and reduction in the purchasing power of ordinary Nigerians.

The security challenge of the country has an international dimension. The Boko Haram terrorist insurgency in the North-Eastern part of the country brought global attention to Nigeria through both its activities in Nigeria, and other countries within West Africa. Dating back to 2010, the Boko Haram group continues to unleash terror and mayhem on institutions and individuals across the northern part of the country. Prior to the commencement of the Buhari administration, the country was besieged by the criminal activities of the group, among which was the sacking of, and hoisting its flag in Damboa community, the bombing of the Police headquarters in Abuja, the attack on the UN office in Abuja, and other daring bombings of 'soft' targets (Smith 2014). Perhaps the dominant discourse in the activities of the group so far, is the brazen act of insolence with which the group invaded and abducted two hundred and seventy-six secondary school girls in a night at Chibok, Bornu state in April, 2014 (BBC News 2016). Despite the global outcry against this action, the group keeps majority of the school children in captivity more than two years after. All attempts by the Nigerian government to rescue the school children have so far failed. This is the unenviable burden inherited by the Buhari administration from the Jonathan administration. Based on its campaign promises, the Buhari administration immediately swung into action to address the Boko Haram menace upon assumption of office. In relative terms, the Buhari administration's success in the short-term has surpassed whatever was achieved under the Jonathan administration. While majority of the Chibok girls are still in captivity, there is however a noticeable reduction in the capacity of the Boko Haram group to wreck havoc. On record, the group has been chased out of its fortress in the Sambisa Forest of the North-East part of Nigeria. Whatever capacity remains for the group is now expended on low-level attacks against 'soft' targets in Nigeria and neighbouring countries (Vandiver 2016).

Asides from the high incidences of kidnapping and other regular challenges of insecurity, the Buhari administration was equally faced with the activities of economic saboteurs from the South-South geo-political zone of the country. The Niger Delta Avengers is the umbrella body of disgruntled elements in the South-South bent on causing government's attention to bear on the economic, environmental and social conditions of the area. The group's method is to disrupt oil production by blowing up pipe-lines that serve as conduit in the production of crude oil for the international market (Hinshaw and Kent 2016). This act of economic sabotage continues to cost Nigeria the much needed revenue, especially at a time when the world is witnessing great reduction in the prices of crude-oil in the international market. Concerned about the negative implications of their activities, the government continually makes efforts to 'pacify' the group by focussing attention on the development of the area. For instance, a reversal of the despoliation of their lands is being undertaken through the 'Ogoniland Clean' project (Alike 2016). As the administration engages the Niger Delta people in the solution to the problems in the area, there is a noticeable reduction in the negative activities of the Avengers, with direct impact on oil production, and positive implications on revenue accruing to government.

Deriving from the President's publicly declared hatred against acts of corruption, the administration made the fight against corruption a pivotal part of its domestic policy. With a focus on the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, the Buhari government deploys the anti-corruption institutions of state; the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) to handle corrupt cases, while putting machinery in motion for blocking loopholes used for corrupt practices. Remarkably, numerous corrupt practices of government officials under the erstwhile Jonathan administration have been uncovered, and the processes of prosecution are ongoing.

These three critical issues; economic revival, provision of adequate security, and the fight against corruption have formed an appreciable part of the basis upon which the Buhari administration has engaged the rest of the world since inception.

## **Nigeria's Foreign Relations under President Buhari**

The Buhari administration was under no illusion that it could solve the multiplicity of problems confronting Nigeria without concrete engagement with the international community. Though not comparable in terms of frequency and number of times as was with President Obasanjo in his first term of office, nonetheless President Buhari equally embarked on high-power 'Shuttle

Diplomacy' in his first year of assumption of office. The purpose of the shuttles, which have been at both bilateral and multilateral levels are tied to solving the domestic challenges of economic recovery, insecurity and fight against corruption.

Shortly after assumption of office, the President undertook a tour of member-states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission in West Africa that are equally affected by the activities of Boko Haram. For the purpose, the President also visited France because of France's interest in West Africa, as a result of the close affinities with her former colonies. The visits were meant to seek collaboration, cooperation and the assistance of the various governments in tackling the Boko Haram menace. In line with the government's determination, the Boko Haram terror issue featured prominently in the president's discussion with the US authorities on his official visit to America. In the final analysis, the contacts made with various governments yielded result in the mould of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) (Assanvo et al. 2016). At present, the Boko Haram terrorist group has been seriously decimated (Somorin 2016), with its existence hinged only on attacks on 'soft' targets.

In the attempt to tackle Nigeria's economic problems, the president has been visible on the world stage, attempting to sell Nigeria as a haven of business opportunities to governments and corporations around the world. Indeed, the president has left the space wide open by not discriminating against any part of the world, either on the basis of ideology or religion. In the search for FDI, the president has made both bilateral and multilateral visits to Europe (France, Germany, Britain), the US, China, United Arab Emirate, Saudi Arabia, amongst many other countries. Some of the efforts have generated visible results, for instance, "the secured commitments for investments worth \$6billion from the Chinese government and private companies most of whom signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with the Nigerian government as well as private companies" (Akwaya 2016). While the economy is still in a terrible state, especially in the period of recession, there are signals that with the monetary and fiscal policies of government, in addition to the giant strides the government has made in establishing contacts and building the confidence of foreign investors, the Nigerian economy is on its way to recovery in a relatively short while.

Finally in this regard, the Buhari administration aggressively sought the commitment and cooperation of the international community in fighting high-level corruption at home. Specifically, the government continually canvasses and lobbies foreign governments, especially in the West where most monies carted by Nigerian government officials are stashed. The cooperation of the foreign governments are sought in the area of refusal to provide safe havens for stolen wealth from Africa. Furthermore, the government is on an aggressive campaign of repatriation of stolen wealth that are already stashed abroad. The

president's trips abroad are meant to win the loyalty of the foreign governments in this regard. One of such shows of support came from the government of the United Arab Emirate as demonstrated in the signing of a bilateral agreement that details the willingness of the UAE to "facilitate the extradition of wanted persons, and seizure of stolen assets among others" (Akwaya 2016). In the quest for a corruption-free Nigeria, the president played a visible role in the London 2016, Anti-Corruption Summit, where emphasis was laid on erecting a strong global coalition against corrupt practices (Wakili 2016).

While the Buhari administration displayed elements of determination and commitment in deploying foreign policy to solve the various challenges at home, the government has equally been alive to its responsibility to the sub-region, in line with the underlying principles of the national interest. This is evidenced in the material and technical support provided for the following countries during their elections; Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Chad and Guinea Conakry. Most recently, the Nigerian government played a significant role as a leading member of ECOWAS to solve an impending political imbroglio in Gambia. The group ensured that the recalcitrant former President Yahya Jammeh vacated office for the democratically elected President Adama Barrow. From all indications, Nigeria, Senegal, Liberia and Ghana, under the auspices of ECOWAS, would have implemented a forceful removal of Yahya Jammeh from office (Freeman 2016).

Equally important in the foreign policy drive is the extent to which President Buhari is willing to make Nigeria relevant in international politics. In most international forums, the president leads the Nigerian delegation, thereby creating visibility for the office of the President of Nigeria and by extension, enhancing the country's image. In this regard, the President has attended and addressed, the UN General Assembly, the African Union Heads of State and Government meeting, the Heads of State and Government Meeting of ECOWAS, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, the COP21 Climate Change Summit, the China-Africa Conference, the Nuclear Security Summit, among numerous others (Akwaya 2016).

Despite the commendable efforts so far made on the foreign policy arena, especially as they relate to achieving positive outcomes in the domestic policy pursuits, the Buhari administration is relatively weak in terms of the pursuit of a concrete diplomatic agenda. It is an irrefutable fact that diplomacy is one of the most critical instruments of foreign policy, hence, the need to accord high level of importance to Nigeria's diplomatic practice. A recurring albatross of Nigeria's diplomatic practice is the lack of funds experienced by many of the diplomatic missions in various capitals of the world (Aremu 2016, 534). This unacceptable practice hinders the capacity of the missions to carry out their

responsibilities effectively and efficiently, with negative consequences on the efforts made by government from home. The government appears to be addressing the challenge by shutting down some of the diplomatic missions that are considered unviable (Salawu and Echewofun 2016) perhaps so that funds can be made available to the diplomatic missions in capitals presumed to be of strategic importance to Nigeria's national interest. This position may appear logical on the surface, it however impedes government's efforts in taking advantage of opportunities across the globe. With the dynamic nature of globalisation, there is a sense in keeping diplomatic relations with as many state actors as possible, for the possibility of the strategic importance of a state may arise at short notice. Moreover, given the itinerant nature of the average Nigerian, government must be conscious of providing representation in as many countries as possible.

A related development in this regard is the slow pace of appointing Ambassadors and High Commissioners to head the various diplomatic missions. As a critical element of foreign policy pursuit, the diplomatic machinery must be fortified to the highest level. A situation in which the appointment of the country's highest representatives take too long to be finalised does not bode well for the relationship between Nigeria and the country starved of the highest level representative. It is therefore imperative for both the executive and legislature to harmonise the processes of nominating, confirming, and approving Nigeria's highest ranking representatives abroad.

## Options for Buhari's Foreign Policy towards Africa

The nature and character of Nigeria's foreign policy towards Africa continues to be a core issue in the country's foreign policy pursuit. The desire to play an active role in Africa was a priority for Nigeria's founding fathers, hence, the notion that Nigeria has a 'manifest destiny' in Africa. It was therefore not unusual that the onerous task of Africa's development forms part of the underlying principles of the national interest. Nigeria's attainment of a leadership role in Africa therefore comes with the aspiration of becoming Africa's sole hegemon. The prospects were evident during the 'Golden Age' of Nigeria's foreign policy in the 1970s, but it all faded with the 'uninspiring' foreign policy pursuits of successive administrations, especially the combative foreign policy posture of the Abacha era (Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike 2016). President Obasanjo made spirited attempts at reinforcing Nigeria's position as Africa's foremost leading nation by collaborating with South Africa on many Africa-centred projects. For instance, the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) were established at the behest of both Nigeria and South Africa. However, Africa's problems remain



immense, and at this time, the continent beckons on a country like Nigeria to facilitate its growth and development. Here lies the opportunity for Nigeria to claim the position of Africa's hegemon. According to Meierding (2007, 12): "In addition to being conditioned by leaders' personal preferences and by domestic political circumstances, Nigerian foreign policy has also been consistently influenced by prevailing dynamics in the international system". President Buhari's administration must seek a convergence between the aims and objectives of both the domestic and foreign policies. We hereby isolate a critical issue of global importance with which President Buhari can latch unto to elevate Nigeria's status for the position of Africa's hegemon.

There are divisions among scholars and practitioners on the justification (moral or legal) for prosecuting Africa's cases at the International Criminal Court (ICC). The divisions arise from the structure and processes of the ICC and the seeming unfairness and lopsidedness in the subjects of prosecution (Nyabola 2012). The ICC was established on the strength of the Rome Statute which came into effect on 1st July, 2002. Specifically, the ICC is meant to prosecute individuals (essentially at the highest political level) accused of committing any of the following four crimes; genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. There are one hundred and twenty-four State Parties to the Rome Statute, out of which Africa contributes thirty-four states (that is the highest number of any bloc of states from any region of the world). Despite the preponderance of membership, there is growing discontent within Africa about the logic of membership of the Assembly of State Parties of the Rome Statute (BBC News 2017). The discontent has contributed in building an AU bulwark against the ICC in respect of international criminal justice system in Africa and for African leaders.

One of the issues informing AU's reservations about the ICC as a just and impartial international court for criminal justice deals with an aspect of the processes of investigation and prosecution of cases. According to Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute:

A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is on the basis of this provision, that the ICC issued an arrest warrant on President Al-Bashir of Sudan over the Darfur crisis in 2005 and the prosecution of the *dramatis personae* in the 2011 Libya crisis. The AU decries such enormous powers being exercised by an undemocratic UN Security Council. Moreover, three of the permanent members of the Security Council, namely;

China, Russia and the United States are not members of the Assembly of State Parties of the Rome Statute. For this purpose, the AU regards the ICC with little respect, and indeed, attempts to frustrate the efforts of the ICC in respect of the arrest warrant issued against President Al-Bashir (Mbola 2010). Specifically, the AU at its 13th Summit of Heads of States and Governments in July 2009 adopted the 'Policy of Non-Cooperation' towards the arrest of President Al-Bashir (Chigara and Nwakwo 2015). A number of African countries, including Nigeria, have been sympathetic towards this cause. Although acting with caution, none of the African members of Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute arrested President Al-Bashir in their territory whenever he had reasons to visit.

The AU seems to claim it has no grouse against a system that prosecutes violators of international humanitarian laws, however, the mechanisms, processes and structures must be based on fairness, justice and equity. These are qualities lacking in the ICC as presently constituted. Therefore, the AU within its ranks has proposed to establish its own international criminal justice system. The AU has proposed to expand the jurisdiction of the existing African Court of Justice and Human Rights to cover the grave international crimes of; genocide, war crimes, crime against humanity, and various other transnational crimes. The African Court of Justice and Human Rights was created through the merger of former African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union, and it is the belief of majority member states of the AU that the court can competently handle cases of international criminal justice.

The discontent about the character of Africa's international criminal justice system provides Nigeria the opportunity to lay claim to the leadership of the African continent. Like it happened under the regime of General Muhammed in the early 1970s, when Nigeria galvanised the rest of independent Africa, under the auspices of the OAU, and indeed, defied the 'instruction' of President Gerald Ford of the US to go all out against the white-supremacist regimes in southern Africa in general, and the apartheid regime in South Africa in particular. Nigeria matched its actions with words with immediate human and material resources extended to the freedom fighters in Angola (Ashaver 2014, 291). This was subsequently followed up with immense support for the various liberation movements, which granted the status of Frontline state to Nigeria.

Nigeria is on the threshold of history, and thus, must seize the opportunity to work with the AU in ensuring the mass withdrawal of African states from the ICC. On the basis of its structure and processes, and in addition, its bias Afro-centric list of prosecutions, the ICC represents a symbol of the West's continued domination of Africa. Nigeria must therefore work assiduously to ensure

the creation, functioning and sustenance of the enlargement of the scope and jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights to include the prosecution of the high-profile international crimes. Just like the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime's efforts of the 1970s and former President Obasanjo's and former President Mbeki's collaboration of the early 2000s, President Buhari must place the African agenda at the core of Nigeria's foreign policy, so that Nigeria can attain the deserving position of Africa's hegemon. Leading the charge for the establishment of a truly African international criminal court of justice is a step in the right direction for the Buhari administration.

## Conclusion

From all indications, the Nigerian government is under pressure to fulfil its campaign promises. The foreign policy initiatives of the Buhari administration has been critical in seeking panaceas to the numerous domestic challenges in Nigeria. Nigeria must however not shy away from its responsibilities towards the African continent, because the country's destiny is tied to the growth and development of the continent. It is acknowledged that Nigeria plays a leadership role in West Africa, however, the leadership role must be 'forcefully' extended to the rest of the continent. Literature is awash with Nigeria's enviable role in the political and economic development of Africa in the 1970s, President Obasanjo attempted a re-enactment of the feat in the 2000s, but subsequent regimes did not follow up on the achievements recorded. This is the time for the Buhari administration to step up and be counted.

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## ABSTRACT

There is a constant stream of discourses on Nigeria's foreign policy behaviour by scholars and policy makers alike. This owes largely to the unpredictable nature of the country's actions and inactions on the global arena. Over the decades, there have been periods of dynamic foreign policy posturing, as well as the era of moderate foreign policy behaviour, and the combative approach to foreign policy. In large part, the prevailing attitudes are induced by the conditions in the two environments of foreign policy. This paper interrogates the impact of the conditions of the domestic milieu on the foreign policy behaviour of the Buhari administration. The analysis is based on the juxtaposition of variables in both the domestic and external environments of foreign policy. On the strength of data gathered from secondary sources, it is observed that the subsisting domestic conditions have great influences on Nigeria's foreign policy behaviour under the Buhari administration. However, in the overall interest of projecting, promoting and protecting Nigeria's national interest, the Buhari administration must continually balance the scale between domestic and foreign policy pursuits.

## KEYWORDS

Nigeria; Buhari; Foreign policy; Domestic policy; Environmental variables.

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# CAPE VERDE AND THE ATLANTIC SPACE

Francisco Proença Garcia<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

Traditionally when we look at the World Map it is usual to see the Mercator cylindrical map projection, centered on the Euro-Atlantic region; but in Geopolitics we know that there are several perspectives of the same geographical reality, and that the center of the Map is chosen according to our notion of belonging to a certain space. And in the background, different historical experiences result in distinct interest narratives and normative preferences in commerce or security. For example, Nicholas Spykman (1969), in a fine extension of the Thomas Mahan tradition, considered in his analysis the American Continent as central, demonstrating how it holds a favorable geographic position because it is facing the two oceans (the Atlantic and the Pacific) which gives it access to the main commercial routes of the world.

In International Relations and Geopolitics it is common to say nowadays that there was a transition from the centrality of the political and economic power of the Euro-Atlantic area to the Asia-Pacific region (Nye 2014; Biscop et al. 2015). But in our approach our objective is to show that there is a reaffirmation of the Atlantic Space, especially by maintaining the geoeconomic importance of the European Community by the new dynamism of the transatlantic link, but above all by the interest shown by the emerging and re-emergent powers in the South Atlantic.

In this scenario, Cape Verde has an integrating role throughout the Atlantic Space due to its geographic location that strengthens several belongings. The country is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and has a Special Partnership with the European Union (EU); at the same time it is a part of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) and has hosted military exercises of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-

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<sup>1</sup> Associate Professor at the Institute of Political Studies, Catholic University of Portugal.  
E-mail: franciscoproencagarcia@iep.lisboa.ucp.pt

zation (NATO) in its territory, reason enough to shift our curiosity towards a geopolitical study relating this archipelago of the African coast with the Atlantic Space.

## The Atlantic Space

From a geographical point of view, the Atlantic space encompasses 86 million and 560 thousand square kilometers, or 23.9% of the land surface, covering 30 countries in the Americas, 11 in Europe and 24 in Africa (Correia 2010), all of them very heterogeneous from the political, economic, social and cultural point of view.

This immense body of water connecting the North Pole to the Antarctic includes the Gulf of Mexico, the North, Baltic, Caribbean, Black and Mediterranean Seas, and it is possible to consider six accesses: two in the north (northeast and northwest), two in the center (the Panama Canal and the Strait of Gibraltar) and two in the south (Drake Passage, Cape of Good Hope), having its smaller width between Natal (Brazil) and Freetown (Sierra Leone), defining the line that joins these two points as the geopolitical equator (Correia 2010).

The vast space of the Atlantic Basin is characterized by its accentuated heterogeneity parallel to increasing factors of interdependence. In this space, we find a community of shared values such as democracy and free trade, which coexist with different political, economic, social and cultural traditions in different regions and countries (Grevi 2016). In the Atlantic space, we find different levels of economic development, institutional and security stability, ideologies, religious cleavages, family organizations and interpretations of values such as the Human Rights.

From the geopolitical point of view, the North Atlantic is more homogeneous than the Middle or South Atlantic, characterizing the so-called West, a shared community of common values.

## Political Regimes and Systems

Analyzing the map from a point of view of regimes and political systems we find that in the Atlantic area, most countries are democracies, more precisely 62 democracies, 12 regimes considered hybrids and 7 authoritarian regimes (Gratius 2015); in Europe, democratic regimes predominate (88% of countries), with a smaller percentage in America (only 2/3 of countries) and only 20% of countries are considered democracies in Atlantic Africa, 43% are

autocracies and 37% are hybrid regimes (Gratius 2015)<sup>2</sup>.


On the other hand, we also verified the existence of a multiplicity of political units in a fragile condition (weak, failed or collapsed). According to the Fund for Peace index of 2016, in the Atlantic Basin there are 12 political units in this situation, of which 11 are in Africa and one in the Caribbean, Haiti<sup>3</sup>.

## Economy and resources

The economic and investment interdependence in the Atlantic basin has been increasing since the beginning of the century. Its intensity varies, since there is great diversification and differentiation of the economies. Between North America and Europe, trade accounts for 40% of the total crossing the Atlantic, followed by EU-Africa trade (21%) and between North and South and Central America trade (18%) (Grevi 2016).

Figure 1 represents the traffic of ships in the several existing maritime lines of communication, with a higher density between the two development poles in the North Atlantic, USA and Europe, which reflects the commercial dynamics between the two margins, but we can also verify a significant South-North sea traffic, for example, the one expressed in the figure, which portrays the density of traffic between Brazil and the rest of the world.

Figure 1 – Domains of maritime circulation



Source: European Union External Action 2014.

<sup>2</sup> For further statistical data, check <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016>.

<sup>3</sup> For further data, see <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/>.

Maritime traffic in the Maritime Communication Lines (Linhas de Comunicações Marítimas, LCM) of the Brazilian coast accounts for an average of 359 daily merchant ships (MS/d) and annually moves more than 350 billion dollars. Among these, can be highlighted:

**Figure 2 – Major Brazilian Maritime Communication Lines (LCM) that cross the South Atlantic**

- LCM with Europe and North Africa, with 215 MS/d;
- LCM with North America, the Caribbean and northern South America, with 68 MS/d;
- LCM with the Brazilian coast, with 359 MS/d;
- LCM with the Gulf of Guinea (central Africa), with 40 MS/d;
- LCM with the Southern Cone and the Pacific Ocean, with 77 MS/d;
- LCM with southern Africa, the Middle East, and Asia through the Cape of Good Hope (Cape Route), with 65 MS/d.

**Source: Guerra 2011.**

Despite the significant numerical expression, the South Atlantic is still considered an ocean of transit (Correia, 2010), and the main routes are along the American and African coast. It should be noted, however, that the main South-North routes cross the geopolitical equator and pass close to Cape Verde, which highlights the importance of this and other Macaronesia (Azores, Canary Islands and Madeira) archipelagos.

In a region that can be considered its energy system, the Atlantic Space possesses a large part of unexplored fossil reserves, including 40% of the oil, 20% of the natural gas and 40% of the world coal (BP 2015), also having 67% of the technically recoverable reserves of shale gas, 77% of the installed capacity of solar energy, 64% of the wind energy and 59% of the geothermal energy (Kraemer and Stefes 2016).

The largest proven oil reserves are concentrated in the Americas and part of the Atlantic Africa. In Brazil, for example, oil reserves will be about 46 billion barrels, with the possibility of reaching 70 to 100 billion oil barrels, in addition to a large volume of gas; in Venezuela, the reserves are estimated at 80 billion barrels (Hanson 2008).

In the region of the Gulf of Guinea, oil production accounts for about 16% of the world production. In this unstable region, almost all the oil fields

are located offshore, which guarantees them some security, away from the instability that ravages the continental area (Guedes 2013). This region also includes the Congo Basin (the second largest water and forest complex in the world after the Amazon), which covers nearly two million square kilometers.

## Threats to Security

There are also several threats to transnational security in the Atlantic, the most serious being the previously mentioned weakness of the State. The weakness of the State can and should be related to the other threats, since, having no power or control over the whole of its territory, States are permeable to the germination and development of the most diverse forms of subversion (Garcia and Ferro 2013).

Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), with the funds generated, acquire a level of power that competes with the States of the region. They express this power by the ability to create various forms of instability in the countries they operate, wide-ranging instability, from social to economic, from political to psychological. At the same time, they attempt to indirectly gain political power through the corruption of their sovereign organs and their officials, in order to intimidate the established power to guarantee complete freedom of action in their criminal activities. This situation further undermines the weak State structures.

In the west bank, we can highlight the criminal violence of the drug cartels and the thousands of deaths caused by their actions<sup>4</sup>. Countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, or Mexico struggle to contain the high levels of violent crime that affect state authority (Grevi, 2016).

In West Africa, a region where most countries are among the world's poorest, drug trafficking is estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars. Drug trafficking networks often take advantage of the structural weaknesses of countries such as Guinea-Bissau and, with the approval of local elites, have turned the region into a significant transit center for Europe's distribution route<sup>5</sup>.

In the 2014 report of the *West Africa Commission on Drugs*, data pre-

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4 According to the Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015, published by the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (2015), Central and South America, the Caribbean and South Africa lead in the number of violent deaths.

5 On this subject, the details are in the 2014 report of the West Africa Commission on Drugs, which analyzes the transformation of Guinea Bissau into a major drug center distribution in West Africa: <http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/report>.

sented for 2010 shows that most of the cocaine flow from Latin America to West Africa this year crossed the Cape Verde archipelago from where it was headed for the coast Atlantic region; from this analysis it can also be concluded that Cape Verde is one of the main points of transit between Latin America and the African continent.

Despite this weakness, Cape Verde is considered a success story on the African continent in terms of socioeconomic development and democratic resilience, somehow a pole of stability in a volatile region (Santos, 2014). However, there have been major funding difficulties, particularly for the training of its security forces and services. However, this vulnerability is being covered by international aid, including the inauguration in 2010 of the US-funded Maritime Safety Operations Center (*Centro de Operações de Segurança Marítima*, COSMAR).

These threats are also related to Regional Levels of Conflict. There are numerous conflicts in the Atlantic space, and just to mention the most relevant ones: in the Middle East we have the persistent Israeli-Palestinian problem, the Syrian civil war, and in Iraq, where Daesh asserts itself as a subversive phenomenon on a global scale; in Europe, the problems with Russia remain due to the situation in Ukraine and Georgia; in Turkey, beyond internal convulsions, there is the Cyprus issue and again the Kurdistan problem; in North Africa there remains the issue of the status of Western Sahara, conflicts in Libya, Mali and all manifestations of instability and insecurity in the Sahel; in sub-Saharan Africa we highlight all the conflict in Nigeria, both around the Niger Delta and the Boko Haram; and we should mention the humanitarian disaster in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where violence is endemic.

In the Gulf of Guinea space, piracy represents a clear example of threat that can endanger Western economic and energy security, since this criminal activity prevents the free circulation of goods (among which hydrocarbon ones) in the lines of maritime communication. The piracy phenomenon that manifests itself nowadays in the Gulf of Guinea is responsible for 600 attacks from 2002 till 2012, severely affecting local economy and port activities (Grevi 2016). In 2012, the Nigerian government estimated that 400.00 barrels were stolen daily, at a total monthly cost of one million dollars (Chatham House 2013).

It is interesting to notice that the TCOs that operate in the region, searching for some support of the people, take on some forms of social responsibility, replacing the States in the construction of roads, schools and hospitals.

In addition, in Africa there are economic disparities and exponential

population growth. This breeding ground on the West African coast raises factors that ultimately encourage irregular immigration, forcing populations to move in search of safety and welfare.

The migratory element (as a generator of tension and some instability), with the flow oriented predominantly to the Western countries, where the new communities are hardly integrated in the local societies, increases the expansion of disenchanted and potential affiliates and Combatants for the alternative presented by global subversion.

Irregular immigration, from which the TCOs take advantage, leads to the exploitation of human misery. Look at the dramatic situations of those who seek in the European dream to lessen their misery. In the boats that go to the north bank of the Mediterranean or to the Canaries we find people from all over the African continent. They come mainly from West Africa, but also from Sudan, Chad, Horn of Africa and even from Southern Africa. These immigrants in search of security and welfare are at great risk of life. Many of them cannot remain in the transit countries, which become their final destination. They even stay for years and stage their “jump operation”, which also allows them to have several informal jobs during the trip, which will ensure them to pay for the next step (IOM 2005).

The migratory phenomenon accompanies the Cape Verdean people, and it is inevitable to speak of this phenomenon when talking about the country. Today, as a result of the emigration of several decades ago mainly to Europe, the United States, and Africa, the country has a large diaspora spread around the world and estimated at around 500 thousand citizens (Cardoso 2006). That is, accordingly to the 2010 census, a number similar to those in the archipelago<sup>6</sup>, which strengthens the idea of a global nation in the foreign policy of this small state and serves as a “link in the integration of Cape Verde internationally” (Madeira 2016).

Human mobility also enhances the transfer and sharing of knowledge and culture. In the case of Cape Verde, its diaspora can be considered “a transnational community because emigrants function as a link between Cape Verde and the rest of the world. They support a social relationship between the host country and the country of origin” (Cardoso 2011), providing an important contribution to the country’s economy with its remittances, while also bringing new business models based in the learning achieved in the countries of destination (Ridout and Goerg 2016).

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<sup>6</sup> According to data from the 2010 Census, the Cape Verdean population was 491,875 residents, more about this subject can be found in the website <http://www.ine.cv/dadostats/dados.aspx?d=1>

With the economic and financial crisis and the instability that has plagued several countries in the region, Cape Verde has also become a destination country for emigration, mainly due to free movement policies for ECOWAS citizens. This situation contributes greatly to the intellectual, political and academic debate about the country's integration in that community (Madeira 2013), its economic impact, but above all the cultural and identity impact.

## International Organizations

The Atlantic space represents one of the most integrated regions due to the role played by several International Organizations, of the most diverse purposes. Without being exhaustive: the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries (CPLP), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS). These organizations eventually constituted a network of platforms that connect these Atlantic countries and, concomitantly, "contributed to the diversification of foreign relations for many countries of the global South" (Ridout and Goerg 2016).

In our essay, only three of these International Organizations that possess relevant politics and practices to the Atlantic security will be addressed.

## The European Union

The Atlantic, which characterizes EU's western frontier, is the great maritime space that defines two thirds of European borders, involving four seas (the Baltic, the North, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea) and many archipelagos, with some of them being considered as in an ultra-outlying position, such as Reunion, Guyana, Madeira and Martinique.

The sea has a significant value in the European economy, since the maritime regions represent 40% of Europe's GDP. The EU also owns 40% of the maritime transport's global fleet. One clear example of the importance that the bloc attributes to the sea is the existence of six agencies whose main concern are sea issues (Frontex, EDA, EMSA, EEA, ACCP, ESA) (Correia 2010), still existing a handful of diverse politics regarding the sea, in which we can emphasize the Blue Book (an EU integrated maritime policy), the Atlantic Action Plan, and the Maritime Security Strategy.



The execution of the strategy to the Atlantic defined by the European Commission demands a great effort by communitarian institutions, member States and even private entities. In the Atlantic Action Plan, to be executed until 2020, there is the establishment of the priorities regarding the investigation, the investment and the reinforcement of competences, which the States may follow as to promote the “blue economy” in the Atlantic region, in a sustainable and inclusive way in the coastal regions.

The Atlantic is vital for EU’s security and welfare; besides the threats and the risks manifested in the maritime global dominium, we must consider that it is through the sea that EU processes 90% of its international trade and 40% of its internal one (Rodrigues 2014). The EU strongly depends on the import of petroleum (88.4%) and gas (65.3%) derived especially from the Middle East and from the Eurasia (Eurostat 2015), being, however, passing through a process of diversifying its supplying sources, including the Atlantic, in such a way that the imports from Africa have grown from 18% to 23% between the years of 2006 and 2014; only in 2014, Europe represented 45% and 20% of the Nigerian and the Angolan exports, respectively (Grevi 2016). In this way, it is imperative to guarantee the freedom of circulation in the sea and the security of its supply.

The goal of the Maritime Security Strategy, adopted in 2014, consists in the defense of the maritime interests that Europe needs to safeguard in the nearby sea area (the one concerning the spaces under the state members’ jurisdiction and its proximities in the high sea), as well as further maritime interests (the security of vital navigation routes, transportation and distribution networks) that may be threatened (Rodrigues 2014).

This strategy aims to enhance EU’s response and it integrates five areas of action: external action; maritime alert; vigilance and information sharing; capacity enhancement; risk management and protection of critical maritime infrastructures; crisis response and, also, innovation and investigation in maritime security, education and training.

The greatest “systemic” threat, nonetheless, is not a result of the current competition between the great powers. On the European side, it is possible to verify a severe identity crisis of the EU as a relevant Organization. In this sense, one can consider that one of the most significant threats is the internal one, and it embodies the renationalization of its External and Common Security and Defense Politics (CSDP).

In a period when memory and history impose themselves upon the treaties, in which we witness at the same time movements against the integration and favorable to the self-exclusion in the EU, we shall properly analyze the consequences brought by such phenomenon to European security and

defense.

The EU has adopted, still, a joint strategy with the AU, based on the principles of belonging and joint responsibility, as well as it has developed several dialogue and cooperation mechanisms in partnership with sub regional African organizations. In the security scope, there are numerous initiatives<sup>7</sup>, particularly in the West Africa and the Sahel regions, involving the ECOWAS, in order to contain the illicit traffic, the piracy and the terrorism. It also had a prominent role in supporting the definition of an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and in projecting military forces under CSDP in support of reforms on both the security and the defense sector in Niger and Mali.

Moreover, as it will be further seen, the US and Brazil are also conducting naval exercises in the west African coast involving regional navies, contributing, therefore, to their training and capacity building.

In Africa's Atlantic coast, the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), which comprises eight countries of the region, also has an important role, especially in the coordination and information exchange, contributing to regional maritime security.

## NATO

It is mandatory to talk about the Atlantic Alliance whereas speaking of security in the Atlantic, which represents a regional alliance with global interests, but that is, also, par excellence, the promoter of the transatlantic connection, maintaining its position as Europe's most important security mechanism.

NATO, aiming at guaranteeing its interests, since its creation, ensures the control of the sea, at least in the North Atlantic. Nowadays, however, in the current maritime security environment, as non-State threats begin to arise and as Russia reemerged, the Alliance, through a maritime strategy adopted in 2011, sought to not only enhance its contribution to defense and security, but also to promote its values. This strategy materializes through its naval operations in four areas: dissuasion and collective defense; crisis management; cooperative security; and maritime security. Regarding the maritime security itself, always within the strict respect of the law, NATO is able to watch and patrol any area defined by the Council, as well as to contribute to the energetic

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<sup>7</sup> The EU Gulf of Guinea Action Plan 2015-2020 and the Sahel Action Plan 2015-2020 are examples of such.

security, being here included critical infrastructures and maritime communication lines (NATO 2011).

It is worth mentioning that Cape Verde also has a strategic importance for NATO. We may here recall that, in 2005, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs from Bulgaria, Salomon Passy, formally proposed the inclusion of the State of Cape Verde in the Atlantic Alliance; furthermore, in July 2006, NATO managed to fulfill the firsts military exercises in Africa, namely the exercise Steadfast Jaguar (Guedes 2012).

## ZOPACAS

In the Security and Defense scope, Cape Verde is still part of another international organization with interests in the South Atlantic, ZOPACAS.

ZOPACAS, created by a Brazilian initiative during the 1986 United Nations General Assembly, comprises 24 countries. Such organization is characterized for being more like a forum “to discuss the management of the South Atlantic space than a military or political entity” (Ridout and Goerg 2016) and has as its main objective the promotion of regional cooperation and the maintenance of peace and security in the South Atlantic region. Besides cooperation initiatives, initiatives of political-diplomatic character stand out, particularly in protecting the environment, avoiding the nuclear proliferation and finding pacific solutions to conflicts between the integrating parties.

ZOPACAS is not a regional integration organization, presenting itself more as a structure that gathers all the countries of the region, fomenting cooperation and interaction agreements in the South Atlantic, than a space for joint action (Guerra 2011). The organization arose revitalized in 2013, after the VII Ministerial Reunion in Montevideo, inserted in a context in which Brazil had already discovered its oil fields in the Pre-Salt layers, in São Paulo’s seacoast; in which the US resurrected its IV fleet, almost 60 years after its dissolution in 1950; and finally, in which an increasing presence of China in South America can be verified.

The VII ZOPACAS’ Ministerial Meeting took place at city of Mindelo, in Cape Verde, between May 20 and 21 2015, having the participants approached cooperation subjects in the areas of maritime security, oceanographic investigation, maritime transportation, university cooperation and technological information and communication (Panapress 2015).

In this complex context of struggling for the affirmation in the South Atlantic space, Brazil invested in a cooperation with a “South-South” character, and the progressive reinforcement of ZOPACAS’ role was relevant, as

well as the role of other forums, such as the IBAS (India, Brazil and South Africa). The maritime cooperation between Brazilian, Argentinian, Uruguayan and South African navies had established itself as a reality due to the regular naval exercises, such as the ATLASUR and the IBASMAR, which, during 2008 and 2010, jointly exercised IBAS forum's naval forces (Pereira 2013).

In spite of these cooperation actions, there is still a gap in an institutional articulation of both the Atlantic margins, through which circulate the most diverse threats.

## The South Atlantic

The Atlantic continues to be of great interest to the US, considering that the country possesses five different command fighters responsible for significant areas of the ocean (EUCOM, AFRICOM, CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM), as well as three fleets that project its naval power in the region: the second, the fourth and the sixth fleets.

More recently, the South Atlantic has brought to light new US interests in the area, leading to the creation of AFRICOM in 2008, and the rearrangement of the fourth fleet, in order to lessen the country's progressive loss of hegemony in the region. These interests are not apart from the oil reserves' discovery in the Brazilian offshore and in many of the Guinea Gulf countries, both of which, besides representing local supplying alternatives, have also a more persistent stability when compared to the traditional sources in the Middle East and the Central Asia, that are subject to significant and recurring convulsions.

Completing the diversity of interest here addressed, one can add Angola's ambitions to achieve its oceanic capability (Correia 2015), and we can also ask who, from a military perspective, controls the Atlantic space? If, in one hand, in the North we may consider NATO or even the US, in the South, on the other, despite Brazilian intentions in this oceanic space, there is a significant set of islands under British sovereignty: Ascension, St. Helena, Tristan da Cunha, South Georgia and South Sandwich and Falkland, that form an arc that disputes with Brazil this space. Moreover, as the holder of such islands, the United Kingdom still claims thousands of square miles at the bottom of the ocean.

The reactivation of the fourth fleet without any previous consultation of regional partners had not been taken for granted by a number of South Atlantic states. From a Brazilian point of view, such move figures a threat to the maritime oil reserves. Some authors, such as Moniz Bandeira (2008), sug-

gest the deflagration of a second Cold War, involving South America, “where US’ penetration constitutes an element of instability and concern”. Then, the Brazilian president, Lula da Silva, stated that “when the US established as a priority the reinforcement of the Atlantic’s Fourth Fleet, we must clearly worry. The country allegedly does it for humanitarian reasons, but we did not ask for this, nor did anyone”. In this sense, Brazil’s president engaged on the re-equipment of Brazilian Armed Forces, on the enhancement of defense industries and also on a concrete proposal to UNASUR regarding the creation of a regional defense organism, the South American Defense Council (Fonseca 2011).

During Lula’s presidency, Brazil approved, in 2005, a new National Defense Policy and, in 2008, the National Defense Strategy, through which the defense priorities to both the green and the blue Amazon are highlighted. The country has also assumed the position of maritime power in the South Atlantic, being the main driving force of South-American regionalism and South-South cooperation (Grevi 2016). At the corporate level, for instance, construction, mining and agro-industrial companies’ investment in Africa was notorious, especially in Angola; Brazil’s diplomatic network more than doubled since 2002, currently counting with thirty-eight official representations, situation that contributes for the country to represent 70% of the trade between South America and Africa (Kotsopoulos 2014).

In this sense, we may consider that South-South cooperation became a priority in Brazilian foreign policy agenda, as a way of promoting the country’s international insertion, and that such cooperation constitutes, nowadays, the essence of Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Aguilar 2013).

One of the different types of cooperation is designated by the term “technical cooperation”, having its fundamentals on the technical support, counting with the sending of specialists in determinate sectors of activity in order to build capacity of the population in areas of knowledge with a lack of technical resources (Aguilar 2013).

The technical-military cooperation also plays a major role: among others, cooperation agreements have been signed with Cape Verde (1994), South Africa (2003), Guinea-Bissau (2006), Namibia (2009), Nigeria, Senegal, Angola and Equatorial Guinea (2010), besides the already mentioned naval exercises between both sides of the Atlantic. It is also worth pointing out that, in CPLP’s scope, there exercises from the Operation Felino series and periodical meetings involving the Defense Ministers and Chiefs of State.

Moreover, Brazil has established a strategic cooperation with South Africa, in 2007, and with Angola, in 2010. In the economic level, MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) and SADC (South African Development

Community) concluded, in 2009, preferential trade arrangements (Grevi 2006).

In the South Atlantic, it is still important to consider the diverse interests of various political units regarding the extension of the maritime platform, which, in the Brazilian case, concerns the so-called Blue Amazon, that, roughly speaking, corresponds to an increase of 50% of its territorial extension. In this vast space the south region of the Atlantic is located and it is still possible to evidence divergent interpretations regarding the border delimitation between UK's and Argentina's sovereignty in the region of the Falklands/Malvinas. Such position contrasts with the one in West Africa, where six<sup>8</sup> countries gathered to jointly request and mutually recognize its pretensions of expanding its continental shelf.

In the level of language at the Atlantic's space, several *lingua francas* (English, Spanish, Portuguese and French) are expressed, which facilitate the communication between the numerous political units and its respective populations, promoting the socialization and the negotiations, and being also significant forums of cooperation among the Atlantic countries<sup>9</sup>. In the South Atlantic, the "Oceano Moreno" by Adriano Moreira (1993), the presence of the Portuguese language is more expressive in the virtuous Brazil-Cape Verde-Angola triangle.

In this sense, we may consider that such space has Lusophony in its center and, furthermore, that the CPLP sought to play a distinctive role on the definition of development and cooperation policies, as well as on the decision-making process of creating a stable security architecture.

## Cape Verde in the Atlantic space

When speaking of Cape Verde in the complex, heterogeneous and dynamic context of the Atlantic space, it is important to remind the geopolitical author Spykman (IAEM 1982), for whom "the geography is the most important factor of the national power, because it is the most permanent one", being also important to remember that the geopolitical value of a determinate space is only circumstantial and depends on the importance attributed by other states (Correia 2010).

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8 These six countries are Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Sierra Leone. Regarding this subject, more details can be found in [http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs\\_new/submissions\\_files/wa775\\_14/wa7\\_es\\_en\\_sept2014.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/wa775_14/wa7_es_en_sept2014.pdf).

9 Regarding more specifically the Portuguese language, we can mention an important study conducted by Luís Reto (2012), about the economic potential of the Portuguese language.

This small archipelagic country, situated 500 km from African west coast, possesses a territory of 4033 km<sup>2</sup> and has approximately 500,000 inhabitants. Such characteristics impose to Cape Verde great challenges in the political context, both regional and internationally.

The first great challenge is the one of affirmation and even survival. In this challenge, we can also include the issue of belonging whether to Europe or to Africa<sup>10</sup>. This debate, that has been going on for decades, is far from being consensual in Cape Verde.

If we approach this issue exclusively from a geographic perspective, the country is closer to Africa; nevertheless, the notion of belonging includes other factors, such as identity and culture both perennial in geopolitics. Cabral and his contemporaries have always defended africanity and, consequently, a broader integration in the regional African context (Cabral 1978). This approach, however, does not represent a consensus, since that many argue in favor of a previous European identity and an integration into Western civilization (Madeira 2013).

Nowadays, such debate focus on whether promote a stronger integration with ECOWAS or in the enhancement of the Special Partnership with UE, balancing its possible benefits and challenges. If the path chosen is the ECOWAS one, Cape Verde will become the only insular state to integrate a community of fifteen states and holder of approximately 250 millions of consumers (Monteiro 2016). However, the organization's integration project is not yet consolidated, and the situation is aggravated by several cultural, religious and political difficulties among its members, as well as divergences regarding the free circulation of people, goods and capital. If the choice favors a greater regional African integration, the interaction of internal/external, geopolitical, economic, demographic, cultural and religious factors will continuously turn into a slow and complex process.

The other option, the Special Partnership with EU, established in 2007 (under Portuguese presidency), "represents a political approach that surpasses the mere relationship between the giver and the beneficiary" and does not constitute an alternative to the Cotonou Agreement. This partnership embraces an action plan based on six pillars: good governance; security/stability; regional integration; technical and normative convergence; knowledge socialization; fight against poverty; and development (UE 2007).

Since this Special Partnership takes into account regional integration, this will allow Cape Verde to establish a bridge between the two continents (Madeira 2015). On one hand it prioritizes closeness to further peripheral

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<sup>10</sup> For further information, see Madeira 2013.

regions and the rest of the Union, and on the other, a simultaneous intensification of regional relations in the ECOWAS scope (UE 2007).

Both of these options must pass through a process of reflection and evaluation of the opportunities and disadvantages. If a stage of greater integration is reached, one must create instruments that will minimize the country's vulnerability and fight against phenomena that may endanger the archipelago's security and sovereignty (Madeira 2015).

In our point of view, in an even more global world, in order to guarantee its freedom of action, Cape Verde must establish coherent, and, foremost, convenient alliances, improving multilateralism and "looking forward to the mobilization of comprehensive political-institutional solutions, capable of overpassing the vulnerabilities of an insular country" (Monteiro 2016), in such a way that reinforces its connections with Africa, Europe, Brazil, China, the US, CPLP and the South Atlantic.

The second challenge is directly attached to the security issue, in which the combat against the most diverse forms of transnational organized crime is included. The socioeconomic development, considered as a third challenge, will only be fulfilled with a good governance and a deep institutional consolidation, which are likely to drag foreign investors' attention and, consequently, to significantly improve development.

## Conclusion

From the previous description, we may conclude that the Atlantic - notably an heterogeneous space, where challenges are complex, multidimensional and globally scaled, and where there is a lack of institutional articulation - had not lost its centrality to international relations, having, therefore, reaffirmed itself, both from an economic and from a security perspective.

In order to preserve its differential, Cape Verde must keep the advantages brought by the images of good governance and political and social stability, also needs to gradually reduce its vulnerabilities throughout a multiplicity of partnerships, putting its sovereignty on service of the international community.

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#### ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to show that the centrality of the Atlantic continues to be a reality, above all, by maintaining the geo-economic importance of the European Community, by the new dynamism of the transatlantic link but mainly by the interest shown by emerging and re-emergent powers in the South Atlantic. In this context, Cape Verde plays in the Atlantic an interesting integrating role.

#### KEYWORDS

Geopolitics; Atlantic; Cape Verde.

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# LOGISTIC COMPLEXITY IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: A CHALLENGE

Mauro Cesar Barbosa Cid<sup>1</sup>  
Luiz Rogério Goldoni<sup>2</sup>

## Introduction

The 21st century continued to see an increase in peacekeeping missions led by the United Nations Organization, both in quantity and complexity, a phenomenon that began after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Leslie 2012). Such increases directly affect the planning and management of peace operations.

In this context, logistics must adapt to the dynamic nature and political complexity of each operational scenario presented for peace operations. The determination of the logistical support for each mission depends on the origin and the responsibility of the support to the force spent; this, in turn, causes direct impacts on the operational actions demanded (Patriota 2009).

Logistical support is crucial to enabling civilians, military staff and the police force participating in Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) to fully comply with the UN mandate. Such support is also fundamental to preserve the operational capacity and safety of civilians involved in the “theater of operations” (Neves 2009).

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1 PhD candidate at the Post-Graduate Program in Military Science, Brazilian Army Command and General-Staff School (ECEME). Specialist in Irregular Warfare (Special Forces Course, 2003) and in Command Actions (2002), Center for Special Operations Instruction of the Brazilian Army. He served as a Military Observer and Liaison Officer at the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (UNFICYP) between the years of 2012 and 2013 and contributed to the planning of sending Brazilian military personnel to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 2014. E-mail: maurocid@gmail.com

2 Professor at the Post-Graduate Program in Military Science (PPGCM) of Meira Mattos Institute, Brazilian Army Command and General-Staff School (IMM/ECEME-Brazil). He is one of the editors of the Meira Mattos Collection (<http://www.eceme.ensino.eb.br/meiramattos/index.php/RMM/index>). E-mail: luizrfgoldoni@gmail.com

The objective of this work is to analyze the complexity of logistic support in the PKOs under UN's mandate. Initially, to achieve the proposed goal, a basic theoretical framework of logistics concepts in the UN peacekeeping environment will be presented. Following this line of thought, it will seek to raise the challenges that affect logistics in support of the PKOs. After that, it will be possible to analyze how the complexity of logistics affects the course of these operations.

The article will not seek solutions to the challenges posed, but will briefly address some options presented by the UN to solve these challenges.

## Concepts and definitions

The concept of “peacekeeping” has been broadly defined in the “Agenda for Peace”<sup>3</sup> document. According to the 1992 text, signed by the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Gali, “peacekeeping” would be the:

[...] deployment of the military, police and civilians in order to help in the implementation of agreements to cease hostilities. It is taken into effect with the consent of the parts involved in the conflict and is driven by the impartiality of its actions. International forces only make use of force in their own self-defense (Boutros-Ghali 1992).

The use of the military, police and civilians in PKOs is subject to a peace or ceasefire agreement. The deployment of peacekeeping forces is needed to guarantee the respect for the ceasefire and to provide the necessary environment for the negotiation of a peace agreement and to enable the presence of peacekeepers in the scene to ensure the implementation of the measures agreed upon by the belligerent parties (Neves 2009).

Still on the Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali described the size increase, scope and complexity of UN peace missions and defined three types of missions linked to “peacekeeping”: preventive diplomacy, the maintenance of peace and the pacification. In 1995, in another document, the “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace”, additional terms such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding and disarmament were introduced, expanding even more the reach of nowadays missions carried out, fully or partially, by the UN.

Peacekeeping is one, among several activities, carried out by the Unit-

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<sup>3</sup> Document presented in 1992 with suggestions on how the UN could respond to violent conflicts.

ed Nations and other international actors to maintain peace and international security around the world. The United Nations Manual of Principles and Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations 2010a)<sup>4</sup>, also known as the “Capstone Doctrine”, mention the importance of understanding how multiple concepts are related and also differ from each other. There are definitions of conflict prevention<sup>5</sup>, peacemaking<sup>6</sup>, peace enforcement<sup>7</sup>, peacebuilding<sup>8</sup>, and peacekeeping<sup>9</sup>. According to the “Capstone Doctrine”, peacekeeping:

[...] is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace (United Nations 2010a, 18).

According to Coleman (2014, 2), within a context of peacekeeping, logistics is “the science of planning and executing the movement and maintenance of staff and equipment in operations”.

Logistics, in general, is influenced by several aspects that characterize the environment in which the support will be provided. The political complexity and dynamic nature of each operational scenario; the topographic geography and the climatic variations of theaters of operations; the number of countries involved and the large variation in operational and logistical stand-

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4 The Manual in question was launched and approved in January 2008. This article uses the revised edition in January 2010.

5 “Conflict prevention involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict” (United Nations 2010a, 17).

6 The peace process includes measures to solve ongoing conflicts and involves diplomatic action to establish a negotiated agreement between hostile parties (United Nations 2010a).

7 Peace enforcement involves the implementation, with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council, of a series of coercive measures including the use of military force for the restoration of international peace and security (United Nations 2010a).

8 Peacebuilding is a complex and long-term process. One of the components of this process is the analysis of the structural causes of violent conflicts. Peacebuilding measures seek to strengthen the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its essential functions (United Nations 2010a).

9 Joint operations involve the coordinated use of elements of more than one singular force (land, naval and air) for interdependent or complementary purposes. Combined operations are those composed of elements of armed forces from more than one country.

ards and procedures; language and communication differences are aspects that have direct repercussions on how logistics will be planned and executed, and their analysis and study are important (Leslie 2012).

Still according to Leslie (2012), UN missions can range in size from a small group of observers to a major joint operation and/or combined with ground, air and naval troops involving thousands of civilians and military staff. Any logistics concept will have to be tailored to a specific mission taking into account the operational task, space and time, labor, material, environment, climate, infrastructure and available resources.

Referring to supporting large-scale missions, in November 1994, the UN General Assembly approved the establishment of a Permanent Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy (United Nations 1994). The United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) was initially a hub for supplies. The role of UNLB was expanded in 2002 to include the creation of a Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) concept. The SDS is the stock material of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, which supports a rapid deployment and the initial operational capability of a complex peacekeeping mission. The UNLB warehouses provide air support for peace missions, as well as logistical training within the UN (Leslie 2012; Baig 2010).

The logistic support is focused on in-service and operational logistics, which, according to Coleman (2014), include:

- Acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance and evacuation of the equipment and materials necessary for the functioning of the operations;
- Transport of staff into and out of the operation mission;
- Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposal of facilities including housing and warehouses;
- Acquisition or provision of services, such as food, cleaning, and postal services and
- Medical support.

## Logistical Support in Peace Operations

The first step in logistics planning in a UN operation begins with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) through the Office of Mission Support, where the needs of Logistic Support for the troops are raised. The agency details guidelines and monitoring mechanisms for structures in the region of operations and seeks to promote efficient and effective management of resources throughout the mission (United Nations 2003).

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is then established, consisting of an agreement between the contributing state and the UN. The MOU defines the type and level of support to be provided, as well as the responsibilities associated with each entity. The Handbook on United Nations Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) (UNITED NATIONS, 2003) explains that the Memorandum contains details on personnel, equipment and services, as well as the values that each contributing nation will receive for participation in the mission. In addition to this document, a Letters of Assist (LoA) may also be signed between the UN and the government of the contributing country for the supply of specific goods or services not included in the MOU. An alternative to logistical support is the Memorandum of Agreements (MoA), which is established between two or more nations, agreeing on the support provided from one nation to another (United Nations 2003).

All UN missions have in its composition a Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), who is responsible for all Administrative-Logistic support. The CAO is responsible for, among others, the following tasks: managing and controlling the human, material and financial resources of the mission; to advise the mission commander in the financial and budgetary areas and to implement an internal control and transparency system for the utilization of mission resources (United Nations 2003).

In contemporary peace operations, logistical support can be provided by states or by the UN itself. Regarding sources of logistical support, the “Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” (Baig 2010), a manual, quotes the following types of logistical support:

**a) Logistical support provided by participating countries:** a State can provide broad logistical support to its troops in every region of operation or in a specific area. Countries can also provide specific capabilities, such as physical (medical or engineering units) or management (for example, movement control).

**b) Logistical support provided by the international organization coordinating the operation:** this type of support is based on the provision of materials such as tents, generators, vehicles and medical equipment. In addition to the material, the UN can help with logistics management through planning, shopping, movement control and supply chain management.

**c) Logistical support provided by the host nation:** the host nation has a great importance in structuring the logistics in its territory. This support is closely linked to the permission and use of the country’s logistical structures, both



for transportation purposes and for facilities and accommodation. The use of airspace, airports, roads and railways is of vital importance for the logistic and operational deployment of the troops in the state. Likewise, the host country could provide water and fuel supplies and services, such as medical and engineering. Local companies can be hired by the UN to provide needed support for the demands of troops in the country<sup>10</sup>.

**d) Donors:** some States can contribute with heavy equipment, strategic or tactical transport and other types of logistical support. One example is Germany's Federal Relief Agency for Technical Relief which assisted in the construction of the housing facilities for the civilian staff of the Sudan peacekeeping mission (Marginean 2010).

**e) Contracted companies:** In 2013, the UN expenses with contracts and purchases exceeded US\$ 2.4 billion. The companies contracted may be from the host nation or from the contributing country. One example was the hiring of DynCorps International to provide strategic transport for the mission in Somalia (Clemente 2014).

## Critical Challenges for Logistical Support

Just as Peace Operations are highly complex, both because of multinational characteristics and because of the volatility and hostility of the operational environment, logistical support follows the same line of complexity in its planning and execution. According to Coleman (2014), three major challenges are posed for effective logistical support in peacekeeping missions: 1) Difficulty of a fast logistical deployment; 2) Logistical Support, Procurement and Impacts for the host country; and, 3) The use of technologies to reduce logistical challenges. These challenges are analyzed subsequently.

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<sup>10</sup> Kress (2002) writes about the "three options for defense logistics": getting the necessary resources on the battlefield; carry the resources with the troop; send the resources from a distant area to be distributed among the troops on the battlefield. The author emphasizes that modern logistics should be based on a combination of the three options. The contemporary version of the first method "to get on the battlefield" differs from that practiced in the battles of antiquity in which the main resources used were water, food, animal fodder, stones and pieces of wood found in "operational theaters". "Looting and foraging, as a main source of sustainment, has been transformed into partial reliance on host nation's resources" (Kress 2002, 14), in situations of force projection and missions of peace.

## Difficulty of a fast logistical deployment

One of the great challenges is the difficulty for a fast unfolding in the operational area. The initial phase of a peace operation is critical to the establishment of logistics<sup>11</sup>. A large amount of personnel and material should be transported to the host country, where their arrival and all movement to the area of operations should be supported. The installation of a basic logistical support with the rental of buildings, infrastructure for camps, roads, airfields and warehouses, become particularly difficult in remote areas (Coleman 2014).

The speed of installation and unfolding is a central challenge. In the words of an UN official, “eventually we will always get what we need the problem is to get it fast” (Boutellis 2014).

The speed to launch an UN operation is closely linked to the precise assessment of the available host country support capacities. One solution to this problem is to increase “intermission” cooperation. Thus, experts already employed in other missions would be temporarily transferred to carry out the logistical assessments of the initial needs. In order to achieve this type of crossing, the new mission must bear all costs, which has created administrative problems with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), which opposes the temporary redistribution of specialists (United Nations 2014e). Likewise, existing missions are reluctant to release their specialists, even temporarily, which, in addition to costs, can create problems in the operational capabilities of the mission that transfer the specialist (United Nations 2014a.).

In addition to the delay to receive the equipment, there is the problem of training the staff to use this material. Thus, intermission cooperation offers a partial solution: personnel and equipment with the appropriate capabilities already deployed on another mission could be transferred to a new operation to provide the necessary capabilities (United Nations 2014e). However, according to Coleman (2014), practical experiences have shown that there are limitations in the real potential of intermission cooperation. The sender missions lose combat power, which can often not be admitted given that missions work on fairly and reliably, based on persistent pressure on UN operations to “do more with less” and the economic difficulty of some important financial contributors.

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<sup>11</sup> According to experts (Banomyong and Sodapang 2012; Beresford and Pettit 2012; Zeimpekis, Ichoua and Minis 2013; Sebbah et al. 2013) the first 72 hours are critical in a humanitarian aid operation following natural disasters.

The solution of using cooperation requires the consent of the contributing member state, which depending on its internal approval process, may take considerable time, which would make it impossible to logistically unfold in a timely term.

Another measure to try to increase the UN's logistical capacity is the creation of a list of logistics experts potentially available for a start-up mission, which would be responsible for carrying out a technical assessment and implementing a peace mission anywhere in the world. This list would include UN experts with logistics expertise who are retired or in other roles. These professionals would have the experience and capacity to analyze the environment and could present logistical solutions to a specific type of mission (Coleman 2014)<sup>12</sup>.

Following the example of NATO, the UN began to gather information on the possibilities of logistical support in the host country. NATO facilitates planning logistics in advance of a crisis by encouraging members and partners to develop a "Capability Catalogue" (OTAN 2010). The suggestion, described by Coleman (2014), is that this process be initiated in regions that experience great instability, facilitating to the logistic component its rapid unfolding.

Another measure to speed up and facilitate the rapid use of logistic means is the hiring of private sector service companies at a global level with great mobility and logistical expertise. Because contracting is time-consuming, the prior agreements specify the delivery of particular assets or services to potential missions and can be activated when necessary to implement a mission or strengthen UN capacity. However, global system contracts are expensive and contractors may refuse to introduce (or increase rates) under particularly dangerous circumstances<sup>13</sup>. From a practical point of view, hiring the private sector has become a vital tool for national governments and international organizations in peacekeeping missions. The private sector is engaged in a broad spectrum of logistics activities, ranging from medical treatment to aircraft rental (Brooks and Mangan 2011), giving great flexibility and speed to the implementation of a peace mission.

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12 Many reserve soldiers act as logistical agents on peace missions. In addition to their experiences, these professionals contribute to bring together and settle disputes between the interactions of humanitarian organizations with military corporations (Balcik et al. 2010; Barber 2012; Heaslip and Barber 2013).

13 To avoid total reliance on third parties, the German Federal Relief Agency, for example, maintains a team specializing in the construction of peacekeeping camps. For more information, see: Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk, "Standing Engineering Capacity". Available at: [www.thw.de/SharedDocs/Einheiten/DE/Ausland/SEC.html?Nn=2061858](http://www.thw.de/SharedDocs/Einheiten/DE/Ausland/SEC.html?Nn=2061858).

Boutellis (2014) asserts that there is no viable substitute for State's readiness to provide the critical logistical elements capable of maintaining large contingents during the early stages of a peacekeeping mission. The UN provides logistical support for operations, including commodities such as food rations, fuel and water, as well as vehicles and other equipment through its Strategic Deployment Stores located in its Logistics Bases<sup>14</sup>. Likewise, the UN assumes financial responsibility for the transportation of personnel and equipment to the area of operations and reimburses States in their costs of implementing the Contingent Owned Equipment. However, this does not replace the will of the state to keep its self-sustaining troops for an initial period of 90 days, until supply systems can establish themselves (Boutellis 2014).

According to Coleman (2014), the planning of UN logistical deployment starts from a premise that states do have the ability to provide their own equipment for the early phases of the mission. Deployment delays in the missions come from two factors: 1) the lack of capacity of the countries to provide the equipment and 2) the inability to carry out the self-support of the troops as promised in the initial agreements with the United Nations. This occurs because most peacekeepers come from developing countries, some of which do not have all the capacity required by the UN. These countries are reluctant to invest and acquire resources until the United Nations confirms the authorization for the mission, which leads to delays in the implementation and deployment of all the logistical means in the operational area.

In order to increase the readiness of the logistical units by providing incentives for States, the UN seeks to reimburse countries that contribute with specific capabilities that can directly reflect the rapid deployment of mission logistics (United Nations 2014c). This provides more targeted incentives that not only facilitate a rapid start-up of the mission, but also promote continued operational readiness on the part of contributing countries.

Coleman (2014) compares UN actions with NATO's ability to pressure Member States to deliver on commitments and engage in long-term logistics planning cycles to identify existing gaps that would, within multi-national cooperation, enable the best logistic conditions of unfolding. In this comparison, the UN does not have the means to pressure States to develop their logistical capabilities within the current context of the Organization.

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<sup>14</sup> The UN Logistics Bases is comprised within the United Nations Global Assistance Center (UNGSC). The Bases are located in Brindisi (UNLB) and Valencia (UNSBV) and currently (February 2017) they provide logistical support for more than 37 peacekeeping missions.

## Logistical Support, Procurement and Impacts for the host country

International organizations are aware that logistical support does not only support Peacekeeping personnel in the fulfillment of their mandate, but can directly impact mission objectives such as stabilization and economic reconstruction of the host country. According to Carnahan (2006), the decision of “where”, “if” and “how” to build roads, airfields, wells, how to generate electricity and how to acquire supplies can have profound effects in an area of conflict. A 2010 UN report (United Nations 2010b) noted that Peace Operations spending has the potential to leverage the local economy and suggested increasing local procurement as the best way to positively impact the area of interest.

The UN’s Global Field Support Strategy defines the full use of “investment in local and regional capabilities” as a mission objective (United Nations 2010b). An example is the Regional Service Center in Uganda that facilitates the hiring of local and regional businesses, facilitating and linking the local economy with UN procurement services.

The UN procurement system also recognizes that there are certain essential goods and services that are not available from the UN Headquarters and therefore lend themselves to local or regional procurement (United Nations 2013a). Coleman (2014) again puts NATO as an example, mentioning the increase on services and local acquisitions in Afghanistan.

However, there are two challenges for using contracts and local procurement. One is that member states have a strong political and economic interest in securing contracts for their domestic companies. This has led the UN system to focus on contracts and procurement from suppliers in developing or transition<sup>15</sup> countries, not only in the host country.

The UN Procurement Division tracked the percentage of contracts in developing or transition countries. The conceptualization of these countries is very broad and makes it difficult to control and systematize, though. By 2013, contracts in this category totaled US\$ 1,67 billion (representing 69% of peacekeeping contracts), including US\$ 276 million in contracts with Russian companies, US\$ 313 million in suppliers in the United Arab Emirates and US\$ 72 million with Kuwaiti companies (United Nations 2013b). The UN Acquisition Division is seeking to separately control contracts taking into account the states’ financial contribution capacity (Coleman 2014).

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<sup>15</sup> The term generally includes the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that are emerging from a socialist-type economy to a market-based economy.

The second challenge is that not always the hiring of local suppliers is in the interest of the host nation. In regions where local resources (such as food and building materials) are scarce, contracts can deprive local populations of access to these basic needs. Even a simple drilling of an artesian well can be problematic if it interferes with irrigation systems, as it did with NATO in Afghanistan (Williams 2009) or as it did in northern Mali, by obstructing a fossilized source of water<sup>16</sup>.

In addition, local contractors can engage in practices that undermine the objectives of a peace operation. Clement (2009) points out, for example, that Taliban forces have benefited from local NATO-based contracts in Afghanistan.

According to Coleman (2014) to face this challenge, the UN has the benefit of a centralized procurement system. However, the “UN Procurement Manual” does not explicitly list the impact on the host country as one of its guiding principles; rather, it focuses on subjects like “best value for money”, “justice, integrity and transparency”, “effective international competition” and “the interest of the UN” (United Nations 2013a, §1.3.c).

Still according to Coleman (2014), the flexibility and the great challenge of this system consists in the determination of what really is the “best value for money.” The manual above identifies “cost-free factors” that include supplier competence, the market environment, risk factors and the search for an “ethical, fair and transparent” supplier; which opens space for subjectivities and value judgments. Besides that, when the acquisition takes the form of a bidding with the solicitation of proposals where suppliers are invited, they are evaluated in a highly technical way, taking into account the financial part and the attendance of the needs of the contracted product or service. Member States have called on the UN to seek a better definition of the “best value for money” principle (United Nations 2013c). The questions include how this principle can affect suppliers in developing and transition countries, and whether or not more sustainable contracts should be encouraged (United Nations 2014d).

## The use of technologies to reduce logistical challenges

Technology can be used to reduce challenges of logistical support. For example, it can facilitate the supply chain management by improving information on the movement of people, goods and services in the host country. Within the UN, electronic fuel management and inventory systems are un-

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<sup>16</sup> In geology, the underground water of an aquifer is called fossil water or paleowater.

der development and deployment (United Nations 2014c.). According to the Center News publication (2014), the UN has also developed the use of a Geographic Information System to find new sources of water for its missions and for the exploration of solar energy generation.

However, other technologies that could lessen logistics support challenges remain unexploited. For example, monitoring with equipment such as fixed cameras, aerial camera platforms (including unmanned aerial vehicles) and surveillance radars can complement the efforts of human monitoring (Dorn 2011). Its use would allow a greater concentration of personnel internally on bases from which patrols could be carried out, reducing the logistic demand.

The UN began using some of these technologies (including unmanned aerial vehicles) and could extend and standardize its use. It is reliable and facilitates contact with local suppliers of supply and services (United Nations 2013a). For local procurement, missions require information about suppliers' capabilities, and suppliers need information about mission requirements. In East Africa, services that provide market information through text messaging have been developed and are used by farmers to obtain information on product prices. At the same time, cell phones began to be used to receive and make payments. Technology can accelerate payment and help protect vulnerable suppliers (women, for example) against theft and corruption (Twonbei 2013).

In the long run, "3-D printing" will revolutionize some key aspects of logistical support. Existing technology already allows the printing of metal and plastic objects, opening up the possibility for highly skilled personnel in remote areas to print a wide variety of items ranging from spare parts to custom medical devices<sup>17</sup>.

For peace operations, 3-D printing can offer a great solution for the variety and diversification of equipment from the different countries that integrate a mission, simply by changing the design of the print. It is unlikely that this technology can replace conventional supply chains in the near future, but it can drastically reduce the need for an extensive stock of material. The 3-D printing can potentially provide a temporary solution, generating local capacity. This would create flexibility and capacity until that the supply chain could meet the demand (Sherman 2012).

The UN has convened a Panel of Experts on Technology and Innovation in Peacekeeping Missions under its responsibility. The Panel deliberations include considerations on technologies that facilitate logistical support.

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<sup>17</sup> Drushal (2010) analyzes the impact of technology on the logistics of the US Armed Forces, especially in the Navy.

In the longer term, however, a more permanent frame should be created within the UN Secretariat to monitor and evaluate technologies that can benefit peacekeeping operations within the logistical field (United Nations 2014b).

## Final Considerations

The efficient logistical support is crucial to enable civilian, military and police officers deployed in peacekeeping operations to fulfill their mandates. The way this support is implemented impacts both host and donor countries.

In peace operations, the logistical support emanates from a variety of sources, including the deployed contingent self-sufficiency capabilities, logistical capacity of contributing States, international organizations involved in coordination and the host nation, business enterprises and donors.

Logistical support seeks to improve its procedures by supporting a fast implementation of a mission, optimizing the impact of the provision to the host country, and incorporating new technologies so that peace operations do not suffer a disruption solution and, instead, have their mandates fulfilled.

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## ABSTRACT

The increase in the number and in the complexity of the UN Peacekeeping missions led to challenges in logistics implementation and operationalization. This study aims to understand and investigate the complexity of the logistical support in UN Peacekeeping operations missions and its implications and consequences.

## KEYWORDS

Logistics; Supply Chain; Complexity; UN Peacekeeping Mission.

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# DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT INDUSTRY: THEORETICAL CONTROVERSIES AND IMPLICATIONS IN INDUSTRIAL POLICY

Christiano Cruz Ambros<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

Two main discussions permeate the relationship between defense and development: i) whether there is a relationship between military spending and economic growth; and ii) whether military spending generates technological development in society as a whole. These two discussions are fundamental both for the motivations and justifications used by political actors for military expenditures and for public policies (including industrial policies) for the defense sector.

Hartley and Sandler (1995, 201-2015) make an important review of specialized literature in the debate between defense and development in several schools of economic thought. For the authors, the main studies that find positive correlations between military spending and economic development have five main points: 1) economic stimulus effect of military spending during periods of unemployment, caused by both underconsumption and underinvestment; 2) spin-offs and technological effects of the defense sector that, when applied to the civil sector, cause economic growth; 3) military spending can increase (economic) growth if some of these expenditures are used to provide social infrastructure (such as dams, highways, airports, communication networks) and other forms of public goods; 4) military spending can promote growth by providing nutrition, training and education to a segment of the population, and this improved human capital can positively impact the civil

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<sup>1</sup> PhD in Political Science, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). He is currently an International Analyst at the Secretary of Economic Development, Science and Technology of the state of Rio Grande do Sul. E-mail: chrisambros@gmail.com

sector; and 5) military spending may indirectly support a safe environment for the promotion of an export market and for attracting foreign investment.

For the authors (*Ibid.*, 202), those who consider that defense activities may have an inhibitory influence on growth argue that: (1) defense can divert resources from public and private investment that would be more growth-promoting than Defense, since if the defense competes for resources intended for private investment, then any crowding-out effect will have negative impacts on long-term economic growth; 2) if a country imports a large part of its armaments, military expenditures may have adverse impacts on the balance of payments; 3) economic growth can be inhibited when defense activities divert private sector research and development (R&D) resources, because although there may be technological spin-offs, private sector technology applications are generally faster and more targeted when they originate by the private sector itself; 4) Military expenditures can inhibit growth by diverting resources originally destined for the export sector, so that goods that would bring foreign exchange into the country are not sold abroad; and 5) the defense sector limits growth through inefficient bureaucracies created by taxes used to finance military spending, as well as the public sector in general.

In this reflection exercise, we will discuss contributions that use Classic, Marxist, Neoclassical and Keynesian approaches to development to expose the debates in relation to military spending and economic growth, and, on the other hand, we will focus on the Defense Industry's contextualization as a driving factor for Technological development and innovation using the Cepaline and Schumpeterian theories, as well as systemic approaches on the historical technical-economic transitions of the international system. As we will argue, the Defense Industry's contribution to development goes beyond the concept of a causal relationship between military spending and economic growth, being a sector capable of endogenizing certain technologies and productive processes that structure a country's capacity to guide its development trajectory in new technical-economic paradigms. For the State to pursue the strategy of nationalization of critical technologies of these new paradigms, institutional arrangements and instruments are needed, with a coherent and robust industrial policy.

## **Military Expenditures and Economic Growth**

Generally, for economic theory there is no clear distinction between general public spending and military spending. These are just another form of government spending. Briefly and superficially, we can say that, for Neo-

classical theory, security may even be necessary for trade, but there will be a trade-off between “weapons and butter”<sup>2</sup>, while for Keynesians, security, since it constitutes public spending, can have positive effects on demand (Dunne and Haines 2000). For Marxists, in parts the two views are combined, but scholars of the Underconsumption current see a clear and positive role in military spending, although they have not found empirical evidence to support such view (Smith and Dunne 1994). According to Dunne and Nikolaidou (2011), economic analysis of military spending is extremely difficult insofar as it is not a purely economic matter but a mixture of economic, political, strategic, psychological, cultural, and even moral factors.

Adam Smith (1723-1790) was the first great economist to defend the free market as an essential rule for the proper functioning of the economy and to postulate that the state should interfere as little as possible in the relationship between power and the market. However, Smith posits about the special character of the defense and the importance of the monopoly of force being exclusively in the hands of the sovereign. Matthews and Maharani (2009, 91) argue that Smith had a view of defense as the public good by definition, which was too important to be left to the market. According to the authors,

Smith’s insistence on defense by the public sector has two justifications: first, defense is one of the best examples of Pareto’s optimum, that is, where all citizens benefit from the provision of a good without the danger of free-riding; And secondly, policy must be oriented so that defense product initiatives are public, since only public ownership will ensure the sovereignty of supply remains with stakeholders. (Matthews and Maharani 2009, 91).

Adam Smith argued that defense spending should be an obligation of the sovereign state, including the maintenance of a permanent and professional army, following its own logic of the division of labor in a society. Moreover, accepting the importance of material production for the sovereignty of the nation, Smith admitted that State interference in the economy, especially in relation to import restrictions, is admissible when it serves to protect industries essential to national defense. In that sense, Smith advocated maintaining the UK Shipping Acts, even though they were unfavorable to foreign

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<sup>2</sup> Skinner (1969) introduced a fundamental concept in the study of strategy and operations management: the trade-offs. A trade-off is defined as a situation where there is a conflict of choice, that is, the balancing of two opposite situations or qualities, which are desired concurrently. For example, a classic trade-off is between “guns and butter”, the more we spend on national defense (arms) to protect our borders from foreign aggressors, the less we can spend on consumer goods (butter) to raise our standard of living internal.

trade from cost increases. Since the merchant navy was easily converted into a navy, it became a strategic requirement to sustain the British naval industry in times of peace to ensure its existence in times of war. So, Smith did not necessarily discuss the impact of military spending on economic growth, but saw the defense industry as strategic for the power of nations.

In the Marxist approach, the phenomenon of war is often seen as an instrument for the destruction of the stock of capital, which excessively undermines the rate of profit given the organic composition of capital. That is, war would be a way for the capitalist system to continue its continuous process of accumulation from the destruction of constant capital stock that is no longer sufficiently productive. Dunnes (2000, 6) points out that Baran and Sweezy (1966), theoretical Marxists of underconsumption, were one of the first authors to actually reflect on the mechanisms of military spending as a way of benefiting the growth of the capitalist profit rate when Economy is in imbalance. In general, Marxists tend to regard militarism and military spending as social phenomena within historical aspects and focus on the strategic and political aspects of military spending.

The Keynesian theory of economic growth reflects the delicate period of the international economy of the 1920s and 1930s, introducing for the first time in the debate macroeconomic concepts. Keynes's main concern regarding economic growth is the dynamics of the effective demand of the economy, since, given that supply tends to adjust to the effective demand in the long term, it ends up that consumption and investment determine the product and the employment in an economy. According to Porcile, Esteves and Scatolin (2006, 365), "the government, in order to reduce unemployment, can increase effective demand through increased public spending, leading to an increase in output". In Keynes's view of interventionist and proactive State, military spending could be used to increase output from multiplier effects when aggregate demand is inefficient. In addition, if aggregate demand is relatively low regarding potential supply, increases in spending may lead to increased productive capacity, increasing profits, and thus increasing investment and economic growth.

According to Dunne and Nikolaidou (2011), Keynesian models of demand are widely used to explain the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth, which, in general, tend to find a negative relation between military spending and economic growth, verifying the Displacement Effect (Crowding Out) of savings or investments. The direct relationship between increased military spending and economic growth in the Keynesian logic finds a basic challenge, which is to rely on a national defense industrial base so that military expenditures are not reversed in imports. Moreover, for

the authors, the basic disadvantage of this theory is the excessive focus on demand and the failures to consider defense supply issues (technological developments and positive externalities).

The Neoclassical School tends to perceive military expenditures as a pure public good and the economic effects of these expenditures will be determined by its opportunity costs, that is, the trade-off between military spending and some other expenditure. This approach perceives the State as a rational actor who seeks to balance the opportunity costs and security benefits of military expenditures to maximize a well-defined national interest and reflected in a social welfare function (Dunne 2000).

Thanks to the tendency to take a tragic choice between military spending and other expenditures, well exemplified in the classic “guns and butter” dilemma, Neoclassicists often argue that defense spending undermines economic growth. In this paper, we can see that Deger & Smith (1983), Heo (1999), Kwaben (1989), Lim (1983) and Shieh (2002). For Dunnes (2000), the most influential Neoclassical models in defense economics are those of Biswas and Ram (1986), developed from the Feder (1982) model. With Feder’s model on the effects of exports on growth in developing countries, these authors have created a model for cross-country analysis of the effect of military spending on economic growth. ERDF models tend to suggest that the impacts of military spending on growth are positive, especially from the effects of export and technology transfer, or are insignificant (Dreze 2006).

The enhanced economic model of Solow<sup>3</sup>, introduced by Mankiw in 1992, was used to measure the effects of military spending on growth by

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3 The Solow Model is one of the major structuring studies of the Neoclassical school. In it, besides perfect competition, the factors of production are homogeneous, divisible and perfectly interchangeable (i.e. one of the main Neoclassical presuppositions). The model seeks to relate savings, capital accumulation, and population growth (which automatically becomes the labor market) to explain the long-run per capita product variation. The deepening of capital, that is, its accumulation (in a Marxist language), is financed by per capita savings, which must be sufficient to supply capital to the growing population at a certain rate and to depreciate existing capital. According to Souza (2011, 264), “the conclusion of the model is that the increase in the saving rate expands the K/L ratio and per capita income until the economy reaches a stable long-term equilibrium, when the rate growth per capita will remain constant and equal to the rate of population growth”. However, once the equilibrium is reached, the increase in saving will no longer impact the growth rate of the product to the point of raising it above the rate of population growth. That is, the explanation of long-term growth is exogenous to the Solow model, which introduces technological progress as an exogenous variable explaining long-term sustainable growth, since it is the increase of the technique that will provide higher labor productivity and higher rates of capital deepening. Finally, Souza (ibid., 265) concludes that “the important conclusion of the Neoclassical model is that the pace of technical progress determines the growth of per capita income in the stable long-term equilibrium”.



Knight et al. (1996). The key premise is that the portion of military spending affects the productivity factor through the level of effect on the efficiency parameter that controls the increase in labor given the technological change. That is, the main effect of military spending on the economy is the increase in technology.

Neoclassical models for the analysis of military expenditures and its impacts on economic growth have the advantage of allowing the development of consistent formal models for empirical analysis. However, in general, the school provides models of static allocative efficiency, which are visibly limited by not considering historical and dynamic aspects, as well as concentrating excessively on the supply side, “ignoring the internal role of the Armed Forces and their interests, supposing the existence of a national consensus and requiring extreme knowledge and unrealistic cognitive abilities of rational actors” (Dunnes 2000, 5).

In an important and provocative contribution, Emile Benoit (1973) pointed to a positive association between military spending and economic growth for forty-four developing countries during the period 1950-65. In these cases, higher defense spending as a proportion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) may have fostered economic growth (measured by the growth of civilian output) for these countries. According to Hartley and Sandler (1995), Emile Benoit’s controversial studies have prompted research with the most different theoretical approaches to the economy in order to find flaws in its methodology or to apply other analytical models to study the same cases.

Briefly, these models were focused on the supply side<sup>4</sup>, the demand side<sup>5</sup>, or a combination of both. Hartley and Sandler (1995, 215) argue that most models focused on the demand side found negative impacts of military spending on economic growth given the competition of defense resources

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4 See Hartley and Sandler (1995, 204-8) that supply-side explanations of the relationship between defense and economic growth derive from the aggregate production function. From the most macro level, national income or output,  $Y$ , can be expressed as a function of resources and technology  $Y = F(L, K, Tc)$ , where  $L$  is aggregate labor,  $K$  is aggregate capital, and  $Tc$  is the technology index (Deger and Smith 1983). Based on this basic equation, models (Mueller and Atesoglu 1993) studied scenarios of military technology incorporated or not in available resources and focused on the study of differentiated productivities and externality networks between private sector, non-military public sector and military sector (Ferder 1983; Ram 1986; Biswas and Ram 1986).

5 Demand-side models are based on Keynes’s representations of aggregate demand, where income,  $Y$ , or potential output at full employment,  $Q$ , is the sum of components of real demand for goods and services, i.e.:  $Y = QW = C + I + M + B$ , where  $W$  is the gap between current and potential output,  $C$  is aggregate consumption,  $I$  is public and private investment,  $M$  is real military expenditure, and  $B$  is the trade balance. Some models are applied by Deger (1986), Faini, Annez and Taylor (1984) and Lebovic and Ishaq (1987).

with other investments. The main studies corroborating these analyzes are Deger (1986), Deger and Smith (1983), Lebovic and Ishaq (1987) and Scheetz (1991). However, when the supply-side approach is employed, military spending can have a positive influence from spin-offs and positive externalities. More than that, in studies with developing countries, the effects on productivity were positive. Overall, supply-side studies find that military expenditures have a small positive effect or almost no externality effect of economic growth.

As Hartley and Sandler (1995, 2020) put it, while individual studies of the impact of military spending on economic growth have apparently controversial results, one can still see some strong consistencies. While demand-based models tend to verify the crowd out phenomenon and the negative impact on growth, supply-side models almost always have a positive or neutral impact. Thus, the positive or negative relationship between economic growth and military spending cannot be confirmed. However, it has been shown that technology involved in defense-related business processes can contribute to the development of a country. Therefore, in the next section we will focus on the debate on the relationship between military and civilian technologies in the dynamics of a country's technological development.

## Military Expenditures and Technological Development

It is important to distinguish between types of military spending and their impacts. Dumas (2004) argues that military spending is a broad concept, which can be divided into Operations and Maintenance, which includes the payment and operational support of the military serving the Armed Forces; And Acquisition, which includes purchases of domestically or overseas weapons systems and R&D services. Both types of spending consume financial capital, but acquisition has a much greater effect on the allocation of key industrial and technological labor assets and physical capital (Dumas 2004, 23). It is from the designs designed for military acquisitions that the effects of spillover, spin-off and spin-on were supposed to occur.

Bohn (2014) states that the terms spillover and spin-off are often used interchangeably in the wrong way. In a synthesized way, the term spillover deals with the general externalities of military projects, while spin-off would specifically be the overflow of technological results from the military to the civil sector of the economy, and spin-On would be the reverse, that is, civilian technologies being converted for military purposes.

As Walsh (2009) points out, the conception that spillover and spin-off processes would occur from public investments in the defense sector began in the US after World War II. Among the examples often referred to as

spin-off in general terms are the use of nuclear energy, space technology for communications, meteorology and cryptography, as well as products such as radar, transistor, microwave oven, Teflon, GPS, medical laser, internet and cell phone.

Although the spin-off, spill-over and dualization processes of technologies are defended as models of development and support of the defense industry of several countries (Walsh 2009), authors such as Dagnino (2010) point out that they are used as elements of an ideological construction to defend exacerbated military expenditures that find no support in academic studies. That is, the idea of spin-off which, according to the author (2010, 153), was a real and observable phenomenon in the post-Second World War soon became the spin-off paradigm, Ideology conceived and used by the US to justify and promote the expenditure of vast resources for the military R&D necessary for latent confrontation with the Soviet Union. According to Dagnino (2010, 103),

disclosed by the establishment of the central countries, but criticized by eminent scientists and by sectors of society, the idea of the spin-off has been the subject of intense debate in the academic institutions, military and government decision-making bodies of these countries (...) studies conducted in advanced countries, even following different disciplinary approaches, have shown undesirable implications of military R&D for the civilian research system. With a macroeconomic and temporal approach, some of them have called attention, through empirical research comparing time series of expenditures in military R&D and public budget for research, that the former has not behaved as an additive variable, but as an expense that tends to be deducted from the total amount applied.

Thus, Dagnino (2010) points out that the idea that the spin-offs of the production of weapons systems would generate economic and social benefits, as well as the belief that the diffusion of the technologies produced in the military to the civil sector would be a natural flow and that it would be possible to adapt them with minimum effort for applications in the civil industry is very controversial. In view of this conception, justifying military expenditures based on economic and technological gains would be impracticable.

We consider that the processes of spillover, spinon and spin off are not automatic and do not follow a natural flow. They need to be stimulated by policies that take into account issues such as intellectual property, financing, technological absorption capacity and product marketing potential. Besides that, in general, the gains in technological development are not necessarily in the conversion of the final product of military R&D into civilian applications,

but in the whole process of basic and applied research and the training of a supply chain of components and subcomponents that was necessary to create the final product.

The separation between civil and military technologies is not so clear when we look at their process of design and development, and not just their application. It is common to imagine revolutions in military technologies as independent processes of society, somehow separable from human activity from non-military spheres. There is analytical value in assuming that there is a defined military sector in society, but much more can be harnessed if we think in terms of the fundamental and extensive links that connect this sector to the technology of the civil sector. Despite their distinctive features, frequent changes in military technologies need to be seen not as something separate, but as an integral element of a broad revolution in science, technology, and the human condition as a whole due to the emergence of the industrial age, and now of the age of information technology (Buzan and Herring 1998).

Buzan and Herring (1998, 21) state that in all eras, civilian and military technologies have been very close. The proximity of civil and military technologies during the nineteenth century is evident both in terms of the common body of knowledge that underlies them and the numerous overlaps between the civil and military applications of these technologies. During the nineteenth century, knowledge of metallurgy, engineering and design techniques that generated the revolution in firearms was the same knowledge that produced ever more efficient steam engines for mining, shipping, railway machinery, and the civil sector industry. Similarly, knowledge in chemistry that has developed more efficient explosives is also closely linked with the knowledge that underpinned the flourishing industry of civilian-bound chemicals ranging from fertilizers to pharmaceuticals. In both cases, as in many others, the knowledge and skills that produced revolutions in military technologies were almost indistinguishable from those that served civil purposes.

Nowadays, the advent of large-scale digitization<sup>6</sup> tends to further blur the frontier between military and civilian technologies. Generally, in the military area, the digitization is called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), addressing the incorporation of communication and information technologies and the advancement of situational awareness in the spheres of strategy, operation and tactics. However, Martins (2008, 7) criticizes the denomination of RMA by focusing too much on the confrontation between armies, not

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6 According to Martins (2008, 7), "digitization is the process by which a certain data (image, sound, text) is converted to binary format to be processed by a computer. On a military level, digitization refers to the confluence between radar, infrared, laser and high-power microwaves".

between societies. That is, by clearly separating the military sector from the civilian. According to Martins (2008, 7-8),

if we consider the definition of Clausewitz, for which war is a confrontation between societies and not just between armies, this usual terminology (RMA) becomes anachronistic. The idea of talking about a revolution only in “military matters” loses the dimension of the impacts of digitization on the civil economy, which is reflected in the technological convergence between the television, the telephone and the computer, which operate on the same network and on a common hardware basis. The change brought new standards for material production, for business management, and for leverage and business financing. Hence the use of the simpler and more precise digitization (instead of RMA) to account for the systemic character of the ongoing change.

The conception that the processes of military and civilian technological development are closer than they appear is relevant to understanding the role of military spending in technological revolutions that influence economic development. The idea of evolutionary processes and technological revolutions is introduced in theoretical thinking on economic growth by Joseph Schumpeter (1961). In the Schumpeterian view, technological change is the central element of capitalist dynamics and the microeconomic level, that is, of the firm, would be at the center of this innovation process. The phenomenon of development is more revolutionary than incremental, as economic cycles are changed once and for all by the innovations and technologies introduced. Unlike the neoclassical view, Schumpeter argues that development driven by new technologies does not generate uniform impacts on operating results and nor are productive factors easily absorbed by all actors involved in the market. That is, technology creates inequalities and hierarchy of capabilities.

However, in his works, Schumpeter considers technological innovation as an exogenous variable to the explanatory model, as well as broader socio-institutional factors. Carlota Perez (2007) seeks to advance the understanding of the role of institutions and innovation as an endogenous variable to the model, arguing that the causal factor of the cyclical character of capitalism stems from the asymmetrical effect of technological revolutions on the economic (more changeable) and socio-institutional (more difficult to change) spheres. That is, there is opposition between the dynamism of technology and the conservative and stable character of institutions. Thus, in order to deal with the characteristics of long-term technological cycles, “she creates the concept of a ‘technical-economic paradigm’, which encompasses the two dimensions of change (technical-economic and socio-institutional) and

whose creation depends on institutional framework to the new technological reality” (Muller 2009, 43). In the table below, we can verify the five technical-economic paradigms of Perez and the countries that led the technological cycle.

**Table 1 – Technical-economic Paradigms of Carlota Perez**

The “Big Bangs” of the technical-economic waves of Carlota Perez (2002)				
Technological Revolution	Popular name of the period	Country or central countries	Big Bang	Year
First	The “Industrial Revolution”	Great Britain (GB)	Arkwright mill	1771
Second	Vapors and Railways Age	GB (spreading to the mainland and the USA)	Test of the “Rocket” locomotive	1829
Third	Steel, Electricity and Heavy engineering Age	USA and Germany surpassing GB	Bessemer Steel Plant of Carnegie	1875
Forth	Oil, Automobile and Mass production Age	USA, German competition, expanding around the world	Launch of the Ford-T model	1908
Fifth	Information and telecommunication Age	USA, expanding to Europe and Asia	Launch of Intel’s first commercial microchip	1971
Source: Bueno (2009) based on Perez (2002).				

The ability to enforce decisions on technological innovation is a fundamental part of a country’s development and international insertion. It is worth pointing out the Brazilian case, according to Muller (2009, 43):

the paradigm of steel and electricity, which began in 1875, corresponds to the Brazilian enthronement of the steel industry. The petroleum and automobile industry, which began in 1908, corresponds to the enthronement of fine chemistry in Brazil from the 1950s. Since 1971, this strategic challenge of development has been embedded in the information and telecommunication paradigm, which includes chips, microelectronics, computers, softwares, fiber optics, semi and superconductors, etc. Such a context corresponds, therefore, to the field of digitization, since the digital computer is the “node” that serves as the nucleus of communication networks.

For a country not to be left out of the development of the technical-economic paradigms that dominate the international dynamics, it is necessary to create institutional mechanisms that take care of the economic challenges. It is in this sense that Celso Furtado’s (1962) concept of the “Decision Center”, one of the founders of the CELAC school, becomes fundamental

to understand the process of endogenization of economic and technological development. This idea is understood as the capacity of the State to manage, as it suits, its own economic development from the control of the productive technologies and techniques nucleating of a certain stage of the economic development. That is, it is related to the political-institutional and social mechanisms created to consolidate the capacity of a country to make decisions regarding its own development in a new technical-economic paradigm.

According to Oliveira (2012, 29), “the control of decision-making processes at the national level is in opposition to cases in which decisions regarding the economy and productive activities occur abroad, that is, decisions made by foreign actors who do not necessarily share development interests and objectives of the country”. For a country to be able to plan and execute a national development project and thus achieve some degree of strategic autonomy that allows for a sovereign international insertion, it is necessary to nationalize the Decision Centers of the current technical-economic paradigm, which is, digitization.

It is within the domain of the digitization Decision Center that the modernization of the Armed Forces through parts of the national defense industry is strategic and structuring, both for the sovereignty of a country and for its economic development. Given that defense is a public good that the State has as its fundamental function to provide and, therefore finds sufficient legitimacy to act strategically from the promotion of robust policies, it can be used as a way of enthroning the digitization Decision Center. We agree with Martins (2008, 15) when the author states that

digital military capabilities in the state-of-the-art (through the acquisition of systems, transfers and nationalization of technology) restructure the state physically and allow the recovery of the economic decision-making center. Digitization today is equivalent to the national strategy, which, in due course, was the acquisition of the decision-making center for steel, fine chemicals and nuclear energy. In short, the recovery of the operational capacity of the armed forces matters for all socioeconomic development. Digitization entails a growing instability in the international system which, by creating local war threats, engenders as a systemic response to military investments. If, instead of acquiring military equipment abroad, opting for native production, these investments can endow the regional powers with the decision center (semiconductors and superconductors) that are the nucleus of the contemporary economy.

The defense industry can be considered one of the pillars for the enthronement of the Decision Center of the digitization from three central

points. First, dual technologies dominate the digitization dynamics, given the presence of semiconductors and superconductors in most civilian equipment and weapons systems. The good synergy between dual-use technologies allows the dilution of research investments between civilian and military areas that bring the country closer to control of the productive processes of the nuclear technologies of the Decision Center.

Second, many critical scanning technologies are denied by those who master them, both for civilian and military purposes. Space technologies are a clear example, since it is common for subsystems and components that will compose a space project for civil purposes (eg, commercial communication, remote sensing and tracking) to have your sale banned with national security justifications. Thus, the technological restraint from the military perspective also impacts on the civilian sectors. Therefore, the measures that the State can take to overcome the technological constraint will impact on both dimensions. Once the state can manage the technological restriction from international partnerships, the specificities of defense make possible certain business arrangements that would not be possible in commercial sectors. As Brick (2016) puts it, “defense investments are immune to trade retaliation within the WTO (World Trade Organization), unlike other government R&D investments”<sup>7</sup>.

Third, the State has the legitimacy to act as a promoter of the development of this industry. In historical cases, the State has played a strong role in the defense industry without much questioning about its economic intervention, especially regarding the establishment of the Science, Technology and Innovation (ST&I) infrastructure necessary for its development. Mariana Mazzucato (2014) argues that the US experience of technological development to win wars was only possible thanks to state initiatives. Moreover, according to Brick (2016), specific industrial and technological policies for defense

do not burden the country's economy because the entire cost is 100% scaled and contained in the defense budget. The society does not pay for this as in past market reserve policies such as information technology and local content in the oil industry, which generate costs for consumers, cost increases and delays in investments, without developing and creating an industrial and technological capacity for the country<sup>8</sup>.

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7 cInterview of July 26, 2016, available at <http://defesaeseguranca.com.br/entrevista-engine-de-de-esa-de-de-esa>.

8 Interview of July 26, 2016, available at <http://defesaeseguranca.com.br/entrevista-engine-de-de-esa-de-de-esa>.



Thus, given that “the development of a strong national defense depends on a robust national scientific-technological structure, and the strengthening of this structure depends on state induction, the State has the greatest responsibility for the development of defense-related ST&I and consequently, for the strengthening of the IDB [Industrial Defense Base]” (Andrade and Franco 2016, 18).

Therefore, we consider that the Defense Industry’s impacts on economic and technological development cannot be fully understood from conceptions that focus on the causal relation or correlation between military spending and economic growth strictly, but rather as a central variable in the control of Decision Centers referring to the technical-economic paradigms that govern the long-term technological transitions.

## Defense Industry and Industrial Policy

For the defense industry to play its role in the endogenization efforts of economic decision-making centers in the country, the industrial and technological development of this sector must be coherently inserted in the Great Strategy<sup>9</sup> of the country. In addition to the application of power resources, the Great Strategy deals with the development and allocation of these resources (Layton 2012). In this sense, the ability to master critical technologies of the digitization era in the IDB is fundamental to guarantee the maintenance of military power and to aspire leadership positions in the international system.

The current international scenario did not keep up with the expectations of the end of the Cold War, where it was thought that a lasting model of peace promotion would have been achieved from the hegemony of a superpower. The increasing polarization of the international system (Huntington 1999; Amin 2006) has led to tension between the United States, Russia, China and some regional powers to new theaters and spheres of conflict, contesting strategic positions around the world and systematically making “use of its military power as an instrument of political pressure, now reinforced by new cybernetic and aerospace technologies” (Filho and Moraes 2012, 14).

In this unstable scenario, the digitization of military technologies and the modernization of the world’s Armed Forces bring challenges to countries that wish to maintain an autonomous capacity for maintaining sovereignty and that seek to enter strategically into the international order (Martins 2008). According to Filho and Moraes (2012, 15),

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9 On Great Strategy, see Gray (2011); Brands (2011); Hoffman (2014).

it is precisely in the technological field that the greatest transformations of the armies are perceived. Military power based on the number of means and personnel gives more and more space to smaller and more flexible defense structures, but with high operational capacity, due to the continuous improvement of the means of combat. These new configurations require, in turn, increasing investments in technology and the preparation of human resources capable of operating integrated defense systems. The process of combination and interoperability is also intensified, leading to the need for convergence of the plans and doctrines of the three forces (Army, Navy and Air Force). Finally, frequent cyberattacks, destabilizing civilian and military control systems across nations, as well as the risks posed by the “militarization of space” in the context of a world increasingly dependent on satellites, point not only to threats but also necessary paths for the future progress of military technology.

The development of military technology and the ability to industrialize it to the point of mobilizing sufficient material means to respond to an external threat in medium- and long-term conflicts is essential for the international strategic insertion of a country that intends to become a global player. Military Power only gains concreteness in its material base, which is built and/or maintained by the Industrial Defense Base. The strengthening of an Industrial Defense Base (IDB) is intrinsically linked to the autonomous defense capability of a State, since it has the industrial facilities and technological know-how capable of effectively producing and using the goods needed for National Defense, it ensures a key element for mobilization and response capacity. In this way, the IDB ends up being the central pillar guarantor of an active and sovereign diplomacy. According to Melo (2015, 26),

an independent and universal foreign policy has as a necessary complement a robust defense policy ... and an essential element of a robust defense policy is an Industrial and Technological Defense Base capable of equipping the Armed Forces. Its structuring and strengthening is a strategic priority for a country such as Brazil, which, in addition to possessing a considerable amount of strategic natural resources that it needs to protect, is seeking an active insertion in the international political and economic scenario.

The creation of an IDB represents a major challenge for emerging countries, since Science, Technology and Development is an arena of power struggle in the international system, especially when it refers to military technologies, a reflection of a closed and competitive defense market, restricted to

transfer of technology (Moreira 2016). Given the sensitive nature of technology<sup>10</sup> that military technology inherently possesses, technological restraint<sup>11</sup> is a standard practice in international trade in military systems. Thus, the State must consider in its foreign policy, defense policy and development policy (especially industrial policy) ways of dealing with the challenges related to technological development and the industrialization of military solutions from a robust and consolidated national defense industry in order to reduce its external dependence on sensitive technologies. According to Brick (2009),

[m]odern defense products are severely restricted for acquisition on the international market and, when available, never match what is most current and / or effective in dealing with contemporary threats. Thus, in order to guarantee its sovereignty and its interests, no country, wishing to be a relevant actor in the international system, could dispense with a technological-scientific-industrial complex capable of supplying its armed forces with the defense products needed to deal with threats that may be presented by any other countries.

Therefore, we consider that the Defense Industry is strategic for any country that wishes to maintain its sovereignty and its autonomy in the 21st century and is a key variable for the composition of National Power (Tellis et al. 2000). Thus, “State support to defense industries is strategically justified because a developed IDB enables the State to master its own technological capabilities, giving it additional power in the international system” (Mota and Rodrigues 2012, 3).

The IDB is also important in its aspects of economic and technological structuring, “which are related to the domain of sensitive technologies, many with a dual character, and to the generation of innovation, high-skilled

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<sup>10</sup> According to Longo (2011), sensitive technology refers to technologies of a civil or military nature whose particular group of countries or country perceives that it should not be passed over for an undetermined period, reportedly for reasons of national security.

<sup>11</sup> According to Amarante (2013, 80-82), “the practice of technological restraint (...) is a set of judicial measures usually taken by developed states against developing or emerging states, in order to avoid access to sensitive technologies. (...) The policy of not obtaining, pure and simple, prevents access to sensitive knowledge, already dominated and exploited by a select group of countries. It is a blockade that removes the needy from the benefits of science, technology and innovation, provoking the widening of the technological gap between those who know and those who do not. Summarizing and emphasizing, the leading countries in scientific, technological and innovative development have practiced the explicit restriction of third parties to the access to technologies that, unilaterally, they consider sensitive. For example, the areas of study considered sensitive by the United States, listed in the Technology Alert List (TAL), issued by the US Department of State. When violated, the foreclosure may or may not be accompanied by retaliation, mainly of an economic nature”.

jobs and exports with high added value” (Melo 2015, 26). As we have already pointed out, the IDB is a possible strategy for the endogenization of the Decision Center of the digitization era.

For the State to act in a transformative way in the industrial material of a country, it is necessary condition to develop a robust industrial policy. It is in this sense that the public policies focused on the development of the IDB must be aligned with the broad industrial policy of the State. Industrial policy is an instrument of economic intervention by the state, whose objective is to change the market status quo, conforming the behavior of economic actors from incentive mechanisms, conditionality, restrictions and prohibitions for the purpose desired by policy makers.

Shapiro (2014, 242) points out that there are two main approaches that inform the logic of the Development Policy and the regulatory action of industrial policies: i) the vision of market failures, whose main attributes are the hypothesis of market primacy and static evaluation of their competition process, and the type of intervention that the State can undertake is the correction of failures horizontally (without the choice of sectors) to level market conditions and allow economic agents to maximize existing efficiencies; and ii) the structuralist-evolutionist view, in which the State can institute and shape the economic environment and its instruments serve to “change the existing economic allocation towards another pattern of productive specialization, more inclined to incorporate innovation and technical progress” (Ibid., 243), that is, the structural-evolutionist industrial policy seeks to prioritize sectors capable of diffusing innovation, purposely creating an asymmetric economy between different sectors.

Cimoli et al. (2007, 68) point out that industrial (structural-evolutionary type) policies and the institutions developed to conduct them affect jointly

- i) the technological capabilities of individual and corporate organizations, and the pace at which they can learn; ii) the economic signals perceived by them (including, of course, the signs of profitability and perceived opportunity costs); (iii) how they interact with each other and with other non-market institutions (such as public agencies, development banks, training and research entities, etc.).

We agree with the authors when they say that

It turns out that all major developed countries currently have relatively high degrees of intervention whether consciously conceived as industrial policies or not which affect all of the above variables. And this applies even more to the period when today’s developed countries were seeking to

match the international leader of the day. What primarily distinguishes the various countries are the instruments, the institutional arrangements and the philosophy of intervention (Cimoli et al. 2007, 68).

Thus, in order to induce a structural and innovation-oriented transformation, especially in such a strategic and competitive sector and requiring constant innovation as the defense industry, it is a necessary condition for a structural-evolutionary industrial policy to establish instruments and institutional arrangements that are aligned with this type of industrial policy. In order to implement and execute a robust defense industrial policy it is necessary to create the political and institutional conditions to coordinate and process the various actors and interests involved in the conduct of public policy (Evans 1995; Rodrik 2004). Therefore, the endogenization strategy of digitization through the defense industry requires an emphatic State action through industrial policies that establish guidelines, institutions and instruments aimed at the promotion of the sector.

## Conclusion

This article had as its main objective to discuss the theoretical debate that involves the relation between defense and development. The implications of this debate are embodied in ideological positions and public policy choices that influence public spending on defense and the acquisition of new systems. In this way, we tried to emphasize the approach that points out that military spending is more related to technological development than to economic growth.

The promotion of the defense industry is a viable strategic choice for a country to be able to endogenize the technologies of digitization and thus nationalize the necessary means to be the protagonist of its own development. The State, as a legitimate monopolist of the use of force, has the legitimacy to establish robust policies that guarantee the material supply for its defense. Based on this premise, it may be through defense industry development policies that the state is enabled to intervene in the industrial and technological fabric of the country without being accused of excessive interventionism.

Therefore, the formulation and implementation of industrial policies aimed at strengthening the defense industry are instruments for the technological development of the country and with the potential to implement critical technologies for significant transformations in the industrial fabric. Therefore, it is fundamental for the advancement of studies on the defense industry, research that is dedicated to understanding the design of industrial

policies and the institutional arrangements structured to formulate and implement them.

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## ABSTRACT

The main objective of this article is to expose the debate around the relationship between military spending and economic development, as well as between defense industry and technological development. With this in mind, we have explored literature from the classical school of economics through to Marxist, Skeletal, Schumpeterian and Neoclassical writers. We argue in this paper that the strengthening of the defense industry, through a robust and focused industrial policy, is a viable strategy for the endogenization of critical technologies central to the domain of the paradigm of development of the digitization. This strategy demands the construction of a robust industrial policy focused on the development and strengthening of the national defense industry. Therefore, it is necessary to advance the research agenda of institutional arrangements and governance focused on this sector.

## KEYWORDS

Defense Industry; Development; Industrial Policy; Military Spending; Defense Economy.

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# STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: STATE- BUILDING AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

Marco Aurélio Chaves Cepik<sup>1</sup>  
Pedro Txai Brancher<sup>2</sup>

## Introduction

How does competition<sup>3</sup> among agents impact the evolutionary processes<sup>4</sup> of *international political systems*? The answer to this question requires primarily the ontological delimitation of the objects in analysis<sup>5</sup>. It will be

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<sup>1</sup> Associate Professor at the Department of Economics and International Relations (DERI), Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). E-mail: marco.cepik@ufrgs.br

<sup>2</sup> PhD candidate in Political Science at the Institute of Political and Social Studies (IESP), Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ). E-mail: pedro.txai@gmail.com

<sup>3</sup> In this work, competition and conflict of interests are treated like synonyms and are defined as: “a form of interaction among individuals, groups, organizations and collectivities which implies shocks to the access and the distribution of the scarce resources” (Pasquino 1998, 225). Moreover, it should be pointed out, that the aim is not to identify the causes of conflicts, but its consequences to the evolving process of the delimited objects of analysis.

<sup>4</sup> By evolution, one understands the sequence of transformations in the components of social systems, not implying the normative content of these changes (Vasconcellos 2013, 85).

<sup>5</sup> It is important to emphasize that “systems” are understood as the logical models that represent entities formed by sets of elements interacting (Bertuglia and Vaio 2005, 3). Therefore, the ontological definition of a system deals with the “criteria of distinction that indicate what we speak of and specifies its properties as being, unity or object” (Maturana and Varela 2005, 47). However, defining them ontologically does not imply that physical and social reality is a de facto system (Wight 2006). In other words, the analytical validity of instantiation and operationalization of such models will always be subject to empirical conditions. As Reis (1997, 19) argues: “Whether these conditions are observed or not, so that we can describe the societies we study from those models, or if the system as we define it adequately describes the set of phenomena we want to analyze, are empirical questions, which we will answer affirmatively, or at times negatively. But we can perfectly, on a purely logical-analytical basis, discuss whether

defined that international political systems (IPS) have an anarchic structure, being composed mainly by the interactions<sup>6</sup> that involve the use or threat of the use of the force among political organizations which are not subordinated to a higher authority able to impose limits on the behavior of agents (Waltz 1979; Buzan and Little 2000, 92). *National political systems*<sup>7</sup> (NPS), on the other hand, have a hierarchical structure, being formed by interactions between individuals and organizations in territories in which there is an organization that concentrates the coercive means and imposes limits for the behavior of the agents (Waltz 1979; Elias 1993; Geuss 2001). *States*<sup>8</sup>, in turn, will be both the constituent units of international political systems and the organizations that monopolize coercive means in national political systems (Tilly 1996; Hui 2005; Levy and Thompson 2011).

It is assumed that the variations in the degrees of concentration of coercive means<sup>9</sup> distinguish the nature and consequences of competition between the agents of each system (Waltz 1979, 92). It is argued that the absence of central government makes competition in international political systems involved in the survival of state political organizations, which consequently constrains the possibilities of increasing the functional specialization between them. On the other hand, the concentration of the means of coercion in national political systems imposes limits on the use of force in conflicts of interest, which in turn reduces the insecurity of agents and allows the increase of division of labor in the system (Elias 1993).

According to the agents and means involved, three dimensions of

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these or those conditions are really necessary or not for the reproduction of a system as it is defined in given work”.

6 Interaction is understood as the set of relations that makes the parts of a system interdependent with each other.

7 It is emphasized that the concept of national political systems does not refer only to social systems in which there are political organizations called nation-states. The concept will be used to characterize any social system in which there was monopolization of the means of coercion by a state organization, whether that organization is a city-state, an empire, a kingdom, etc.

8 The terms political organizations, units, states and agents will be used as synonyms of the components of the international political systems. Furthermore, we will refer to states with “s” minuscule when dealing with political organizations that exercise or aim to exercise control of the means of force in a given territory. In this sense, the term can represent Empires, city-states, city leagues, kingdoms, etc. The term State with the capital “S” will be used when referring to political organizations formed after the end of the feudal order in Western Europe. That is, referring to the National States that are constituted like the predominant political organization in all the continents at the present time.

9 Coercion means the imposition of the will of one agent on the other through the use or threat of the use of force. Coercive means consist of the material resources necessary for one agent to exercise coercion over another (Giddens 2001, 37).

social competition will be identified: the International Competition, characterized by competitive interactions that comprise the use or threat of use of force between political organizations in IPS, and which involves the material capabilities and organizational elements that sustain the use of force in the international arena; the Construction of the State<sup>10</sup>, characterized by the competitive interactions between the state, organizations and individuals around resource extraction and control in NPS, and which concerns the ways in which political organizations achieve the monopoly of the means of coercion and well establish legitimacy for their domination in a delimited territory; and, finally, Regulated Competition, characterized by disputes between non-state organizations and individuals on matters of distribution of life probabilities within national political systems<sup>11</sup>, and which involves the ways that the regulation imposed by the states influences the distribution of life probabilities within the NPS.

Delimiting the objects of analysis, it is defined as a working hypothesis that the results of the interactions between the agents according to the strategies chosen by them to cope with the competition they face cause changes in the structure of the international political systems and in the characteristics of the state political organizations.

To demonstrate the argument, the article is divided into two sections. The first section questions the conditions under which competition between states engenders mechanisms that reinforce processes of concentration of coercive means in international political systems. Firstly, it is assessed that the assumptions of anarchy and low functional specialization present in the model proposed by Kenneth Waltz (1979) do not necessarily imply the existence of only one mechanism acting on the IPS. In fact, it is argued that, because international political systems are open systems, the interactions among its agents allow the emergence<sup>12</sup> of competing mechanisms, which may favor

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<sup>10</sup> The term “state-building” will be employed to characterize conflicts of interest between state, non-state organizations and individuals within national political systems. The term “state formation” will be used to characterize historical processes in which political organizations have been formed.

<sup>11</sup> Thus, three sources of literature are evaluated. The understanding of how a structure of political systems in general constraints the behavior of units - International Relations Theory - is complemented by the weighting on how human resources produced and extracted in democratic systems - Historical Sociology -, as well as by the analysis of the logistical and operational conditionings that sustains the activity of war - Strategic Studies.

<sup>12</sup> Emergence is the process in which phenomena that cannot be apprehended from the sum of the isolated behaviors of the constituent units arise at the systemic level (Holland 2012). There is no need for central planning. Organizational patterns emerge from interactions among agents and become irreducible to them (Abbot 2006).

both concentration and distribution of means of coercion. Finally, it will be analyzed the explanatory model proposed by Victoria Tin-bor Hui (2005) on the transformation of the kingdom system in China to an empire under the Qin dynasty during the period of 656-221 BC.

The second section questions how international competition influences the dimensions of state building and of regulated competition within national political systems. Firstly, it is distinguished ontologically the states from the other agents belonging to the NPS. It is considered that the specificity of the state political organizations consists in the execution of three activities: monopolization of the means of coercion within the NPS; imposition of orders of behavioral regulation to the other agents; and defense against other political organizations (Tilly 1996; Waltz 1979; Giddens 2001).

Then, it is argued that the regulatory orders are not neutral in relation to regulated competition. Indeed, they will tend to favor individuals and organizations that dominate the resources necessary for states to accomplish their purposes (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009). In addition, to the extent that state actors concentrate the resources needed to carry out these three tasks, they will have greater autonomy from other NPS organizations. In turn, if these resources are concentrated in other actors, state interventions will tend to reflect the interests of those actors. Finally, the explanatory model proposed by Tilly (1975; 1985; 1996) on the effects of international competition on the process of formation and consolidation of nation-states in Europe is analyzed.

## **International Political Systems: competition and evolution of the structure**

Understanding the nature of competition in a social system requires the ontological delimitation of three elements: boundaries, mechanisms, and structure (Gilpin 1981). Borders refer to both the conditions necessary for the inclusion of components in the model and the interactions between the system and its environment. In other words, to the delimitation of what is inserted and what is excluded from the system, which allows us to understand how exogenous variables interfere with its functioning (Maturana and Varela 2005). Mechanisms are the plausible and often observed forms in which processes of change occur (Pierson 2000).

The structure refers to the way the units are ordered in relation to one another. The structural level indicates: “a general description of the ordered overall arrangement of a society written in terms of the placement of units

rather than in terms of their qualities” (Waltz 1979, 9). Identifying the elements that compose the structure matters for the evaluation of the constraints imposed on the units, as well as for formulating hypotheses about their behaviors (Carlsnaes 1992).

It is defined as necessary conditions for a unit to belong to the IPS: (i) a political organization that concentrates the means of coercion in a delimited territory and (ii) has the capability of action at the international arena (Waltz 1979; Rosenau 1997; Jervis 1997; Cusack and Stoll 1994)<sup>13</sup>. In other words, agents in IPS are entities composed of various subgroups, organizations, communities, and many individuals that are sufficiently cohesive to possess agency quality (Buzan and Little 2000, 101). This means that the IPS units (aggregates of institutions and individuals) are able to interpret, plan and execute actions that do not derive solely from constraints and structural incentives<sup>14</sup> (Friedman and Starr 1997).

However, although we recognize that states interact in a number of ways, we will not include all kinds of interactions in our analysis. This is because, as Barry Buzan and Richard Little (2000, 76) point out, different types of interaction, and therefore different types of units become more or less prominent depending on the sectoral lens used to analyze the international system. Therefore, even recognizing the importance of cultural and economic interactions for international relations (Watson 1992; Wendt 1999; Arrighi 2010), the model is restricted to interactions involving coercion, that is, the use or threat of use of force (Geuss 2001)<sup>15</sup>.

The structure of the system will be described based on two assumptions presented in the model proposed by Kenneth Waltz (1979). The first is that international political systems are ontologically anarchic, that is, they have no central authority. This assumption derive from the conception that the capacity of action of political organizations in the international arena depends on their prerogative (and their capacity) to define and execute independent external actions<sup>16</sup>. Because of this, the distribution of the means of

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<sup>13</sup> The ontology and evolutionary processes of agents of international political systems will be evaluated in the next section. For the moment, it should be pointed out, that the autonomous capacity for action in the international sphere is a necessary condition for the membership of a political organization in the IPS model of this study (Waltz 1979; Buzan 1984; Watson 1992).

<sup>14</sup> Like Waltz (1979), one assumes that, although they have several objectives, all states seek first to ensure their survival in international political systems.

<sup>15</sup> Cultural economic interactions will be evaluated as exogenous variables to the model, that is, to the extent that they influence how competitive interactions involving the use or the threat of use of force between states influence the evolution of the IPS structure.

<sup>16</sup> It is important to emphasize that to assume that international political systems are ontologically anarchic and that their units have an autonomous capacity of choice does not imply the

coercion<sup>17</sup> in the system cannot be concentrated to the point where one unit is able to totally regulate the actions of the others. In other words, it is obvious that there is no agency without the capacity of action (Buzan 1984).

Decentralization of the means of force in an IPS creates in itself uncertainty about the behavior of its agents. In other words, the absence of central government makes international competition<sup>18</sup> permeated by constant informational incompleteness about the intentions and real capabilities of the units. Thus, only possessing the means of force necessary to defend oneself from others is that states can ensure the continuity of their own existence (Waltz 1979, 74)<sup>19</sup>.

Once the anarchic ontology of the IPS structure is delimited, one can deduce how the socialization-selection mechanism operates in its evolutionary process. According to Checkel (2006, 364): “socialization refers to the process of inducting new actors to the norms, rules and ways of behavior of a given community”. That is, the tendency for agents’ behavior to conform to the constraints imposed by the structure (Elias 1993). As argued above, the anarchic structure of the IPS makes the nature of international competition involve the survival of states. Because of this, war becomes a fundamental element of socialization-selection in international political systems, both by eliminating agents who do not adapt to structural pressures and by encouraging the emulation of perceived winning strategies (Levy and Thompson 2011, 61; Posen 1993, 82).

The second ontological assumption of the structure model proposed

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absence of hierarchical relations between states. What, in fact, the absence of central authority implies is that it is the distribution of the means of force in the system that defines which units will suffer the greatest structural constraints in their actions (Gilpin 1981, 28).

17 Anthony Giddens (2001, 85) argues that “the resources involved in the reproduction of social systems that have some degree of continuity in space and time form aspects of the structural properties of these social systems.” In this sense, it was delimited in this study that the international political systems refer to the interactions that involve the use or threat of the use of force between states. Because of this, the way in which the means of coercion are distributed is also a defining element of the structure of this type of system.

18 To suppose that international political systems are ontologically competitive does not mean to exclude the possibility of cooperation between states. It implies only recognizing that cooperation initiatives will always be permeated by mistrust derived from informational uncertainty regarding the motivations of the parties involved, as well as the inexistence of a central authority capable of ensuring behavioral control.

19 It is emphasized that the ability to defend militarily from external aggressions is not the only means that allows the survival of a state in the IPS. In fact, there are innumerable cases of states that do not have the means necessary to withstand external aggression and continue to exist. However, it is argued that such states have their capacity for action in the IPS extremely constrained.

by Waltz is that there is low functional differentiation in the IPS. According to Buzan and Little (2000), functional differentiation in social systems occurs when units specialize, assuming specific tasks and objectives. In these cases, the agents become interdependent due to the social division of labor. This condition acts as a constraint on individual action, since the survival of a unit depends not only on its own capabilities, but also on the activities carried out by the others. Agents that perform similar functions<sup>20</sup> will depend less on each other and, consequently, will maintain greater autonomy in the systems in which they are inserted (Elias 1993, 206).

It is argued that different levels of coercion imply different possibilities of functional differentiation. The lower the concentration, the greater the behavioral uncertainty and the greater will be the insecurity. Therefore, the smaller will be the structural incentives for increasing the division of labor. As the monopolization of force increases, behavioral uncertainty decreases, and insecurity is reduced with it. Consequently, the division of labor between the units may intensify (Waltz 1979, 104). According to Norbert Elias (1993, 198, emphasis added):

[...] societies without a stable monopoly of force are always those in which the division of functions is relatively small, and the chains of actions that bind individuals to one another relatively short [...]. By forming a monopoly of force, peaceful social spaces are created, which are normally free from acts of violence. The pressures acting on these spaces are different from those that existed before.

Thus, one disagrees with Hendrick Spruyt's statement that "the condition of anarchy implies the existence of a particular type of unity" (Spruyt 1994, 13). In the context of interactions involving force, when one or a few political organizations monopolize the means of coercion and impose orders of behavioral regulation on others, anarchy begins to change. At the limit, such a change would alter the structural constraint that induces agents to build means of coercion that ensure their survival. In this case, states would become "free to specialize because they have no reason to fear the increased interdependence that goes with specialization" (Waltz 1979, 104). We would be facing the end of a system composed of the interaction between independ-

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20 It is important to point out that this study refers to the functional similarity between states only in the context of international competition and the concentration of the means of coercion in the NPS. That is, it is considered as a necessary condition for defining the agents in the IPS that political organizations are able to defend themselves against external aggressions and concentrate the means of coercion in their respective NPS. However, it is clear that, in addition to these two functions, each state can perform specific tasks.



ent political organizations and the subsequent formation of a single global political system.

Therefore, although one can agree with the assumptions of anarchy and the low functional specialization present in the Waltzian model, it presents a theoretical gap by omitting certain dynamics that act in the evolutionary processes of the IPS. According to Waltz, his definition of structure necessarily implies the emergence of the balance of power mechanism (Waltz 1979, 121). That is, according to him, as long as there is no single central authority, the behavior of the units will result in a tendency to restore the de-concentration of the means of force in the system (Waltz 1986, 53).

However, it is argued that the assumptions of anarchy and low functional specialization do not necessarily imply the existence of only one mechanism, which would always encourage the restoration of the deconcentration of force in the system. In fact, there is the emergence of multiple mechanisms that strengthen distinct and even conflicting evolutionary trajectories (Hui 2005, 1).

The concept of mechanism, in turn, is the subject of intense controversy in the literature (Elster 1989; Tilly and Goodin 2006; Archer 2015). Nevertheless, it is noted that there is relative consensus in the conception that they represent the ways in which one variable produces effects in another (Hedstrom and Ylikoski 2010). Roy Bhaskar (1998 34) argues that “mechanisms combine to generate the flow of phenomena that constitute the present states and events of the world”. Charles Tilly and Richard Goodin (2006, 13) point out that mechanisms generate energy transfers between elements and rearrangements in the positioning of units. Anna Grzymala-Busse (2011, 1268) considers that “the analysis of mechanisms and processes involves temporality, to the extent that mechanisms specify change: how and why transformations, trends and developments occur”.

It is argued that the distinctions in the meanings attributed to the concept of mechanisms lie in the fact that their explanatory logic depends on the ontology of the evaluated system. In closed systems, in which interactions with the environment and number of elements can be controlled, mechanisms describe functional relationships between pairs of variables. That is, the trajectory of events that starts with changes in a certain independent variable and generates changes in a dependent variable (Vasconcellos 2013, 81). In this case, the evolutionary trajectory of the system will tend to be linear, since the sum of the individual actions is equal to the aggregate behavior (Mitchell 2009, 22).

On the other hand, in open systems in which the influences of ex-

ogenous variables and the number of interactions between units are high<sup>21</sup>, mechanisms do not operate in the same way (Bhaskar 1998). Due to the interconnection between agents, it is impossible to act alone in this type of system (Hardin 1963). Because of this, small modifications at a specific point can trigger disproportionate and/or unexpected consequences in their general state (Elster 1989). Thus, “organizations may not fully appreciate the implications of what they are doing, and it may take a long time for the consequences of their actions to emerge in full form” (Levy and Thompson 2011, 11). Furthermore, the causal relationships between its components may be recursive (Jaccard and Jacoby 2009). That is, although one particular entity X has an effect on another entity Y, there is nothing to prevent that in a second moment Y also has an effect on X.

Thus, the evolution path of open systems is not linear. Since “a continuous change of the value of one variable may lead to discontinuous behavior of the entire system” (Wimmer 2006, 8), transformations can occur both gradually and abruptly. In such contexts, mechanisms that reinforce tendencies of change (mechanisms of positive feedback), and mechanisms that operate in the restoration of the initial state (negative feedback mechanisms) both act according to Thelen (2003) and Hui (2005).

Finally, due to interactions with the external environment, the changes in the system are irreversible (Prigogine and Stengers 1984). In other words, systemic dynamics depend not only on changes in variables but also on the specific time trajectory in which these changes occurred (Pierson 2004). Therefore, not only can similar actions produce different effects depending on when they occur, but also choices in a given period constrain the possibilities of alternative paths in the future (Thelen 2003).

International political systems are open social systems and composed of the interactions between a significant number of units. Therefore, their evolutionary processes are necessarily unpredictable and the result from the strategic interactions between agents, exogenous variables and competing mechanisms (Hedstrom and Ylikoski 2010, 60). In other words, interactions involving the use or threat of the use of force between states do not necessarily imply the deconcentration of the means of force in the system, and indeed there are multiple possible trajectories of evolution for the IPS.

In this sense, it is possible to summarize the relationship between

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21 The number of elements matters, since as it expands, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify exclusively independent variables, as well as the measurement of effects (Pierson 2004).

agents and structure in the IPS in the following stages: in a first moment<sup>22</sup>, the international competition in an anarchic structure constrains the behavioral variability of the states. Such pressures encourage the units to seek means to ensure their survival, but are assimilated and answered according to the specific characteristics of each agent. In a second moment, from the interactions between the strategies chosen by each state to face international competition emerge transformational mechanisms<sup>23</sup> that produce effects on the structural level. Tendencies are generated both towards the decentralization of the means of force and their concentration (Braumoller 2012).

Therefore, to the extent that “the contingency and flux of the social world, in where multiple mechanisms are also constantly interacting, mechanisms cannot be deterministic” (Wight 2015, 52). In this sense, the inconsistency of the Waltzian model consists in the omission of mechanisms that could overcome the tendency to balance<sup>24</sup>. Thus, the question is to know under what conditions international competition engenders mechanisms that reinforce processes of concentration of coercive means in international political systems.

Victoria Tin-bor Hui (2005) advanced in this regard by analyzing the process of transformation of the IPS formed by sovereign kingdoms in ancient China into a unified national political system in the Qin Dynasty during the period 656-221 BC<sup>25</sup>. The author assumes that this IPS was characterized by anarchy and intense competition among its units (Hui 2005, 5). This diagnosis is in accordance with the analysis of Kiser and Cai (2003, 519), who consider that: “there were only 38 peaceful years between 772-485 BC, and only 89 between 463-222 BC”. However, with the expansion of the Qin Kingdom, the anarchic structure of the system did not engender mechanisms that

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22 Starting the analysis by the effects of the structure on the units does not mean assigning temporal precedence to them. As argued in the first part of this paper, to discern the effects on agent-structure relations, one must consider the time trajectory in which they occur (Friedman and Starr 1997). Thus, one could have begun by evaluating the effects of the units on the structure without any analytical impairment.

23 According to Hedstrom and Ylikoski (2010, 59), **situational mechanisms** are those by which social structures constrain individual actions. On the other hand, **transformational mechanisms** are those by which individuals, through their actions and interactions, generate several intentional and unintentional results and change the structure.

24 In fact, despite not elaborating the argument, Waltz suggests at certain moments the possibility of overcoming the logic of anarchy by the IPS agents.

25 The work of Hui (2005) will be analyzed, since the author uses the model of international political system of Kenneth Waltz like theoretical presupposition. However, it is important to note that there is a consistent research agenda on the influence of war in the process of Qin kingdom expansion. See: Mann (1986), Wong (1997), Kiser and Cai (2003), Lewis (2006, 2007).

would impede the concentration of the force means.

Hui (2005) argues that initially the Chinese international political system evolved according to the assumptions of the Waltzian model. That is, international competition and the mechanism of socialization homogenized the behavior of agents. Thus, not only did political organizations become militarized, they also waged wars, formed alliances, and established diplomatic contacts during periods of peace. Moreover, in the period from 656 BC to 284 BC, balancing alliances and increased power projection costs<sup>26</sup> sustained the anarchic structure. That is, all the states that tried to dominate the agency of the other units in that period “perished as a result of the mechanism of the balance of power and the rising costs of expansion” (Hui 2005).

However, although the structure of the IPS has led to the adoption of similar behavior by the units, each kingdom opted for different strategies to face international competition. According to the author, the Qin Kingdom would have responded through internal administrative reforms which assured it relative advantages over its competitors. Victoria Tin-bor Hui called this type of action a strengthening reform: “efforts to increase military and economic capabilities by enhancing the state’s administrative capability” (Hui 2005, 79). Three dimensions are fundamental to the success of this strategy: the establishment of conscript national armies, the bureaucratization of administrative staff and the imposition of a centralized tax system. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of each dimension as well as its effects from the external and internal point of view on the capacities of the states:

**Table 1: Strengthening Reforms: International Competition and State Formation**

Strengthening Reform	International Competition	State Formation
Conscripted and permanent national armies.	Increased number of combatants and effectiveness in combat.	Monopolization of means of coercion and creation of administrative apparatus
Bureaucratization: meritocratic criteria for the training of administrative staff.	Mobilization of resources and control of conquered territories.	Increased administrative capacity and facilitation of behavioral control.

<sup>26</sup> The increase in the costs of force projection refers to the fact that it becomes economically costly for the state to sustain the material and human resources necessary to secure domination in places far from its base (Gilpin 1981, 103). It is based on this observation that the concept of loss of the force gradient is conceived, which indicates the increase in the difficulties of projecting military power in regions geographically distant from the state base, mainly through large bodies of water (Boulding 1962; Mearsheimer 2001).

Centralized tax system.	Larger and more reliable sources of funding for wars.	More resources for internal domination. Reduced influence of other organizations and private actors.
Source: Adapted from Hui (2005).		

The beginning of the strengthening reforms in the Qin Kingdom comes with the arrival of Prime Minister Shang Yang in the middle of 359 BC (Kiser and Cai 2003)<sup>27</sup>. Taking advantage of technological innovations in military equipment<sup>28</sup>, Yang established large-scale conscription in Qin-controlled territories (Lewis 2007, 31)<sup>29</sup>. Thereafter, all men between the ages of 15 and 60 could be recruited to combat (Kiser and Cai 2003, 520). In this context, the fighting forces of the kingdom began to be composed not only of carriage-mounted cavalry formed by fighters from the agrarian aristocracy but also by infantry made up of masses of peasant soldiers (Hui 2005, 80). In addition, systems of punishment and inducements for cowardice or bravery in combat were instituted: “Anyone who gained merit in battle by slaying enemies or commanding victorious units was rewarded with promotion” (Lewis 2007, 32). This model became “the most important form of achievement in this era”, as “military merit was to be more important than noble birth” (Hsu 1965, 73, cited in Kiser and Cai 2003, 521). In addition, the formation of ever larger armies led to the construction of institutions capable of managing the necessary logistical imperatives to sustain such a force projection (Lewis 1990, 9). Therefore, it is noted that not only did Qin’s capabilities increase in relation to the other IPS states, but also that the state strengthened vis-a-vis private power holders (Kiser and Cai 2003, 520).

The bureaucratization of the administration, by diminishing the influence of the agrarian elites, was another element that contributed to the increase of the capacity of intervention of the state in the national political system. Gradually, instead of the nobility, the state was dominated by a single autocratic ruler, whose agents recorded and mobilized the peasants for state service, as well as collecting the taxes that sustained the military expansion (Lewis 2007, 32). The territory was divided into 36 administrative districts

27 Shang Yang had previously served in the Wei Kingdom, where he also introduced strengthening reforms on a smaller scale. Its importance in implementing reforms in the Qin Kingdom suggests the relevance of the diffusion of technological innovation as a mechanism that mediates the effects of international competition on agents.

28 Among the technological innovations that have contributed to the massification of armies are the invention of the beast and the development of cheaper brass swords and spears.

29 Despite difficulties in obtaining reliable data for this period, Kiser and Cai (2003) estimate that the total contingent of the Qin army would reach between 500,000 soldiers.

that were identical to military recruitment units and were divided into sub-units controlled by officials nominated by the sovereign (Rosenstein 2009). In these districts, designations of officers by merit have increased over those achieved by heredity. In addition, codes with central state laws began to be published in all regions of the kingdom and civil servants were required to send detailed annual reports on the conditions of each locality.

In order to reduce the costs related to the behavioral control of the other NPS agents, the population was divided into groups formed by 10 families at most. If an individual committed any transgression, the whole group to which he belonged was held accountable. However, if the criminal was reported to the authorities, the group would receive benefits on lands and official positions. According to Kiser and Cai (2003, 528), the advantage of such a form of control was that “[t]his kind of social control mechanism held everyone under fairly constant local supervision and thus made tax collection and military recruitment much easier”.

Regarding the mobilization of resources, it is noticed that the agricultural activity was perceived as essential for the sustenance of military forces (Lewis 2007). Thus, while the commercial and handicraft sectors suffered penalties, agriculture in small farms received state incentives. The irrigation canals and roads created at that time were intended to flow more efficiently and to increase military mobility (Hui 2005, 172). Besides, according to Rosenstein (2009, 26), a strict redistribution of land was promoted, in exchange for the recognition of land ownership for the peasants to be acquiescent about paying taxes and providing military service. On the other hand, the population increase was pursued through subsidies granted to couples with more than two children and incentives for the entry of immigrants. Thus, not only the population of Qin increased in absolute terms, but also compared to the other kingdoms. In this context, “with the ability to engage in total mobilization of national resources, Qin’s power and wealth reached a new height” (Hui 2005, 84).

Increasing their material abilities compared to their competitors enabled more aggressive external actions<sup>30</sup> on the part of the Qin Kingdom. Victoria Tin-bor Hui argues that, by having a bureaucratic body formed in a meritocratic way, Qin developed strategies that exploited the collective action problems<sup>31</sup> inherent in the balancing alliances eventually articulated against

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30 For an analysis of the relationship between increased state power in the domestic sphere and more aggressive external policies, see Zakaria (1998).

31 As Mearsheimer (2001) stresses, “Putting together balancing coalitions quickly and making them function smoothly is often difficult, because it takes time to coordinate the efforts to prospective allies or member states, even when there is wide agreement on what needs to be done.

them (Hui 2005, 100). Thus, while in the period 656-357 BC the kingdom began only 7% of the wars involving the largest states of the system, between 356-221 BC, it initiated 54% and won 92%. Of this total, only eight of the fifty-two wars fought by the kingdom found resistance in the form of alliances (Hui 2005, 78). Moreover, “anti-Qin alliances formed very slowly and infrequently, they did not have enough member to overpower Qin, they rarely had unified command, and they readily disintegrated” (Hui 2005, 79). As a result, in 293 BC Qin had already defeated the main forces of his close neighbors: the kingdoms of Wei, Han and Chu. Around 257 BC, the kingdom controlled about half of the system’s territory. In 236 BC, he launched a final war of unification against the Qi state. As a conqueror of this conflict, the concentration of force in the system was completed under the command of the Qin Dynasty in 221 BC (Hui 2005, 64-79).

One may question why the mechanism of socialization has not encouraged the emulation of the reforms and strategies pursued by the Qin Kingdom by rival political organizations. The author suggests that the specific trajectory of events made the accumulation of power a process of positive reinforcement<sup>32</sup>. In the first place, Qin’s peripheral position made its initial expansion seem little threatening in relation to the multiple threats faced by each kingdom<sup>33</sup>. Second, after Qin conquered more than half of the system, “even the combined capabilities of all six states would not match that of Qin” (Hui 2005, 77). In this way, the perception that the most appropriate behavior to ensure survival was not resistance, but submission to the strongest state<sup>34</sup>, spread among the other realms.

It is worth summarizing the evolution of the agent-structure relationship in the Qin Kingdom expansion process, according to the model proposed by Victoria Tin-bor Hui. At first, the anarchic structure of the system (E) induced competition and encouraged similar behaviors among its units. Then the combination of exogenous variables (innovation and technological diffusion) with responses from a specific agent (empowering reforms) changed

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Threatened states usually disagree over how the burdens should be distributed among alliance members. After all, states are self-interested actors with powerful incentives to minimize the costs they pay to contain an aggressor”.

32 According to Hardin (1963, 71), social power is a process of positive reinforcement. Through numerous stratagems a monopolist may attempt to manipulate the machinery of society in order to eliminate threats which aim to restore a natural balance. A monopolist in one area will try his power for others, without limits.

33 It is important to note that not even the rulers of the Qin kingdom initially aimed at dominating the system. According to the author, only in 287 BC was the first mention of such an objective in military strategy documents (Hui 2005, 100).

34 On the relation between perceived threat and inability to form balancing alliances, see Schweller (2004).

the distribution of capabilities in the system and made the conquest and administration of the dominated territories less costly. At last, the interactions, exemplified by the conflict between the anti-balancing strategies and the disorganized collective resistance of the other realms, favored the tendency of force concentration and resulted in an increase in the functional specialization of the system (E'). Therefore, the transformation of an international political system into a national political system took place.

In conclusion, Hui's work suggests that the conjunction of technological transformations, empowering reforms, and strategies of destabilizing alliances can overcome the mechanism of the balance of power and make the concentration of means of coercion a process of positive reinforcement. Thus, the continuity of the existence of the IPS formed by the Chinese kingdoms was not assured, but was dependent on historical contingencies derived from the strategic interactions between the agents and the influence of contextual variables. In the following section, the ontology and evolution of national political systems and states is evaluated. In this case, not only international competition matters, but also interactions between states, non-state organizations and individuals belonging to the different NPS.

## **National Political Systems: state-building and regulated competition**

Political systems are constituted by political organizations that centralize the coercive means, allowing the advance of labor division among the other agents. However, as there is in international political systems, there is no iron law that ensures the continuity of the structure. Thus, it is not only the IPS existence, but also the survival of the states and NPS continuity are contingent phenomena.

First, it is necessary to differentiate the states from the other units of the national political systems. According to Charles Tilly (1993, 46), states are coercive organizations, distinct from families and kinship groups and in some aspects have a manifest priority over all other organizations within extensive territories. In turn, Stein (2008, 129) understands that organizations are "conceptually recognized entities that combine groups of people who follow defined common rules". Therefore, states constitute only one of the agents that form the NPS, which is also composed of non-state organizations and individuals. Its specificity lies in its claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of the means of force in the demarcated territory (Weber 1999).

State-forming processes occur when organizations monopolize the means of coercion in a social system (Tilly 1996). Such deals face opposi-



tion from rival political organizations internally, as well as threats from other units belonging to the IPS. In order to consolidate, states need to develop the means to extract and convert the resources produced in the national political system into material capacities for coping with domestic resistance and international competition (Giddens 2001).

Thus, it is noted that states are not formed by means of agreements between the sovereign and society, as suggested by contractualist approaches<sup>35</sup>, but they result from the efforts of monopolization of the coercive means by one organization to the detriment of others. Therefore, state-building processes necessarily involve conflicts of interest between political organizations and the other components of NPSs. Indeed, Tilly (1985) argues that before providing security, they would be the main potential threat to individuals and non-state organizations.

In the previous section, it was argued that the insecurity and the low functional specialization between the units predominated in the IPS in function of the anarchy. In turn, it has now been pointed out that states concentrate the means of coercion on the famous systems. The difference in the distribution of the coercive means in each system has implications in the mechanisms that act in its evolutionary processes. In other words, a competition between NPS agents is subject to the pressures derived from a structure different from the one found in IPS.

It follows from this distinction that, while in the IPS the action of the units is constrained by the insecurity derived from the uncertainty about the intentions of the other units, in the NPS the behavioral variation is delimited by a *regulatory order* imposed by the state organization. Max Weber defines regulatory order as the set of rules “that regulates other social actions and guarantees by means of this regulation the probabilities provided to the agents” (Weber 2010, 99). Because of this, the NPS diminishes individual insecurity insofar as the order restricts the means tolerated in the competitive interactions between the units.

It is noted that competition and the mechanism of socialization are not eliminated, but operate differently. It is argued that the fundamental difference is that in a system in which there is a regulatory order imposed by the state, the survival of agents does not depend on their own capabilities. Consequently, in these systems the incentives and constraints derived from the

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35 By contractualism, it is meant: “all those political theories that see the origin of society and the basis of political power in a contract, that is, a tacit agreement or expressed between the majority of individuals, an agreement that would signify the end of the natural state and the beginning of the social and political state” (Matteucci 1998, 272). For an evaluation of contractualist approaches to state formation processes, see Moore (2008).

structure make it possible to increase the functional specialization between the units (Elias 1993).

According to Waltz (1986, 324), the increase in functional specialization occurs when the division of labor between the units of the system increases. No longer concerned with physical threats, agents may fail to seek coercive means and perform specific activities that are embedded in the functioning of the collectivity. Hence, if IPS were characterized by functional similarity between sovereign units, the social division of labor that makes them interdependent would integrate NPS agents (Doyle 1986).

Thus, the increase in functional specialization is inextricable from the formation of political organizations that concentrate coercive means and ensure orders of behavioral regulation. That is, it is only when “peaceful social spaces are created that the pressures that act upon people in these spaces are different from those that existed before” (Elias 1993, 198). In these spaces, socialization constrains the agents to repress impulses of physical aggression. Because of this, the nature of competition differs, with the survival of the unit no longer at stake, but its positioning in a wide and integrated network of interactions (Elias 1993, 132).

However, it is argued that increasing functional specialization in a national political system does not entail eliminating conflicts of interest between its units. So, what is the nature of competition in a system in which there is a regulatory order imposed by state organization? We use Max Weber’s distinction between the concepts of power and domination<sup>36</sup> to advance this issue. According to Weber: “power means all probability, within a social relation, to impose self-will even against resistance, whatever the basis of that probability” (Weber 2010, 102). In turn, “domination will be called the probability of finding obedience to an order of certain content in certain people” (Weber 2010, 102).

Due to the absence of a central authority, relations of power predominate in IPS. That is, there is no strong regulation of the means by which one political organization tries<sup>37</sup> to impose its will on the others<sup>38</sup>. In turn, it was

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36 On the concept of power, see Dahl (1961), Giddens (2001), and Lukes (2004). The Weberian definition is used to emphasize the distinction between social systems in which there is no superior regulation of the means by which an agent can impose his will on another, of social systems in which there is a regulating order delimiting the acceptable behaviors by the units.

37 It is important to emphasize the importance of the term to try, since, as Giddens (2001, 36) points out, “an agent may be in a position of power in order to be able to employ a range of resources. Nevertheless, how far these resources can be used to ensure specific results depends on ensuring any consents that are needed from other agents”.

38 As argued above, such a configuration does not imply randomness of results or even chaos,

defined that the states concentrate the means of coercion and establish regulatory orders on the behavior of the other agents of the NPS. Thus, in this type of system, obedience to the delimited behavioral limits is configured as a relation of domination and authority between governors and the governed.

Weber argues that a regulatory order “exists when there is a probability that it will be maintained by a specific cadre of people who will use physical compulsion with the intention of achieving order compliance or enforcing penalties for their violation” (Weber 1981, 61). In other words, to the extent that: “for the very fulfillment of a ‘minimal’ agenda, the State cannot completely avoid interfering in the economic life of the community that sustains it” (Reis 2003, 65), its consolidation requires not only the concentration of means of force, but also the creation of administrative institutions necessary for intervention in society (Bendix 1976, 23)<sup>39</sup>.

That is, although the possession of coercive means is a necessary condition for the imposition of the regulatory order, state domination becomes unsustainable if it is based only on coercion (Buzan 1984, 53). As Wong (1997, 74) argues: “coercive control is expensive, labor intensive, and sometimes capital intensive”. Therefore, even though the concentration of the means of force is fundamental to behavioral regulation, states are unable to sustain themselves without the acquiescence of other organizations within society<sup>40</sup>. Thus, “the question of legitimacy becomes fundamental, since it alone would be the ultimate guarantee of the subsistence of a political association” (Bianchi 2014, 100)<sup>41</sup>. Hence, state agents would strive to consolidate the relations of domination by “acts of persuasion, such as the creation of beliefs in the morality, sensibility, necessity, or desirability of a certain kind of social order” (Wong 1997, 74). In other words:

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but behavior patterns that emerge in a decentralized way from behavioral expectations derived from the distribution of force in the system.

39 According to Max Weber (1991, 96): “The qualitative and quantitative development of administrative tasks inevitably favors, in the long term, the effective continuity of at least some of the employees, because technical superiority in the administration of public affairs, in a more sensitive way, in training and experience. Therefore, there is always the probability that a special and perennial social formation will be constituted for administrative purposes, and this at the same time means: for the exercise of domination”.

40 According to Miguel Centeno (2002, 106): “the capacity of a state to extract resources will be closely linked to the willingness of the population to accept these burdens”.

41 Legitimacy is defined as “an attribute of the State, which consists in the presence, in a significant part of the population, of a degree of consensus capable of ensuring obedience without the necessity of resorting to the use of force, except in sporadic cases. It is for this reason that all power seeks to reach consensus, so that it is recognized as legitimate, transforming obedience into adhesion” (Levi 1998, 675).

If the State can rely on the population's adherence to the norms in force, not only to comply with them routinely, but also to punish recalcitrant or at least denounce them to the competent authorities then it is licit to expect a more efficient performance of political institutions (Reis 2003, 63).

That is, "states must have a physical base of population and territory; they must have governing institutions of some sort which control the physical base; and there must be some idea of the state which establishes its authority in the minds of its people" (Buzan 1984, 40). In short, state domination over the other components of the NPS is sustained by the concentration of coercive means and the legitimacy of the regulatory order<sup>42</sup>.

However, it is still necessary to explain how the concentration of the means of force, the establishment of a regulatory order, and the functional specialization themselves condition the interactions between individuals and non-state organizations.

It has been argued that the survival of units (organizations and individuals) is reasonably guaranteed in the interactions that take place within national political systems where there is a state monopoly of coercive means and a regulatory order. However, conflicts of interest do not occur exclusively through coercion. In fact: "there is a whole set of means whose monopolization allows man, as a group or individual, to impose his will on others" (Elias 1993, 146)<sup>43</sup>. Therefore, in the NPS "groups, whose social existence is mutually dependent, through the division of functions, still struggle for certain opportunities. They are both opponents and partners" (Elias 1993, 147). Thus, as Lockwood (1956, 139) points out, the increased division of labor resulting from pacification is also the cause of new conflicts of interest.

In this case, Weber argues that competition occurs around specific life opportunities, arising from the positioning of units in the distribution structure of economic and social orders (Weber 1981, 62-63). The author called this type of competition as regulated competition: "to the extent that it is directed, in ends and means, by an order" (Weber 2010, 72)<sup>44</sup>. That is,

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<sup>42</sup> It is important to note that the use of coercion is not restricted to the international arena. The relevant distinction for this article is that in national political systems, with the exception of state organizations, agents do not organize collectively to threaten or use physical force to defend their interests. When they do, they are subject to the penalties defined in the regulatory order and imposed by the state organization.

<sup>43</sup> As Pasquino (1998, 226) argues, "violence can be considered a usable instrument in a social or political conflict, but not the only and not necessarily the most effective one".

<sup>44</sup> According to Weber (1981, 63): "we can call 'social order' the form by which social honor is distributed in a community among typical groups participating in that distribution. The

even if there is regulation of the means tolerated in social competition, the agent's position in the division of labor will provide greater - or less - access to the resources needed to defend his interests in the NPS (Hay and Wincott 1998, 956)<sup>45</sup>. Therefore, although the means used by regulated competition are variable, it is considered that:

The processes of constitution of society are very often simply commitments of antagonistic interests, which neutralize only part of the object or the means of struggle, but leave, in the end, opposition of interests and competition around probabilities. And the ordering of social action, regardless of its kind, leaves, as it were, any effective selection in the competition of the different human types around the probabilities of life anyway (Weber 2010, 80).

Three distinct dimensions of conflict involving the states are thus evidenced: international competition, due to the behavioral insecurity derived from the anarchic structure of the IPS; the construction of the state itself, fraught with tension between the state and the other organizations and individuals of the NPS (especially regarding the extraction of resources for external defense, monopolization of internal coercion and imposition of the regulatory order); and regulated competition, represented by conflicts of interest between non-state organizations and individuals around the distribution of resources, provide access to specific life opportunities (Table 2).

**Table 2: Dimensions of the Conflict involving the IPS and NPS Agents**

Types of Conflict	Agents	Means
International Competition	States belonging to IPS	Material Capabilities for War
Construction of the State	State, organizations and individuals belonging to the NPS	Coercion and legitimacy formation
Regulated Competition	Non-state organizations and individuals	Delimited by the regulatory order imposed by the state
Source: Elaborated by the authors		

social order and the economic order are both, of course, related to the 'legal order'. However, the social and economic order are not identical. The economic order is for us only the way in which economic goods and services are distributed. The social order is obviously conditioned to a high degree by the economic order, and in turn reacts to it".

45 According to Elias (1993, 105): "thanks to centralization and monopolization, opportunities that were previously to be won by individuals with military or economic force become amenable to planning. From a point of development, the struggle for monopolies no longer aims at their destruction. It is a struggle for control of what they produce, for a plan according to which their burden and benefits are further divided, in a word, by the keys to distribution".

The three types of conflicts are linked. It should be noted, for example, that the regulatory order imposed by the state is not neutral in relation to regulated competition. That is, “the structure of any legal order directly influences the distribution of power, economic or otherwise” (Weber 1981, 61). Thus, the benefits derived from the order sustained by the states tend to be directed towards the agents who dominate and provide them with the resources necessary for their purposes (Mann 1992, 13). This condition is made explicit in taxation, whose stipulation is the result of political pressures and counter pressures (Reis 2003, 65).

Hence, the existence of a regulatory order implies the continuation of conflicts of interest in the system, since “the imposition of order necessarily resolves the conflict on terms favorable to either party” (Clarke 1991, 4). Thus, the other agents dispute the nature of the order imposed by the state, insofar as it defines the behavioral expectations of the competition between them (Lustick 2011, 2). That is, although states establish relations of domination over individuals and non-state organizations, they are also a necessary condition for increasing the division of labor that allows the integration of NPS themselves. However, the order that underpins the increase in functional specialization is not neutral, favoring the interests of certain agents in exchange for acquiescence and support for state domination (Elias 1993). At the limit, it is such asymmetries and biases that fuel revolutions and/or reforms in national political systems over time (Cepik 1999).

In addition, state domination is contextually variable (Stein 2008, 164). To the extent that governors legitimately concentrate the resources necessary to survive in the IPS and monopolize the means of coercion in the NPS, they will not only have greater freedom of external action but also greater autonomy from the other organizations and individuals that make up the political systems national authorities. On the other hand, if the resources needed to implement these imperatives are concentrated on other actors, state interventions will tend to be constrained and reflect their interests (Giddens 2001, 160).

Among the mechanisms that interfere with the way in which international competition influences state-building and regulated competition, war (Posen 1993; Tilly 1975; Tilly 1985; Tilly 1996; Herbst 2000; Centeno 2002; Hui 2005).

Charles Tilly, for example, argues that the evolution of nation-states in Europe in the period 990-1990<sup>46</sup> was the result of rulers' efforts to mo-

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<sup>46</sup> It is important to emphasize that the analysis of long temporal processes generates as weakness the omission of specific events in the evolutionary trajectories of each case. It is recognized that such contingent events on certain occasions play a decisive role in determining

nopolize means of coercion internally and to face international competition (Tilly 1996). Compelled by external threats, the states increased the extraction of resources from the other components of the NPS<sup>47</sup>. To the extent that such agents resisted state-owned enterprises, conditions for the provision of resources were barred<sup>48</sup>. Thereby, in exchange for the material and human resources necessary for wars, the state organization granted political and / or social rights by modifying the NPS regulatory orders.

However, there were regional variations in the construction trajectories of nation-states. The author points out as a factor responsible for these distinctions the differences of state capacity that each ruler possessed to impose his domination over the holders of capital in each territory. This difference would have been responsible for changes in two dimensions: how resources were extracted; and what are the characteristics of the orders that regulated the behavior of the units. Three ideal types of trajectory would be observable: intensive in coercion, highly capitalized, and an optimal trajectory (from the point of view of the nation-state) of capitalized coercion (Tilly 1996, 203).

At one extreme, in the predominantly agricultural areas, few cities with little capital (Russia, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, Sicily and Castile), rulers used coercive strategies to extract resources, wage wars and control order in their territories<sup>49</sup>. The confrontation of international competition was

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which organization would triumph over the other. However, it is considered that the selection mechanisms derived from the structure of the European international political system acted generally independently of such accidents, encouraging the centralization of political power in larger states. On the advantages and disadvantages of evaluating long time processes, see Tilly (1983).

47 Although, at the end of the period evaluated by the author, this process has promoted the convergence of the formats of the European political organizations towards the nation-state, this trajectory would not have occurred in a linear way. In fact, there have been the formation of political organizations with extremely varied characteristics. City-states, city leagues, kingdoms, ecclesiastical potentates, and empires coexist in the European international political system. See Spruyt (1994).

48 According to Kliemt and Ahlert (2013, 47), bargains occur when: “humans are engaged in ‘antagonistic cooperation’ and have to negotiate agreements on matters such as prices, wages, and regulations concerning personal, group, and international relations. Bargaining parties have partly opposing interests and need to negotiate how to compromise them to the advantage of all concerned”. About the relationship between bargaining, taxation, and state formation, see Moore (2008, 37).

49 According to Tilly, the Russian case is the ideal model of the coercive strategy. After Tsar Ivan IV (1533-84) conquered conflicts with the agrarian nobility, he would have come to benefit state officials with expropriated lands. In a second moment, agrarian landowners and state agents lined up around the exploitation of peasant labor. By imperial decrees, the peasants were fixed or transferred to certain territories. In 1700, Peter the Great issued a decree according to

financed by the exploitation of a peasant mass subject to a regulatory order maintained more by the alliance between rulers, landowners and state officials (Tilly 1996, 213).

At the other extreme, in areas with dense networks of cities and abundance of capital (Flanders, northern Italy, and the Netherlands), rulers employed capital-intensive strategies. The presence of a powerful merchant class established “serious limits to the direct exercise by the state of controlling individuals and families, but facilitated the application of relatively efficient and painless rates on trade” (Tilly 1996, 161)<sup>50</sup>. In the absence of agricultural areas, the conflicts in which these states were involved were borne by loans, customs duties, and excise taxes. Control of trade routes was defined in quick battles fought by low-cost mercenary forces. Such means did not require large bureaucratic apparatus, being administered by employees of the families of merchants and bankers. Therefore, the preparation for international competition and the regulatory order was sustained by commercial and financial profits (Tilly 1996, 223).

In an intermediate position were the rulers who used strategies of capitalized coercion (England, France and Prussia). In these cases, there was less asymmetry between landowners, merchants and petty bourgeois in cities. The greater balance ensured less reliance on coercive aspects in extractive activity - compared to strategies of intensive coercion - while at the same time resulting in increased state capacity for penetration into society - compared to those who adopted capital intensive strategies. Consequently, the regulatory order in these NPS counted “with the acquiescence of both landowners and merchants” and established regulated competition in which “nobles faced financiers, but in the end ended up collaborating with them” (Tilly 1996, 161). Finally, Tilly (1996, 268) states that this type of state prevailed over others because of its greater ability to support armies with its own resources.

The hypothesis of Tilly’s model is that international competition was intermediated by the way in which regulated competition and the construction of the state - represented by the interactions between mercantile classes, agrarian nobility, peasants and state agents - was structured in each region (Tilly 1996, 76). In addition, it suggests that the consolidation of the nation-state as the predominant unit in the system was not the only possible path of evolution (Spruyt 1994). That is, although the increase in international competition led to the mobilization of resources by the units, there was a time lag until the socialization mechanism operated to converge the regulato-

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which every freed servant was to go immediately to military service, and if he was refused he should submit to another master (Tilly 1996, 212).

<sup>50</sup> In this case, the trajectory of Venice is the ideal case presented by the author.



ry orders of the NPS (Tilly 1994, 94).

If the variation in the relations between coercion and capital were pointed out as the cause of the initial divergence in the nation-state formation processes, transformations in the shape of military and police forces would be responsible for subsequent convergence (Finer 1975; Tilly 1975; Paret 1986)<sup>51</sup>. That is, if international competition initially led to the mobilization of resources, after the transformations in the means that sustained the use of force the mechanism of socialization selected the political organizations whose reforms best adapted to such changes.

First, there was an increase in the scale of resources used in international competition. According to Mann (1993, 371), “states were fighting major wars for two-thirds of the time, involving progressively greater demands on manpower, taxation, and agricultural and industrial production”<sup>52</sup>. Therefore, the number of combatants has increased consistently. In this context, it was evidenced that armed forces formed only by knights of the nobility and mercenaries were not able to face armies composed of thousands of conscripted, trained and disciplined soldiers (Jones 1987, 150). As a result, the establishment of established and permanent forces gradually took over (Porter 1994).

Second, the entry of the masses into the theaters of operations was made possible by technological innovations in military equipment that diminished the predominance of the nobility in the fighting. Lighter cartridges, as well as the inventions of musket, shotgun and bayonet increased the efficiency of light infantry over heavy cavalry (Jones 1987)<sup>53</sup>. The spread of gunpowder increased the range of artillery and diminished the importance of castles as military fortifications (Giddens 2001, 132).

The nature of the new equipment required more standardization of collective actions, which in turn required discipline, hierarchy, and constant training of soldiers in times of peace (Finer 1975)<sup>54</sup>. The achievements

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51 It will follow the model proposed by Finer (1975, 90), who considers that the “format of the military forces” consists of two dimensions: (i) the recruitment and the service of the soldiers: if they are native or foreign, or voluntary, ad hoc or permanent; and (ii) the size of the armed forces, the composition of arms, and the social stratification of force.

52 In addition, the number of deaths per combat increased from 3,000 per year in the 16th century to over 223,000 per year during the 20th century (Tilly 1996, 131).

53 According to Barry Posen: “The widespread employment of skirmishers in “open order” seems to have spread fairly quickly after the revolution, and persisted to some degree in most European armies. It was hard to fight the French without adopting their methods” (Posen 1993, 94).

54 Black (1991, 83) considers that “the ability to strike first and hard, as France did against the Dutch in 1672, and against Austria in 1733 and 1741, and as Prussia did against Austria in 1740,

of states that adopted such measures pressured their opponents to emulate them (Black 1991). Consequently, “the modern command army thus emerged on the stage of Europe, highly disciplined and conceived as a pliant instrument of state authority” (Porter 1994, 162).

Both the need to supply and coordinate larger contingents, and the imperative of mass production of equipment, the financial costs and logistical, strategic, and operational requirements of war have expanded (Finer 1975)<sup>55</sup>. Such needs have led to an increase in state’s ability to intervene on NPS. According to Michael Mann (1993, 369): “It is probable that late eighteenth-century states had the highest fiscal extraction rates the world had seen before the wars of the twentieth century”. Bruce Porter (1994, 166) points out that in this period “finance departments, reeling from the spiraling costs of war, faced drastic overhaul and rationalization”<sup>56</sup>. Thus, preparation for the inter-state wars produced consequently states with increasingly robust administrative apparatus.

The changes in the resources needed to cope with the war in Europe evidenced that the survival of the states depended on the extraction of resources from the entire NPS (Hobsbawm 1992). Consequently, the parameters of competition between states, individuals and non-state organizations have also been altered. On the one hand, the lesser role of the nobility in wars increased the autonomy of state agents in relation to this group (Kennedy 1989). That is, “war has taken a course which has made fragmented and small-scale sovereignty a clear disadvantage” (Tilly 1996, 121). Hence, the ability of aristocracies to maintain armed forces independent of central governments has deteriorated (Black 1991, 83)<sup>57</sup>. Thus, the tendency of centralization of the means

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produced obvious benefits for rulers who retained a large peacetime army. Their actions were watched with concern by other powers and only they enjoyed a real freedom of manoeuvre in international relations. As a result there was considerable pressure in certain states to increase the level of military preparedness, an expensive business”. On the other hand, according to Finer (1975, 99), the first permanent military forces arose in 1445 in France, in 1645 in England, in 1660 in Prussia and in 1707 in Russia.

<sup>55</sup> Posen (1993, 83) argues that the essence of the mass army is its ability to maintain combat power in the face of the challenges posed by friction in the campaigns. Thus, not only are the imperatives of command, control, and logistics enormous, but maintaining political motivation, education, and training large contingents are challenges for state agents.

<sup>56</sup> According to Mann (1993, 393), the percentage of state employees in relation to the total population between 1760 and 1910 increased from 0.06% to 1.17% in Austria, from 0.26% to 1.4% in France, from 0.18% to 0.64% in England and from 0.33% to 1.57% in Prussia/Germany.

<sup>57</sup> According to Black (1991, 83), “the armies retained by weaker powers did not compare with those of the major states, one of the significant military and political developments of the post-1660 period being their increasing discrepancy”.

of force in political units with greater territorial extension was consolidated.

On the other hand, the participation of the masses in the fighting led to the reformulation of the terms in which state domination was legitimized. The effects were the emergence of the national ideal as a source of legitimacy; and the increasing civil demands on states, including, at the limit, the revolutionary action of the previously subaltern working masses (Hobsbawm 1992). That is, if nationalism was operationalized by European rulers as a tool for ideological mobilization and homogenization of populations within their territories, it also served as a justification for claims for the extension of access to civil, political and social rights in the regulatory orders (Marshall 1973)<sup>58</sup>. The contrast between Admiral Nelson's speech before the Battle of Trafalgar in 1808: "England expects every man to do his duty" (Hobsbawm 1992, 150), with the slogan "one man, one vote, one gun" spread during the conflicts surrounding the extension of suffrage in Sweden at the beginning of the twentieth century (Bendix 1976, 115) illustrates the relationship between mass military mobilization, a national ideal, and increasing demands on the state.

Therefore, if reforms in this period increased the capacity for state intervention in the NPS, they also altered the correlation of forces among the agents involved in regulated competition<sup>59</sup>. Bendix (1978, 28) argues that, as public administration expanded, access to official positions was separated from hereditary or proprietary criteria. Other authors note that the establishment of free public education systems (Posen 1993) accompanied policies of linguistic unification<sup>60</sup>. Michael Mann (1993) points out that state spending

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58 T. H. Marshall (1973) distinguishes three types of citizenship rights: civil, political and social. Civil rights would be those that would guarantee freedom of association, speech and justice in relation to accusations of inappropriate behavior. Political rights deal with the participation of individuals in the exercise of political power. Social rights refer to the prerogative of each individual to have minimum standards of security and economic well-being within the NPS.

59 For a detailed evaluation of the process of centralization of public administration and the means of force in state political organizations during this period, see Bendix (1976), Elias (1993), Giddens (2001). The passage from the work of Reinhard Bendix (1976), which sums up the fundamental distinction between the way in which the regulative orders was sustained in the medieval period and in the nation-states, is reproduced here: "In the medieval conception the "building block" of the social order is the family of hereditary privilege, whose stability over time is the foundation of right and of authority, while the rank-order of society and its transmission through inheritance regulates the relations among such families and between them and the supreme ruler. The modern nation-state presupposes that this link between governmental authority and inherited privileges in the hands of families of notables is broken" (Bendix 1976, 138).

60 As Posen (1993, 120) points out: "mass literacy makes it possible for states to train larger armies in peacetime and mobilize them in wartime with greater speed. In addition, it makes

on education and well-being between 1870 and 1910 increased by 500% in France, 399% in Germany and 638% in the United Kingdom. Benedict Anderson (2008) assesses that the development of the press not only increased the ability to disseminate law codes, reporting and gathering information, but also strengthened national identity through the mass media. On the other hand, Helleiner (1998) and Lauer (2008) demonstrate how the creation of national currencies facilitated taxation, increased the capacity of intervention in the economy and spread messages with national content. In other words, from the conjunction between technological transformations and the strategies of control and social mobilization used by the rulers emerged the conditions that transformed the subjects into citizens of the nation.

Thus, the consequences of the preparations for competition in the European IPS during the nineteenth century engendered a tendency not only to increase centralization of political authority in the NPS but also to transfer control of the monopoly of the means of force and the sphere's regulatory order Private - monarchy and nobility - to the public sphere (Elias 1993)<sup>61</sup>. That is, through measures that broadened the political participation of the population; Bureaucratized the administrative apparatus; and expanded the social expenditures and social functions of the states, "regimes obtained from peasants and workers not, as in agrarian societies, a particularistic loyalty to lineage and locality but an emerging loyalty to the universal nation-state" (Mann 1993, 501).

Here again, it is worth summarizing the relationship between agents, structure and exogenous variables in the process of nation-state formation in Europe. Initially, states with distinct resource mobilization strategies and regulatory orders (A) coexisted on the continent. In a second step, the scale of the resources needed to cope with the constraints imposed by the structure of the European IPS (E) changes as a result of technological and organizational innovations in the form of military forces. Finally, the socialization-selection mechanism removes the units incapable of adapting to the new demands of international competition, consolidating the nation-state as the predominant political organization in European IPS (A').

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soldiers more accessible to propaganda, both as children and as adults, which facilitates the spread of nationalist ideology".

61 Norbert Elias describes such a process as: "the monopoly privately owned by a single individual or family falls under the control of a broader social stratum and becomes a central organ of the state in a public monopoly" (Elias 1993, 101). Anthony Giddens stresses, "while the road to sovereignty generates a centralization of resources in the hands of rulers, it fosters a widespread awareness that political power depends on collective capabilities, that the figure of the monarch may perhaps symbolizes, but for which the traditional adornments of the real domain have little relevance" (Giddens 2001, 217).

In conclusion, two hypotheses are considered implicit in Tilly's explanatory model. The first is that the way in which the competition in the European NPSs was delimited during the medieval period constrained the options of strategies used by the rulers to face the international competition. Thus, it is noted that the trajectory of the interactions that determined the evolution of the structure of the European IPS was dependent on the course of events that occurred previously within each national political system. In addition, the long period of coexistence between states with regulatory orders and strategies for mobilizing distinct resources suggests the difficulty (and possible undesirability) of establishing ideal models of political organization. In fact, exogenous variations were necessary for the socialization-selection mechanism to converge the shape of the military forces and to consolidate the nation-state as the predominant unit in the system.

The second is that an exogenous variable - technological innovation of military systems - has had effects on the dimensions of state building and regulated competition. The increase in the scale of the necessary resources and the changes in the nature of the equipment made the participation of the masses in the wars condition necessary for the survival in the European IPS. Because of this, the correlation of forces between the rulers, non-state organizations and individuals was altered: the influence of the nobility on the state was reduced; Conditions have arisen for the claim of the extension of civil, political and social rights in the regulatory orders; and nationalism consolidated as a source of legitimacy for state domination.

Simultaneous analysis of contemporary processes of international and national competition would enable us to better understand how the mechanisms involved (especially war) are producing the emergence of new, regulated orders, structures of authority, and even altering the very nature of the international system.

## Conclusions

The article investigated the ontology of international political systems, national political systems and states, as well as the effects that competition between their respective agents produces in their evolutionary processes. In order to do so, we resorted to the critical revision of theoretical categories from three areas of knowledge: International Relations Theory, Historical Sociology and Strategic Studies. The resulting model sought to integrate the constraints imposed by the IPS structure, the constraints of state domination in the NPS, and the role of the use and threat of the use of force in international competi-

tion.

It has been assumed that both IP and NPS are open systems. Therefore, the relation between units, structure and exogenous variables is not deterministic in any sense. It is only possible to integrate analyzes of the agency's role with assessments of structural constraints and incentives if the epistemological limits and contingent character of the historical evolution of social systems are recognized (Braumoller 2012).

In the first section, the relevance of the concepts of anarchy and low functional specialization present in Waltz's IPS model (1979) was defended. It was considered that these two elements do not imply the absence of hierarchical or cooperative relations between states, but rather that such asymmetric interactions are conditioned by the distribution of power and permeated by the behavioral uncertainty between the agents. That is, international politics remains "the realm of power, dispute and accommodation" (Waltz 1979, 112). However, it has also been argued that these elements do not limit the possible trajectories of evolution of international political systems, but rather they enable multiple paths. In this way, there is nothing to ensure the reproduction of an anarchic political system over time. In fact, the result of the interaction between states, exogenous variables and competing mechanisms may favor both decentralization and concentration of the force means. To illustrate the argument, the explanatory model of Hui (2005) on the process of transforming the IPS formed by Chinese kingdoms in 656 BC into an NPS dominated by the Qin Dynasty in 221 BC was followed. After all, Qin Kingdom rivals were also Political organizations that aimed to survive in an anarchic system. However, the mechanisms for restoring power decentralization were not enough to prevent system integration. In that context, strengthening reforms and strategies to destabilize alliances have made the coercion means concentration a process of positive reinforcement.

In the second section, we analyzed the effect of international competition on the evolutionary process of national states and political systems. It has been found that the concentration of the means of coercion in a specific unit the state alters the means used in competition between the agents forming the NPS. According to the actors and means involved, three dimensions of conflict were delimited: international competition among IPS units; construction of the state; and regulated competition between non-state organizations and individuals around the specific life opportunities in NCPs centralized in national states. It was argued that the preparation of the agents and the result of the clashes in each dimension generates consequences for the evolution of the objects of analysis in the other dimensions. In the end, the formation of the nation-states in Europe was evaluated from the explanatory

model proposed by Tilly (1996). In that case, the ways in which state-building and regulated competition stabilized constrained the strategies available to rulers to face international competition later; the long period of coexistence between states with regulatory orders and distinct resource mobilization strategies has suggested the impossibility of establishing ideal models of political organization; And technological and organizational variations in the format of the military forces competing in the IPS have had effects on state-building and regulated competition.

Finally, we concluded that the research agenda that deals with the necessary requirements for the “defense of the state” must be inseparable from discussions about “what (or whom) the state serves for”. In addition, the analysis indicates the progressivity of the following research problem: under what conditions competitive interactions between agents contribute to the emergence of political organizations capable of surviving, acting in the international political system, and providing security, welfare, and political rights for its citizens? This remains a central political issue in the 21st century.

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## ABSTRACT

Conflicts are intrinsic to social systems and constitute an irreducible part of their development. This article analyzes the conflict between states and its effects on the evolutionary dynamics of the international political system. We discuss the ontology of each object of analysis and the causal mechanisms that connect their respective evolving trajectories. Then, the analytical model is evaluated regarding to the processes of formation of the Qin Empire in China and the construction of Nation-States in Europe. The working hypothesis is that the interactions among the strategies chosen by the agents to cope with the structural constraints and competition conditions they encounter cause changes in the international political systems, as well as on the actors themselves.

## KEYWORDS

International Systems; State building; Structure.

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# LITHIUM GEOPOLITICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Bernardo Salgado Rodrigues<sup>1</sup>  
Raphael Padula<sup>2</sup>

## Introduction

Because of the abundant presence of common and rare natural resources, South America is considered highly strategic for the new stage of capitalist accumulation and for the reproduction of its mode of production, inserting itself in a new competitive pressure worldwide that tends to accentuate even more as the global demand for the resource increases. In geopolitical terms, it seems that the region has been incorporated in the world's competitive pressure in which some regions "must become international 'zones of fracture', in which conflicts and rebellions involving the great powers and companies that compete for the regions control could rise" (Fiori 2014, 161).

This article aims to evaluate the lithium geopolitics in the 21st century considering the national, regional and global geopolitical disputes that put South America at the center of the debate and create possible new tensions in the Andean region of the subcontinent. Our hypothesis is that lithium is one of the most strategic natural resources, whose world reserves, quantitatively and qualitatively, are concentrated in the South American region, based on a

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1 PhD candidate in International Political Economy at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ-PEPI). Master in International Political Economy at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ-PEPI). He is currently a member of the Laboratory of Studies on Hegemony and Counterhegemony (LEHC-UFRJ) and of the Working Group on Latin American and Caribbean Integration and Unit of CLACSO (Latin American Council of Social Sciences). E-mail: bernardo.rodrigues@pepi.ie.ufrj.br


2 Coordinator of the Postgraduate Program in International Political Economy (PEPI) at the Institute of Economics (IE/UFRJ), Adjunct Professor at Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) in the area of International Political Economy, Geopolitics, International Political Theory, International Economics and Regional Integration. E-mail: padula.rafael@gmail.com

bibliographical and qualitative review of statistical data on the subject present in studies and government documents. It is extremely important to carry out an analysis that covers the study of its behavior regarding reserves, production, prices, supply, demand and a geographical analysis.


## Lithium Characteristics

Lithium is an alkali metal, the smallest and lightest atom among all metals in the periodic table, under normal conditions of temperature and pressure. Because of its low atomic mass, it has a high charge and a specific power. It is not found in its native state. That is, it does not exist free in nature, being located most often in the condition of an ionic chemical compound. In addition, due to its high specific heat it is used in heat transfer applications and, because of its high electrochemical potential and high energy density, it is used as an anode suitable for electric batteries. For example, a typical lithium-ion battery can generate approximately 3 volts per cell, compared to 2.1 volts for the lead acid battery or 1.5 volts of zinc-carbon cells.

As for its applications, it is used in the manufacture of heat conducting metal alloys (aluminum), in the form of ceramics and lenses (telescopes), lubricating greases, military applications (rocket propellants and hydrogen bombs), in medicine (drugs for depression and bipolar disorder), in the electrical and electronic industry (production of batteries and electric batteries, such as cell phones, notebooks and hybrid/electric cars), among others.



Fonte: U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries, February 2014 (elaboração própria).




Fonte: Baskin, 2011 (elaboração própria).

The demand for lithium has remained largely unchanged since its discovery in 1817 by the Swedish chemist Johan August Arfwedson. Over the

years, its properties were adjusted to the needs of technological development in several sectors, but its qualities as an energy transmitter were emphasized mainly in the 1970s, “considering a technological paradigm linked to computing and electronics, in which a series of appliances and instruments are, increasingly powered by lithium batteries” (Palacio 2012, 6), such as the case of batteries of electronic devices and hybrid electric cars. From the 1990s onwards, this situation has changed mostly due to the proliferation of cell phones and portable computers.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, with the emergence of high demand for lithium ion batteries, the new companies have expanded lithium extraction to serve industries in this sector. Because of this, since 2007, the lithium market has as its largest consumer lithium ion battery industries, with even greater future projections.



Sourec: Cormarck Securities Inc. 2011; Baylis 2012.

Therefore, the strategic importance of lithium - a consequence of technological innovation and its applicability in the rechargeable battery industry of almost all portable electronic devices consumed in the world - is latent. However, perhaps its most important application, from the technological and environmental point of view, is the production of a new rechargeable battery technology for electric and hybrid vehicles: the EV (Electric Vehicle), which is powered only by electricity and charged in a electric plug-in, and also the Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV).

The advantage of the new lithium-ion battery technology is its high energy density, which allows it to store more energy per unit of weight, re-



ducing considerably the total weight of these batteries compared to those produced from NiCd (nickel–cadmium battery) or NiMH (Nickel-metal hydride battery). In 1992, when lithium batteries were introduced, they had only 10% more energy than NiMH batteries. In 2005, the average energy density of lithium batteries was 80% higher than that of NiMH batteries. In 2009, as part of its energy program, the US government awarded 24,000,000 hours to IBM at two national laboratories, Argonne and Oak Ridge, for research to increase battery functionality for electric cars (Palacio 2012, 6).

The increase in the energy density of the lithium batteries has allowed the constant reduction of the total weight of these and consequently the decrease of the weight of the portable devices that use them. In the case of hybrid electric vehicles, the high energy density of lithium batteries is crucial (Viana, Barros and Calixtre 2011, 239).

Even with the technological developments in the scientific field of lithium, some scholars still consider the large and heavy batteries, besides their reactivity being another source of problems. Still, scientists are opening new ways, working on a “lithium-air” battery<sup>3</sup>. In them, instead of being sealed in a casing, the lithium remains in contact with the air, and uses the ambient oxygen as a cathode, as do the zinc batteries of hearing aids, making the battery much lighter. There are also scientists who have been using nanotechnology to densify the surface of the cathode, which can multiply the number of reactions and increase, at least in theory, the power of the battery.

The use of lithium in these industrial branches is very recent. However, its increasing consumption in several strategic sectors has increased its consumption worldwide over the last 30 years. Thus, its regional/global mapping and its geopolitical disputes are fundamental to understand its growing importance in the international scenario over the years, and especially nowadays with its use for scientific and technological purposes.

In this context, it is highlighted how the presence of lithium in South America has aroused national, regional and global geopolitical disputes, placing the region at the center of the debate and creating possible new tensions in the Andean region of the subcontinent.

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3 “A new technology, the lithium-air battery, may be capable of substantially increasing the energy density of lithium batteries, effectively rivaling the energy density of petroleum. Although development of lithium-air battery technology is still in its infancy, a coalition of U.S. national laboratories and commercial partners led by International Business Machines Corp. anticipated having a laboratory prototype battery ready by 2013, a scaled-up prototype capable of powering a car ready by 2015, and commercial batteries in production within a decade” (United States 2012).

## The Lithium Geopolitics

The external environment that each state encounters in drawing its own strategy - an environment involving the presence of other states also struggling for survival and advantages -, aligned with periods of global upheaval and constant technological innovations, leads to a rebirth in the ideas regarding geography (Kaplan 2013, 62). This is the case of lithium, whose technological cycle begins between 2000 and 2005 and has a forecast of intensive use until the period 2035-2045, according to estimates by Bruckmann (2011, 217-219).

For a case study analysis of lithium geopolitics in South America, it is very important to carry out an analysis that covers the study of its behavior regarding reserves, production, prices, supply, demand and a geographical area analysis.

Lithium reserves can be found from two distinct types of lithium salt concentrations: in hard rock mines, mainly in Australia, which produce lithium mineral concentrates for technical purposes and for conversion into lithium chemicals, almost exclusively in China; and in continental brines, for example the salares in Argentina, Chile, China and Afghanistan, most commonly used for the production of lithium carbonate, hydroxide and chloride. Generally, these regions are considered to be of lower operating cost and therefore more commercially viable compared to lithium minerals - although both are located in remote locations and present very different technical and logistical challenges.

The main reserves are found in salt regions, lands that for tens of thousands of years were covered by oceans and, with the geological formation of the continents, ended up drying and forming great salt deserts. The lithium is dissolved below the coarse crust in a layer of salt impregnated solution. The fact that it is a mineral that is concentrated in the region of salares causes countries like Bolivia, Salar de Uyuni, Chile, Salar de Atacama, and Argentina, with Salar del Hombre Muerto, to be among the world's largest holders reserves of this resource, forming the so-called "lithium triangle", presenting approximately 92% of world reserves in 2009 (Bruckmann 2011, 219).

The accounting of the world's reserves of lithium varies according to the agencies and companies that realize it, as shown by several reports and the table below. However, its great geographical concentration in the Andean region of South America is an undeniable fact.

### Estimated lithium mineral resources (in million tonnes)

País	Mt Li met.	Fuentes
Bolivia	8,90	COMIBOL (1)
Chile	8,04	Roskill (2013), SQM, CORIO (1)
Argentina	7,09	Compañías mineras (2)
China	5,15	Roskill (2013) (1)
EEUU	1,67	Compañías mineras (2)(3)
Australia	1,55	Compañías mineras (2)
Congo	1,15	Roskill (2013) (1)
Serbia	1,05	Roskill (2013) (4)
Rusia	1,00	Evans (2012), USGS (2013) (1)
Canadá	0,74	Compañías mineras, Roskill (2013) (2)
Brasil	0,10	Roskill (2013) (1)
Zimbawe	0,06	USGS (2012) (1)
Austria	0,05	Global Strategic Metals (2)
Portugal	0,01	Roskill (2013) (1)
Otros	0,20	Estimación propia en base a Roskill (2013) (1)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>36,74</b>	

(1) Reference value, the methodology and parameters used are unknown.


(2) It was considered the resources that were measured and indicated as published by mining companies.

(3) According to Según USGS (2013) US resources amount to 5,5 Mt. Notwithstanding, the deposits that were considered and the parameters used on this calculation are unknown.

(4) Estimated resource published in Roskill (2013).

**Source: Cochilco 2013.**


### Lithium reserves by country



**Source: Fox-Davies 2013.**

Although the methodologies and accounting parameters are used differently, since there are distinctions of the models according to the companies or agencies that carry out the surveys, the fact is that Bolivia, Chile and Argentina own large percentage of the world's reserves of lithium in the Year of 2013. The image below ratifies this argument, in which South America would have approximately 71% of the lithium reserves, with Bolivia with 34%, Chile with 31% and Argentina with 6%.

Since the use of lithium has intensified on a commercial scale, its world production has increased exponentially, and has been further intensified since the 2000s, as shown in the graph below.



Source: Lagos 2011

However, international lithium prices - which are published by major producers and traded directly between buyers and final users with industry groups and governments, with no terminal market and virtually no spot market for third parties - is not keeping up with this high rate of world production growth. As the world's production increases, lithium carbonate prices register oscillations and a decoupling with their production.

### Evolution of lithium carbonate prices (1953-2008)



Source: Libertad y Desarrollo 2012.

The behavior of prices between 1953 and 2009 should be noted. Between these years, the price of lithium increased only by less than 20% than the United States CPI (Libertad y Desarrollo 2012). That is, international prices show a weak growth in current dollars, and even drop when considering the base-year of 2008.


In the early 1990s, the average lithium carbonate prices were \$4,000/t, decreasing to \$1,600/t for several years, especially when Chile's SQM - Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile S.A.- entered the market in the mid-1990s. From the 2000s, as demand increased, the price of lithium gradually increased to a peak of \$6,500/t in 2008. In 2009, prices were driven by the global crisis, and since then, relatively stable at \$5,000/t. The forecast is that, in the coming years, prices will be stable, at approximately \$6,000/t, and forecasts of increase depending on the new market structure (Cormark Securities Inc. 2011).

From the graph above, five geopolitical facts can be presented as conclusions regarding international lithium prices: 1 – a change from a duopoly production of the lithium market to the mid-1990s, when SQM was introduced - which explains in part marked prices fall in the second half of the 1990s - and the Australian Talison in 2007; 2 – still in the 1990s, the large-scale development of resources in lower-cost salt flats, such as in Chile and Argentina, by SQM, Germany's Rockwood and the US FMC, modified the world's lithium supply by reducing the prices, including closing down operations in other parts of the world that had higher costs, such as the US,

Russia and China, and, in a certain extent, also explain the downward price curve in the mid-1990s; 3 – with the 2008 crisis, international prices decelerate the upward trend seen in the early 2000s with the increase in demand, with a slight reduction but, later on, its upward trend was resumed; 4 – from 2010 onwards, and in the médium and long term, the world trend will be of a strong increase in demand influenced by Asia, whose main supply will be from Australia - due to its geographical proximity -, Argentina, Chile and from new economically viable sources. In other words, the marginal cost of supply will be an important factor for the basis of international lithium prices in the coming years; and 5 since 70% of the world's ore reserves are in South America, with lower costs and higher purity, this set of three countries will play an important role in establishing prices.

Thus, in terms of global offer, four countries account for 92% of supply (Chile 38%, Australia 31%, Argentina 13% and China 10%) and four companies concentrate 80% of this supply (Talison 35%, SQM 26%, Rockwood 12% and FMC 7%), as shown in the image below.

**Lithium supply by country (2011) and lithium supply by producer/company (2012)**



Source: Fox-Davies 2013.

The Australian Talison Lithium is the world's largest lithium producer, supplying approximately 35% of the world's lithium market and the dominant high purity glass and ceramics industry, as well as being the main supplier of lithium carbonate for the Chinese market<sup>4</sup>. In South America, it has a

<sup>4</sup> According to USGS data, the largest Australian mining company invested heavily in 2012 in order to double its capacity of production. The goal is to supply the growing Chinese demand for high quality spodumene for the production of chemical components. The estimated growth of the consumption of concentrates was estimated by 7.5% to 10% from that of 2011 and an

project under development in Salares 7, located in Region III, Chile (Cormark Securities Inc. 2011).

In 2014, the Chinese company, Chengdu Tianqi Industry Group Co. (Tianqi), a joint stock company leader in producing lithium-based chemicals, agreed to purchase Talison with the support of the Chinese government, holding 51% - the other 49% owned by Rockwood<sup>5</sup>. Since 1997, with the help of banks, government departments and other partners, Tianqi's economic aggregate has maintained a steady growth of 40% a year<sup>6</sup>. With ambitious plans to meet growing demand, the company is fast becoming a leading international company in new energy and new materials, among which lithium appears as one of its priorities.

In the salt regions, three companies stand out: the Chilean SQM (Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile SA), Germany's Rockwood Holdings (which includes Chemetall from Germany since 2004, Cyprus Foote from the US and SCL from Chile) and the American FMC Corporation. The SQM owns the largest market share in salares, with 26%, from its production in Salar de Atacama (Chile). Rockwood comes next with a 12% stake, from plants in the Salar de Atacama with Sociedad Chilena del Litio Ltda – SCL and Silver Peak in Nevada, United States. Third, the FMC, with operations in the Salar del Hombre Muerto (Argentina), representing 7% of the market. Of these companies, FMC and Rockwood use the largest portion of their lithium production internally for the production of value-added chemicals, leaving SQM the supply of the majority of lithium carbonate consumed directly by final users.

In January 2015, the North American Albermarle Corporation completed the acquisition of the German Rockwood Holdings<sup>7</sup> in a cash and stock transaction worth approximately \$6.2 billion. This combination reflects the creation of one of the largest specialty chemicals companies in the world, with market leadership positions in a number of industries segments, including lithium.

The key-challenges for both countries and producer companies in the coming years should include: expansion projects for their plants to meet growing demand, reduction of operational costs (such as increased output,

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intensification of the research and extraction in subsurface brines was noticed (United States 2013).

5 [http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140528005569/en/Rockwood-Completes-Acquisition-49-Interest-Talison-Lithium#.VPSw2\\_nF8RE](http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140528005569/en/Rockwood-Completes-Acquisition-49-Interest-Talison-Lithium#.VPSw2_nF8RE)

6 <http://www.tianqigroup.cn/en/Index/aboutus.html>

7 <http://investors.albermarle.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=117031&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2006949>

factory productivity and technological capacity), investment and development projects in old and new plants, updating of regulatory frameworks and jurisdiction in producing countries, updating of the market for acquisitions and mergers of companies, constant and quantified updating of the state of the global market for electric vehicles and observation of the world geopolitical environment related to the ore.

The lithium-producing companies boil down to the big four: in Chile and Argentina most of the global supply of lithium in saltwater with SQM, Rockwood and FMC accounts for 46% of total lithium production. Talison supplies 34% of total lithium production and a near monopoly (65%) of the production of lithium mineral (spodumene) (Cormark Securities Inc. 2011).

Regarding the global demand for lithium, total lithium consumption growth averaged 6.4% per year between 2000 and 2012. From 2012 to 2017, the annual average lithium consumption growth in the world should be approximately 11%, driven by demand for batteries, which grew on average 21% per year between 2000 and 2012 and is expected to grow 200% by 2017, reaching a market of US\$9 billion in 2015, with potential to exceed US\$50 billion by 2020 (United States 2012).

The Asian technology companies continue to invest in developing lithium operations in other countries to ensure a stable supply for their battery industries. China, Japan and South Korea are currently responsible for 85% to 90% of global lithium-ion battery production and 60% of world lithium consumption, with 24% of Europe and 9% of the United States. These three Asian countries, therefore, are generating a high growth of future lithium demand. In 2011, China became the main consumer, with 33% of the world's total consumption, with forecasts of consuming almost 50% worldwide in 2020 (United States 2012)<sup>8</sup>.

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8 "Lithium battery production in China increased from units worth US\$2.1B in 2007 to units worth US\$5.4B in 2011. RIS have reported an annual demand growth forecast of 11% from 2011 to 2017, this being dependent on the uptake of hybrid electric vehicles ("HEVs") and electrical vehicles ("EVs")" (Fox-Davies 2013).



Lithium exports by destination country – 2012<sup>9</sup>

CARBONATO LITIO			CLORURO LITIO			HIDRÓXIDO LITIO		
País	Mill US\$	% Particip.	País	Mill US\$	% Particip.	País	Mill US\$	% Particip.
Corea del Sur	65,7	26,6	China	17,2	57,5	Bélgica	10,2	35,8
China	53,2	21,5	EE.UU.	11,6	38,6	EE.UU.	9,7	34,0
Japón	46,9	19,0	Francia	1,2	3,9	Corea del Sur	3,4	11,9
Bélgica	33,5	13,6	---	---	---	Singapur	1,0	3,6
EE.UU.	20,7	8,4	---	---	---	Argentina	0,9	3,3
Otros	27,0	10,9	Otros	0	0,0	Otros	3,2	11,4
TOTAL	247,0	100,0	TOTAL	30,0	100,0	TOTAL	28,4	100,0

Fonte: Cochilco 2013.

China has announced its intention to become a world leader in the manufacture of hybrids and electric cars, turning itself into a major player in the lithium market. Thus, in order to ensure strategic supply of non-renewable resources and to meet growing domestic consumption, the Chinese government established a sovereign fund, the *China Investment Corporation*, in 2007, with an initial portfolio of assets of 200 billion dollars, to support Chinese enterprises' initiatives for the acquisition of unexplored deposits and exploration projects in any part of the world. The Chinese State has supported foreign investment by Chinese enterprises through the implementation of regulatory frameworks for direct and indirect subsidy investments and by providing concessional financing in the form of credit lines and low interest rate loans through financial institutions owned by the State<sup>10 11</sup> (Lagos and Peters 2010, 18). In addition, as part of its Five Year Plan (2012-17), the Chinese government will spend about US\$ 15 billion to further promote the development of electric vehicles by chinese companies, with much of that investment

9 Among the main applications of basic products associated with lithium are: lithium carbonate (elaboration of compounds for Li-ion batteries, glass and ceramics, chemicals and adhesives), lithium chloride (air conditioning and aluminum applications) and hydroxide Lithium (lubricating greases and Li-ion batteries).

10 "Added to the acquisition of assets abroad, with the same purpose of securing the supply of these resources, Chinese companies were able to extend loans to investors of mining and hydrocarbon industries either/or generating long term supply contracts" (Lagos and Peters 2010, 18). This Chinese geopolitical strategy created some concerns regarding the possibility that China could control the flow of natural resources, gaining preferential access to production and enlarging its control of the extraterritorial industries of the world.

11 "Nowadays, the China Daily has a weekly European edition and, in May 2011, it published five pages, including the front one, dedicate to the issue of electric cars. The newspaper discussed the probable future demand for cars in China, mentioning the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology Industry interest in reaching, until 2020, more than 200 million vehicles registered, well above the 70 million ones of 2011. The government announced its commitment to spend nearly US\$ 15 billion in the next decade to boost the development of electric cars" (O'Neill 2012, 138).

focused on advanced lithium battery research (Klare 2012, 169).

American automobile companies have also set hybrid and electric car manufacturing goals as crucial to their long-term prosperity. In 2009, of the government's economic stimulus package, about US\$ 940 million was attributed to lithium-battery producers and their suppliers (Klare 2012, 169). As part of this stimulus, Rockwood received US\$ 28.4 million from the United States government for the expansion of its existing lithium carbonate plant in Nevada and to build a new lithium hydroxide plant in North Carolina<sup>12</sup>.

In 2012, total exports of lithium compounds in the United States decreased slightly compared to 2011. About 52% of all US exports of lithium compounds went to Japan, 17% to Germany, and 7% to Belgium. Imports of lithium compounds into the United States decreased by 3% in 2012 compared to 2011. Of these, 59% came from Chile and 38% from Argentina (United States 2012).

The market for small batteries (calculators, computers, cameras, communication devices, etc.) is expected to maintain high levels of growth (10% per year), accounting for around 27% of world lithium consumption in 2012, a significant increase to previous years (15% in 2007 and 8% in 2002). The emerging market for large batteries for electric bicycles, hybrids and all electric vehicles is expected to grow substantially (up to 28% p.y.) by 2020, gaining greater market share. Electricity storage networks are also an emerging market for large lithium batteries, with applications for solar and nuclear reactors in the near future. Lithium salts are used intensively as fluids in concentrated solar power plants (CSP), which has a growth estimate of 1.5GW in 2010 to 25GW in 2020. Thus, the total demand for lithium in batteries (all types combined) revolves around 65% of total consumption by 2025 (Fox-Davies 2013).

### Demand for lithium batteries

Application / Tonnes LCE	2011	2025	CAGR 2011-2025
Batteries for Portable Devices	30,416	111,176	9.7%
Batteries for Grid	500	7,500	21.3%
Batteries for Hybrid and Electric Vehicles	6,967	204,901	27.3%
Other Lithium Applications	91,400	174,994	4.7%
<b>Total Lithium Demand</b>	<b>129,283</b>	<b>498,571</b>	<b>10.1%</b>

Source: Fox-Davies 2013

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.carcelen.cl/upload/docs/Litio%20Amcham%20March%202011.pdf>

Several companies in the automotive industry are performing operations to supply their lithium demand for electric car batteries. The EVs capture will be the focal point of growth for the industry, where companies like Toyota, Nissan, Ford, GM, Tata Motors and Volkswagen are just a few. Toyota, for example, expects to increase its production of lithium batteries by up to six times, including establishing a joint venture with Orocobre in a brine project in Argentina (Fox-Davies 2013). Likewise, the Volkswagen Group, which starts these operations in 2012, has established partnerships with battery manufacturers to start mass production of the same (United States 2012).

It is noteworthy that the international projections regarding the essentiality of lithium for this new branch of technology are difficult to predict, besides specific characteristics of the batteries themselves, whose challenges need to be taken into account<sup>13</sup>. However, there have been a large number of government incentive programs worldwide to advance the development, production and use of electric and hybrid cars. Despite the short-term uncertainty regarding the growth of lithium batteries in the electric vehicle segment, it is believed that the reduction of carbon emissions by governments and consumers, as well as significant investments in new transport battery technology, will provide the growth of a significant future demand for lithium. However, there have been a large number of government incentive programs worldwide to advance the development, production and use of electric and hybrid cars. Despite the short-term uncertainty regarding the growth of lithium batteries in the electric vehicle segment, it is believed that the reduction of carbon emissions by governments and consumers, as well as significant investments in new transport battery technology, will provide the growth of a significant future demand for lithium.

In this way, lithium possibly forms part of one of the changes in the world energy matrix, whose dimension is still uncertain, given that the substitution of oil as the main strategic resource is not yet evident and will persist in the medium term (Palacio 2012, 11). In an optimistic scenario, the electric car would take center stage and could, according to its supporters, break the dominance of oil transport, generating a positive environmental impact and


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13 "Batteries still have to be smaller, weigh less, charge faster and last longer with a single charge. They also need to prove that they can last longer despite continuous loads and recharges. They will have to show that problems of 'thermal leakage' - destructive overheating - will not happen. [...] And the cost must decrease substantially [...] Infrastructure is the second challenge. The current automotive system could not function without the vast network of gas stations built over many decades. A new fleet of electric cars will need a network of similar recharging stations" (Yergin 2014, 727). Among other factors, it could add to the lack of standardization in the size of EV and PHEV car batteries and the cost Relatively acceptable to be a mass product, not a niche product.

helping to reduce pollution by offsetting the carbon emissions that precipitate climate change, since the electricity that makes the electric car work can be generated from several sources, and may or may not be petroleum of them. In addition, it could offer a response to the increase in the fleet of automobiles from one to two billion and represent a totally alternative route to the global energy system. “The result will have a huge impact both in terms of economy and in terms of geopolitics” (Yergin 2014, 712).

With lithium carbonate being one of the lowest cost and most relevant components of a lithium-ion battery, the main issue to be addressed is the safety of lithium supplies from different geographic sources. Thus, the high demand for lithium at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century encouraged the prospection and exploration of 90-120 new reserves, distributed in more than 11 countries, as shown in the figure below.

**Worldwide distribution of lithium reserves (in million tonnes)**



Source: United States 2014.

Although at first glance the geographical division of lithium in the world encompasses all continents, its concentration in absolute terms is predominantly located in South America, but specifically in the Andean region of the continent, the so-called “lithium triangle”.

In this region, the feeling of isolation determined by its peripheral location in the southwestern portion of the continent, by highly hostile top-

ographic and climatic environments (Kelly 1997, 67) and the distance from neighboring states and access to the sea, are geopolitical characteristics of the triangle. The isolation does not translate into security or the lack of interest of multinational companies and foreign countries, who are trying to reach their feet in the region. Also, according to Klare (2003,41), another worrying factor regarding the supply of vital materials, such as lithium, would be the fact that their location is shared between three countries and in neighboring regions, where in a small space they have different three different jurisdictions.

Triangle of Lithium in South America



Source: own elaboration, from site map <http://triangulodelitio.com/>.

Distribution of companies in the triangle of lithium



Source: <http://www.talisonlithium.com/sfimages/salares/salares-map.jpg>.

Yet, it is also reiterated that “the location of the so-called lithium triangle is a disadvantage since the geographic concentration of lithium production is going to exacerbate the tense geopolitical relations between Latin Americana and the US” (Tahil cited in Palacio 2012 , 27). In other words, despite the geographical difficulties, the triangle is one of the most promising lithium fields in the world, both because of its concentration in a relatively small space and because of its availability and purity that are superior in this region. This leads to long-term planning, as promoted by the main stakeholders; of these, all four major lithium companies in the world have a portion of exploration in the region, as can be seen in the image below.

Thus, the region that corresponds to the salares (salt regions) of Hombre Muerto, Atacama and Uyuni, the so-called *triángulo del litio*, or *Saudi Arabia of lithium*<sup>14</sup>, is considered highly strategic for the new stage of capitalist accumulation and for the reproduction of its mode of production. This new South American ABC, therefore, is part of a new competitive world pressure that tends to be further accentuated by the increase in the world demand for the resource.

In geopolitical terms, it appears that South America has generally been embedded in world competitive pressure where some regions, such as the lithium triangle itself, “must become international ‘zones of fracture’, and there may arise conflicts and rebellions” (Fiori 2014, 161). In addition, the geopolitical study of *the oro gris* (gray gold) allows us to analyze the construction of different national strategies, public policies, institutions and regulations of the three countries with reservations in South America - Argentina, Bolivia and Chile -, their internal and international disputes and the connections between internal and external actors, connecting the national, regional and global perspectives.

## For a Geostrategy of the lithium ABC

One must understand, analyze and use geopolitics as “a strategic and normative knowledge that evaluates and redraws one’s own geography from some specific, defensive, or expansive power project” (Fiori 2014, 141). These power projects should seek to leverage regional development in South America anchored in a political symbiosis (progressive and autonomous), economic (productive, commercial and technological), social (reduction of regional asymmetries and inequalities) and geopolitical (international political and economic expansion).

Thus, it is verified that the viability of a geostrategy of the lithium ABC is one of the pillars of a regional integration project focused on strategic natural resources. However, it should be noted that, in pursuit of this geostrategy, these states must systematically “disregard” the rules, institutions, and coercions of markets and all the great centers of power that are against their political-economic emancipation, going against the “institutional established order and the great geopolitical agreements on which it is based” (Fiori 2014, 276). By prioritizing joint geostrategic interests that, although unilaterally, are at first contradictory - as in the case of the geostrategic conception of Argentina directed towards the Atlantic, of Bolivia without access to the sea

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14 [http://www.forbes.com/fdc/welcome\\_mjx.shtml](http://www.forbes.com/fdc/welcome_mjx.shtml)



and of Chile facing the Pacific, for example - can become a cohesive element of changing their relative positions within that system.

Nowdays, it can be seen that the strategies related to lithium in the three countries are different. In Argentina, companies and the state boost industrialization with private capital, which is questioned by the residents directly affected; in Bolivia, the strategy is based basically on the form of financing of the state project, proposing its control by the state; and in Chile decisions to allow private participation in the exploitation of lithium are limited to the scope of the state - but not controlled by it - with a class between the government and the opposition political parties (Palacio 2012, 17).

It can be seen that in Argentina and Chile there is a predominance of foreign capital, a situation similar to the extraction of other strategic metals. These capitals, which have been investing more and more in the last 15 years and are positioned in specific areas, now have practically all the proven lithium reserves. In addition, most of these extractive companies have direct links with automotive or highly lithium-demanding companies.

A different case is found in Bolivia, where a policy of corporate alliances with popular organizations and other social subjects is implemented, in which the government situates itself in the debate in a position to the left of its neoliberal critics, giving legitimacy to its discourse before the national projects. However, neighboring nations do not share the thinking of economic independence that prioritizes resource-bearing nations. They end up undermining Bolivia's sustainable development opportunities in the region by offering large amounts of lithium to foreign miners at a much lower cost than Bolivian, since the basis of Argentina's mineral exploitation model and in Chile it embraces the old capitalist patterns of exploitation of natural resources, "in which profits accumulate in the hands of the holders of capital, while the exploited region is degraded, it does not develop and its workers live in absolute misery" (Wright 2010).

As can be seen in the specific case of Bolivia, the reaffirmation of lithium for "energy sovereignty" and as a "strategic resource" - in this case also for Chile - manifests itself in different dimensions: control of the actual exploitation of resources, extracted volumes and possibly exported, investments in exploration and transport infrastructure; the sharing of profits from the activity; utilization of resources obtained from economic and social development projects, as well as the quest to stimulate new productive chains based on an endogenous industrialization of lithium.

It is observed that the global geostrategy of lithium is in full phase of accumulation and concentration of capital, ratified by the acquisitions, fusions and joint ventures of several companies of the branch. This fact does

not exclude South America from this process, where these companies have operations and control a large part of the region's lithium reserves and production, in accordance with the strategic plans of its foreign parent companies. At the same time, the conclusion that, in the near future and with full production, Argentina, Bolivia and Chile will manage the lithium market, it leads to a discussion about strategic planning based on this resource.

The regional economic development can not be understood and explained in isolation or from unique and exclusively endogenous factors. As Fiori (2014, 37) states, "economic development followed strategies and followed paths that were designed in response to major systemic challenges of a geopolitical nature". Aligning coalitions of interest, class or government, a power bloc that responds to these external challenges through strategies and policies of long-term economic strengthening, that calls for changes "in the rules of management of the world system and in its hierarchical and unequal distribution of power and wealth" (Fiori 2014, 35).

For Medeiros (2013, 157-158), a national strategy - and, from the present work, concomitantly regional - is called "nationalism of natural resources", which encompasses a political dispute involving power over resources and energy security of producers and consumers. Medeiros affirms that the control and coordination of natural resources must be carried out by the state in a state strategy of development and reconstruction through nationalization of natural resources that engenders political and fiscal autonomy for states in relation to private and international interests, involving complex geopolitical challenges. Thus, this strategy would be based on the "exploitation of industrial possibilities along the value chain of natural resources" (Medeiros 2013, 164), although with great challenges, such as the "great dependence on its unstable prices, its structural financial vulnerability and the constant challenges created by technical progress" (Medeiros 2013, 165).

Among the other challenges, we can mention the "weakness of the connections between capital accumulation, technical progress, structural change and institutional evolution" (Medeiros 2013, 150). In other words, a natural resource-based development can generate a particular social structure of accumulation that can block structural change from the moment that economic growth can be achieved without new technological structures not modifying the macroeconomic problems that dominate the economic policy agenda, the institutions and the state.

Bruckmann defends the need to think about cycles of scientific-technological innovation and economic cycles in relation to the use, transformation, appropriation and consumption of natural resources, allowing to evaluate the trends of mineral consumption in the world economy. Thus, according



to the author, it is currently a clash between two development models based on strategic natural resources:

one based on the planning and sustainable use of natural resources aimed at meeting the needs of the majority of social actors; and the other based on the violent and militarized exploitation and expropriation of these resources and the social forces and peoples that hold them (Bruckmann 2011, 198).

In this way, the search, planning and protection of strategic natural resources becomes one of the primary security functions of the state. Some scholars argue that export limits seek to encourage foreign firms to set up their high-tech manufacturing operations requiring rare earths in Chinese territory (Klare 2012, 158-159), thus establishing a virtuous cycle for the country's poorest regions, where the largest reserves are located. That is to say, if such control over resources and export restraint were adopted as a joint policy of the three countries, the positive consequences might resemble those of the Chinese initiative.

As Kelly (1997, 159) points out, "major domestic groups have come to recognize that without South American integration, local economies could be exposed to a global 'marginalization'". In other words, cooperative and unifying orientation in the form of integration, the realization of autonomous and sovereign regional blocs are presented as a practical way for the new reality of the region in international relations. In fact, internal cooperation, rather than conflict, emerges prominently in contemporary South American geopolitics.

## Conclusion

In the present work geopolitics was the method used for studying the international political economy of the South America countries, focusing on strategic natural resources, specifically lithium.

It is well known that even if we go to South American peripheral geopolitical studies, the world's great centers of power also make systematic prognoses about geopolitics in South America and the world, and undoubtedly geopolitical shocks are present in the international arena. The accumulation of power and wealth lies at the heart of the matter, and so understanding the geopolitical configurations of the region is fundamental.

In sum, the set of five proposals outlined below covers guidelines for a geopolitics of strategic natural resources in the region. Thus, in the specific case of lithium, these initiatives should be discussed jointly by the three countries, thus conforming a regional geopolitics of lithium:

- *Regional security planning and resource protection*: strategic security of natural resources should be part of a regional project, with state technical agencies, particularly the armed forces, obliged to defend these new natural sources in native soil. This will be all the more important when the lack of energy, water, raw materials and food on the world stage worsens. From this hypothetical international scenario, a vital objective is the intensification of the South American armed forces, within the framework of the South American Defense Council of Unasur, in order to have a dissuasive-strategic capacity;

- *Endogenous industrialization policy*: the geopolitics of lithium in the region provokes the need to elaborate a regional lithium industrialization policy that moves the production of rechargeable batteries of portable electronic devices and electric cars from Southeast Asia to South America. This policy should be planned continentally, determining which productive sectors of the South American system could gain international competitiveness, transforming them into sectors of collective interest of all the countries that conform the area of integration, appropriating scientific and technological research in relation to the mineral and developing its entire cycle, from mining to local industrial development, achieving an industry with high added value;

- *Participation in the establishment of international prices*: once the region has a large concentration of the world's reserves of strategic resources, it has ample capacity for negotiation and international price formation. Since Argentina, Bolivia and Chile control almost all lithium reserves, the three nations could set up an organization similar to that of oil-producing countries, with the capacity to take measures that in the future, will influence the regulation of metal prices;

- *Effective national public governance of natural resources*: such prerogative involves regulatory, fiscal, macroeconomic management, strategic planning, formulation and implementation of public policies. Thus, countercyclical mechanisms should be institutionalized in the face of the inherent volatility of the international prices of primary products exported by the region, increasing the progressiveness of the state's participation in farm income - especially in the cycles of high prices - in order to develop mechanisms to ensure efficient public investment of income derived from the exploitation of natural resources in education, health, infrastructure, innovation and technological development, as well as their equitable distribution among social groups and levels of government;

- *Measuring environmental and social impact*: to manage and effectively measure the socio-environmental conflicts that inevitably arise during the development of the natural resource sectors, calculating compensation rates, environmental recovery strategies and reducing negative externalities.

Managing natural resources is a dynamic process and requires careful monitoring. Information and knowledge are fundamental sources of policy and decision making, so it is imperative to create tools to move in that direction. The continuing and systematic research is needed to deepen the study and knowledge of the various dimensions that involve the use of natural resources as a basis for the integral development of the region.

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## ABSTRACT

This article investigates the hypothesis that lithium is one of the most strategic natural resources, whose world reserves, quantitatively and qualitatively, are concentrated in the South American region. Thus, this article presents a geopolitical analysis of lithium in order to define geostrategic possibilities for South America.

## KEYWORDS

Geopolitics; Lithium; South America.

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# SOVEREIGNTY OR “GLOBALIZATION”? REFLECTIONS ON AN APPARENT ANTAGONISM

Diego Pautasso<sup>1</sup>

Marcelo Pereira Fernandes<sup>2</sup>

## Introduction

During the last decades, especially with the disintegration of the Soviet bloc and the projection of the neoliberal thinking, it has become commonplace to speak of the end of the States and/or the erosion of sovereignty, whereas all social dynamics are frequently justified as a result of what is conventionally called “globalization”. This article aims to discuss the assumed antagonism between, on the one hand, State capacity and sovereignty, and on the other, “globalization”, understood here as *the integration of markets worldwide and the consequently intensified flows of goods, capital, information and people*. There is a current manichaeism that often reduces approaches to “globalists” or “skeptics”, as is the case of the work of Held and McGrew (2001), which contributes little to understanding the contemporary international system. Studies on “globalization”, while recognizing the coexistence of tensions between sub-national and supranational scales, end up featuring the reduction of national autonomy (Mittelman 1996, 7-8). Theories regarding the contemporary world and “globalization” either underestimate or neglect the State issue (Kumar 1997; Ianni 1996). Within the scope of International

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<sup>1</sup> PhD in Political Science, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), he is currently Professor of International Relations at the University of the Sinos Valley (UNISINOS) and researcher at the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT-UFRGS) and the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA-UFRGS). E-mail: dgpautasso@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup> PhD in Economics, Fluminense Federal University (UFF) and Professor at the Department of Economics, Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRRJ). E-mail: mapefern@gmail.com

Relations (IR), the tendency is to either adhere to state-centric uncritical views of the State category, with little regard for its internal divisions and its systemic transformations (Waltz 1979), or, at the other pole, stick enthusiastically to the emphasis on supposed transnational forces.

In this sense, it is imperative to discuss the State, which has been, after all, cause and consequence of the formation of the international system, the *locus* of the accumulation of wealth and power, the main building instrument of international regimes and even the political apparatus which is both object and promoter of international processes. Thus, the expansion of State formations and its strengthening as bureaucratic capacity coincides with the further integration of the economy on a global scale, so that instead of antagonistic, these dynamics are mutually reinforcing, though not without contradictions.

Hence, one must overcome the supposed antagonism between state-centered and transnational views, which ultimately prevail in the IR area, in favor of critical approaches aiming to understand the interweaving between the State and the internationalization of capital, permeated by the current capitalist expansion process. Hence, as proposed by Losurdo (2015a, 63), this requires a *general theory of social conflict* that takes into account the various forms that class struggles and social conflicts assume: gender and/or family issues; racial and ethnic background; class, and between fractions of the same class, struggles; and which is especially important in IR studies between States and nations. This inflicts emphasizing that social conflicts are multifaceted and multiscaled, with distinct priorities in every space and time. In the same line, there are distinct contributions that can enrich critical approaches (Bartolovich and Lazaruz 2002)<sup>3</sup>, especially when social groups and subaltern countries are globally regarded.

Thus, the paper is organized as follows. In the first section, the importance of the State for the formation of the international system and as an agent of accumulation of wealth and power will be discussed. The second section analyses a few myths about the crisis of the State and the so-called “globalization”, in order to better understand the inseparable bond between the State and the internationalization of capital. In the third section, the role of sovereignty will be discussed, stressing its non-absolute character within the international system. In the fourth section, a few limitations that still remain

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<sup>3</sup> Because of stereotyped views, as highlighted by these same authors (Bartolovich and Lazaruz 2002), such approximation has been compromised: Marxism was seen as Eurocentric based on totalizing and “modernizing” metanarratives, while post-colonial studies were considered uncritical face to an academicist and subjective imperialism (disregarding material and productive inconsistencies of capitalism).

in the study of IR - which is based on the supposed market-State antagonism - will be addressed. And lastly, brief closing remarks.

## The State and the formation of the international system

The modern international system was born from *the dialectic between States and capital*. If it is correct to stress, as does Halliday (1999, 16), that there was a gradual expansion of pre-existing flows of people, religion and trade, before the formation of national States; it should also be noted that the centralization of political power in the Iberian Peninsula was the crucial factor for the beginning of maritime mercantile expansion. Thus, since the beginning, State formation forged the global economy, which is, as we shall see, the basis of the current interstate system.

Despite the existence of numerous approaches to the formation of modern States, nations and nationalisms (Balakrishnan 2000), the fact is that the relationship between territory, borders and sovereignty is constitutive of the formation and existence of the State in general. States are political organizations that involve the construction of national identity, usually from previous cultural areas, with an impact on the “damping” of class conflict (Hobsbawm 1990), on the production of internal cohesion and of legitimacy in the construction of borders.

According to Tilly (1996), coercion and capital were fundamental forces on the formation of European States. States are the product of complex relationships, marked by social conflicts, historical discontinuities and intense competition among nation states and those with other types of political units (empires, city-States, etc.). The aim to exercise power stably over populations and territories, to guarantee the extraction of “monetized” resources and to strengthen bureaucracy in an environment of disputes and rivalries, occurred through wars and the use of force. Both the monopoly of the legitimate use of force and the genesis of what is recognized as citizenship and national identity fall under a territorial and border limit. In a summarized statement, the State made war and war made the State, so that coercion and capital combined in the construction of modern States, in a sophisticated gear of accumulation of power and wealth (Tilly 1996).

On the one hand, the competitive expansion among States created colonial empires and internationalized capitalism, especially after the new imperialist cycle initiated after the end of the 19th century, dominating Africa and Asia almost entirely. Just as colonialism dominated America for more than three centuries (between the 16th and early 19th centuries), the crea-

tion of the world space was forged amid the spread of State formations. With what Hobsbawm (1977) called "double revolution" - the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution - the progressive unification of the globe by capitalism took place incorporating, dominating and undoing the various types of societies it met. Parallel to this, an enhance of wealth, income and power concentration could be observed on a global scale, with destructive effects on democracy and institutions, as highlighted by Piketty (2014).

As highlighted by Fernandes (1999), the greatest contribution of Marxism, arising from the *Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels*, is the ability to understand the internationalization of capital as an articulated and contradictory process, expressed by the worldwide diffusion of the political form of the modern State and its institutions, and the integration of markets promoted by the internal need of capital expansion. That is, the modern world system as a product of the complex *dialectic* between *State and capital*, reflected in the reorganization of both the capitalist economy and the geography of world power (Arrighi 1996). For this reason, according to Fiori (2008), capital expansion and the nationalization of power are overlapped, not only in terms of the military and bureaucracy, but also of currencies, banks and identities.

If such arguments are well founded, it is possible to overcome the manichaeism regarding the supposed antagonism between State and markets in International Relations and beyond. On the one hand, theories with Realist matrices focus too much on the stability and repeatability patterns of the system, underestimating historical transformations and systemic changes. On the other, sometimes studies of liberal orientation, in an attempt to purge the State-centrism, eventually even the critical approaches, end up overestimating the supposedly transnational forces, as does Robinson (1998), assuming all changes as new, including processes intrinsic to the formation of the international system. Therefore, the problem is not the obvious need to recognize the changes in the characteristics and intensity of current capitalist expansion processes, but taking as antagonistic what has been symbiotic. Actually, since *The Manifesto*, the State's role is not taken as an obstacle to the expansion of capital, but as its "steering committee", as its *locus* of power (Marx and Engels 1998).

In other words, it is not possible to make invisible - or even to underestimate - the *necessary* historical connection between power accumulation (State) and wealth (capital). As pointed out by Wallerstein (2001, 41-50), the *policy of accumulation* of a State occurs through the following attributes: 1) *territorial jurisdiction*, which controls the borders and the flow of goods, capital, labor; 2) *legal right*, which defines which rules govern social relations; 3) *tax collection*, which appears as the main source of State income and of policies



promoting accumulation (subsidies, public investments, etc.); and 4) *monopoly of force*, that internally ensures the maintenance of “order” and, internationally, (re)produces power asymmetries.

The problematic of the international system as being anarchic, asymmetrical and global, can only be properly understood within the following premise: the State, as maximum concentration of power, does not work against capital and, in contrast, uses the legitimate monopoly of force as a condition for internal existence and projects it, internationally, as a reflex of the asymmetry of its own wealth accumulation processes and State power. Complexity increases because the State is both an instrument of development and of liberation to the oppressed nations. The very discussion about the State’s place in post-capitalist societies remains obstructed. Or, as highlights Losurdo (2015b, 54-55), Marxism joined uncritically the notion of extinction of the State and neglected the need to discuss the institutions and the limitation of power which largely contributed to the concentrated and autonomous forms that took power of State in real socialism, with the consequent (con) fusion between party and State apparatus (Fernandes 2000).

## The “crisis of the State” and “globalization”

The narrative carrying the banner of “crisis or withering away of the State” is shrouded in a mixture of inaccuracies and specific interests. In other words, the deepening integration of global markets is not a teleological force, but reflects political and territorial conflicts between specific actors, hegemonic power structures, crossed by interests of major global corporations and major States in international system. The theories of “globalization”, which treat globalization as a new historical period of a capitalist world without borders, available for the exploration of allegedly stateless capital, ultimately obscure or deny fundamental aspects concerning the functioning of the international system (Halliday 2002; Petras and Veltmeyer 2007; Ruccio 2003). In fact, the idea of “globalization” suppresses a number of issues related to the historical development of exploration relationships within the States and in a systemic level - which includes global asymmetries and the role of imperialism as a theoretical and historical reference (Sakellaropoulos 2009).

Firstly, on a domestic level, States depend on multiple capabilities, involving the collection and management of resources from institutions and a system of rules, in addition to the means for imposition of order and national defense - politically built by combining coercion, consensus and co-optation. Indeed, as defines Tilly (2013), this State capacity determines how the State

penetrates society and changes the distribution of resources, activities and interpersonal connections - meaning it is a polysemic, multidimensional and transdisciplinary concept, central to defining the role of the State in promoting development.

Despite the dominant narratives, it must be recognized that there was a decline of States and their capabilities, either measured by the proportion of public employment<sup>4</sup>, or by government revenues (taxes). In OECD countries, the tax burden rose from 24.8% in 1965 to 30.1% in 1980, 32.2% in 1990, 34.2% in 2000 and 34.1% in 2013. Even promoters of the liberal discourse, as the United States, Great Britain and Germany, had rates of 25.5%, 33.5% and 36.4% in 1980 and culminated with 25.4%, 32.9% and 36.7% respectively, remaining stable<sup>5</sup> in 2013. The wealth of data collected by Piketty (2014, 136-137) is reinforced by the fact that the total value of government assets in France and in the United Kingdom have expanded 50% in the 18th and 19th centuries to about 100% of national income in the 20th and 21st centuries. When analyzing the importance that the set of taxes and revenues began to play in the national income of countries such as Sweden, France, United Kingdom and United States between 1870 and 2010, there is no doubt about the evolution of the public power's role in developed societies (Piketty 2014, 463), as illustrated by OECD<sup>6</sup> data. Thus, as pointed out by Losurdo (2015a, 13), the constitution of the Social Welfare State in Europe (and the attacks it has been suffering nowadays) is related to the political and social mobilization of the lower classes. The combination of mobilization of domestic struggles for the appropriation of wealth and the influence of the socialist bloc weighed heavily in the expansion of State's responsibilities in public services and infrastructure to broad segments of the population. Therefore, the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the rise of neoliberalism have potentialized the dismantling of universalist public policies.

Secondly, on an international level, the place of States in the world must take into account the anarchic, competitive and asymmetrical international system. First, it should be noted that imperialism was one of the facets of the expansionist policy of liberal England in the 19th century (Losurdo

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4 By observing the performance of developed countries regarding public employment in relation to the total of employed, it is noted that there is a substantial growth between the 1960s and 1980s, from the supremacy of liberal discourse on, there was, at maximum, stability. Data available in the study by IPEA: [http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/TDs/td\\_1578.pdf](http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/TDs/td_1578.pdf).

5 The OECD series of statistics allows the observation of the behavior of the tax burden in all countries. Available in: <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV>.

6 See the detailed data provided by the OECD report, available at: <http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/OECD2014-Social-Expenditure-Update-Nov2014-8pages.pdf>.

2015b, 258), and returned to prevail with the advent of neoliberalism using the sophisticated structure of international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, the European Central Bank and the WTO, whose goal was - among others - to serve the interests of the central countries (Chang 2004; 2008) and opening new frontiers of accumulation to the major powers<sup>7</sup>. It can also be emphasized that “free trade imperialism” is not dissociated from “human rights imperialism” and from motivations to intervene in peripheral States. The current humanitarian and “democratic interventionism” reissues colonial imperialism, with similar rhetoric of war for peace, for freedom and for Western civilization (Losurdo 2015b, 65-87). New informational (*Internet War and Psywar*) and military (*Revolution in Military Affairs*) means interlace, converting the spectacle as war technique and, by extension, boosting strategic goals of Western powers (Losurdo 2016, 109-160).

Recognizing the elements of continuity does not prevent the recognition that the capitalist system has undergone profound transformations since its origin. Its technological changes accelerate the integration and the flow of capital and goods, causing reorganization in the hegemonic structures of power and their hierarchies in the world. Therefore, as it has been pointed out, hasty readings have underestimated the contemporary role of the State, as well as overestimated the newness of internationalization of capital.

In this sense, Batista Jr. (1998) confronted - with a wealth of quantitative data - what he called the five myths of “globalization”. First, it does not inaugurate a stage in world economic history, since in many ways the degree of international integration achieved between 1870 and 1914 is comparable, or even superior, to that observed in the “globalized” economy of the late 20th century. Second, the dissolution of national borders in favor of a world market did not happen, despite the technical progress and innovation, due to the preponderance of wealth creation in the domestic sphere and the global concentration of wealth flows in developed countries. Third, there is no relentless decline of national States because of neoliberal policies, since the size of the State in the vast majority of economies persists, measured by aggregate indicators such as the ratio between public expenditure and revenue and the GDP. Fourth, there is no domination expected of such “transnational” companies, since these are companies with national loyalties, keeping the bulk of its assets, sales, employment and, above all, decision-making capacity on its national basis. Fifth and last, the argument that global financial transactions liquidated the autonomy of national policies is not applicable, to the extent

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<sup>7</sup> The case of the creation of the WTO is illustrative, having the biggest commitments and obligations for participants in investment (TRIMS), services (GATS) and intellectual property (TRIPS) themes.

that even with the sharp expansion of international financial transactions, domestic applications are still widely prevalent and dependent on their central banks. Or rather, as Ghemawat (2009) highlights, with a substantive set of data<sup>8</sup>, the global world is less flat than the dominant discourses have us believe.

Thus, not coincidentally, the discourse that associates the crisis of the State and “globalization” has strengthened precisely in the context in which the United States took advantage of the end of the Soviet bloc to project power on a global scale, seeking to create and consolidate a unipolar world and an agenda of liberalization of post-socialist and/or developmental markets. Paradoxically, the dominant discourse began to converge with the leftists ones - including the ones of Marxist tendencies-, critical to the power and importance of the States in the world order. In the latter case, the argument was added to the idea of permanent terminal crisis of capitalism and the collapse of the United States. Besides hindering the understanding of power dynamics in the world, such conceptions harm the formulation of any alternative national project and often contribute to the weakening of Keynesians, developmental and socialists experiences. Indifferent to the relevance of the debate over the US decline (Wallerstein 2004; Fiori 2008) and the emergence of a multipolar world, the fact is that one cannot underestimate the US leadership<sup>9</sup>.

In short, understanding the intimate and symbiotic relationship between the State and the internationalization of capital in the formation and transformation of the international system is central to encompass the complexity of these phenomena. Thus, one can neither forget the historical character of certain global dynamics<sup>10</sup> (migration, trade, tourism, refugees, political activists), nor underestimate the internationalization of capital - particularly its current financialization - among the deep motivations behind national reactions, identities promotion and the increase of inequalities.

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8 See data available at the personal website of the author: <http://www.ghemawat.com/>.

9 Since the 1950s, with the Chinese Revolution, the setbacks on the Korean peninsula and the Russian early lead in the space race; then in the 1970s, with the end of the dollar-gold convertibility, the defeat in Vietnam and the oil shocks; in the 1980s, with the “Rust Belt” in Detroit and the rising twin deficits; and, finally, in the 21st century with the attacks of 9/11, the difficulties in the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the subprime crisis in 2008. Ironically, despite the challenges (and even relative decline), the US won the bipolar order, became leader of the 3rd Industrial Revolution, were among the first to emerge from the crisis and now give a major step in overcoming its energy vulnerability through the shale reserves.

10 Halliday (1999, 118) draws attention to the fact that many processes that characterize contemporary transnationalism were already present decades and even centuries ago, as the Reformation, the Industrial Revolution, the spread of universal suffrage and migration.

## State and sovereignty in the world space

State and sovereignty are closely linked and refer to the subject of politics, as authority constituted with legitimate monopoly of force in a given territory and population and having international diplomatic recognition. Instead of focusing on the evolution of the conceptual debate origins, definitions, forms and theories the goal here is to question the assumption that the crisis of the State would have led to the erosion of States' sovereignty, and understand its implications.

Regarding the assumption of the link between withering away of the State, and, by extension, of sovereignty, it must be said that these conclusions are wrong to take as premise the absolute and monistic character of sovereignty. The misconception is to regard sovereignty as something absolute, since States were formed in a global, asymmetric, anarchic system; that is, immersed in global flows of people, information, knowledge and goods and submitted to the unequal distribution of wealth and power - and by these factors States are conditioned. In this sense, it is clear that there are States with greater or lesser sovereignty within the system. Or as highlights Halliday (1999, 97), having monopoly of power and legitimacy within a territory, as well as diplomatic and international legal recognition, does not imply not knowing that there are national and global limits to the State's control capability. Thus, the rigid separation between external and internal does not make sense, for it implies neglecting cleavages and asymmetries that underlie the dialectic of formation of the international system. If, on the one hand, the principle of sovereignty resides in the capability of ensuring decision-making autonomy and independence to the country, on the other, this is not absolute, because interdependence is in the formative nature of the international system.

Hence, the Westphalian system formally establishes sovereignty internally and equality internationally, though in none of the cases it should be absolutized, given the differences of material and political capacity. As written by Kissinger (2015, 34-35), such a system took the multiplicity of forces as its starting point in the common search for order, mediated by forums for resolving conflicts with their respective legal arrangements. According to the same author, the Westphalian system has faced challenges linked to 1) the concept of shared sovereignty of European integration; 2) jihadism, that takes religion and not the State as reference; and 3) the US's exceptionalism that relativizes notions of sovereignty (Kissinger 2015, 15), whether in humanitarian interventions, in "color revolutions" or in attacks by drones without giving any attention to international law.

As for the implications arising from the discourse of the erosion of sovereignty, it should be remembered that there is a fine line that separates the growing protagonism of international organizations and their governance systems. Attention should be paid, however, that behind the different conceptions and normative references, linked to human rights and democracy, there are also the interests of powers in broadening the scope of interventions (Bartelson 2006). The strengthening of the governance system and international law in the last half century does not imply a supranational arrangement, but the adoption of treaties by countries, in which the application of these rules depends on the mobilization and on the capacities of the signatory countries. The opposite of sovereignty is not, as it may seem, the “general will” of the international community, but rather the rules and their imposition by countries (powers) with the capacity to coerce and impose norms in an anarchic system.

Instead of this “general will” community, as addressed by Losurdo (1998, 87-88), the construction of universal is done by great powers and, by extension, is confused with ethnocentrism and imperialism. Not rarely the great powers mobilize speeches intended to ensure “peace” and expand the “civilization”, the “free market” and the “law”, while project their power on a global scale, from the colonialism of the 16th century to contemporary foreign intervention<sup>11</sup>. Many forget that there are ambitious interests seeking to eliminate State ties (sovereignty) to legitimize and legalize new wars. Often the argument in favor of human security is put in opposition and to undo the security of States; although exceptionalism and imperialism also pose the strongest threat to the security of States (peripherals) and individuals (Walker 2006). It is not about relativism, but about problematizing the construction and application of legal systems and cultural codes in a deeply heterogeneous and asymmetric system.

For these reasons sovereignty has assumed distinct political meanings between its Westphalian formulation and nowadays. Not by chance, for the powers, the concept of sovereignty is no longer at the center of political-diplomatic and academic formulations. This stems primarily from the fact that sovereignty is (or seems to be) equated in a territorial scope by historically consolidated military superiority. Secondly, because these powers have the capacity to resist decisions contrary to their domestic interests, even if arising from regimes and international organizations. This can be illustrated by the violations committed by the US in the War on Terror, well documented by

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<sup>11</sup> In the Post-Cold War era, interventions, institutional violations and war crimes have become recurrent, as in the case of the invasion of Panama, Yugoslavia, Iraq by the US and NATO in the 1990s, or in Afghanistan, Iraq again and Libya and Syria in the 21st century to mention the most important ones.

Scahill (2014), or by the practice of massive agricultural subsidies as opposed to what the powers themselves (and the WTO) advocate for the sector. Thirdly, these powers are the great builders of the legal systems, in order to make them converge with their own broader interests.

In short, the needs of these powers are enabled by the extension of their interests on a global scale, by force, through corporations and/or their international regimes which presupposes precisely the flexibility of States and their sovereignty. It is not about, of course, discrediting inter-state organizations and international regimes and their governance mechanisms. But to warn to the fact that the extension of the attributions of such organizations, under the domain of the great powers and accompanied by the consequent weakening of the national States, has intensified the asymmetry of the international system. In other words, by recognizing the relationship between sovereignty and State capabilities of each country, it is possible to understand the motivations and contradictions involving the relationship between national States and international organizations and regimes.

In addition to the motivations behind the narrative of State and sovereignty depletion in the current context (post-Cold War) it is not difficult to recognize that there are other empirical and historical limitations. Moreover, how to conclude that there is a weakening of sovereignty when it was just in the last quarter of the 20th century that most of the world was formed by independent countries? The UN was founded in 1944 with only 51 members, as most of Africa and Asia was still a colony, and now it has 196 members. Before that, in the 19th century, the countries of America were beginning their journey of independence from the European metropolis. It is up to the “globalization” (as novelty) enthusiasts define what would have been the context of full affirmation of the State and sovereignty which would be difficult to locate before the year 1990. The inconvenient question that remains is: when did sovereignty and the States had their maximum expression so that they could face the process of withering away? In summary, the globalist approaches build a distorted version, assuming absolute sovereignty and high State power, to favor the argument they intend to disprove.

## Beyond the State-market antagonism

Despite theoretical advances in International Relations, it is still imperative to discuss State, sovereignty and “globalization”. The dialogue with other areas of the Humanities contributes to transcend conceptual and empirical limitations that still prevail in international studies. The first limita-

tion is the persistent maintenance of the concept of State as a “billiard ball” (Huntington 1997, 35) that apart from being ahistorical, hides divisions and tensions between State/society, State/government and State/nation. It is underestimated that the complexity of the State lies in the specificity of the political mediator and regulator of a set of interactions in a global economic entirety, where the domestic and international levels intersect (Halliday 1999, 94-95; 104).

The second limitation is the lack of understanding that if, on the one hand, technologies deepen the integration of world space and cross-border capital flows, on the other, these technical means strengthen State capacities. On the domestic sphere, the e-government dramatically increases performance capacity of the public sector in various activities involving taxation, inspection, planning, services, etc. Internationally, the means of the current technological revolution also potentiate interstate power asymmetry, through Space Command (satellites) and artificial intelligence that allows the automation of various operations such as guided munitions, drones, cyber war, etc. As highlighted by Duarte (2012), technology neither decides nor lead wars, but it is crucial to set the conditions of confrontation

The third limitation is disregarding the intertwining between the concepts of State, sovereignty and “globalization”. The mistaken premise that the Westphalian Peace would have been a milestone in the establishment of a supposed absolute or full sovereignty, should be, as addresses Osiander (2001), overcome. If sovereignty refers to the ability to control the activities within its borders and getting recognition from other States, it is asymmetrical and historically conditioned. And it depends, of course, on the different State’s capacities and levels of development, of their political, military and economic power, as well as their international insertion, which all influence the vulnerability and the decision-making autonomy of a State.

The fourth limitation is located in the authors who normatively defend post-State societies as imperative to overcome what does not stem from the Westphalian system. This is the case of theorists entitled as criticals (Linklater 1998; Walker 1993) who problematize concepts related to national-State construction, such as nationality, citizenship, territoriality and sovereignty, and its consequent opposition, such as sovereignty-anarchy, security-threat, identity-difference. The problem is that such divisions and tensions do not come from the Westphalian system, but from emancipation-“disemancipation” processes that underlie the complex processes of development and construction of the international system. What is also not sufficiently explored is how to construct emancipatory processes (public policies and legal guarantees) on the margins of institutions, political organization and democratic processes.



As well highlights Goodhart (2001), democracy is neither built in the context of “globalization” by simply undoing the troubled reality of sovereign States, nor by waiting for a “world government”.

The fifth limitation covers the recurring arguments for the erosion of States and their sovereignty, in favor of liberalization processes. Such examples frequently underestimate the entanglement between the State and the internationalization of capital. Therefore, it is worth illustrating with cases of regional integration processes and other non-State actors. In the first case, the European example is often mentioned, forgetting the role of States in integrationist dynamics, interstate asymmetry within the bloc and the limits of integration, precisely by not sharing crucial elements of State sovereignty (military). Even so, eventual success in building a new supranational arrangement at European level would be made redundant in a new European State with the same prerogatives, but on an expanded territorial scope! In other cases, non-State actors such as international organizations, non-government organizations and big corporations do not arise, are funded or act outside the interstate system. That is, without understanding the hierarchies of power between and within States is not possible to understand the political asymmetrical weight in organisms such as the UN Security Council, the IMF and the WTO; participation, accession, compliance of international agreements; promotion and enforcement of rules and practices in different areas of the international system, etc. It is worth mentioning the case of multinational companies that, according to Chang (2008, 97), are actually domestic companies with world presence, in which management, innovation and capital accumulation are closely connected with the interests of their countries of origin.

Finally, it can be concluded, bending the stick to the opposite pole (to bring it to the adequate point) that: the twenty-first century will be one in which the issue of State-building and sovereignty will be at the center of politics, for the challenge of development and democratic institutional building (even when in integrative processes and/or international organizations and their regimes) is set for the overwhelming majority of countries in the international system, particularly those in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Sometimes, certain amount of ethnocentrism forgets that the challenges faced by these regions are still for motives prior to any post-Westphalian argument: on the contrary, building a basic energy, transport and communication infrastructure; the establishment of minimum consumption patterns; the provision of public health, education and security services; and the organization of the public administration apparatus. From the point of view of a Marxist approach, disregarding the importance of State (and sovereignty) in the internationalization of capital, is to disregard key elements of the general theory

of social conflicts. First, because the State continues to be the “management committee of the bourgeoisie”, the political epicenter of the accumulation processes and the instrument of competition in respective fractions of the bourgeoisie. Second, the State becomes, to the peripheral nations, an important element for national autonomy and independence. Finally, it should be considered that social struggles are aimed at emancipation and these permeate public policies, material gains and recognition and naturally depend on the budget and on public institutions. Reiterating the issue raised by Losurdo (2015a), class struggles are not limited to the simplified version of labor-bourgeois conflict on the factory floor, but encompass various forms of social conflicts and processes of emancipation/”disemancipation”, as interstate, race, gender and different social segments struggles<sup>12</sup>.

## Final considerations

It is important to recognize, as do the scholars of “globalization”, that there are structures, processes and phenomena currently emerging simultaneously - it refers inherently, in fact, to social and historical processes. The relationship between territoriality and flows, or between geographical scales (local-global), is driven by technological transformations and economic and political rearrangements. The bottom line is not these findings (sometimes truisms), but understanding the changes and the way in which States gain not only new importance, but also expanded capabilities. It is erroneous, then, the argument (of liberal matrix) that tends to oppose State and market, sovereignty and “globalization”, disregarding the constitutive trajectory of the international system, including wars, currencies, interstate agreements, etc. Moreover, it contradicts empirical evidence, such as the notorious global integration of the developed countries (and sovereign), as opposed to failed States on the margins of “globalization”. In other words, organized markets in developed countries impose bureaucratic and institutional capacity, in the same way as the global market does not stem only from choices of large corporations.

It is interesting to observe how approaches focused on “globalists” and “post-Westphalian” discourses disregard basic demands from most countries, peripheral and emerging, representing about 85% of countries and world population on the margins of the restrictive circle of the rich members of the

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<sup>12</sup> Although recurrent, either dogmatic readings by part of the left, or conservative efforts to delegitimize Marxist critical approaches, the fact is that from its origin its formulators have paid attention to an extended version of class struggles. One can see the various publications of Lenin on the issue of gender when this issue was neither on the political agenda of States, nor on the dominant political forces. See Lenin (1956).

OECD. The need to understand the hegemonic structures of power and their connection with the production of wealth on a global scale (capital), placing the interstate contradictions and political disputes, as well as the asymmetries and hierarchies, requires the comprehension of the dialectic of “globalization” and a perspective that escapes the ethnocentrism reigning in the IR.

The interweaving between global and interstate dynamics are more complex; and the international events occurred in the post-Cold War era contradicted “globalists” discourses: the formation of new States (in the former Yugoslavia, former USSR, former Czechoslovakia, Eritrea, South Sudan), the resurgence of separatist movements claimants of territorial States (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, in Russia; Xinjiang and Tibet, in China; in the Caucasus; in Kurdistan; in the Basque Country; in Scotland); the civil wars and the resulting dispute for the State apparatus (particularly in Africa, such as DRC, Angola, Rwanda); the growing competition over natural resources (oil, water, diamonds, natural gas) as a central element of national security ; the resurgence of trade protectionism as an expression of interstate competition ; the formation of new interstate political coalitions (G20, IBAS, BRICS); the activism of diplomacies in international institutions (UN, WTO, IMF); the conflict of national interest in integration processes (as illustrated by the Greek case); the intensification of underground operations and military interventions conducted by the powers (the coup in Venezuela, “color revolutions”, the destabilization of Syria); new demands for national actions when facing cross-border threats (SARS, terrorism, drug trafficking, weapons and contraband, etc.); among others.

In short, the manichaeist approaches are not able deal with the complex interaction between States (their sovereignties) and global dynamics. In effect, social struggles tend to become clogged by the misunderstanding of the importance of States in the various sides that the processes of emancipation/“disemancipation” present, which permeate the international system.

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## **ABSTRACT**

The article intends to problematize the alleged antagonism between, on the one hand, state capacity and sovereignty and, on the other hand, the integration of markets at a global level. The current manichaeism that tends to reduce approaches to “globalists” or “skeptics” does not contribute to the understanding of the contemporary international system. It is necessary to overcome the supposed antagonism between state-centric and transnational visions, in favor of critical approaches that understand the interlacements between the State and the internationalization of capital, which are crossed by the process of expansion of capitalism in contemporary times.

## **KEYWORDS**

Globalization; State; Capital; International System.

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# BRITISH GEOPOLITICS AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE POUND STERLING<sup>1</sup>

Mauricio Metri<sup>2</sup>

## Introduction

There were few currencies that took a leading position for the whole international economy, serving as the currency of quotation, settlement and reserve value for transactions involving payments and receipts, credits and debits between different independent national monetary systems. Only the pound sterling after the Franco-Prussian War (1871) and the US dollar since World War II have achieved such pre-eminence.

Before, when there was no global reference currency, it is controversial to suppose that transactions between different political-territorial spaces were based on barter operations; or that they ceased to happen; or that some merchandise had been chosen to perform the functions of general equivalent and means of exchange. The historical research has been showing that, in these cases, the “international” transactions involved: or (i) a combined transaction between export and import intermediated by the account currency of the territorial political space where the transaction was geographically given<sup>3</sup>; or (ii) the use of credit instruments (bills of exchange, for example) that allowed the conversion of exchange rates between different currencies<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Professor of International Political Economy at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). E-mail: metri.mauricio@gmail.com

<sup>3</sup> In this case, in order to import any merchandise, it is necessary to sell something (export), in order to obtain the local currency and, through it, to acquire what one wishes to import. See Goitein (1967, 200) and Metri (2014, 192-198).

<sup>4</sup> In this case, there must be a network of compensation centers of specific financial instruments to currency conversion, such as the bill of exchange of yesteryear. See Goitein (1967,

Since the sixteenth century, the circulation space of the pound sterling has expanded beyond the borders of England, establishing itself as the first international reference currency after 1871. Associated with this occurred the globalization of the pound-gold monetary standard. The objective of the paper is to analyze the internationalization of the British currency, the pound sterling, during the XVII - XIX centuries. The analytical perspective is that this process accompanied the defensive and expansive movement of the English power in response to ongoing threats of that era and, therefore, came as the result of the British geostrategy itself.

Besides this introduction and the conclusion, this paper is divided into three other sections. In the next one, the relations between geopolitics and the internationalization of a currency are analyzed in general terms. Afterwards, a brief description of the English geostrategy since the sixteenth century is made. Thus, it is intended to be clear the parameters that guide the actions responsible for the extension of the monetary territory of the pound, subject of the last section before the conclusion.

## From Geopolitics to Monetary Territories: brief theoretical notes

The term *geographic coercion* created for the historian Fernand Braudel is referred to one of the structures that formed the base of the History of the Men and act over this as “long term prisons” (Braudel 1990, 50). In some of his books<sup>5</sup>, the author incorporated geography as the starting point of his analysis, more precisely the relations of space with men movements, in order to reveal one of the realities that constrain the paths of societies over time<sup>6</sup> (Metri 2017b).

For the international system, geography also has influenced its history since its medieval origins to the present days, as well as its featured inter-state relations, mainly when interpreted with a *hobbesian bias*, in the sense that each political-territorial unit constitutes a potential threat to the others<sup>7</sup>. This makes the prospect of confrontation and the wars themselves a chronic result of the system, marked for a constant competitive pressure *on each other* (Metri 2017b).

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242) and Metri (2014, 172-175).

<sup>5</sup> Highlight for Braudel (2000).

<sup>6</sup> Braudel (1990, 49-50)

<sup>7</sup> Hobbes (1983, 75).

The important issue to realize in this context is that the geographic knowledge acquire strategic character, becoming itself a necessity to the central authorities that command the political-territorial units of the international system. There are at least three reasons of this *geostrategic imperative*. In the first place, the knowledge and the constant study of the many aspects which characterize the geographic space are indispensable to the formulation of any security strategy of preparation of defense and/or conquest (military reason)<sup>8</sup>. In the second place, the continuous development of the productive forces and necessary activities to the provision of material resources relatives to the permanent preparation for war does not occur without the specificities of the geographic space occupied and organized for such purposes (economic reason)<sup>9</sup>. Thirdly, the war effort requires the organization of a tributary system of payments, structurally based on a currency, which constantly makes viable both the extortion of material and human resources located in the geographical space of domination, and the development of productive activities in general (monetary reason)<sup>10</sup>.

Not for other reasons, among the superpowers geopolitical reflections were disseminated and also geoeconomic ones, however there are only a few with a geomonetary character, about their space of interest to outline their (geo) strategies (military, political, economic, monetary and financial) against external threats and internal challenges. It seeks to take advantage of and / or mitigate vulnerabilities.

About the geomonetary challenges, it is necessary to understand that taxation is one of the instruments used for the occupation, organization, structuring and exploration of a geographic space, especially to make both the extortion of resources (material and humans), and the economic development associated to the defense effort and conquest possible. On the other hand, the currency is nothing but the counterpart of the taxation, it means, the instrument used for the central authority to make its spending and accept by it for the liquidation of tax debts, as defined in Knapp (2003, 32-38).

The capacity to declare (impose) the condition of debtor (of tribute) to the collectivity in which it dominates is what guarantees to the central authority the exclusively privilege to proclaim (enunciate) how these obligations must be liquidated. Only the central authority, which legitimacy inside of a geographical space is based on the domination of the mechanisms of violence and physical coercion, has the power to create a currency of account, define

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8 Lacoste (2008, 23).

9 Gottmann (1975, 534-535).

10 Metri (2014, 134).

the means of exchange and guarantee social recognition of both<sup>11</sup>. Indeed, every monetary unit is an arbitrary denomination. It depends on a power that establishes and proclaims it (Knapp 2003, 21-22).

Therefore, the territorial limits of validity and circulation of a currency are directly related to the scope of taxation mechanisms or, more appropriately, to the space of the effective exercise of violence. One can mention, then, a monetary territory derived from social processes related to the strength and expansion of a central authority (Metri 2014, 65-70). In such a way, if we suppose that these central authorities (States, for example) act from geopolitical and/or geoeconomic challenges, the form that assume the monetary organization of its territories will respond to the characteristics of these challenges and of the geostrategies involved. This is the connection between geopolitics and currency of a theoretical point of view, where the link is the concept of territory as a geographical space accessible to men, which organization, use and occupation are defined by processes and permanent political interventions<sup>12</sup>.

In the International Political Economy (IPE), the debate about the internationalization of a currency has as central parameter the advantages seek by the set of agents (political and economic) that operate in the international scope. There is an underlying idea of free choices, and that the national currency with more accessions will prevail, or at least the most important ones<sup>13</sup>. It is important to realize that, in general, it is not considered that the possibility of the internationalization of a currency is related to the capacity of the state with a superior military power to compel the other agents and central authorities to operate based on its national currency. This is because there is a common difficulty in dealing with the dimension of power in monetary affairs. The category *power* appears as a historical condition and not as a relevant theoretical dimension; an external category and foreign to the concept of currency from which they depart (Metri 2014, 36-39).

According to the perspective of this paper, the internationalization of a currency is due directly to the projection and the conquests of the most well succeed power in geopolitics global disputes. They are processes whose dynamics are manifested to a great extent at the end of international conflicts and in the international negotiations that accompany them. Indeed, the methodology that organizes the relevant historical information is based on the following general aspects. The first one are territorial conquests, commercial routes, building of colonial systems and other forms of expansion of the

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<sup>11</sup> This is the concept of coin. Knapp (2003, 35).

<sup>12</sup> Gottmann (1975, 525-526).

<sup>13</sup> Helleiner and Kirshner (2009, chapter 1).

direct domination space. In this case, occurs an extension of the scope of taxation, and also of the possibility of the (re) structuring of economic life these taken spaces as a means of institutionalizing the necessities of importation and financing in the *expansive currency*, frequently associated to the imposition of the *metropolitan commercial exclusivism* (Metri 2014, 87-88). As it will be argued, something usual in English history.

The second aspect is the building of hierarchical and asymmetric economic relations between different central authorities, arising from the negotiation of unequal agreements of a commercial, financial or investment nature, most often associated with contexts of wars and interstate disputes. In some cases there is the definition of a specific currency as the reference one, which “choice” reflects the relations of power and power between the central authorities involved. In other cases, there is the accumulation of imbalances in the external accounts of central authorities that are disadvantaged in the negotiations, whose solution involves the use of indebtedness in the *expansive currency* (Metri 2014, 88-89). This also was a very common dynamic in the history of the pound internationalization.

The third aspect is the domination of strategic spaces and the zones of accelerated accumulation of wealth characteristic of each historical period, such as commercial routes and warehouses, consumer markets, sources of raw material, etc. Once theses spaces and zones have been dominated, the other states become compelled to operate on the basis of the currency arbitrated by the expansive power otherwise they would be excluded. Depending on the strategic importance of theses spaces and zones, their domination means a veto to the initiatives of projection of power and wealth of the others (Metri 2014, 89-91). As it will be seen, this was, for example, the form of framing of Germany shortly after its unification.

Finally, it should be noted that, because of the significant advantages in having the reference currency, international monetary disputes acquire important status in the competition between the super powers. The projection well succeeded of a determined currency means a veto to other similar initiatives, besides the imposition and generalization of the problem of external restraint. Thus, just as in power struggles, monetary disputes assume the form of a systemic game of relative positions where the rise of one represents the fall of others.

## The English Geostrategy in Historical Perspective

Following this brief description about geopolitics and monetary ter-

ritories, one returns to a concise narrative about the evolution of the English (geo) strategy over time in order to make the background and the parameters that guided the actions responsible for the extension of the monetary territory of the pound throughout the centuries clear.

To many authors<sup>14</sup>, since the Middle Age (century XI-XIII), relations between the central authorities were guided, in last instance, by the perception of reciprocal threat, forging, with effect, a *competitive pressure*, whose dynamic responded to the challenge of take care for the social existence of its group, impelling the conquest of frontier lands and the subjugation of close neighbours. Such dynamic formed the very own interstate relation centuries later in a global scale<sup>15</sup>.

With the emergence of the Plantageneta Dynasty (1154-1399), the borders of the kingdom came to encompass England as well as expressive continental dominions<sup>16</sup>. Its “geostrategy” was guided by the logic of expanding boundaries against contiguous enemies and direct close threats, whether on the continent or in the British Islands as a whole, seeking to expand the protection zones and to provide raw materials.

However, with the failure of the Hundred Years War (1337 - 1453), the English no longer disputed positions on the continent and:

Between 1453 and 1558, between the end of Hundred Years War and the resumption of Calais by Francisco da Guise, England, without being aware of at the time, become an island (forgive-me the expression), this is, an autonomous space, different of the continent. Even this decisive period, despite the Mancha, despite the North Sea, despite the Strait of Calais, England was corporately linked to France, to Netherlands, Europe (Braudel 1998, 326).

The fact of having to assume its insularity, because of a military defeat, occurred simultaneously with the rise of new threats from the continent, the Habsburg Empire and the Kingdom of France, both with expressive territorial extension. Furthermore, with the reform of 1534, England founded its own religion, the Anglicanism, moving away from the Catholic Church of Rome and instituting the British monarch as its supreme head. Therefore the antagonisms against its catholic enemies from the continent, France and Spain, were reinforced (Metri 2017b).

However, there was a geographic revolution of the international system with significant effects for England, due to the Russian expansions in

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<sup>14</sup> Elias (1993), Tilly (1993) and Fiori (2004).

<sup>15</sup> Elias (1993, 47).

<sup>16</sup> Elias (1993, 111).

Eurasia from 1462<sup>17</sup> and the Iberian overseas one since 1488<sup>18</sup> (Mello 2011, 43). In this context, England made a progressive transformation in its geopolitics, that was no longer guided by territorial frontier disputes on the continent and began to seek the preservation of the European balance of the power as well as its projection overseas<sup>19</sup>. It has, in effect, prioritized the development of its navy war and merchant navy, that is, of an expressive naval power, aiming to control the seas, the construction of a colonial empire and privileged positions on several boards. This strategic change, even without a complete formulation and awareness of its reach and depth, was only possible since it happened due to the discovering of the New World and of the new routes of navigation to the Far East (Metri 2017b).

Each well succeeded step of the English projection, of its conquests in different game boards over time, based on this new strategy, determined the territorial advances of the pound to beyond its political space of origin, once this conquests derived tributes, commercial monopolies, treaties and unequal agreements of the most varied, whose achievement implied (directly or indirectly) the arbitrage of a monetary unit of reference, thus guaranteeing the expansion of the pound. This is the central connection suggested between power and currency, geopolitics and monetary territory to the interpretation of the raising process of the pound to the condition of the first currency (national) of actual global reference.

Since then, there were two foundational parameters of the English geostrategy: consolidate itself as the most important navy power globally; and act for the preservation of the balance of the power in Europe and, latter, also throughout the Eurasian mass.

In a first moment, between 1516 and 1659, although the dynamic was of a systemic game, in which there were no permanent allies or perennial enemies, the focus of concern generally fell upon the Habsburg Empire, with its extensive territories on the European continent and its rich overseas colonial spaces<sup>20</sup>. In a second moment, between 1660 and 1815, the concerns in general fell more heavily on France, since the end of the Thirty Years War (1648), but mainly after the effective rise of Louis XIV in 1661<sup>21</sup>. These fears were preserved until the defeat of Napoleon's troops in 1815. In the nineteenth

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<sup>17</sup> The Times (1993, 158-159).

<sup>18</sup> The Times (1993, 152-153).

<sup>19</sup> That is why Mackinder divided the history of England in before and after Columbus. "Before Columbus, the insularity was more evident than the universality. (...) After Columbus, value began to attach to the ocean- highway, which is in its nature universal" (Mackinder 1902, 11).

<sup>20</sup> Kennedy (1989, 44-45).

<sup>21</sup> Kennedy (1989, 80).

century, these concerns turned to Russia that, even before the Vienna Agreements, was already one of the main threats<sup>22</sup>.

On the one hand, the origins of the “Big Game” between England and Russia in Asia go back to the Treaties of Gulistan of 1813 and of Turkmanchai of 1828, when Persia ceded to Russia important territories in the region of the South Caucasus<sup>23</sup>. On the other side, the very assembly of the European Concert in the negotiations of Vienna in 1814 revealed the British geostrategic priorities. the Quadruple Alliance was “destined to cut at the root, with overwhelming force whatever aggressive tendencies of France” (Kissinger 2007, 68), in order to secure European equilibrium on the continent; The Holy Alliance, promoted indirectly by England, was designed to tie the Russian initiatives to the actions of its other partners, which meant a certain power of veto to Austria, ally of England<sup>24</sup>.

The practice of English imperial politics throughout the nineteenth century, served of background to the formulation of the synthesis of its geostrategy, developed by Mackinder in 1904. In his conception, there is a unique ocean of interlinked waters (*Great Ocean*) and a big continent (*World Island*), formed by Asia, Europe and Africa. In the heart of the World Island, there is the *Heartland*, “(...) a fortress inaccessible to the harassment of the maritime power of the island or marginal powers of Eurasia, while favoring the development of the terrestrial power of the continental power that possessed or would conquer that basilar region” (Mello 2011, 45). Around the *Heartland*, there were 4 marginal regions that projected themselves to the Great Ocean: Europe, India, China; and the Near East.”Unlike the pivot area, these two-sided marginal regions are within the range of maritime power” (Mello 2011, 45). However, there was a dispute for the strategic positions on the marginal regions, once this was a regional of natural projection of the land power consolidated on the *Heartland* (Russia), as well as it was the first line of defense of the maritime power (England) against the terrestrial power. It is not for other reason, as it will be seen, that important areas of the expansion process of the English currency were located in these marginal regions around the *Heartland* that Mackinder spoke of.

In short, if in a first moment the pound expansion coincided with the territorial conquests of the Medievo, incorporating mainly the continuous areas, in a second moment, due to the British geostrategic alteration, the pound expansion has been linked to the English overseas expansion based on its

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22 Kennedy (1989, 168).

23 Dalziel (2006, 80).

24 Kissinger (2007, 70).



global geostrategic.

## The Expansion of the English Monetary Territory

After debating the evolution of the English (geo) strategy, the focus of this section is directed to the political-military actions oriented by the English (geo) strategy that resulted in the expansion of the monetary territory of the pound. In the scope of this work it is not possible, however, to make a chronological description of the process of incorporation of all regions that somehow belonged, at some moment to the English monetary space. So, the choice to analyze some of the most important cases from the point of view of English geopolitics, identifying, when it is possible, the elements that put into evidence the *expansive* and *authoritative* character related to the internationalization of a currency.

## The First Colonial Conquests

One of the first steps of England in the building of its colonial system occurred in 1497, with the revindication of the Island of New Land in Canada, annexed in 1538. However, the growing of its empire got an effective impulse in the beginning of the seventeenth century, in two main regions: North America, Antilles and the Caribbean. In a dynamic marked by advances and setbacks, the conquests in North America were: Virginia (1607); Massachusetts (1620); New Hampshire (1623); Maryland (1632); Rhode Island (1636); Connecticut (1639); New York (1664); New Jersey (1665); Pennsylvania (1681). In the Antilles and Caribbean, the English dominated: St. Lucia (1605); Bermuda (1609); Barbados (1624); Barbuda (1628); Nevis (1628); Bahamas (1629); Montserrat (1632); Antigua (1632); Anguilla (1650); Jamaica (1655); Nicaragua (1658); British Virgin Island (1666); Cayman Island (1670); e Turks and Caicos Island (1678). There was also some conquests in Africa, Ghana (1621) and Gambia (1661), in addition to the Island of St. Helena, occupied in 1651. In the Indian subcontinent, the English also took their first steps in the seventeenth century when they settled in Bombay in 1665<sup>25</sup>.

Generally, the colonial territories were directly taxed in pounds or in local currency issued by the administration of the colony. In the second case, the exchange rate issue was always a source of disputes between the authorities of the metropolis and the local ones. Anyway, colonial exports were priced

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25 Smith (2003, 927-962), Dalziel (2006, 136-37) and Ferguson (2003, 43-47).

in pounds, just like its imports in general, due to the *metropolitan exclusivism*, inserting the colonies in the monetary territory of the metropolis. On the other side, the economic life of the colonies were re (structured) focused in the commodities production for foreign markets, which made them dependent on a broad range of imported goods traded in pounds sterling<sup>26</sup>. Even in the case of the *white domains*, etc., what was of strategic importance to England remained somehow under strong control of the metropolis<sup>27</sup>.

It is important to note that, in this period, the English currency still had a secondary position in the European context. In the Dover Treaty (1670) negotiations between Luis XIV (1643 - 1715) and Carlos (1660 - 1685), was accorded the support of England to France against Spain and Netherlands in the midst of the Wars of Return (1667-68) and the Netherlands (1672-78). In exchange, among other things, the English monarch received financial aid, which values were defined in terms of French currency, the *livre torinois*, and not the contrary<sup>28</sup>.

## The Anglo-Portuguese Unequal Treaties

During the Restoration Wars (1640-1688), the Kingdom of Portugal sought support that would guarantees it against its enemies, Spain on the continent and the United Provinces overseas. Given the ambiguity of French politics, the Portuguese monarchy directed its efforts to England<sup>29</sup>. It was important to avoid Portugal's closeness with its continental enemies, seeking to preserve the balance of power in the region. They signed a series of Trade Agreements (1642, 1654 and 1661), culminating in the famous Treaty of Methuen of 1703. In general, in exchange for support against external threats, Portugal ceded territories such as Bombay in 1665 and allowed a privileged insertion of English merchants in the kingdom and in their colonies.

In accordance with the purposes of this work, it should be noted that since the Treaty of 1652 obligations were established in English currency. In the "(...) preliminary articles of the Treaty of Peace, signed on December 29, 1652, compensation was demanded for '50,000 **pounds** of good English cur-

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26 "Every European nation had endeavored, to a greater or lesser degree, to obtain for itself the monopoly of the trade in its colonies, and for this reason they have forbidden ships from foreign nations to trade with them, in addition to forbidding them from importing European goods of any foreign nation" (Smith 2003, 726-727).

27 Smith (2003, 726-727).

28 Ogg (1984, 344).

29 Batista (2014, 44-48).

rency' (art. IV); (...)." [emphasis added] (Batista 2014, 48). On the other hand, it was only a few years before the economic imbalances between the two countries increased. Even before the outbreak of the Spanish War of Succession in 1701,

(...) there was already a strong imbalance in the trade balance between England and Portugal (the result of trade agreements) (...). D. Luís da Cunha [Portuguese diplomatic representative in London] already foresaw that the payment of the increasing balances of the trade balance, would be made in gold, and not by the importation of the 'fruits of the earth'. (...) The output of gold, necessary for the payment of the excessive balances unfavorable to Portugal, was, in the eyes of D. Luís da Cunha, something impossible to maintain that time, due to the scarcity of this resource (Silva, 2003: 63).

In this sense, because of the agreements signed, in order to make imports from England possible, the Lusitanians were obliged to sell, for example, gold (or some other product) to obtain the necessary pounds to rebalance their external accounts with England.

The approximation between Portugal and France in 1701<sup>30</sup> was reversed by the English two years later. To this end, they sent ships to the Mediterranean and threatened to besiege the city of Lisbon<sup>31</sup>. Compelled, the Lusitanian crown moved away from France and signed a Treaty of Defensive Alliance with England in May 1703, whose English representative in the negotiations was Paul Methuen<sup>32</sup>. A few months later, at the beginning of the War, both countries returned to the negotiating table and signed the Trade and Cloth Trade Treaty of December of 1703, a kind of additive to the Defensive Alliance agreement, whose English negotiator at that time was John Methuen, Father of Paul.

Therefore, the meaning of this Commercial Treaty signed by Methuen (father), enshrined in the economic literature by Ricardo in his Theory of Comparative Advantages, is not adequately understood if it is understood apart from the Mayan Arbitration Treaty of May 1703 signed by Methuen (son)<sup>33</sup>. In any case, both the Treaties of Methuen (father and son) reinforced both the politico-military ties and the economic imbalances between the two countries, contributing also to the insertion of the Kingdom of Portugal and

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30 Silva (2003, 70).

31 Silva (2003, 71).

32 "Basically, the Allies promised naval and land security to the Portuguese state and required the right of access to the Lusitanian ports to carry out the landing of the troops, part of which would be allied to the Lusitanian army" (Batista 2014, 90).

33 Silva (2003, 70).

its Colonies into the monetary space of the pound in the following centuries.

## The Spoils of the “Second One Hundred Years War”

The successive peace treaties that ended each of England's wars between 1689 and 1815 reveal their strategy of defending, on the one hand, the balance of power in Europe and, on the other, disputing control of the seas and building an empire colonial.

The Treaty of Ryswick ended the War of Nine Years (1689-1697) and established, among other things, the resignation of Louis XIV as part of his conquests, the recognition of William of Orange as King of England, the assignment of the New Land Island and the Hudson Bay to the English.

In the Treaties of Utrecht (1713) and Rastatt (1714), which ended the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), it was decided that France would abandon its claims on Nova Scotia and New Land Island, a key to control for the St. Lawrence River, as well as the Hudson Bay. The closure of the port of Dunkirk was demanded, which gave the dominion of the Channel and of the North Sea. They recognized the succession in England, and the balance of power in the continent was maintained with the separation of the Spanish and French kingdoms. Spain ceded to England, Gibraltar and Minorca, decisive for navigation between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Finally, in relation to Spanish America,

(...) England obtained from Spain the “license vessel”, which allowed it to set up its trade in the River Plate, and the seat - exclusive concession of the slave trade to an English company - for thirty years. Thus, England expanded to all Spanish America the clandestine commerce, which until then had been practicing on the basis of the Antillean and New England ports, besides Brazil (Armstrong 2014, 64).

Indeed, some asymmetries were struck in favor of English merchants in certain affairs of the Spanish colonies. It is noted, however, that in the second article of the Treaty of Asiento of 1713 the values to be paid by the colonies to the South Sea Company were denominated in terms of the currency of the Spanish Empire (weight shields)<sup>34</sup>.

The Seven Years War (1756-63) confirmed British domination in Canada and India, ending French influence in those regions. In general, they stand out: the acquisition of Benguela and the confirmation of Bombay (1757)

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<sup>34</sup> Treaty of Asiento (1713). Available at: [https://archive.org/details/cihm\\_28677](https://archive.org/details/cihm_28677)

in India; the conquest of Dominica (1761), Grenada (1763) and Trinidad and Tobago (1762) in the Caribbean; as well as the first occupation of the Falklands (1766) and New Zealand's claim (1769)<sup>35</sup>.

The Napoleonic Wars allowed England to acquire new colonial territories. They can be mentioned: Sri Lanka (1795-96); Sierra Leone (1787); Malaysia (acquisition of Penang 1786); Malta (1798); The Cape of Good Hope; The maritime provinces of Ceylon; Maurice; Seychelles, and some islands in the Caribbean<sup>36</sup>.

The historian Eric Hobsbawm summed up the result of English politics in the eighteenth century as follows:

The result of this century of intermittent wars was the greatest triumph ever achieved by any state: the virtual monopoly between European powers, from outside colonies, and the virtual monopoly of naval power on a world scale. Moreover, the war itself - by mutilating Britain's main competitors in Europe - expanded exports; if anything was served the peace was to diminish them. (Hobsbawm 2000, 47).

It can be said that in the wake of these triumphs of England, colonies, naval power and commercial expansion, the pound consolidated the basis of its later and effective globalization.

## The Domination of the Indian Subcontinent and Southeast Asia

As seen, the French defeat in the Seven Years War represented the end of the presence of its companies in India, making the English East India Company the dominant foreign power<sup>37</sup>. In the regions where it was present, in addition to the foreign trade monopoly, the company took control of the already established tax and monetary systems<sup>38</sup>, but also instituted plundering as a common practice<sup>39</sup>.

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35 Dalziel (2006, 136-137).

36 Dalziel (2006, 136-137).

37 "Thus, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in the northeast, the Circars North, further down the east coast, Madras within the territory of Carnataca, and Bombay on the west coast, constituted the territories of the British East India Company, in 1765" (Guimarães 2010, 64).

38 "(...) [the Company] did not initially make major changes to the tax system of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, maintaining the structure of taxation and the form of payment of existing taxes (...)" (Guimarães 2010, 115).

39 Panikkar (1977, 104).

It did not take long, however, for the Company to implement monetary reform with a view to more efficient extortion of the local population. In 1778, the new rupee was introduced as the local currency, which meant “(...) defining the conversion rate of the old into the new rupee, and this was an indirect form of taxation, since now more rupees would have to be delivered to pay taxes due to the government” (Guimarães 2010, 115).

A petition of the time corroborates the perspective regarding the compulsory character of the currency related to the taxation for the organization of an extortion system.

Even more precise is a petition addressed by the great landowners [in Bengal] to the country Council. ‘The warehouses of the English lords are numerous... Hardly any part of Bengal escapes them. They traded... with all kinds of grain, cloth and all the commodities the country could offer. In order to obtain such articles, **they force the peasants to accept their currency**, and having thus purchased by violence those goods, for which they pay almost nothing, **they compel the inhabitants and the retailers to buy them**, at a very high price [in their currency], higher than the markets... Almost nothing remains in the country. ‘ [emphasis added] (Panikkar 1977, 104-105).

From 1805, the Company consolidated its hegemony in India and, in the 3rd Anglo-Maratha War (1813-23), conquered most of the Empire (Maratha). In 1835, the new general government promoted a new monetary reform, creating the silver rupee<sup>40</sup>. Thus, as the central authority, the Company reorganized India’s domestic monetary space and subordinated it in practice to the English monetary space. In the words of Guimarães,

The definition of a single unit of account for the British territories in India will also fulfill the role of facilitating the regulation of the exchange rate between the rupee and the pound through the mechanism of the sale of company bills of exchange payable in pounds in exchange for Rupees. Thus, the same movement that affirmed the supremacy of the company’s rupee over the other currency units in the Indian subcontinent also affirmed **the subordination of the rupee to the currency of the conquering power, the pound sterling** [emphasis added] (Guimarães 2010, 165).

But it was only after the Sepoy Mutiny (1857-59) that the English state took over India’s administrative control and removed it from the Company<sup>41</sup>.

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40 “(...) which proclaimed a single currency (Act of 1835), the silver rupee, for all territories under the British East India Company (...)” (Guimarães 2010, 163).

41 The Times (1995, 230-231), Panikkar (1977, 107-108) and Guimarães (2010).

From then on “India remained the true dairy cow of England throughout the nineteenth century: it delivered to Britain raw materials which it was then to buy in the form of manufactured goods” (Panikkar 1977, 151). At the center of this arbitrary trade was the pound.

The English rule over India in the nineteenth century had also served as a basis for its projection in the South Asia region, that is, the other strategic areas for siege and containment of the Heartland peoples of which Mackinder later spoke. According to Panikkar,

We have already noted the role that India played in China’s first war. (...) it was from India that the British penetration took place in the Sinkiang (...) in Afghanistan (...). It was also thanks to India that the British annexed Burma, which intervened in Persia, and which in general made their supremacy recognized on the coast of Arabia and the Persian Gulf (Panikkar 1977, 160).

In South East Asia, the English conquered Singapore (1819), Malacca (1824), Hong Kong (1842), Labuan (1846), Lower Burma (1852) and Sarawak (1888)<sup>42</sup>. According to Ferguson,

They had been forerunners of a race in the Far East, swallowing up northern Borneo, Malaysia and a slice of New Guinea, not to mention a chain of islands in the Pacific: Fiji (1874), Cook Islands (1880), New Hercules (1887), the Phoenix Islands (1889), the Gilbert and Ellice Islands (1892), and the Solomon Islands (1893) (Ferguson 2003, 256).

In the case of Burma, after successive failed attempts, the English managed to occupy Rangoon in 1826 and threatened to follow towards Ava. The king of Burma recoiled and negotiated a peace agreement, that involved indemnifications. “Lord Dalhousie, then governor-general, had set himself up for the trouble, and demanded from Ava’s court an indemnity of 920 **pounds**, which Commodore Lambert went to claim in Rangoon with the baggage of six ships” [emphasis added] (Panikkar 1977, 109). Burma has accumulated debts in pounds as a result of its defeat in the military field and has continued to be taxed through indemnities denominated in the currency of the winning power.

## The Taking of Oceania and the Partition of Africa

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<sup>42</sup> The Times (1995, 240-241).

Oceania, at first, did not arouse interest. It was only after 1786 that England established a first penal colony in New South Wales, in South East Australia. The City of Sydney, founded in 1788, was designed to protect routes against the French. From then on, the cities of Newcastle (1801), Hobart (1803-4), Launceston (1804), Brisbane (1824) and Albany (1826) were created. It was not long before England in 1829 annexed all of Australia and then New Zealand in 1840, so that by the middle of the nineteenth century almost all Oceania had already undergone the crown (Figure 1)<sup>43</sup>.

**Figure 1: The British Empire after the First World War**



**Source: Goodlad (2000, 94).**

In the case of Africa, before 1880, there were few areas on the African continent that were colonized directly by Europeans. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, almost all of Africa had been conquered and divided between European countries, with the exception of Liberia and Ethiopia. The starting point for this sharing was the West Africa Conference of 1884 in Berlin. Initially, its negotiating agenda was limited to the search for rules to be considered for the occupation of the African coasts and for the navigation of the Congo and Niger basins. However, as a practical result, the process of territorial conquest on the continent began, by establishing as a rule the criterion of effective occupation to guarantee both the territorial domain and the legitimacy of claims of sovereignty.

During the period of the Partition of Africa (1880-1913), Europeans

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<sup>43</sup> Dalziel (2006, 82-83) and The Times (1995, 232).



managed to take direct control over 36 of the 40 colonies born. Under English rule there were, in addition to Sierra Leone, Gold Coast and Union of South Africa: Egypt (1882); British Somalia (1884); Bechuanaland (1885); East Africa British (1888); Rhodesia (1888-1895); Uganda (1890); Sudan (1898); And Nigeria (1914), including forming the Cape Corridor to Cairo. (Figure 1)<sup>44</sup>.

In 1909, according to surveys of some authors<sup>45</sup>, the British Empire had about 25% of the world population (about 440 million people) and a similar proportion of the world's land, 32.5 million km<sup>2</sup>. In comparative terms, the territory of the British Empire was three times larger than French and ten times German<sup>46</sup> (Metri 2017b). As discussed earlier, taxation and/or exclusive trade with England directly or indirectly imposed on these geographical spaces the need to earn pounds.

**Figure 2: British Royal Naval Bases – 1898**



Source: Adapted from Ferguson (2003, 262).

As pointed out by the historian Niall Ferguson, the British Empire still had a significant amount of soldiers and naval bases scattered around the world in the late nineteenth century (Figure 2). According to his calculations, there were: 99,000 soldiers in Britain; 75 thousand in India; 41,000 in the rest of the Empire; another 100,000 sailors distributed in strategic positions; a native army of 148,000 men in India; 33 naval stations of coal scattered in

44 Dalziel (2006, 72-73) and The Times (1995, 236-237).

45 Ferguson (2003, 256), Parsons (1999, 6), Hodge (2008, 108) and O'Brien (2002, 209).

46 Ferguson (2003, 256), Parsons (1999, 6), Hodge (2008, 108) and O'Brien (2002, 209).

the world; and a set of naval bases spread across the most diverse ocean corridors and most important seas, thus controlling global navigation and allowing the British military to be effectively present in various geographic boards (Ferguson 2003, 261).

## The Debt Cycles of Latin America and the Relationship with the United States

England fostered the independence of the colonies of other countries in Latin America during the 1810s and 1820s, displacing the decadent powers of Portugal and Spain. English bankers acted promptly by lending (in pounds) so as to provide financing for import needs, enabling the process of independence of the new countries and inserting them immediately into the English monetary territory.

In March 1822, an envoy of Simon Bolivar arrived in London responsible for negotiating a £2 million loan to the New Republic of Colombia. In May of the same year, loans in pounds were also granted to Chile, as well as to Peru. The Latin American insertion in the international financial system did not occur without producing a speculative process in the European stock exchanges, mainly in London, with the formation of a bubble from 1824<sup>47</sup>. Its overflow occurred in 1826, subjecting the region to its first debt crisis, once practically all of their countries have become defaulters in English currency<sup>48</sup>. Due to the type of insertion of these national economies in the international system, a chronic tendency of cycles of external indebtedness of the Latin American economies was inaugurated. From independence to World War I, there were four cycles (all in pounds) that resulted in severe economic crises<sup>49</sup>.

The United States, even with its independence in 1776, remained within English monetary territory, no longer as a colony, by the mechanism of taxation and exclusive trade, but because they continued to have a functional

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47 Chancellor (1999, 123-125).

48 "In 1822, government bond issues were floated by Colombia, Chile, Peru, and the fictitious 'Poyais' with a face value of £3.65 million; in 1824, there were new issues by Colombia and Peru, plus Buenos Aires, Brazil and Mexico to the tune of £10.4 million; and in 1825, Peru (yet again) plus Brazil, Mexico, Guadalajara, and Central America issued bonds for a further £7.1 million. (...) As investors soon discovered, these issues were at best risky, at worst (in the case of Poyais) a fraud. When fiscal burdens escalated with the wars of independence and subsequent civil wars, a wave of defaults ensued, with all bond issues in default by 1827" (Paolera and Taylor 2012, 2).

49 Paolera and Taylor (2012, 2).

and privileged relationship with England. “(...) the numbers indicate that it was the United States that occupied throughout the nineteenth century the main position within this group of countries which had the advantage of belonging to a kind of ‘co-prosperity zone’ of England” (Fiori 2004, 71).

US foreign trade remained dependent on British banking houses and their lending in pound. “The capital that financed most of America’s foreign trade (...) originated in London. (...) Foreign exchange meant the pound sterling and almost all bills of exchange to finance foreign trade **were drawn in it**” [emphasis added] (Cummings 2009, 23). In addition, the US was the main recipient of British investments in the nineteenth century<sup>50</sup>. Receipt of such capital implied transactions in pounds, which is why in 1834 the United States actually adhered to the gold-pound standard, although its *de jure* membership only occurred in 1900. The Americans built a bimetal monetary system in which the relation of prices between the two metals (gold and silver) ended up making the operation based on gold (the pound) the most appropriate, working in practice as in the gold-pound standard.

## The Unequal Treaties with China

The Chinese empire had the largest territory and largest population in Asia at that time, including China, Mongolia, Manchuria, Tibet, and Turk-estan, as well as influencing other areas such as the Korean peninsula (Panikkar 1977, 124).

Before the Opium Wars, in order to acquire the coveted goods of the Middle Empire and resell them in Western markets, European traders, restricted to the port of Guangzhou, had to find something for which there was demand in China in order to obtain the local currency, to buy the coveted products.

Europeans had practically nothing to sell in exchange for the immense quantities of silk, tea, and rhubarb tea they bought. The main problem had always been to find something that could meet China’s needs and avoid the gold exports that had until then served to balance the trade balance (Panikkar 1977, 125).

This is because the pound has no validity in the Chinese political-territorial space. Neither was there a foreign exchange market, or financial centers to offset bills of exchange that involved the two currencies. As discussed ear-

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<sup>50</sup> For more details see: Fiori (2004, 70-75).

lier, the principle prevailed that one commodity pulled another<sup>51</sup>.

Initially, the strategy adopted by the English East India Company was based on the cultivation of opium in India and its illegal trade in China. This worked well for a while. "In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, opium became the most important part of European imports in China. In 1818 it accounted for only 17% of British imports into China, in 1833, only 16 years later, it was already half" (Panikkar 1977, 126). England got the local currency receipts that allowed her to buy Chinese goods. In a second moment, due to the Chinese authorities' own reaction against the significant growth of drug trafficking in their territory, the English went to retaliation and the war against China.

In the First Opium War (1840-42), with the Chinese defeat for British forces, it was defined, by the Treaty of Nanking<sup>52</sup> of 1842, that: the Island of Hong Kong became English; there would be the opening of five ports (Guangzhou, Amói, Fuchou, Ningpo and Shanghai)<sup>53</sup>; the end of the Co-Hong monopoly (association of Chinese urban merchants who held the mercantile monopoly of Guangzhou); and the imposition of a series of claims denominated in silver dollars, one of the monetary units used by the Chinese Empire (articles 4 to 7 of the Treaty)<sup>54</sup>. This immediately resolved the problem of obtaining the local currency for the acquisition of coveted Chinese products.

The second Opium War followed the same dynamic, with a new unequal treaty, that of Tientsin (1858), where it was defined, among other things: the opening of eleven new ports; the granting of extraterritoriality to European foreigners; and the free movement of traders on Chinese territory. In the case of the indemnities, these were defined in taels, another Chinese monetary unit<sup>55</sup>, in a single article in the treaty signed with England; and Articles 4 and 5 of the treaty signed with France. With Russia and the United States, there were no indemnity clauses involving monetary counterparts. The ratification of the various treaties took place in the Beijing Convention of 1860. In its third article, indemnities were denominated in taels "even higher than

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51 "To acquire Asian products at a time when there was no international monetary standard and the pound was not accepted in the major markets of Asia [eighteenth century], the English company needed to take from England products to sell in this market" (Guimarães 2010, 50).

52 Available at: <http://www.international.ucla.edu/asia/article/1842>.

53 "Putting aside the annexation of Hong Kong, the main clause of the treaty, which would then structure all of China's relations with the western powers, was the one that opened five ports to trade 'where foreign merchants could install themselves with their families to carry on their business without restraint and with all hope'" (Panikkar 1977, 133).

54 Debin Ma (2012, 3).

55 Debin Ma (2012, 3).

before” (Panikkar 1977, 140). Since then,

China thus opened a new chapter in its long history, a chapter characterized by its submission and dependence on the representatives of the great powers. Under the treaties they interpreted quite broadly, if by force, these powers arrogated rights, privileges, dignities and prerogatives that accumulated over 50 years, eventually formed a particular code of international laws that controlled practically all aspects of Chinese life (Panikkar 1977, 168).

## The Sovereign Debt Securities in Europe and the French Threat to the Pound

By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, in 1815, the British government had issued more than £400 million in bonds, which provided, to some, opportunities of accelerated enrichment. Highlight to the rise of the Baring Brothers and Rothschilds. With the end of the war, they had to seek new opportunities for financial gain. The Barings had to negotiate reparation debts with France, giving them loans in 1817<sup>56</sup>. In their turn, the Rothschilds became the bankers of the Holy Alliance, negotiating financial aid to the central authorities of Prussia (1818), Russia (1822) and Austria (1822), due to the war effort. For the first time in the history of international finance, central authorities have issued sovereign debt securities denominated in foreign currency (or indexed to it, as in the Russian case), that is, in pounds sterling<sup>57</sup>.

First, they introduced the issuance of **sterling-denominated foreign government bonds** to the London market. The bonds issued by the Rothschilds in 1818 and 1822 would become the template for initial public offerings of sovereign bonds for more than a century – a century that would see London flourish as a center for cross-border capital flows on a scale undreamt of in eighteenth-century Holland [emphasis added] (Ferguson 2005, 314).

Because the liquidation of these debt securities was done through the English currency, the issuing states of this type of financial instrument became obliged to obtain it somehow, by submitting themselves to the English monetary territory.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, France attempted to rival England, which was already in an advanced stage of the internationalization

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<sup>56</sup> Landes (2007, 20) and Chancellor (1999, 122).

<sup>57</sup> Ferguson (2005, 319-325) and Chancellor (1999, 122).

of its currency, when, in 1865, Napoleon III proposed the adoption of another universal value standard and a new uniform coinage. He suggested the construction of an alternative international monetary system to the English project, whose currency of account and universal denomination would be the French franc, based on a bimetallic pattern on gold and silver. In order to do so, he sponsored a Conference in 1865, where he proposed the formation of the Latin Monetary Union, whose initial participants were Italy, part of Switzerland (of French influence) and Belgium. The following year, the Latin Monetary Union was, in fact, created and counted on the accession of the Papal States. In 1867, Greece and Bulgaria also joined, but Germany and England expressed their opposition<sup>58</sup>.

This dispute was only defined with the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), in which the Germans had English support and financing to defeat the French military forces. The war reparation debts imposed on France in the Frankfurt Treaty of Peace of 1871 were determined in gold franc, a French currency minted with fixed parity to gold, which allowed the Germans to avail themselves of the indemnities to stabilize the adhesion of the milestone to the standard Pound-gold. "The indemnity paid by France to Germany as a result of the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War was the basis of the mark, the new German currency based on gold [pound]" (Eichengreen 1996, 41). The French issued perpetual debt securities subscribed by the Rothschilds, traded largely outside of France itself. The project of the universalization of the French franc, an explicit initiative against the pound, sunk together with the army of Napoleon III.

### The German Crossroads and the Consecration of the Pound in 1871

The German framework followed different paths. At that time, Britain had already dominated important strategic spaces and zones of accelerated accumulation of wealth at a global level, which included the Indian subcontinent, ports and strategic positions of the Chinese Empire, most of the Latin American countries, which already operated within the standard pound-gold, in addition to the US and Canada, Central America, some parts of Africa and Oceania. Faced with this monetary geography, Germany had to choose between: (i) membership of the English monetary territory in order to access such zones, exporting capital, commercial and financial transactions; or (ii) non-adherence to the gold-pound standard, that is, the isolation of its national economy, which actually represented a veto to the possibilities of German ex-

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<sup>58</sup> Chown (1994, 84-88).

pansion. In this context and according to Bernstein, Germany had to adhere to the pound.

**(...) to meet the growing demand for pounds sterling that would be used to pay for the raw materials imported from the provinces of the British Empire.** Ludwing Bambeerger [summoned by Bismark for the discussions of Peace] (...) made great confession by declaring: *'We choose gold not because gold is gold, but because Britain is Great Britain.'* [emphasis added] (Bernstein 2001, 266).

Germany's entry into the gold-pound pattern after the Franco-Prussian War did not occur without criticism and awareness of its burden on the consequences that would be imposed to Germany. Beilchroder, a German banker, told Bismark that Germany's exclusive (formal) entry into the gold standard would make it dependent on England's gold market, that is, the Bank of England's interest rate manipulation, in other words, policy monetary policy<sup>59</sup>.

On the other hand, the German accession, because of the weight of its economy, already the main European industrial power at the time, dragged with it a large part of the continent's countries, especially those closest to it, with solid commercial, financial and investment relations.

Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the countries of the Latin Monetary Union were the first to adhere to the gold standard. They were all countries close to Germany; all of them had trade relations with the Germans, and the Germany's decision significantly affected each country's economic interest in that group. Other nations followed the same path. (Eichengreen 1996, 43).

As a general result, it can be seen that, at the end of the nineteenth century, the international reserves of most countries were composed of monetary assets, especially the British currency. According to Eichengreen, only the pound corresponded to 43% of the reserves in the year 1899 (Eichengreen 1996, 48). The author also draws attention to the fact that countries "could hold a portion of their reserves in British Treasury securities or bank deposits in London" (Eichengreen 1996, 48). That is, as described earlier, the internationalization of a currency eventually drains resources from other countries

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59 "The chief proponent of the gold standard in Germany was Ludwig Bamberger 'virtual founder of the Reichsbank'. He was opposed by Bleichroder, (amongst others) who: '...knew how to appeal to Bismarck on this highly technical issue. In 1874 he warned him that the early introduction of an exclusive gold standard would make Germany dependent on the British gold market, which the British defended by raising rates' (Stern 1977, 180-1)" (Chown 1994, 90-91).

into its national financial system, creating advantages for its national financial institutions.

## Conclusion

From the sixteenth century onwards, England ceased to be guided by territorial frontier disputes on the continent and began to focus on the preservation of the European balance of power and its projection overseas. From the sixteenth century onwards, England ceased to be guided by territorial frontier struggles on the continent and began to focus on the preservation of the European balance of power and its projection overseas. Its new geostrategy gave priority to positions on the globe to the detriment of territories on the European continent. It allowed England to build a Colonial Empire, whose effect was also to expand the area of circulation of the English currency, once these areas started to have the need to earn it in order to either make viable the payment of taxes to the crown, or to purchase imported products derived from commercial exclusiveness.

Furthermore, through the use of its military power, England was able to compel other independent nations to be formally inserted in its monetary territory, or through agreements of economic nature or the domain of strategic areas.

Thus, the pound sterling became the currency of quotation, liquidation and reserve of value for the entire international economic system, especially after the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. The rise of the pound as an international reference currency was not due to credibility or reputation of its authorities, much less the choice of agents operating in the most diverse international markets. It was, however, a construction of power, associated with the conquest of a colonial empire, commercial monopolies, strategic positions to the accumulation of power and wealth.

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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the historical process of ascent of the pound sterling to the condition of the international monetary standard in the late nineteenth century. It intends to show that England, led by its geostrategy, diplomacy and war, was able to build a colonial empire and negotiate favorable international treaties, at the same time that it constructed a monetary international territory based on its currency.

## KEYWORDS

British Geopolitics; Monetary Territories; Pound Sterling.

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# JOAQUIM NABUCO, A BRAZILIAN LIGHT IN WASHINGTON

Bruno Gonçalves Rosi<sup>1</sup>

During most of the 19th century, Brazil and the United States were predominantly estranged from each other. After its independence in 1822, Brazil dedicated itself to the task of obtaining the diplomatic recognition of other nations. Although the United States was the first country to grant diplomatic recognition to the new South American nation, it was clear at the time that the leaders of the new country valued little the recognition from the nation to the north, in their evaluation merely a republic, and a young and expressionless republic at that. Although Brazil was the first country to formally recognize the Monroe Doctrine, and even to propose a permanent treaty with the US on this basis, the diplomatic recognition of England seemed much more important to the leaders of the new Empire in South America. In addition, the United States had as its priority tasks as the expansion to the west and to avoid the pitfalls of European diplomacy. With this in mind, Brazil certainly did not appear high on the list of US foreign policy priorities.

The picture of relative detachment described above began to change in the second half of the 19th century. Several diplomatic misunderstandings led to the gradual departure between Brazil and England. At the same time, the US emerged from its Civil War as a more united, strong and fast-growing country, more willing to engage diplomatically with the world. Brazilian coffee exports found a strong consumer market in the United States, and gradually the nation to the north gained the space previously occupied by England in the foreign policy of the Empire. But this did not mean an official change in the foreign policy paradigm of the two countries. This change would come after the proclamation of the republic in Brazil.

Although the first decade of the republic in Brazil was quite tumultuous, the new regime achieved some stability with the presidencies of Campos

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<sup>1</sup> PhD in Political Science, Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ), and Assistant Professor at Candido Mendes University.

Sales and Rodrigues Alves. Part of this stability was in foreign policy: in 1902 Rodrigues Alves invited José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior, the Baron of Rio Branco, to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At that time, the Baron was already an extremely popular person in Brazil and deeply experienced in foreign policy. The Baron's contributions to Brazilian foreign policy were many, but the most central was the adoption of a new foreign policy paradigm. Following the trend of the previous decades, the Baron consolidated the centrality of the United States in Brazilian foreign policy in a paradigm called Americanism. Central gesture of the adoption of this new paradigm was the elevation of the diplomatic representation of Brazil in Washington at the embassy level. For the first Brazilian ambassador to the United States, the Baron chose none other than Joaquim Aurélio Barreto Nabuco de Araújo.

Generally Nabuco is best remembered for his struggle against slavery and for his literary career than for his diplomatic performance in Washington. When summoned by the Baron to occupy the new position he already had extensive political experience, mainly in the abolitionist campaign. With the proclamation of the Republic, Nabuco imposed a kind of self-exile, moving away from public life. In this period he founded the Brazilian Academy of Letters and wrote some of the greatest classics of Brazilian historiography. Faced with these feats, his years in Washington may seem of lesser importance, even for being under the command of the Baron. My interpretation is that nothing could be further from the truth.

The objective of this text is to examine the diplomatic work of Joaquim Nabuco as ambassador in Washington, between 1905 and 1910. Although summoned by the Baron to assume the position of ambassador, Nabuco had reached a conclusion very similar to that of the Baron independently: Brazil should privilege the United States in its foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Americanism of Joaquim Nabuco had peculiar characteristics, that distinguished it from the Americanism of the Baron. The Baron's Americanism had predominantly practical characteristics, seeking Brazil's "national interest", as the Baron perceived it. Nabuco saw in the approach with the USA the possibility of building something bigger, that would serve more than the interests of Brazil. In this sense, he had a broader ideological liberalism than the Baron. My interpretation is that this liberalism was already present in Nabuco in his previous political trajectory, and in this way there is cohesion between the abolitionist Nabuco, the historian Nabuco and the Nabuco diplomat. Joaquim Nabuco's diplomatic contribution had the potential to transform what was understood by international relations, something that the Baron's contribution – attached to a cynical realist paradigm – did not have.

With this goal in mind, this text begins with a brief review of Joaquim

Nabuco's biography. Although he is a well-known personage of Brazilian historians, I visit his early years, his political career within the Liberal Party, his abolitionist campaign, his intellectual career, and finally his entrance into diplomacy. As much as possible the text follows a chronological structure, but the objective is to observe the cohesion in the ideas of Nabuco that led him to propose in the approach of Brazil with the United States the construction of a new model of international politics.

## First years and abolitionism

Joaquim Nabuco was born in Recife, Pernambuco, on August 19, 1849 (basic biographical information on Joaquim Nabuco is very well known. One can search simply, for example, at <http://www.academia.org.br/academicos/joaquim-nabuco>). He was the son of Ana Benigna Barreto Nabuco de Araújo and of José Tomás Nabuco de Araújo. Three members of the paternal line, the great-uncle, the grandfather and the father, were lifelong senators of the Empire. Despite starting his career in the Conservative Party, Nabuco de Araújo became one of the most important leaders of the Liberal Party. He became "the statesman of the empire," as his son called him, one of the leading Liberal leaders of the entire Second Kingdom (Nabuco 1897).

Joaquim Nabuco spent the first years of his life away from his parents. A few months after his birth, his father was elected deputy and left with his family to Rio de Janeiro. Nabuco was under the care of his godmother, Ana Rosa Falcão de Carvalho, owner of the sugar mill Massangana. With the death of the godmother, in 1857, he moved to Rio de Janeiro. As with almost all of the Brazilian imperial elite, Nabuco studied at Pedro II College and from there he joined the Law School of São Paulo. He showed little interest in legal studies, but was influenced by Professor Jose Bonifacio, the Young, to adopt progressive liberalism as a political ideology. According to the custom of the time, he transferred in the fourth year of the Law School of Recife, in order to have the experience of the south and the north of the country.

Nabuco was still in his last year of the Law School when he defended a slave named Thomas, accused of murdering his master. In the defense Nabuco stated that the slave had not committed a crime: he had removed an obstacle. The defense was successful enough for Thomas to have the penalty reversed from execution to forced labor. The episode gave great fame to Nabuco, but although he was formally ready to follow his father's footsteps and to enter the parliamentary career, this passage was made difficult due to the rule of the Conservatives in Pernambuco at that time, and it took eight years

before he was elected deputy. But he filled this time well: in Brazil he worked as a journalist in different newsrooms, published some texts and worked as a lawyer with his father. He also made a trip to Europe between 1873 and 1874, when he met some of the greatest intellectuals and politicians on the continent and acquired the passion of a lifetime for London.

Nabuco was able to be named a diplomatic attaché to Washington by Princess Isabel in April 1876. During his 14 months in the United States he spent little time in Washington. Instead he lived in New York and traveled the country most of the time. He felt tempted to pursue a diplomatic career. However, at the beginning of 1878 the Liberals returned to power. Nabuco de Araújo passed away in March, but not without first getting the party leaders the commitment to include the son in the list of candidates. Nabuco was elected last in the list, despite being little known in the province.

Between 1879 and 1881 the Liberals attempted to pass some reforms, and gradually Nabuco became prominent and the theme of abolition gaining strength. In 1880 he helped found the *Sociedade Brasileira contra a Escravidão*, and soon became one of the movement's most prominent leaders. During the parliamentary holidays, between 1880 and 1881, he traveled to Europe to seek support from foreign abolitionist movements, culminating in the encouragement received from the Anti-Slavery Society in London. The firm stance against slavery weighed politically against Nabuco. Without electoral support in Pernambuco and before a new dissolution of the House he did not obtain a new mandate. He then returned to London from 1882 to May 1884, where he was correspondent for the *Jornal do Comércio* and legal adviser. More important, however: in London he wrote *O abolicionismo* (1883).

Despite parliamentary resistance, the abolitionist idea was gaining ground in the following years. Nabuco returned to Brazil in 1884 and was candidate again in Recife. His campaign was highlighted by the appeal to public opinion, mass demonstrations and conferences at the Teatro Santa Isabel, unusual things at the time. Even with typical difficulties of the electoral process of the time, Nabuco managed to be elected. He found, however, a parliament still resistant to abolition. The next years presented difficulties, but in 1888 Nabuco witnessed the proclamation of the Lei Áurea, putting an end to slavery in Brazil.

## Self-exile, career as historian and conversion to monroism

Ironically, abolition accelerated the arrival of the republic in Brazil. With the proclamation of the new regime, Nabuco moved away from the par-

liamentary life. He devoted himself primarily to the offices of writer and historian. A friend of Machado de Assis, he helped found the Brazilian Academy of Letters in 1897, where he made the inaugural speech and of which he was the perpetual secretary general. In this phase of his departure from public life, he won his life with difficulty: he practiced law (in which he did not have much success) and journalism (he collaborated especially with *O Jornal do Brasil* in its monarchist phase and with the *Revista Brasileira*). He also wrote some great books and other works: *Porque continuo a ser monarquista* (1890), a pamphlet in defense of the deposed regime; *Balmaceda* (1895), biography of the Chilean statesman (in reality an exercise of comparative politics between Brazil and Chile in which the monarchist position of the author is perceived); *A intervenção estrangeira durante a revolta da armada* (1896), a work on diplomatic history; *Um estadista do Império* (released in 3 volumes between 1897 and 1899), a biography of his father (in fact, the political history of the country); and finally, *Minha formação* (1900), a memoir that once again tells a good deal of the history of the empire.

Although Nabuco initially refused to join the Republican regime, he gradually drifted away from other more inflexible monarchists. His monarchism became purely intellectual and affective. He ended the mourning for the monarchy in 1899 and accepted the invitation of President Campos Sales to return to his diplomatic career. He became at one time ambassador of Brazil to London, the most prestigious diplomatic post of the time, and envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary on special mission in the matter of Brazil with England, regarding the limits of English Guiana. Nabuco was involved with the question of Guyana until 1904. The defense was delivered to King Vitor Emmanuel III of Italy, arbitrator of the matter, in 1903. The arbitration was issued in June 1904. Despite the defense formulated by Nabuco, Vitor Emanuel III considered insufficient the evidence presented by both Brazil and England. He divided the territory almost in half between the two litigants using only geographical criteria, with some advantage for England. It was neither a complete defeat nor a loss so significant for Brazil, but the result was very shocking to Nabuco. In his own words, “in matters with England (...) a weak country like Brazil can be considered a winner, when it gets half of what it claims” (Pereira 2005, 11), and on Vitor Emmanuel III, “if we were to subject ourselves to Our sovereignty over two-thirds of Brazil, he would say that we have no right” (Nabuco 1949, 169).

Besides the personal aspect of the defeat, Nabuco was alarmed that Vitor Emmanuel III's arbitration was based on the principles defined for the Congo by the Berlin Conference of 1885, and not the primacy of discovery and historical occupation invoked by Brazil. According to the doctrine used,



the only recognized means of acquiring and preserving sovereignty would be the requirement of full present possession and effective occupation of the territory. According to Nabuco himself, respecting this criterion, two thirds of the Brazilian territory of that time, especially the Amazon region, would be in danger (Ricupero 2005, 7).

The defeat in the litigation with England marked the definitive turn of Nabuco towards monroism. In that episode it became clear to him that Brazil had no chance of competing with Europeans and maintaining its territory. It is mainly from there that he came to understand that only the US and the Monroe Doctrine could protect Brazil against European imperialist pretensions. According to him, “such a policy would be worth the greatest of armies, the greatest navies we could ever have” (Ricupero 2005, 9). From this, the Monroe doctrine should be accepted by Brazil “as the outer formula of the independence of our continent, as the law of our international orbit apart from that of the Old World” (Pereira 2005, 11). Brazil was “a world over which the greed of the nations that hunger for land, of the races that need to expand” (Pereira 2005, 11), and the Monroe Doctrine, “a defense against the foreigners bona fide, a forbidden possession” (Pereira 2005, 12). In other words, Nabuco believed Brazil had to choose “between monroism and European colonization” (Ricupero 2005, 6).

It is important to locate historically this interpretation of Nabuco. The world lived then the era of Imperialism. Within this context it is easier to understand the words of Nabuco himself: “My impression is that for all the countries of Europe and America the external problem tends more and more to overcome internal problems and that we are moving towards a time when the fate of all of them without exception has to be affected by the solution that has the conflict of influence and preponderance between the great current systems of forces, such as the Triple and the Dual Alliance, the British Empire, the Monroe Doctrine, etc.” (Letter to Campos Sales, cited in Nabuco 1949, 403).

Against this background, even before becoming ambassador Nabuco already defended that “our diplomacy must be mainly done in Washington” (Ricupero 2005, 5). In sum: the defeat in the Guyana case was a turning point for Nabuco. His motivation was, above all, the security of the Brazilian territory, threatened, in his opinion, by a European legal tendency dangerous for Brazil, exemplified by the erroneous sentence of Vitor Emmanuel III, in the arbitration with Great Britain (Ricupero 2005). In view of this, the only means of securing two-thirds of the Brazilian territory would be for Nabuco the Doctrine of Monroe. In his words: “I do not see any other intuition on which the conservation of our great national whole depends so much” (Costa

1968, 48-49).

Roosevelt's mediation in 1904-1905, which put an end to the Russo-Japanese war, was especially important for Nabuco to confirm his view of the United States (Nabuco 1911). Writing to Roosevelt he said: "I ask Your Excellency to kindly accept the expression of our gratification and common American pride for the noble page you wrote in the history of civilization. The whole world will read this as a preface to a new era of peace (...) In that sense you have created for the American presidency a function that will win the moral hegemony of the world, the only one that can be accepted" (Telegram from Nabuco to Theodore Roosevelt, August 30, 1905, cited in Pereira 2005, 10).

From then on, Nabuco confirmed the hypothesis he had formulated when he failed in the case of Guyana: the US should be the preferential option of Brazil's foreign policy. He was very explicit in this sense: writing to his friend Gastão da Cunha he said "I am a monroist" (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Gastão da Cunha, December 14, 1905, cited in Pereira, 2005, 12) and on another occasion he stated that monroism conferred a "moral alliance" on the continent (Nabuco, 1911, 146-147). He "prided himself that there was nobody in the diplomatic service who surpassed him in his monroism or favoring a closer approach to the American government" (Ricupero, 2005, 2).

## Ambassador in Washington

A few months passed before Nabuco could have the opportunity to put his theory into practice. It was then that the Baron of Rio Branco invited him to take over the new embassy in Washington, in February 1905. The US returned the gesture by elevating the representation in Rio de Janeiro to embassy as well. With this gesture the Baron intended to move the diplomatic axis of Brazil, from London to Washington. Nabuco had no connection with the initiative to create the embassy, which is entirely due to the Baron, and even expressed doubts as to the convenience or opportunity of the gesture (Ricupero 2005, 3). However, the Baron was right to take this initiative, and Nabuco was benefited by it. From the American point of view, the act expressed, through the symbolic language of protocol formalism, that Brazil became for the government of the United States its main partner in South America (Ricupero 2005, 3). Beyond the symbolism, Nabuco would have a protocol advantage that other diplomats did not possess (Ricupero 2005, 3-4). Finally, the Baron intended to use Nabuco to provoke answers from American monroists against attacks on Brazil. One of the most emblematic cases in this

sense was the Panther accident, when the Baron corresponded with Nabuco saying “Try to provoke energetic articles from monroists against this insult” (Costa 1968, 232; Telegram from Baron of Rio Branco to Joaquim Nabuco, in Ricupero 2005, 9).

Upon assuming the position of Brazilian ambassador to the United States, Nabuco began to attend the American intellectual circle. Among other activities, he attended lectures at universities and lectured on various subjects, in which international policy issues and possible evidence of his international political thinking came to the fore. In the transcriptions of these speeches it is possible to identify some peculiarities of his Americanism, as will be seen later in this text.

In 1906 the Americanist policy of the Baron had a significant retribution: the III American International Conference was based in Rio de Janeiro. Nabuco came to Rio de Janeiro to preside over the conference and in his company brought the American Secretary of State Elihu Root. Both defended Pan-Americanism, in the sense of a broad and effective continental approach. Another sign that Baron’s Americanist policy was working is that in 1908 the German minister in Brazil informed his superiors that he suspected that the Baron would withdraw from office and be replaced by Nabuco. Informing his superiors in Berlin the German diplomat said that “given the English formation of mister Nabuco, now impregnated with Americanism, this would in no way represent a gain for Germany” (Corrêa 2009, 129).

Nabuco’s health began to deteriorate shortly after an official trip to Havana to attend the restoration of Cuba’s national government in 1909. He died in Washington on January 17, 1910. His body was conducted with exceptional solemnity, to the cemetery of the American capital, and then was transferred to Brazil, on the North Caroline cruiser. From Rio de Janeiro he was transported to Recife, his hometown.

## The Americanism of Joaquim Nabuco

### America as a separate peace zone

As already mentioned, Nabuco’s first contact with the United States was as an attaché to the Legation in 1876. It was not a good first impression. The US then lived a troubled moment in its domestic politics, and Nabuco then wrought a series of strong criticisms of US policy and politics (Pereira 2005, 9). However, coming to his arrival at the embassy in 1905, he reviewed his ideas about the US as much as he reviewed his ideas about Europe. In

1898 he declared in an interview with the newspaper *Estado de São Paulo* that “we are today one of the many unknowns of a vast problem: the American problem. Europe, Africa, Asia form a single political whole. Faced with this colossal mass, which should be called European, what is the destiny of South America?” (Interview to *O Estado de São Paulo*, 1898, in Nabuco 1929, 403). Specifically, he attempted to find a guideline that would give meaning to his position of rapprochement with the United States, especially the role of the United States in the world, with Roosevelt in charge of foreign policy.

In presenting his credentials in the US, Nabuco already demonstrated an essential feature of his foreign policy thinking: the US as defining the American continent as a zone of peace, in contrast to Europe, a war zone: “All the votes of Brazil are (...) to the increase of the immense moral influence that the United States exert and is translated by the existence in the world for the first time in the history of a vast neutral zone of peace and of free human competition” (Address of presentation of credentials, May 24, 1905, in Ricupero 2005, 6). The same essential characteristic would be emphasized on other occasions. An example: “America, thanks to the Monroe Doctrine, is the Continent of Peace, and this colossal peace-building unit, fundamentally interested in other regions of the Earth – all of the Pacific, to say the least – forms a Neutral Hemisphere and counterbalances the other Hemisphere, that we may very well call the Belligerent Hemisphere” (Nabuco 1911, 146-1470). And yet again: “The beneficent influence of the United States in history is proved by the existence, for the first time, of a large Neutral zone, as is all independent America, inclined to peace, alongside another mass (Europe now formed by control, alliances, etc., a whole with Africa and Asia) inclined to war, real or eminent” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Mr. Hay, June 21, 1905, in Pereira 2005, 13).

As mentioned earlier, Nabuco’s Americanism can be especially deduced from lectures given by him at US universities during his time as ambassador to Washington. An example of what is being said is the lecture entitled “The feeling of nationality in the History of Brazil”, delivered before the Spanish Club of Yale University, May 15, 1908. According to Nabuco, Brazil was able to maintain a large territory thanks to several factors, among them the Monroe Doctrine (Nabuco 1911, 440). According to him, the main characteristic of Brazilian nationality is its idealism, and within this idealism, Americanism, the perception of belonging to a group of countries of the same continent, linked together by something greater than geography (Nabuco 1911, 441). For him, the countries of America have an indissoluble association, the Monroe Doctrine being an example of this (Nabuco 1911, 443).

In another lecture, entitled “The Part of America in Civilization”, given

at the University of Wisconsin on June 20, 1909, Nabuco identifies “keeping the peace” as one of the main contributions of the United States to the History of Civilization. Through the Monroe Doctrine, the US has pressed Europe for peace. In the words of Nabuco, “America, thanks to the Doctrine of Monroe, is the continent of Peace” (Nabuco 1911, 449). Moreover, being a continent of peace, America establishes a balance with “the other hemisphere, which we could call belligerent” (Nabuco 1911, 450). However, Nabuco identifies the cause of wars “on the obstacles to national aggrandizement,” something the United States had not yet experienced (Nabuco 1911, 450). The US thrived unimpeded at the same time when “the progress of civilization” was “to replace War for International Law” (Nabuco 1911, 450). Thus, according to Nabuco, the pacifist sentiment of the United States would be put to the test when they found the first serious obstacle to their national aggrandizement. Only then would the United States go through its profession of faith in favor of Peace (Nabuco 1911, 450). According to Nabuco, the great profession of US faith in favor of peace would be to support Pan Americanism and make it an integral part of the US foreign policy independent of the Monroe Doctrine. Thus, not only would the United States fully identify with peace, but it would also connect the rest of the continent with it, bringing all humanity closer to the time it will deny war. In his words, “for you and for us, the words Peace and Pan-Americanism are convertible” (Nabuco 1911, 450).

Rubens Ricupero agrees that the main characteristic of Joaquim Nabuco’s diplomatic thinking was “the creative elaboration of the concept of a separate system of the Americas, distinct from the European and reserved to be a space of peace and collaboration, in contrast to the aggressive and belligerent essence of the European system at that time” (Ricupero 2005, 6). Similarly, Clodoaldo Bueno interprets Joaquim Nabuco as the Brazilian who most influenced the recognition of America as a distinct continental system with its own international personality (Bueno 2003, 166). In this interpretation Nabuco was accompanied by the Baron: “The truth is that there were only great powers in Europe and today they are the first to recognize that there is in the New World a great and powerful nation to count on (...). The definitions of US foreign policy are made (...) unambiguously, with arrogant frankness, especially when they are aimed at the most powerful governments of Europe, and what happens is that they do not protest or react, but rather welcome the American interventions” (Baron of Rio Branco, dispatch to Washington, 1905, quoted in Pereira 2005, 11). But there was something in Nabuco’s interpretation that surpassed the chancellor’s theory: Americanism not as an option among others, but as the only option of Brazil’s foreign policy: “our rapprochement with the United States is a policy that has (...) the greatest of

all the advantages that any policy can have – that of having no alternatives, that there is nothing that can be given in place of it, nothing that can replace it because the policy of isolation is not an alternative and would not be sufficient for the immense problems that await the future of this country” (Nabuco 1911, 424).

## Connection between Americanism and abolitionism

Another characteristic of the Americanism of Joaquim Nabuco is the connection between this and the cause of the abolition of slavery defended previously. According to João Frank da Costa, “the work of approaching the United States and of the full realization of continentalism had (...) for Nabuco, the same importance that was once the capital issue of abolition” (Quoted in Ricupero 2005, 2). In the words of Nabuco himself: “I consider May 24, 1905 [day when he personally delivered to Roosevelt his ambassadorial credentials] as great for our external order as May 13, 1888 [day of the signing of the Lei Áurea] was for our internal order” (Quoted in Costa 1968, 76). And more: “Fate wanted this rest of life (...) to be employed in a cause, a service, which (...) filled the empty space that that great idea had left in my soul. I am referring to the rapprochement between the two great Northern and Southern Republics” (Nabuco in *Gazeta de Notícias*, July 24, 1906, quoted in Ricupero 2005, 2). In other words, Nabuco’s performance in Washington was not disconnected from his thought or from his earlier role as an abolitionist. His role as ambassador was imbued with the same humanitarian liberalism, still inherited from the abolitionist struggle and its unfolding on social issues (Pereira 2005, 9).

## Belief in progress

Another characteristic of Nabuco’s international thinking is the belief in progress. He believed that the international system was undergoing a change: the center of power was moving from Europe to America, or more precisely to the United States. The Baron saw the international system more statically: Europe is still a threat, as were the South American neighbors. The US and the Roosevelt Corollary were a compensation for these and other possible threats. In looking at the international system, the Baron did not see a scenario so different from that faced by Brazilian diplomats of the 19th century. Looking at the international system, Nabuco saw a real revolution going on, and regret that his colleague did not accompany him with the correspond-

ing policies (Pereira 2005, 15).

## The US as an example for Brazil

Nabuco did not see the US only as a preferential foreign policy option. For him the US was also an example, not only for Brazil, but for all of Latin America: in contact with the United States, it would impregnate itself, to a different extent, of the American “optimism, intrepidity and energy” (Nabuco 1911, 143). Nabuco hoped for the construction of a new Brazilian national identity referred to in American civilization (Pereira 2005, 13). The United States thus appeared also as a friend or model to be followed, representing the anti-imperialist alternative (Cardim and Almino 2002, 424).

In the lecture “The Approach of the Two Americas”, delivered at the University of Chicago on August 28, 1908, Nabuco presents his Americanism even more explicitly. He uses a verb, “to Americanize” and defines it as infiltration of US optimism, self-confidence, and energy in other countries of the continent (Nabuco 1911, 464). According to Nabuco, the countries of Latin America would have much to gain from the example of the United States. The US in turn would win the friendship of Latin Americans. From this, Nabuco imagines an America united in the same moral, the same political system and the same destiny (Nabuco 1911, 467). According to him, in part this dream was already being realized by the Pan American conferences. But alongside these, it was necessary to create “a pan-American public opinion” (Nabuco 1911, 468). He cites examples of the existence of a “world public opinion”, capable of leveling societies to international standards. And if a world public opinion, distant and dispersed, had this power, much more would be able to do “a united American opinion” (Nabuco 1911, 469).

In the same lecture Nabuco also focuses on what can be described as a positive aspect of the Monroe Doctrine: instead of presenting it only negatively as a defense of US interests against Europe, he presents it as “an American instinct”, “an intuition that this new world was born with a unified destiny” (Nabuco 1911, 466). According to Nabuco, the two Americas, the Anglo-Saxon and the Luso-Hispanic, kept apart from each other for too long. On the part of Latin America, the reason for this isolation was the fear of having closer contact with the United States, “in view of the great difference between the power of this country and that of all other American republics” (Nabuco 1911, 463). “For its part, the United States, being a world in itself, and a world that grows more and more rapidly, opposed to any movement in this sense the strongest of resistances – that of indifference” (Nabuco 1911, 463-464). According to

Nabuco, Brazil, for its part, was a special case: it always had a disposition favorable to the approach with the USA. According to him, Brazil never had reason to deviate from the spirit of this proposal, nor has it ever experienced any disappointment on the part of the United States. Thus, “it could not happen to Brazil that other countries had reasons, not to adopt the route followed by us since independence” (Nabuco 1911, 464), especially because he believed that the United States, with its high civilization, could not hurt any nation (Nabuco 1911, 464). In conclusion, Nabuco expresses his desire to see an America that tolerates diversity, and also to “see all the states of the two Americas know each other, love each other and communion as members of a single family among the nations” (Nabuco 1911, 470).

## Nabuco and the Brazilian Liberal Party

Nabuco was not isolated in his opinions: he was a representative of a group of Brazilians who believed that the United States was the great Brazilian partner of the moment, a group that included (with more or less optimism) individuals like Machado de Assis, Euclides da Cunha, Oliveira Lima, Domício da Gama, Silvio Romero, José Veríssimo, Salvador de Mendonça, Graça Aranha and Rui Barbosa (Pereira 2005, 1-2). But it was not just that. These individuals, and mainly Nabuco, only culminated a tendency that came from the monarchy. Since before its independence, Brazil had individuals who saw the USA at the same time as an example and as an ideal international partner. Nabuco himself mentions Aureliano Candido Tavares Bastos, an important Brazilian deputy in the 1860s, as one of his “precursors, preparers of the way, sowers of ideas” (Nabuco 1897, Book 3, 238).

The most Americanist tendency of Brazilian politics in general was confused with the Liberal Party (Vianna 1991), of which Nabuco was a member, following in his father’s footsteps. This party had a reformist character, and defended a federative monarchy, more decentralized than the Conservative Party considered ideal. However, when the republic was proclaimed, Nabuco was critical of the new regime (Nabuco 1999). He was a reformer, but he was also a monarchist: he oscillated between reformism and conservatism, freedom and order, nation and citizenship (Salles 2002, 27-28). Eventually Nabuco made peace with the new regime, but at first he feared that it was precisely to deprive the country of the liberties achieved in the last years of monarchy.

The members of the Liberal Party were nicknamed “luzias” by their Conservative opponents in allusion to Santa Luzia, a city in the state of Minas



Gerais. There, in 1842 the Liberals organized a resistance movement to the Conservatives, who had seized power in the country. The Liberals were defeated by military forces sent by the Conservatives, and ended with this nickname. Ironically, Luzia comes from the verb *luzir*, to produce light. Nabuco hoped that the US would be a light for the American continent, and that the American continent would be a light for the world on international relations.

## Moments of skepticism

Despite all optimism, Joaquim Nabuco's Americanism was not idealistic, utopian, or naive. Vices of American society and foreign policy were not hidden from him. Regarding foreign policy, João Frank da Costa observes that "Nabuco does not approve the American policy of intervening in Central America [but did not think that such a fact would] prevent (...) the strengthening of relations between Brazil and the United States". In a letter to the Baron, Nabuco himself said: "Note that I do not follow Mr. Roosevelt's ideas of American occupation (...) of South American countries. My monroism is broader and does not bind me to such expedients as he imagines to 'justify' (...) the doctrine of Monroe (sic) before Europe" (Costa 1968, 203).

As for American society, Nabuco wrote critically in his diary on August 6, 1909: "The greatest of the national games here is to pile dollars (for men) and spend them (for women). Dollar-heaping and dollar-squandering, I can call them. After that, hit the blacks. Just yesterday a white minister escaped being attacked by the mob for having squeezed the hand of a black colleague. A senator, who slapped a servant of color, told the judge: "I did not strike a man, but a negro (sic)". They designate a woman of color in a document of justice: "A female of the genus *africanus* (sic)" (Diaries, volume 2, 460, quoted in Ricupero 2005, 10). Nabuco was so shocked that he even came to the conclusion that the US would eventually exile all the country's blacks (Ricupero 2005, 12).

However, as Rubens Ricupero observes, lucidity and moral condemnation in such commentaries coexisted with deep realism. This can be seen in Nabuco's comments about the anti-American reaction aroused by the Hague Conference: "Defeating the United States is a foolish glory for any nation. God, let there be prudence in our press, clairvoyance among our public men. There is a lot that irritates, spoils and annoys us on the part of the United States, but we must understand that our only foreign policy is to win their friendship. There is no country to which it is more dangerous to give pinpricks, even those of the press" (Diaries, volume 2, 409, annotation of September 4, 1907,

quoted in Ricupero 2005, 12-13). Still about The Hague, and the anti-American sentiment awakened there, Nabuco wrote in his diary: "One does not get big for jumping. The only way to look big is by being it. Japan did not need to ask that they recognize it as a great power, since it proved to be so" (Diaries, annotation on August 25, 1907, quoted in Ricupero 2005, 8). This note also serves to demonstrate that Nabuco's foreign policy program was feasible because it coincided with the interest and the notorious position of the United States. It was not aimed at utopian (or unrealistic) goals, like to obtain for Brazil in the world the recognition of power status above its real possibilities. It was a strictly defensive and moderate program (Ricupero 2005, 7-8).

## Criticism from Oliveira Lima and differences with the Baron

While the Baron and Nabuco worked for the rapprochement between Brazil and the United States, making a positive reading of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, opposition began to emerge. Oliveira Lima is an important example of this counterpoint for the Baron and especially for Joaquim Nabuco (Lima 1907, 11). Putting in general lines, Oliveira Lima saw the US and especially Theodore Roosevelt with suspicion. He believed that instead of alignment with the US, Brazil should seek closer ties with Latin American countries, precisely to counterbalance US influence on the continent (Lima 1907, 10). Oliveira Lima openly criticized Joaquim Nabuco for interpreting US foreign policy in another way, taking Brazil closer to the US, a position that contrasted with the "Spanish republics of South America" (nominally Chile and Argentina), which adopted more cautious positions in relation to the Americans (Lima 1907, 41-42). According to Oliveira Lima, Nabuco in Washington had become "too American, as in London he was too British, in Italy too Roman and in France he would be too French" (Lima 1937, 212).

Another opponent of Nabuco was the Baron himself. Nabuco did not see his role in the embassy as Rio Branco's project. In his words, he saw himself "called to create this role" (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Graça Aranha, February 2, 1905, in Nabuco 1949, volume 2, 207). In the words of Luis Viana Filho, the ambassador intended to "play his own game" (Viana Filho 1952, 299). In 1906, when Rio Branco was invited by the new president Afonso Pena to continue as minister, Nabuco wrote congratulating him, but also seeking to guarantee this autonomy: "I see you will be the minister. For the country I esteem, for you are a force at its service (...) for me in the part that is direct to me, I congratulate myself, for you will not distrust me and you will give me freedom of action, without which I can do nothing for the American friendship" (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Rio Branco, December 10, 1906,

quoted in Pereira 2005, 7).

Nabuco was indeed concerned with the autonomy he received from the Baron. Writing to his friend Graça Aranha, he said, “Rio Branco, this one, does not write to me or tell me anything, so that I cannot conjecture anything about his plans and thinking” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Graça Aranha, June 21, 1905, in Nabuco 1949, volume 2, 219, also quoted in Pereira 2005, 8). To be sure, all the time he was at the embassy, Nabuco complained about the Baron’s lack of correspondence (Letters from Joaquim Nabuco to Graça Aranha from June 21, 1905, February 2, 1906 and November 12, 1908 and letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Cardoso de Oliveira from October 22, 1909, all cited in Pereira 2005, 8), even wishing for a retirement because of that (Confidential letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Hilário de Gouvêa, from the Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D.C., on January, 19, 1909, in Nabuco 1949, 329-330). Paradoxically, this lack of instructions only reinforced the autonomous character that Nabuco understood that his mission should have, and accentuated the differences between the ambassador and the chancellor. In addition, Nabuco’s “advertising” profile eventually transformed his individual initiatives into official politics. He gave a more drastic tone to the ideas of Rio Branco regarding the relationship with the United States, encouraging what he called an “almost alliance” or, at least, seeking the international system to perceive the relationship of the two countries as such (Pereira 2005, 8).

A difference between the ambassador and the minister can be observed in a letter from Nabuco to President Rodrigues Alves. In this he affirmed that it would be essential to achieve a strong and *exclusive* [my emphasis] proximity to the United States, in order to guarantee security and stability for Brazil (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Rodrigues Alves, July 16, 1908, cited in Pereira 2005, 13). This exclusivity would be favored by historical factors, since Brazil had demonstrated on several occasions an identification with the ideal of American solidarity (Nabuco 1911, 133). According to him, “the rapprochement between the two countries [is] our *only possible* foreign policy. It is worth more to me than any Dreadnought we can build (...) Without it, our isolation would be worthless” (Reserved letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Ilanir da Silveira, October 31, 1908 – emphasis in the original –, quoted in Pereira 2005, 14). In the same vein, writing to his friend Hilário de Gouvêa, Nabuco pointed out the differences with the Baron: “he trusts in Germany, France, England, Chile, Argentina, I do not know who else, and I only trust the United States” (Confidential letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Hilário de Gouvêa, from the Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D.C., on January, 19, 1909, in Nabuco 1949, 329-330).

This difference in the Americanisms of the Baron and Nabuco (priority in one case, exclusivity in the other) was present mainly when the Baron

leaned toward a pact with Argentina and Chile, the Pact of ABC, a project to be pursued in parallel with the approach with the USA. According to the Baron, there was no reason “for the three main nations of South America – Brazil, Chile and Argentina – [to bother] with the language of President Roosevelt (...) no one can say with justice that they are in the number of unruly or turbulent nations that do not know how to make good use of their independence” (Baron of Rio Branco to Gomes Ferreira, reserved dispatch for Washington, January 31, 1905, quoted in Pereira 2005, 5). That is: the Baron understood that Argentina, Chile and Brazil formed a special group in South America, with a differentiated relationship with the United States. Nabuco did not necessarily disagree with this, but vehemently opposed the alliance proposed by the chancellor. Unlike the Baron, he did not trust the South American countries, and wanted exclusivity with the US: “Our friend [the Baron] came to think of replacing the North American axis of our foreign policy with the Argentine-Chilean axis, and I had to ask to the President and to him to dismiss me from this position in such a case, to frustrate at the outset this unhappy policy of ABC” (Confidential letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Hilário de Gouvêa, from the Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D.C., on January, 19, 1909, in Nabuco 1949, 329-330).

Another difference between Nabuco and Rio Branco was the duration of Americanism: while the Baron gave signs of adopting Americanism in a contingent and temporary manner, the ambassador in Washington indicated a much longer project. The entente between the two countries (as Nabuco called it) could only be created “here and there, being prepared long in advance by efforts like mine” (Reserved letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Ilanir da Silveira, October 31, 1908, quoted in Pereira 2005, 14). Nabuco feared that in time monroism might lose its strength, and “in that day poor us, if our friendship is not well cemented” (Confidential Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Barbosa Lima, July 7, 1907, quoted in Pereira, 2005, 14, also available in Nabuco 1949, 277). It was necessary to seize it while American foreign policy was conducted by Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root, individuals who were in favor of coming closer to Brazil (Confidential letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Hilário de Gouvêa, from the Brazilian Embassy, Washington, D.C., on January, 19, 1909, in Nabuco 1949, 329-330). Specifically, Nabuco feared that the Baron would be pleased with a much more modest approach to the United States. In this sense, the ambassador complained to his friend and confidant Graça Aranha that the Baron showed “to ignore the march of the world and not to have the instinct of our own conservation” (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Graça Aranha, September 28, 1908, in Nabuco 1949, 315).

Although Nabuco’s Americanism was not exactly the same as Baron’s,

they both agreed on criticisms of certain aspects of Roosevelt's foreign policy. Addressing Rio Branco, in a letter already quoted here, Nabuco said: "Note that I do not follow Mr. Roosevelt's ideas about the American occupation, or otherwise, of customs, etc., of South American countries. My monroism is broader and does not bind me to those expedients" (Letter from Joaquim Nabuco to Rio Branco, December 19, 1905, quoted in Pereira 2005, 15, also available in Nabuco 1949, volume 2, 238). In short, if there were differences of opinion between the two, there were also important similarities with respect to international relations. According to Rubens Ricupero "The ambassador in Washington in particular has always been [more] capable of theorizing and conceptualizing than the chancellor" (Ricupero 2005, 5). Citing the same author, "Nabuco's personality was certainly more attracted to general ideas, more strongly imbued with poetry and religious sentiment than that of the Baron and his generous and romantic nature overflowed with eventual excesses of emphasis or confidence" (Ricupero 2005, 12). Be that as it may, the "excesses" of Nabuco's Americanism were largely contained by Rio Branco (Pereira 2005, 17), and despite occasional differences, the two were in tune in fundamental points and even used the same words to express this convergence (Ricupero 2005, 13).

## Conclusion

After a successful life as abolitionist and intellectual, Joaquim Nabuco was summoned by the Baron of Rio Branco to be the first ambassador of Brazil in Washington. Following independent paths, the two reached a similar conclusion: European imperialism was a threat to Brazil, and the best defense was friendship with the United States. But the ambassador was not merely a follower of the chancellor's orders: Nabuco had his own convictions about how Brazil's Americanist policy should be implemented. And that is where differences between Nabuco and the Baron can be observed: they could agree on something essential, but they disagreed on points that were not accidental.

In addition to seeing US as a protection against European imperialism, Nabuco believed that by supporting US leadership on the continent, Brazil could help transform America into a zone of peace, in contrast to the internal belligerence of Europe. In other words, Nabuco believed in the possibility of creating an entirely new type of international relations. This perspective was not divorced from his past as an abolitionist, intellectual and a member of the Liberal Party. Nabuco believed in great ideas, and especially believed in progress: by carrying ideals to reality it would be possible to build a future different from the past. In this sense he saw the USA as a light, a beacon guiding

the continent. Brazil should not only seek diplomatic rapprochement with the United States, but also follow its example in internal transformations.

The Baron gave signs of adopting Americanism for a shorter period of time, more circumstantially. Nabuco gave signs of seeking a long-term project, wanting to change circumstances. Although the Baron and Nabuco were not diametrically opposed, their differences should not be ignored. They were engaged in a debate of political thought: the Baron was a conservative, skeptical of substantial changes. Nabuco was a liberal, seeking to transform reality through his ideals.

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## ABSTRACT

Throughout the 19th century, Brazil and the United States had little intense bilateral relations. This picture changed when the Baron of Rio Branco decided that his country should privilege relations with the United States. As part of his plan the Baron named Joaquim Nabuco as Brazil's first ambassador to Washington. However, Nabuco had an Americanism distinct from that of the Baron. He believed in the possibility of transforming the American continent into a zone of peace. This Americanism was linked to Nabuco's liberal world view, already evident in his struggle against slavery and in his pre-diplomatic intellectual trajectory.

## KEYWORDS

Joaquim Nabuco; Brazil-United States Relations; Brazilian Political Thought.

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The Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) was the first Centre in Southern Brazil to focus its study and research, exclusively, on international relations. It was established in 1999 at the Latin American Advanced Studies Institute (ILEA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), and, since 2014, it is part of the Faculty of Economics of the same institution in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

Its objective has always been the critical and innovative study of the international system's transformations after the end of the Cold War. In parallel, NERINT has also sought to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options for the autonomous international insertion of the country, from the perspective of the developing world. Brazil's choice for an "active, affirmative and propositive" foreign policy in the beginning of the 21st century converged with the analyses and projections put forward by NERINT through its numerous seminars and publications.

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