DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY 
IN BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY: 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS OF LULA´S AND 
DILMA´S GOVERNMENTS (2003-2016)

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Introduction

The following paper analyzes one of the bases of Brazilian foreign policy by referring to the search for national development in its external action, conditioning to it several subareas such as international security. This Brazilian position is going to be supported by a theoretical basis centered in the Human Security doctrine, proposing to redirect the security focus – from the State to the human being – and, therefore, from threats and strategies of security. The first is enlarged in order to include, within the classic threats (war, terrorism), social economic threats, such as hunger or insalubrity; The second is summarized in two fronts, the protection of the individual against direct threats and the empowerment (prevention against the emergence of threats). The link between general strategies of development and the security

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planning is presented in the latter: measures such as the generation of emp-
employments or the hunger combat show up as a link between development and
security, useful to the discourse and action of Brazil. Such considerations will
be more closely analyzed regarding policies of the governments of Lula da

Hence, it is necessary to verify the way how the country foreign policy
is structured, aiming to understand the basis on which the Brazilian securi-
ty vision stands. Consequently, the research problem focused on identifying
which are the theoretical connections between foreign policy as a tool for na-
tional development and international security planning in the Brazilian case.
The hypothesis of the work, acknowledges that Brazilian foreign policy, taking
national development as its ultimate goal, restricts connected areas of foreign
relations to the same means, as the international security discourse promoted
and defended externally. The theoretical link between social economic devel-
opment and Human Security offers good possibilities of a wider international
insertion to Brazil, in the sense that it enables the coherence of discourse
and planning between the economic and international security spheres. The
relevance of the theme resides in the contemporaneous character of the pro-
posal, contributing to the construction of the guideline of Brazilian acting in
the international scenario (the holistic position regarding international secu-
rity). Methodologically, the paper was structured on a qualitative approach,
using the hypothetical-deductive method in primary and secondary sources,
examining the hypothesis regarding the relation between development and
security in Brazilian foreign policy.

Initial theoretical considerations

Foreign policy is formulated by the government – in general, the ex-
ecutive power – and executed by the state’s diplomacy, that is, the human and
bureaucratic bodies that concretizes the actions determined by the decision
makers. The imminently state character of a foreign policy is inferred – al-
though counting on some influence of civil society, it is a public policy pre-
ponderantly formulated by the State. It is assumed that the international sys-
tem comprehends a group of political entities, the States, whose presence is
highlighted as an influencer of other actors’ decisions (Aron 2008). Soon, the
great States are the responsible for shaping the system in the direction of an
oligopolistic structure of power, where anarchy reigns. To smaller States, the
task of system adjusting imposed by the great powers is entitled. Therefore, a
huge part of the objective of a foreign policy is centered in accomplishing a fa-
vorable international insertion to the country. In Aron’s vision, this insertion
would come from the quantity of power of a State: if it is big, the State can shape the system; if it is small, it is subjected to a system dictated by the great powers.

According to Spektor (2014), country objectives can be summed up in the purpose of maintaining autonomy: only through it could a State guarantee an international insertion advantageous and coherent with its interests. For the author, this is the objective that explains the external actions of Brazil at least since the 1950s, when the country adopted the “autonomist project” of international politics. Lafer (1987), in his turn, seeks to outline a strategy of insertion proper to countries with less power. For him, such states would be in constant negotiating process, seeking to insert their guidelines or to promote reforms in the structure of the system that will benefit their positioning. Also in relation to the international milieu, Lafer outlines the international insertion of a country as dependent on its performance in three fields – strategic-military, economic relations and values – and in different diplomatic contexts – that of the great powers, regional and contiguous (neighbors).

Given this theoretical scope, it is understood that Putnam (2010) corroborates with our understanding. For him, every state would have, roughly speaking, two spheres of action: the external one, denominated “Level 1”; and the internal, “Level 2”3. Concerned to understand the ways in which this interlocking of influences occurs, Putnam argues that any agreement or decision taken at Level 1 must be approved at Level 2 through parliamentary deliberation. The chances of a state action taken at Level 1 being ratified internally depend on the size of the Win-Sets, that is, on the set of international agreements or decisions that would be internally approved. If the state action is outside the Win-Set, the State runs the risk of “involuntary defection”, as a result of internal disapproval.

Putnam does not openly discuss foreign policy or international insertion strategies. However, his theory allows deriving interesting elements for the present research. In order not to run the risk of involuntary defection, a state must be guided externally so to respond to the pressures and interests of internal actors. This means guiding foreign policy and the diplomatic corps in pursuit of external objectives consistent with the general national interest. In other words, the Two-Level Game recommends that a state seek to align internal and external interests to ensure consistency. In this interpretation, the coherence of internal and external interests would be Putnam’s strategy of insertion.

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3 According to Putnam, it matters little to identify which level weights more, because there would be an influence balance between external and internal.
As Altemani (2005, 3-6) recognizes, in an anarchic international system, all states are free, each in their own way, to seek the external projection of their interests. The author considers the state’s duty to align internal and external interests, and it is the task of foreign policy to design an action plan that meets this imperative. Based on these considerations, what would, in the Brazilian case, be the element that makes it possible to align the internal national objective with the national external objective? As a premise to be verified, we begin by the idea that the search for national development is, precisely, the element that brings the coherence of levels to Brazil. However, before analyzing the way in which development is pursued by foreign policy, it is necessary to approach another concept in relation to it.

Several authors emphasize features peculiar to Brazilian foreign policy. Soares de Lima (2005), for example, identifies that the formation of Brazilian foreign policy is unique in Latin America because of its precocious formation. This is mainly due to the option of Imperial Brazil to use diplomacy – instead of the Armed Forces – in the delimitation of its national borders. The success of this endeavor marked in the Brazilian diplomatic service, from the beginning, the idea of an autonomous sector of the government, immune to the party cleavages characteristic of the political game and, therefore, marked by the continuity in general.

In this sense, Cheibub (1984) argues that the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) is endowed with a high degree of institutionalization, coming from four characteristics: adaptability, complexity, autonomy and cohesion. The result of this institutionalization would be similar to the one that was diagnosed by Soares de Lima: the characteristic continuity of foreign policy. Reinforcing this consensus, Altemani and Lessa (2006) start from the assumption that foreign policy enjoys continuity due to the relative nonpartisanism, which in turn is a consequence of the institutional insularity of an election ministry that is not attractive from the electoral point of view. Cervo (2008, 11) also points out that, in general, there is a mutual relation of influence between diplomacy, government and civil society. In the Brazilian case, however, the MRE historically chose to keep public opinion out of the formulation of national foreign policy, which, as a consequence, would lead to less pressure from it.

Spektor (2014, 19) adds that the continuity of Brazilian foreign policy is also due to the positive history attributed to the national diplomatic service. Such a history would be the result of the diplomacy’s effort to defend the country’s autonomy, which eventually raised allies and supporters “in the private sector and in the state apparatus, in left and right political parties, in conservative and reformist forces”, granting the MRE a kind of “armor”
against governmental changes.

This continuity is important to understand Soares de Lima’s observation (2005a), according to which the basic guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy remained practically unharmed throughout the twentieth century. Also, according to Miyamoto (2010, 9), the history of Brazil’s foreign policy is not characterized by abrupt changes in its trajectory, but rather by conjunctural changes that, nevertheless, tended to maintain the essence of the external insertion of the country.

Aiming to consolidate theoretically such characteristic, Cervo (2008, 26-29) argues that this continuity provided the Itamaraty with an accumulation of guidelines, objectives, orientations and characteristics related to the foreign policy formulation process, the “historical accumulation of Brazilian foreign policy”. This accumulation holds the theoretical bases on which the formulation of foreign policy is based⁴. Insofar as it is based on the conditions of institutional insularity of the MRE or the departure of Brazilian diplomacy from public opinion, the adoption of historical accumulation as a theoretical reference could weaken an international insertion based on Putnam’s model (2010). A foreign policy away from internal divisions would not at first have reason to worry about the coherence of levels, since Level II would not have significant weight to generate the threat of involuntary defection of state actions abroad.

Although this may have been the case for much of the twentieth century, the current situation can no longer be described in these terms. According to Castro Neves (2006, 369-370), another factor responsible for the continuity of Brazilian foreign policy would be the “tacit consensus” among actors involved with it. This consensus, during the Empire and the Old Republic, would have revolved around the need for territorial demarcation; from 1946 to 1980, resided in the strategy of “import substitution”. From the 1990s, however, factors such as globalization and the acceleration of information technology, 
redemocratization, economic openness, the multilateralization of Brazilian foreign relations or the promotion of South American integration would have put an end to this consensus, generating a greater interest of the internal public opinion on the directions taken by Brazilian diplomacy.

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⁴ In a schematization effort, Cervo divides these bases into eight historically accumulated features of Brazilian external performance, namely: first, the defense of the principles of peaceful coexistence such as nonintervention, the self-determination of peoples or the peaceful resolution of conflicts; second, jurisdiction, that is, full respect for international legal norms and the defense of their observance; third, normative multilateralism; fourth, cooperative and non-confrontational external action; fifth, establishment of strategic partnerships; sixth, realistic and pragmatic performance; seventh, official cordiality in dealing with the neighbor; and finally, eighth, the search for development as a vector.
The heterodox development in Brazilian foreign policy

Adopting the notion of historical accumulation, the article assumes that, without detracting from the other seven characteristics listed by Cervo (2008), development as an objective occupies a central place in the formulation of foreign policy. This is easily verifiable in the literature. Although it cannot be considered the first major objective of Brazil’s foreign policy as an independent country, Lafer (2009, 46) points out that after the Brazilian diplomatic service established the borders, decision-makers began to guide foreign policy through national development.

The Baron of Rio Branco already had this idea in 1909, when he argued that the peace and stability conquered by the borders were necessary to guarantee “national progress” (Lafer 2009, 54). But it was with the rise of the developmentalist state of Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s that development was emphatically affirmed as a major national objective, both internally and externally.

Following the same line of thought, Hugueney Filho (2005, 71) considers that after the Second World War, the Third World adopted a reforming model of development that required a coherence between the internal and external dimensions. This coherence took place between the adoption of a national internal development strategy and the orientation towards a foreign policy that had a dual function: to support internal development efforts and to combat the anti-development bias generated internationally by the developed countries.

For Altemani (2005, 1), it is mainly from the 1960s that foreign policy was properly tied to the national development project. As examples, the Independent Foreign Policy (PEI), in force during the governments of Jânio Quadros (1961) and João Goulart (1961-1964) had as goals the diversification of Brazilian commercial partnerships and the opening of new external markets, always in the name of development (Dantas 1962); with the exception of Castelo Branco (1964-1967), all military governments (1964-1985) sought to preserve the main characteristics of foreign policies of previous governments, such as nationalism and development as an external objective (Cervo, 331).

The governments of Sarney (1985-1990) and Itamar Franco (1992-1995) did not undo much of this trend. In the name of development, José Sarney’s foreign policy was tied to macroeconomic stabilization efforts to contain the inflationary and commercial crisis that plagued the country in the 1980s, through the search for “multilateral and bilateral partnerships that would lead to mechanisms for insertion and cooperation capable of giving way to the exhaustion of the import substitution model, to the loss of competitiveness.
and to the risks of marginalization of the country” (Albuquerque 2000, 367).

In his inaugural speech, Collor announced that his foreign policy “[...] must incorporate the best Brazilian diplomatic vocations. The contribution to peace and justice will be permanent. The struggle for development will guide the external action of the Republic at all times” (Collor de Mello 1990, 22). The difference with the predecessors, according to Cervo (2008, 22), are the means by which this development was sought. Instead of protectionism, diversification of partners, or state promotion of industrial vigor, Brazil’s adherence to the neoliberal wave of the 1990s included trade liberalization, focus on large traditional markets, and privatization as the means to boost the country’s economy and, as a consequence, the well-being of the population. In fact, the presidential mandate of Itamar Franco (1992-1995), unable to re-take the developmentalist practice of import substitution, sought to imprint the distrustful stance with which Brazil in the developmental years considered external development projects (Cannani 2003).

Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) also listed development as one of the central objectives of the Brazilian international action. Explaining the project of autonomy for the integration of the president, Luiz Felipe Lampreia affirms that “it seems correct to say that, in the case of Brazil, the main objective is to obtain external exchange elements useful for achieving the priority development goal in the broader meaning of the concept”. That is, only by seeking full integration into the world economic system could Brazil engender a process of sustained growth and development (Lampreia 1998, 8).

The persistence with which development emerged as the central objective of the foreign policy of the various Brazilian governments of the twentieth century is a strong indication of its centrality. It is essential, therefore, to understand the current concept of development. The complexity in defining this concept derives, in part, from the fact that it has changed much during the twentieth century. Regarding Brazil, for example, Arbix and Zilbovicius (2001) report that:

In a country of needs like ours, development has already been totem and taboo. With deep roots in the past, but embedded in the territories of the future, this concept throughout the twentieth century was an inexhaustible source of creation, protection and destruction of new images of the world, especially in backward countries. Under the rule of the state, it was insinuated beyond good and evil. Moments have erupted in pregnant feelings, involving rulers and ruled with the reasons of the economy. In others, however, he could barely disguise a cynical vacuum, which brought his elasticity of concept closer to that of a powerhouse of illusions (Arbix and Zilbovicius 2001, 55).
According to Sachs (2008, 30), reflections on development emerge in the 1940s in the form of efforts to promote the economic and social reconstruction of war-torn European countries. It is during this period that the discussion about development gains international force from the theses defended by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), such as the deterioration of the terms of trade, the center-periphery system, or the very notion of “underdevelopment”. The overcoming of this condition of delay was identified with a dual strategy of State action: internally, import substitution and weakening of the primary export model; externally, reform of the international economic system, with changes in trade rules and better distribution of resources. The success of this strategy was relative: at the domestic level, it succeeded in industrializing some economies like the Brazilian one, without, however, providing great progress in the social area; on the external plane, reform was barred by opposition from developed countries (Hugueney Filho 2005, 66-67). It was thus a notion of development more identified with industrial growth and the challenge of international structures; the social dimension was relegated to a second plane.

The 1970s were an important moment of transformation in relation to the concept of development. At the Stockholm Conference in 1972, the “ecodevelopment” aspect emerged, according to which not only economic growth and social concern should have a development strategy but also a responsibility for environmental preservation. Thus, in the 1990s a new understanding was consolidated, with the emergence of the so-called “human development”. This more heterodox view, however, was not able to achieve

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5 In 1991, with the launching of the Bruntland Report, the abandonment of the ecodevelopment denomination and the adoption of the term “sustainable development” (ROMEIRO, 2012).

6 This process occurs concurrently with that of Latin America. The oil shocks of the 1970s, the debt crisis and the inflationary wave of the 1980s produced enormous adversities on the lives of the peoples of that region, and the process of redemocratization was the moment when civil society began to put more pressure on governments. Both ECLAC thinkers and international economists are more compelled to admit the need for “social debt redemption”, incorporating concerns about market efficiency into the imperative of better distribution of wealth, growth with social equity (HUGUENEY FILHO, 2005, p. 68-69).

7 At least one developmental aspect and another expression that summarizes the values and the priority subject of the same, the term has origins in the theoretical work of the Pakistani Mahbub UlHaq, with the collaboration of the Indian Amartya Sem. Human development ascends within a larger context of international conventions and conferences of a humanistic nature – it is the so-called “social decade”. Commissioned by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in 1990 the Human Development Report launched a series of annual publications which, through the Human Development Index (HDI), development processes in the world (OLIVEIRA, 2011).
consonance in the academy, remaining opposed to an orthodox one, whereby the development process is directly – and, in a way, exclusively – associated to the good performance of macroeconomic indicators such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), per capita income or employment levels (Medeiros 2010).

Despite the consensus about the centrality in the individual, there is a great heterogeneity of views within the heterodox line. Amartya Sen (2000, 28) argues that development is a process in which the widening of individual freedom of choice is observed. For him, wealth itself is proof of that since it does not contain its own value, truthfully it is nothing more than a means to attain happiness by the unlimited expansion of the freedoms of choice. Thus, it is a fact that mere economic growth cannot be the sole objective of any government, since it cannot bring welfare alone.

In fact, for Sen, growth cannot even be seen as the basis of development, since both processes would be complementary: the expansion of an individual's freedoms entails an increase in the capacities of the individual, such as the ability to work, earn income and consume. The author explains:

[...] the increase of human capacities also tends to go hand in hand with the expansion of productivities and the power to earn income. This relationship establishes an important **indirect linkage through which an increase in capacities directly and indirectly helps to enrich human life and makes human deprivations rarer and less pungent** (Sen 2000, 114, emphasis added).

Therefore, far from pursuing a merely moral approach, Sen argues that the end of inequalities through the expansion of individual freedoms is a powerful driver of economic growth and is the ultimate goal of development. The author outlines a development strategy that encompasses five related dimensions: economic opportunities, political freedoms, social faculties, guarantees of transparency and protective security. Being interdependent, investment in one dimension tends to bring direct benefits to others. In order to achieve the expansion of these freedoms, however, the government should focus its efforts on eliminating what Sen calls “sources of deprivation of liberty”, such as hunger, misery or social inequality (Sen 2000, 18).

Another heterodox author is Ignacy Sachs (2008), who proposes a three-pillar strategy: modernization of the producer core, growth in employment rates and action on people’s well-being (2008, 88-89). His thesis is broad, covering variables such as culture, environmental sustainability, individual happiness, human rights, among other elements that must be included...
in any national development strategy. Sachs argues that development needs to be thought in a multidimensional way, going through five dimensions: social, environmental, territorial, economic and political:

Equality, equity and solidarity are, one may say, embedded in the concept of development, with far-reaching consequences for economic thinking on development to differ from reductive economicism. Instead of maximizing GDP growth, the larger goal is to promote equality and maximize the advantage of those living in the worst conditions, in order to reduce poverty, a disgraceful, unnecessary phenomenon in our world of abundance (Sachs 2008, 14, emphasis added).

The present article adopts the heterodox aspect as its analytical vector. Insofar as the focus of the research lies in the Brazilian foreign policy and, being the majority attribution of the executive power, it is natural to consider that the understanding of development by government will be reflected in its external speeches and actions. Speaking at the conference of the Global Fund to Combat Poverty, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011) highlighted his social concern:

Combating hunger and poverty is not a utopian goal. It consists of the fight against exclusion and inequality, and in favor of social justice and sustainable growth. I am proposing a change of attitude. I am making an ethical and political call for the international community to work for a new concept of development, in which the distribution of income is not a consequence, but the lever of growth (Silva 2004, s/p).

Three elements should be emphasized: concern for social justice, mention of a new model of development that is seen as a “leverage for growth”, in rhetoric very similar to that of Amartya Sen, and the call to the international community, the Brazilian willingness to promote this broad vision of development in international forums.

In a similar speech, President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) points out before the UN General Assembly that in her first term the government sought to promote:

[...] the construction of an inclusive society based on equal opportunities. The great transformation in which we are engaged has produced a modern economy and a more egalitarian society. It demanded, at the same time, a strong popular participation, respect for Human Rights and a sustainable
vision of our development (Rousseff 2014, s /p).

In this way, both presidents have sought to associate the success of Brazilian development with the fight against poverty and inequality, not with economic vigor. These are convergent visions with the theoretical assumption presented here. As will be seen below, it is precisely the proximity to this strand that makes it possible to argue the expanded view of security adopted by Brazil.

These indications show that, both domestically and abroad, Brazil defends a heterodox view of development quite convergent with that adopted by this work. Independently of being complementary to or prioritizing the Brazilian development effort, it is a fact that foreign policy is a public policy entirely planned within the logic of achieving this goal. The historical picture presented earlier is the first clue, but there are others. Foreign policy is a broad public policy, encompassing various dimensions of action such as economic, diplomatic, security, among many others. One of the central hypotheses of the present article concerns the force of development as an objective: being preponderant, such objective conditions the planning of foreign policy as a whole. The focus of this article, however, lies in the influence of this objective on a specific foreign policy sub-area, international security.

The Brazilian view on international security

The conditionality of the Brazilian foreign policy planning in the international security subarea is evident. The analysis of the bibliography reveals that an enlarged - or holistic - security vision has as its main characteristic the fact that it identifies as threats problems commonly identified with the problem of development. This convergence results in an approximation between the fields of development and security, which can lead to the creation of strategies that suit both one and the other field. A relevant example of this logic is the element of poverty: isolated from the traditional security studies, it is considered a double threat according to a broader view; direct threat, because it is an affliction to the human subject; and indirect, since it subjects the human being to other threats - diseases, for example (Schoo 2008, 3).

In general, one of the central concerns of the holistic security visions concerns the stability of a society. In this sense, one of the problems identified is unemployment. As a limiting factor in the distribution of income and...
productive capacity in the country, unemployment constitutes a threat to the extent that it foments social declines (Dupas 1999, 195), where there is the possibility of disturbances such as informality and even the increase of criminality.

The analysis can go further. Studies on peace missions indicate that the stabilization of countries aided by external intervention is never fully achieved when the operation is limited to the achievement of negative peace (mere absence of armed conflict). Positive peace is only achieved when the country’s economic growth momentum is boosted in order to ventilate the benefits of a sustained development process in society9.

It is evident that a holistic approach to security integrates problems such as poverty, misery, hunger and unemployment within the category of threats, whether for the State, for society or for the individual. The search for a coherent approach between economics and politics tends, in this sense, to generate a very interesting “developmentalist” approach to peace (Hugueney Filho 2005, 76).

The coherence between the two aspects is important because, as Slomboda (2013, 98) argues, a country like Brazil must have a defense policy that is a middle ground between two realities: that of a country of continental territorial proportions, regional preponderance and considerable international weight; and that of a developing country suffering from serious social ills responsible not only for harming the well-being of the population but also endangering the stability of the country. The concern with threats stemming from underdevelopment is clear. However, the author also points out that the country cannot forget traditional security. This is a valid observation, since, as Proença Junior (2010) points out, although the international system has undergone great transformations throughout the twentieth century, it would be a mistake to assume that inter-state wars are things of the past.

The search for development cannot, therefore, sacrifice the Brazilian ability to defend its population and its interests from more direct threats such as war. Adopting a security approach that is consistent with both objectives is, as argued, an advantageous option. In addition, according to Buzan and Hansen, International Security Studies (ISS) have their objects of analysis defined not by events or by international politics, but by the scrutiny of theorists who study them and assign them or not analytical importance. Thus, issues considered relevant in the South of the world system - hunger, misery, unhealthiness - tend to be neglected by Northern theorists (Buzan and Hansen

9 In this view, fostering development works not only as a preventive measure against the emergence of social gradients that can foment conflicts; also helps in the implementation or maintenance of the democratic environment of the country (Oliveira 2011, 102).
It would be incumbent on a State such as Brazil to promote these issues in the global security agenda, as well as in academia. For Sardenberg (1999), highlighting the more heterodox and less traditional vulnerabilities and threats present in the current international system - such as the socio-economic ones - is a good strategy for international insertion. In the author’s words:

It is not easy to make proposals regarding emerging vulnerabilities and possible Brazilian attitudes concerning them. Many of them are already dealt with diplomatically, bilaterally and multilaterally. However, it would be very useful to promote a broad academic study and political debate that would allow us to evaluate the substance of each of these vulnerabilities, their possible interrelationships and possible ways of dealing with them at the international level, including, where appropriate, in our own United Nations (Sardenberg 1999, 172).

It should also be remembered that the conditionality of the national security planning to the development objective is geopolitical. According to Lafer, among the various “deep forces” of Brazilian foreign policy, Brazil’s geographic distance from the world’s poles of conflict has a great weight on our perception of security (Lafer 2009, 20).

In light of the positive aspects of adopting a holistic view of security, as well as the evidences of using this vision in previous presidencies, it remains to analyze how the governments of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) worked with this approach. Efforts to characterize the foreign policy of the Lula governments (2003-2010) are quite common. According to Dias (2014), the foreign policy of this period is characterized by a reaffirmation of several classic principles such as the preservation of national autonomy, the search for development, the pacifist nature, the defense of nonintervention, among others. (Dias 2014, 1). In addition, Soares de Lima and Pinheiro argue that Lula’s foreign policy was a mix of traditional elements with innovations, resulting in an assertive stance and broadening of interests and ambitions possible thanks to the favorable international context of redistribution of powers (Hirst et al. 2010, 22).

Within the broad objectives, initiatives and guidelines that drove President Lula’s foreign policy, a specific and quite evident characteristic is of central importance for this research: humanism, an element responsible for

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According to Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle (1967), the deep forces can be understood as geographic factors, demographic conditions, economic forces and nationalism.
bringing Brazilian foreign policy of the 21st century closer to not only heterodox aspect of development, but also of the humanized notions of security addressed here.

Maintaining the continuity of previous foreign policies, Lula reaffirmed the goal of economic development, but according to Miyamoto, he innovated by adding the imperative of “social justice” (2010, 22). It is important to emphasize that this humanist orientation is not exclusive to its foreign policy; on the contrary, it worked in a way that would help a national social project of Lula (Penna Filho 2006, 356). This integrated nature of foreign policy to the national humanist orientation is evident in the speech of Hirst, Soares de Lima and Pinheiro:

Contrary to the recent past, when foreign policy was ancillary to macroeconomic stability and had the function of guaranteeing international credibility, today, proactive and pragmatic foreign policy is one of the pillars of the government’s strategy based on another three pillars: maintenance of stability economy; resumption of the role of the State in the coordination of a neo-developmental agenda; and social inclusion and the formation of an expressive mass market (Hirst et al. 2010, 23, emphasis added).

Regarding Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) governments’ foreign policy some considerations are inferred. Cervo and Lessa regard Rousseff’s foreign policy as characterized by both continuity and a decline relative to the previous government. This relative decline would be caused by three factors: the loss of efficiency of the state as inductive agent; the absence of key ideas or concepts that would mobilize national action abroad; and the prejudice of the role played by BRICS (Cervo and Lessa 2014, 149).

One of the most important characteristics of Lula’s foreign policy that remained in Dilma government was “[...] the expression of the will to contribute to international development with a transformative perspective linked to the reduction of the characteristic asymmetries of the world system” (Ayllón Pino 2012, 194, our translation). Nevertheless, as the Rousseff governments’ foreign policy promoted an effort to maintain the general guidelines of the previous government, it can be argued that, similarly, neuralgic elements such as the humanist connotation were maintained, even with less intensity. The analysis of initiatives strengthens this idea. Cervo and Lessa provide two examples: first, during Rio+20, amid the discussions on environmental stability, Brazilian diplomacy has shown concern in inserting the fight against poverty in the discussion agenda; secondly, in the face of Chinese and Indian penetration in Africa, Brazil has sought to preserve its presence on the
African continent by using “soft power of cooperation in sectors of popular appeal, such as social inclusion, agriculture, education and health” (Cervo and Lessa 2014, 138-141).

Identifying this humanistic tendency in the foreign policy of both governments analyzed here is important, since it allows advancing the argument regarding Brazil’s expanded security vision. It is not difficult to find evidence of this view in the bibliography or even in government actions. According to former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, the quest for peace - one of the great universal goals - necessarily involves investing in diplomatic consultation and development (Sloboda 2013, 68). This notion that development is directly related to the security of countries appears several times in the speech of the two presidents. In 2004, during the opening of the XI United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), President Lula stressed that:

Eliminating hunger, reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development must be a concern of all countries, including the richest. This is an imperative if we are to guarantee peace and the effective fulfillment of human rights (Silva 2004a, s/p).

That is, the characteristic elements of heterodox approaches to development are, according to this view, imperatives for peace. This vision deepens in Lula’s speech at the opening of the LIX General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) in 2004:

In the last decades, asymmetric and exclusionary globalization has deepened the devastating legacy of misery and social regression, which explodes on the agenda of the twenty-first century. (...) **Only the values of Humanism, practiced with lucidity and determination, can stop barbarism. The situation demands, from the peoples and their leaders, a new sense of individual and collective responsibility.** If we want peace, we must build it. If we really want to eliminate violence, we must remove its root causes with the same tenacity with which we deal with the agents of hatred (Silva 2004b, s/p, emphasis added).

In addition to highlighting “Humanism” as a value, the president mentions a recurrent expression in Brazilian discourses concerning security and in academic works of the area: the “deep causes”. These causes would be the roots of conflicts and manifestations of violence within a country, such as poverty, unemployment, hunger and so many other elements worked through the broad security approach. The logic is simple: appeasing a conflict means
merely combating the “symptoms” of a deeper evil. Fighting the “disease” itself, ie the causes of conflict, requires attention to these root causes. Foreign Minister Celso Amorim explained these ideas in a speech at the UNSC session:

For my part, I wish to emphasize the need to develop new and better tools to address the structural problems at the root of the tensions that lead to violence and conflict. Poverty, disease, lack of opportunities, inequality. These are some of the causes of conflicts, particularly those within countries, which are, regrettably, increasingly part of our agenda (Amorim 2004, s/p).

The expanded view on security advocated by Brazil is even more evident when it is used as an argument for the reform of the UN Security Council, one of the major national objectives. In the words of former President Lula, “Brazil wants an expanded Security Council, in which we can defend a security approach based on the links between peace, development and social justice” (Silva 2006).

As mentioned, the presidency of Dilma Rousseff did not represent a disruption with the basic assumptions of the previous administration. On the contrary, in security matters it reaffirms these assumptions. Opening the LXVI General Assembly of the United Nations, the President demonstrates this continuity:

For at least three years, Mr. President, Brazil repeats, in this same forum, that we must combat the causes, not just the consequences of global instability. We have insisted on the interrelationship between development, peace and security and that development policies are increasingly associated with the Security Council’s strategies for pursuing sustainable peace. This is how we act in our commitment to Haiti and Guinea-Bissau (Rousseff 2011, s/p, emphasis added).

Also the Foreign Minister, Antonio Patriota, reaffirms these principles. During the Security Council High Level Meeting, he mentions that:

We believe that peace results from collective efforts to build fair societies. We have emphasized the interdependence between peace, security and development. We know from experience that stability and security are rarely achieved where there is social exclusion (Patriota 2011, 313).

The analysis of the speeches is important, since it reveals the princi-
ples that govern the foreign policy of Lula and Dilma\textsuperscript{11} presidencies. Even so, the speeches alone are insufficient to affirm with certainty that Brazil, in fact, adopts a comprehensive vision of international security.

The National Defense Policy (NDP) is the highest-level government document, responsible for listing the principles, objectives, and actions of national defense. Launched in 2005 by the Lula government, the document brings such determinations as the distinction between security and defense, cooperation between diplomacy and the Armed Forces, and greater participation in UN peacekeeping operations. In 2012, the Dilma government proposed the new National Defense Policy (NDP), which, among other things, ratifies internally what foreign policy already ratified before: the expansion of threats to encompass those of an economic and environmental nature (Sloboda 2013, 50-51).

Although not specific in its statements, the PND provides some evidence that its understanding of security converges with the expanded approach worked out here. Regarding the security approach, the PND testifies to the need to target other security subjects beyond the State when it says that the concept of “security” traditionally starts from the idea of

\begin{quote}
(...) confrontation between nations, that is, protection against threats from other political communities or, more simply, external defense. As societies developed and the interdependence between states deepened, new demands were added. Gradually, the concept of security was expanded, covering the political, military, economic, psychosocial, scientific-technological, environmental and other fields. Preserving security requires broad-spectrum measures, involving, in addition to external defense: civil defense, public security and economic, social, educational, scientific-technological, environmental, health, industrial policies. In short, several actions, many of which do not imply any involvement of the Armed Forces (Ministério da Defesa 2012, 1-2).
\end{quote}

Another important indication appears in the National Defense Strategy (NDT), a more closed document in the area of defense and strategy, with issues focused on the restructuring of the Armed Forces or investment in the defense industry. Although, at the outset, it does not explicitly mention an expanded approach to security, the document clearly states in the first pages that

\textsuperscript{11} Discourse Analysis is characterized, among other elements, by the concern to identify the relations between the text, discourse or statement with its surroundings. Its discursive approach assumes that all speech is conditioned by the author, who in turn is conditioned by the reality that surrounds him, by the social construction that contains it. Language cannot be dissociated from social interaction (Rocha; DeusdaráOCHA 2005).
the “national defense strategy is inseparable from the national development strategy” (Ministério da Defesa 2012a, 8).

One more example is the principle of “non-indifference.” Equally defended by the Dilma government, this concerns an update of the classic non-interventionism, according to which the sovereignty of a country is inviolable, and any intervention of external countries in the internal affairs of a State is considered illegitimate. Non-indifference, on the other hand, seeks to insert an exception to the rigidity of this rule by stipulating that, to the extent that a country plunged into chaos calls for the support of the international community, countries would have a responsibility to intervene for the good of the population. This action, once requested by the government of the country in crisis, would not constitute, according to this view, violation of the principle of non-intervention. For Hermann, Brazil understands that the legitimacy of this principle resides in an element already emphasized in President Lula’s speech and in academic analysis already mentioned here: “humanist solidarity” (Hermann 2011, 204-206).

A similar principle, but not proposed by Brazil, is Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Accepted by the UNGA, but not yet effective as an international legal norm, the principle changes basic assumptions of the institute of state sovereignty: from an absolute and inviolable right, it becomes a state responsibility for the well-being of its population that can be charged by the international community. If a State is negligent in protecting or threatening its population, it is up to other countries, under the auspices of the UN, to interfere in the country and remedy the situation. Unlike non-indifference, R2P claims to be an automatic norm, causing diplomats from countries in the South such as Brazil to accuse it of approaching the “right of interference” (Dias 2014, 6).

Against R2P radicalism, the Dilma government promoted “Responsibility to Protect”. This new principle advocates the need for countries engaged in peacekeeping missions not to worsen the situation of the local population. The constant monitoring by the Security Council of respect for human rights by the intervention troops becomes an imperative (Patriota 2013, 158). Although it still presents itself as a not very specific concept in its recommendations, Responsibility to Protect denotes the characteristic humanistic concern of Brazilian foreign policy.

Thus, it can be argued that the expanded view of Brazilian security, which is concerned with linking security and development and with a strong humanist concern, is clear in the discourses, planning and actions of Brazilian diplomacy, revealing an active foreign policy in promoting this idea between 2003 and 2016. Nevertheless, a more effective way of evaluating the extent to which Brazil follows this approach is to analyze empirical situations
of its practical application.

The humanization of the international agenda in the post-Cold War era had repercussions in the field of security. In 1994, UNDP released the Human Development Report, stating that an international conflict, beyond its state dimension, is also human. Thus, the converse would also be valid: every human crisis, as a consequence, would have to be seen as an international crisis (Sloboda 2013, 38).

Sen (2000, 115), one of the theorists linked to human security, mentions that social inequality can undermine social cohesion, creating the risk of dangerous conflagrations to the stability of society. Sachs (2008, 15), dividing the concept of sustainable development into five dimensions, argues that in the social dimension there is a risk of disruption, a perspective that “loom threateningly on many problematic places on the planet”. This idea of social stability as an element closely related to security is not infrequently transplanted to the systemic level. For Jaguaribe (2013, 2), among the various challenges that characterize the international reality of the 21st century, we can mention the increasing asymmetry between the political North and South, a situation stemming from persistent extreme poverty in the southern part of the globe. would generate global insecurity.

Nef (1999) argues that linking security and development already existed prior to World War II. However, the Cold War was responsible for separating these two domains in different axes: the first in the East-West contention, the second in the North-South slope. Unrelated, security and development would be incomplete for the author, and their meeting is necessary through the concept of “mutual vulnerability”, according to which poverty generates insecurity that is not governed by the geographical or political divisions of the world. Efforts to extinguish the sources of global destabilization would be the responsibility of all countries. What makes this reading possible is interdependent globalization. Understood beyond its narrow reductionist view on trade and financial flows, globalization focuses on the faster and more comprehensive spread of information. For authors such as Nye (2009, 312), the combination of an unequal world and the rapid dissemination of information is problematic. Thus, in the post-Cold War period,

with the shift from security to internal problems, such as civil wars, ethnic conflicts, the struggle for natural resources, etc., security and development could no longer be seen from a zero-sum perspective, but from a non-zero sum perspective, with possibilities of winning and losing together (Oliveira 2011, 85-86, emphasis added).
The understanding that poverty and inequality are elements that can bring dangerous systemic destabilization alone would be enough to argue the imperative need to update security approaches to more holistic and coherent notions with a much more complex reality than that characteristic of the bipolar years. However, there is yet another element, characteristic of the post-Cold War era, which urges states to reject more and more classical approaches to security: the “new threats”\textsuperscript{12}. It is understood here that Human Security is a fundamental principle to be analyzed, within the ESI aspects. The choice is justified by the fact that Human Security is the most politically successful side, that is, the one that best penetrates the decision making and international political discussion. This is due, in large part, to the strongly institutional origin of Human Security as a theory, since its emergence took place within the UN - more specifically, within the UNDP (Buzan and Hansen 2012, 306-307).

As with the other broadening threads, Human Security emerged in the context of the post-Cold War era. Insofar as it seeks to defend the notion of interconnected threats beyond the military universe, apart from associating security, development and human rights, Human Security could not have arisen in previous decades, where the rigid bipolar agenda would block such a proposal (Oliveira 2011, 74). The main premise of Human Security (SH) is the displacement of the subject to be secured, of the state - denying the State centered emphasis of Strategic Security Studies - to the human being. According to Osorio (2012), Human Security

\[\text{(\ldots) could be seen as a kind of prevention with a greater objective of valorization of the human person so that it could (sic) freely potentialize its capabilities without barriers of war, poverty, hunger, natural disasters, physical violence and diseases, among other possibilities of degradation of the human condition (Osorio 2012, 7).}\]

That is, once the subject of security changes, so do the threats to be considered. For Cepik (2001, 14), the problems that Human Security must address “would shift from the ability to neutralize predominantly military type threats to the neutralization of threats to human life that are the result of environmental degradation, economic instability and the disintegration of social ties”. If the state is threatened by war or terrorism, one needs to add to

\textsuperscript{12} The term refers more to the innovative way in which such threats are dealt with, since their occurrence dates back long before the end of the Cold War. Basically, it refers to all kinds of threats that run counter to the classic security model, which only considered state threats such as war.
this list hunger, misery, disease, political oppression, etc. The result is a more complex approach to security, with five characteristics: focus on people, multisectoral planning, comprehensive approach, concern for adaptation to each specific situation and oriented towards prevention before deterrence (UNTF-HS 2009, 7-8).

In terms of acting strategy, Human Security offers two possibilities, both mutually complementary: protection, that is, the act of shielding people against threats that are beyond their control, such as natural disasters or conflicts; and empowerment, an action that seeks to develop in the individuals of a society resilience against indirect threats such as hunger or unemployment.

Another important feature of Human Security is its double character. The paradigm is centered on guaranteeing freedoms to human beings - in thinking very close to Amartya Sen’s “development as freedom” -, and these freedoms are grouped into two broad groups: freedom from want and freedom from fear. The first refers to the objective of “protecting people from the vulnerabilities of underdevelopment,” while the latter seeks to “protect them from the physical violence that arises from wars and civil conflicts” (Bazzano 2014, 43). More than an analytical concept, Human Security pretends to present itself as a guiding operational concept of a country’s public policies. This claim has led the concept to relate to two elements: development, focused on the strategies of empowerment and on the scope of freedom from want; and sovereignty, working more with protection strategies aimed at guaranteeing freedom from fear (Oliveira 2011, 73).

One of the hypotheses of the present article suggests that the adoption of Human Security as State rhetoric would be beneficial for the international insertion of Brazil, theoretically qualifying the acceptance of the expanded model of Brazilian security. This assumption is based on the premise that Human Security proposed a theoretical construction so close to the model proposed by Brazil that the convergence between the two would be easy and beneficial to foreign policy.

According to Krause (2004, 43-44), rather than an analytical concept, the adoption of human security by Brazilian foreign policy is a term of force of speech and enormous political appeal, being more successful in politics than in academia. Suhrke (1999, 1) adds that the success of the concept is due to the fact that it evokes progressive values. Another positive aspect, argued by Buzan and Hansen (2012, 311), is that Human Security is a useful concept for developing countries insofar as it can be associated with the more general criticism of neoliberalism as a policy of development - since Human Security proposes measures to strengthen the State for the well-being of the individual. It is not difficult to understand Human Security as a convergent rhetoric.
with the aspirations of developing countries, inasmuch as this approach, in its broad perspective, presents conflict prevention as intrinsically linked to the eradication of poverty, something that Brazil has already defended for a while.

A third element concerns Putnam’s model of international insertion (2010). As previously noted, it recommends that states align their objectives internally and externally, as well as the means to achieve those goals. In terms of international security, it was argued that expanded security and its developmental focus would be the appropriate means of achieving this level coherence. Since Human Security has a theoretical construction aimed at reaching freedom from want, emphasizing the relationship between development and security, the convergence with the Brazilian model is possible. However, as analyzed, it is a theoretical construction still in progress and the operationalization of Human Security in terms of human development is still problematic. In addition, the paradigm has a second dimension, freedom from fear, and this other face brings risks that inhibit the adoption of the concept as a whole.

In objective terms, what the southern countries of the world system fear is the indiscriminate use of the concept of Human Security in order to legitimize the military presence of Northern countries in the periphery. On this, Hermann (2011, 194) argues that the engagement of Brazilian diplomacy over concepts such as Human Security or the Responsibility to Protect is necessary to participate in the process of defining these concepts, avoiding that they fall into the interventionist logic. Brazil has already done this by complementing R2P with the concept of Responsibility when Protecting. Regarding Human Security, it would be pertinent for Brazil to combat the overvaluation of freedom from fear to the detriment of freedom from want.

Human Security is a concept that, despite recommending humanitarian intervention if the State is unable to protect human rights, has a strong commitment to prevention. It would be a good idea if Brazil exalted the preventive characteristic of the concept in international forums: once there is human development in the countries, humanitarian intervention is hardly necessary. For a country like Brazil, only freedom from want is interesting, and freedom from fear should be seen as a last resort, not as the first. This caution with regard to Human Security is the position of Brazilian diplomacy towards the concept. For Celso Amorim:

In considering the individual as the center of security concerns, he be-

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13 As Schoo (2008, 2) reminds us, Human Security offers an interesting bridge between the internal and external levels, working the interdependent relationship between a country’s security in the international system and its internal threats.
comes a subject of international law, like the States. In this perspective, “human security” could justify preventive measures for the protection of individuals, falling under the same interventionist framework of the right of interference and the responsibility to protect (Amorim 2003, s/p).

Thus, it can be concluded that Human Security, despite being a concept of strong political and progressive appeal, does not present itself as a positive state rhetoric, since its full consolidation as an international rule carries the risk of state interference in the internal affairs of countries where poverty, insalubrity or unemployment are still relevant problems. In the end, Human Security could lead to a dangerous process of securitization of the most varied issues, a situation in which “the Security Council’s action in almost any area of international relations would be legitimizd” (Neves 2010, 34).

Final remarks

The argument proposed throughout this article was thought in a linear way, with the theoretical elements articulated in order to demonstrate the coherence and validity of the Brazilian conditioning of its security thinking to the development objective, along with other subareas of its foreign policy and with other public policies at the domestic level. In addition to identifying the bases of this assumption, the work also sought to highlight its positive aspects and its limitations for the Brazilian international insertion.

Consequently, analyzing theoretically and empirically the Brazilian reality had as its objective to confront the hypothesis that development as the ultimate foreign policy objective conditions Brazil’s international security planning. To this end, we examined the development on two fronts, from its role in foreign policy and conceptually. Historically and gradually, development has been affirmed as the main objective of foreign policy since the time of the Baron of Rio Branco, becoming, therefore, one of the standards of conduct presented by Cervo (2008) in its historical accumulation - that is, the development is at the very basis of Brazilian foreign policy, acting as a deep force. The benefits of this, according to Putnam (2010), come from the consistency of levels that the setting of this end by foreign policy represents, since it is the same objective of all domestic public policies of the country.

The historical analysis of the way in which the concept has been taken over the Brazilian governments since the 1930s has shown the changing configuration with which the term was used, sometimes referring to the opening of external markets, sometimes referring to the universal fight against misery (alternating between the orthodox view and the heterodox view). At the
same time, it has been understood that the very concept of development has changed much over the last century, and that the humanist heterodox strand of development is very close to the rhetoric of the 21st-century PT governments.

Progressists, the foreign policies of the Lula and Dilma governments, the focus of the present analysis, deepened the notion of development present in its formulation. It is notable that the foreign policy of the Lula government has emphasized the values of humanism as guiding principles of development strategies, as well as presenting huge convergences with Amartya Sen’s thinking that investing in human capacities is a lever of economic growth, rather than a mere consequence of it. The same concerns are observable in the speeches of Rousseff’s government, marked by continuity with relative decline in relation to the previous one.

However, the discussions presented here demonstrated that the heterodox development can be attributed to the Brazilian foreign policy when it defends the universal fight against poverty, promotes the humanization of security, proposes developmentalist notions of conflict resolution or promotes the integration between diplomacy and the necessary Armed Forces for executing social projects in unstable areas (such as Haiti, for example). This was a statement that could not be made with much assurance about the governments of the last century.

As another several areas of the Brazilian diplomacy, it can be stated that international security is also conditioned by the preponderance of development in foreign policy- added to geopolitical issues such as regional stability. This conditionality can be perceived, in the Brazilian part, in a comprehensive, broad or holistic concept of security, that goes beyond the merely strategic or military scope, by including in its planning developmentalist elements such as the fight against poverty and the identification of socioeconomic illness as threats to the stability and security of the country.

The holistic planning manifested itself on the speeches of governmental agents and official documents relative to national security (the National Defense Policy and the National Defense Strategy) and in the actions of Brazilian diplomacy- militancy in the United Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, promotion of the Responsibility to Protect and so on. In the field- or, according the preference of some strands, “theater of operations”- this planning translated into the humanitarian and social actions of the Brazilian army in peace missions.

It can be concluded that Human Security is a concept that needs to be better faceted and its use is subject to debate, since it is so much closer to the right of interference, rejected by Southern countries. This would represent
the denial of the hypotheses that since Brazil has a comprehensive vision of security closer to the concepts of Human Security, that it would gain from adopting it. However, this rejection can further a concern: if by securitizing social economic problems Human Security clears the way for interventionism, wouldn’t Brazil be doing the same with its holistic vision of security? This cannot be discussed here, but it leaves the door open for possible future research and debates.

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Since the mid-twentieth century, Brazilian foreign policy has been gradually inserting into its agenda the concept of development (alternating between an orthodox and a heterodox view) as a fundamental motto of action. Other sub-areas of Brazilian diplomacy have become conditional on development, especially international security. Presenting social aspects of development and Human Security as intertwined since the 1990s in Brazil, the article analyzes theoretically and empirically the foreign policy of the governments of Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). Taking as its main goal to verify the validity of such hypothesis, the article concludes that this conditionality is coherent with Brazilian socioeconomic and geopolitical reality, but that its proximity to Human Security must be taken with caution.

KEY WORDS
Brazilian Foreign Policy; Development; Human Security.