AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC: REFLECTIONS ON PEACEKEEPING IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA (BOUGAINVILLE)

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Introduction

Armed conflicts pose challenges to national, regional and international peace and security. Conflicts are threats to economic development, especially for countries of the Third World regions as the Asia-Pacific. Evidences from empirical studies established that conflicts can retard and contract economic growth. Often, post-conflict economies suffer from this challenge as the spin-offs of armed conflict continue to retard economic growth and development (Collier 1998). Many of the conflicts in the world today are no longer international. Starting from the end of the Cold War, the majority of conflicts that pose threats to international security are fought within states (Straus 2012). The nature of the post-Cold War conflicts is opposed to that of the Cold War period, whose conflicts were interstate in character. Intrastate conflicts involve non-state armed groups. Such internal conflicts involve resistant groups aim at overthrowing the central government as witnessed in such places as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola and Tajikistan. Also involve in these conflicts are ethno-linguistic movements, especially among minority ethnic groups fighting for total independence or regional autonomy. Most often, such minority ethnic groups as Mohajirs of Pakistan; Ogoni and Ijaws of the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria and Dayaks of Indonesia assert that they are fighting for their rights in a country where they are victims of discrimination by the state (represented by the government) in areas such as employment, land use, property rights or language use. As well, they

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are fighting against inequity and unequal distributions of national wealth (de Varennes 2003, 153; for the Nigerian case, see Badmus 2010). Thus, in this kind of situations “violence is necessary to secure or maintain a slice of the pie. In this manner, disorder becomes a necessary resource and opportunity for reward while there is little incentive to work for a more institutionalised ordering of society” (Cilliers 2004, 26; see also Chabal and Daloz 1999, 5-6).

The Pacific (and the Asia-Pacific region broadly) is not an exception to the nature and pattern of conflicts explained above. Efforts to resolve some of these conflicts have, on a number of occasions, triggered regional and international peacemaking and peacekeeping interventions, and in most cases these efforts prove daunting. Regional and international conflict resolution interventions/efforts have resulted to solution or de-escalation of some conflicts, thanks to the implementation of power-sharing arrangements or regional autonomy that are embedded in peace accords. These are the cases of Bangladesh (Chittagong hill tribes), Papua New Guinea ⸻PNG⸻ (Bougainville) and the Solomon Islands (Guadalcanese). In some cases, protracted conflicts have led to complete independence as the cases of Eritrea in 1993, Bangladesh in 1971, and East Timor in 2002 (de Varennes 2003, 156; Turton, 1997). In the Pacific, regional powers, Australia and New Zealand, in partnership with regional arrangement, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), other international actors such as the Commonwealth and the United Nations (UN) and a ‘coalition of the willing states’ have proved relevant to the world that they are forces to be reckon with on how regional organisations, driven by regional powerful states might contribute to and maintain regional security by preventing mass atrocities; thereby implementing pillar two of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (Bellamy and Davies 2011, 156).

In light of the above discussions, this paper examines security management in the Pacific. Specifically, it examines conflicts in the region, their causes and narrows its investigation to two countries in the region, PNG (Bougainville), and the Solomon Islands. The purpose is to document their peacekeeping experiences. My main objective is to interrogate whether peacekeeping missions in the region (either under the auspices of the UN or regional actors, such as the PIF, pivotal states, or a coalition of the willing states), especially in the two countries under focus, were successful or otherwise. And, if successful, then key questions are posed: (1) What factors/conditions were responsible for their achievements and also, whether their experiences and lessons learnt can be factored into and/or offered as possible lessons that could be useful in developing a useful peacekeeping model for other regions of the world, especially in Africa where the continent’s foremost organisation, the African Union (AU), is developing a comprehensive security mechanism
Explaining the Triggers of Armed Conflicts in the Pacific

The roots of conflicts in the Pacific are multidimensional ranging from ethnicity, underdevelopment and poverty, weak state structures, effects of a long period of colonialism and, by extension, neo-colonialism, international power politics, environmental problems, effects of modernisation and globalisation, inequity and injustices, among others (Edstrom 2001; Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004; Henderson 2005; Henderson and Watson 2005; Jenkins 2005). In the Asia-Pacific countries more broadly, interstate wars have given way to predominantly intrastate conflicts and as such, many studies have established that, between the late 1980s and late 1990s, the region is home to higher incidences of ethnic conflicts and have witnessed the emergence of more ethnic motivated political groups challenging the authority of the states in the region than anywhere else on the globe (Gurr 1994). The Asia-Pacific region had the largest number of major armed conflicts of any region in every year between 1989 and 1997, and virtually all of these conflicts were intrastate conflicts (Reilly and Graham 2004, 10). The roots of many of these conflicts are interrelated as there is no meta-theory or a mono-causal explanation to the eruption of any civil war. This implies that they are always intertwined with diverse political, socio-cultural and economic factors.

Ethnicity and other kinds of identity issues have been defining factors in the Pacific conflicts. This is going by the highly intermixed and fragmented sociological configurations and ethnic demography of the region. Ethnicity has been cited as one of the principal causes of conflicts in such places as PNG, Fiji and the Solomon Islands, as well as in Indonesia and Burma in the wider context of the Asia-Pacific (Bennet 2002; May 2005; Pollard and Wale 2004). In fact, PNG is regarded as the most ethnically diverse country in the whole of Asia-Pacific with over 800 ethno-linguistic groups within its borders. Doubtless, the manipulation of ethnicity by the political elites is central in explaining the causes of most conflicts in divided societies (Ellingsen 2000), but we must understand that ethnicity or ethnic animosities have to
be linked with other issues before they can become manifest. It has been established by many studies that ethnicity or ethnic pluralism do not always lead to conflict except it combines with other elements (Turton 1997). This is probably why Teaiwa (2005, 271) argues that ethnic conflicts are only manifesting themselves where socioeconomic gaps and inequalities already exist. In relations to the Pacific, Teaiwa (2005, 271) contends further that:

[E]thnic diversity alone does not cause bloodshed or bitterness. Every major conflict in the Pacific over the past 30 years has had at its heart inequitable access to resources. The resulting competition for limited resources has often been converted into antagonism played out along the latent social fracture lines etched by ethnic, class, gender, and religious identities. In turn, these have provided the basis of many of the conflicts in the Pacific Island region.

Ethnic divisions are likely to lead to ethnic interest conflicts in all societies. Moreover, the greater the degree a society is ethnically divided, the more political and other interest conflict tends to become channelled into ethnic lines. Therefore, in the Pacific, ethnicity is important but conflicts based on ethnicity are a subset of a larger whole of the instabilities that the region faces. This is because “ethnic animosities are also convenient cloaks for mobilising support around political and economic issues, such as control over resources, changing social relations, increasing group inequalities and the tensions created when traditional lifestyles and power bases are confronted by the inexorable forces of modernisation” (Reilly and Graham 2004, 10). This assertion explains the conflict in the Solomon Islands between the Guadalcanal people (Guali) and Malaita ethnic group where economic factor (underdevelopment and absolute poverty) ignited tensions between the two ethnic groups.

Also, economic factor cannot be explained in isolation of land and natural resources in the Pacific Islands since the three factors provide the push for conflicts. The existence of conflict is a function of the level of socio-economic development in a particular state. This means that the more economically developed a state is, the less such a state is prone to conflict. This supposition seems correct in explaining the conflict in the Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands is a very poor country, nearly bankrupt but kept solvent with Australian aid and budget subsidies. In recent times, political conflicts and ethnic violence have been part and parcel of the island’s features. However, the same supposition fails to give nuanced and convincing explanations as to why an economically underdeveloped and impoverish state like Kiribati has been able to avoid political conflicts. Paradoxically, however, in Melanesia, Fiji, in relative term, has one of the most developed economies in the region,
but the country is prone to ethnic conflicts between the indigenous Fijian and Indian immigrant population, intra-tribal conflicts among indigenous Fijians as well as frequent military coups. The political instability in Fiji supports the assertion that relative affluence is not sufficient to surmount the roots of political cataclysm, including ethnicity, tribal and regional differences (Scarr 1988).

As I stated earlier, in the Asia-Pacific, land and, by extension, natural resource endowments play key roles in fathoming the roots of the region’s armed conflicts. In the Pacific for example, land is mostly owned by communities and retains deep spiritual values. This is why most countries in the Pacific prohibit the further sales or alienation of land. It also explains why land is pivotal in understanding much that takes place in Pacific politics (Henderson 2005, 11). The adoption of free market policies by most post colonial Island’s governments attracted foreign direct investments (FDI) into their economies. Consequently, plantations and foreign entrepreneurs, especially the Multinational Companies (MNCs) and local compradors dislodged small land holders and peasants, thereby aggravating the problem of unemployment. Local lands were used to develop industries (especially, tourism). This apparently favoured foreign entrepreneurs to the disadvantage of the local populations and in most cases alienated indigenous people from their lands and water because it played down their culture. This scenario explains the reason for the 2000 coup d’état in Fiji. In the Solomon Islands, the people of Guadacanal resented the influx of immigrant Malaitan people, while in PNG, the Nasioi people of Bougainville that own the land on which the Panguna Copper and Gold Mine was developed resented the influx of immigrant workers brought in to work in the mine (Bellamy and Davies 2011; Rolfe 2001). In the same vein, there is a correlation between internal conflicts in the region and mineral resources as most of the lands that were forcibly taken away from the local people are endowed with mineral resources. Examples of these include Bougainville (Panguna Mine), West Papua (Freeport Mine), New Caledonia (Nickel Mine), the Solomon Islands (Gold Ridge Mine), and Gold mining in Fiji. Issues such as inequity and injustices and lack of adequate compensation to local landlords and more importantly environmental despoliation resulting from mining activities, have all accounted for conflicts in the region.

While underdevelopment and absolute poverty, rampant and endemic corruption, and marginalisation are contributing factors to the ignition of conflicts in the Pacific, the nature of the state and its structure also serve as variables and add to the complexities of the region’s problems. Like other regions of the world that had experienced colonialism, most Pacific states are artificial creations of European colonialism characterized by frequent
frictions between the dominant cultures and that of ethnic minorities. The Pacific Islands, in particular, were home to strong traditional societies prior to colonialism and was forcibly put together for the purpose of international statehood into a weak modern state (see Badmus 2006 in relation to Africa). This scenario has negative consequences on these modern states as it denies the post-colonial states the opportunity to command the allegiance of its people where there is a clear-cut dichotomy between the dominant culture and that of minority ethnic groups. Unfortunately, many modern Pacific states have weak structures and some even lack the capacity to fulfil the minimum state functions such as the delivery of basic services to their people. The failure of the state to enjoy the loyalty of some segments of the population and its weak structures explain the frequent resurgence of ethnic nationalism (especially from the minority cultures) demanding autonomy or separation from the dominant culture at the centre. This is the situation in the wider context of the Asia-Pacific in Malaysia (Sabah, Sarawak), PNG (Bougainville), and Indonesia (Aceh, West Papua) to mention but few examples. Thus, the weak state structures often deny a number of Pacific countries the wherewithal to address these contemporary intrastate conflicts.

Furthermore, globalisation and modernisation have strong impacts on the socio-economic structures of the Pacific Islands. Most of the countries in the region are in the process of socio-economic transformation from a traditional one to modernity and the process is itself conflict-generating. For, economic modernisation creates winners and losers. Aware that social divisions have provided a way to mobilising coalitions of common interests to be part of the winning side—for example, in competition for scarce natural or economic resources.

The above-discussed factors conjoin to explain the genesis of different kinds of the conflict in the Solomon Islands and PNG (Bougainville). In this regard, the rest of this paper examines these two conflicts in the Pacific to understand the rationale for and appreciate interventions by regional actors, especially Australia, New Zealand and the PIF, and supported by the international community. I explore the background to each of these conflicts, the motivations and rationale for interventions by Australia and New Zealand in particular, and factors that explain their successes or otherwise. I highlight lessons learnt from these missions and, examine whether these lessons can be of relevance to other regions of the world, especially Africa.
Islands and Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)²

Case 1: The Solomon Islands’ Conflict and RAMSI

Brief Background

While an impressive number of scholarly monographs and journal articles³ have explored different aspects of the Solomon Islands conflict, we need not expand here with what is already known about the origin and dynamics of the conflict. Here, a snapshot of the conflict will provide a better understanding of the reasons for international interventions. Different interpretations have been provided in the literature regarding the sources of the conflict. Watson (2005) locates its origin in colonialism. In his analysis, Watson believes that the motive of British colonial policy was to exploit the island nation and this is to the detriment of its future. Although, plantations were developed but this did not translate into physical and socio-economic development. Furthermore, the movement of administrative capital from Tulagi, on the Florida Islands, to Honiara on Guadalcanal Island in 1946 by the British created tension between ethnic Guali of Guadalcanal and migrants to Honiara. This is because “administration and resources became concentrated in the capital at the expense, it was often alleged, of other regions, including rural Guadalcanal” (Watson 2005, 401). For his part, Henderson (2003) is of the view that the unsuitability of the Westminster-style constitutional system is often responsible for the weak structures of the Solomon state. This scenario, in the Solomon Islands context, exacerbated tensions among different ethnic groups where corruption, poor governance and exploitation of natural resources flourished. Furthermore, Stratford (2005, 1) contends that many years of conflict exposed the mismatch between inherited Western institutions and ‘indigenous micro-polities’⁴. This uncovered the inability of the national government to manage the pressures of urbanisation and internal migrations.

The third explanatory variable can be located within the context of underdevelopment of the island state. Again, Watson (2005, 402) provides a graphic account thus:

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² Model with Australia and New Zealand Inputs
³ For incisive analysis on the origin and dynamics of conflict in the Solomon Islands, see among others: Bennet 2002; Fraenkel 2004; Fry 2000; Moore 2004; O’Connor 2003; Wainwright 2003a&b.
⁴ See Hegart and May 2004.
With annual population growth rates averaging above 3 percent for much of the period after independence, 3 percent, the aspirations of the large youth population could not be met. This disaffection was compounded by the concentration of young settlers and their families in newly urban areas such as Honiara, where they were cut off; there was regular contact with people of other ethnic groups, some of whom were evidently doing better economically.

Following independence from Britain in 1978, the above-discussed factors exacerbated ethnic tensions in Solomon Island’s post-colony. Furthermore, rampant corruption, especially among political elites, mismanagement, neopatrimonial character of political governance of the Solomon state, and, to some extent, its rentier economy, primitive accumulation and global factors combined, forced local economy to deteriorate, while absolute poverty and low living standards of majority of the population ensued, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. The increasing economic hardship resulted in the influx of migrants Malaitan people from Malaita Island to Guadalcanal Island where the capital city, Honiara is located. The influx of migrants became highly unbearable to the ethnic Guali people. For, at that time the Solomon Islands was pressured by high population growth rate and employment opportunities were insufficient. The domination of the Malaitan islanders of the labour market in Honiara and in the country’s Police Force became a source of apprehension to the Guadalcanal people. With the Malaitans economic and financial wherewithal, the Guadalcanalese were disposed from their lands. Consequent on the in-built frustrations, the mid-1990s saw the armed Guali gangs’, the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM)/the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA), attacks the Malaitan settlers, forcing more than 20,000 from their homes.

The Malaitan men, responding to the situation, formed a rival militia known as the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) and the clashes between the two groups in 1998 claimed over 100 lives while over 30,000 people were displaced. The MEF demanded compensation for the destruction of ethnic Malaitan owned property. Fighting between the two groups continued unabated until 15 October 2000 when the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) was signed under the auspices of Australia. Central to TPA was the conduct of provincial elections to be monitored by a low-level International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT). Under TPA, Sir Allan Kemakaze was elected Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands. Australia and New Zealand increased aid to the island nation and contributed to IPMT that was to secure peace in the Solomon for 18 months. Dishearteningly, IPMT was unable to restore
Isiaka Alani Badmus
peace because it lacked instruments of coercion and the TPA’s reliance on
the goodwill of the parties proved lacking. Although, TPA was able to douse
ethnic tensions, the agreement failed to secure the surrender of weapons by
both parties to the conflict and allow the situation to continue as a ‘low-grade’
insurgency. Therefore, the IPMT withdrew in June 2002. During this period,
the Solomon Islands faced a serious economic crisis because the sources of
revenue became dwindled as a result of the closure of SIPL and the Gold
Ridge Mine on which the government of the Solomon depends for money
while lawlessness flourished.

Regional Choruses of Disapproval and Responses: Peace Processes and the Deployment of RAMSI

How can the interventions in the Solomon Islands conflict be ex-
plained? Are regional responses an attempt by regional leaders/states (Aus-
tralia and New Zealand in particular) to secure a peaceful Pacific and/or to
safeguard their own national interests? What lessons does the intervention
provide for future operations, either within the context of the UN, region-
al organisations, or coalitions of the willing states? These are some of the
questions that I answer under this intervention. Before I proceed, I empha-
sise that the intervention known as the Regional Assistance Mission to the
Solomon Islands or RAMSI is a good example of how regional institution,
the PIF in this case, might contribute to the prevention of mass killings. The
intervention, as Bellamy and Davies (2011, 156) noted, is a “clear example of
how consensual capacity-building spearheaded by the commission of atroci-
ties, RAMSI demonstrates both the utility of regional arrangements and high-
lights areas where they may [be] in need of augmentation”.

In January 2003, Australia’s Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer
ruled out his country intervention, arguing that Australia did not have the
necessary capacity and that the conflict was an internal affair of the Solomon
state which should be resolved by the people of the island nation (Downer
2003, 11). As the conflict intensified, Prime Minister Kemakaze asked Can-
berra to assist his country to restore order, stem violence and disarm the
IFM militias (McMullan and Peebles 2006, 5). Following Honiara’s request,
Australia and New Zealand jettisoned their ‘Pacific Way’ non-interference in
state’s internal affairs postures and became more involved. As Bellamy and
Davies (2011) contend, the drive for RAMSI intervention came from Honiara
itself. Its request was predicated on the acceptance of the fact that it needed
international assistance to maintain law and order, and protect Solomon Is-
landers. Aware that the volte-face in foreign policies of these regional pow-
ers is explained by the growing waves of insecurity that pervaded the Pacific region following three incidences of major security threats: the 9/11 tragedy in the US, Bali bombing in Indonesia, and instabilities in Melanesian states such as PNG and Fiji (Foukona 2005; Stratford 2005; Watson 2005). Based on the aforementioned incidents, Australia refocused its attention to regional security issues. Foukona (2005) asserts that Australia’s attention and policy shifted to, and focused on terrorism. Canberra became worry because of the possibility of failed states becoming targets of, and even sanctuary for, terrorist groups. Therefore, Canberra considered the conflict in the Solomon a major regional (and, by extension, international) security concern. This position could be heard in the words of John Howard, Australia’s Prime Minister, who says: “failed states present a dangerous breeding ground for crime and terrorism”. Aware that the main reason for Canberra’s decision to work with the PIF in helping the Solomon was based on the June 2003 report of Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) warning that the conflict posed threats to Australia’s security (Wainwright 2008a). Following the release of the report, Canberra proposed the establishment of a regional peacekeeping force to be deployed to the Solomon, raising security threats that the conflict pose for Australia and the Pacific. To enhance RAMSI’s capability and legitimacy, Canberra called for multinational peacekeeping mission, comprising troops from New Zealand and other Pacific Islands states, especially Fiji, PNG, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu (McDougall 2004, 218-219).

Also what reinforced Australia’s policy reversal was the adoption of the famous Biketawa Declaration by PIF in October 2000 that authorised regional responses to domestic problems. The Declaration provided for a collective Pacific Islands Solution to the Pacific Problem on the request from a member state, this did not preclude the efforts of the international community in mediation. The Biketawa Declaration established a mechanism for regional security cooperation among PIF member states and this included the promotion of democratic ideal and processes and, good governance, recognitions of indigenous rights and a process for addressing armed conflicts. The mechanism was operationalised by PIF in relations to Nauru (the Pacific Regional Assistance Programme in Nauru PRAN) in 2005, as well as in Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Bougainville in respect of election observation missions deployed to these states (Bellamy and Davies 2011, 157). Relating the Declaration to the principle/norm of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, Bellamy and Davies (2011, 157) stated:

(...) through the Biketawa Declaration, the Pacific Islands Forum has estab-

lished a regional mechanism for providing assistance to states and addressing emerging crises in a consensual fashion, creating a regional capacity for exercising pillar two of Responsibility to Protect. The Australian government recognised that more forceful measures undertaken under pillar three would have required the authorisation of the UN Security Council, as set out in the World Summit Outcome Document.

It would appear that the Australian government sought to avoid the complexities of, and the cumbersome processes as well as political intrigues that are associated with securing the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorisation of peace operations. In assisting the government of Solomon Islands, third party intervention was visible. The Commonwealth sent a special envoy to Honiara to assess the situation on ground. Amid deteriorating security situation and Honiara’s request from Australia a strong peacekeeping force, the regional peacekeeping force was approved by the PIF Summit in Auckland, New Zealand, on 24 July 2003 with strong backing of the UN, the US, the UK, and the Commonwealth. The agreement stressed that the intervention was at the request of the Solomon and authorised by PIF. Also, RAMSI’s mandate and rules of engagement were outlined in the agreement which received the support of majority of Solomon Islanders.

Led by Australia, RAMSI was mandated to reinforce and uphold the legitimate institutions and authorities. RAMSI intervention officially began on 24 July 2003 and was tasked with, first, restoring law and order, and, second, much longer challenge of restoring core government functions. RAMSI was a robust multidimensional regional peace operation that involved a mix of civilian, police and military components in which Australia was the foremost contributing country, supported by PIF’s member states. In composition, RAMSI initially composed 2,225 military, police and civilian personnel. This number included 325 police officers. RAMSI was under the headship of a Special Coordinator, Nick Warner from Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). He was assisted by a New Zealand Deputy Special Coordinator, Peter Noble, and a Fijian Assistant Deputy Coordinator, Sekove Naqolelevu. The mission planners operated RAMSI on two primary phases. In phase one, RAMSI was to restore and maintain law and order, which involved

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6 This is not surprising because there is the perception of division of responsibilities in the Pacific with Australia playing leading roles in Melanesia while New Zealand has primary role in Polynesia. Generally, the antipodean powers, the UK and the US, expect both Australia and New Zealand to primarily deal with situations in the South Pacific.

7 RAMSI was code named Operation Helpem Fren (The Solomon Islands Pidgin English for Helping a Friend). The Australia Defence Force’s (ADF) participation in RAMSI is known as Operation Anode.
putting a halt to criminal impunity as well as disarming and demobilising militias. In analysing RAMSI, Bellamy and Davies (2011, 157) assert that despite the fact that RAMSI was a ‘police led’, the reality is that during this phase, different parts of RAMSI were led by different agencies. The military component was responsible for disarmament of criminal gangs and armed groups. The cost of RAMSI operation, estimated at $200 million in the first year, was mostly met by Australia while New Zealand, the Commonwealth, the UN, the World Bank, European Union, Asia Development Bank also contributed. RAMSI restored law and order within the first 20 months of its operation. During the first 120 days, 3,040 weapons were collected, excluding 660 sophisticated and modern weapons. August 2003 saw the surrender of one of the well-known criminal leaders, Harold Keke to RAMSI. The surrender of Keke, who was considered a destabilizing factor in the Solomon, effectively removed the risk of conflict. RAMSI police officers also performed creditably in the areas of crime investigation and others. The reasons for this feat are many. RAMSI’s police contingent initiated street patrols. These were conducted with their Solomon Islands counterparts (the Royal Solomon Islands Police or RSIP). RAMSI police officers and RSIP set up collection centres to confiscate and destroy surrendered arms and ammunitions, and also provided transport to remote areas of the rebels. By the end of the first five months of its operation, RAMSI had arrested 733 people on 1,168 charges. RAMSI’s police contingent also involved in conducting training courses for officers of RSIP and justice sector. These efforts were to enhance the capacity of local police to maintain law and order. They investigated crimes committed by militias and criminal gangs, helped RSIP officers to issue indictments including Harold Keke for murder. There were also continuous consultations between RAMSI and officials of the Solomon with the aim of setting up a long-term reform strategy, and provided professional and governmental advice (Bellamy and Davies 2011; Hoadley 2005; McMullan and Peebles 2006).

The second phase of the operation (the most complex and protracted) was to strengthen the Solomon government institutions. With Australia and New Zealand’s assistance, RAMSI also made substantial progress despite the fact that this is a long-term process. During this phase, the police component shouldered huge responsibilities, for there was a draw-down of the military component. Also, RAMSI recorded some remarkable achievements because many cases of impunity were tried, while RSIP took the responsibility for policing their country from RAMSI. However, the socio-economic roots of the conflict, the problem of contracted economic growth and that of inadequate employment opportunities for the increasing population were difficult to address. Thus, the post-conflict nation-building aspect of RAMSI’s mandate
was not achieved. This problem was compounded by the riots that broke out following the April 2006 general elections.

On 18 April 2006, riots broke out in Honiara following national elections. The riots were sparked off by the allegation that the elections were fixed and manipulated with financial assistance of Chinese business men. This led to racial tension which saw Honiara descended into a state of lawlessness. The riots exposed the weakness of the RSIP, as it was unable to contain it, while the responsibility to protect government officials and restoring order fell on international police contingent. The RSIP, with international assistance, eventually prevented the spread of the riots beyond Honiara. RAMSI’s relative success is seen as providing a model for future intervention and lessons learnt in the Pacific. In this context, the questions that need scholarly attentions become: What are the conditions necessary for RAMSI’s relative success? Is RAMSI’s model feasible or an appropriate mechanism for addressing conflict in other regions of the world? I answer the first question in the next section. The answers to the second question will be provided in the concluding part of this paper.

Factors in Success and Lessons Learnt

(...) the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) made serious efforts to adhere to the central tenets of successful peacekeeping: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self defence (Rees 2006, 15).

The RAMSI experiences demonstrate some of the conditions for successful peacekeeping and the advantages of regional assistance in helping states exercise their responsibility to protect, thereby strengthening their sovereignty and capacity. RAMSI’s relative success is a function of a cluster of factors. First, the operation enjoyed the cooperation and consent of the host government and local populations; that is the Solomon Islands and its people. This factor, together with the strong political support from the Australian, New Zealand, and other regional governments, and PIF as a regional arrangement gave RAMSI the latitude to perform its duties without hindrances and fear. This support made it possible for the mission to easily win the hearts and minds of the local populations. The Australia-led intervention was based upon request from the government of the Solomon, in line with the law passed by the Solomon Parliament mandating RAMSI’s presence. What this portends is that, the host state’s cooperation is fundamental to a successful peace operation. Furthermore, the timing of international intervention also
helped tremendously in the case of the Solomon Islands. RAMSI’s Special Coordinator concurred: “RAMSI has been a success because it was the right plan at the right time and we had the right team with the right approach with the right level of political backing and resources” (Warner 2004, 7). The timing of RAMSI intervention is fundamental in that the mission got involved in the Solomon at a time when ethnic tensions had been relatively dampened, otherwise, this would have heightened the division of the community along ethnic fault-lines (Warner 2004, 8).

Contributing to RAMSI’s relatively successful operation is the roles played by its police component. Although RAMSI was a military intervention, its reliance on a regional police component cannot be overlooked. For, the regional planners believed that the type of conflict/violence in the Solomon Islands was a low-intensity and localised one which did not require a full-scale military operation. Hanson (2003, 258) agreed that meeting small-scale, localised conflict/tribal infighting with heavily-armed combat soldiers is inappropriate and it is likely to cause/provoke a reactionary escalation of the conflict. At another level, preference for robust and highly visible policing roles is less provocative and less expensive as well. ‘Operation Helping a Friend’ may be said to find solace in Mary Kaldor’s (2001, 124-131) model of ‘cosmopolitan law enforcement’ which is more or less a compromise between the UN classical peacekeeping approach and peace enforcement. Kaldor’s model encourages the creation of a new ‘soldier-cum-policeman’. According to Stratford (2005, 9) the success of such undertaking is a function of a serious rethinking of issues ranging from equipment and tactics to command and the transformation of doctrine and training.

RAMSI’s rapid deployment capacity is also an important factor for its relative success, for because the mission was deployed rapidly. This factor enabled RAMSI to, as rapidly as possible, remove would-be trouble makers. The April 2006 riots did not spread outside the capital city because the international force provided timely support to the RSIP.

Doubtless, RAMSI’s reliance on the police component has the tendency to contribute to the Pacific Islands states’ own policing capabilities, benefiting from the experiences of well trained and established Australian and New Zealand’s police contingents. This can form the basis of a solid, reliable, and efficient regional unit for future operations. All factors considered, it is important to emphasise that RAMSI was not a transitional administration since its deployment was based on request from the Solomon Islands government and the host country retained its status as a sovereign state. RAMSI’s activities were coordinated with Honiara and also with regard to the international assistance to the island nation. Essentially, Operation Helpem Fren was
an effort to insert a backbone into the Solomon government administration (Rees 2006).

Case 2: Securing a Peaceful Pacific: Secession and Peacekeeping ‘the Pacific Way’ in Bougainville

Historical Introduction and Puzzle

An island to the east of the main PNG’s groups of island, Bougainville is politically an autonomous region of PNG. In 1899, both Bougainville and Buka were separated from the rest of the Solomon Islands and became part of the German New Guinea as a result of the British and German agreed border delimitation agreement. Thus, the boundary creation by European colonialism arbitrarily separated ethnically homogenous people into two jurisdictions. This situation represents one source of contemporary secessionist unrest on the island. For, as Rolfe (2001, 41) stated, the people of Bougainville are ethnically much more close to the western Solomon Islanders and feel little if any kinship with the remaining parts of PNG. The island of Bougainville was occupied during the First World War by the Australian forces and in 1920, the League of Nations mandated Australia to administer the island. PNG became an independent state in 1975, and both the Islands of Buka and Bougainville became parts of PNG and formed its 19th province.

Although Bougainvilleans voted massively for total independence in 1978, their wishes were ignored by the governments of PNG and Australia. The demographic and sociological configurations of the Island are well captured by Rolfe (2001, 41) when he says: “There are 19 main language groups on Bougainville in a population of between 160,000 and 200,000. These are small and largely independent societies, without any central political authority. There are significant cultural differences between language groups”. Although ethnic variations between Bougainville and the main PNG, the so-called Polynesia and Melanesia dichotomy, is visible as a trigger of the age-old conflict and insecurity on the island, underdevelopment and perceived marginalisation of the minority ethnic groups are the proximate causes of the conflict that ignited in the late 1980s (May 1990; Regan 1998; 2004; Smith 1992). The dispute between local landowners and the PNG government

8 Bougainvilleans refer to other PNG as ‘red skins’. This description is in relations to their lighter skin colour when compared with the Bougainvilleans’ colour that is black.

9 There are two types of differentiation in Bougainville. The first is the differentiation of Bougainvilleans from ‘red skins’ and the second is the internal differentiation among Bougainvillean groups.
centres on the issues of royalties from the Panguna Copper Mine (operated in Bougainville by the Bougainville Copper Limited or BCL, an Australian mining company) and compensation from environmental despoilment downstream. Right from its inception in 1972, the copper mining activities have been opposed by the traditional landowners and the people of Bougainville who have been adversely affected by the impacts of mining activities at Panguna. Historically, ethnic Nasiol social arrangements were disrupted by missionaries and plantation owners, especially in the 19th century. New patterns of economic activity and new forms of spiritual worship that were not compatible with, and difficult to incorporate in Nasiol life were introduced. There were also strong Nasiol resistance against European colonialism and its practices. They refused to work on plantations (especially in the 1950s and 1960s) and this saw the influx of people from other parts of PNG and beyond the country to work. The Nasiol ethnic group also refused to partake in such government-sponsored political-economic projects as local governments and producers’ cooperatives. Rolfe (2001, 41) said, “[i]n 1962, when a UN fact-finding mission visited, some Nasiol publicly asked that Australia be replaced by the United States as the colonial power. Distrust of Australia has been another strand in the successions thread and, more importantly, a strong determinant of the shape of subsequent peace processes”. Dissatisfied with the situation, a group of Bougainville nationalists unilaterally proclaimed independence for the North Solomon in September 1975. Tensions were doused with pacification by an agreement to grant Bougainville a degree of autonomy. With this new development, Bougainville became one of the 19 provinces of PNG and Port Moresby paid royalties from the mine proceeds to the North Solomon provincial government.

In the late 1980s (1989 precisely) violence erupted in Bougainville out of perceived inequality in the distribution of the proceeds from Panguna Copper Mine, loss of traditional lands, and the devastating environmental impacts of the mine, among other issues. Aware that, with the passage of time some Nasiol that were employed by the mines were given education and trainings but this did not evenly distributed throughout the community. Unfortunately for the mines owners, such trainings had unintended consequences because it gave young, educated Nasiol the socio-cultural resources to politically confront the BCL. This violence was championed by the Nasiol ethnic group that owns the land on which the mine was developed. Dissatisfied with their inability to gain adequate compensations, disgruntled landowners formed the Panguna Landowners’ Association (PLA) under the leadership of Francis Ona. The PLA was formed to represent the interests of landowners in negotiations with BCL. The PLA eventually transformed into
a militia known as the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) (under the headship of Sam Kauona, an erstwhile junior officer of the PNG Defence Force or PNGDF) to resist marginalisation, and also aimed at succession. The Nasioi people formed the core leadership and personnel of the BRA in the region. In November 1988, there were small skirmishes/attacks by the BRA to disrupt operations via sabotage in which the mine was closed. The clashes between the BRA and PNGDF and PNG Police Mobile Squad in November 1988 signalled the birth of a period of alternating conflicts. In 1989, excessive force was used by PNGDF against the BRA, the result of which led to the closure of the Panguna Mine. The PNGDF operation resulted to impunity against the Nasioi people and their villages were burnt down and a state of emergency was declared in the province, while the provincial government was suspended. Consequent on the prevailing tense political-security situations, large segments of the North Solomon population became alienated, and they eventually developed sympathy with the BRA across and beyond Bougainville.

In 1990, the PNG authority withdrew all its support to and security forces in Bougainville and instituted a blockade of the island with the intention to undermine the BRA activities. In May 1990, an Independent Republic of Me’ekamui was declared and the establishment of the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) followed. The BIG was the political arm of the BRA. The blockade of the island had catastrophic socio-economic effects on Bougainvilleans and it eventually weakened the glue that cemented them. For, there were divisions between and among Nasioi people and other ethnic groups that did not support them. Negotiations between the PNG and BRA doused tensions but the BRA violently attacked other ethnic groups that they believed did not support their cause. This was followed by the growing waves of inter and intra-communal conflicts which saw the formation of a local opposition group, known as the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF), to the BRA. The BRF allied to the PNGDF to fight the BRA. During this period, Australia’s DFAT estimated that about 15,000 people lost their lives to war, hunger and diseases, while about 70,000 people were displaced. Throughout the late 1990s, arms skirmishes between the BRA and the combined forces of BRF and PNGDF continued unabated, a situation that made any third party peaceful resolution to the conflict an arduous task.

The International Dimensions of Civil War: Australia, New Zealand and ‘Peacekeeping the Pacific Way’ in Bougainville

Here, I undertake a quick review of international peacemaking and peacekeeping interventions to highlight the factors for the successful or failed peacekeeping in Bougainville. In 1990, PNG’s neighbours and regional powers, New Zealand and Australia showed interests in resolving the conflict. Both Canberra and Wellington’s involvement in Bougainville was because of regional security concerns. Although, national interests cannot be ruled out as Australia was not trusted by the BRA but the security concerns of the Pacific as a region, and South Pacific in particular and that of the intervening states are central in understanding regional responses to the conflict. Besides, the protagonists were tired of armed confrontations, a situation which Zartman (2003) regarded as the ripe moment and conducive for a successful peace intervention since the conflict has reached a mutually hurting stalemate. According to Zartman (2003, 19), when parties are mired in conflict and it is apparent that victory is not insight and the deadlock is painful to the parties, they tend to look for alternative way out or policy. Thus, in August 1990, peace talks between the BRA and PNG commenced on New Zealand warships, HMNZS Endeavour. Aware that the PNG is in Melanesia which Australia supposed to play a leading role, but New Zealand, a Polynesian state led the peace process because Canberra’s neutrality in the PNG/Bougainville conflict is doubtful. Australia was compromised given its identification with PNG.

During the talks, New Zealand mediators adopted the ‘Pacific Ways’ of negotiation in which Papua New Guineans were allowed to run the negotiations at their own pace rather than imposing any established peacekeeping/peacemaking theoretical model. The talks resulted in a truce known as the Endeavour Accords. The accord sought to restore services to Bougainville and resolved that the protagonists will meet in the future to discuss the island’s constitution future. Unfortunately, the accord effectively collapsed. In January 1991, at the invitation of New Zealand, the belligerents, met in Honiara in which the famous Honiara Declaration was signed. The declaration sought to annul BRA’s unilateral declaration of independence. Also central to the declaration were, amongst others, renunciation of violence, PNGDF’s disengagement from the province. Unfortunately, the declaration failed and sporadic fighting resumed. In fact Francis Ona declared the Honiara Declaration rubbish. The Commonwealth while visiting Bougainville contended that there was an absence of unanimity and common ground between the PNG government and the BRA and resolved that there was no opportunities at that point for the organisation to get involve (Rolfe 2001, 45). Despite New Zealand and Australia’s efforts, nothing significant happened except sporadic
fighting until 1994 when PNG Foreign Minister, Julius Chan, determined to resolve the crisis with the proposal for the deployment of a regional peacekeeping force. In August 1994, the BRA and PNGDF discussed the mission’s concept of operation. A month later, a ceasefire agreement was signed by the new Prime Minister of PNG, Julius Chan, his Solomon Islands counterpart Billy Hilly, and Kauona and it was resolved that another peace conference will be held in October at Arawa. Troops from Tonga, Fiji and Vanuatu would provide security for the meeting; with New Zealand and Australia providing necessary training, administrative and technical support. Unfortunately, the BRA senior leaderships failed to attend the conference for fear of insecurity. Internal squabbles/wrangling within the BRA splitted the movement in which the moderate group and its leaders decided to partner, or better still work with Port Moresby. In November 1994, the PNG and the moderate group signed the ‘Charter of Mirigini for a New Bougainville’ that paved the way for the formation of Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG) in 1995. The newly constituted BTG was to function as intermediary between PNG and radical forces. By June 1995, Bougainville witnessed positive changes as normalcy was gradually returning to district centres and villages, and ceasefire was holding. Thus, with these achievements and the functioning of BTG, Bougainville leaders met in Cairns, Australia in September-December 1995 for discussions. These efforts were insufficient to restore peace to Bougainville as the PNGDF and BRA were at dagger-drawn opposition when they returned home. Inflamed the conflict that made peace a distant aspiration was that Australia’s mediations were viewed with suspicions especially by the BRA radicals. This is going by Australia’s colonial history in PNG and its support for Port Moresby. Therefore, this scenario made New Zealand the lead nation in the peace process, as I have explained above.

New Zealand’s Foreign Minister, Don McKinnon, led the peace process. In May 1997, prominent and influential Bougainvilleans met in Auckland at the invitation of McKinnon. The meeting laid the foundation for the July 1997 meeting at Burnham Military Camp (Burnham I Talks) in Auckland among all the protagonists, with the exception of PNG government. As Rolfe (2001, 45-46) writes:

At Burnham there was a ‘plethora of informal contacts between individuals, working groups and other meetings. The process is very Melanesian and to a “western observers” it is very disorganised without obvious leadership or focus (there was) universal positive comment about the lack of pressure on participants’.

Aware that there were no established procedures by New Zealand and
the peace process continued until all participants were satisfied. By contrast Canberra favoured a top-down strategy. The peace process led to the famous Burnham Declaration signed by Joseph Kabui and Gerald Sinato of BIG and BTG respectively. The Declaration called for reconciliation, demilitarisation and deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Bougainville. It also called for talks with Port Moresby before the end of September 1997. Of note, there was a semblance of unanimity among the Burnham I participants as they wanted peace in their land. The success of Burnham I encouraged McKinnon to invite all the protagonists, including this time, Port Moresby and the PNG military in October 1997. At Burnham II, just like its predecessor, the ‘Pacific Way’ of peacemaking was strongly underlined and in fact, it was put into practice where the Maori cultural practices were visible. The Maori cultural practices obviously helped the peace process because:

At the beginning of each meeting, for example, there was a formal Maori welcome, which include a ‘hongi’ or touching of noses by participants. One of the PNG participants at Burnham II commented to a New Zealand official: the ‘Pacific’ style of welcome had allowed PNG officials at the meeting ‘to shake hands, touch noses and exchange breath’ with Bougainvilleans with whom they had been fighting for 10 years. The Pacific Way enabled participants to walk through glass walls without thinking about what they were doing$^{11}$.

The Burnham II meeting produced a truce and the establishment of an unarmed international Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) to be led by New Zealand$^{12}$. It is unfortunate that, at the start of the operation, the TMG, in its operation, was beset with internal squabbles, especially between the ADF and New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). Furthermore, there was the problem of insufficient preparation and tension between and among different institutional culture as well as lack of trust between the TMG and local groups. Also there difficulties in integration of Fiji and Vanuatu military personnel. Fijians and Vanuatu find some NZDF and ADF personnel rude, hedonistic and lacking cultural sensitivity (see Breen 2002 for details). In 23 January 1998, the ‘Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville’ was negotiated by McKinnon and signed by the belligerents (the PNG government, the BIG, BTG, BRA, and Bougainville members of Parliament) at Lincoln, a university campus near Christchurch. Under the terms of the Lincoln Agreement, PNG withdrew its troops from the island and steps were taken

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12 On Bougainville peace process and Australia’s role (and New Zealand’s to some extent), see various chapters in Wehner and Denoon 2001.
to disarm the armed groups (Breen 2002). The agreement was to be monitored by the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG). The PMG was ADF-led TMG in practice with Australia cultural approach that was at variance with New Zealand’s. The Australian government approach was highly institutionalised and result-oriented instead of process. The Australia-led PMG was to encourage long-term nation-building and the mission received the supports of New Zealand and other Pacific Island Governments (Hoadley 2005). The peace process made extraordinary progress. Following the Lincoln Agreement, the parties stalled in their internal discussions, a situation that led to another round of negotiations in New Zealand in which the participants were exposed to:

Maori approaches of being a nation within a state, to dealing with a ‘foreign’ government and to dealing with internal tribal divisions. The process introduced the immersion of Maori culture and living under the same roof. The Bougainville leaders simply could not ignore each other, especially as guests of another Pacific ‘village’. Negotiations resumed and the groups that had signed Lincoln Agreement now signed the Matakana and Okatina understandings to promote reconciliation (Rolfe 2001, 49).

Based on this success, there was minor UN involvement through the UN setting up a mission in Bougainville (the United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville or UNOMIB). With the successful completion of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and order restored, the PMG team left in 2003, while Bougainville became an autonomous province within PNG, in June 2005. This is based on the PMG’s facilitated negotiations that led to an agreement that Bougainville would be recognised as PNG’s autonomous province. And as part of the current peace settlement, the UN is expected to conduct a referendum on the island’s future between 2015 and 2020.

Factors in Success and Lessons Learnt

I pose key questions: What are the factors/conditions responsible for successful peacekeeping in Bougainville? What are the lessons learnt for future peacekeeping operations in the Pacific or elsewhere? The first thing to realise in the Bougainville peace process is that the planners, especially New Zealand, considered the ‘Pacific Way’ to be the appropriate model rather than relying on any established peacekeeping theoretical consideration. The term ‘Pacific Way’ connotes Pacific solutions to Pacific problems and advocates for the norm of non-intervention and abhorrence of the traditional western way
of conflict resolution\textsuperscript{13}. Rolfe (2001, 39) provides the essence of the Pacific Way by arguing that it (the pacific way) requires:

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\text{’[U]nanimous compromise’ which means that ‘some are expected when possible to ensure personal sacrifices so that the community as a whole will have harmony’. There is an underlying intention that nobody will get left out in a process that inevitably involves long discussion and many involve frank disagreements, but in which no resentment will be felt.}
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Therefore, negotiations, compromise and patience, flexibility, consideration of other points of view, inclusiveness and reconciliation activities form the basis of the ‘Pacific Way’ to the resolution of conflicts within or between nations in the region. The Bougainville case study established the importance of the thorough analysis of the environment in which the operation will take place, that is, context specific for would be peace planners rather than relying on any peacekeeping theory (Rolfe 2001; Mortlock 2005). Furthermore, the success of the peace process/operation in Bougainville unmask the importance of letting peace proceeds at a measured pace. May (2005: 466) asserts that “peacemaking on Bougainville after 1997 was a long drawn-out and frequently frustratingly protracted affair, but...the slow pace of the process allowed the various parties—BRA and BRF, Bougainville and national government—to gain a measure of trust in one another, and to explore the limits within which concessions might be made on all sides.” Probably this is the main reason why Wellington did not impose any solution or time limit.

In discussing the success of the Bougainville peace process/operation, we should not forget the fact that the approach to the peace process was ‘bottom-up’ which means that the process was owned by the belligerents and local population themselves with external supports. The local people contributed greatly to the restoration of social harmony, which facilitated the acceptance of the outcomes. The peace process in Bougainville is very Melanesian in the sense that the facilitator’s (New Zealand) applied an approach that had no intention of driving the process. New Zealand believed that the decision on how to resolve the problem in Bougainville must be handled in the Melanesian way and, Wellington and Canberra (despite its reservations) were just to play supporting roles.

**Concluding Reflections**

The case studies examined in this paper established that the peacekeeping operations have/had some successes and regional powers

\textsuperscript{13} For a comprehensive analysis of the “Pacific Way’, see Haas 1989.
Isiaka Alani Badmus

(Australia and New Zealand) working with the PIF (in the particular case of the Solomon) and other international actors were able to maintain regional security in the Pacific. A number of endogenous and exogenous factors explain the relative successes associated with these peace missions. Are there any lessons for peacekeeping in Africa or elsewhere? Although, most Pacific conflicts are low intensity compare to the situation in Africa, but some lessons from the region are vital for Africa, especially at this critical time when the AU is yearning towards creating its comprehensive, self-sufficient peace operation capacity with emphasis on military and civilian inputs.

In the Pacific, peacekeepers enjoys the support of the host state as in the Solomon Islands and also these peace missions benefited from the interaction that emerge from the nexus of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The peacekeeping experiences learnt in the Pacific serve two purposes for future peace operations in Africa and elsewhere. First, as I stated earlier, the success of peace mission depends on the degree of support of the local population and second, the partnership between the peace mission and the local population must be based on solid trust and sincerity. Although such local support, more often than not, is not easy to come by, future peace operation planners must strive to achieve some degree of semblance to them, because without them it will be difficult if not impossible to achieve its mandate, especially in a hostile environment. This is the present situation in Somalia where the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is facing hostilities from the al Shabaab and other militant groups rejecting the presence of ‘foreign’ troops on their land. In addition, the mandates of a peace mission, which provide legitimacy to intervention, must be feasible and achievable. A feasible and achievable mandate is interpreted to be the one with provisions that is based on a worst-case threat assessment and more importantly reflects the political reality on the ground. Such a realistic mandate should state clearly the mission’s purpose and tasks, the roles of the Special Representative of the peace mission’s authorising institution, conditions under which force may be used, among others. And such a mandate becomes achievable once it is well-matched with the political realities of the situation, mirroring the stakeholders’ commitment (which includes the parties to the conflicts) and sufficient resources that are needed to be allocated to such a peace force to achieve its mandate. Doubtless, feasible and achievable mandates are a prerequisite for a successful peace operation. For, feasible and achievable mandates rooted in pragmatic worst-case planning have a higher propensity to secure peace and save human lives. Any intervention without an achievable mandate is tantamount to self-immolation, suicidal and could be regarded as morally irresponsible. This was not the case in the Solomon Islands as
RAMSI’s mandates were pragmatic and achievable. This is a lesson learnt for the future peace operation, especially in Africa.

It is doubtful whether RAMSI will be an appropriate model in such conflict-ridden settings as Africa in that, as opposed to the type of conflict in the Solomon Islands, African conflicts are more complex and are full-scale military actions involving heavily armed combatant soldiers that do not follow international humanitarian law. In such conflict settings, reliance entirely on policing functions will absolutely resolve nothing. Probably this is why Warner (2004) warned that RAMSI does not provide a model for future operations; rather it may provide an ‘index’ by which future challenges can be gauged.

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ABSTRACT
This paper examined conflicts and regional security in the Pacific. The paper has as its focus the roles of Australia and New Zealand (and the Pacific Islands Forum) in managing security in the Pacific using Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) and the Solomon Islands as case studies. It documented their peacekeeping experiences, and interrogated whether these operations were successes or not and why. Furthermore, the author explored whether the peacekeeping experiences in the Pacific and lessons learnt from these operations might be applicable to, and/or be helpful in developing a useful peacekeeping model for other regions. The argument of this paper is that, although Australia and New Zealand regional security management role is based on security concerns of the region but the national interests of these dominant states are also at play and a key factor that shape the nature and direction of interventions. As well, the dynamics of these operations have revolved around interaction between and among local, regional and global political factors. The author argued that peacekeeping in the Pacific (especially in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands) may not offer an appropriate peacekeeping model in such-conflict ridden settings as Africa where armed violence are more complex, protracted and involve full-scale military actions as opposed to low-intensity and localised conflicts in the Pacific, but some of the peacekeeping lessons from the region may be helpful to other peace operations, especially Peacekeeping the ‘Pacific Way’.

KEY WORDS

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