About the Journal

AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations is an essentially academic vehicle, linked to the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) and to the International Strategic Studies Doctoral Program (PPGEEI) of the Faculty of Economics (FCE) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Its pluralist focus aims to contribute to the debate on the international political and economic order from the perspective of the developing countries.

The journal publishes original articles and book reviews in English, Portuguese or Spanish about themes that lie in the vast area of Strategy and International Relations, with special interest in issues related to developing countries and the South-South relations, their security issues, the economic, political and diplomatic development of emerging nations and their relations with the traditional powers. The journal’s target audience consists of researchers, specialists and postgraduate students of International Relations.

The journal will try, through its publication policy, to ensure that each volume has at least one author from each of the great southern continents (Asia, Latin America, Africa), in order to stimulate the debate and the diffusion of the knowledge produced in these regions. All of the contributions will be subjected to a scientific review.

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EDITOR’S NOTE:
THIRD WORLD OR GLOBAL SOUTH?

Paulo Fagundes Visentini

With the end of the bipolar system, the academic mainstream of International Relations considered that the concept of Third World had no longer operational or theoretical consistency, given that the countries of the Second World (socialist) were converting themselves into “Market Democracies”. The expression Third World was coined by French demographer Alfred Sauvy, in 1952, as an analogy to the Third State (people without privileges) from the time of the French Revolution.

The Third World encompassed very distinct nations, but they had in common the fact that they had constituted the colonial or semi-colonial periphery. In addition to objective factors such as an expanding and young population and abundant natural resources, their limited level of development pointed to potential economic expansion and for the articulation of political organizations such as the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. There was the pursuit of development, anti-colonialist and neutralist ideology, as well as the rejection of accession to military blocs and to the great power politics.

Rather than creating a theoretical fad, the introduction of the Global South concept represented a strategy to depoliticize the meaning of Third Worldism. The Global South is not defined by a positive agenda, but by a negative one because, after all, the North is also global, is it not? Thus, according to the new concept there is no sense in the existence of the Group of 77 or the Non-Aligned Movement. All Southern States would be diluted in globalization, and the largest nations would enjoy the status of “emerging markets.”

However, the unequal and combined development process, which is part of the essence of the world capitalist system, continued to follow its
course. Soon after, initiatives such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum, the autonomist and developmental diplomacy of the BRICS (with Russia and China forming a new Second World) and other variable geometry coalitions came into place. The Non-Aligned Movement continued existing (and growing) and the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference demonstrated the importance and continuity of the Third Worldism.

Hence the constant criticism of any reference to the movements linked to South-South Cooperation, the BRICS and the minimal questioning of international rules defined by the great powers of the North Atlantic. There is a crisis and globalization, in order to sustain itself as a system, needs to avoid any misconduct of other States, no matter how small. Politicians, military, diplomats, journalists and academics are confronted with this situation fostered by the “international community” (powers that speak on behalf of others).

Despite the denial of the importance of the regions that compose the Third World / Global South, what is observed in them is an increasingly fierce strategic dispute, which in a previous edition was called “Economic War”. In Latin America the progressive regimes that emerged in this century are under strong pressure from powers and international organizations. Africa has become a playing field between governments and Euro-US companies on the one hand, and the Chinese and other members of the BRICS on the other. In the Middle East, the armed conflict reached the size of a general war, while in Asia an attempt to form political, military and economic blocs can be observed.

So, this issue of the Austral journal is dedicated to those regions, including an article by Professor Beatriz Bissio, which was one of the editors of the famous Third World Journal. It is very important for the new generations of internationalist scholars to be aware of concreteness, activities and complexities of Third World initiatives consecrated by the UN, such as the New International Economic Order and New World Information and Communication Order.

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UNITED STATES, LATIN AMERICA AND THE XXI CENTURY WORLD: FORGING A NEW GEOPOLITICAL SPACE

Severino Cabral

In order to efficiency of action, whether in personal or in corporate life, we have to recognize the coincident necessities of taking long views and of confining ourselves to short ones. (Mahan 1990)

Both Americas, these two races, these two souls head to head and in permanente conflict inside a new world: this is the international life in the Americas. In the North, a powerful industrial republic, rich, abundant and in the height of its international triumphs. At the South, twenty States in the making, lagging behind, uneven and turbulent, drained by anarchy and undermined by disagreement. (Malagrida 1919)

Around the American Mediterranean and on the continent to the sound lies the world of Latin America. If the word “America” suggests similarity, the word “Latin” should underline a difference. The other America is expected somehow to be live our own because it is a part of this hemisphere, but the actual differences between the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin sections of the New World far outweigh the similarities suggested by the common term American. (Spykman 1942)

(...) Brazil is opening the Amazon, with its road of thousands of kilometers that will cross from end to end and will link the Atlantic to the Pacific and tear their borders with Guyana, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, for the first time opening the possibility of holding that Panibéria who walked, it seems, in the dreams of Alexandre de Gusmão (...). (Silva 2009)

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We must seize the opportunity to develop ourselves; and the key lies in economic development. (Xiaoping 1994)

Currently, the Chinese people are struggling to make true the Chinese dream to rejuvenate the Chinese nation, while the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean are also striving for materialization of Latin American and Caribbean dream, which is unity, cooperation, development and revitalization. I hope our dreams add shine and strength to each other and are realized together. (Jinping 2014b)

United States and Cuba Relations and the International Post-Cold War Context

In the end of 2014, the world was surprised by the announcement of the re-establishment of relations between the United States and Cuba and the opening of dialogue between President Raul Castro and Barack Obama. A historical event and future carrier was pointed out by the two countries throughout Latin America and the rest of the world during the second decade of this century.

Since the beginning of the sixties, the Cuban revolution led by the Castro brothers and Che Guevara, Cuba and the United States ruptured their relations and brought up one of the most serious confrontations of the Cold War: in 1962 the serious crisis caused by the rockets installed in Cuba led the USSR and the US to the brink of nuclear war.

The conflict between Cuba and the United States happened in the double context of the North-South and East-West axis. As the Cuban revolution was proclaimed a socialist one, it inserted itself in the heart of the political and ideological amongst two political systems that divided the international scene: the socialist system, led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the capitalist system, led worldwide by the United States of America. But on the other hand, the fact that Cuba belonged to Latin American inserted the country in the field of developing countries. Also, Cuba already had been one of the founders of the non-aligned movement. Therefore, this triple insertion made Cuba an important part of the international political game throughout the Cold War.

The Cuban factor and its revolution influenced the political development in Latin America ever since. The Conference of the Organization of American States (OAS), held in Punta del Este, in January 1962, by express invitation of the US government, had resulted in the removal of Cuba from the inter-American system. A significant fact that should be noted was that
Severino Cabral

The three largest countries in the Latin American region (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) abstained or in the case of Mexico, opposed the radical measure of exclusion of a member country of the Iberian community of nations (in this case Cuba) because the Cuban Marxist-Leninist regime was considered contrary to the prevailing liberal democratic regime.

Frozen for a long time, the Cuban issue began to change when the Ibero-American Summit meeting of the heads of state in Guadalajara / Mexico 1982, which included the participation of Spain and Portugal, brought Cuba’s return to participate in the group of Latin Americans countries. Due to the end of Cold War, a solution for the Cuba situation was expected such as the lifting of the blockade and its re-entry into the Latin American community. However, this did not happen: the continuity of the segregation policy towards Cuba, became a source of friction between Latin and North Americans.

The Historical Background of the US and Latin American States Relations

The relationship of Latin American countries with the United States has a long history dating back to the beginnings of colonization and settlement of the New World.

The success of the “Reconquista” of the Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula led to the formation of the two kingdoms of Spain and Portugal. They began the cycle of naval expeditions and discoveries. The history of the Western Hemisphere begins with Columbus voyage. A history that was focused in its beginnings in two main actors Spain and Portugal, with the symbolic mark of the Treaty of Tordesillas. This agreement, which succeeded the papal bull Inter Cetera, that divided the world into two halves, North and South, and established that Spain had almost all the lands of the New World and Portugal the Atlantic and Indian domain. The beginning of the occupation of the New World lands took place around 1500 in the wake of the great naval expeditions that opened the world’s oceanic routes, shaping the outline of the Cape in the south of Africa by Vasco da Gama, and the arrival in India by the Portuguese; while under the Hispanic flag, Ferdinand Magellan started the circumnavigation of the southern part of America.

Once they were occupied, the new lands of America aroused the greed and the interest of Britain and France, that started a dispute with Portugal and Spain for the richness of the New World. Later, the United Provinces parted with the Spanish Empire and the Netherlands would also enter the fight for
the possession of these lands and it huge wealth. Also, in the second century of colonization of new lands it was the turn of the English presence to become known in the North of the Americas: with the Puritans of New England and the colonies of the South from the North American subcontinent. This event marked the beginning of the occupation of the Western Hemisphere, as well as its real split into three parts: Spanish America, Portuguese America and the English America (Travassos 1947).

The English, American and French revolutions put an end to the feudal world and created the conditions for the emergence of a new urban-industrial society based on modern science and machinery. The impact generated by the revolution in the economy had an impact on the power distribution inside these societies and pressed for the end of absolutism due to the introduction of liberalism - dominant in industrialized countries. These revolutions also changed the system of power generated by Tordesillas, creating, as its replacement, another system based on the concentration and centralization of the European powers, the so-called “Euro-world”. The reach of the urban and industrial revolution expanded to the New World with the independence of former colonies (turned into Republics) following the American model, with the sole exception of Brazil that was declared as United Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarve, and held for most of the nineteenth century the monarchical form of government.

Throughout the nineteenth century the industrialization process initiated by Britain, which praised for the first time in history the preponderance of machinery over the strength of man or animal, has caused labor productivity to rise, making the trade of manufactures, the most elevated form of wealth creation. This process focused on England and soon, the English colony of America, after becoming independent from the metropolis, would initiate the cycle of industrial expansion in the nation that would become the greatest power of the 20th century.

At the end of the Ottocento former European colonies of the Americas were politically independent but economically subordinate to financial and technological mechanisms created by industrialized countries. They were able to escape the fate of African and Asian countries of being European powers colonies’ but were unable to escape the dependence of the countries that were preparing to enter the second great revolution on capital and technological resources. Therefore at the end of the 19th century the political-strategic concertation amongst Latin American nations developed in order to answer the challenge of confronting their level of industrial development with major US power. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that the US went to war against Spain, seized the Caribbean, turning it in its Mediterranean. Thus, in
the beginning of the 20th century it inaugurated a new position in the world: as a great power, able to intervene in Europe, Africa, Asia as well as in the Western Hemisphere.

The Present and Future of US Relations with Cuba and Latin America

The surprising rapprochement between Cuba and the United States after months of secret talks that even mobilized Pope Francis produced a strong impact on the world’s public opinion and brought up the expectation that one of Cold War remnants would eventually end and the so-called “Pearl of the Caribbean” would return to the familiarity of the Latin American community and be reintegrated into the Inter-American system structure.

However, throughout the Latin American region the positive impact was moderate due to some distrust of the real nature of the new US policy toward Cuba. For many analysts and observers the new position of the US government must be located within the grand strategy announced since the time of the presidential candidacy of then-Senator Barack Obama, as a “New Strategy for a New World”. At the time (July 15, 2008), Obama defined the objectives to be pursued by his future presidency:

As President, I will pursue a tough, smart and principled national security strategy – one that recognizes that we have interests not just in Baghdad, but in Kandahar and Karachi, in Tokyo and London, in Beijing and Berlin. I will focus this strategy on five goals essential to making America safer: ending the war in Iraq responsibly; finishing the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban; securing all nuclear weapons and materials from terrorists and rogue states; achieving true energy security; and rebuilding our alliances to meet the challenges of the 21st century. (Obama 2008)

As he advocated the creation of a new paradigm to deal with energy dependence, the future president Obama waved U$ 150 billion to put an end to what he called the tyranny of oil in our time. In his words:

One of the most dangerous weapons in the world today is the price of oil. We ship nearly $700 million a day to unstable or hostile nations for their oil. It pays for terrorist bombs going off from Baghdad and Beirut. It funds petro-diplomacy in Caracas and radical madrassas from Karachi to Khartoum. It takes leverage away from America and shifts it to dictators. (Obama 2008)
Regarding the establishment of new alliances to face the challenges of the twenty-first century, Obama presented nothing else than the renewal of the cooperation agreement with Europe and the strengthening of its partnership with Japan, South Korea, Australia and India. In a way its proposal did not clash with the strategy outlined by Ms. Condoleezza Rice for the second term of George Bush Jr., of an innovative diplomacy, in order to generate a new framework of world power that included the new emerging nations of the international scenario (Kissinger 2011 and 2014).

However, as his second mandate comes to an end, President Obama is stuck with the internal problems of domestic politics, with a hostile Republican Congress majority to its democratic government. In this situation in which his government remains limited to world market problems of fossil fuel and renewable energy, as well as far to stabilize the Middle East, Obama has turned to the Latin American region and encouraged the creation of the Pacific Alliance involving Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile. This maneuver, which complements the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Trans-Pacific Partnership - TPP), the United States seek to contain a Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere. In order to achieve this goal they insert themselves amongst Latin American and Caribbean countries, especially in the South American subcontinent, where they face resistance to a greater or lesser extent, in Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela.

The intended effect of this double maneuver seems to be the creation of a new context and chart new strategies to maintain the presence and the American leadership in the Western Hemisphere. In fact, the real effect sought by this maneuver is to counter the several collective bodies recently built by Latin American countries such as the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).

For the ones who analyze this situation it is not an easy task to break the shield that was built around this key issue of development in Latin America and the Caribbean. This development, however, is vital to the success of the region and the world economy beset by the wide financial crisis that began in 2008 and which is still in progress, limiting trade and constraining the economies of both industrialized and developing countries (Cabral 2004).

Therefore, the Cuban issue is inserted, in part, in this broader movement of regional integration and cooperation among the countries of Central and South America. In this area are located oil giants like Mexico and Venezuela and further through the south Brazil, which can become a mega energy power due to the discovery of huge oil and gas deposits on the continental
shelf in the so-called “pre-salt” area. Clearly, the strategic observer, there is the elevation of a Southern pole of power, down south the United States with significant projected growth over the next few decades.

It is in this context that one can understand the efforts of the US government to begin a new phase of its relation with Latin America and the Caribbean. After the era of “speak softly and carry a big stick” of Theodore Roosevelt and the “good neighbor policy” of Franklin Roosevelt, there was the East-West confrontation represented by Cuba and the guerrillas in Latin America facing the armies and special forces of the Latin American regimes. This era reached its climax with the dissolution of the USSR, which brought an end to almost half a century of East-West conflict.

The end of the Cold War, however, did not eliminate power politics or the gap in terms of national power that exists between large and small countries within the international system. The reality of world power always favors the major powers in relation to the exercise of autonomy and sovereignty. The relevant geostrategic data in the global world is that the distribution of power - be it economic, scientific, technical and/or political and strategic - suffers today of a greater displacement than in the past and almost redraws the map of world power. And the remarkable thing is the emergency of the new headquarters of global power in the southern fringe of the planet. In this context, one can notice in crescendo, in both parts of the planet, significant changes in space and positioning (Brzezinski 1997, 2004, 2007 and 2012; Huntington 1996; Gruzinski 2004).

In the Asian space, due to the structural influence of the sino and Indo-Persian world, the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” began to be built. Those are the two pillars that should sustain the global economy over the next decades. But across the western hemisphere, the integration of South America with the African southern cone - linking the Pacific to the South Atlantic and the Indian and thus forming the “Great Ocean” - when established will create a new baseline for the rise of trade and global finance (Jinping 2014 and 2014b).

In this new set that is projected for the coming years and decades, a nourished observer of historical information can and should reach the conclusion that a structural emergency is to be constituted, from the revival due to the globalization process, of the Iberian world, which joined the Western route of the Indian and Pacific regions under the dual monarchy of Philip II, King of Spain, who was also Philip I, King of Portugal.

This is the reason that explains why there is a comeback of Geopolitical and classic geostrategic studies. They mold a set of theoretical and practical subjects highly relevant for the understanding of the world power system
United States, Latin America and the XXI Century world: forging a new geopolitical space

today. In a classic text of Geopolitics, written by Sir Halford Mackinder, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,” published during the course of World War II, in Foreign Affairs (July 1943), for example, there is a particular conceptual proposal for a new multipolar world order:

The fourth of my concepts embraces on either side of the South Atlantic the tropical rain-forests of South America and Africa. If these were subdued to agriculture and inhabited with the present density of tropical Java, they might sustain a thousand million people, always provided that medicine had rendered the tropics as productive of human energy as the temperate zones. Fifthly, and lastly, a thousand million people of ancient oriental civilization inhabit the Monsoon lands of India and China. They must grow to prosperity in the same years in which Germany and Japan are being tamed to civilization. They will then balance that other thousand million who live between the Missouri and the Yenisei. A balanced globe of human beings. And happy, because balanced and thus free. (Mackinder 1943)

This geopolitical platform of a global order outlined by Mackinder, even before the end of the war, in which new powers emerge, below the Equator, still plays a decisive role nowadays, exponential in the struggle for the dominance of the so-called world market. When analyzed in detail, one cannot help to wonder if the speculation about the realities of power in the world, either maritime as well land power that absorbed the minds of Alfred Mahan, Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman (the main builders of Anglo American geopolitical thought) - were solidly based on the structure of oceanic routes in the world opened by Iberian discoverers in the early modern times (Mahan 1990; Mackinder 1943 and 2000; Spykman 1944).

This is the reason why the strategy of American leadership for the control of the Pacific and the Western Hemisphere (the Pacific Alliance and the Transpacific Partnership) is built in order to answer to the South American and Latin American processes of integration. In this agenda, the maneuver to recover the American Mediterranean, in which the famous Caribbean island has a strategic position, fits precisely.

In a moment in which the extraordinary development of China puts into question the monopolistic control of world trade played by “the protesters of Tordesillas” it seems clear that the advent of a new “role” by the descendants of the “heirs of Tordesillas” - the Luso-Hispanic children of sunny Iberia - will be seen, preemptively, as a threat to US global power hegemony (Costa 2005).

One can conclude the analysis of US-Cuban rapprochement with the perception that the Cuban problem is not a matter of bilateral interest, or that
it only affects the Central American community, but that it also has an impact all over the Americas and worldwide.

Final Thoughts

The “Cuban issue”, understood as a part of the Latin-American issue (and of its geopolitical, geohistorical and geostrategic relation with Anglo-America), presents us an exercise of the international conjuncture from the standpoint of the emergence of new centers of world power and of the construction of the new world order of the 21st century.

By studying the basic structural logic of the present international system - its mechanisms, devices and changing features- we can detect what we call “determinants” of ongoing complex processes that will shape the world’s power system. Its main designs follow below.

The first one points out to a new era of global economy, the era of “globalization”, which is reshaping the whole system and generating great political structures capable of surviving the challenge of the present and of building the future: the “mega-States”. Only a few political active units hold their territorial space, population and natural resources to be able to elevate to this position. So the ongoing integration processes in the world are creating new giants, of which the most significant one was the creation of the European Union. However, the most significant for the world order in the making in the 21st century is really South American integration. With Brazil at its the heartland, South American integration approaches the southern African cone, anticipating what will be in the future the southern pole of global power (Cabral 2004 e 2013).

The second determinant becomes progressively apparent in a new multipolar world order that is built from the same movement of the creation of “mega-States” in the 21st century (Maisonneuve 2005). The multipolar order, therefore, will be created from the emergence of the new global centers of power. Today, the rise of these new centers is in particular present in the construction of new financial power institutes, scientific and technical. The BRICS is the greatest, most consistent and symptomatic expression of this new phase of the global world.

The third and visible determination of the ongoing globalization process results of the modernization and integration of China into the world economic system. A system that was created by the industrial and urban revolution based on science and technology, and universalized from the 19th century onwards, when it unified the market and the global financial system in
the Anglo-American tutelage. China, due its size, “scale” and degree of productivity achieved, has become the giant of this new era, and its geographical area (Asia-Pacific) is the center of gravity of the entire global economy now (Kissinger 2011 and 2014).

The fourth determinant is the wave that the world watches since the end of the last century with the resurgence and the insurgency of the Arabic Islamic world, Indo-Persian and Turkish. A global phenomenon in itself, it is a relevant factor on the international scene at the beginning of the third millennium, but also a major challenge in the way of the construction of the multipolar world order of the 21st century (Murawiec 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2008).

The fifth and already mentioned determinant is the emergence of the Latin world - with Brazil as its central State due to its size and structural weight - which will bring together all of South America, plus the southern cone of Africa, and will position itself as a future mega-state and the southern headquarter of global power. It is the revival of the Iberian Union on a new basis, truly establishing a “Panregion”, brilliantly described by Agostinho da Silva (2009) as a “Panibéria”. Taking into account such issues one can anticipate that Cuba and the Caribbean region will certainly be a point of friction between the Latin American community and its northern neighbors until the huge changes taking place in the economy and in world politics will determine a new multipolar world order – hopefully!- able to absorb the shocks of an old and always renewed rivalry between the two Americas.

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ABSTRACT
The paper aims to analyze the relationship of the United States and Cuba considering the post-Cold War international environment, characterized by the rise of a multipolar order and Chinese influence, and the emergence of the Latin world and other relevant regional actors in a new era of global economy.

KEYWORDS
Latin America; Post-Cold War; United States of America.

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Beatriz Bissio¹

Introduction

Founded in 1974 in Argentina and subsequently launched in Mexico (1976), Portugal and Africa (1978), and also in Brazil (1980), the journal “Third World” endured over thirty years of extensive journalistic activity, covering international affairs from the perspective of political scientists, journalists and leaders of the South.

The originality of its editorial proposal and the extension of its coverage lead the journal to become an obligatory reference over decades for research in politics, history and international relations in academic circles in the Third World and in social movements, trade unions, non-humanitarian NGOs, human rights groups, environmentalists and international forums of various kinds. Its journalists have interviewed significant leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Fidel Castro, Rigoberta Menchú, Omar Torrijos, Velasco Alvarado, Yasser Arafat, Muammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Samora Machel, Agostinho Neto, Julius Nyerere, Sean MacBride, among others. By having circulated in Spanish, Portuguese and English in Latin America, Africa, Middle East and parts of Asia, the journal played a sui generis role of promoting South-South dialogue.

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A Pioneering Experience, Inspired by the NWICO Proposal

The journal “Third World” was born as a direct consequence of the exile of thousands of political and union leaders, liberal professionals, journalists, students and activists from varied ideologies and backgrounds, caused by the cycle of Latin American dictatorships of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s of the last century. But it is also inspired by the experience accumulated by the Non-Aligned Movement, which in the 1970s, particularly since the debates of the Fourth Summit held in Algiers in 1973, launched two ideas of huge impact and extraordinary significance: the need to implement a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). We will focus in these two proposals a little further, but it should be noted, meanwhile, that with the first initiative the Movement aspired (perhaps naively, as subsequent events suggest) to redesign the global economy, driving up prices of raw materials as the Non-Aligned countries members figured as the main producers. The goal was to establish a more equal relationship with the “market” value of industrialized products. In the gap formed by the persistent fall in commodity prices and the simultaneous rise of industrial products whose manufacture was in the very early stages in the Third World, was in - the analysis of the leaders of peripheral countries - the explanation for one of the causes of inherited colonial underdevelopment, only recently surpassed in most of them. Therefore, to change this equation was a sine qua non necessity to overcome or at least minimize the still very strong dependence on former metropolises. With the second proposal of a New World Information and Communication Order, the Non-Aligned intended to contribute to the debate and offer alternatives to the progressive monopolization process of the international media. Although this process have worsened in the first decades of the 21st century, in the 1970s of last century it was already clear that the mainstream media was, almost without exception, closely linked to financial capital and was controlled by the same segments of power on which depended the economies of most of the peripheral nations. Therefore, the democratization and the achievement of some balance on the flow of information was also a part of the issues seen as strategic to enable development.

In those years, in South America, the right-wing military dictatorships had declared illegal, and crowded prisons with militants from political, social and trade union progressive forces. Therefore even momentarily, they have suppressed popular resistance, armed or not. In the same period, Central America lived a dramatic revolutionary process, called “insurgency” in the headlines of regional media. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista Front was facing a
long-lived Somoza dictatorship with a very high social cost, and in Guatemala and El Salvador the repression of people’s movements against their dictatorships - a resistance presented as a “civil war” in the media - plunged these small nations into the most violent period of the 20th century, whose painful legacy were two hundred thousand dead in Guatemala and eighty thousand dead and “missing” in El Salvador.

In this dramatic context the journal was founded in September 1974 in Buenos Aires. A small team of founders was made up of journalists Pablo Piacentini and Julia Constenla, argentinians, Neiva Moreira, brazilian, and me, then a young exiled Uruguayan, taking the first steps on my career, having had the privilege to live and learn from these and other great masters of the art of communication.

Argentina lived the brief period of María Estela Martínez government - “Isabelita - the widow of Juan Domingo Peron, who died on July 1 this year. Named by Perón to join him in the presidential formula, “Isabelita”, who had neither experience nor political charisma and her weakness allowed the then Minister of Social Action and private secretary of Peron, José López Rega, to increase his direct influence in the government; gradually, there was no decision that did not need his approval. The country was in a permanent confrontation between the progressive forces, which lost power since Perón death, and the most backward forces, supported by López Rega, who organized themselves around a military core. The coup still would take over a year to happen, but paramilitary groups, particularly the Anti-communist Alliance Argentina, the “Triple A”, were already acting with impunity. At that stage, began the era of what was sadly known as the “missing” politicians period, which was also known for the kidnapping and almost daily killings of prominent, Argentine and foreign, progressive political figures. Such was the case of the kidnapping and death of Uruguayan leaders Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz and Zelmar Michelini and former Bolivian President General Juan José Torres.

The journalist Julia “Chiquita” Constenla, important writer and Argentine journalist, who died in 2011 at age 83, had in his resumé, among other works, the biographies of the novelist and essayist Ernesto Sabato, Cervantes Prize for Literature, and Ernesto’s Che “Guevara mother, “who ended up becoming friends. She was the responsible for the Publisher La Línea, founded by Federico “Fico” Vogelius, and welcomed the *Third World* journal project, cherished by Neiva Moreira along with other great Argentine journalist Pablo

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2 The magazine was launched in Buenos Aires named "Tercer Mundo" (Third World). It was renamed in Mexico in 1976 as "Third World" at its relaunch since there was another publication with the same name.
Piacentini. In the 1960s, Piacentini was a founder of the InterPress Service news agency (IPS), along with the Italian-Argentine journalist Roberto Savio, and had been press secretary under President Héctor Cámpora (1973), that at the time was the editor of the international section of the Argentine daily “Noticias”. Neiva Moreira, exiled by the Brazilian dictatorship in 1964, whose rights were revoked in Institutional Act Number 1, alongside Leonel Brizola, Miguel Arraes and other leaders, had a long and recognized journalism career in Brazil, that launched his life in politics. He had exercised several terms as a state representative and later as a congressman for state of Maranhão, and was the Secretary General of the Parliamentary Nationalist Front, under President João Goulart.

The fact that the journal was launched by the publisher La Línea made the team “Tercer Mundo” share the same “roof”, so to speak, with Eduardo Galeano and its magazine “Crisis”, also edited by La Línea. Galeano was a great friend of Neiva, which before that time in Argentina had lived nine years in exile in Uruguay, when I met him. Galeano and Neiva Moreira had worked together with other journalists at the weekly “El Oriental” (a reference to the official name of Uruguay “Oriental Republic of Uruguay”). This publication, linked to the Socialist Party, reached an important movement in Uruguay before the dictatorship, thanks to the efforts of dreamers and quixotic activists who not only received nothing for the work of editing the weekly but also financed out of their own pocket, to a large extent, this publication.

The meetings with Galeano - and with Eric Nepomuceno, who was his collaborator - allowed a fruitful exchange of views about the difficult times we were living in our countries and future prospects. This interaction also used to be attended by the Uruguayan writer Mario Benedetti, exiled like us, and welcomed by Julia Costenla at the same publisher. Benedetti managed the collection “This America”, dedicated to launch books of Latin American themes. Benedetti and Galeano became employees of Third World, particularly Galeano, that even after becoming a recognized writer in the world, not completely abandoned journalism.

The magazine’s launch in September 1974 was an important political event in Buenos Aires; in spite of only having circulated nine editions before the full impossibility to continue with the project in Argentina, Tercer Mundo quickly reached a great success, since its editorial proposal made possible that significant names of journalism and the Argentine progressive political forces, the rest of the continent and the Third World, came together. This convergence, an innovative publishing project, as already clear in the pages of its first editions, which had articles signed by prominent names such as the Bolivian socialist leader Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, later murdered by
the dictatorship of García Meza; Egyptian intellectual Anwar Abdel-Malek, the Palestinian writer Ibrahim Abu Lughod, African-French journalist Jack Bourderie, Brazilian journalists Josué Guimarães and Paul Schilling, the Argentine economist Carlos Abalo, Australian Wilfed Burchett journalist, the first foreign correspondent to enter in the city of Hiroshima after the bombing of the United States3, just to mention some of the publication of the employees from the outset.

But, as expected, this content caught the eye of paramilitary and Argentine fascist sectors. Soon the name of Pablo Piacentini, who appeared as the journal’s editor, was entered in the list of sentenced to death by the Triple A. Shortly after the headquarters of La Linea suffered an attack that served as a warning: the situation was becoming unbearable for those seeking an alternative journalism. At one morning Neiva and I received a “visit” from three hooded and heavily armed men who gave us 24 hours to leave the country. We were living the first moments of the long stage of persecution, torture and death - a period now quite well documented - that eventually led to the withdrawal from Argentina of all the founders of “Tercer Mundo” and the dispersion of initial editorial staff.

When General Videla led a coup in Argentina 1976, nothing remained in Buenos Aires from the “Third World” journal, the journal “Crisis” and the Publishing House “La Linea”. Julia Constenla sought asylum with her family in Italy. Neiva Moreira and I went to Peru, as well as Pablo Piacentini, Gregory Selser and Horace Verbitski, the latter also great contributors of the journal and journalists. And several writers and journalists, recognized figures from the left who had collaborated with us, thickened the lists of the “missing”, including Haroldo Conti, Luis Guagnini4 and Rodolfo Walsh; many others had left Argentina and searched for asylum in different countries.

A new dispersion of our team took place after the fall of the Velasco Alvarado government in Peru in 1976. Again we had a schedule to leave the country, now under the command of General Moralez Bermúdez, we left for

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3 Wilfred Burchet arrived alone at Hiroshima on September 2, 1945, with the possibility to contradict the official version and report the effects of nuclear radiation resulting from atomic bomb. Anyone interested by the story may access: http://assets.cambridge.org/97805217/18264/excerpt/9780521718264_excerpt.pdf

4 Luis Guagnini was assassinated in Buenos Aires at the age of 33, after being kidnapped with his wife, released a few days later, in December 1977. Apparently, he was arrested, tortured for some time. All point out that he was one of the political prisoners that were drugged and thrown into the sea by the Argentine military, as denounced by Horacio Verbitsky in his famous book "The flight," Today he is one of the leading researchers of the subject of human rights violations during the Argentine dictatorship.
Mexico and Pablo Piacentini, for Italy where, as mentioned, it was already “Chiquita” Constenla.

In 1976, the magazine was relaunched in Mexico. Since then, with ups and downs and facing different obstacles, it endured until 2005. In Mexico, it expanded the team of employees and circulation, launching two new editions, the first in English in 1977, mainly to the US public - but also to reach out to readers in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, through subscriptions - and later, in 1978, the second in Portuguese, based in Lisbon, to preferentially serve the public of young people African countries of Portuguese language. This was the golden moment of the journal: circulated in three languages and reached an audience on four continents, America (north to south), Europe, Africa and Asia, either through commercial distribution in newsstands and bookstores, either through subscription (most of the subscribing public in English).

The sad legacy of this period was that various collaborators were murdered in different parts of the world and those in Argentina came to thicken the list of the missing. Our collaborator Malcolm Caldwell, British journalist, researcher at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Marxist, author of numerous works on the liberation struggles of Asia, where he lived for many years, was murdered in December 1978 in Phnom Penh, Camboja, a country that he frequently visited since 1975, when he became a part of the first group of Western journalists to visit the country, also known as Kampuchea at that time after Khmer Rouge took power. At the time it was said that the murder occurred under the order of Pol Pot, the country’s ruler, shortly after both had an encounter in 1978.

The International Context

While in the early 1970s, South America plunged into the toughest dictatorial period, with the armed and political resistance subdued and Central America lived the height of the armed conflict in Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador, and Africa and Asia were experiencing the hard consequences the so-called “decolonization process”, which began in the post-World War II and still simmered. In a Cold War scenario between the two superpowers, African-Asian countries were fighting for its structuring as a force with its own personality, independent from the two blocs, even though many of them maintained a relatively high degree of dependence on one or the other superpower in the economic or political, technological, military fields, or on all of them at once.

The starting point of this movement was the Bandung Conference
(Indonesia) from 18 to 24 April 1955, attended by twenty three Asian and six African countries. Focused on the ideal of creating their own space - it would be appropriate to call it an imagined community? – at the bipolar world of the time, people represented in Bandung were fighting for the promotion of peaceful coexistence, rejecting participation in any military pact. From the traumatic colonial experience, they also argued in favor of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, enshrining the principles of sovereignty and the respect for the territorial integrity of all nations, to the defense of human rights as a fundamental value.

The Colombo Conference, prior to Bandung, was held a year earlier, in April 1954, with representatives from Indonesia, Burma (now Myanmar), India, Pakistan and the host country, Ceylon, now Sri Lanka. Although the Second World War had ended in 1945, the reality of much of the world was in conflict, since the post-war scenario came to be dominated by tensions between the superpowers and the struggle against colonialism. The war in Indochina was one of the bloodiest examples of this distressing reality. While the aforementioned Colombo Conference was in session, it unfolded, in Vietnam, the battle of Dien Bien Phu, and peace negotiations began in Geneva, that would lead to the armistice of July of that year between France and Indochina. As a result a provisional military demarcation solution of Parallel 17, dividing Vietnam into two, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, was adopted. It also established elections in 1956 to define the destiny of the country. In fact, the Geneva proposals were not achievable and the conflict led to the “Vietnam War” whose main protagonist, on the Western side, was no longer France but the United States.

The need to establish a common front to defend the self-determination and peace – at a time when, as mentioned, in addition to the different battles for independence we were faced by the greatest challenge with the possibility of nuclear war between the superpowers - took the participants of the Colombo Conference 1954 to approve the proposal to convene a larger African-Asian meeting, for the following year, in the Indonesian city of Bandung. The tone of the 1955 Conference was soon given by the head of the host State, President Sukarno, Indonesia, in his speech during the event’s opening session.

All of us, I am certain, are united by more important things than those which superficially divide us. We are united, for instance, by a common rejection of colonialism in whatever form it appears. We are united by a common rejection of racism. And we are united by a common determination to preserve and stabilise peace in the world. . . . Relatively speaking, all of us gathered here today are neighbours. Almost all of us have ties of com-
mon experience, the experience of colonialism. Many of us have a common religion. Many of us have common cultural roots. Many of us, the so-called “underdeveloped” nations, have more or less similar economic problems, so that each one can benefit from the others’ experience and help. And I think I may say that we all hold dear the ideals of national independence and freedom. (Institute of Pacific Relations 1955)

Although Sukarno made a significant effort to emphasize the common trends that united participants, in a scenario that was dominated by the political and ideological divisions of the Cold War it was not an easy task to maintain a position of independence from superpowers. Without any doubt, most of the guests rejected colonialism and, in particular, imperialism. But if the question on how different delegations defined imperialism was posed, possibly many diverse interpretations would be found, if not contradictory explanations at all. So it’s interesting to rescue a significant finding, that is rarely remembered: the reason for choosing April 18 as the opening day for the Conference. It was also Sukarno in his initial speech that provided the explanation:

The fight against colonialism has been long; do you know that today is the anniversary of an important even in this history? After all, it was on April 18, 1775 that at midnight Paul Revere⁵ rushed through the rural areas of New England announcing the arrival of British troops and informing the outbreak of the American Independence war, the first anti-colonial war in history. (Institute of Pacific Relations 1955)

The reference to the United States as the first leader of the struggle against colonialism was not random. It was necessary to make it clear that the anti-imperialist position of those present did not stop them to separate the people of the United States, who had written a beautiful page in the history of mankind, from a government that, at that time, for many of them, represented a threat to their freedom and self-determination aspirations. And it was also a concession to the pressure of some governments, such as the Philippines, Pakistan and Thailand, invited to the Conference, which in September 1954 had signed with the United States, France and Britain the agreement

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⁵ Paul Revere is remembered as one the protagonists of the US War of Independence. His "night races" are considered a symbol of patriotism. These night races began on 18 April 1775, when Revere came out denouncing the imminent arrival of British troops on the eve of battles that began the war of independence. He was part of an established intelligence network in Boston to control the movements of the British forces. His gesture was immortalized in the poem "Paul Revere's Ride," Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1860)
that established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).\textsuperscript{6}

For many reasons, the Bandung Conference is considered a milestone in the history of international relations of the 20th century, but the relevant location of the event, purposely conducted outside the Western geographical scope, it is no doubt due to the fact that it has celebrated the emergence of the Non Aligned Movement and the Third World. Without any doubt, Bandung is certainly the starting point of this movement; included as main points of its agenda were goal of structuring a political force in the Third World, able to promote political, economic and cultural cooperation. This alliance was seen as strategic to overcome the tragic legacy of the colonial period that independence had failed to leave behind, since neocolonialism was sustained in many ways, even the most subtle ones.

The call for the realization of the Conference and its concepts were under the responsibility of two of the most important leaders of Asian nations who had recently had gained independence, Ahmed Sukarno, Indonesia and Jawaharlal Nehru, India, with support from Pakistan’s leaders, Burma and Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), precisely the countries that took part in the Colombo Conference, a year earlier, and approved the proposal. Besides the presence of other leaders already mentioned, it is worth noting that among the other prominent figures present in Bandung one should mention Ho Chi Minh City, Prime Minister of Vietnam, and the representative of the US Congress, the African-American Adam Clayton Powell of Harlem. The participation of an African-American congressman was highly significant. In 1954, the US Supreme Court had ruled that school segregation was illegal, but the full repeal of so-called Jim Crow laws - a set of laws established by the Southern States, in force since the last decades of the 19th century, which required separate facilities for blacks and whites in public places, including transport – was still far from being a reality for people of African descent in the United States. This set of laws would only be fully repealed in 1964, after a long and painful process of social struggles.

\textsuperscript{6} SEATO was part of the Truman Doctrine, that intended to establish defense collective pacts with allied nations in order to create a kind of "protective belt" of US interests, against the "communist threat." Initially founded in September 1954 in Manila, SEATO started it formal existence on 19 February 1955, after a meeting held in Bangkok, Thailand, where its headquarters were also located. SEATO was dissolved in 1977, after most of the members lost interest in taking part on the treaty.
Principles for the Defense of Peace

The Final Declaration of Bandung, obtained by consensus, was a call to superpowers to suspend nuclear tests and defined the so-called “Ten principles for peace” that guided all subsequent activities of these nations and were incorporated by the Non-Aligned Movement. They were grounded in the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” as defined in the declaration signed in 1954 by India and China, attended by Myanmar, to overcome their disputes, and emphasized the defense of sovereignty, non-aggression and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the defense of peace.

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<th>The Ten Principles of Bandung were:</th>
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<td>1. Respect for fundamental human rights, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter;</td>
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<td>2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Recognition of equality of all races and all nations, large and small;</td>
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<td>4. No intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries;</td>
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<td>5. Respect the right of every nation to defend itself individually or collectively, according to the UN Charter;</td>
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<td>6. Rejection of the use of collective defense treaties designed to serve the particular interests of the Great Powers, regardless of whether they are;</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a country;</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Settlement of all conflicts by peaceful means such as negotiation or conciliation, arbitration or judicial remedy, as well as other peaceful means they can adopt the countries concerned, in accordance with the UN Charter;</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation;</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Respect for justice and for international obligations;</td>
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These Ten Principles and the general content of the Final Communiqué not only sketched a diplomatic action plan to make the will of the African-Asian countries clear but also their intent to make their voices heard, whereas speaking out clearly in favor of negotiations and diplomatic solution to the conflicts and in condemning a priori the use of force by the powers that have always had interventionist tradition. The Senegalese leader and poet Léopold Senghor, one of the drivers of “blackness” and fighter for the inde-
pendence of the African continent, thus defined the event: “Bandung was the expression, the scale of the planet, the awareness of colored peoples of its eminent dignity. It was the death of inferiority complex. “(Guitard 1962)

In addition to the important step towards their own agenda, the main political achievement of the Bandung Conference was to present a new form of understanding of that historical moment and of geopolitics, rejecting the ideological division between East and West and presenting as, an alternative, the concept of the North-South gap. In other words, the division of the world that mattered, and needed to be pointed out, was the one that separated the rich and industrialized countries from the poor, underdeveloped and commodity exporters.

The Rise of the Non-Aligned Movement

Two important leaders of the young states of Asia and Africa, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Jawahar Lal Nehru, India, inspired by the Bandung experience, decided to follow up the conference determinations and began a series of meetings and negotiations. They were joined by a third leader, who despite belonging to the European continent, was identified with all the postulates raised in Bandung: Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia. In 1956, meeting in Brione (Switzerland), Nasser, Nehru and Tito issued a formal request to the superpowers to end the Cold War and start detente and consolidated the principles that led to the formation of a movement whose ambitious main objective was the adoption of a position of independence from the two blocks, capitalist and socialist.

In subsequent years, significant changes happened due to the advances in the liberation process. In 1960, seventeen countries in Asia and Africa that had gained independence were admitted as full members of the UN during the course of the XV General Assembly of the organization. A new correlation of forces emerged within the most important world body, qualitatively altering the landscape in favor of developing countries. The next step was the call for the Heads of State Summit Conference held in the city of Belgrade (Yugoslavia), 1-6 September 1961. Six years after the Bandung Conference, this meeting formally launched the foundations of Non-Aligned Movement, which was born with a broad representation as new countries had gained independence in the period. There were 28 countries represented in Belgrade, of which 25 were full members and three had observer status; among the full members there was only one Latin American country, Cuba, whose revolution triumphed two years before. The Self-determination of people, the rejection
of multilateral military pacts, the condemnation of apartheid, the struggle against imperialism in all its manifestations, non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, the strengthening of the UN, were strategic themes in the work of the Non-Aligned Movement since its founding in Belgrade.

In May 1963, the progress of the liberation struggles allowed 31 African countries to come together to found the Organization of African Unity (OAU), that strongly supported the non-alignment movement. The II Summit of the Non-Aligned was held in Cairo, 5-10 October 1964, at a time when the movement had grown to 47 full members, ten observers and 30 representatives of liberation movements. The final declaration stressed the need to ensure “peace and international cooperation”, reiterating support for the fight against colonialism, racism and apartheid. In the following years, the Non Aligned Movement endured severe trials. Tensions between superpowers were expressed almost exclusively in conflicts in the peripheral countries, most of them, members of the Non-Aligned Movement. There was one reason for that: if a direct confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union was to happen, the world would be on the brink of a nuclear conflagration. Hence the effort to avoid this scenario. Nowadays, the fact that the Cold War was fought primarily in the Third World and not on European soil, is finally recognized after several decades of stating the opposite.

The Vietnam War and the various Arab-Israeli wars are significant examples of this scenario, and also the consequences of the bloody overthrow of Sukarno in Indonesia by General Suharto, which cost the lives of nearly one million people and the coup in Iran that brought to power with CIA support, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, after the dismissal of the first nationalist minister Muhammad Mossadegh, who had dared to nationalize oil can be put into this agenda. In Latin America there were also numerous progressive governments overthrown - The Nomination is wide and ranges from Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala, which faced the United Fruit and was overthrown in 1954, João Goulart in Brazil in 1964 and Salvador Allende in 1973 - on the grounds of the fight against communism.

At the meeting in Cairo in 1964, economic recommendations were defined by advising member states to seek their own paths to development. The documents already mentioned the need of a change in the world’s economy to reach the so-called “new and just economic order.”

The circumstances in the Middle East, with the Six Day War of 1967 and the crisis in Indochina, among other reasons, led to a gap of six years between the Cairo Summit and the next one. (meetings on the heads of state level are usually carried out, even today, every three years). In the meantime there have been three meetings, one in October 1966 in New Delhi, India,
between the presidents of the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, and the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, called so the “Tripartite Conference”. The other was held in Belgrade from 8 to 12 July 1969, with an advisory capacity. Representatives of the Governments of Non-Aligned Countries, at the time, 44 member countries and seven observers attended the meeting. Not only they reaffirmed the principles of the non-alignment, but they also demanded the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Vietnam and they expressed a clear support for “the Arab people of Palestine” and called for the “withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied after the war June 1967”. It was also defended the right of the People’s Republic of China to join the United Nations. On the economic front, there was a clear reference to the need to adopt measures” to provide better access for developed countries to markets and financing for development “.

The Third Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned met in Lusaka, Zambia, from 8 to 10 September 1970, with the participation of 54 full members. At the end of the event it approved the “Lusaka Declaration on Peace, Independence, Development, Cooperation and Democratization of International Relations.” This document and also the “Lusaka Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress” showed that economic issues had received priority treatment in the debates, fact that showed difference of this meeting from previous ones. Since Lusaka, the debates of the Non-Aligned Movement started to have two focus: one political and the other economic. In the statement which addresses the economic focus, it declares that “the gap between poor countries and developed countries has deepened” and that “efforts should be intensified to urgently implement structural changes in the world economy.” Ripened by the experience of a decade since Bandung, the heads of state were beginning to show their understanding of the importance of economic factors to achieve the goals set by the Non-Aligned.

The IV Summit Conference of the movement, held from 5 to 9 September 1973 in Algiers, is considered one of the most important. The reasons are many, among them, the great attendance: 75 countries full members; Latin America, Argentina and Peru participated for the first time and the socialist Chile led by Salvador Allende, who was overthrown two days after the end of the Conference, was also represented. Also present were eight observer countries, three guests, Austria, Finland and Sweden, and twelve liberation movements. Among the latter, one should mention the presence of the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the African Party of Independence of Cape Verde (PAIGC), the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO, Namibia) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
But, as we have seen, the Algiers Conference was also important for the topics discussed. The final declaration points to a deterioration of the international situation since 1970s, characterized by “tensions in the peripheral areas, due to the deteriorating economic conditions in developing countries.” In fact, at this Conference, the traditional positions of the Non-alignment and of the socialist camp came together; Cuba had a prominent role in these talks that led the movement to adopt a more open attitude towards the socialist bloc. Fidel Castro, in his speech, defended this position, that was incorporated on the “Programme of Action on Economic Cooperation” one of the documents approved in Algiers. This document stated that “The Non-Aligned will seek to boost scientific and technical cooperation with the socialist countries, in particular by signing intergovernmental agreements, and through the creation, if necessary, of joint bodies”.

The document approved at the Summit IV focuses mainly on the analysis of the international scene. Among “the main causes of inequality, which increases permanently and afflicts the developing world,” the statement mentions the “various methods of economic domination and neo-colonial exploitation.” And the old colonial powers are responsible for inequality, since (they) “remain in control of natural resources, despite the success achieved in the field of independence and political sovereignty.” The document also denounces “the transnationals and their monopolistic role in the commercial, financial and industrial plans.” The scenario requires, say the Non-Aligned, drawing up policies that lead to “the establishment of a new type of international economic relations”.

The definitions adopted in Algiers, ratified and extended in Colombo, capital of Sri Lanka, where it was held, in 1976, the V Conference of Non-Aligned, show that in the 1970s, at the height of its operations, the move came to define strategies for the economic field, under the flag of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and in terms of communications, also with an audacious goal: the establishment of a New International Information Order (NIIO). These proposals were the result of studies conducted in different areas and with different methodologies, which confirmed a dramatic diagnosis: overcoming underdevelopment would not be possible without the implementation of profound changes in the ground rules of the international economy and information flows. While prices of raw materials, the main source of income of the majority of the Non-Aligned, were depreciated and manufactured goods were, on the opposite, getting higher, the uneven development between the core countries and the periphery would deepen. On the other hand, the concentration of mass media and the social and technological inequalities between the developed and underdeveloped demanded a change
in the information system. That is, if you keep the imbalance in relation to the production and circulation of information in the world, with absolute predominance of control by the central countries, and information continue to be treated as a commodity, without recognizing its strategic role in international relations, traditional forms of colonial domination, would remain with new clothes.

The proposal of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) also called New International Information Order (NIIO), and one that is its essential complement, the New International Economic Order (NIEO), caused great impact on the international agenda. Part of that impact can be measured by the fact that the New International Information Order was incorporated in 1978 to UNESCO programs (English acronym of UNESCO) and included on the agenda of the General Assembly UN. (Mattelart 2001).

This first step of UNESCO was complemented later with the appointment of an International Commission of Communication Problems Studies, chaired by the Irish Sean MacBride, founder of Amnesty International, a Nobel and Lenin Peace Prize winner. This Commission was formed by 16 members from every continent, but with a significant majority of representatives of the Third World. Among them were two Latin American, Colombian writer Gabriel Garcia Marquez and Chilean diplomat Juan Somavia. The result of the hard work of the Commission was a document entitled “One World and Many Voices” better known as the MacBride Report, published by UNESCO in 1980. For the first time a UN agency recognized the existence of imbalances in information flows and prepared a document with proposals for democratization in the field of information. Correctly, the document pointed out the fact that the generation and distribution of information circulating in the world was concentrated in four news agencies and that was the main reason for the existence of imbalances in the communication between the core countries and the peripheral countries. Considering these agencies, two were European, the French France Presse (AFP) and the British Reuters (now Thompson-Reuters), and two were American, the Associated Press (AP) and the United Press International (UPI).

The boldness to point out that these transnational news agencies, closely linked to major financial capitals was such “villains” aroused strong attacks from the Western capitalist countries media. These attacks were echoed by many of the most important business newspapers in the Third World countries. Diagnosis and proposals presented by the MacBride Commission were accused of bias and a “threat” to press freedom and the free flow of information. (Mattelart 2001).
The MacBride Report defined eleven principles for the consolidation of a New International Information Order, starting with the end of the imbalances and inequalities which characterize the current situation. To achieve this goal, the committee of experts called for the elimination of the negative effects of certain monopolies, public or private, and the excessive concentration of power; it also defined as priorities the removal of internal and external obstacles to the free flow and wider and more balanced dissemination of information and ideas, and the respect for the plurality of information sources and channels; defended the freedom of the press and the information and freedom for journalists and for all professionals of the media, but had a reservation: “freedom is inseparable from responsibility.” The Commission also proposed the preparation of developing countries so that they could improve the information in their own nations, “particularly with regard to the acquisition of their own equipment” and capacity building, with the recovery of infrastructure, “besides making the information and media attuned to their own aspirations and needs.” He extolled the need for a sincere commitment by developed countries to help others to achieve these goals; respect for the cultural identity of each people and the right of each nation to inform the international public about its interests, aspirations and their social and cultural values; and finally advocated “respect for the rights of all people to participate in information exchanges, based on equality, justice, mutual benefits and respect for the rights of the community, as well as ethnic and social groups so that they can have access to sources of information and actively participate in the communication flows.”

We recall that in the late 1970s and early 1980s the two countries that dictate the rules of world capitalism were the United States, governed by Ronald Reagan and Britain, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, two leaders closely connected to the imposition the neoliberal model. By arguing that that UNESCO was “overly politicized”, both countries decided to leave the UN agency and, in doing so, cut their investments on it, causing a drop of 30% of the budget. Without the support of its two most important donors, the agency failed to implement the resolutions of the Commission chaired by Sean MacBride, and due to the economic hardship, entered a long period of ostracism.

More than 30 years after the diagnosis made by the Commission of experts, many of its formulations are still in force. Many experts consider that modern communication technologies open the possibility of re-evaluate and update the document drafted by the Commission MacBride. (Masmoudi 2005). The last summit of the Non-Aligned held in Tehran in August 2012, took up the theme of communications and defined the purpose of reinvigor-
ating the news agency of the Non-Aligned Movement. The correlation of forces at that historical moment did not favor this kind of alternative, and in a broader context, the objectives of the Non-Aligned were frustrated or were gradually dismissed with the consequent loss of leadership and political weight of the Movement internationally.

A Grain of Sand Makes the Difference in the Desert

We have seen that since the launch in 1974 in Buenos Aires the journal “Third World,” was inserted in the multitude of initiatives that have been put forward in different parts of the world, to contribute to the challenge launched in Algiers by the Non-Aligned Movement to democratize information flows. But what could have been done by a journal launched by independent journalists without a significant structure or important capital behind it in face of the power of the big media conglomerates? It may seem a quixotic endeavor ... and it was! But the project was founded on the conviction of the founding group and several collaborators that joined it over the years: a grain of sand makes the difference in the desert.... The initiative could and should serve as an to encourage other multiple initiatives that together could bring a significant change in the information landscape.

Present in Algiers, where he covered the Fourth Conference of the Non-Aligned, the journalist Neiva Moreira had returned to Latin America convinced of the importance of getting the Latin American public opinion, so alien to these issues, to be aware of the debate developed in the event and all its impacts. In Algiers, he had established important contacts with African liberation movements, with leaders of independent countries of Asia and Africa, with journalists and communicators from all over the Third World, there present, and he expressed to them that he would return to the “mission “to bring together a group of Latin American journalists who accepted the challenge of launching a publication devoted entirely to the international theme, focusing on the Third World. And that’s what he proposed to several

7 The Non-Aligned Movement is currently the second largest international organization in the world, after the United Nations. With 120 full members and 17 observer members, it includes most of the countries and governments of the world. About two-thirds of UN member states are full members of the NAM. The African Union, the Organization of Solidarity of the Afro-Asian people, the Commonwealth of Nations, the National Independence Movement Hostosiano, the Socialist Liberation Front National Kanak, the Arab League, the Islamic Cooperation Organization, the South Centre, the United Nations and the World Peace Council are also observers.
Bandung, the Non-Aligned and the midia: the role of the journal "Third World" in South-South dialogue

colleagues: the foundation of a magazine that dealt with the issues discussed since Bandung and to report on the major events of the Third World considering the protagonists own voice. He was luck to find in Pablo Piacentini a colleague who had even taken a step in this direction, when he founded the agency Inter Press Service, and a colleague in Julia Constenla, who was already working in her publishing house with similar ideas alongside with Eduardo Galeano and Mario Benedetti. The result was this publication, a pioneer in our continent, which circulated from 1974 to 2006, with editions in Spanish, Portuguese and English.

The history of the Third World journal shows how much it was closely linked to the debate raised by the Non-Aligned Movement on the theme of information flows. A large network that it could bring together journalists, communicators, thinkers, activists, political leaders, trade unions, educators, students, diplomats, allowed it to stay in the countermovement for more than three decades. The challenges were many and sometimes seemed impossible to overcome, as demonstrated by the fact that the journal was founded and re-founded in various parts of the world. But through its pages several generations were formed mainly Latin American ones, but also African, mostly from Portuguese-speaking countries, and even Europeans and Americans, whose universities were assiduous buyers and subscribers of the publication.

By being present in locals so distant from each other with the same editorial message, it has become a real instrument of South-South communication, at a time when there were none of technologies that shorten the distances in space and time today.

The difficulties were reflected both whereas producing exclusive stories that were the hallmark of the publication, but also in the time of distribution, in order to make it within the reach of readers. Nevertheless, the Third World journal pages portrayed the war of liberation in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe and highlighted the interviews of their leaders. They have shown the consequences of the long Vietnam war, which has spread to all of Indochina; they portrayed the struggle of the Palestinian people to achieve their state and with it, regain their dignity; special materials were devoted to the struggle of the Saharawi people, the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, the liberation struggle in Namibia, Zimbabwe, the resistance to the dictatorship of Mobutu, the oil issue; reporters and special correspondents covered the war in Lebanon, the Gulf War, all the summits of the Non-Aligned Movement; there was an exhaustive coverage of the resistance of the peoples of South America against dictatorships, the fight of the Nicaraguan against Somoza, the Cuban Revolution. The most several issues were analyzed by experts, including the issue of external debt, for example,
agrarian land reform, many of them raised pioneered by the editorial staff, such as the environmental agenda, the issue of GMOs, the fight for respect sexual plurality, the right of indigenous peoples to their lands and for cultural preservation of all Aboriginal people, etc.

In addition, the publication was a kind of informal school of communication, due to the fact that the headquarters in Brazil received trainees from various Third World countries, specially of Portuguese-speaking countries, which passed a few weeks in Rio de Janeiro - or even a few months - improving their knowledge and practice of investigative journalism, always supported by research and an adequate bibliography. Members of the editorial staff were also permanently invited for lectures, seminars, recycling courses for journalists in several countries.

The Final Phase

In the late 20th century, Neoliberalism took over our countries, transforming the economy and political relations at a high social cost, and it profoundly affected the publishing editorial market of Latin America and the Third World journal was no exception. The crisis that eventually forced its closure was installed in the late 1990s and in 2006 the magazine was forced to end its circulation due to absolute financial infeasibility. In previous years there had been a large increase in production costs and efforts to keep the publication circulating were translating into mounting debts.

The breath to continue for some time came from a very loyal legion of subscribers - many of which today refer fondly to the importance that “Third World” had in their formation - and signed agreements with Secretaries of Education from the states of Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul. These signatures were destined to public schools and state and municipal libraries. The magazine has always been appreciated by the teachers to work in the classroom. These signatures represent significant financial support, as each teacher was also a promoter, this has generated an interesting movement, which increased the number of new subscribers, as was the case for many parents who accompanied the work of their children, with the magazine, in public schools.

With ups and downs, losing its periodicity, cutting expenses, it was possible to continue for a while. But under the neoliberal frills, the magazine was seen by many as a “dinosaur”, sustained on exceeded flags, as would be the own Third World. The defense of the state’s role, for example, was completely incompatible with the new political positions and economic as-
sumptions of the ones that could have had the power to change our situation. With each new edition debt increased as a snowball; the situation became untenable.

To resist in the face of the challenges of the moment it would have been necessary to rely on advertising, something that has never been easy for a publication as Third World. Only revenues from subscriptions, although very numerous, did not allow to balance finances. But then, no one was willing to help with publicity neither official companies nor private companies, nor the government. This results in the at least curious fact that an editorial experience that had endured throughout the cycle of Latin American dictatorships, would end at the moment that Brazil, a country which had its headquarters since 1980, was being ruled by a party with a progressive platform, the PT, whose President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a man of humble origins, had forged his leadership the heat of the union struggles. A theme to reflect, no doubt!

Currently, the increasing concentration of media in large conglomerates linked to the world of finance, at the national and international levels, has become a challenge equally or more important than in the decades in which the Non-Aligned Movement raised the issue of the New International Information Order. The people of South America, which at the beginning of the 21st century, through the ballot box, have shown their willingness to promote a renewal of the political and social life today realize the enormous difficulties to deepen this process without the existence of democratic and plural media, committed to the processes of change.

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ABSTRACT
The paper traces the history of the Third World journal since its ascension until the closure, analyzing the historical period, the Non-Aligned Movement, including its New International Economic Order and New World Information and Communication Order proposes, and the political conditions that caused the journal’s extinction.

KEYWORDS
Media; South-South Dialogue; Non-Aligned Movement; Communication.

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MULTILATERALISM AND THE UN IN SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY

Chris Landsberg

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) was established in Dumbarton Oaks, San Francisco, seventy-years ago with the promise of bringing peace to the world and to saving “successive generations from the scourge of war”. After as many years, the UN still reflects the world order of 1945, and remains out of touch with the global realities of the 21st century. South Africa, a country that was for almost a half a century at the receiving end of ostracist measures from the world body for its racist policies of apartheid, became a keen champion of the reform of the UN (Geldenhuys 1984). Indeed, no sooner was Jan Smuts a sponsor of the preamble of the UN Charter, than he found himself in the wharf for the racist policies of promulgated and upheld by himself and his government (Geldenhuys 1984). In an extraordinary turn of historical events, post-apartheid South Africa has made multilateralism a central tenet of her foreign policy, and has advanced this strategy under the banners of “transformation of global governance” during the Mbeki years and “active participation in the global system of governance” during the Zuma period. As a country located in the South, South Africa’s new governments made bold efforts to sure her voice is heard, and her agency felt likewise.

In Defence of Multilateralism

South Africa became a proponent of multilateralism and multilateral diplomacy. This is important given that multilateralism presents a platform

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and space for developing countries to have a voice and agency. Kishan Rana has described multilateral diplomacy as “diplomacy via conferences attended by three or more states” (Rana 2004, 20). It is frequently but not always confined to thematic subjects, for example environmental degradation and global warming, arms control or international regimes and policy (Rana 2004). According to Vladimir Petrovsky, “multilateral diplomacy is often considered to be a type of superstructure over bi-lateral diplomacy. I think”. He goes on to assert: “these are two sides of the same coin and none excludes the other... Multilateral negotiations, despite their being time-consuming, are a very effective safeguard against hegemonic and similar tensions” (Petrovski 1998).

In the post-Cold War era, multilateralism is characterised by more complex agendas of conferences and negotiations with larger numbers of issues and the growing involvement of experts, citizens groups and NGOs. Multilateral diplomacy is trying to adapt to the complex post-Cold war environment and conditions, but the changes are happening at a very slow pace (Petrovski 1998). There is in fact a need to revise the rules and procedures of multilateralism so as to become more effective.

All post-apartheid governments have supported multilateral diplomacy as a strategy and modus operandi behind diplomatic efforts. Carlsnaes and Nel reminded us that, “a central dimension of South Africa’s normative role has been its promotion of rules-based multilateralism as the appropriate institutional form for conducting international affairs in what Mandela called ‘an interdependent world’” (2006, 21). The authors go further to argue that the commitment to multilateralism has stood South Africa and its allies in good stead in developing combined and revitalised initiatives in world trade talks, developing joint initiatives for reforming global financial institutions, promoting global arms control and humanitarian measures, and strengthening emerging international criminal law institutions such as the International Criminal Court (Carlsnaes and Nel 2006). Pretoria believed that its peaceful transition and international credibility gave it “vote-pulling capacity and influence in multilateral fora” (Department of Foreign Affairs 1996, 16). It was committed to a policy of “multilateral diplomacy” and claimed that its “policies and practices and its consistent principled approach has endowed it with particular moral authority to champion the need for the democratisation, good governance and improved effectiveness of international, regional and sub-regional institutions” (Department of Foreign Affairs 2005, 20). In this context, the government has continuously emphasised “(...)its commitment to multilateralism, and in this context, to the pre-eminent role of the UN in global affairs” (Department of Foreign Affairs 2005, 20).

Multilateralism was not just an end in itself for South Africa; it was...
a means to an end. It was viewed as an important international instrument to help solve global problems. In 2005, the Mbeki government was adamant that, “South Africa, in the conduct of its international affairs, acts in a manner that respects international law and promotes multilateralism as a means of seeking consensus in the affairs of the world” (Department of Foreign Affairs 2005, 5). When South Africa joined the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the first time in 2007, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma opined: “we do so conscious and convinced that the multilateral system of global governance remains the only hope for challenges facing humanity today”\(^2\). At least in terms of stated policy, the Jacob Zuma-led government continued with the position of its two predecessor governments. In February 2012, the Minister of International Relations and Co-operation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane stated that “South Africa is committed to...reforming the multilateral institutions that make up the global system of governance” (DIRCO 2012). At the heart of the Republic’s multilateral strategies were efforts to advance the interests of Africa and the developing countries. Multilateral fora were regarded as platforms in which South Africa could enhance the voice and participation of Africans and countries from the South.

With multilateralism at the heart of its diplomacy since 1994, South Africa has long championed the idea that the UN and the UN Charter should be placed at the centre of world governance as it pursued the strategy of a transparent and rule-based international political and economic order. The Thabo Mbeki-led government (1999-2008) persistently punted “the importance of multilateralism and the urgent need to revitalise and reform the UN” (Department of Foreign Affairs 2005, 16).

In its March 2012 International Relations Policy Discussion Document, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) stated that the governing party “will continue to work with other progressive forces globally to promote global transformation towards multilateralism and against growing unilaterality”\(^3\). It was the view of the Zuma-led government that western powers, notably the US, Britain and France tend to use the UN, including the Security Council as instruments to serve their interests (Landsberg 2010, 242).

### Setting the UN-South Africa Scene


\(^3\) African National Congress (ANC), International Relations, Policy Discussion Document, Johannesburg, March 2012.
South Africa’s preferred strategy of multilateralism was to work through the UN and forums such as the G77+China, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Africa Group within the UN, and other like-minded states, with the aim of upholding the sanctity of the UN Charter and observation of its rules, especially in dealing with conflicts. It has implemented UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on various issues, including peace-support operations and combating terrorism.

Since hosting the 2001 World Conference against Racism, it has focused on establishing and operationalising the UN Human Rights Council as an agency with resources and authority to advance the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, promoting women’s rights by campaigning at the UN for tangible action on the Beijing Declaration and Programme of Action.

Two other strategies towards the UN were, firstly, to elevate issues of development and poverty and move away from emphasis on “peace and security” as defined by the West; and, secondly, to challenge the dominance of the West in international relations and address inequities in the global political economy. On this score, South Africa’s strategy was driven by a quest for both fairness and representation and a voice for the developing South. Giving a greater voice to countries from the developing South has indeed been a major raison d’être underscoring these multilateral moves.

The Mbeki government put the UN and its reform at the centre of its diplomacy. A 2005 foreign policy document asserted that “it is clear that it is only through a reformed UN that threats and challenges of the 21st century could be collectively confronted. For South Africa”, the document continued, “multilateralism is not an option, but the only way that can bring about development and therefore durable peace” (Department of Foreign Affairs 2005, 7). That administration was of the critical view that “a unilateral approach to global problems has led to the erosion of the United Nations multilateralism, and the undermining of the international treaties and international law” (Department of Foreign Affairs 2005, 7).

South Africa also regarded itself as a voice and “spokesperson” for Africa within the UN and other multilateral agencies. In 2002 and 2003, for example, South Africa successfully campaigned for the UN General Assembly to endorse the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to be adopted “as the policy framework around which the international community – including the UN system – should concentrate its efforts for Africa’s development”, and set up modalities for UN support to NEPAD4.

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4 United Nations A/Res/57/2; A/Res/57/7; and A/Res/57/300; quoted in Landsberg
In an address at the University of Limpopo on 12 March 2012, the Deputy Minister of International Relations and Co-operation, Ebrahim Ebrahim made a link between UN reform and Africa’s interests. The Deputy Minister reminded us that “the Security Council dedicates most of its time and energy to focusing on peace and security matters on the African continent. More than 70% of Security Council deliberations are centred around African conflict situations” (Ebrahim 2012). As a perceived “anchor state” in Africa, South Africa saw itself as a spokesperson of Africa, and felt duty-bound to make the case for African representation in UN agencies, including the UN Security Council.

Democratising the UN

South Africa has been active in the affairs of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), which it regarded as an ideal platform to help shape a progressive agenda sensitive to the needs of poor and marginalised countries, and has duly defended it as appropriate for broad political and economic engagement.

The Mandela government aspired to becoming a responsible global citizen in promoting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and arms control, since when the role of exemplar in eradicating weapons of mass destruction has characterised foreign policy (Landsberg 2010). The post-apartheid Republic quickly acceded to the Convention on Inhumane Weapons of 1995, joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and provided information on its own weapons trade to the UN’s Register of Conventional Weapons. It made substantive inputs into the Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995, as it helped to shape the middle ground for a “New Agenda Coalition” between nuclear and non-nuclear blocs. Its role allowed for the indefinite extension of the treaty without a vote, and helped facilitate broad consensus by reminding both blocs of their obligations. Its role in the conference helped establish itself as an honest player in this complex terrain (Landsberg and Masiza 1996).

South Africa’s role during the 1995 nuclear extension conference has long been hailed as one of its most important breakthroughs and roles in foreign policy and diplomacy. After 1999, the Thabo Mbeki government continued with this important theme in diplomacy. South Africa therefore refused to adopt a narrow view with regard to nuclear non-proliferation, and challenged the idea that it is only the so-called nuclear-have states that should have the right to embark on nuclear programmes. Non-nuclear weapons
Multilateralism and the UN in South Africa’s Foreign Policy

states, or nuclear non-haves, policy held, should also have the right to develop civilian nuclear programmes. As a member of the Board of Governors of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), South Africa actively tried to shape discussions pertaining to Nuclear issues. As far as the long standing controversy around Iran’s nuclear programme was concerned, for example, South Africa’s position was that a confrontational approach needed to be avoided at all costs, and an inclusive, comprehensive solution had to be sought. This commitment to non-confrontation and non-violence, and the peaceful resolution of disputes has been a key tenet of post-apartheid foreign policy. Pretoria-Tshwane was in favour of a balanced stance in favour of the rights both of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) members to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the need to build international confidence and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Instead of adopting a hard-line attitude vis-à-vis Iran or any other actor, policy was in favour a pro-negotiations stance, encouraging them to give up nuclear weapons programmes while supporting their position in favour of peaceful nuclear programmes.

In prioritizing the importance of multilateralism and the urgent need to revitalise and reform the UN, Pretoria-Tshwane was in a position to “…consistently [call] for more equitable representation of Africa and other developing regions and for the adoption of more just and transparent rules and procedures” (Department of Foreign Affairs 2005, 16). The idea of South Africa as the voice and spokesperson of the underdeveloped and destitute came through again.

Support for UN Human Rights Architecture

South Africa has contributed to the establishment and operationalisation of the UN Human Rights Council, the challenge being that UN institutions charged with advancing the Universal Declaration on Human Rights were haemorrhaging under pressure from the securitisation of the UN and human rights agenda by powerful states such as the US (Scanlon 2006). South Africa joined the G77+China campaigns for the replacement of the Commission for Human Rights with an effective, impartial and well-resourced body that would be a full subsidiary of the UNGA. This led to the establishment of the Human Rights Council by General Assembly Resolution GA 60/251. During the UN Millennium Plus 5 South Africa, together with other countries like Botswana and Mauritius encouraged UN members to support the adoption of the “responsibility to protect (R2P) concept” (Mwanasali 2006). Preceding that, as early as the year 2000, South Africa was instrumental in encouraging the African Union (AU) to adopt its own responsibility to protect regime,
called “from non-interference to non-indifference” (Landsberg 2010b, 438). Under the banner of this new doctrine, the continent would permit interference and intervention in the Affairs of African states so as to root out gross violations of human rights, genocide, instability within countries that may threaten broader regional stability in Africa, and unconstitutional changes of government (Akokpari and Zimbler 2008; Mwanasali 2006). Whilst supporting the R2P principle, South Africa was weary of this principle being used and abused by western powers for selfish foreign policy ends, and as a tool to settle scores with governments they had differences with. It was this kind of scepticism which led to the fall-out over the visit to South Africa of Sudanese president alBashir and the ANC ultimately imploring government to consider withdrawing from the ICC (Masters and Landsberg 2015).

Linking to the R2P debate, the Human Rights Council is responsible for observance of and respect for human rights globally, and is viewed by South Africa as having the primary responsibility for dealing with global human rights violations, not the UNSC - a view that informed their decision on the Myanmar affairs (Landsberg 2010b). Secondly, its decision was bolstered by the decision of ASEAN countries that Myanmar did not constitute a threat to their region and stressed that it would take its cue from sub-regional bodies on matters affecting member states. South Africa would not budge on a principled stance over matters tabled in the UNSC and vehemently resisted attempts by major powers in the council to place on the agenda matters that belonged in other chambers of the UN. In effect, South Africa disallowed the use of extraneous agendas as instruments to further their narrow self-interested foreign policy ambitions. But this strong stance came at a price, as it created the perception that South Africa was merely paying lip service to its commitment to uphold human rights. Its voting behaviour caused great consternation as many critics regarded it as inconsistent with its exemplary Constitution and foreign policy principles.

Pursuing UN Security Council Reform

The commitment to democratising the institutions of global governance, primarily the UN, found strong support from a resurgent global South in the UN and former Secretary General, Koffi Annan. The latter worked to develop consensus on the reform of the Security Council during his tenure and whose commissioned report of 2005 underlined the need of the UN to promote representation at decision-making levels and an equitable distribution of power within the UN system generally. The country that was once at the receiving end of sanctions and other punitive measures by the UN and
broader international community for pursuing apartheid and white minority domination, on account of what was dubbed a “crime against humanity” and a “threat to international peace and security”, is now a keen champion for the transformation of the world body. South Africa supported Annan’s position and a 2005 strategic foreign policy document reminds us that “South Africa actively participates in the debates on UN reform, particularly the reform of the UNSC, in order to make the UN more effective in dealing with new challenges as well as to make it more transparent, democratic and sensitive to the needs of Africa and the South” (Department of Foreign Affairs 2005, 21). Here again, it emerges that South Africa did not only see itself as a champion of multilateralism, but of the needs and interests of Africa.

The record demonstrates that South Africa contributed immensely to the evolution of this debate, thus helping to develop a common position as early as 2007, after three years of zealous consultation with African states. The Harare Declaration of that year informed the subsequent position on African representation in the Security Council, the so-called Ezulwini Consensus, which called on Africa to insist on two veto-wielding permanent and five non-permanent seats (Landsberg 2005). This position, however, failed to win support from the UN Summit in September 2005 and caused a stalemate in the reform process. South Africa’s failure to get Africa to move from its all-or-nothing position and build global coalitions will go down as a major strategic failure in its quest for democratising institutions of global governance. Former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, stated that “the UN, where the Security Council is dominated by five permanent members, need[s] to be reformed” (BBC News 2004). In 2014 and 2015, President Zuma used the occasion of his addresses to the UN General Assembly to openly canvass for the reform of the UN Security Council.

In February 2010, the AU Summit held in Addis Ababa endorsed South Africa’s candidature for the non-permanent seat on the UNSC for the period 2011-2012. The Minister of International Relations and Co-operation vowed that South Africa “would be guided by its commitment to strengthening the multilateral system and its support for a broader multilateral approach to questions of international peace and security” (The Diplomat 2010). She further noted that the country will “promote the African Agenda and...contribute to achieving peace and stability in the continent and in all regions of the world” (The Diplomat 2010). In February 2012, the Minister reiterated that

South Africa has been actively engaged in and supportive of all aspects of the reform process...However, more than ever, the world is in need of comprehensive reform of the UNSC which involves an expanded Council
in both the permanent and non-permanent categories, and with improved working methods. (DIRCO 2012)

In line with the Ezulwini consensus, South Africa sought to play the role of “voice” for the voiceless when the Minister asserted that, “in keeping with the principle of equitable representation, Africa, which makes up a considerable percentage of the overall membership of the UN, must be represented in the permanent category of the UNSC” (DIRCO 2012).

In that 2012 speech by the deputy Minister of International Relations and Co-operation mentioned earlier, reference was made to the fact that “(...) Africa is a huge continent that has 54 member states, representing more than one billion people” (Ebrahim 2012). Yet, complained deputy minister Ebrahim Ebrahim (2012), “(...) not a single African country is a permanent member of the UN Security Council”. President Zuma also weighed in on the debate during a Security Council Summit Debate on 12 January 2012. According to the President: “the failure of representation, on a permanent basis, of such a big part of the globe in an important body such as the UN security Council, points to the necessity and urgency for the fundamental reform of the UN Security Council so that it can become more representative and legitimate” (Ebrahim 2012).

South Africa in the Security Council

The first year of South Africa’s two-year tenure as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, January 2007 to December 2008, shows that despite the current global power imbalances, norm entrepreneurs (i.e., states that act in an exemplary and predictable manner in keeping with expectations about desirable behaviour) can make a limited but significant contribution to the cause of the UN and broader multilateralism. South Africa also had a second term as a non-permanent member in 2011-2012. Using the opportunity to contribute directly to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, it brought to the council a commitment to enhancing the integrity of the UN and its organs and placement of Africa and the global South at the centre of their agenda.

To be effective in the council, a member requires capacity to understand and handle the complex agenda and calculate how to respond to the disproportionate power of the Permanent Five (P5) - China, France, Russia, the UK and US - and their willingness to use this power to push through issues of self-interest. South Africa was concerned about the P5’s ability to arrogate to themselves the right to define threats to international peace and their re-
response. This produced tension between South Africa and some of them over what was considered abuse of power.

Siphamandla Zondi argued that “(...) South Africa needed coalition with like-minded members, and with six other non-permanent members who were also members of NAM (Congo Republic, Ghana, Indonesia, Panama, Peru and Qatar) it reconstituted the NAM Security Council caucus to develop unified positions on major issues before the council and protect the interests of the developing countries”. Without the privilege of the veto powers, the united positions of these states have affected the outcomes of major decisions in the council. South Africa virtually acted as a spokesperson and champion of the group, and deftly used its position as the chairperson of the broader G77+China Group for 2007 drawing on its own moral authority, further to punt loudly for the reform of the UN and other multilateral bodies.

A Perspective on Voting Positions

South Africa’s principled positions on Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Iran, Libya, Cote d’Ivoire and, currently, Syria, have been regarded by representatives as major successes in the UN chambers; but poor public diplomacy has led to criticism in the public arena. In recent times, it has also been difficult to reconcile the various positions of the country as it appeared contradictory in nature. As exemplified by the recent agreement between the country’s ruling party and Hamas rather than all stakeholders in the Palestine-Israel conflict, a weakness in its conduct of international relations and position in the Security Council continues to be communication: on each occasion on which its vote was controversial, the Government has failed to anticipate the shift in the rhetorical war of words from the chambers of the UN to influential media. It underestimated the power of the media and communications machinery, and to counter this, the Department of International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO) must be considerably strengthened. It is often weak in articulating the country’s foreign policy imperatives in normal circumstances, let alone in complex matters relating to their application to international relations.

The UN and Peacebuilding

Partly informed by South Africa’s own extraordinary political trans-

formation and peace diplomacy in Africa, the country has put coordinated and structured post-conflict development firmly on the agenda of the global South and, subsequently, that of the UN. It should be remembered that Pretoria played a key role in helping to negotiate the AU’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework of June 2005 (Landsberg 2009). In the context of the peacebuilding commission, South Africa has stressed the need for a long-term perspective that supports countries emerging from conflict in order to prevent relapses. Equally important is the need to put them on the road to recovery, development and self-reliance, in which the decision of the UN Summit in 2005 to establish a Peacebuilding Commission was a milestone. South Africa held the view that the Peacebuilding Commission would be an important interface between the Security Council and ECOSOC, and that its mandate needed to be open-ended enough to enable the participation of any country that could contribute effectively to its work (Landsberg 2009).

**UN Interface with Regional Organizations**

South Africa has adopted a close and structured working relationship between the UN and regional organisations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and has helped redefine the UN-AU interface in favour of African peace and development. It has successfully argued that the UN’s capacity to discharge its developmental and political responsibilities requires cooperation with regional organisations to build on their long expertise. This has encouraged the UN to work through and support regional initiatives where there are synergies with UN goals and programmes, and where regional organisations can assist the UN. Overall, the idea is to ensure that UNSC expansion does not undermine regional self-reliance. A balance is also needed between working through regional organisations and overburdening them.

A major goal of South Africa, in conjunction with the AU, was to create synergy between the UN Security Council and other regional organisations, in particular the AU Peace and Security Council, with a view to preventing conflict in Africa. As former Minister Dlamini-Zuma put it: “(...) South Africa will strive in conjunction with the AU to create synergies between the work of the AUPC and the UNSC with a view to the prevention of outbreak of violence and conflict in the continent”6. Pretoria vigorously pursued this aim and during the second tenure of its presidency a special debate took place, chaired by Mbeki and attended by heads of government serving on the Se-

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Security Council, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and African leaders who were non-permanent members. The outcome was the adoption of Resolution 1809, which welcomed the role of the AU in bringing peace and stability to the continent and thereby expressed support for its work.

In part because of South Africa’s agitation, the council expressed determination to enhance the relationship between the UN and regional organisations in accordance with Chapter VIII. In this, it made the point that common and coordinated efforts undertaken by the UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU, should be based on complimentary capacities and make full use of their experiences.

South Africa convened a joint meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council and the UNSC at ambassadorial level in April 2008, to explore ways to maximise the cooperative relationship between itself and the AU Peace and Security Council in the fields of conflict prevention, resolution and management. This meeting was a visible sign of the willingness of the two bodies to work together in the interest of international peace and security, based on the logic of comparative advantage. In 2012 again, during South Africa’s second stint on the UNSC as non-permanent member, it stressed that, “in accordance with the provision of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter”, there was need for “common ground” between the UNSC and the AUPSC (DIRCO 2011).

South Africa and Global Environmental Governance

South Africa’s ratification of multilateral environmental agreements and its hosting of the WSSD in 2003, and again the COP 17 Summit in 2012, have bolstered its reputation as a pivotal player in global environmental governance, campaigning for strengthening of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), and the World Bank-driven Global Environmental Facility (GEF)—all key structures in the global environmental system. During the 2005 Millennium Plus 5 Summit, South Africa and other developing countries called for the development of a more inclusive International Framework on Climate Change beyond the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol. These countries supported the idea of the establishment of a UN Environment Organisation, as well as the establishment of a National Disaster Relief and Environmental Protection Fund (Landsberg 2009). South Africa has stressed the importance of efficiency and effectiveness, and the need for the World Bank and other institutions, as well as the industrialized powers, to meet their obligations towards the South and
the developing world.

South Africa is one of only four developing countries donating to the GEF trust fund, a position it used to advance the African Agenda and Agenda of the South and push for greater coordination and cooperation between UNEP and related agencies. In the UN CSD, South Africa has been active - especially as a chair in 2004 - in developing mechanisms for synergising various plans of action, including Rio, WSSD, COP 16 and COP 17. Pretoria has recognized the need to develop sustainable development strategies, including an integrated policy framework for harmonising industrial policies and environmental governance, and developing meaningful links between social, economic and environmental dimensions.

Conclusion

South Africa has been an avid supporter of UN reform during the cause of the past two decades. On issues of conflict and threats to international peace and security, the post-apartheid South African governments have prompted middle powers and countries from the South to help challenge the dominant powers. We take this to include not just the western powers, but other dominant powers like Russia and China as well. It is determined to prevent an abuse of the Charter by states for selfish foreign policy aims and is concerned about the power some countries have over the UN simply through contributing to the bulk of its budget.

It not only sought to reform the UNSC, the UNGA and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOC), but also strengthen the capacity of the UN bureaucracy. During the period 2005 to 2007, it galvanised members of the G77+China and others behind UNGA resolutions to increase representation of developing countries in the UN Secretariat, improve access of vendors amongst them in the UN procurement system, enhance the accountability of the Secretariat, set apart funds for refurbishment of the UN’s headquarters, and provide additional resources for the expansion of Secretariat personnel. Pretoria sought to defend the integrity of the UN and multilateralism by securing its financial position and urging developed and developing countries alike to meet their obligations.

UN reform seems poised to be a more tardy, tedious and long-term project than South Africa often makes it out to be. But this is not a good enough reason for the Republic to rest on its laurels. South Africa should continue to beat the transformation drum, but should do so in partnership with others and stress multilateral engagement for the sake of multilateral
transformation.

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**ABSTRACT**

Post-apartheid South Africa pursued a pro-multilateral stance in world – regarding multilateral institutions as crucial instruments for reinforcing its new-found image as a champion for southern African and African causes. Challenging the hegemony and dominance of western powers in particular, powerful countries in general, was at the heart of South Africa’s multilateral strategies. Central to all multilateral engagements was respect for international law and the centrality of the United Nations (UN), stressing the promotion of human rights, debt relief, peace and stability, an equitable global trading system and sustainable development. Also of priority was reform of the UN and institutions of global governance, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

**KEYWORDS**

Post-apartheid; South Africa; Multilateralism.

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CAPE VERDE: GEOPOLITICS AND PROJECTION OF A SMALL ISLAND STATE IN WEST AFRICA

João Paulo Madeira

Introduction

A group of analysts seek to comprehend the geopolitics of Cape Verde at the international context, particularly on the West African region. Duarte (2004), Tolentino (2007), Fernandes (2008), Rocha (2008), Gomes (2009) e Costa (2011) highlight the importance of Cape Verde as a small island state and deepen the relation of this country with other West African states, namely: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. These authors write on the mechanisms and processes of regional integration of Cape Verde in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The territorial (4033km²) and demographic (500,000 inhabitants) characteristics of the archipelago, its features and its relevance on global decision-making process puts Cape Verde into the categories of small states and small islands states at the same time (Shlapentokh 2012). Since its independence in 1975, the country, besides being an insular and peripheric state, faces enormous challenges on the regional and international context. The signing of the Constitutive Treaty for the integration of Cape Verde into the ECOWAS took place in 1977, only two years after its independence (Reis 2008). The archipelago finds itself inserted in a region with about 262 million people and it has the smallest territorial dimension compared to the continental mass of the ECOWAS (Rocha 2008).

Cape Verde’s integration to the ECOWAS has been questioned re-
Regarding the benefits and challenges that this process could bring to the archipelago. These debates center essentially on political and economic matters, and on the deepening of peace and security in the region. Such discussions were brought back in May 2015 due to Cape Verde’s campaign to preside the African Development Bank (AFDB) with Cristina Duarte, Minister of Finances. Despite her defeat, she managed to raise significant support by non-continental voters, when compared to her direct competitors. Nevertheless, it is commonly pointed out that one of the fundamental factors for the defeat was the weak participation of Cape Verde in the African context. In that sense, we depart from the assumption that Cape Verde needs to focus in West Africa’s geopolitical scenario, in order to make its socioeconomic interests be fulfilled. It is equally important, for both its regional and international projection, that, despite its reduced territorial expression, the country manages to affirm itself as a role-model for other African states since it values the principles of democracy and good governance.

Geopolitics as a method for the interpretation of the dynamics of political phenomenon based on its spatial reality (Castro 1961; Gallois 1990) allows small insular states, such as Cape Verde, to effectively bet on view of development that prioritizes, above all, the security, peace and defense of the national territory. Cape Verde, given its geographic reality, needs to promote itself in the West African context and, given its geostrategic reality, search for a special statute, as it has been doing for the past years. Some investigators like Taglioni (2003), Bouchard (2004) and Baldacchino (2007) point out and affirm that there are significant economic impacts that result from the insular character of small states.

Cape Verde must gather the benefits of this trend and reaffirm a geopolitical prominence in West Africa, reversing the fragilities that come from its territorial dimensions smaller than 5,000 km, and from its demographic dimensions that do not exceed 0.5 million. There is a big effort coming from policymakers and partners in order to leverage and project the archipelago in the international system, looking for means to gain each time more relevance and notoriety on a region shaken by phenomenon like terrorism, threats to peace, security and stability and the menace posed by the Islamic State.

In this article, we seek to consider some central questions, such as: if Cape Verde should, given its geostrategic position in the Atlantic, and in spite of the international financial crisis, bet on the continent and its respective emerging economies, aiming to boost its socioeconomic development; if the archipelago should bet in new sectors, transforming them in service and specialized labour platforms, in order to reinforce its regional integration process. If so, which aspects should prevail to intensify the small state geopo-
Cape Verde: geopolitics and projection of a small island State in West Africa

To answer such questions, we anchor our work on the qualitative method, namely on the interpretative approach and on bibliographical revision. We believe that there is the urgent need to analyze and interpret to further explain and understand the geopolitical configuration of Cape Verde in the West African context, based on the current international conjuncture shaken by the economic and financial crisis. From the originality of the problematic of Cape Verde’s insertion on the West African context, we consider that the present study has a great value to add in this field of study. In a context where there is an urgent need to develop deep studies on Cape Verde geopolitics on West Africa, it is indispensible to analyze an array of social, geographic, political and economic factors. Given its insularity, Cape Verde needs to bet on a geopolitical orientation that confers stability and protection in order to face its vulnerabilities. The archipelago’s security must be a national priority due to the current instability of the sub-region it is located. Cape Verde must take advantage of its image of an economic, political and socially stable country so that it can effectively materialize the projection it seeks.

Geopolitics and Small States

Geopolitics asserted itself as a scientific field that combines both geographic factors and political phenomenon. The term ‘Geopolitics’ was first used by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, that found support on the work Politische Geographie (Political Geography) (1897) by Friedrich Ratzel, to defend an organic vision of geography, in which the state resembles a biological organism in constant expansion, that is, states follow “the categorical imperative of space expansion, through colonization, amalgamation or conquer” (Costa 2008, 57). Even though geopolitics aim to show that processes and political guidelines have no meaning out of their respective geographical frames, like territory, location, natural resources and populational contingent, what is certain is that it ends up characterizing as a method that interprets political phenomenon in its spatial reality (Castro 1961). The process of assertion of geopolitics as science do not show itself as an easy task, considering that some facts and justifications pointed out were summoned by the nazi expansion campaigns between 1933-1945, culminating in real tragedies for mankind. In that sense, geopolitics transformed itself in a very criticized science, given the works of Karl Haushofer, from the Geopolitics School of Munich and the journal Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, created in 1924 (Mello 1999). Today, geopolitics is gaining notoriety between specialists of different study areas, from politics, investigators, journalists and, above all, international politics.
analysts, that frequently use the term, mainly because of three factors: firstly, because the geopolitical discourse constantly deals with matters of power and conflict in the international arena, making it attractive to the public opinion; secondly, because of the fact that geopolitics coherently seem to explain the most complex international phenomenon, creating schemes of analysis and interpretation, that give consistency to explanations on how an event may influence or be influenced by a much larger process in global scale; third, it almost seems to have a prophetical discourse, since it foresees and points towards a given direction of global evolution (Ó Tuathail 2006).

Geopolitics characterizes itself for being an autonomous field of study that seeks to comprehend the way in which geography interferes in the political behavior of states and societies, differing from political geography in the extent that it seeks to present a synchronic vision of reality, while geopolitics tries to present a diachronic vision, providing simultaneously signification, sense and perspective (Nogueira 2011). It is not just about a compression of political geography, but a vision of the power disputes in the international scenario. It is important here to perceive the concept of power in order to comprehend the conception of geopolitics, in the extent that states (possessing vital spaces) seek, through material and political instruments available, to impose their hegemony at international level. Geopolitics “covers the conflict, transformation, evolution, revolution, attack, defense and dynamic of terrestrial spaces, and the political forces that fight over those to survive” (Weigert 1943, 24).

From the infinity of theoretical and conceptual schools of thought, above all from the English Geopolitical School, established by Halford Mackinder, the German School, by Friedrich Ratzel, the French School of Geopolitics, by Vidal de La Blanche, and the North-American Geopolitics School, by Alfred Mahan, it becomes necessary to highlight two chains of thought that are fundamental to the comprehension of geopolitics as a concept. The first one refers to the ‘theory of the organic state’, that emerges from the social darwinism and has among its proponents Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen; the second one, denominated ‘geostrategy’, is based mostly on geographical and political facts, having proponents such as Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder (Céleriér 1969; Glassner 1993).

The first theoretical chain, the ‘theory of the organic state’ has as its main forerunner Friedrich Ratzel, being strongly influenced by the discoveries of Charles Darwin and, therefore, by the ‘social darwinism theory’. The German Friedrich Ratzel, geography professor at Leipzig and a graduate in biology and chemistry, on its work Political Geography (1896) used metaphors from the biological study to comprehend the state as a living organism. In that
sense, Ratzel looks into the fundamentals that govern the relations between geographical space (the land) and states, considering that all state and social activities should be seen from the perspective of their real fundamentals, that are found in the land and the soil on which they live (Weigert 1943). Rudolf Kjellen, disciple of Ratzel, follows up from the perspective of his master, considering in its work *State as a Manifestation of Life (1916)* that “geopolitics is the study of state as a geographical organism, that being, the phenomena located on a certain point of Earth, or as a country, territory, region and a political domain” (Santos 1993, 7). Kjellen highlights the growing need to guarantee political spaces that are vital to the survival of each state, causing a growing competition between them, and having the bigger and stronger a greater probability to survive, since they extend their domains over smaller ones. The central idea on Kjellen is that only the most powerful states would survive (Glassner 1993). States, to guarantee their own existence, need space in a growing extent in order to expand their borders, being sometimes necessary in the process, to resort to war with other states.

The second chain, ‘geostrategy’, privileges the analysis of a system of states, seeking to find models of behavior that fit this system with the goal to formulate the best strategies for state actions. Alfred Mahan, north-american Admiral and one of the most important proponents of this chain, developed the *Maritime Power Theory*, supplying strong recommendations for his country’s foreign policy. Mahan considered that the United States should draw as its strategy of survival, the hegemony and the control over its continent, in order to prevent Japan’s expansion in the Far East, and focus, on the middle run, on maritime affairs (Glassner 1993). In that sense, *Maritime Power Theory* turned out to be the “bible of the supporters of United States manifest destiny and the advocates of North-American power expansion based on naval power” (Mello 1999, 15). Halford Mackinder, geographer and another important proponent of this chain, developed the theory of land power, warning the importance of the “pivot region” between Germany and Russia, referred as *Heartland*, that represented the vital center of Eurasia (the continental mass that embraces Europe and Asia). For Mackinder, “whoever rules East Europe, rules the *Heartland*; who rules the *Heartland*, rules the World Island, and who rules the World Island, rules the World” (Glassner 1993, 26), that is, whoever dominates the *Heartland* will consequently control the World, since it is a region with no accessibility to the sea and is, therefore, protected from eventual maritime attacks of naval powers.

Taking into consideration such perspectives, it is possible to highlight that geopolitics is intrinsically related to the geographical power configuration between states in the international arena. We believe that, the bigger the
geographical domains of a state, equipped with material conditions (such as military and economic power), the bigger is its influence in the international context. We also believe that states need to afford such material and political capacities to create maritime and territorial strategies with the goal of sustaining their power at a local, regional or world level. Here, we can also add the following question: how can these dimensions apply to small states and, namely, those that are insular? Small states have been the object of study of different areas of knowledge, as they have been evolving on international relations in the last decades (Keohane 1969; Alouche 1994; Nye 2004; Neumann e Gstöhl 2006; Carlsnaes 2007; Gaspar 2007; Nunes 2007). Nevertheless, there is no consensus regarding the definition of small states (Henrikson 2001; Maass 2009). There is substantial disagreement about which criteria, quantitative or qualitative, are more adequate and capable of characterizing small states (Maass 2009). Can material, military, scientific, spatial, demographic, institutional, political and moral factors be treated the same way? Measuring the last three factors constitutes a very complex task. For example, the Soviet Union was a great power, but entered a decay period in the 1990’s, while Switzerland, a small state, demonstrated to be a strong country on central Europe, by its diplomatic and political position (Gaspar 2007). In this framework, “the difference between great powers and small states should be, above all, made according to the geographical and human resources available” (Gaspar 2007, 114). The definition of small state varies basing on the criteria the entity uses, which can be qualitative (physical and geographic characteristics) or quantitative (territorial, demographic and economic) (Tolentino 2007). However, considering the heterogeneity of small states, applying a precise and rigorous definition could create numerous exceptions (Hey 2003).

Through a more classic approach, a small state usually holds a narrow territory, a relatively small number of inhabitants and few resources (Aron 1970). The matter of size is taken as a central criteria to define a small state, even though it is not a consensus determinant. For example, Foz (2006) considers that criteria such as dimension are not measurable. Indeed, the author centered his analysis on the diplomatic aspect. Therefore, we believe that, in order to characterize a state looking for its dimension, we must take into consideration both qualitative and quantitative aspects (Gaspar 2007; Tolentino 2007; Maas 2009). In that sense, we must apply a definition that avoid those stiff and excludent specifications, to find a broader one (Vital 1971). The United Nations, for example, utilizes some criteria such as population inferior to 2.5 million inhabitants, political sovereignty and area below 5,000 km² to characterize the dimensions of such small states (Tolentino 2007). That way, a small state, from the United Nations perspective, is a state with extremely
small identities on what refers to area, population, human and economic resources - based on a comparative and not absolute scale (Rapoport, Muteba and Theratill 1971).

Small states, and in this case the insular ones, according to the United Nations, present different criteria: population below 1.5 million inhabitants, political sovereignty or autonomy recognized by the UN and area below 5,000 km² (Tolentino 2007). Allied to this aspects are other factors: isolation, vulnerability to natural disasters, natural resource scarcity, excessive dependency in international trade, lack of economy scale and high infrastructural, transport and administration costs (Tolentino 2007). Cape Verde, the focus of our study, fits in this category, presenting a lack of natural resources, narrow territory and extreme dependency on international affairs and strategic cooperation partnerships. Facing such reality, Cape Verde needs to create alternatives to confront its smallness and insularity. These alternatives, necessarily demand the reinforcement of regional and sub-regional integration that can sustain in the medium and long run stability and economic sustainability. But that will only be possible if it is given primary attention to geopolitics, at least in the West African context, whereas considering the prospects of an international projection.

West Africa: The ECOWAS

According to the Department of Economic and Social Affairs - from the Division of Statistics of the United Nations - the West Africa, where the countries of the ECOWAS are located, is formed by a group of sixteen countries, eight francophones (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea Konakri, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo), one arabic (Mauritania), five anglophones (Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) and two lusophone (Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau) (Boahen 2010; Uzoigwe 2010).

As shown in Figure 1 on the next page, this region of the African continent is divided in two subregions: Sahel, that extends from Mauritania to Niger, including Cape Verde, Senegal and Gambia; and the Coastal, that includes countries from Guinea-Bissau to Nigeria. West Africa, a stage of the European colonization, is one of the most important regions of Subsaharan Africa, formed by many countries with diverse culture and characteristics. Several African empires, with great weight in transaharian trade, emerged in this region (Ghana, Mali, Songai) (Adetula 2004). After the Scramble for Africa (1884-1885) the west territory served as a key region on the process of African decolonization (Diop 1987; Visentini 2007), producing important leaders and intelectuals that firmly opposed the colonial regime (Suret-Canale
The Scramble for Africa, that happened during the Berlin Conference, organized by the former German chancellor Otto Von Bismarck, between November 19th of 1884, and February 26th of 1885 and that praised the race towards Africa of the European great powers, represented for the continent, and above all for the West Africa, an era of new geographical and territorial configurations (Uzoigwe 2010; Visentini 2011). Such process led to territorial conflicts and civil wars across the region (Diop 2000; Ki-Zerbo 2010; Visentini 2007) that arose from the rivalries of the European great powers (Ribeiro 2007), which were fighting for territorial, natural and mostly African labor. Thus, Visentini (2007, 115) considers that:

Rivalries between distinct groups were stimulated by the colonizers as a means of domination, leaving behind a tragic heritage, expressed on the ‘minorities’ and ‘tribalism’ issues, besides the antagonism between those that embraced the European culture, and those who didn’t. Many of the future civil wars would result mainly from the distortion of traditional African structure by the colonizers. That is, they were outcomes not of a ‘traditional tribalism’, but of its appropriation by European modernity.
Nevertheless, given the complexity of such process, countries of the African region created many regional organizations and institutions aiming to project socioeconomic development, which was not an easy task. For instance, in May 28th of 1975, through the Lagos Treaty, the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) was established, representing a group of regional states, whose central goal is to create a custom union and a common market. The Community, in a broader way, seeks the promotion of regional trade, cooperation and development amongst countries such as: Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

Given the complexity of the African continent, and specially of the West African region, the creation of the ECOWAS was determined by two fundamental ideas, being them: [i] the creation, through the cooperation among small states of the region, of a common front to fight against the oppression of international forces; [ii] the establishment of a robust and viable economy, with the main goal of eradicating poverty, that emerged from the small dimension of national markets, and the failure of development plans from the United Nations for Africa during the 1960’s and 1970’s (Fernandes 2011). The goals of the ECOWAS aim for: the promotion, cooperation and integration of all economic aspects, in order to raise the life quality of their inhabitants; the maintenance and eventual growth of economic stability; the reinforcement of relations between member states; the contribution to the general development of the continent; the harmonization and coordination of national politics; the creation of a common market, that points do the liberalization of economic trade; the establishment of common trade policy and fares; the elimination of obstacles for the free circulation of people, goods, services; and the creation of an African Union (UEMOA, 2006; Fernandes 2007; Gomes 2009). Even though the biggest concern of the ECOWAS refers to the economic arena, other aspects have become part of the community priorities, such as politics, peace and security in the region. As examples, we have the meetings of Chiefs of State that ended up resulting in the approval of the 1978 Non-Agression Protocol and, in 1981 of the Joint Defense and Assistance Protocol (De La Veja 2007). The foundation of the ECOWAS was pushed by the persistence of Nigeria, which wanted to overcome the conflicts of the region, namely the Coup d’Etat in Togo (January of 1963 and January of 1967), Congo-Brazaville (August of 1963 and September of 1968) Dahomey (October of 1963, December of 1965 and December of 1969), Gabon (February of 1964), Central African Republic (January of 1965), Upper Volta, nowadays Burkina Faso (January of 1965), Algeria (June of 1965), Congo-Kinshasa (November of 1965), Ghana (February of 1966), Nigeria (January of 1966),
Burundi (November of 1966), Togo (January of 1967), Sierra Leone (March of 1967 and April of 1968), Mali (November of 1968), Sudan (May of 1969), Libya (September of 1969), Somalia (October of 1969) and Lesotho (January of 1970). These coups d’Etat influenced Nigeria to convince its neighbour states and regional partners of the need to create a common regional entity.

Nigeria, with the support of other countries, specially Togo, Ghana and Niger, embraced the task of promoting regional integration, and in 1975 convinced the countries of the region, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo to take part on the creation of the ECOWAS, signing its Constitutive Treaty. This particularity made Nigeria acquire notoriety as a hegemonic power in the region and, strategically, conduct the geopolitics of Africa. Besides this country, there are others which have been object of scientific investigation in this geographical space, like Cape Verde, given its specificity of land and territory, and its presumable importance in the region, at a context where peace, security and development have been constant worries of African countries, considering the negative impacts of globalization such as drug trafficking and terrorism.

Cape Verde at the ECOWAS: projection of a small insular State

Cape Verde is a small insular state located in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, between Africa, Europe and the Americas. Composed by about 500,000 resident inhabitants, the archipelago is formed by ten islands and several islanders:
According to Figure 2, shown above, the ten islands of volcanic origin are divided into two regions: the Leeward, formed by the islands of Maio (269 km²), Santiago (991 km²), Fogo (476 km²) and Brava (64 km²); and the islanders of Santa Maria, Grande, Luis Carneiro and Cima; and the Windward region, composed by the islands of Santo Antão (779 km²), São Vicente (227 km²), Santa Luzia (35 km², inhabited), São Nicolau (343 km²), Sal (216 km²) and Boa Vista (620 km²); and the islanders of Boi, Pássaros, Branco e Raso, Rabo de Junco, Curral de Dado, Fragata, Chano and Baluarte (Gomes 2008). With a total surface of about 4033 km², Cape Verde is located at around 500 km off the African West coast, sided by Senegal, between the parallels 17º 12’ and 14º 48’ latitude North and the meridians 22º 41’ and 25º 22’ of longitude West of Greenwich (Teixeira and Barbosa 1958).

Its independence was acquired in the 5th of July, 1975, and symbolized a new age of internal and external conquests for the archipelago, recognized by international institutions and organizations. The recently created state of Cape Verde gains the statute of a full member of the international community and acquires several compromises in order to promote its economic and social development, as well as to defend its territorial integrity. Given the international organizations of which Cape Verde is a member, we highlight: the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Group of 77 (G-77) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Cape Verde becomes a member of the ECOWAS at March 16, 1977, two years after its independence. This community is formed by countries with different territorial and geographic dimensions that depend on the development of the region as an instrument for its international projection. Cape Verde is the only insular state among those of the continental mass that is a member of the ECOWAS and, for that reason, seeks, backed by Article 68 of the Abuja Treaty, for a special statute inside the community. In this context, Cape Verde is trying to obtain benefits, since its independence, from the assistance and help that can derive from such multilateral spaces.

The particular case of Cape Verde goes on the opposite way of Tonra’s (2003) idea, of an attempt among small states to take profit of their positions inside international organizations, to make viable the expression of a new international identity, marked specially by the idea that superpowers would stand in the same level as small states. The archipelago, knowing its...
geographical dimension and its lack of natural resources, both economic and military, survives, not side by side with world powers, but with the perspective of having a geopolitical use for the world, that even though prioritizes the expansion of its Continental Shelf (to 350 nautical miles), seeks to maintain its national unity and have impacts on the promotion of dialogues and peace in the international level.

Given its geostrategic position, Cape Verde is being inserted in the debates and concerns regarding international security and in the fight against drug trafficking networks and international terrorism, particularly considering the imminent threat of the Islamic State. Moreover, the archipelago can play an important role on the bonding of the ECOWAS with the world, particularly with the European Union, China, United States and Brazil. In our vision, Cape Verde holds, in the Special Partnership with the European Union, signed in November 2007, the safeguard of its status as the bridge between both continents, having, therefore, important advantages. It is also added the importance of such geostrategic position to European Union as a whole, in the sense that the country should be more integrated regionally in the African continent. However, several controversies have emerged from this process. Some defend a ‘no integration’ option, given the problems Africa has been facing, while others defend there should be more integration. The ECOWAS “despite the political will of its member states leaders, has become an organization with little articulation, and incapable - financially and politically - of answering to the demands detailed on its founding program” (Rosa 2007, 8). Costa (2011) considers that the ECOWAS project of regional integration is doomed to fail, for the simple fact that the community lacks institutionalization.

The adherence of Cape Verde to institutions “in the nature of ECOWAS was made voluntarily, sustained more on a mythical africanist belief than as a result of a realist assessment, based on data regarding the viability of goals” (Reis 2008, 84). For those that defend the ECOWAS integration, the central argument is that Cape Verde would manage to achieve significant benefits from it, since, between 2005 and 2007, there were reforms inside the community, that gave it more credibility and efficiency (Rocha 2010). Fernandes (2008) believes that, on relation to the free-circulation of people in the region, it allows for a more global conscience on the need of workforce and, consequently, on the reinforcement of the humanization of political agendas and of greater intervention on humanitarian issues and the protection of human beings. The free circulation “can work as an ideal, for overthrowing the prospect of the globalization of a common workforce” (Fernandes 2008, 64). Duarte (2004, 119) recognizes that the regional integration process can be
profitable for the Cape Verdian economy, alerting that due to the territorial dimensions of the archipelago:

The Cape Verdian economy will have to introduce itself in a vast regional market, allowing the country to successfully face latent and permanent conflicts between the smallness of its regional market and the optimal dimensions of production with its economic dimension, to leverage its geopolitical position as a twisting board of international trade.

The debate over regional integration gained renewed attention once again in May 2015, with the candidacy of the Cape Verdian Minister of Finances and Planning, Cristina Duarte, for the presidency of the African Development Bank (AFDB) which, facing the context of West Africa, gathered a weak support, gaining only 10.27% of the votes. However, her direct contestant Akinwumi Adesina, from Nigeria, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development won the elections with more than 59% of the votes. One of the factors that were presented to explain the defeat of the Minister is related to variables of geopolitical nature that favored the Nigerian candidate. This question provoked a wave of critics in Cape Verde, against the integration of the archipelago, believing that the country has not been able to enjoy a satisfactory relation with the continent, and that it is necessary to adopt a geopolitical agenda that take that into account. The geopolitics of Cape Verde should be centered specially in its strategic position on the Atlantic, with attention for its defense and security, given the threats of drug trafficking and terrorism.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MIREX) of Cape Verde has been looking for, alongside its strategic partners, to develop an intense activity towards Africa. We noted, for instance, that Cape Verde has few diplomatic representations (embassies) in Africa (Senegal, Ethiopia and Angola) in countries that could be strategic for its development. Moreover, one should question the lack of effective diplomatic representations in the African Union and the ECOWAS. Brito (2015), director of Cristina Duarte’s campaign, considers that there is a lack of political will and a lack of understanding of the African continent reality, that is, Cape Verde did not have a policy of integration in Africa. The author is not in favor of creating embassies but argues in favor of a closer connection between the economic and diplomatic systems of Cape Verde, through Chambers of Commerce, or Cape Verde Investments.

We believe, corroborating other reflections on the issue, that the geopolitics of Cape Verde in West Africa and, in a wider manner, in the continent, has been really modest, and we can see a disconnection between governmental practice and the rhetoric of political leaders. In order to achieve a bigger
opening for the African continent, we believe that Cape Verde should invest in a geopolitical agenda based on six pillars: [i] its geostrategic position in the Atlantic, that has helped on its international projection [ii] its potential as a buffer zone to combat terrorism and drug trafficking, attracting international resources for the country’s development; [iii] continue to fight for the extension of its Continental Shelf, making use of the acquired geographical space to increase the dynamics of the national economy; [iv] Bet on sectors such as technology, communications and electronic governance, transforming itself into a platform of services and specialized workforce in the ECOWAS, searching for the deepening of its regional integration; [v] The internationalization of enterprises with significant investments, by creating, for instance, joint ventures that would be able to compete with other companies that are installed in the region; and [vi] Make use of its image as a model of good governance and democracy in Africa in order to mobilize resources for Cape Verde development and, at the same time, act as a “consultant” for other countries in the region.

Such initiatives should be put in practice in a framework of cooperation amongst Cape Verde and other states, recognizing its limitations as a small insular state with few resources, and that prioritizes the mobilization of assistance for development purposes, defense of peace and international security. To face off against African powers (with more economic and military resources), is not a viable solution for Cape Verde geopolitics in the continent. However it is necessary to bet on an international and regional projection that may bring advantages for the archipelago in its plan for aid and cooperation. We believe that Cape Verde’s geopolitics should not focus on the material acquisition of geographical space in the framework of ECOWAS, but mostly, and above all, we believe that it should search for immaterial achievements such as being recognized by a model country that could offer advantages for countries in the region.

**Final Notes and Geostrategic Recommendations**

The geopolitics of Cape Verde in the West African region should be based on its possibilities, and mainly on its boldness to create and produce dynamics of development that enhances its credibility in the region. The whole trajectory of the archipelago’s history, since its independence, has been accompanied by challenges for development, in a perspective of conciliating its geostrategic position in the Atlantic with the image of model for the African continent. The deepening of the Cape Verdian geopolitics in the West African region necessarily demands a deeper knowledge of the reality of this region,
without losing sight of its condition as a small insular state.

Whereas considering the relative hierarchical position of states in the world is complex and is hard to identify the resources of states from some characteristics, mainly the non measurable ones. However, due to the identified and analyzed components, we consider Cape Verde as a small insular state that need, by considering these characteristics, to create mechanisms to join the geographic regions of its insertion in order to fight against phenomenon that put into danger the safety of the archipelago. It is not a coincidence that Cape Verde is deepening its relations with powers such as the United States, the European Union, China and Brazil. Nevertheless, the archipelago’s credibility may also reside in a broader regional integration and in the benefits gained from the mechanisms provided by the region of its geographic insertion, that could be reached through a geopolitical agenda that stresses diplomatic efforts and the image of a united country that is sustained in the principles of peace and collective security.

We consider that the geopolitical strategy of Cape Verde does not involve isolationism, but rather the insertion in a region that may help to achieve stability and protection against the vulnerabilities of its own territory. The security context of the archipelago needs to be allied to its historical, geographical, political and economic references, allowing it to combine both internal and external factors. The current system, shaken by changes that derive from the globalization allows, somehow, for the widening of the scope of action of small states, mainly those whose territory seems vulnerable to phenomenon such as terrorism and drug trafficking. This field of action is supported on the contribution of small states to peace and is, indeed, “today, like during most of its history, their most dominant characteristic and function” (Almeida 2012, 425). We can surely affirm that this is what is happening in Cape Verde, supported by big regional blocs, in order to contribute in the fight against these phenomenon and that is somewhat being a means to prevent some conflicts in in West Africa. As long as it follows like that, Cape Verde needs to take advantage of its image to project itself regionally, based on a geopolitical agenda that emphasizes peace and good governance. In fact, the contribution of the archipelago should not limit itself to a selfish concentration of efforts to defend its national interest, but as an “active participation in the definition of global ethics” (Políbio 2012, 425). We shall say, then, that more than global ethics, Cape Verde should prioritize regional ethics. This field needs deep and scientific thinking. It would be important, here, to encourage other investigators to explore other prospects and potentialities, mainly on what refers to Cape Verdian geopolitics, not excluding the works developed so far. However, we alert to the weak scientific production in Cape Verde, particularly in the
area of African geopolitics. Facing this reality, we sought, in this investigation, to ally scientific literature to an array of other researches from foreign investigators that lean over this reality.

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**ABSTRACT**
The article seeks to understand the geopolitics of Cape Verde in the context of West Africa, and its projection as a small island State. The central argument is that Cape Verde needs to make pragmatic use of the Western African coast region for its regional projection. The article focuses on a qualitative methodological analysis, based on an interpretative approach and a bibliographical revision in order to address the international phenomena that configure the Cape Verdean geopolitics in West Africa.

**KEYWORDS**
Cape Verde; Geopolitics; Small State; Small Island State; West Africa.

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TERRORISM IN WEST AFRICAN HISTORY: A 21ST CENTURY APPRAISAL

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Introduction: conceptual and historical background

The word terrorism has received increased and exaggerated attention recently more particularly since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States of America. Since then there have been several attacks on various governments, countries, foreign embassies, hijacking of airplanes, kidnappings of foreign and Western workers, drug trafficking and abduction of sex workers in almost all parts of the world. Yet what constitutes terrorism in terms of the definition is as varied as the different perspectives advanced by several scholars with divergent backgrounds. (Bolaji 2010; Hoffman 1998; Hutchinson and O’Mallery 2007; Wardlaw 1982; Warren 2012; Toros 2008). This problem arises because it is not exact what terrorism is and according to whose perspectives. What one person will see as terrorism will be seen in another perspective as not terror. The debate on what constitutes terrorism reached the corridors of the United Nations Security Council in 2013. In his opening speech, the United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, said inter alia: “(...) opportunistic links between terrorist and transnational organized criminal groups ensure the constant flow of people, money, weapons and illicit goods across borders, allowing such groups to survive and proliferate (...)” (Omuoha 2013).

The UN Secretary was defining terrorism in relation to transnational organize crime which in itself has occupied much research in West Africa. Drug trafficking and prostitution have all occupied scholarship as transnational organized crimes in West Africa. With regards to drugs, scholars have contend that drugs such as cocaine, cannabis, marijuana have found their way

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from areas as far as Latin America through West Africa and are then rooted back to Europe (Akyeampong 2005; Brown 2013; Champin 2011; De Andres 2008; Einstein 2012; Grassley 2012; Harrigan 2012; Hebab-Brown 2010; Limoncelli 2006; Wyler and Cook 2009). Other scholars have carried out penetrating research on prostitution as transnational organized crime in colonial and post colonial Africa (see Abderrahmane 2012; Aderinto 2007; Aderinto 2012; Barrera 1996; Brown-Taylor 2002; Gilfoyle 1999; White 1990). With all these events occurring in West Africa it will not be an overstatement to say the region has been at the center of illegal activities in Africa.

Although terrorism has received multifarious meanings (Williamson 2009; Schmid 2011; Hoffman 1998; Hoffman 2006; Novotny 2007), it will be relevant to supply a working definition which will be adapted in this article. According to Article 3, of the defunct Organization of African Unity which now is known as African Union (AU), Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999), terrorism is defined as:

any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to: (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint or to act according to certain principles; or (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or (iii) create general insurrection in a State; b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii). (OUA 1999)

It seems to me that we can profitably adapt such definition and context to understand terrorism in West Africa as a longue duree rather than just situating it in the contemporary period. Thus in this article I will consider the above definition of terrorism authentic and relevant. Contemporary and/or recent scholars and researchers have treated terrorism by focusing on what has been happening recently and the literature on such an approach is replete. For instance, Omuoha (2013) opines that terrorism in West Africa is not new which I find it quite inspiring to this article. It was not until September 2001 when the United States was attacked that West Africa became quite topical when it comes to terrorism. Terrorism took on national and transnational
dimensions while at the same time the academia took interest on the subject. Although terrorism has been going on in the sub region it was not until 2006 that it was still doubted whether terrorism was real or imagined in the sub region (Obi 2006).

Whether it was real or imagined, terrorism was further lend credibility when its apologetics said:

(...) There is therefore, no doubt that international terrorist organizations have a presence in West Africa and have used the sub region as an operational base without carrying out any major terrorist attacks of international significance.....The absence of a major attack on any international terrorist target situated in West Africa may, therefore, deliberate tactic to insulate their hiding place from prying eyes of the international community in order to sustain their activities. (Yoroms 2007, 27)

Yoroms got the point, and it needs some rationalization. The first and relevant point is that terrorism is real in West Africa although the terrorist have not used the region to carry out any significant activities out of the continent. Thus, West Africa appears to have been only a place where terrorist hide and launched attacks within the continent. The fact that Yoroms contend that there has not been any significant terrorist activities from West Africa which reached international proportions evokes debates and according to this article, such insinuation could be simplistic and reductionist if we do not take into consideration deeper historical roots of terrorism and also the definition of terrorism as provided by the AU which this article is using its frame. A closer scrutiny of terrorist activities suggests that if it is limited to the recent periods and happenings then we are missing the point. In this article I draw from the Cultural historian, David C. Rapoport’s well organized and researched article which addresses four waves of terrorism. He defines a wave as “a cycle of activity in a given time period with expansion and contraction phases” (Rapoport 2004, 47). He further identifies the “Anarchist Wave” as the first terrorist movement with global activity, then discusses the “Anti-Colonial Wave”, the “New Left Wave,” and finally the “Religious Wave.” His discussions of each period can help in understanding the motivations of the groups that give rise to, and perpetuate, terrorist activity. Although exclusively not writing on West Africa, his model can be very helpful in the understanding of the history of terrorism in this region.

This article therefore examines the place of West Africa as a citadel of organized terrorism in the 21st Century. West Africa has been very topical in scholarship and for a very long time too. Recently, terrorist activities like the al-Queda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM), Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria,
Seleka-anti-Balaka in Central African Republic and Janjaweed of Southern Sudan has attracted much international concerns. The region has also come under attack from international community and criminal networks that are using the sub region as a global hub for distribution, wholesale and increased production of illicit drugs and trafficking of human beings especially in children. (Brown 2013, 1-23). Once branded as the “Whiteman’s grave” until the discovery of quinine in the mid 1880s, West Africans were well known as “hewers of wood” and “drawers of water” (Nkrumah 1963, IX; Allman 1991, 6). This generally kept the continent in the backyard of the entire world’s civilization as it was assumed.

Much focus has been paid to West Africa as a zone of organized terrorism (Nkwi 2015; Ellis 1996; Curtin 1969; Lovejoy 1982; Manning 1990). This is however done by more contemporary historians, anthropologists and political scientists. The zone as a geographical transit region has played host to three major crimes. These include the slave trade, legitimate trade, prostitution and drugs. This has not been adequately handled by researchers. The zone refered to as West Africa in this article will include Mauritania, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-Leone and Togo.

While talking in January 2012 with regards to West Africa, the former United Nations Secretary, Kofi Annan said:

Over the last decade, West Africa has made encouraging progress; violent conflicts that had blighted the region for many years have been ended. There have been real advances in development, health and education. Economic growth is accelerating. Democratic practices although still not the norm everywhere in the region are taking root. However, we need to take action now before the grip of the Criminal networks linked to the trafficking of illicit drugs tightens into a stranglehold on West African political and economic development. (Annan 2012)

Put in its proper place one wonders whether the speech of the former UN Secretary General could be taken seriously given the fact that much conflict has been going on in the region. He emphasized illicit drugs trafficking but left out even the historical part of it which saw prostitutes, slave trade as well as even what was called legitimate trade. All said and done the point is that the region has played host, in time and space to terrorists’ acts of all sorts which needs to be properly historicized.

This article questions what have been the changes and continuities of terrorist activities in West Africa? What have been the ramifications? Who have been the key players? What explains the fact that the region is fertile for
Terrorism in West African history: a 21st Century appraisal

terrorist activities? What have been the implications on the region and what attempts have been carried out by organizations to stamp out terrorism? In other to achieve these objectives the article will begin by examining the whole period of trans-Atlantic slave trade as the beginning of terrorism in the region.

Slavery in Africa is a very wide domain which cannot be captured in a single article. But it suffices to maintain that slave trade has been going on amongst West African societies long before the Trans-Atlantic slave trade. In terms of dimension, longevity and quantity of slaves procured on the continent, the trans-Atlantic slave trade is in the superlative. Once an African was captured and he/she lost his/her freedom he was a slave. The literature on the Trans Atlantic slave trade is well established. (Manning 1990; Austen and Derrick 1999; Northrup 1994; Klein 1993; Iliffe 1995). Generally it was the procurement of slave from Africa to the Americas. Despite the literature which is replete, it is still to be examined as the beginnings of terrorism in West Africa. Within a period of three hundred years more than twenty million Africans were evicted from the villages and shipped across the Atlantic to work in the plantations (Curtin 1969). European powers which included Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, carried out the trade. Following the definition of terrorism given by the AU and adopted here there is no other way one could reasonably see it more than terrorism and West Africa simply being a victim. Undoubtedly, and with some few exceptions, European buyers purchased African captives on the coasts of Africa and the transaction between themselves and Africans was nothing more than a form of trade. One could reasonably see that it was also true that very often a captive was sold and re-sold as he made his way from the interior to the port of embarkation (Rodney 1974). On a general level the process by which slaves were obtained in Africa in general and West Africa in particular was not trade at all. It was through warfare, trickery, banditry and kidnapping (Rodney 1974). When one tries to measure the ramifications of the Trans Atlantic slave trade on the African continent, it is essential and relevant to realize that one is measuring the net effect of social terrorism and/or social violence rather than just trade in any normal sense of the word.

A closer look at the social terrorism orchestrated by the European powers on West Africa also reveals the number of Africans who were kidnapped and shipped to America. The exact number of the people who were kidnapped to America has never been clear and thus has long been an object of speculation in the discourses (Manning 1995; Eltis 1983; Eltis 1987; Eltis and Walvin 1981; Eltis and Jennings 1989; Inikori 1992; Curtin 1969). Estimates ranged from a few millions to well over a hundred millions. While the numbers remain an object of speculation it is relevant for us to draw
conclusions that human resources were kidnapped and adapted for over three centuries. This marked the beginnings of Social terrorism in West Africa. The slaves were captured, kidnapped, convicted and completely deprived of freedom. The beginnings of industrial revolution led to the decline of the Atlantic Slave trade. Although scholars (Iliffe 1995; Eltis 1987; Curtin 1969; Fage 1969) have argued differently that it was because of the fact that the trade was evil, the general consensus that explains the end of the trade is that Industrial revolution which began in England witnessed the relevance of machines in doing the same work which human beings were doing and faster too. Slave labour was then redundant. The same European powers who had been at the heart of the slave trade introduced the legitimate trade in which West Africa again became a victim. Iliffe (1995, 148) maintains that during this period West Africa’s foreign trade as a whole expanded dramatically and that trade with France and Britain multiplied six or seven times between 1820 and 1850, while imports of European cotton cloth multiplied about fifty times. He further posits that effects of such trade should not be exaggerated since to a large extent, the average per capita value of West Africa’s overseas trade during the 1860s was only one-fortieth of Britain’s and France.

The political stable years of immediate post independence were soon to meet their dusk. During the post colonial period and quite recently there has been an upsurge of terrorism in West Africa especially in the Sahelian sector. This has involved different actors from the pre-colonial and colonial period, but what has continued has been the act itself. Almost the whole of West Africa gained “flag independence” by the end of 1960 and enjoyed some political stability which was interrupted by the Nigerian fratricidal war. The 1980s were black years for West Africa in several domains. They were years of economic decline. West African countries were found in financial difficulties because of the world economic recession. These countries were forced to borrow money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and so had to undergo economic liberalization in the name of Structural Adjustment Plan. Consequently, Structural Adjustment Plan (SAP) required deep cuts in public expenditure and laying off of public employees. Drastic reductions in public budgets sent many people into acute financial difficulty (Ellis 2009, 13). Added to this, the mostly unemployed claimed their classical roots of religion. In this direction most terrorist groups which had links with the Maghreb and Arab North Africa created their own terrorist groups. The new crop of terrorists groups were formed by indigenous West African youthful population. Crucial to these terrorist groups was the link which they had with other terrorists organizations in Africa. Thus, these groups in West Africa could easily
fraternize with those in the North Africa and East Africa. The key players or actors had changed. The next section examines the emergence of terrorists groups in the 21st century.

The Emergence of Terrorist Groups in the 21st Century

Terrorist groups in the West African region are many and have one main objective. They include: Boko Haram which operates mostly in the Northern part of Nigeria, Northern Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Northern tip of Central African Republic, AQIM, which operates in Northern Mali, Mauritania, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), the Janjawee of Southern Sudan. These terrorist groups have their main objective to do away with western civilization. Thus, they have as their main agenda to bring back the classical Islam which had existed in the region since the 10th Century. As I argued elsewhere (Nkwi 2013), their aim has been to achieve this objective they have launched attacks on Western installations, kidnapping of western tourists, bombing of western embassies and attacking those who stand on their way to achieve their objectives..

Their links to classical Islam needs further clarification. By classical Islam, I mean the Islam that was established in West Africa long before the jihads of Usman Dan Fodio. The pre-colonial history of West Africa teaches us that by 1066 AD Islam was well implanted in West Africa. It also teaches us that the Empires of Western Sudan survived through Islam (Ajayi and Espie 1969). The Islamisation of the Northern Nigeria in the early years of 19th Century was through the religious wars which of course were perfunctorily political. Usman Dan Fodio who had carried such wars ended by carving out the famous Sokoto Caliphate which occupied a large area of the Sahel stretching from Sokoto, through Yola down to Adamawa (Ajayi and Crowder 1971). A closer look at the terrorist groups today suggests that most of its leaders still find relevance in planting classical Islam around these areas. Thus, their objective is to do away with westernization because of the strong believe that westernization had adulterated classical Islam. Whether this is right or wrong remains a matter of conjecture.

There has been a superfluity of literature on Boko Haram. Boko Haram claims that it is out to purify Islam just like the 19th Century jihads of Usman Dan Fodio had claimed. Since the beginning of the 21st Century when the activities of Boko Haram became more visible in Nigeria, researchers, scholars and journalist and ‘jack-of-all trades’ have taken keen interest on it and their conclusions have been as varied as their methodologies and backgrounds. Loimeier (2012) provides an historical background paying attention
to the Yan Izala movement of reforms within Islam. Last (2007, 2009 and 2011) have all attempted to provide an historical account. Others have defined and sustained their stand that Boko Haram is a terrorist group (see Popoola 2012, 43-66; Omitola 2012; Onapajo 2012, 337-357; Musa 2012; Soyinka 2012; Ojo 2011, 45-62; Maiangwa et al. 2012, 40-57; Barrett 2012, 719-736; Bagaji 2012, 33-41). Yet, others have posed the question, what is Boko Haram (Rogers 2012; Adibe 2012; Adesoji 2010; Akokegh 2012; Cook 2011; Mantzikos 2010). Others still have concentrated at examining the current happenings surrounding Boko Haram and violence in the south of Nigeria. Watts (2009) offers a nexus between events in the North and the rich oil Delta of South East Nigeria while Walker (2012) offers an interesting link between real and imagined Boko Haram. Other scholars that belonged to this school include Onuoha 2010; Ifeka 2010; Danjibo 2009; Adesoji 2010. Still others have attempted to trace Boko Haram having relations with al-Shabab of Somalia (Cook 2011; Akokegh 2012, 46-55). Some of the works have remained at best skeletal and limited in scope. I have researched on the ramifications of Boko Haram in Central and West Africa from an historical and contemporary perspective (Nkwi 2013)

As I have maintained elsewhere (Nkwi 2013), the historical origins of Boko Haram have been handled by many schools of thought (Pham 2011; Pham 2012; Elkaim 2012; Marchal 2012; Rogers 2012; Aghedo and Osumah 2012; Musa 2013). Needless to repeat the historical roots of Boko Haram here but rather examine its activities as a terrorist group in West Africa. Boko Haram started as a national terrorist group with its first activities quite insignificant in 2010. In December of that year, the group attacked the Bauchi prison where it allowed prisoners to escape and also launched attacks at Abuja. Between 22 April and December 2011 ten attacks were carried out in most parts of the North and central Nigeria. So also was the situation between 5-6 January and 11 October 2012 (Nkwi 2013).

The next terrorist group has been AQIM which has focused its activities mainly in Northern Mali. This group is an offshoot of the Algeria-based Salafast Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). It is widely believed that this group first made its appearance in northern Mali in 2003. From thence it fraternized with the population through marriages and protection of smuggling paths and also preaching classical Islam. The name AQIM was first used in 2007 but its origins no doubt could be easily traced to Algeria in 1992. Onuoha (2013, 85), maintains that it was an affiliate of Islamic Salvation Army (FIS). AQIM has provided aid to other smaller terrorist organizations in the sub-region by providing logistics. It has made remarkable operations in Mauritania since 2005 by kidnapping and assassinating Western tourists, UN aid
workers and even Mauritanian soldiers. In 2009, AQIM admitted that she was behind the attempt to kidnap and murder a United State citizen in the capital of Mauritania, Nouakchott. Since then it was a threat to Western citizens. For instance, a French citizen in Southwest Mali, near the border with Mauritania in 2012 was kidnapped. To further buttress the activities of AQIM in Mauritania, a suicide bomber attacked the military barracks in 2010 and in 2011, attacked a military base in Bassiknou in southeastern Mauritania.

Political events have been working hand in glove with terrorism in some West African countries. Mali again is a case in point. In 2011 the defunct government of Ahmadou Toumani was toppled in a coup by Captain Amadou Sanogo on 22 March 2012. A vacuum was created. That vacuum was filled by the Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azaward (MINLA), which was backed by Islamist forces combined with AQIM and MUJAO. MUJAO, defined its objectives which were mainly to spread Islam across West Africa and linked its philosophical ideologies to Islamic icons such as Osama bin Laden and the Taliban cleric, Mullar Omar. What was striking was that it laid more emphasis on 18th Century Islamic leaders such as Usman dan Fodio, Cheikh Ahmadou and el Hadj Umar (Okpi 2013, 2-3). After defining their objectives, MUJAO went ahead to take two-third of the country. MUJAO became quite active in Mali and its operations went beyond the borders of Mali in the north of Mali it carried out attacks at Konna. Its *modus operandi* stretched as far as to Algeria where in April 2012, it abducted seven Algerian diplomats in Gao, Mali and the next month they stroke the *Gendamerie Nationale* base in Tamanrasset, Algeria. The terrorist activities have not been going on *ad infinitum*. Regional and international organizations have attempted to combat such terrorists groups. Our attention now turns to it.

**Combating Terrorism in West Africa**

The activities of terrorists groups in the West African region have met with stiff resistance from international organizations and the government of countries which its activities have threatened. The international organizations include: Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) which has played one of the most significant contributions in this direction. There is also the Lake Chad Basin Commission

**ECOWAS: a history**

This section of the article focuses on ECOWAS one of the largest re-
regional organization which is made up of the former British and French colonies of West Africa. One of the distinguishing features of Africa’s political chemistry is its many protracted social and political conflicts and always attempts to resolve the terrorism so that security, peace and development could be established in the region. These conflicts do not operate in isolation and so their spillover effects have always made it imperative that national and transnational organizations search for ways and means to contain the activities.

For the readers who might not be familiar with West African politics in the post independent period and economic blocs it will be relevant to recapitulate a brief history of ECOWAS. ECOWAS was formed on 28 May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria. There were fifteen members initially which included amongst others: Benin, Ivory Coast, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe. Cape Verde later on joined to make the sixteenth state. The main aim for which this organization was established was to promote the development of the region through economic, social and economic cultural cooperation. The headquarters of ECOWAS is in Lagos while that of the fund is in Lome, the capital of Togo (Onuoha 2013, 85).

The organization has the following aims: to eliminate duties on imports from member countries; removing quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade between member states; establishing common external tariffs; removing all restrictions on the free movement capital, services and persons among member states; harmonizing agricultural policies and the promotion of common projects in the member states; harmonizing the economic, social and cultural policies of member states; creating a fund for cooperation, compensation and development and evolving a common policy in, and the joint development of transport, communication, energy and infrastructural facilities. These objectives did not remain static. They were constantly revised by the member states. During the crisis that rugged Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s the organization tug under their objectives another objective which was to intervene in member countries during the periods of conflict and crisis (Ellis 2009). It was also during those crises that ECOWAS formed a military wing known as ECOMOG. This was because ECOWAS group had felt the effects of the civil war to a much greater extent than did countries outside of the region. In response to both regional instability and a heavy refugee flow, ECOWAS created the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a force aimed at resolving the conflict, restoring order and establishing a democratically-elected government (O’Neill 1993) The ECOMOG force was the first African sub-regional peacekeeping body to intervene in another state. ECOWAS has since the Boko Haram crisis intervene in several ways to bring the insurgence to an end and to give Nigeria the stability it deserves.
Condemnation and Resolution in Meetings on Terrorist Activities

In a broader spectrum, ECOWAS have adapted several mechanism as well as instruments. Some of these instruments were aimed at collective suppression of these challenges, and include the protocol on Non Aggression and the protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence which came into operation in 1978 and 1981 respectively. In 1999, ECOWAS, also adopted the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for an Conflict Prevention, Management Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (Bolaji 2010; ECOWAS 2013). This was carried out for a greater efficiency in its approach to check terrorist activities in the region. After three years (2011), ECOWAS went ahead to adopt the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance to ensure the development of law and consolidation of democracy (Onuoha 2013, 107). What appeared quite crucial recently, was that ECOWAS adopted the Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism. Such a declaration provided for a regional Counter Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan to help member states fight terrorism. Besides, such a strategy was also to smooth the progress of the implementation of regional, continental and international instruments in combating terrorism. It further provided a common operational framework a community-wide action to prevent and exterminate all terrorists’ related acts (Onuoha 2013, 108; Bolaji 2010)

ECOWAS have worked hard to put some terrorist activities under control especially Boko Haram. On Wednesday 24 February 2014 in one of the Boko Harams activities in colleges, she attacked and killed some fifty students at the Federal Government College in Buni Yadi, Yobe State (Forest 2012; Act 2011). ECOWAS quickly met at Abuja the Federal capital of Nigeria and through its Commission strongly condemned the unprovoked attack by a terrorist armed group on a Federal Government College which had resulted in the deaths of some 50 innocent students in the early hours of Wednesday 24th February 2014. Furthermore on behalf of the Community Institutions, the President of the Commission His Excellency Désiré Kadré Ouédraogo showed deep concern and expressed his heartfelt condolences to the President of Nigeria, His Excellency President, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, the Government and People of Nigeria, as well as the bereaved families (Forest 2011).

The ECOWAS set up an on-the-spot commission which was known as Abuja. Commission. The first thing the commission did was to assure the
Government and good people of Nigeria that the entire Community stood solidly behind them in that moment of grief and in the collective efforts to rid the country and the region of terrorism, a dangerous cankerworm that had not spared any part of the globe (Nkwi 2013). It added that the latest terrorist attack was a wake-up call, not just on the Nigerian authorities, but on every Member States and all community citizens to remain vigilant and more importantly, to join hands with all relevant agencies in the battle against terrorism in not only in Nigeria but in the entire West Africa. The Commission also reaffirmed its commitment and determination to collaborate with all Member States and other partners in the struggle to make the region terror-free, and to promote the necessary environment for peace and security towards realizing the overarching goal of regional integration and development thereby keeping states within the brackets of political stability. The ECOWAS members further met at Ivory Coast in the month of June to reaffirm its commitment and responsibility towards keeping Nigeria stable out of the chaos of Boko Haram (Nkwi 2013).

Thus at Yamoussoukro, Cote d’Ivoire, ECOWAS, urged member states and the international community to assist Nigeria in its efforts to combat Boko Haram. The Leaders of the 15-member bloc strongly condemned the terrorist aggression perpetrated by the sect, and directed the ECOWAS Commission to participate in the efforts to halt the terrorist aggression (Bolaji 2010, 207-222). The members of ECOWAS also reminded themselves that the Boko Haram, which meant “Western education is sin” in the local Hausa language, had killed over 1,200 since 2009, when it launched its violent campaign aimed at imposing the Islamic Sharia law on the predominantly-Muslim north, among other objectives. (Musa 2013, 234-260). The terror attacks by the sect have continued despite the efforts by the Nigerian government, including the deployment of troops to the affected region and the imposition of emergency rule on the worst-hit areas. The previous month had witnessed attacks on churches in northern Kaduna state which also triggered reprisal attacks by Christians and raised the specter of religious warfare in Africa’s most populous state, which was almost equally divided between Muslims and Christians.

**The Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) Speaks Out**

The Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) of the Economic Community of West African was not in a slumber. The member States met in Abuja from 18-19 June 2013, with the Boko Haram insurgency in the north eastern Nigeria dominating the agenda and discussions (Yoroms 2007). The Boko Haram sect, since the killing of their leader in police custody, has been
detonated explosives in several places, including the police headquarters and the UN building in Abuja. The Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Olu-seyi Petinrin said the meeting became necessary following the upsurge in acts of terror in some countries including Nigeria. The meeting attempted to proffer lasting solutions to the terrorists attack and related crimes. He said threats to national security and regional peace in West Africa were deeply rooted in social, political and economic factors. “It is on this that our deliberations will seek to vigorously addressing security issues, in order not only to avert the negative consequences of these threats but rather promote the prospects of socio-economic and political development.” (Igbe and Ndahi 2014, 2160). He said naval chiefs of all member countries were attending the meeting to deliberate an increase in sea robbery, within the Gulf of Guinea as well as proliferation of small arms within the region. The Commissioner for Political Affairs Peace and Security of the ECOWAS, Mahamane Toure said the meeting will receive reports from the defence chiefs of Nigeria and Niger on the development relating to direct threat on Sahel-Saharan ECOWAS member states following the AQIM and Boko Haram renewed attacks and the Libyan crisis impact on the region (Igbe and Ndahi 2014). The members of lake Chad Basin Commission members were not slow in the process.

**Lake Chad Basin Commission and Terrorism**

In direct parallell to ECOWAS is the Lake Chad Commission Basin. Except otherwise cited all the information gotten here as the background of Lake Chad is taken from Mahamadou (2007, 28). In terms of scope and financial potential, it is no match to ECOWAS. However, it will be relevant to have an idea about the short history of Lake Chad Basin Commission before examining its role in the Boko Haram crisis. The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC or CBLT in French) is an intergovernmental organization of countries near to Lake Chad which coordinates actions that might affect the waters of the lake. The organization’s secretariat is located in N’Djamena, Chad. The LCBC is Africa’s oldest river or lake-basin organization. In its founding document (the Convention and Statutes relating to the Development of the Chad Basin) the parties commit themselves to a shared use of the basin’s natural resources. It is a member of the International Network of Basin Organizations (INBO).

The membership and funding is quite relevant to us here. Hydrologically, the Chad Basin (not all of which feeds Lake Chad) includes eight countries, which in descending area of land included are: Chad, Niger, the Central African Republic, Nigeria, Sudan, Algeria, and Libya. Amongst these
countries, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Chad (the four countries directly containing parts of Lake Chad and its wetlands) signed the Fort Lamy (today N’Djamena) Convention on May 22, 1964, which created the Lake Chad Basin Commission. The Central African Republic joined in 1996, and Libya joined in 2008. Sudan was admitted in July, 2000, but has observer status because it has not ratified the founding convention. Algeria has not participated.

The activities of the commission are many and varied. The activities are tugged under the Commission’s Basin Committee for Strategic Planning (BCSP), coordinates local activities between the member states. The LCBC controls the hydro-active regions in the Chad Basin called the Conventional Basin. The initial Basin consisted of approximately 427,500 km² of the total area of the Chad basin in 1964. The definition says it excluded the majority of the terminal depression consisting of desert that provides little or no effective hydrological contribution to the Basin. This was subsequently expanded to include additional watersheds in northern Nigeria southern Chad, and northern Republics with a current total area of 967,000 km² (Carvenka 1969). One of the most popular areas in which Lake Chad Basin had tackled terrorism in the sub region is on Boko Haram.

**Lake Chad Basin and Boko Haram**

Speaking in the organization’s summit, on 30 April 2012, Chad’s President Idriss Deby immediately proposed setting up a task-force to fight the Islamic extremist movement, Boko Haram. The president made the proposal in Libreville, Gabon at the opening of the annual meeting of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) (Nkwi 2013). “The time has come to act and we must decide today,” said the president. The LCBC was set up to monitor conservation of Lake Chad and its basin and is made up of 16 countries, including Nigeria. “Our basin,” said Deby, “is exposed to insecurity because of Boko Haram’s permanent threat. If we don’t eradicate them, we won’t be capable of saving our Lake Chad.” (Mc Elroy 2013). Among those present who signed on to the idea was Francois Bozize, president of the Central African Republic, who offered to supply troops to the multinational contingent.

With all the meetings and commissions set up to contain Boko Haram it is still a little wonder why much has not been achieved to bring an end to the insurgency. Perhaps with different cultures and traditions of colonial backgrounds these organizations are diversified in the way which they felt could solve the problem. ECOWAS, For example is one bloc which has countries with Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone backgrounds. Lake Chad commission is another which has members as far as to the Maghreb.
Terrorism has not been a new phenomenon in West Africa. Its roots go deeper than the literature has portrayed. Researchers and scholars have concentrated on terrorism in the contemporary period. By the contemporary period I mean the period since 2001 in which the World Trade Center was bombed in the United States. From thence, there is no gain saying that terrorist activities increased exponentially in West Africa. The Western civilization became abhorred by these terrorist groups.

This article has reflected on the conventional manner in which terrorism has been treated in the extant literature and attempted to break away with that conventionality by contending that for a better understanding of terrorism in the region one has to take a deeper historical perspective. Yet it has also added substantially by arguing that West Africa is not just a bastion
of terrorist activities but has also been a victim of terrorism since the days of slave trade. To achieved that the essay has contended that for a fuller and deeper understanding of terrorism a full historical perspective is needed and thus changes and continuities which have occurred in the region in time and space need to be galvanized and significant conclusions drawn. The article has further shown how organizations have attempted to combat terrorism. In whatever manner we looked at the terrorist activities in the region, there is no doubt that it has had a very negative impact on the region’s developmental efforts.

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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the history of terrorism in West Africa in the first half of the 21st Century and attempts by regional and international bodies to combat it. It argues that although recently much attention has been paid to the sub region as a zone of terrorism, such terrorism has deeper historical roots and as such pre-dates the position taken by most contemporary scholars. West Africa has been a victim of terrorism over the years and to take on board only recent happenings is to do injustice to history. What has changed and continued? Who have been the key players? What attempts have been carried out by the respective organizations to stamp out terrorism?

KEYWORDS
West Africa; Terrorism; History.

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RADICAL ISLAMISM IN ALGERIA: EVOLUTION AND CURRENT SITUATION

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The Islamic militants that have been operating in Western Africa Sahara-Sahel during last years have their origins in the 1990s, in the context of the internal war that broke in Algeria. This north-African country has been the most affected by the violence of terrorism of the Islamic kind, a phenomenon that, even though spreading through most of the countries from Northern Africa and Middle East, had different impacts on each country. The Algerian case was deeply linked to the long civil war faced by this country and, since the beginning of the 21st century, turned into a residual element restrained to a few Algerian wilayas and expanded towards south, entering the Sahara. Being one of the most affected countries, with incidence throughout the rest of the region, it is necessary to explain how this problem evolved to become an issue of security to lots of nations in the region.

Internal antagonisms: the path to civil war

Thirty years after celebrating its independence of French colonialism (1962 - 1992), the Algerian nation broke into an armed conflict, a result of its economic difficulties, the exhaustion of the post-independence political model and the following state crisis, social pressures and the emergency of new political forces that had as its programmatic base the Islam. Under the presidency of Chadli Bendjedid (1979 - 1992), third president of the nation, the gravest tensions took place as a result of the destabilization of the state combined with the rise of Islamist movements. In 1985, the economic crisis had worsened due to the slump of oil prices in 1981, compromising the country’s main source of foreign currency.

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In 1960 the Algerian population was composed by a total of 10,800,000 people and, as of 1985, this number had more than doubled: 21,990,000 inhabitants (Fayçal 1987, 42). This demographic growth added to the economic crisis caused the rise of social pressures. Describing the Algerian scenario of these years, Jason Burke states the following: “the grave economic problems caused and worsened by the growth of population, the massive migration towards cities, the inadequate and unplanned urban development, corruption and strikes, principally among university professors, slapped the faith in the nationalist and socialist ideology of the regime” (Burke 2004, 233).

In 1988, the large street riots that took place destabilized the country\(^2\). For these reasons the government, desperately seeking solutions to the domestic problems, had to negotiate with the International Monetary Fund and to reduce social expenditure (Gutiérrez Mendoza 2006-2007, 34-35).

Nonetheless, Bendjedid was reelected in 1984 and for the third time in 1988, for a five year period. It was in his last mandate that a shift took place in Algerian politics, with the beginning of the process of economic opening and the transition to a multi-party system, following the constitutional referendum of February 1989. As the single-party system of the National Liberation Front (FLN) – the party of the independence – ended, new political forces arose, such as the Islamic Front of Salvation (FIS), wearing the flag of political Islam in its different variants. The FIS, party of the Islamic opposition, was legalized on September 14, 1989, and stood ahead of the riots, reaching greater popular support. “They took on an important activism inside popular mosques (…) they offered a space of exchange and of debate that was absent in other ambits of society, supported its inhabitants in moments of natural catastrophes, which served to consolidated its leadership” (Rufins 1996, 87).

As part of this process of political changes, the first multi-party rallies. On June 12\(^{th}\), 1990, municipal elections gave FIS a victory with 54.25% of the votes counted, an achievement that would mark a tendency of support to the Islamic discourse. The FIS won the control, thus, of the majority of Algerian communes. The next year, on December 26\(^{th}\), there was the first round of legislative elections, in which the FIS reached a victory with 24.25% of the ballots against the FLN, with only 12.17%. The second round of legislative elections was suspended when Chadli Bendjedid resigned from the presidency, on January 11\(^{th}\) of 1992, as the military intervened and cancelled the electoral process. Following the coup d’état, the power was given to the High State Committee, which gave the presidency to Mohamed Budief – killed by Islamists in June 29\(^{th}\) of the same year.

\(^2\) The 1988 protests became known as the “couscous riot”, due to the excessive rise of food prices and the endemic poverty.
Following these developments the state of emergency was declared and, at the same time, FIS was considered illegal and its leaders arrested: Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhaj, respectively the President and Vice-President of FIS, were condemned to 12 years of jail. The refusal of the Islamist forces to accept their marginalization of the political process was their main reason for taking up arms against the army. The country turned from then on into a generalized theater of military operations. The moderate Islamists of FIS had lost the battle in trying to Islamize the Algerian state and, rapidly, were substituted by a new wave of violent extremists led by Afghan veterans. Jason Burke (2004) considers this process as the step from political Islamism towards more radical tendencies of Islamic activism.

The most important armed Islamic groups were the GIA and the EIS. The activities of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) date back to 1989 and its actions heightened due to the void caused by the arrests of the main leaders of FIS. This group was nourished by guerrilla fighters who were part of the anti-Soviet Islamist militias in Afghanistan, financed and trained by the CIA. As the war finished in 1989, many of these internationalist combatants for the “cause of Allah” came back to their countries of origin. It is estimated that 900 Algerian “Afghans”, as they were known, joined the rows of GIA, reinforcing the extremist ideology. They had in their agenda the aggressive re-Islamization of the Algerian society through coercion and the practice of takfir, which would be used to justify the attacks against civil population. Primarily, the GIA conducted guerrilla warfare and right away adopted a terrorist approach against the Algerian army and population. In early 1993, the group started its terror campaign, attacking military positions, as well as non-military objectives including foreigners, intellectuals, journalists and the common population.

The prohibition of FIS in 1992 produced a stalemate, in which its members who were not arrested or sent to camps in Sahara, started to organize. It was not until 1994 that the armed division of FIS appeared: the Islamic Armed of Salvation (EIS), presenting as an alternative to GIA extremists. The EIS claimed that the use of violence would force the government to undertake political changes and allow FIS to turn back to the political process; in

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3 It was considered takfir any Algerian who did not join the fight alongside GIA, thus being an unfaithful who should be eliminated.

4 Abu Qutada, Jordan-Palestinian scholar, acted as official ulema for various radical groups, mostly in Algeria since 1994. He became known after stating his opinion regarding a fatwa from an Algerian clerk in 1994, in which he supported the idea that the killing of women and children in Algeria by the Islamic militants was justified. See in: Jason Burke 2004, 216. (Note of the translation: ulema is a term that refers to an expert in teology and religious law of Islam)
other words, the return to electoral process was conceived in their program, an aspect rejected by GIA leaders. The main support zone for EIS was the rural areas. The GIA had adherents among poor and rural young people but soon gathered influence also in Algiers and surroundings, gaining its main support from urban areas.

The methods employed by GIA were based in indiscriminate violence against civilians. In October 1994, Djamel Zitouni became the national emir of GIA. Under his leadership the group focused more in the struggle for power against EIS than in the opposition to the government (Harmon 2010, 14). Their operations therefore did not limit to Algerian lands. Djamel Zitouni and his fellows were the ones that undertook the hijacking of the Air France Airbus in 1994, the bombing in Paris’ public transport of 1995, as well as the kidnapping and assassination of the catholic monks of Tibhirine, in 1996.

In January 31st, 1994, General Liamin Zerual, Minister of Defense, was appointed President of the Republic. Zerual’s mandate’s priority was to attain political dialogue with the Islamist opposition and to eradicate the violence that affected the whole country – objectives that were not attained. In November 16th, 1995, new presidential elections were held, giving the victory to Zerual, the indisputable candidate from the Armed Forces. With his election expired the mandate of the High State Committee, in power since the ousting of Bendjedid. In the national reconciliation process, the armed groups had to resign their weapons. While the president negotiated with the representatives of political parties and hoped for another moderated variant of Islamism, the FIS was still excluded from political dialogue.

In November 1996 a new constitutional referendum was held, which produced the prohibition of Islamist and national berber parties. In the same year, it started the massacres appointed to GIA and, in May, the negotiations between the Algerian army, led by General Mohammed Boughaba and the EIS’ emir, Madani Mezrag. These negotiations had a covert character and produced two important facts: the release of Abassi Madani in July 1997 and the unilateral ceasefire from the EIS, in October.

The divisions inside armed Islamism provoked an increase of violence and sharpened the Algerian crisis. The researcher Yohanelis Gutiérrez

5 Among the Islamist armed groups there were also the Islamic Front for Armed Jihad (FIDA) and the Movement of the Islamic State (MEI).

6 The political forces that took part of the National Conference summoned in September 1996 were represented by: the moderate Islamist faction from the Movement of the Islamic Society (MSI – HAMAS) and the Islamic Renaissance Movement (MRI – Ennahda); the ethnic berber-based opposition parties: the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD); and the opposition Party of Algerian Renewal (PRA). See: Rufins 1996, 88-90.
affirms that the violence had two different sources: the official power and the Islamist armed groups (Gutiérrez Mendoza 2006-2007, 49). The Arab Cause Solidarity Committee stated that proliferated denounces and testimonies claiming the direct involvement of the government in some of the most bloody episodes appointed to Islamist guerrillas and, also, in some of the disappearances and atrocities committed by security forces (Comité de Solidaridad con la Causa Árabe 2001, 4).

In January 1996 the GIA declared publicly the war on EIS and in this very same year the radical Antar Zouabri became the group’s national emir, blaming the civil population of not supporting the jihad. Among the different Islamic factions fighting, the GIA gained prominence. The amount of deaths in the conflict rose to tens of thousands of people, when the GIA focused their attacks on “collaborator” civilians - an extremist approach that costed GIA the loss of popular support. The escalation of violence reached its zenith in August 1997, being this year the most violent of the whole internal war, with more than forty massacres, most of it attributed to GIA.

In late 1990s, a series of factors had debilitated the GIA. Among them there were the successful governmental policy of eradication of extremist groups and the loss of the small public support they had before, due to its extremist policies and violent tactics. The army forces had to some extent controlled the Islamist militias. The principal leaders had fallen during combat or were captured, added to the many others that resigned their arms bearing in mind the effective national reconciliation policy of the government. The army’s actions forced the GIA to establish in the southern part of the country, from where they could assure the provision of firearms and finance their fight. Terrorist activities became limited to specific areas of the country, especially in the rural ones such as the southern part of Algerian Sahara.

In September 1998, Zerual announced that he would leave the presidency and the celebration of presidential elections, in the next year. In April 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected president, with 73.79% of the votes.

7 In August 28th, 1997, took place the massacre in Sidi Rais, a local in Algeria’s south, where more than 300 people were killed, and it was known as the worst slaughtering of the year. In September a massacre in Sidi Youssef had also occurred.
8 The successive “national emirs” of the GIA Djamel Zitouni, Antar Zouabri (Abu Talha) and Rashid Abou Tourab were eliminated by the Algerian security forces.
9 He was born in March 2nd, 1937. In 1960, he was designed with a Commander rank to the Algeria’s southern border to control the so-called “Mali’s front”, in order to avoid the division of the country intended by the French colonial power. In 1962, he was elected member of the Constituent Assembly and, after, appointed as Minister of Youth, Sports and Tourism of the first government of independent Algeria, led by Ahmed Ben Bella. In 1963, he was appointed as Foreign Ministry and, in 1964, was elected by the National Liberation Front Congress as
the support of the Military General Staff and a presence in the polls of 60.3% of the population. In June 27th, 1999, his government approved the project of the Law of Civilian Agreement, under which members of the demilitarized fundamentalist groups could be reintegrated in society. The GIA had announced its will to take part on the process if some requisites were followed: the incorporation of their men in the security forces and the release of its jailed members in Algeria and abroad (Gutiérrez Mendoza 2006-2007, 39) – demands which were not accepted.

In July the amnesty decree was signed to thousands of Islamists who had not taken part in crimes of blood and violation. As of September, the government submitted this project to referendum, which was accepted by 98.6% of a population exhausted by a civil war that already lasted seven years. Once the law was approved, almost all regretted Islamists were favored by the measures. Between 5 and 7 thousands of militants added to the amnesty process regardless of the crimes by them committed. As stated by Bouteflika himself, the death toll since 1992 surpassed the 100 thousands, and the material losses floated around the 20 billions of dollars (Khashana 2001, 84). It was not until 2002 that GIA – or, better, what was left of it, since it was deeply debilitated – accepted the law.

Foundation of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)

Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Algerian war against Islamists was changing from a general conflict to a low-intensity insurgency, as the Algiers’ authorities had developed a series of military operations at the same time that managed the amnesty process of the detainees and arrested other Islamists. Most of Islamic militants, practically defeated, gradually departed from the radical vision represented by GIA. In general, the Islamist movement in Algeria was becoming more moderate, as they started to accept the electoral process. In this context, some of the main leaders of GIA decided to break with the organization. In 1998 emerged the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, splitting from the GIA also because of its bad leadership. The creation of this new group meant the disappearing of the first other (Ruiz Miguel 2010). In the formation of this armed organization played an essential role Hassan Hattab, Shaykh Abu al-Bara – considered the ideologue

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member of the Central Committee of the Political Bureau. In 1974, Bouteflika was elected president of the 29th session of the UN General Assembly.
of the group – and Amari Saïfi\(^\text{10}\). These dissidents had criticized the group’s policy of indiscriminately attacking the civilian population.

His disagreement regarding the civil slaughtering was the main reason for Hassan Hattab breaking up with the group. Among the principles of the new Islamist organization, there was the doctrine of attacking only security forces and governmental entities. In the first statement emitted by the group, in April 1999, Hassan Hattab declared that their enemy was the Algerian government and that the Muslim community should not fear GSPC’s activities. He also rejected the doctrine exposed by GIA that a society by itself could be in a condition of apostasy, in turn reinforcing the doctrine shared by Al Qaeda which blamed the state for the population not following Salafist Islam (Gray and Stockham 2008, 93). With this approach, they expected to regain the popular support as it was in the years of FIS.

Even though they distanced themselves from the violent methods used till then, they were still a radical organization, which did not accept the peace process proposed by the authorities. Hattab’s group refused to give up their weapons, counting with a number of members that oscillated between 800 and 1500 militants – as of 2002, nonetheless, they were reportedly 4000. The GSPC kept, as its main objective, fighting the secular Algerian government. Other targets were the agents that protected foreign employees who took part on engineering works and, also, military convoys. The clashes between Salafists and Algerian agents happened daily and, practically every week, there was the arresting of extremists or attacks in their bases, with a high number of casualties.

Constantly raided by the army, the GSPC had to retreat to two main places: the northwestern berber region of Cabilia and to the Algerian Sahara, in the southern part of the country. Their main subsidiary kept the fighting against state representations in Cabilia and in the mountains of the Tell Atlas, around 200km and 300km away from the capital. This region was where Algiers and the main urban centers were located. In the large extensions of Sahara and in the borderlands with Niger, Mali and Mauritania operated the Saharan branch. At a first moment, it was led by Amari Saïfi, with whom the links among Islamists and smuggling started.

Bearing in mind its structure, the organization was divided into zones, being the most active ones only three of them: zones 2, 5 and 9. Each one was headed by an emir and divided in \textit{katibas} or brigades, which, by their turn, contained from three to four \textit{fassilas}, each of them with 12 or 18 men.

\(^{10}\) He was known as El-Para, because served in an Algerian parachutist team. The elite forces of some African francophone countries are called “Paras”.
Zone 2, which had Hassan Hattab as emir, included Algiers, Bourmerdes, Tizi Ouzou and Cabilia. Zone 5 focused its attention in the eastern part of Algeria, near the border with Tunisia, and its emir was Saïfi already since 1999. Zone 9, by its turn, acted in the southern borders of Algeria.

The period of Hattab’s leadership was characterized by moderation in the group’s actions, by a scarce propagandistic activity and for this above-mentioned geographic division of operation zones. The group was oriented to focus on the national jihad at the expenses of a more internationalist perspective, which produced several critics from colleagues. As the civil war extinguished, and the group suffered defeats, the local commanders felt frustrated by the way under which the organization was led. No military advances were being achieved. Amari Saïfi soon challenged Hassan Hattab’s authority when, contradicting the instruction regarding attacks on civilians, managed the kidnapping of 32 European tourists.

This was the first action directed against foreign interests. The fact took place between mid-February to late March, 2003, when the tourists were driving with their off-road vehicles around the locations of Ouargala and Djanet, in the Algerian Sahara. Seventeen of them were set free in mid-May after a rescue operation undertook by the Algerian army in the region of Tamanrasset, and a second group was released after paying ransom.

Thus, the most radical elements inside GSPC’s direction decide to depose Hassan Hattab. In September 2003 his leadership was over, with his substitution for Nabil Sahroui (Abou Ibrahim Mustafa), old GIA commander. The organization did not, however, have great advances in the military realm. Following the kidnapping organized by Saïfi, a capture plan was undertaken, involving the security forces of Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad in a persecution through the Sahara. The action began when, returning to Algeria, Saïfi and his men were detected by the satellite surveillance of the United States.

In March 16th 2004, after several battles that spread through these countries, El Para – one of the remaining classic leaders of the Islamic insurgency – was captured with some of his followers by the Chadian opposition

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11 Southern Algerian wilaya, whose capital is the homonym city of Tamanrasset. This city is placed in the middle of the Ahaggar region and maintains a certain tuareg atmosphere, where it is possible to see in the streets numerous tuareg men of the Kel Ahaggar confederation, dressed in their traditional way and even riding camels through the main street. Due to its altitude – almost 1,400 m –, its climate is not that hot.

12 The group of tourists was composed by a majority of Germans, 16, followed by 10 Austrians, 4 Swiss men, a Dutch and a Swedish. The German government was the one which payed the ransom of 5 million dollars. See: Algeria Watch 2008.
group Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad\textsuperscript{13}. With the mediation of Libya, they were delivered to Algeria. In another military setback in June 2004, the emir himself fell on combat together with his three highest ranked lieutenants, during a clash with Algerian soldiers in the region of Béjaïa, Northeast Algeria—which represented a huge blow to the group. The capture of Amari Saifi and the death of Nabil Sahraoui implied the strengthening of the figure of Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, also called Abdelmalek Droukdel and who became in 2004 the “National Emir” of GSPC.

In the political realm, the year was marked by the reelection of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in April 8\textsuperscript{th}, with 85% of the votes. In his second mandate, the need for stability in the country and for the end of violence was still one of the primary objectives of the government’s agenda. To attain these aims, a new phase of the peace process was launched under the Project of the Peace and National Reconciliation Charter. On November the 29\textsuperscript{th}, 2005, the law project was submitted to popular consult and approved on February 27\textsuperscript{th} of the next year. With these national reconciliation initiatives, the figure of President Bouteflika got stronger.

This governmental policy presented a challenge to the new leadership of Abdemmalek Droukdel. The obstacle was posed as the government’s actions were getting stronger against the small number of remaining militants and the amnesty gave them the possibility of rendition, translated in the desertion of the combatants. In fact the number of troops of GSPC had dropped from the assumed 4,000 in 2002 to less than 500 in 2006.

In order to adapt to these new circumstances the group had, under the leadership of Droukdel, to change their tactics, their structures and strategic guidance and also to undertake their operations in a transnational scope. The former operation zones in which the group was divided were also changed. With the new restructuration only 4 zones remained: the central zone (Algeria), East (bordering Tunisia), South (Sahara-Sahel) and West (Mauritania). Militants from other nationalities were increasingly incorporated to the group, giving it a regional scope. In other words, their area of activity did not limit to Algerian territory. Networks of logistic support were created. Suicide attacks came as a new tactic and the group resumed actions against civilians, on the other hand, the group incorporated in their strategy a bigger effort regarding media divulgation\textsuperscript{14}.

\textsuperscript{13} Mouvement pour la Democratie et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT) is a rebel Chadian group opposed to Idriss Déby’s government. Their most important actions were concentrated between 1998 and 2003. It was led by Youssouf Togoimi, old Defense Minister, and acted in the region of Bourkou-Ennedi-Tibesti, Northern Chad.

\textsuperscript{14} The renovation of the group’s website had been approved (www.almedad/jama3a/) and
Mokhtar Belmokhtar surged as a new leader as he took the direction of the southern zone of the Sahara in January 2005, leading 300 to 500 militants. One factor that strengthened this group was its responsibility for trans-border smuggling. The group started to use the traditional illicit trade routes in order to obtain resources – an idea supported principally by Droukdel himself. Tobacco was the most smuggled basic product, whose business started to be administered by Belmokhtar.

On June the 4th, 2005, took place the armed attack of the Lemgheity garrison, in northern Mauritania, located near the border with Mali and Algeria and 400km from Western Sahara. This action was the first undertook outside Algerian territory, and in which 150 GSPC militants took part. The operation was led by Belmokhtar, causing the death of 15 Mauritanian soldiers and injuring 17 others. It put the Mauritanian army in alert, forcing it to reinforce the vigilance in this desert triangular area. These events were the result of the GSPC’s expansion through the region. In what regards Mauritania, it is said that the presence of GSPC’s cells was limited, but certainly there were Mauritanians who started training the secret bases of the organization in the Algerian desert. Furthermore, there were Islamists involved in the coup attempts of 2003 and 2005 against Ould Taya and even in the successful coup that overthrew him in 2005.

In addition, the group established contact with other extremist groups of Maghreb countries. As stated by Stephen Harmon, the main organizations with which they related were the Tunisian Islamic Fighting Group and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and, according to the author, this connection with national jihadist movements strengthened GSPC’s role in the region (Harmon 2010, 20-21). At the same time, as it got weaker inside Algeria, the GSPC started an infiltration process towards neighboring countries through the vast borders and the desert zones. Islamic extremism in Algeria spread through the region by the hand of the Salafist militants headed by Abdelmalel Droukdel. The pinnacle of the organization enabled a greater association with the leaders of the Islamist international movement, headed by Al Qaeda.

The bonds of Algerian Islamists with Bin Laden: the creation of AQIM

The beginning of the internal war in Algeria, in the 1990s, coincided with the return of the periodic Al-Jama’s, whose last number was released in mid-2006. Its eight editions were published very irregularly. About the media activities of the group, see: Soriano 2010.
with the period after the end of the Afghan-Soviet war in 1989. This meant the victorious return of many mujahideens to their places of origin. The Algerian scenario was seen by these combatants as the ideal context to initiate the next great Islamic uprising. In the period between 1991 and 1996, Osama Bin Laden had set in Sudan\footnote{Due to the continuous presence of Islamic radicals in Khartoum, the US had included Sudan in its list of terrorist sponsors countries in 1993.}, presenting himself as an important leader of the Islamist movement. In Khartoum, there had representations of several Islamist groups, among them the GIA. Since, the links of Algerian closer to Bin Laden and the GIA’s directions started. This was not an easy relationship and was affected by ups and downs.

According to Jason Burke (2004), there is little evidence that Bin Laden participated actively in GIA’s activities, which does not mean that there was no relationship among them, as they had contact while in Khartoum. Nonetheless, the author states that

the Algerian security forces insist that Bin Laden helped GIA acquiring weapons in the beginning. However, this contradicts with declarations of former GIA combatants which said that their direction asked economic help from Bin Laden in 1994, but they did not like the ideological and operative control demanded by the Saudi as a condition (Burke 2004, 238).

Even though they did not consolidate formal bonds among leaderships, some Bin Laden’s men did collaborate with GIA members, in a personal manner. Amari Saïfi, Bin Laden’s brother-in-law, was sent to Algeria with 40 thousand dollars and the directives to support the Islamist faction that opposed the reconciliation with the government (Gray and Stockham 2008, 92). Saïfi was the director of a jihadist pension in Peshawar\footnote{Western Pakistani city near the border with Afghanistan, where in 1988 Bin Laden organized, the first group of Islamists which would become Al Qaeda.} and leader of the Algerian contingent in Afghanistan, which allows us to believe he was a person trusted by Bin Laden. Regressing to Algerian he constituted the main core around which the GIA was formed. As the war advanced and GIA tactics became more violent and indiscriminate against civilians, the international rejection and from the Islamic world increased and, above all, from the Algerian population, exhausted by the situation. Other jihadist Arab groups, such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, from Ayman al-Zawahiri\footnote{Born in Cairo in 1951, he was jailed and tortured during the repression that followed that assassination of Anwar Sadat. He fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets, became Bin Laden’s number two and currently is the head of Al Qaeda, following the death of Bin Laden.}, and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, publicly broke with the GIA due to its excessive use
Amar Makhlulif, an Algerian who was trained in Al Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan, was one of the first to suggest to Hassan Hattab to part with the GIA (Harmon 2010, 15). This could be an evidence of Al Qaeda’s role in trying to implode GIA from the inside. When the GSPC emerged, as it broke from GIA, Al Qaeda leaders welcomed the new group. The GSPC embraced Al Qaeda’s ideology of global jihad, but Hattab was not eager to promise loyalty to Bin Laden and rather kept some distance. “(...) the GSPC, under Hattab’s command, supported an alliance with Al Qaeda in which the organization would remain mostly independent while its members would be trained by Al Qaeda” (Botha 2009, 3)

Al Qaeda had supported Hattab because he represented an alternative to GIA, but soon showed its dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in Algeria in an important moment to the Islamist movement, as it was being attack by the international coalition since 2001 in Afghanistan. To prove the existence of bonds among GSPC and Al Qaeda, Algerian authorities claimed that Imad ibn al-Wahid18, a Yemeni downed by the army near Batha in September 12th, 2002, was an emissary from Bin Laden in the Magreb and Sahel, which had recorded a message in which he affirmed Al Qaeda’s approval of Algerian Salafism (Mellah and Rivoire 2005). In the year of 2002 Al Qaeda sent Abu Muhammad Al-Yamani to Algeria, but Amari Saïfi did not bother in presenting him to Hattab, whom he considered a just nominal emir (Gray and Stockham 2008, 93).

Bearing in mind the relation among Amari Saïfi and Bin Laden, Hattab’s posture in distancing himself from the Saudi’s direction is understandable. This attitude from Hattab and his fragile actuation in developing a more international and less nationalistic jihad, weighted on the decision of the other GSPC emirs in deposing him. So, when Sahraoui substituted Hattab, he defended a closer relationship with Bin Laden’s organization. In September 11th, 2003, the anniversary of the attacks on the World Trade Center, Sahraoui submitted a letter to Bin Laden considered as an oath from the GSPC to Al Qaeda. However, this political maneuver did not have the expected results, at least during Sahraoui’s short mandate, as there were still some doubts for the part of Bin Laden regarding the Algerian organization’s real commitment towards the global jihad, which meant fighting the “distant enemy”.

With Sahraoui’s death in 2004, the new emir Abdelmalek Droukdel was the responsible for finally getting the organization into Al Qaeda’s orbit,

18 Anneli Botha recalls this same fact but refers to the Yemeni as Emad Abdelwahid Ahmed Alwan. See: Botha 2009.
which is to say, to complete the integration process in the tactic and methodological realms among the two movements. The context of the new US invasion and allies in Iraq (or, as called by the Islamists, the “crusaders and the Zionists”), in 2003, was seized by Droukdel to sharpen these bonds. To do so, they set training camps for young recruits for the organization which would be sent to Iraq in order to fight the Western powers forces. According to Gray and Stockham, “Iraq constituted the first large-scale international participation of the Algerian jihadists since Afghanistan” (Gray and Stockham 2008, 94).

Droukdel also declared his support to Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s network, which admitted Algerians – principally the younger ones – willing to fight in Iraq. Moreover, a public letter from Droukdel to Al Zarqawi was released where the former recalled the necessity of attacking French soldiers and expressed his greetings about the murder of two Algerian diplomats in Baghdad. According to North-American military sources, 20% of the suicide attacks in Iraq had Algerian origin (Gray and Stockham 2008, 94). In 2006, the GSPC prepared to formalize its reorientation process towards Al Qaeda’s principles. Thus, in early 2007, the Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb was created, a date that was determined by the change of name of the organization.

In January 2007, the group announced its new identity: “Al-Qaeda in Northern Islamic Africa”, which later would be changed to the official Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Since then, relations between Abdelmalek Droukdel leader of the GSPC, and Abu Obeida Youssef, former chief of the group’s Council of Notables, deteriorated. The main reason for this was the announcement of GSPC’s affiliation to the international Al Qaeda’s network. The Council of Notables was dismissed, as it was not consulted in the creation of the new organization, and finally restructured by Droukdel, ratified as “National Emir”. It was recognized, thus, his capacity of leadership, to be reaffirmed in this post. From this date on, July 25th 2007, Ayman Al Zawahiri – Al Qaeda’s main strategist – began to assist this organization that exalted its

19 Leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
20 The assassination of two Algerian diplomats by jihadists in Iraqi, in July 2003, had a huge impact in the country. FIS’ number two, Ali Belhadj, who had been released in the same month after a 12 year imprisonment period, were detained on July 27th after being accused of supporting terrorism in some declarations regarding the killing, in the Qatari jail Al Jazeera.
21 In June 2007, the leader of AQIM said that the organization “was created to extol God’s word and of the Quran, and to free Maghreb’s people of the hand of corrupts, tyrants and traitors, rebuilding the society in the grounds of justice, religion and morality, which will lead to spiritual, geographic and political unity, ending divisions and divergences”. See: Reinares 2010.
22 “Abu Obeida Youssef” or “Youssef the Annabi” were the alias of Yassid Embarek.
position as Al Qaeda representative in the Maghreb.

According to a report from the German secret services of 2009, related to the development of Al Qaeda’s networks around the world, Oscar López Fonseca states that Al Qaeda – its main network – is increasingly less a hierarchic terrorist organization and more a cloudy amount of jihadist groups. Moreover, it has been showing a tendency regarding the tactic formation of affiliated groups, in which it impelled local organizations and cells in the attacks, leaving to them the whole planning and execution of the terrorist acts.

To some researchers, the adoption of Al Qaeda’s brand was a strategy of GSPC due to its recent operational debility. Anneli Botha (2009) affirms that Al Qaeda would be an ideological reference and, by its turn, could increase its influence in the Maghreb zone. Alternatively, Gray and Stockham (2008) see the name changing as the culmination of an evolution of several years from the Algerian uprising to its full integration to Al Qaeda, rather than a propaganda act or an act of desperation. Both stances have valid elements, as it is a step of advance towards a farer-reaching entity.

For his part, Ronan Farrell points that “the association with Al Qaeda seems to be at a large extent rhetoric, in the tactical as well as in the strategic realm, as the AQIM had adopted the speech, the techniques and the long-term objectives of Bin Laden’s organization, without having much evidence of a logistic or financial relations between the two” (Farrell 2012). To say that the existence of direct financial and logistic links among central Al Qaeda and AQIM can’t be proven, is not the same as to say the latter can’t be placed in the orbit of the international Islamist movement led at the time by Bin Laden, and at the same time to maintain its own autonomy and structure.

Terrorist Incidents in Algeria

The International Center for Terrorism Studies of Washington DC, USA, and the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies of Virginia, released a series of four reports whose responsible was Yonah Alexander, in which the

23 According to the referred German secret services report about the many Al Qaeda ramifications, of 2009, in Africa there were at least six groups that maintained links with the network run by Bin Laden. The largest of the six is AQIM, being the rest of them: the racial Islamic militia Al Shabbab, which fights the Somali government; the Egyptian Al Gamaa Al Islamiya; the Sudanese Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Niles; the self-entitled Nigerian Talibans (Boko Haram), some members of which had shown their will in incorporating to AQIM and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (GICL). See: López Fonseca 2009.

24 The four reports, made under Yonah Alexander’s coordination, are: Maghreb & Sahel Terrorism: Addressing the Rising Threat from al-Qaeda & other Terrorists in North & West/Cen-
terrorist incidents produced in Maghreb and Sahel between 2001 and 2012 were listed. These papers contained the terrorist acts notified by different local media vehicles, such as *El Watan* and *Magharebia*, in chronological order. Looking at these reports, it is perceivable that they were elaborated following Western patterns and were directed towards North-American interests. In one of the recommendations given by the 2012 report, it is said that the USA should expand its anti-terrorist technical assistance through the region, and that they should dismantle the refugee camps of the Polisario Front in Tindouf so that they could no longer serve as a recruitment base for terrorist and smugglers (Alexander 2012, 6-7).

Reading the information compiled by these documents regarding three Western Sahel countries, Mauritania, Mali and Niger, some contradictory aspects in this investigation is perceived regarding their classification of terrorists. Following its descriptions, these institutes defined as terrorist attacks the actions of the *Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice* inside Niger. In this organization Nigerien tuaregs that fight against Niamey’s government for their political and economic rights were included. In Mali’s case, most of the facts regarded as terrorists between 2007 and 2009 are attributed to tuareg militias which during these years held another of their historic rebellions against Bamako. These examples show the political and ideological stances of its authors.

The first action claimed by AQIM in Niger did not happen until December 18th, 2008, when they kidnapped the UN special envoy altogether with his assistant; in Mali, the first report of tourist kidnapping undertaken by AQIM members was in 2009. It was in this year that their actions started in the northern part of Mali: on July 11th, 2009, they murdered the intelligence official Lamana Ould Cheikh at his home in Timbuktu, following orders by the cells under Abou Zeid responsibility. This action provoked the response from the army, in which about 26 Islamists were detained near the border with Algerian. On January 5th, a grenade exploded in the French embassy in Bamako. In Mauritania, the first action with reportedly AQIM participation was on December 26th, 2007, when a military patrol was attacked. On February the 1st, 2008, an armed man opened fire against the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott. In 2009 a North-American was murdered in this same capital and, also, a suicide bomber exploded near the French embassy in the country.

The rest of the attacks in these three countries relate, fundamentally,
to the kidnapping of Western people as it can be seen in annex 13. Despite their approach, these reports were of great use as they enabled the use of the same data to get other results. In the reports, just the following table (Alexander 2013, 20) appears as processed information, where are displayed the set of attacks considered by its authors as terrorists.

Data Table - Terrorism Incidents in Maghreb & Sahel since Sept. 11, 2001

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
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<tr>
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<td>204 attacks</td>
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<tr>
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<td>178 attacks</td>
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Undoubtedly, Algeria has been the country that suffered the most with AQIM terrorist acts, which was why the information given by the reports was quite ample, enabling the processing of data from each of the Algerian press offices. To this research 23 variables were extracted as a result of computing the 1234 attacks notified by the Algerian press. With a more detailed analysis of each of these incidents, the following tables and charts were elaborated:

Table I - Algeria: Victims of Terrorist Attacks

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<th>2004</th>
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<th>2008</th>
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One of the variables used was the one of “attacks attributed to: GIA, GSPC and AQIM”. The result showed that of these attacks only 13 were attributed to GIA between 2001 and 2003; a total of 74 to the GSPC between 2001 and 2006; and 49 to the AQIM, between 2007 and 2012. These numbers express a methodological problem, as they solely point the amount of actions which these organizations claimed as theirs. Most of the reports, between 2007 and 2012, did not specify which of these groups claimed the attacks. The majority of the terrorist actions in this same period took place in the provinces of Boumerdés, Tizi Ouzou and Bouïra, which are part of the mountain region of Cabilia, where AQIM has its main base. This allows us to say that most of the attacks reported were undertaken by members or recruits from the AQIM, the organization which has the military capacity to hold this kind of action in the region. More than 70% of the registered attacks took place in the Boumerdés and Tizi Ouzou provinces, as it can be seen by the following chart.
Different types of attacks were compiled in Table II. The use of explosives has been the most used method by the AQIM inside urban zones in Algeria. Inside this variable, there are diverse variations such as car-bombs, road bombs, homemade bombs or improvised explosive devices (IED), mine explosions, remote control bombs or cell phone bombs, the use of fanatics who suicide in public places or that exploded cars against public facilities such as police offices, simultaneous explosions and bombs hided inside police patrols or even inside corpses. The use of these artifacts, which in most of the cases were roughly fabricated, increased significantly until 2009 and 2010.

The actions undertaken by the Algerian army and special forces towards the dismantling of explosive devices reduced the effectivinness of this kind of attack in Algeria. Observing the periods between 2010 and 2011 in the charts the numbers indicate an inverse relation among the increase of bomb
deactivation and the significant diminution of the explosions. The 2012 bomb detonations resulted much less effective about the number of affected people. A great part of the attacks in this year did not produce a large number of mortal victims, which were also reduced by these actions.

In this chart AQIM’s capacity in installing bombs in Algeria is displayed. The 70% of bombs set that were detonated, were not classified by the press in any of the pointed categories. Among the kind of devices used, stand out the roughly produced and handmade ones. If we add the total of detonated bombs with the amount of devices dismantled by the army, it can be affirmed that the explosive power in the hands of Islamist cells has been much bigger.

The second kind of action employed by part of AQIM in Algeria has been ambushes. Included in this variable were ambushes against police patrols, military convoys and the installation of fake controls in highways by using uniforms of the Algerian army. The rest of the attacks were done through skirmishes or shootings among moderate Islamists and official forces, attacks against control posts, army garrisons and the kidnapping of military personnel.

On January 17th, 2002, Mohamed Laid Khelfi, security chief of the Ilizi region, was kidnapped near the border with Libya.
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The attacks in public locations are referred to in a broad variety of actions in which are included armed attacks to cafeterias, explosions in cinemas and stadiums, hijacking of passenger buses and simple but mortal attacks in funerals or weddings. The explosion of lots of car bombs during small periods of time has been a mode of simultaneous attack equally employed. Its level of impact in society is much bigger due to the high number of victims it can provoke, among which are not only the people who were in the place, but also the ones who had gone there to help the wounded.

Another group of attacks focused against apartment complexes and in the assassination of students or government figures as members of the parliament, regional political leaders or local authorities. Between 2006 and 2012 at least 29 political figures were killed, pertaining to different levels inside state apparatus. These killings were also directed against people suspected of collaboration with security services, government whistleblowers or Islamists included in the amnesty process, the so-called deserters of the Islamist cause. In 2011, at least five “regretted” terrorist were physically eliminated by AQIM. They have undertaken, moreover, sabotages in economic facilities of the country, such as the pipelines of the National Gas Company.

About Table I, the one referring to victims of terrorist attacks, it is necessary to acknowledge that these numbers express an estimate minimum of the amount of people affected and, also, who had been noted in the very same moment of the terrorist act. All reports indicate the immediate victims, and none of the cases consulted affirmed how many of the wounded, for example, died after. An additional problem is that in some of the reports it was not specified the exact number of deaths and wounds, rather attributing an indeterminate sum. In other cases a concrete number was given, but without defining how much of it corresponded to military forces and how much to civilians. This means that the real number of victims is much bigger than these numbers recognize. Nonetheless, lots of interpretations could be done with the data gathered, as well as to point some general tendencies.

A first observation to be done at first sight is that the year of 2007 was undoubtedly the most violent inside Algeria. This date coincides with the year of creation and adoption of the new fight conceptions inside AQIM. The civilian victims were considerable.
Civilian Victims

In the 2007-2012 period the amount of victims decreased more than three times than the one in 2007, falling to 961 from a former amount of 268. From 2007 on the general tendency was of a permanent decline of the number of victims – including civilian and military. This was due to the work done by the security forces in neutralizing the terrorist actions, a factor related to the rising tendency in deactivating bombs set by the Islamists, as it is shown in the chart related to this variable, which was explained above.

Algeria: Civilian Victims of Terrorist Attacks
Nonetheless, if a comparative analysis is made having in mind the military and civilian victims in separate, it follows the conclusion that the majority of the affected people between 2007 and 2012 pertains to the military sector – soldiers, security personnel, police and officials.

**Algeria Victims of Terrorist Attacks**

![Graph showing Algeria Victims of Terrorist Attacks]

In 2007, when AQIM was created, the organization broke with the principle instituted by Hassan Hattab of not focusing the attacks against civilians. Just in 2007 the numbers cited above of civil deaths and wounds were produced. This was not due to an abandonment of this method by part of the group’s leaders, but rather because they were increasingly surrounded by the army. Most of civilians were wounded in the indiscriminate explosive attacks when they were trapped in crossfire or trying to rescue an injured.

Regarding the kidnappings, activity for which the AQIM became known internationally, the numbers indicate that in Algeria’s case the ones directed against Algerians themselves were more numerous than against foreigners, tourists and workers. The most widely known case was the one of 2003, when the GSPC kidnapped 32 European tourists. In 2007, AQIM kidnapped three Chinese workers. The actions against foreigners in the country were very marginal. This is an example that shows that the most affected by attacks and kidnappings undertaken by Islamic terrorist, were the Muslims.
rather than Westerners.

Military Victims

Recent Developments (2013-2014)

The “Arab Spring”, triggered in Northern Africa, provoked disturbances and political change in Tunisia and Egypt, while in other scenarios it was used as a pretext to depose legitimate governments as the one of Libya. In particular, the disarticulation of the Libyan state, as a result of the NATO invasion, provoked widespread destabilization in the Sahel region, in which the main example was the Islamist offensive against Bamako and the following French-African military intervention in Mali. The situation described was identified as a direct menace to Algeria’s security, as all of its borders in east, south and southwest flanks were under military pressure. This was the favorable context for the AQIM Islamists to reactivate their actions inside Algeria.

The most significant example was the attack against a gas facility in In Amenas, in eastern Algeria, which pertained to British Petroleum. This fact happened on January 16th, 2013, five days after the French intervention in Mali. The action was claimed by Belmokhtar’s group, which had split up from AQIM in December 2012 (Oumar 2013). This action was a response to the developments in Mali and a means to show AQIM its capacity to conduct large-scale operations. They seized 792 hostages, among Algerian and foreign workers, executing 23 of them of British, French and North-American nationalities. This fact became known as the hostage crisis and provoked a strong military response from the Algerian army.
According to the fifth report of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, during the rest of 2013 terrorist actions showed a tendency of reduction. Besides the In Amenas attack, just 26 cases of civil victims were reported, most of them injuries, while the military was still the most affected sector, with almost 60 deaths and 14 injuries – still, comparing with former years, the number was way smaller. The same tendency was shown regarding the amount of bomb explosions: in comparison with 2012, with 72 cases, 2013 had only 27, far less than half of the former. About the geographic distribution of the actions, these were still concentrated in the Cabilia region: in Bouira (8 attacks), Tizi Ouzou (7) and Boumerdés (4) (Alexander 2014). So, in comparison with 2012, the attacks as well as the victims from terrorist attacks diminished to less than half.

In the regard of terrorist groups’ actions, the most important fact of 2014 at an international level, was the rise of the self-entitled “Islamic State” (IS) and of its caliphate created between Syria and Iraq. Its emergency had an impact on the rest of the former Al Qaeda followers around the world, causing important ruptures among its affiliate groups which, till then, led the global jihad and was displaced by the new group. This influence also was felt inside AQIM, whose command center is in Algeria. The contradictions among the two groups started in July 2014, when the IS demanded AQIM’s loyalty for its “caliphate”. The leader of AQIM, Abdelmalek Droukdel, rejected the request and restated his fidelity to Al Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden’s successor in Al Qaeda. Groups such as Ansar al-Sharia (The Supporters of the Sharia) in Tunisia and Libya had expressed their loyalty to Al Baghdadi, Islamic State’s “caliph”, even raising the possibility of creating a group called Islamic State of the Islamic Maghreb (ISIM).

In Algeria’s case, the separation did not linger and, in September 2014, emerged the organization called Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria. The militia is headed by Gouri Abdelmalek25, known as Jaled Abu Suleiman, who declared his loyalty to the Islamic State. Obviously it is a small cell without great possibilities of development, but that complicates even more the relations among Algerian Islamist radicals. These fragmentations are an example of their debilities in Algeria. Also they show that: Algeria terrorist cells are increasingly disarticulated; they do not have popular support at all; their actions concentrate on increasingly less points of national geography, mostly in the isolated mountains of Cabilia and in some determined places of Sahara; and, at last, the Algerian state and armed forces have a solid and radical strategy to

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25 Gouri Abdelmalek was AQIM’s chief in the central region of Algeria. Known as Jaled Abu Suleiman, he is 36 and known as comes from the city of Boumerdés. He had been condemned to death for his involvement in the death attacks against a commissary in Thenia of 2008, and spent some years in Tizi Ouzou’s jail.
completely eliminate these remaining terrorists and guarantee the security of Algeria’s citizens, contributing, with their experience, to the antiterrorist fight in the Sahel region.

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ABSTRACT
The present article addresses radical Islamism in Algeria, encompassing the period between the rise and radicalization of the first Islamist groups, during the Civil War (1992-2002), and their activities in recent years. The study analyses aspects such as the tactics used by them, the rise of new groups and the fall of the old ones, as well as the impacts of these developments on the political scenario of Algeria.

KEYWORDS
Algeria; Islamism; Terrorism.

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MILITARY MODERNIZATION IN THE PRC: DOCTRINAL CHANGE AND PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION

Thiago Malafaia¹

1 Introduction

Doctrinal changes are central to understanding Chinese military modernization, from the beginning of the 1990’s onwards. To fully grasp the process it is important to analyze the events influencing doctrinal changes: mainly, diminishing world tensions and the results of the 1990’s Gulf War.

This paper analyzes how People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) doctrine changed. It is divided in three sections. In the first, doctrinal changes and their influence to the process of military modernization will be assessed; in the second, I analyze PRC’s military structure, as well as the evolution of the country’s armed forces, in retrospect, and the process of modernization, per se; in the third section I draw conclusions as to these events.

2 Doctrinal Changes and their Influence in the Modernizing Process

The PRC’s military modernization is a pressing theme for IR and for Strategic Studies. Since the 1970’s Beijing has been talking about it in official pronouncements and documents. The process, however, picked up momentum after the end of the Cold War. For Bergstein et al. (2008), the Peoples’ Liberation Army (henceforth PLA) is profiting today from steps taken more than 20 years ago, even though some mild revisions have been undertaken to enhance performance and better connect the modernizing pushes with world

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political developments.

In January 13, 1993, the Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and leader of the Central Military Commission (CMC), at the time, Jiang Zemin, launched the foundations of a novel national military strategy, which guided PLA’s modernizing efforts thereafter: the “Military Strategic Guidelines of the New Era”. Its main focus was on “a continuous and sustainable modernization”. Zemin was an extremely important figure in Chinese military modernizing push. He sought to implement stricter controls on military institutions and ameliorate PLA’s relationship with the CCP. It was not an easy task breaking, as Cohen (1988), Scobell (2000), and Swaine (1996) argument, with Mao Zedong’s politico-ideological “heritage”, diminishing corruption among ranks and top echelons of the armed forces and eliminating some privileges the military had required lots of political skill. That, however, meant that the military were bound to have a bigger say in CCP policy-making processes.

The Guidelines were launched at an auspicious time, in light of structural necessities of Chinese armed forces. Chinese top brass inside the CCP and the CMC made two pivotal decisions, which would define the country’s military modernization process: 1) to revise the previous evaluation of China’s security, and; 2) to acknowledge the mutating nature of modern conflict.

Chinese analysts recognized how world political structure and conjuncture had changed as a result of the end of the Cold War. The post-Cold War world represented two characteristics: 1) reduction of the risk of conflict between China and another great power; 2) augmentation of the challenges and risks to Chinese security coming from its immediate periphery, which included Taiwan (Peng and Yao 2005). Beijing had also predicted that a multipolar order would arise right at the outset of the post-cold War era. However, the post-Soviet world was a unipolar one, even though the situation has changed recently.

These conclusions influenced changes in force posture and structure aimed at heightened effectiveness and modernization. The 1991 Gulf War, easily won by U.S. and allied forces, impressed Chinese top politico-military echelons. More than that, the capabilities displayed, mainly by Washington’s military, shocked PLA leaders. They realized that Chinese forces were not prepared for the conflicts of the end of the 20th Century — highly dependent on cutting-edge technology, on constant information flow, and on highly efficient communications. These capabilities would be even more necessary in the coming Century and not incorporating them would cause Beijing to lag behind. These novel conflicts exhibited eight main characteristics:
1) fought for limited political objectives and limited in geographic scope; 2) short in duration but decisive in strategic outcome — i.e., a single campaign may decide the entire war; 3) high-intensity operations, characterized by mobility, speed, and force projection; 4) high-technology weapons causing high levels of destruction; 5) logistics-intensive with high resource consumption rates, with success depending as much on combat sustainability as on the ability to inflict damage upon the enemy; 6) information-intensive and dependant upon superior C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities and near-total battle space awareness; 7) simultaneous fighting in all battle space dimensions, including outer space and the electro-magnetic spectrum; and 8) carefully coordinated multiservice (army, navy, and air force), ‘joint’ operations (Bergstein et al. 2008, 193-4).

These factors were gradually internalized in PLA’s military doctrine. However, as suggested by Cordesman and Yarosh (2012), Chinese discourse regarding its forces should be taken at face value, even though they can be used for apprehending general guidelines as to Beijing’s intentions.

The major reason for that is the fact that Beijing’s multiple security-related institutions each publish documents concerning the security domain and advance prescriptions. These institutions are all embedded into a greater system, which presents a chain of command structure and hierarchies. As a consequence, these hierarchies also apply to documents published by diverse agencies with some being more important and presenting guidelines with farther-reaching scope than others. The most important document in the series is the “Strategic Military Guidelines”. The Chinese label this chain of documents the “Science of Military Strategy”.

The authors suggest that efforts to differentiate hierarchy between the official documents led to the identification of two key concepts: 1) Active Defense, and; 2) Local Wars under Informatization Conditions. There is, still, the not-so-recent concept of People’s War that used to guide Beijing’s military doctrine. It was “refurbished” not to fall in obsolesce, in the 21st Century.

As for Active Defense:

Active defense is an operational guideline for military strategy that applies to all branches of the armed forces. It states that China’s military engages in a policy of strategic defense and only strike militarily once it has already been struck. However, Active defense specifically states that such a defensive posture is only viable if mated with an offensive operational posture. Moreover, the first strike which triggers a Chinese military response need not be military: actions in the political and strategic realm may also justify a Chinese reaction, even if the PLA fires the first shot tactically (Cordesman
It is an interesting resource for it implies that situations perceived as threats to national security can also be considered attacks justifying response, what basically legitimates preventive strikes.

The “Science of Military Strategy” establishes three pillars for Active Defense: 1) China will exhaust all diplomatic means before resorting to force; 2) the PRC will try to deter war before it happens, using military and/or political means; 3) Beijing shall respond to attacks with offensive action intended at destroying enemy forces (Peng and Yao 2005). Beijing will also not be the first to resort to nuclear weaponry in a conflict to put down enemy resistance. This was further stated in PRC’s White Papers Series (2015): Chinese nuclear posture is defensive and China will not be the first in a conflict to use nuclear weapons nor shall it use them against non-nuclear-armed states or in declared nuclear-free-zones.

As for “Local Wars under Conditions of Informatization”:

Since 1993, [...] the concept has been the official military doctrine of the PLA. This doctrine states that near-future warfare will be local geographically, primarily along China’s periphery; limited in scope, duration, and means; and under ‘conditions of informatization’, which the DOD describes as ‘conditions in which modern military forces use advanced computer systems, information technology, and communication networks to gain operational advantage over an opponent’ (Cordesman and Yarosh 2012, 35).

The Chinese identified in the 1991 Gulf War a new stage of the “Revolution in Military Affairs”². They also concluded that the end of the Cold War produced stark changes, both in the logic of conflict and in the constraints to war. The result was: highly informatized “new conflicts” of a more local character which, according to Chinese perception, would lead to limited political goals, in opposition to total war. In a nutshell, a more limited, albeit more concentrated, use of force.

However, these elements (shorter and more local conflicts, cutting-edge technology, force informatization, and the capacity of distributing

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² Used for the first time, by the Chinese, in their 2004 White Paper. There, the sense is one of shift in military operations’ conduction patterns, not restricted only to information. The changes encompassed are wide-ranging: from mechanization to informatization. Central to the whole discourse is the incorporation of state-of-the-art technology. That, however, is the Chinese take on the term. In academia the term has been used and debated for a longer time and does not refer, solely, to innovations taking place during the later part of the 20th Century.
information timely and efficiently) yield to produce highly lethal and destructive engagements, albeit limited in political objectives and geographic scope. What brings forth another key aspect of modern conflict: logistics efficiency and outstanding mobilization capabilities. Evidence provided by Bitzinger (2011), DoD reports (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) and the IISS’s Military Balance (2012, 2014) strongly suggest that the Chinese are keen on force modernization along these lines, with efforts especially aimed at heightening force mechanization and informatization rates as well as enhancing action coordination between branches.

As for the concept of People’s War, it has been reformulated in order to remain relevant today. There is, at times, confusion about what “People’s War” really means. The concept is ambiguous and some think it to refer to a supposed government incentive to its population, so that the later organize itself into paramilitary groups, guerrillas, national defense forces, and fight alongside the PLA. The claim, however, does not hold water. It actually refers to what Beijing labels “Active Support”: active help from the population to the military during conflict or when they are called upon to act. According to Cordesman and Yarosh (2012) it could take the form of logistic, political, operational support, or any combination of the three.

Arming civilians, however, was never completely ruled out by the PLA. Actually, it is seen as a valuable element especially in difficult/costly military campaigns. Nevertheless, other terms are used to define the possibility: militia formation, civil defense and reserve forces (PRC White Paper 2006). This means that one of the most important rules of the Chinese military is to maintain a good relationship with civilians for, ad postremum, they could prove decisive for the war effort. The issue was also specifically addressed in one of the documents of the Second Artillery, the “Science of Second Artillery Campaigns” (SAC 2004).

Another pivotal point in Chinese military modernization is coordination between branches. This is a central theme in strategic calculations, being a part of what the PLA calls “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics”. The Zhōngguó de Guófáng 2004 (2004 White Paper), is specially important in this sense for it, in addition to acknowledging the

3 From Mandarin (中国的国防). Literally, “Chinese National Defense in the Year of 2004”. It is a periodic series of documents published by PRC’s authorities presenting the guidelines to be followed by the various organs linked to the defense and security of the country. It has a great hierarchy inside the ensemble of Chinese publications on the subject even tough it is still beneath the “Strategic Military Guidelines”. The guidelines do not replace one another. Rather, they complement one another. Posterior papers present the “results” of the actions of preceding issues.
interest and necessity of integrating the services, establishes further some noteworthy measures and guidelines: “[...] adapting to the features and patterns of modern warfare, the PLA has intensified joint training among services and arms at all levels to enhance joint fighting capabilities” (Zhōngguó de Guófáng 2004). The document establishes four pillars. The first is about the accomplishment of conjunct operational training and high-level post-training exercises, what enhanced Commanding Officers’ capacity in performing joint operations.

As for the second pillar, conduction of joint tactical training, military units and diverse services stationed at the same geographic military zones “[...] have intensified their contacts and cooperation in the form of regional cooperation to conduct joint tactical training” (ibid). Joint exercises were conducted during 2003, e.g., in Dalian, in September, that year.

The third pillar revolves around perfecting the means of joint training. Years were spent in developing training procedures and routines. With all that expertise “substantial progress” (sic) was achieved in three areas: training, per se; simulation training; and network training. But that is not all:

Almost all combined tactical training activities at division, brigade and regiment levels can be conducted on base. All services and arms have set up their basic simulation training systems for operational and tactical command. A (joint) combat laboratory system of simulation training for all military educational institutions has been initially put in place. A military training network system has been set up to interconnect the LANs of military area commands, services and arms, and command colleges (Zhōngguó de Guófáng 2004).

As for the fourth pillar, training of joint operations’ COs, great strides were made. Coordination of actions at the levels of Elementary, Intermediate, and Advanced Command Universities was established. These educational institutions are tasked with honing Chinese military officials’ skills, providing strategic studies and joint operations courses, and on-the-job training.

Other measures were also envisaged. Among them the cut on 200,000 men in PLA personnel, leading to intestine force reorganization; strengthening the Navy, Air Force and the SAC; acceleration of informatization efforts; acceleration of armament and equipment modernization; skilled-people strategic project implementation; escalation of logistics reforms; political job innovation; and, finally, the governing of the military according to the laws of the PRC. Incentives and reforms to Chinese science and technology areas and to the national defense industry were also addressed.

Little changed in the Beijing’s strategic planning as shown by the
Zhōngguó de Guófáng 2006. The greatest innovation can be attributed to Active Defense implementation. One important shift, however, figures on the 2008 paper, others, on the 2010 issue. In 2008 a new objective was advanced: strengthening political and ideological works, what meant a stronger control of the armed forces by the Chinese CCP. It is an unequivocal message to the world, reaffirming that the PLA is under CCP control.

As for the 2010 paper, some points are put forward. Firstly, creation of joint operational systems with measures such as: 1) intensifying research on operational theories; 2) strengthening combatant forces' formation; 3) enhancing operational command systems, and; 4) modernizing joint support capabilities. Secondly, promoting transition in military training, with such measures as: 1) training tasks reform; 2) training methodologies innovation; 3) enhancing the means of military training; 4) training management reform. Thirdly, multilateral approaches in developing a modern logistics system, a shift dependent on a series of steps, e.g., outsourcing services; stepping up system integration process; informatizing a multitude of processes and adopting more scientific postures to managing logistics support systems. Fourthly, and most importantly, accelerating new cutting-edge weapons systems development, with Chinese technology; strengthening the modification and modernization process of present weapons, equipment and their management, that is to be conducted in more rational ways; and developing mechanized weapons and equipment and/or their conjunct informatization (i.e. branches cooperation between themselves and between branches and Chinese R&D centers, factories, industries, educational institutions, etc.). To the exception of these innovative four points, little has changed in relation to the 2008 paper.

The 2012 and 2014 White Papers further reaffirm such tenets. Here, however, the central objective of Chinese reunification is given even more importance. The 2014 version of the document states that that is one of the most cherished Chinese foreign policy goals. However, other important security events are also tackled by Beijing’s near term strategy. These are the challenges to Chinese existence as a unified political entity coming, mainly, from separatist groups in Tibet and Uyghuristan. Such groups are considered terrorist by Beijing and are treated the same way as groups espousing like political agendas operating in the Middle East and Central Asia. That is an effective strategy for, while it delegitimates these groups’ operations inside China, it also works towards giving credibility and coherence, at least in discourse, to Chinese policy. Naturally, however, Chinese actions are not standardized regarding this matter and a violent process of cracking these groups down, domestically, is ensuing, even though this does not hold true for groups operating beyond borders and elsewhere in the world.
Some attention was also given to Japan and the US. Even though the White Papers do not explicitly name the challengers in East Asia, the presentation of hurdles and the strategies to counter them clearly have Tokyo’s and Washington’s names in them. On the other hand, the Chinese, at least discursively, are seeking to enhance cooperation with both countries, or so the documents say. Recent events, nonetheless, suggest that tension is mounting, what can yield to unpredictable results in the future.

The Chinese took all of these tenets to heart and the results are already appearing in the form of force structure and doctrine as well as force modernization, mechanization and informatization. The most important development from this is the fact that China poses, nowadays, as consistent challenge to American interests in the region. Tellis and Tanner (2012) suggest that China used its relentless economic growth for, at least, 30 years, as a means to produce the resources to improve its military. This is, they argument, a source of anxiety regionally for China is geo-strategically located in the “heartland” of Asia given its central location in the continent. Because of this Beijing is consistently in the position to trouble American force projection in Asia. Panda (2007) gives a similar account of the matter. More so today as the Chinese continuously augment they access-denial capabilities, especially after the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Naval forces here are key as Fravel’s (2008) account suggests. The modernization of Chinese naval forces augments their punch and tactical and strategic capabilities, what is a consistent source of anxiety in a region so riddled with territorial disputes.

One should not understate what the PLA Navy means regionally and how force modernization can substantially increase its power projection and access denial capabilities. One should also not downplay what Taipei means to Beijing. On the one hand, O’Rourke’s (2012) evidence strongly suggests that the Chinese stepped up existing efforts toward refurbishing their navy after the 1996 Taiwan Strait fiasco in terms of national pride. They realized that their forces were not a match for Washington’s. The Clinton administration intimidated Zemin’s through the deployment of two aircraft-carrier battle groups to the region. The Chinese are poised not to experience the situation again. On the other hand, however, there also seem to exist other objectives the Chinese wish to achieve through a more capable navy. O’Rourke’s (2012) evidence suggests that these are mainly linked to regional preeminence, control of territorial waters and ensuring Chinese easy access to regional waters and beyond. Beijing is especially concerned with logistics and ensuring the safe arrival of energetic supplies coming from the Gulf of Aden to the mainland. Creating a countenance force to America in the Pacific is also a cherished goal in China. Bitzinger (2011) offers offers a similar account of the sit-
uation, stressing that Chinese military modernization might create regional imbalances in military strength, specially when it comes to Japan and Taiwan.

Further evidence substantiating this can be found in Larson’s (2007) account of Chinese military capabilities. For him, Beijing has been focusing on the improvement of asymmetrical capabilities and in building a Navy and an Air Force capable of operating further off the mainland’s shores. As for the Army, modernization is intended at enhancing mobility. Taken together, these changes effectively contribute to heightened power projection capabilities in land, air, and sea. It also means that attacks will be more precise, increasing tactical and strategic effectiveness, what also reflects on Chinese diplomatic/political efficiency and Beijing’s prestige internationally.

Another point worth mentioning is the political work currently undertaken by CCP leaders towards both the armed forces and the general public. This is a specially pressing theme for the Chinese, which saw in Soviet demise an example of what an unsupportive military can do politically (Scobell 2000). As a matter of fact, one of the most crippling blows to the Soviet Union was regime abandonment by its military. That is why the Chinese are so keen on politico-ideological work/indoctrination of both the armed forces and the public and on the need of maintaining a harmonic relationship between the civilian and military realms of activity. Beijing seems to have taken the lesson to heart and the presence of the topic in the country’s White Papers and other doctrinary documents only attest to that.

Anyhow, indigenous weapons development is the policy that most catches de eyes of observers and governments, and in particular Washington’s. The issue is shrouded in controversy. Evidence presented by Labrecque et al. (2011) and Chang (2012) suggests that Chinese military modernization outpaced US and Western analysts expectations as to timeframes in development, procurement and deployment of new pieces of weaponry. Indeed, the speed with which the Chinese are managing to develop state-of-the-art equipment locally and the ability with which Beijing has managed to conceal the progress, success and development rates of this undertaking are astonishing. Shambaugh (2005-6) suggested that the Chinese were being quite effective in their process of military modernization. The analysis holds even truer today.

Beijing’s indigenous military modernization brings consequences for all branches and parcels of military activity in China. Nevertheless, some areas such the navy, the air forces and space/extra-atmospheric warfare capabilities are receiving a lot of attention. In this respect, Labrecque et al.’s (2011) evidence is conclusive. If in 2000 only 9% of Chinese submarines were modern, the rate had risen by 2009 to 50%. The numbers in submarines have also increased along the years. Amphibious ships were also added to the fleet
and it is estimated that their number are likely to grow in the future. However, the Chinese still have to tackle technology-related problems and critical sub-components currently in use are Russian-made. The PRC faces the same problems in relation to its aircraft carriers, which are, also, Russian in origin, even though they might be currently undertaking to build such ships indigenously. Evidence, however, suggest, they are still a long way off in terms of mastering a force posture enabling them to make the most out of these ships. These capabilities are considered crucial to tackle such problems as: Taiwan, the South China Sea territorial disputes, to secure important sea-lanes for energy supply, and anti-piracy operations. Carter and Bulkeley (2012) give a similar account on the matters stressing, further, that Chinese military modernization may prove to be detrimental to American interests in East Asia.

As for the air force, modernization rates have been astonishing: from 2% of modernization in 2000 to 34% in 2010. There has also been substantial increase in the numbers of fourth-generation fighters. A fifth-generation fighter, the J-20, was also developed but not yet deployed. One of the main problems with the new model is it reliance in Russian motors and avionics. Support systems are another area of interests to Chinese leaders and, according to evidence, the Chinese are intent in developing an AEWC system. Nevertheless, other areas such as aerial defense, surface-to-air missiles, training and education, service integration, and long-range capabilities are also in the order of the day.

The Chinese space program is another area of particular strategic and commercial/economic interest to Beijing. The launch of a panoply of satellites attest to that, making many in Washington wondering if the Chinese are using this as a way of enhancing the effectiveness of their ballistic missiles. One must not forget that such areas hold many similarities in terms of technology. On the other hand, the development of anti-satellite missiles, a current trend in Chinese strategic posture, represents a risk not circumscribed only to military affairs. Having the capability to temper with communications systems worldwide brings consistent bargaining power for this represents the possibility to bring substantial costs to bear on oppositionists.

Four examples of Chinese prowess in hiding military activities and indigenous development of military capacity elucidate the discussion, as Fisher Jr. (2006) discusses. Analysts did not hope that the new Yuan-class submarine, “discovered” in 2004, were almost fully operational at that time, let alone that it can bear air-independent propulsion systems (Chang 2012). A second weapons system, which development speed caused awe, was the anti-satellite missile. In 2004, analysts were aware that potential tests could happen but its exact moment could not be estimated. It was believed
that the Chinese were to acquire ASAT (anti-satellite) capability “soon”. But trials did not take long to take place and in January 11, 2007, the Chinese achieved their first successful trial. One of their own climate satellites, the FY-1C, which flew at approximately 530 miles above the Earth’s surface, was destroyed. The test, that caused concern in various governments, and especially the American, created the biggest man-made space waste cloud, at a single time, in history. In January 11, 2010, they launched another missile to intercept one of their own mid-range ballistic missiles, the CSS-X-11 (ibid).

Obtaining an anti-satellite capability is paramount to the Chinese. White Papers make it fairly clear, albeit in a tacit way, that Washington is Beijing’s main adversary. Thus, such capacity is extremely well place for facing the Americans in case of conflict, for the US is currently heavily reliant on SIGINT. Disrupting satellite operations can give the Chinese an edge over American forces for it would consistently undermine their information gathering capabilities. Carter and Bulkeley (2012) and Scobell (2000) give a similar account on the matter stressing, further, that anti-satellite capabilities have been on Chinese “wish list” for quite some time. However, in analyzing such subject one is urged the see the bigger picture. Such capability could also be extremely influential in relation to markets and social functioning, especially in relation to the West and some East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea. Interfering with satellites could bring dire consequences in terms of economic activity, natural disasters forecasting, and society, for a substantial parcel of contemporary communications are satellite-based. Oh (2012) argues that Chinese ASAT capabilities do not pose a threat to American and other countries’ interests in the region. However, in light of the presented evidence, I beg to differ.

It is simply too difficult to obtain reliable information about Chinese new weapons systems. Still, miscalculations are also a constant here and occurred at least twice. The first concerned the development of ground-based anti-ship ballistic missiles; the second, the stealth fighter J-20.

When it comes to the former:

Chinese naval modernization efforts — including anti-ship ballistic missile development, among the numerous projects and weapons acquisition programs — began in the 1990s. Conventional ballistic missile technology has developed at remarkable speed. The Dong Feng-21 (DF-21) medium-range ballistic missile, for instance, has several variants. The development of the DF-21D variant (a ground-based ASBM) is reportedly fitted with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), has GPS and active radar-based terminal guidance, and the ability to strike 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers away from China’s shores (Chang 2012, 21).
Washington underestimated Chinese capacity to develop and field the system. It predicted that the system would only be operation by December 2010. However, by 2008, both the Chinese and Taiwanese media affirmed that the system was already part of PLA forces. Moreover, a 2009 Nasic report suggested that the Chinese inventory of missiles, ballistic and non-ballistic, of various ranges was already diversified.

Concerning the fifth-generation fighter-plane J-20, American specialists’ forecasts indicated that the initial prototype trials would only happen in 2012. Anyhow, the plane made its first observable flight in January 11, 2011.

According to Chang (2012), despite American specialists’ claims, in 2010, that the J-20 would only enter service somewhere between 2017 and 2019, one Chinese military academic affirmed that the Chinese were very close to completing one of the last technological requisites of the plane and that it be fielded by 2015. Until December 2011 the Chinese conducted 60 test-flights. In February 2012 the Chinese media released a series of reports informing that Beijing intended to continue testing that year.

Evidence suggests it is very hard to estimate the speed at which the development of new Chinese weaponry is being conducted and there are reasons for that. Labrecque *et al.* and Chang (2012) point reasons why this happens. For starters, Chinese strategy of denying and omitting information, in official channels, and disclosing in some “alternative channels” hints and clues about the stage of development of its armaments is such one issue.

Secondly, analysts sometimes fail to grasp deepness and broadness of transformations, which Beijing’s war industry went through. It is true that chokepoints still exist. However, Chinese innovation capacity should not be underestimated.

The difficulty in understanding the relationship between the diverse organs involved in defense and security issues also poses problems for analysts. Hierarchies regulate even the publication of documents about military doctrines and governmental objectives. But that is not all. Evidence suggests that there are serious bureaucratic coordination problems between government organs. Moreover, there also exists the possibility “[...] of a civil-military divide at the top levels of Chinese policymaking” (Chang 2012, 4).

Beijing’s threat perceptions are frequently underestimated. Many analysts underestimate how much some countries, specially the U.S., are seen as threats to Chinese national security. The substantial American economic, cultural, and military presence in Eastern Asia and the Pacific are factors observed with great caution by decision-makers. However, recent past events worked as catalysts of great importance in military modernizing processes.
The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1999 bombing of Chinese embassy’s Annex in Belgrade, by U.S. aircraft during the ex-Yugoslavian crisis are cases in point.

Another issue is the country’s military spending. Chinese military spending, between 2000 and 2010, had not exceeded 2.21% of GDP p.a.. However, the country’s economic growth in the period was outstanding, exceeding, in 2007, the 14% p.a.-mark (Cordesman and Yarosh 2012). This makes so that the real amount invested is increasing year in and year out.

Even though the amount invested in military spending is crescent but official figures are deceiving. Evidence strongly suggests that a multitude of expenditures, which would be computed as military spending by other governments, are simply left out of the assessment. Bergstein et al.’s (2008), Cordesman and Kleiber’s (2006), Cordesman and Yarosh’s (2012), IISS (2012, 2014) and SIPRI’s (2015) figures attest to that. Large wage raises were granted to PLA personnel in 2006, 2008 and 2011. Additionally, spending with imports of armament, bids for foreign weaponry, military assistance to and from foreign governments, paramilitary forces and strategic and nuclear forces spending, war materiel production subsidies, military R&D spending, and the PLA’s own fund-raising are not computed as part of the official “military spending” statistics. In light of these considerations, it is estimated that the real amount invested by Beijing in its military is consistently larger than officially announced figures.

Lastly, linguistic skills are paramount to assess PRC’s military modernization process. Few analysts have adequate linguistic training to understand information pouring in Chinese open sources. This problem is aggravated by the lack of regard with which PRC sources are treated. Few can understand Chinese sources and fewer still are interested in them publications (Chang 2002).

Chinese military modernization and weapons buildup is not only important from a strategic point of view. It can potentially bring consistent change in regional politics. East Asia is an important area of concern for American foreign policy and evidence strongly suggests that Chinese strategies are intended at sidelining Washington diplomatically and politically when it comes to regional presence and prestige. Bitzinger (2007) wrote in 2007 that Chinese military modernization was not the main driving force to Southeast and East Asian countries’ own military modernization efforts. However, evidence suggests that such a trend has not been holding much water recently and the various disagreements and rhetorical clashes between the countries of the regions concerning the legitimacy of islands and influence over sealanes are just but a few cases in point and attest to what I contend. Gill (1998)
arguments that Chinese military modernization, although not the main factor driving military choices in the countries of the regions, is considered a substantial source of concern. Tow and Rigby (2011) argue that such trend is already in motion when it comes to China-Australia and China-South Korea relations. China has been courting these two middle powers economically for quite some time, what caused a steep increase in economic interdependence. This just makes them even more vulnerable to Chinese political strategies. Raising the stakes these countries have in their relations with Beijing can make them more prone to political acquiescence or, at least, lack of intense resistance to Chinese political choices in the region, even despite maintaining close relations with Washington. However, other countries are even more vulnerable to Chinese preferences because their stakes are even higher. These are mainly countries geographically adjacent to Chinese borders. This can potentially yield to political tensions and redistribution in regional prestige, favoring Beijing to the detriment of Washington and, perhaps, Tokyo. Shambaugh (2005-6), suggested, 10 years ago, that the process of Chinese military modernization would yield changes in regional balance of power. His analysis held water for this is exactly what is happening today.

3 People’s Republic of China Military Structure and Historic Evolution of Forces

The PLA is but a part in PRC’s security apparatus, though responsible for the bulk of the country’s security. The Ministry for State Security is the Chinese intelligence agency, conducting domestic and international operations. The Ministry for Public Security is responsible for domestic security and commanding police forces. Both ministries function under PRC’s State Council. The People’s Armed Police (PAP), although not formally part of PLA, is also subordinated to the Central Military Commission (CMC). The 2010 White Paper refers to it as a “[...] shock force in handling public emergencies” (Zhōngguó de Guófáng 2010). This is not surprising for political work is also carried out regarding PAP. Moreover, it can act as light infantry reserve in case of conflict and in reconstruction and rescue efforts after national emergencies. There is logic behind a large PAP force. Chinese leaders have to tackle large resistance from separatist groups operating in Tibet and the so-called Uygurstan. Thusly, the force would also be intended to quell domestic resistance. Scobell (2000) also considers the political challenge such groups pose to Beijing’s central planning and even go so far as to state that

4 Estimated at 600000 people (Cordesman and Yarosh 2012)
PAP also has a paramilitary character.

The most prominent Chinese security institution is the PLA. According to the Zhōngguó de Guófáng 2010, after de creation of the “New China”, in 1949, the PLA set as its goal ensuring Chinese self-defense capabilities. As time went by, another objective was added: deter Taiwanese independence (Panda 2007). Over the years, the adoption of a scientific/technological force modernization posture motivated a change in focus: from scale and quantity of forces to quality and efficiency. Thus the “labor-intensive” approach was substituted for one more “technology-intensive”. This shift in paradigms influenced, in the long-run, various PLA manpower reductions. Evidence supporting this can be found in IISS Military Balance publications from 1985-2014. Despite being called People’s Liberation Army, it comprises four branches: the Army (PLAA), the Navy (PLAN), the Air Force (PLAAF), and the Second Artillery Corps. (PLASAC).

The Zhōngguó de Guófáng 2006 sets the PLA’s command structure, which has the CMC as its most important agency. According to the document and to Cordesman and Yarosh (2012), the CMC has the role of planning and deciding over security policy in all issues regarding the armed forces. It is an organ that derives, directly, from the CCP Central Committee, what puts the PLA under party control.

The CMC bears great responsibility: from the armed forces, per se, to the development of military doctrines, to logistics, and finally, to the civil-military relations. However, there are actually two CMCs, one for the CCP and the other for the State. They exist next to one another even though they are not identical as to membership.

This heavily influenced PLA’s force frame, impacting further the number of total available personnel. Severe manpower cuts were carried out as China moved its focus from quantity to quality and efficiency. All branches, except the SAC, suffered substantive personnel cuts, as shown in graph 1. The numbers are very representative of doctrinal change. The PLAA had in 1985, 3160000 men; in 2012, 1600000. The PLAN had in 1985, 350000 men; in 2012 255000. The PLAAF had in 1985, 490000 men; in 2012, 330000. The SAC had a total force of some 90000 men, in 1990. In 2012 the numbers had risen to 100000 men (IISS 1985-2012).
Graph 1: Absolute Force Tendencies of the PLA over the Years

* After Cordesman and Yarosh (2012, 50), the data for the manpower of the Second Artillery Corps, in 1985, were not found. Therefore, for this graph were used the numbers for the year of 1990.

In 2012, Chinese military forces numbered 2285000-odd PLA members, 660000-odd active PAP members, and, at least, 510000-odd reserve military forces, not to mention the 8000000-plus militias (Cordesman and Yarosh 2012).
Increasing the numbers of highly educated officials in all branches is also a concern. In order to do this, aside from the already mentioned policies (amongst them opportunities for the talented, closer relationship with universities, military educational institutions quality enhancing), the Chinese are trying to implement an initiative not strange to other military: a body of non-commissioned officers. Such measure would heighten the “years of education” average among the officers “[...] by rebalancing the personal system, recruiting high human capital into the PLA, providing opportunities for increased qualification among the non-conscript PLA, and offering greater compensation for the entire force” (Cordesman and Yarosh 2012, 54).

In addition, reserve and militia structures are also experiencing shifts, even though less attention is being currently assigned to the matter. These changes come in the bulge of the “Revolution in Military Affairs”, much like the changes taking place in the PLA: reserves and militias are also being reduced. Even tough there is no precise information about the issue Beijing’s official positioning, evinced on the White Papers, is that these two organizations are going to give support to PLA regulars. Cordesman and Yarosh (2012) go even further, stating that instead of reinforcing the maneuver forces of the PLA (for which role they would need to be massive) they now take over auxiliary roles, being responsible for logistics, technical and air defense making scale redundant. They were, thus, reduced, becoming more compact and smaller. There seems, however, to be more mundane reasons for paramilitary downsizing. Crane’s et al.’s (2005) evidence is conclusive. A substantial parcel of the money flowing to paramilitaries does not come from central establishment but, rather, from municipalities and lower instances of government. Thus, these lesser sectors of administration became less than satisfied with the situation and, ergo openly voiced their preference for the reduction of such burden. Evidence suggests that the Chinese regime is heeding the call. This can contribute to a more transparent presentation of military budgets in the future for expenses such as these (and many others) do not figure in officially disclosed figures.

Chinese military expenditure is one of the most complicated matters surrounding the whole process of force modernization. The Chinese omit a series of elements that would figure in most countries’ calculations. Consequently, official military expenditures are artificially lower. This can be evinced when one compares the official figures with estimates from other countries’ and foreign institutions’ assessments, such as the DoD and SIPRI. After DoD data (2010), in some periods (1996 and 1997), the estimated expenditure arrives at twice the amount of officially published numbers, as shown in Graph 2 and Table 1.
Graph 2: The Evolution of PRC Military Expenditure between 1996-2009

SIPRI also presents numbers very different from official estimates. After the Institute, “[...] the figures for China are for estimated total military expenditure, including estimates for items not included in the official defense budget” (SIPRI, China’s Military Expenditure Data).

Table 1: PRC’s Military Expenditure (Continues)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People’s Republic of China</th>
<th>Military Expenditure — Millions of Constant 2011 U.S. Dollars</th>
<th>As % of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>25345</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>26251</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>29819</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Available at: http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4
The issue is so surrounded in uncertainty that a multitude of assessments regarding Beijing’s military expenditure are carried out. Each of which presents different figures concerning the theme. As a result, one can only reach a tentative conclusion regarding the issue. This is evidenced by Crane et al.’s (2005) assessment on the matter: officially disclosed figures (the lowest) present a more-than-10-times-over divergence in relation to the highest arrived-at figures.

Equipment modernization rates are another important point of the process. DoD data regarding four segments of Chinese forces (Naval Surface Forces, Submarine Forces, Air Forces, Air Defense Forces) is surprising. In terms of modernization, none of them presented “hardware” modernization rates superior to 10%, in 2000. However, modernization rates, by 2009, for the Air Force and the Naval Surface Forces, the two most delayed “cantles”, had reached 25% modernization rate, as shown by Graph 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Modernization Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>34364</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>36995</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>45367</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>52796</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>57325</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>63503</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>71425</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>83850</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>96702</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>106592</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>128701</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>136220</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>147258</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>161409</td>
<td>2.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>174047</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>190974</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weaponry imports is a crucial aspect of Chinese military modernization process. After SIPRI data the PRC presented quite an irregular pattern of arms coming-ins between 1993-2014. The peak happened between the years of 2000 and 2006, in terms of total expenditure. Before this interregnum, imports would rise and fall, alternately. After it they would fall only to begin rising again in 2011, as shown by Table 2.

Technology transfers always come to mind when one talks about armament and equipment imports. As evinced by Table 2 the Chinese are diminishing their imports of armament and equipment since 2006. However, for Cordesman and Yarosh (2012), the country did not abandon its old practice of reverse engineering foreign weapons systems. According to SIPRI’s data and the aforementioned authors, Russia is the main Chinese partner regarding technology transfers. They both present a very interesting graph about Russian relative participation in Chinese total armament and equipment imports.
Table 2: Imports of Armaments and Equipment by Source, performed by PRC between 1993-2014, in TIV (Trend Indicated Values) in U.S.$ m. 1990 Constant Dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Germany (FRG)</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>U.K.</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>909</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2581</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>31008</td>
<td>1105</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1492</td>
<td>38807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The acquisition of dual-use goods poses a serious problem when constructing a comprehensive picture of the PLA’s overall technological capabilities. The 2012 DOD report states that China is pursuing a systematic effort to exploit dual-use goods for modernizing its armed forces. The dominance of state-run companies, in combination with a government-mandated policy to secrecy, makes it very difficult to track down the potential applications of single items. In light of the information provided in the early DOD reports, it seems likely that China is undertaking systematic efforts to exploit du-
In conformity with its new doctrinal tenets and guidelines, the PRC has been implementing wide-ranging modernizing efforts recently. The 2006 White Paper explains that China is going to go through a three-step modernization program. The first step, concluded in 2010, sought the creation of a “solid foundation” (sic); the second, scheduled to end in 2020, seeks to reach a “great progress” (sic); the third step establishes an ambitious objective: “win informatized conflicts by mid-21st Century” (sic).

Eland (2003) and Crane et al. (2005) questioned what they termed somewhat alarmist analyses by the DoD and other authors and that China’s military modernization was not so wide-ranging. However, evidence, as presented throughout this piece, strongly suggest that the changes encompass substantial parcels of the armed forces and the results they produced and will produce in the future are surely to be noteworthy. According to Cordesman and Yarosh (2012), trend analyses have been showing that progresses at quicker paces than previously envisaged are taking place in some areas. On the other hand, other areas are still lacking and strides are ensuing at a slower pace. Another factor that, despite its importance, is always neglected is that “[...] the results of equipment modernization are strongly influenced by the PLA’s ability to modernize its tactics, strategy, training, and communications networks” (Cordesman and Yarosh 2012, 68).

4 Conclusion

In light of the discussion presented one realizes that Chinese military modernization could not have come to fruition without doctrinal changes, mainly those put forth by the Strategic Military Guidelines, but also by the White Papers and by other documents that, taken as a whole, form the Science of Military Strategy.

However, cornerstone to the entire process were shifts in international conjuncture, which resulted from USSR’s collapse. Moreover, the Gulf War, at the outset of the 1990’s, impressed the Chinese greatly, making them realize that they were not prepared for the latest twist in the “Revolution in Military Affairs”. The first event had pivotal influence regarding shifts in conflict character that, now, tend to be limited geographically, in scope, and in political objectives. Such a development brought with it demands that needed to be met such as being aware of whatever happens inside combat space, almost instantly, not to mention the capacity to project force with unprecedented speed. Thence the necessity of high mobility rates, uncommon to previous
conflicts, which also found expression in the second event.

In order to meet all of these requisites it was needed that the potential combatant understood the precepts of the Revolution in Military Affairs, took them to heart, and put himself carefully in its school.

These two events showed that the Chinese were not prepared to wage modern warfare. Even though they still counted on the massive scale of their manpower, force coordination, in relation to the countries that had already mastered the “Revolution” was unsatisfactory, at best. Another critical Chinese flaw, one that could prove to be fatal should they had faced “modern” forces in the sense of the aforementioned “revolution”, was their exceptionally low force mechanization and informatization rates. Thus, mobility and communication capacities, paramount in modern combat, could have proven to be Chinese Achilles’ heel.

All this considered, one could label these events as being of pivotal importance in the advance of new tenets in military doctrine. The reformulated body of doctrine is intended at modernizing Chinese forces according to the premises of the “Revolution”. The results of such policies start to bear fruit in the mid- to long-run. Thus, China, today, reaps the benefits of past decisions, took at the outset of the 1990’s and even earlier.

A tenet, however, does not replaces others, what shows great strategic vision, obstinacy, and persistence on the part of Chinese decision-makers, as evinced by Evron’s (2009) evidence. But this also constitutes a problem to analysis in that tenets are advanced by different command instances, making so that some be more important than others, what often leads to confusion. All in all, Chinese decision-makers continually show extreme pragmatism and realism in their expectations.

Also notorious was force modernization and operating personnel improvement. Beijing made great strides in developing state-of-the-art weapons systems, e.g., the Yuan-class submarine, the SC-19, the Dongfeng-21D and the Chengdu Jian-20. However, it is important to stress that technology, armament, and equipment imports, mainly from Russia, played and continue to play a great part as the Chinese are still committed to reverse engineering as a means of technology internalization. International concern, especially American, about the recent-acquired Chinese capabilities is grounded, also, in considerations deriving from Chinese force augmentation. For Cliff et al. (2007), in the bulge of the country’s military modernization comes, too, an increase in access denial capabilities to areas adjacent to Chinese borders and to remoter areas.

The DoD (2012) made a similar analysis and went even further as to
state that even though the Chinese are already able to produce advanced weaponry with indigenous technology, their use of reverse engineering could make them dependent on technology, armaments, and equipment imports for still some time in the future.

In 2006 Kogan (2006) stated that the Chinese faced some great basic hurdles in their military modernization efforts. He specifically mentioned avionics; motors; ship-based air defense and anti-ship advanced weapons systems; electronic warfare advanced capacities; propulsion systems and sub-systems; AWACS; real-time strategic alert surveillance; reconnaissance systems; and, heavy cargo transport helicopters. This further evidences the importance of technology, armament, and equipment imports. Notwithstanding, evidence show that the Chinese are taking care of these problems at amazing speeds, even tough that country’s secrecy policy and “creative accounting” makes so that only a small amount of information escape.

Examples of this evidence were the CSBA studies, quoted by “The Economist”, in April 7, 2012. After the magazine article, CSBA reports stated that, by 2020, the Chinese would already have:

 [...] satellites and reconnaissance drones; thousands of surface-to-surface and anti-ship missiles; more than 60 stealthy conventional submarines and at least six nuclear attack submarines; stealthy manned and unmanned combat aircraft; and space and cyber warfare capabilities. In addition, the navy has to decide whether to make the (extremely expensive) transition to a force dominated by aircraft-carriers, like America (“The Dragon’s new teeth: A rare look inside the world’s biggest military expansion.” 2012. *The Economist*, April 07. Accessed October 08, 2015. http://www.economist.com/node/21552193)

Moreover, after RAND and CSBA studies quoted by The Economist (*ibid*), by 2020 the Chinese would already be able “[...] to deter American aircraft-carriers and aircraft from operating within what is known as the “first island chain”— a perimeter running from the Aleutians in the north to Taiwan, the Philippines and Borneo”.

The issue has also been receiving extensive international media coverage. Examples are articles from a multitude of media vehicles including the Spanish *El País*, the French *Le Monde*, the Germans *Spiegel Online* and *Zeit Online*. The Chinese are also covering their military activities, and Chinese official news agency is not always reliable for *Xinhua* News Agency is state-controlled. Furthermore, that many authors confront only shows in a rather crystal-clear way how important the subject is.

Strategic vision, alone, would never have accomplished so much. A
factor that cannot be left out of the analysis is the high growth rates of the Chinese economy. While it enabled substantive raises in military budgets, year in and year out, it also encouraged state investments in key-areas such as energy and industry, indispensable to the proper functioning of the Chinese war industry, as well as to the military modernization process.

It is very difficult to analyze Chinese military modernization for it is multifactorial. Beijing’s military reality has profoundly moved away from that at the outset of the 1990’s. And it is going, however, to move even farther away, it seems. Whilst one should not make long-run forecasts as to the condition of international conjuncture in, say, 35 to 40 years, I believe that it would be rather safe to state that, should the current trends continue, the Chinese armed forces are going to be one of the most powerful in the world, in not so distant a future, and a force to be reckoned with. Anyhow, it is going to be interesting to confer what course are the Chinese are going to take, as to their armed forces modernization process.

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ABSTRACT
Chinese military modernization came with doctrinal changes, improvements in armament and operating personnel, and the import of hardware. It increased China’s access denial capabilities to areas adjacent to its borders and to farther locations. High GDP growth, in the last years, has been indispensable to the process.

KEYWORDS
PRC Military Modernization; Military Doctrine; GDP Growth.

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CHINA AND VIETNAM IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: DISPUTES AND STRATEGIC QUESTIONS

Talita Pinotti¹

Introduction

Being one of the most dynamic regions in the International System (IS), both in the economic and political point of view, Asia ends up attracting global attention and also questions, that were local until then, become the focus of international interests. Among these are the territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS), which involve the Southeast Asia countries and one of the most important powers in the contemporary international system: People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Regarding the parts involved in the territorial disputes in the SCS, Vietnam and China are the only ones to claim sovereignty of the totality of the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos, engendering an overlap of demands. While China occupies the entire group of Paracel’s islands and fifteen formations of the Spratlys archipelago, Vietnam occupies some of these islands, considering them as a maritime district of the Province of Khanh Hoe (U.S Energy Information Administration 2013, 7). There is another common point in their demands: both countries legitimize its claims based on historical rights of the use and occupation of these territories in dispute. This similarity, allied with the particularities of the sino-vietnamese relation, makes the evolution of this bilateral dispute sheds some light on the understanding of the political and strategic elements involved in this debate.

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The South China Sea

The SCS is a semi-open sea and surrounded by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand, Philippines and Taiwan. The SCS has a total dimension of approximately 3,600 square kilometers and it connects to other seas through the Taiwan Strait, the Lombok Strait and the Malacca Strait, making a strategic connection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Between the main groups of islands, stands out the Paracel, in its Northwest portion, and Spratly, in the centre of the Sea, both being the focus of the most part of the territorial disputes (Beckman 2012, 3). Figure 1 below brings the representation of the Sea in question, identifying its main elements.

Figure 1 – The South China Sea

Source: The South China Sea, website.

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China and Vietnam in the South China Sea: disputes and strategic questions

The Sea on debate raises regional and global interests due to some aspects. In the first place, there is significant speculation about the exploration potential of natural resources, in particular hydrocarbons, in the region. Notwithstanding, there’s still no consensus on the dimension, or even on the existence, of such resources, the projections are uncertain and divergent. The U.S Energy Information Administration (EIA), for example, estimates that there are reserves of about 11 billion of oil barrels and about 190 trillion of cubic meters of gas in the region (U.S Energy Information Administration 2013, 2). For its turn, the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), suggested, in 2012, the existence of reserves of about 125 billion of oil barrels and 500 trillion of cubic meters of natural gas in SCS (U.S Energy Information Administration 2013, 2). Spratly and Paracel archipelagos would be less attractive: the first one would have little or no oil reserves, but it could hold significant gas depositories due to its geological characteristics. The second one, in turn, would not show relevant reserves, and presented discouraging geological studies results (U.S Energy Information Administration, 4).

In second place, the Sea on debate is one of the maritime routes with more circulation in the world: it’s estimated that more than a half of the oil and mercantile fleet of the world go through the SCS every year. This occurs due to its geographic position: the area is not only the shorter route starting from the Middle East and Africa, important oil and natural resources suppliers, towards Asia, but also it gives access to Southeast Asia, that gathers the main manufactured goods exporters of the world economy (Rosenberg 2011, 7-8).

The SCS attracts, thus, the interests of different countries, not only Asian ones, but also from others parts of the world, motivated by the strategic importance of the region. It’s worth to notice that the contraposition of regional and international interests is reflected in the application and elaboration of agreements and treaties about the use of the area. Among them, two examples about the Law of the Sea stand out, an international and a regional one: the UNCLOS3 (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and the Declaration on the Conduct Parties in the South China Sea (COC), elaborated together by Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China.

The UNCLOS defines zones that delimit and clarify the extension of the sovereignty of coastal states over its seas and adjacents oceans, allowing the regulation of the economic exploration of the costal states. They are three,
the zones established by the UNCLOS from a common point, the baseline. They are determined by the line, along the coast, where the sea level is the lower before the mainland. The first zone from the baseline is the Territorial Waters, which extend up to 12 nautical miles (about 22 km) and above where the Costal State exercises full sovereignty over the sea, land and subsoil, besides having duties of police and of sailing regulation, allowing only the harmless passage of commercial ships and/or warships (Accioly, Casella, Silva 2009, 568).

In the case of the countries whose coasts are opposite or adjacent to others States, the extension of the Territorial Sea besides the medium point between the baselines of both is prohibited. This decision is not applicable only when there is a specific historical determinat (e.g: the historic use of the area) or other special circumstance. This point is extremely important in the SCS case: the sea not only fits in the opposite or adjacent classification, but also, in the perspective of the demanding countries, it brings historical elementes that justify adaptations.

The second zone established by the UNCLOS is the Contiguous Zone which can reach up to 24 nautical miles (including the 12 miles of the Territorial Sea). In this area, the country can exercise all the necessary preventive measures to ensure its security, before ships, commercial or warships, reach the Territorial Sea, as customs and phytosanitary control (Accioly, Casella, Silva 2009, 574). The third delimitation is the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), an adjacent area of the Territorial Sea, that includes the Contiguous Zone, reaching up to 200 nautical miles (about 370 km) from the baseline. Each country has its own EEZ sovereign rights with regard to exploration, preservation and administration of the natural resources, whether living or non-living, existing in the water, ground and underground of the EEZ (Organização das Nações Unidas 1982, 45).

Besides the zones, two concepts defined by the UNCLOS deserve to be pointed: Continental Shelf and islands. The Continental Shelf is a natural extension of the continent that extends to some point of the sea or, when not geographically determined, to 200 nautical miles, following the EEZ references. The Shelf refers to the ground and underground that allowed the economic exploration of these areas. Upon the continental shelf the Costal State has the sovereign right of exploration and apropriation of the existing resources.

The concept of “island” refers to “(...) a natural land formation, surrounded by water, that stays uncoverd in the beach-sea” (Organização das Nações Unidas 1982). Islands capable of bearing human habitation also have right to the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the EEZ and the Continen-
tal Shelf (Organização das Nações Unidas 1982). Such definition of island becomes central on the debate about SCS: of 150 rocky formations that compound the Spratly range, only 40 come near of the island classification established by the UNCLOS. Thereby, the most part of the rocks, islets and reefs that form the Spratlys does not have the EEZ and the Continental Shelf: the sovereignty on this island, so, does not ensure, necessarily, the possession of its natural resources (Beckman 2012, 3).

Finally, the UNCLOS also created the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), whose goal is to facilitate the implementation of the convention with regard to the delimitation of the signatories States’s Continental Shelf. Its function is to analyze the datas submitted by the coastal states, allowing the identification of the Continental Shelf dimensions (Organização das Nações Unidas 1982). It is worth mentioning that the CLCS only analyzes the presented information, not having, so, the power to decide controversies between two or more States.

The UNCLOS is the main reference about Law of Sea, getting to influence even the non-signatory States. On the SCS issue, great part of the territorial claims made by the countries involved in the dispute use as reference the elements established by the UNCLOS and its consequential sovereignty rights: therewith, the pleas guarantee more international legitimacy. Vietnam and China, for example, incorporate the UNCLOS classification in its pleas, but also use other arguments, as the historical right, to legitimate its demands (U.S Energy Information Administration 2013, 10).

The second example highlighted concerns a regional effort of regulation: the COC, elaborated by ASEAN and China. The COC’s negotiation process began, in reality, in order to elaborate a binding legal document: the Code of Conduct in the SCS. The initiative was launched in 1999, after a series of incidents involving countries of the region, members and no-members of ASEAN. Identifying the potential for regional destabilization, the Association proposed the formulation of a document capable of regulating the activities in the SCS, avoiding conflicts and the escalation of tensions (Thao 2003, 279-280).

The negotiations were marked by disagreements on the content of the document and reflected the disputes and the national pleas regarding sovereignty rights. Among the main difficulties were: (a) to determine the scope of the enforcement of the Code, if for the entire SCS or only for the areas in dispute; (b) to restrict or not the use of occupied places and in dispute; (c) to allow military activities next to the Spratly aggregation, and (d) to liberate fishing in the areas in dispute (Thayer 2013, 76-77). The lack of progress in the negotiations and the need of a consensus that would legitimate the doc-
ument, lead China and ASEAN members to sign, in 2002, the COC, a not binding political document which expressed the commitment of both parts on keeping a positive effort to ensure regional stability (Thayer 2013, 77).

The document stressed yet the principles agreed in the UNCLOS, in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that guide ASEAN (Thayer 2013, 280). It is interesting to note the blend between elements consecrated on the region dynamics, as the mutual trust and the pacifism, and international regulatories elements, as is the UNCLOS case, which serve as a pilar for most part of the territorial demands of the ASEAN countries acting, thus, as its legitimating base.

Even if the COC didn’t match the initial goal of a binding Code, it was seen as a progress for the maintenance of regional peace and security, providing the references for futures discussions regarding the rights of exploitation and sovereignty over the SCS. Moreover, the main points that should compose a Code of Conduct were contained in the Declaration: (a) no use of force; (b) self-restraint; (c) pacific resolution of conflicts; (d) strengthening of the mutual trust; (e) cooperation and (f) respect for the freedom of navigation (Thao 2003, 281). Even so, the text gaps, as the inaccuracy about the scope of the Declaration and the ambiguity, made it urgent, in the ASEAN vision, the elaboration of the Code (Thayer 2013, 79).

However, some obstacles hamper negotiations, such as the extension of the Chinese participation on the formulation of an ASEAN document, the period needed for the maturation period of proposals, the possibility of foreign interference and the need of consensus (Thayer 2013, 81-82). Thus, negotiations remain open and evolve taking slow steps, despite external pressure especially from the United States (USA) and Japan, and internal, as from Vietnam. The negotiating process of the COC as well as the Code, reflect the typical regional reality: for the Southeast Asia countries it’s clear the idea that the relations between China and ASEAN are the basis for Asian stability, then, coexistence, pacific whenever possible, respecting the role of each actor involved is central for the understanding of the Asian perspective about the

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4 The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia was signed in 1976 and had as goal to reinforce the historical tie that got the countries of the region united. The signatories would be committed to cooperate in different areas, as policy, economy and social, so to ensure the stability necessary to the progress of the Southeast Asia region (Associação das Nações do Sudoeste Asiático 1976).

5 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are: (a) mutual respect for sovereignty and regional integrity; (b) non-aggression; (c) equality and mutual benefit, (d) non-interference on domestic questions, and (e) peaceful coexistence.
The demands of China and Vietnam: origins and legitimacy

Chinese demands use as their main argument the idea that the PRC has an historical right\(^6\) over the SCS. For this purpose, China refers to official documents of several dynasties that already mentioned the SCS relevance for the country. Records from Western Han dynasty (206 BC – 9 AC), for example, point that the routes that connected the Southeast Asia countries, and passed through the Strait of Malacca, were already used and served as facilitators for regional trade. Historical records of the Yuan dynasty (1271 BC – 1388 AC) show a high degree of development and of patrol capacity of the Chinese navy, concentrated on the maritime routes (Shen 2002, 120-123).

The cartographic technicals precariousness of this period hindered the standardization of the localizations and the names of islands, corals and reefs existing on SCS. Although a more recent map, elaborated in 1402 during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), identify three locations that, according to the geographic coordinates, would correspond to the Spratly and Paracel islands: since that period, Chinese officials maps put such places as being part of the Chinese territory, even if the names were different from the current ones (Shen 2002, 126-128). The Qianli Changsha (actual Xisha or Parcel) and Wanli Shitang (actual Nansha or Spratly) islands, therefore, were already under the jurisdiction of the City hall of Qiong, that currently correspond to the Province of Hainan (Shen 2002, 132). From this perspective, China would be the first State to map, study and make use of the SCS. Such condition would not have been internationally expressed and officialized long before only due to the inexistence of contestation of the Chinese presence and sovereignty in the region (Shen 2002, 140).

The first formalisation of the Chinese claims happened yet in 1887 with the Convention regarding the Delimitation of the Border between China and Tonkin, which determined the jurisdiction of each portion of the SCS (Furtado 1999, 388-389). At that time, European and Japanese expansionism to Southeast Asia made Chinese predominance over the SCS uncertain and open to challenge. In 1933, French troops invaded and occupied nine islands of the Spratlys archipelago, and, in 1939, during the Second Word War, Japa-

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6 Such premise is based on intertemporal right, whose use is extensive in China. From this perspective, the questions are judged based on the analysis of the historical process and in its comparison with the contemporary laws: thereby, the laws in force in the moment of emergence of the disputes would have prevalence over the current ones (Jacques 2009, 294).
nese troops invaded some of the main islands of the SCS (Shen 2002, 136).

With the end of Second World War, the sovereignty question over the SCS islands got worse: with the eviction of the territories by Japan and European powers, there were room for countries, till then occupied, to also present its claims over the SCS. At the time, the Chinese government was worried about the agreements that allowed the resumption of the territories occupied by foreign powers: the Declaration of Cairo and the Proclamation of Potsdam determined that the occupied territories during the war should be returned to its original owners, including the occupied territories in the SCS (Shen 2002, 137).

Thereby, in 1951, in the period of elaboration of the Treaty of San Francisco, Zhou Enlai, then PRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that the Chinese Sovereignty over Spratlys and Paracels was inviolable and that, although the territories had been occupied by Japan during the Second War, China succeeded in recovering them, reaffirming its sovereignty (Furtado 1999, 389-390). Between the years 1960 and 1970, however, due to internal questions, the debate regarding the sovereignty over the SCS stayed on the background (Jian 2013, 20).

From the Vietnamese side, its sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel islands also has historical foundation. In the *White Paper* about the *Hoang Sa* (Paracel) and *Truong Sa* (Spratly) islands published by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1975 an historic is presented that would be able to prove its sovereignty over the archipelagos in debate. By the given description, maps elaborated between the years 1630 and 1653 would already bring indications of the existence of such islands, that would be part of the Vietnamese territory: such documents brought references to the characteristics of the islands known currently as Paracel (República Socialista do Vietnã 1975, 5-6). The formalization of the Vietnamese possessions over the Paracel territories would have occurred in 1816 and, since then, the government of Vietnam was responsible for several administrative activities and for the patrol of the islands and adjacent waters (República Socialista do Vietnã 1975, 14-16). In the Spratlys case, the Vietnam government would not have implemented a systematic policy of administration and jurisdiction, but a map published in 1838 by local explorers would make reference to the Spratlys, under the name *Van Ly Truong Sa*, as part of the Vietnamese territory (República Socialista do Vietnã 1975, 28).

It is worth noting that the period of French occupation, contrary to what could have been imagined, had not broken Vietnamese sovereignty over the archipelagos: in Vietnam speech, France only gave continuity to the administration held until then by the Nguyen dynasty. In the Spratly case, the
french invasion in 1933, reported by China as an agression to Chinese territory, would be, in the Vietnamese view, the legal possession of the islands under the administration of the French protectorate (República Socialista do Vietnã 1975, 26). In relation to Paracel, the French government would have given continuity to the administrative activities “on behalf of Vietnam”, having its domain over the archipelago interrupted briefly from 1941 onwards, due to the Japanese invasion. The end of Second World War, however, forced Japan to return the territories to its original owners.

It should be noted that in the Vietnamese White Paper the mention to the Declaration of Cairo and to the Proclamation of Potsdam presented a Chinese dynasty’s interpretation. In the Vietnamese view, since the right of possession of Vietnam was not denied, it allows the transference of sovereignty from France to Vietnam to be seen as a legacy from the colonial period (República Socialista do Vietnã 1975, 32).

In 1951, during the 7ª Plenary Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Tran Van Huu, then Vietnam’s Prime Minister, made a pronouncement reaffirming Vietnamese sovereignty over such islands (Furtado 1999, 391). Such declaration had the function to assure an already existing right and, so, would have an effect even over countries not represented in the Conference7, what would annul any contestation to the fact (República Socialista do Vietnã 1975, 37). In the period after, marked by the Civil War between North Vietnam and South Vietnam, the territorial claims stayed on the background.

In 1974, in a supposed response to the constant violations of the Chinese territory of Paracel and of the attack to fishermen and to Chinese military ships from the part of Vietnamese vessels, Chinese soldiers occupied the main islands of the archipelago retaking the territory from the foreign domain (Shen 2002, 147). In Vietnam, the event was described as a brutal invasion to the archipelago by the Chinese troops: unprepared for the conflict and undermined by the Civil War, Vietnamese troops would have had little responsiveness, losing the totality of Paracel for China (República Socialista do Vietnã 1975, 42).

In the 1980s, the emphasis given by Vietnam on the economic reform, Doi Mou, redefined the priority assigned to territorial demands: the need of a stable regional environment which allowed to focus on economic development was essential, by making Vietnamese external politics seek to improve its relations with its neighbors (Hai 2013, 27). On the Chinese side, the 1980s were marked by the concern with the reassurance of its presence

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7 At the time, the government that represented China in the United Nations was the Republic of China and not PRC, with whom the disputes about the islands in question are more intense. The PRC only would take the seat designated to China in 1971.
In 1988, a new tension happened between Chinese and Vietnamese troops, this time in the Spratlys region (Crisis Group 2012 a, 3). According to the Chinese report, the clash occurred because, in one of its patrol exercises in the Spratlys region, Chinese navy ships would have been attacked by Vietnamese ships, being forced to hit back in defense. As a result, the Chinese government would have felt the need to reinforce its presence in the occupied islands of the archipelago (Shen 2002, 149). Since then, China controls part of the Spratlys islands.

Since the 1990s both governments will be concerned about the adequacy of their claims to the international norm. In 1992, for example, the Communist Party of China (CPC) approved the Law about the People’s Republic of China’s Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which defines the Chinese sovereignty on the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, in addition to reserve to China the right of the use of force in case of disrespect of its sovereign rights (Thao 2000, 105).

The ratification of UNCLOS by both countries, not coincidentally, took place in this period: Hanoi ratified the Convention in 1994, while Beijing did it in 1996. It was also in the 1990s that the idea of peaceful resolution of the disputes gains prominence within ASEAN: in 1994, during the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting, China committed itself to solve the disputes with Vietnam in relation to the Spratlys through peaceful negotiations (Thao 2000, 108). In 1995, Vietnam became an official member of ASEAN, and was able to make use of the Association as a broker in the negotiations with China (Kaplan 2014, 53). Years later, in 1999, the Vietnamese and Chinese General Secretaries of the Communist Parties, Kha Phieu and Jiang Zemin respectively, published a joint statement that valued the reinforcement of the mutual trust and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Thao 2000, 111-112). In the same year, the proposal to create a Code of Conduct between the ASEAN members and China is officially released (Thao 2000, 114).

In the beginning of the 2000, the efforts to cooperate resulted in one of the only initiatives well succeeded of the joint administration of the SCS resources that involved, precisely, China and Vietnam. The agreements in question make reference to the Gulf of Tonkin, or Beibu, that borders both countries and is the meeting point of its related EEZs. The agreements, signed in 2000, entered into force in 2004 and shall be effective for fifteen years. The documents define rules for fishing, for the access to the EEZ of the counterpart and for the joint administration of the goods of the Gulf (Rosenberg 2011, 120). Although restrict to only one area of the SCS, the document is seen as an example of the provision of the parts to cooperate, prioritizing the joint
development of resources (Kaplan 2014, 42). Two years later, in 2002, the signature of COC between China and ASEAN represented an important advance in the negotiations about the topic, favouring mutual trust (Thao 2003, 281).

Nevertheless, in 2009, Vietnam surprised the Chinese government by submitting to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) two requests of extension of its Continental Shelf to beyond the 200 nautical miles. One of them, together with Malasia, made reference to the south portion of the SCS; the other one, individual, proposed to advance the Vietnamese Continental Shelf, closer to the Spratly archipelago, reaching the limit of 350 nautical miles (Crisis Group 2012a, 3). In the document, Vietnam defended the legitimacy of its plea according to the UNCLOS provisions about the Continental Shelf and asserted that the area under discussion had not been claimed by previous presented demands until then. So, the Vietnamese government plea involved sovereignty, the sovereign rights and the national jurisdiction over the seas and the continental shelf of the Spratlys and Paracels (Malásia, República Socialista do Vietnã 2009, 2).

In response, China sent a verbal note to CLCS contesting both of the submissions, the joint as well as the Vietnamese with the following text:

China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached map). (República Popular da China 2009, 1)

The text went on stating that the joint submission violates the sovereign rights and the Chinese jurisdiction in the region on debate and, therefore, requested to CLCS that disregard the request. The SCS map\(^8\) attached (Figure 2) showed nine lines in the shape of "U" that, together, formed a belt drawn from the Chinese territory which included the Paracel and Spratlys archipelagos (República Popular da China 2009, 1-2). This was the first official mention to the pointed map in a context of debate about the SCS. However, the figure by itself doesn’t clarify the Chinese position regarding the delimited area: even the verbal note didn’t offer subsidies that allowed the identification of the Chinese demands.

The verbal note, added to the nine lines map, points four elements,

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\(^8\) This map was drafted in 1946 by the Republic of China (RC) government as an attempt map the region defined as the RC’s "historic waters". Since 1949, the new communist government of the PRC made use of this map only altering the number of lines: from eleven to nine, but maintaining de delimited area. The nine lines map, as it became to be known, includes the whole of the SCS, without limiting itself to the special economic zones. (Rosenberg 2011, 11)
without offering further information: (a) the Chinese sovereignty extends to the SCS islands and to the adjacent waters, without defining such concept; (b) the sovereignty includes the maritime bottom and subsoil; (c) the rights there presented have historical foundation, and (d) the nine lines map serve as reference to the Chinese claim, even if not defining its content (Nien-Tsu 2010, 204-205).

Such inaccuracies unleashed new speculations about the Chinese claims (Nien-Tsu 2010, 204). Among some of the raised interpretations were the most radicals views, such as the Vietnamese, that understood that the nine lines map preached Chinese sovereignty over the entire area inside the lines, as well as more moderate views, as the Singapore one, which highlighted the inconsistency with the international laws made absurd the idea that the entire area inside the nine lines was pleaded by China (Crisis Group 2012a, 3). On the Chinese side there was no effort to clarify: however, statements in international forums seemed to indicate that the country didn’t claim for sovereign rights over the entire area delimited by the line, but over the island that it surrounds. In 2012, for example, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hong Lei, differentiates disputes regarding the sovereignty over the SCS reefs and islands from disputes with regard to maritime delimitation (Crisis Group 2012b, 3).

Since then, the region became more sensitive with regard to topics about territorial disputes in SCS. In 2010, as president of the ARF meeting, Vietnam included the SCS on the agenda’s event, warning to the urgency of a legal administration mechanism of the disputes. Therefore, several countries present, not only the Asian ones, treated the topic in its official speeches: until then the subject was debated exclusively in Asian forums (Crisis Group 2012a, 7).

The subject reappeared in the next year, in 2011, during the East Asia Summit (EAS). In the occasion, the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao defended the inadequacy of the forum for the discussion of the topic. Even so, he reaffirmed China’s posture of collaboration with ASEAN neighbors, which set, through the COC, the negotiation of a Code of Conduct. The premier reinforced the importance of mutual trust and cooperation to ensure the regional stability (“Premier…” 2011, 1). Wen made clear with such declaration that the attempt to press the country through the involvement of other parts in the negotiation, would not lead to a solution of disputes.
In the same year, Chinese maritime patrol ships approached the Vietnamese seismic survey ship, Binh Minh 02, during an operation supposedly inside the Vietnamese EEZ and cut one of its cables of seismic monitoring. The episode had great repercussion in Vietnam, with public protests against China organized by the national elite in the main cities of the country. The domestic pressure stimulated a more assertive answer from the Vietnamese Prime Minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, whose declaration reaffirmed the determination of the Party, the population and the army of protection of the Vietnam’s rights on the region (Thayer 2011, 86-88).

In the following weeks several military exercises were carried out in Vietnamese waters, fostering the wave of nationalist demonstrations, which lasted around twelve weeks, mobilizing a great part of the Vietnamese society (Thayer 2011, 89). To avoid the escalation of tensions, Vietnam and China leaders met and published through a joint announcement that ensure the mutual disposition in solving the question by peaceful negotiations, aimed at peacekeeping and regional stability. The announcement also mentioned public demonstrations about the topic and the need that they were guided by governments: the Communist Parties should avoid that popular demonstrations prejudice the bilateral relation (Thayer 2011, 90).

Therefore, Beijing decided that it needed to review its posture with
regard to the SCS, expanding the legal backing of its sovereign rights. There-
by, it released in 2011, the 12º Chinese Five-Year Plan for Oceanic Develop-
ment, which reaffirmed the need to reinforce the legal structure related to
Chinese demands in the SCS and defined measures to protect and preserve
the existing maritime resources, including natural resources (Jian 2013, 23).
In the next year, the country announced the creation of a new city, Sansha,
under the jurisdiction of the Province of Hainan, whose objective would be
the administration of the Paracels and Spratlys archipelagos (Jian 2013, 23).
The creation of the city had been already authorized in 2007, but Vietnamese
protests suspended its establishment (Crisis Group 2012b, 23).

Still in 2012, and in great part as a response to Chinese practices, the
Vietnam National Assembly published a Vietnamese law about the Law of
the Sea. In general, the document presented devices which determine that in
the case of a conflict between national and international norms of maritime
rights, the second one should prevail over the first: the initiative represents
the effort to adequate Vietnamese laws regarding the UNCLOS (Hai 2013,
29).  

Besides the adequacy to the International Law, another strategy em-
ployed in the the SCS dispute, for countries like Vietnam, is the internation-
alization of the debate: this increases the geopolitical costs of a more assert-
ive action, or even coercive, by China in the resolution of maritime disputes.
Between the countries that direct or indirectly end up involved on the SCS
question the USA stands out, whose interests go beyond the questions related
to trade and the exploration of natural resources.

The American involvement in the SCS question is also justified by
the reorganization of the priorities of the American foreign policy. When
Barack Obama came into Presidential power in 2009, he defined as one of
hos goals the revival of the the alliance with Asia and the reassurance of Amer-
ican leadership in the region (Obama 2009). In 2010, in ARF, Hilary Clinton,
then Secretary of State, classified the SCS question as an American “national
interest” and listed the principles that guided USA posture: in the first place,
the freedom of navigation, that can be translated in free access for American
ships, in particular of the contingente of the Seventh Fleet, to the region,

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9 In the response letter to the Chinese verbal note, in 2009, Vietnam signals that its proposal
were in accordance with the UNCLOS provisions, while the Chinese contestation based on the
nine lines map had no legal foundation. Hai (2013) affirms that such change occurs due to a
modification in the strategic perception: while the plea with historical bases would legitimize
China’s own claim, the use of legal arguments for the territorial contestation, not only would
suit to the existing international norm, but it would also require the Chinese counterpart to
review its own plea (Hai 2013, 28).
taking into account the norms of international right. In the second place, the freedom of maritime trade routes that passes by the SCS and guarantee the access to important consumers and exporters at Southeast Asia. In the third place, the adequacy of maritime claims to the UNCLOS principles, that requires a clarification of the Chinese plea based on the nine lines map10 (Bader, Lieberthal, McDevitt 2014, 6-7).

In the fourth place, the appreciation of the sovereignty-territory relation, which assigned legitimacy only to the claims based on the extension of the Continental Shelf inside the limit set by the UNCLOS, invalidating the Chinese map. Finally, the emphasis in the negotiated resolution of the dispute, that intends to avoid the coercion and the expansion of the tensions that could harm American interests or, even, drag the USA to an unwanted conflict (Bader, Lieberthal, McDevitt 2014, 7). Such points reveals the ambiguity of the American position that, at the same time that is concerned in reaffirming its space in Asia, seems unwillingly to get involved in an extra-regional conflict, or, even, to compromisse its relation with China (Bader, Lieberthal, McDevitt 2014, 2-4).

For China, an increase in American presence can threaten the already unstable regional balance of forces, also undermining the efforts of decades of harmonization of its relations with the neighbors. For Vietnam, a greater American leadership represents greater security at the same time that it also may represent the choice between China and USA that must be avoided by all means for the guarantee of its own national interestes.

The SCS and the National Interests

Chinese national interest is based on a set of variables from different origins. In foreign policy, the SCS question challenges at the same time the international and regional Chinese strategy. By signing and ratifying the UNCLOS as an effort of reinforce its image of a “responsible power”, the country restricted its possibility of completely denying the Convention. Since recognizing the strategic relevance of UNCLOS for Chinese foreign policy, the country has been developing a set of domestic legal instruments that suit to the Convention (Jian 2013, 20). Even a major Chinese “assertiveness” in the region may be interpreted in this sense: the international law tends to prioritize the effective and continuous occupation over the historical rights

10 Such identification worries the USA, because the case referred to the sovereign rights over the existing resources in the region, it can prejudice American companies that exercise fishing activities or the exploration of the region’s resources.
in the analysis of territorial disputes. Then, a greater Chinese activism with regard to the Spratlys and Paracels archipelagos and to the exploration of natural resources, would have the intention to reinforce the Chinese presence as a “responsible power” for the areas in dispute (Jian 2013, 22). Allied to this would be the fact that, due to the Chinese economic growth, the country acquired capacity to effectively monitor its region. The percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) destined to defence is low, but it translates in large investments for the sake of the size of Chinese economy. The result is the modernization of the navy, the expansion of patrol capacity and, consequently, the multiplication of incidents (Jian 2013, 21; Yahuda 2012, 32).

On regional policy, the SCS is, on the one hand, an opportunity for the Chinese government to prove to the neighbors that it’s capable of getting involved in a constructive way in the region, representing a source of support and alliance essential for Southeast Asia stability. On the other hand, when the overlap of demands contributes to the expansion of historical tensions and the internationalization of the topic, raises an extreme disapproval of China, the country is faced by a deadlock since it needs to avoid a posture that would risk all the progress obtained with the good neighbor policy practiced since the 1990 (Yahuda 2012, 32-34).

Also in the regional spectrum, there is the nationalism that, in China’s case, is confused with a high self-confidence, motivated by the socioeconomic advancement of the last decades. China would be retaking the glorious path of the “Middle Empire”, leaving behind the period of subjugation to the West and Japan: so, it may retake rights that were denied until then (Yahuda 2012, 34). It helps to explain, for example, the difficulty to accept the UNCLOS dispute resolution mechanisms for the SCS question: accept Western solutions for regional problems may be seen by the population as a weakness of the CCP (Crisis Group 2012a, 4-5).

The SCS also raises more practical interests: a greater integration of the Chinese economy to global and regional economies expanded the need to ensure the maintenance and stability of trade routes that passes by SCS. It is estimated, for example, that one third of the Chinese oil imports reach the country by the SCS that, as already pointed, connects the Pacific and Indian oceans, besides being the most direct connection with the Middle East (Yahuda 2012, 32). Before the increasing Chinese energy dependence, such trade route becomes strategic. Finally, the SCS represents a “natural shield” for the access to China’s territory: the coastal region of Guangxi and Guandong is one of the richest, most populous and most developed of China, besides it connects essential regions for the Chinese national integration strategy: Hong Kong and Taiwan (Kaplan 2014, 41).
The Vietnamese interest on the SCS is also motivated by several elements. In Vietnam’s case, the SCS exercises a particular role: of favoring the national unity. The separation history between North and South of the country, allied to a particular geographic distribution, makes Vietnam present a wide polarization between the two extremes of its territory. The concentration of demographic and economic activities in Hanoi (north) and Ho Chi Minh (South) creates a detachment between the areas that goes beyond the geographic issue. Therefore, the wide coast of 3,444 km is the link between the two most dynamic regions of Vietnam, it’s the element that keeps the national cohesion and unity (Hai 2013, 27).

Despite the its extensive coast, Vietnam has no historic of intense maritime explorations: the country has a limited naval capability that, combined with the narrowing of the central part of the territory, strengthens the perception of its maritime vulnerability (Hai 2013, 27). To reduce its fragility, Vietnam has made efforts in the sense of modernizing its navy and expanding defense ties with ASEAN and foreign powers, as already mentioned in the USA’s case (Crisis Group 2012b, 4).

As well as China, the Vietnamese nationalist sentiment is an explanatory part of the subject. National identity is marked by the historic of resistance against various foreign powers that had invaded the country: China, France, Japan and USA. In this scenario, nationalism is still influencing the political decisions of the country, especially those that involve former aggressors, such as China. In the SCS case, for example, to give up of the claims in favor Chinese predominance, would represent an outrage to the Vietnamese identity of resistance and defence of territorial integrity, raising historical resentments (Crisis Group 2012b, 4).

The distrust and animosity in relation to China end up being used by the Vietnamese Comunist Party as an excuse to avoid certain commitments or to press the neighbor. The protests that spread through Vietnam, in 2011, after the episode with the seismic monitoring ship, are a great example: the manifestation was supported by the governmet as long as it represented a pressure element over China, from the moment that both sides were willing to talk, the manifestation was suppressed (Crisis Group 2012b, 20). Moreover, proof of the instrumental use of the Vietnamese nationalism is the country’s approach with the USA, which also keeps a historic of aggression: even so, the memory of the war was left in the background in favor of the current strategy.

Moreover, the territorial disputes introduced an opportunity to ensure to the country its autonomy in relation to China. In the SCS, even if all countries present a different regional and international projection, they are equally a relevant part of the territorial dispute. When the smaller neighbors of South-
east Asia, placed ASEAN as an intermediate in the negotiations, they gained weight in the disputes and in the Chinese strategic calculus. The inclusion of the topic on the ARF’s 2010 agenda is one of the main examples of such strategy (Crisis Group 2012a, 6).

The SCS stills gain prominence on the Vietnamese economic strategy. Today’s Vietnam is a country focused on exports and, due to its already mentioned geographic characteristics, concentrated on maritime trade: thus, the guarantee of freedom of navigation and of the trade routes that passes by the SCS is essential (Hai 2013, 8). Besides, fishing activity is important for the exports as well as for Vietnam’s domestic market. Then, the peaceful resolution of disputes and the exploration of resources as in the Gulf of Tonkin’s case, are essential for the country (Crisis Group 2012b, 16).

Final Considerations

This brief analysis revealed, therefore, that the SCS question involves a variety of conditions that characterize the complexity of the topic. The search for the sovereignty of the archipelagos without potential for habitation or economic exploration hides, actually, much more subjective and revealing components of the regional dynamics and challenges. These disputes are a reflection of the race for strategic positions, strongly influenced by regional nationalism.

We saw that even the internationalization of the debate about the SCS is far from representing the answer for the solution of disputes, it brings new nuances to the already complicated regional context. Combining historical questions, regional stability and the presence of foreign actors, the SCS question challenges the very basis of Chinese regional actions.

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China and Vietnam in the South China Sea: disputes and strategic questions


ABSTRACT
The dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea involves strategic interests that are mixed with cultural and historical heritages fundamental to the understanding of their respective positions. Ensure the sovereignty over the islands, for these countries, also means to ensure important economic and geopolitical interests in Asia.

KEYWORDS
China; Vietnam; South China Sea.

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ORGANIZATION THEORY AND COMPLEX PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: NOTES FROM THE MINUSTAH

João Marcelo Dalla Costa

Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, the UN developed the so-called complex peace operations and became increasingly involved in peacebuilding, working alongside with other intergovernmental, governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Complex peace operations (or complex peacekeeping as known in the Brahimi Report), includes the traditional peacekeeping tasks of interposition and observation, the new functions of elections monitoring, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), protecting humanitarian relief workers, and transitional administration (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004). Due to the great variety and interdependence of actors involved in this kind of mission (military, agencies, NGO’s, etc.), the complex peacekeeping offers an opportunity to access how far Organization Theory is able to shed light on the interorganizational coordination in such operations.

The concept of peacebuilding was discussed by Boutros-Ghali in the 1992 Agenda for Peace, and was further debated in the 2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (most known as the Brahimi Report). The Brahimi Report linked the functions of peacebuilding and peace enforcement to the definition of complex peacekeeping. In this sense, the Brahimi Report defines peacebuilding as: “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war” (Brahimi 2000, 3). On the other hand, Roland Paris suggests a more comprehensive ac-

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2 See also Paris 2004.

academic definition based in the premises laid in the Brahimi Report but more useful to analyse and understand complex peacekeeping: “actions undertaken at the end of a civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of fighting. A peacebuilding mission involves the deployment of military and civilian personnel from several international agencies, with a mandate to conduct peacebuilding in a country that is just emerging from civil war” (Paris 2004, 38). Paris’ definition observes that peacebuilding is a post-conflict activity, and most importantly, it involves the participation of a range of different actors, therefore recognizing the need for coordination as part of the mission (Paris 1997). In this sense, as much as interorganizational coordination can be seen as a prerequisite to the operation’s success, also persistent coordination failures, especially through competition between the different actors in the field, can lead to the collapse of complex peace operations as a whole, and have impacts on future operations (Cooley and Ron 2002). As mentioned in the 2005 Report on Integrated Missions: “(...) the multi-dimensional nature of such an enterprise [post-conflict peacebuilding], thus, demands effective coordination measures”. (Eidel et al. 2005)

The UN makes use of a notable number of coordination mechanisms for its peace operations. Those can comprise the use of Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSG’s), personalities, definition of departments in the UN that stay responsible for the coordination measures (lead departments), deployment and support, the Strategic Framework initiative, Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), Humanitarian Operations Centres (HOCs), and Civ-Mil Operation Centres (CMOCs/CIMIC). Individual States also contribute to coordination with the development of a group of friends of the peace process, Contact Groups, etc. Nevertheless, the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund also contribute to enhance cooperation in peacebuilding (Jones 2002).

Interorganizational coordination is a serious pitfall especially in complex peace operations that involve several actors with different organizational cultures. The UN has developed many mechanisms and techniques to deal with the coordination flaws in complex peacekeeping. The issues of interorganizational cooperation are central to the Organizational Theory, and many branches of Organizational Theory can offer insights and shed light on those pitfalls and flaws. In this sense, the theory suggests that coordination can occur through transmission of common standards in organizational fields (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Studies based on transaction costs and relational contracting present insights on the circumstances under which coordination using hierarchical structures and instruments are adopted and work well (Weber 2000). On the other hand, principal-agency theory argues that agen-
cy control problems can discourage coordination in hierarchical structures (Hawkins et al. 2006). Coordination without hierarchy is also analysed by social network theory (Kadushin 2012). Most studies of peacebuilding in International Relations tend to focus on the relationships between States and Intergovernmental Organizations. They tend to analyse such missions exclusively as a principal-agent problem. They explain coordination problems as caused by a failure of delegation and accountability. This view lacks a more comprehensive understanding of the verticality of complex peacekeeping operations and the great variety of actors involved.

The recognized importance of actors others than intergovernmental organizations to the success of complex peace operations means that an exclusively focus on hierarchical coordination is not able to grasp the complexity of these new kind of relationships. Interactions between various actors such as States, militaries, armed and civilian local actors, regional organizations, international organizations and nongovernmental organizations must be taken into account if one wants to understand how interorganizational coordination works in complex peacekeeping. Organization Theory approaches both formal and informal paths of interorganizational coordination, thus is more adequate to clarify how the coordination in complex peacekeeping occurs.

This article draws from previous research carried by Michael Lipson, Roland Paris, Thomas Weiss and others. We offer a brief case study of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), explaining, with the help of Organization Theory, why the cooperation between military and NGO’s is efficient to deliver local ownership and increase legitimacy to the mission4.

Organization Theory

Among the different approaches developed by Organization Theory, we will observe in this article the transaction cost economics and network theory. We understand that these two approaches better explain both formal and informal ways of interorganizational coordination. Other Organizational Theory approaches such as resource dependence, contingency theory, organizational ecology and garbage can process can also be tested against our argument in order to achieve the best explanatory power (Fordisck 1999).

Transaction Cost Economics

4 This case study is largely based on interviews with members of the MINUSTAH, National Diplomats and NGOs representatives.
Central to the field of economic strategy, Transaction Cost Economics addresses basic questions of why companies exist and how they govern operations. In this sense, companies are created to structure and coordinate transactions in a controlled and predictable way. This hierarchical coordination works more efficiently than the market. Therefore we can argue that organizational structures emerge as a consequence of economizing on the costs of arranging and implementing contracts governing exchange. According to Lipson, this logic, employed by International Relation theorists to explain international regimes and security arrangements (Hasenclever, Meyer and Rittberger 1997; Hart 1995), can also be used to understand coordination in peacekeeping. In his words:

This would suggest the hypothesis that the structure of coordination mechanisms should reflect the relative transaction cost efficiency of alternative means of coordinating interorganizational relations in peacekeeping. *Ceteris paribus*, where transaction costs of coordination are high, we should expect more hierarchical coordinating mechanisms, such as SRSGs with strong mandates and explicit authority. (Lipson 2007, 15)

Likewise, David Lake (1999) examines the relationship between joint production economies, governance costs, and costs of opportunism; while Katja Weber (2000) observes that transaction costs interact with threat levels to determine how much hierarchy will exist in a security arrangement. Those assumptions suit the case of cooperation among States understood as rational unitary actors. However they are not broad enough to capture the different variety of actors (most of which cannot be included in the narrow category of rational actors, such as NGO’s and local actors) included in complex peacekeeping. Those missions are better understood as open systems; therefore, due to the quantity and complexity of interdependent actors involved for the success of the mission, the importance of exchange of information and coordination among themselves and with the environment is fundamental. This suggests that transaction costs approaches, however useful to observe that the degree of hierarchy is in part a function of transaction costs, must be taken prudently.

**Social Network Theory**

More fruitful to our discussion on the interorganizational coordination in the MINUSTAH, is the informal coordination through networks of actors participating in the mission. Networks are more flexible than hierarchies. The basic premise of networks is that parties in the relationship are mutually
dependent on the resources controlled by each other, thus pooling resources can lead to mutual gains (Naim 2003). In this sense, the effectiveness of coordination through networks have become salient with the economic, social and technological changes induced by innovation, higher levels of education, and the culture of cooperation and trust in sectorial industries (Alter and Hage 1993). According to Alter and Hage (1993), this new governance mechanism is to increasingly substitute both markets and hierarchies. Because networks are much more flexible than hierarchies, it suits better in situations involving increasingly amount of information, need for rapid responses, reliance on trust, reciprocity and shared understandings, thus enhancing cooperation.

According to Lipson, in complex peacekeeping, much of the interdependence and coordination occur bilaterally (when pair of nodes of a network are strongly coupled with each other) than multilaterally (when organizational nodes are tightly coupled and multiply linked). That is, most coordination occurs in situations when a NGO needs military escort, or when a civil affairs unit needs supply from local sources (Weiss 1998). In these cases, informal structures are more adequate (like the CIMIC/CMOCs), while more hierarchical, formal arrangements can be dangerous, or at least dysfunctional, especially in scenarios where principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force are unstable or inoperative, and the locals perceive one or more actors involved in the mission as part of the problem.

This is not to argue that formal structures are not important for the interorganizational coordination in peacekeeping missions, but that in cases where actors are involved in ongoing, complementary activities and in circumstances that require operational integration, or under conditions of uncertainty about how to obtain desired outcomes, informal networks are more likely to develop. These informal networks normally navigate around formal structures that are inefficient. They can develop when the formal structures present an obstacle, or even block the task to be accomplished for the success of the mission. In these cases, informal networks complement formal arrangements compensating for their weaknesses. In extreme cases, all interorganizational coordination may be carried exclusively through informal arrangements, rendering formal structures merely ceremonial (Alexander 1995). This kind of decoupling between interorganizational coordination and formal structures is useful if makes the organizations coordinate better their activities through informal arrangements while keeping the hierarchical (formal) structures intact in order to satisfy political pressures (Brunsson 1989).

Interorganizational Coordination in the MINUSTAH
In February 2004, the Haitian president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, left the country after a series of armed conflicts that started in the city of Gonaïves and threatened to spread into the capital city. In April 2004, the UN Security Council passed the resolution 1542, which established the fifth UN mission in Haiti, the MINUSTAH, to take over the Multinational Interim Force (MIF). The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti is the last of a series of UN missions in Haiti since 1993. The complexity of those interventions increased from peacekeeping to include State and nation building (Aguillar 2002). According to its mandate, the MINUSTAH is responsible for the establishment of a secure and stable environment; assist and support the political process; and monitor and report on the human rights situation (UN 2004). In this sense, the MINUSTAH can be included in the definition of complex peacekeeping presented above due to its tasks that range from restructure the Haitian National Police (HNP), run a DDR process (together with the United Nations Development Programme), foster political dialogue among political actors and assist the government to organize elections, monitor and report human rights violation working in close cooperation with the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and deliver basic humanitarian needs to the local population. Thus, the range of actors and the tasks involved in this Mission requires well functioning interorganizational cooperation. This complex peacekeeping mission takes place in a very specific environment where local elites are used to foreign interventions and take profit of it.

The United Nations’ organization chart in Haiti resembles pretty much as a ordinary peacekeeping chart: with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) as head of the mission, the Principal Deputy, the elections section, the administration section, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Humanitarian Coordinator, Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative for UNDP; the military commander and the police commissioner (Marcondes 2008). While the chart is very clear, the situation on the ground determines the pace, and how the coordination among all agencies, local actors, and other stakeholders really develop. The one size fits all approach does not work in practise and the peacekeeping operation (PKO) tend to interpret the mandate creatively according to the local specificities, finding the best path to produce bureaucratic problem-solving actions and concrete results for the success of the mission (Rocha 2009).

In an effort to understand the specificities of the local Haitian elites, Antônio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha identifies there are three fundamental principles that organize the Haitian society: short-termism, marronage and authoritarianism. These three principles combined influence economic, political and
social processes in Haiti. The first refers to the need that results of public policies must be seen immediately, because life is short (life expectancy of 52 years old) and the future is uncertain. The second principle refers to the great informality and ambiguity in social interactions; it also refers to the fact that Haitians do not trust each other and hardly make commitments outside their family circles. The third principle refers to the fact that René Préval was the first and until now the only elected president in the History of Haiti to transfer the power peacefully to another elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, in 2001; it also refers to the fact that the political game in Haiti has no clear rules and political parties are created and dissolved according to the leaders’ short-term interests and political circumstances. This recalls the idea of predatory republicanism advanced by Robert Fatton (2002), to explain that Haitians see the access to State institutions, through regulatory privileges that favour families and economic groups, as the primary, or the only mean of acquiring wealth and power.

In this environment of short-termism, where everything is perceived as precarious and transitory, the actors strive for survival generating a cycle of fear among political groups. These groups use gangs in order to try to preserve their political influence. The spiral of violence avoids any kind of agreement among political groups and, due to its past record, international intervention is seen as only a topic, transitory and superficial solution. In societies, like Haiti, where violence is seen as legitimate to solve conflicts and settle disputes, this dynamic is perpetuated, exchanging periods of tyranny and of mob rule. Local actors have experience in dealing with foreign interventions, and see them as a possibility to take personal advantage. This also follows a circular logic: political crises are created and solved to keep financial inflows for the advantage of some actors, while the issues are kept unsettled. According to Antônio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha: “As the local elite understand the timing of missions and the persons in charge of the operations, as well as their professional career interests, they manipulate time, make agreements, foster social unrest, depending on the issues on the agenda” (2009, 17). Peacekeeping missions are also scapegoats for local elites that justify the government’s inefficacy and gain support among the population, normally telling the people that the country remains under foreign occupation. The degree of legitimacy associated with the local government also reflects the tolerance with the PKO. In the absence of legitimate authorities, spoilers feed the spiral of violence and avoid any possible agreement.

The MINUSTAH operates in this complex environment, which includes also the participation of NGO’s, companies that provide different kinds of services, including security, flows of goods, persons and information, and
under strong media surveillance. Local elites charge donors and the PKO as responsible to address not only the security stabilization but also if not all, most social needs. The PKO is charged and pressured by the local elite, to build basic infrastructure, develop economic public policies, and create jobs, all designed to favour particular sectors of the economy or specific groups. The Haitian elite is experienced and skilful to affirm at the same time State sovereignty and its fragility, depending on the interest at the moment. In this sense they are able to explore the interorganizational flaws in the UN agencies to set the timing at their favour, according to the case, creating changes to justify investments but controlling the final destination of the money at their own favour. In the radio, in créole (the local language), congressmen and members of the Cabinet blame the international community for the actual situation, trying to gain leverage among population and maintaining an ambiguous and risky game. This groom image of the MINUSTAH gains force among the population, as it is asked to repress manifestations and control of social order. After more than ten years of MINUSTAH, the donors and international organizations still see the situation as volatile, while new urgencies that emerge around the globe demand resources and energy. The local population sees the presence of foreign military troops as too long (Rocha 2009).

For this reason, taking into account traditional political practices and understanding how the local society works are fundamental factors for enhancing legitimacy and increasing the chances of success of the mission. The recent experience of cooperation between different actors in the MINUSTAH shows that informal relations are the most effective way to deliver local ownership in an environment populated by a skilful elite, already used to take advantages from international interventions and the social need to see concrete outcomes of the mission in the short-term. Local ownership entails more than just organizing local elections, it represents that the key to the success of complex peacekeeping remains with domestic actors. However the Haitian case, local ownership beyond elections exposes tensions between international norms and domestic realities. The necessity of the Haitians to see the concrete results of the peacekeeping mission in their daily life represents a big challenge to its legitimacy. Nevertheless, the traditional local owners – the local political elite – are the most problematic. In this sense, one possibility to bypass the problem of corrupt local elites is to strength civil society organizations. Domestic civil society can be seen as an alternate set of agents capable of carrying out projects of local ownership, while strengthening the public confidence in the peacekeeping mission (Donais 2008). According to Beatrice Pouligny (2005): “[civil society is] often seen to carry the best hopes for a genuine democratic counterweight to the power-brokers, economic ex-
exploiters, and warlords who tend to predominate in conflict-ridden, weak, or failed States”.

Some caution is needed also not to over-dimension the importance of NGO’s to peacebuilding. In some cases empowered and activist civil society organizations can be just like the political elites that engage in factionalized politics (Pendergast and Plumb 2002). Especially in the case of Haiti where donors are faced with weak government institutions, tend to go around the government and prioritize the work with NGO’s. Nevertheless, institutional building must be the fundamental objective (International Crisis Group 2009).

However, after legitimacy crises between the departure of Aristide in 2004 and the inauguration of Préval in 2006, the MINUSTAH regained legitimacy especially due to the Préval’s election and the successful deliver of humanitarian needs coordinated effectively by MINUSTAH and NGO’s. This coordination is done using mostly informal arrangements, which answer more rapidly and effectively the needs of the Haitians, taking into account the local specificities. While the formal long term institution building is carried by UN Agencies, the local delivery of basic social needs is more effective through local and international NGO’s. In this sense, the two biggest obstacles to the success in Haiti depend also on the interorganizational capacity of the MINUSTAH to keep developing the “peacebuilding from below”5, especially carried using informal coordination among military and NGO’s; and continue to address the Haitian State’s capacity deficit through the formal means of the UN Agencies.

**CIMIC and the BRABAT**

In regard to the interorganizational capacity of the MINUSTAH it is fundamental to observe the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) especially in the Brazilian Battalion (BRABAT). The Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) defines CIMIC as: “(…) a military staff function that contributes to facilitating the interface between the military and civilian components of an integrated mission, as well as with the humanitarian and development actors in the mission area (…)” (DPKO 2010). Brazil has not only the military command of the Mission but is also the major troop contributor with 1,343

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5 “(…) peacebuilding from below seeks to combine the top-down local ownership produced by national-level elections with myriad forms of bottom-up local ownership, in which local-level actors, communities, and organizations become active participants and agents in the peacebuilding process, rather than simply passive recipients of outside interventions.” (Donais 2008, 16)
boots on the ground. The relations between the NGOs and Brazilian troops have been described as “very positive” by some NGOs which previously have been declared skeptical of cooperation with military.

Each Battalion has its own Civil Affairs Section (G9) which coordinates the CIMIC. The 6-month rotation of the G9 is a flaw in the long term vision for Mission’s interorganizational coordination. In this sense, we observe that each contingent has its own objectives established by the G9 according to the local circumstances. These objectives are in general restricted to the 6-month rotation period. Besides, the lack of qualified personnel working in the CIMIC points to a difficulty to its activity (Cerqueira 2014). One of the greatest doctrine challenges of the G9 is to present the troops with a clear cut differentiation between CIMIC and Civic-Social activities. Civic-social activities are those short-termed, temporary activities performed exclusively by the military with the objective to solve a urgent social need and win the hearts and minds of the local population. This misconception leads to the error of the military ignoring or duplicating the civilian effort. Besides the intensive training in CIMIC previous to the deployment, informal talks between the military and the civilian components involved in the CIMIC were fundamental to understand the difference between CIMIC and Civ-So Actions. It was also identified that the information included in the Area of Responsibility (AoR) were exclusively target to military and intelligence activities and did not include CIMIC. There was no single document that included CIMIC activities in the AoR in which the military could base their planning. To solve this problem, the Brazilian Army started a new Strategic Study of the Area. This document, aimed at mapping the CIMIC needs to foster coordination, was based in two other documents: the NATO’s CIMIC Field Handbook and the Doctrine Coordination Note of the Brazilian Army (N. 02/2012). Six major fields of cooperation based on the Mission’s Mandate were mapped according to the AoR: political, security, economic, social, infrastructure and informa-

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6 Figures of May 2015.
7 Interview with NGOs. Especially the Viva Rio has openly declared their positive cooperation with the brazilian military in Haiti.
8 “A set of non-permanent activities, episodic or of programmed assistance and aid to communities that promote the civic and communitarian spirit of citizens, in the country or abroad that is carried out by armed forces military organizations in the most varied levels of command. It makes use of the human, materiel and technical resources available to solve immediate and clear dangers. In addition to its nature as an aid initiative, it is also inserted as a civilian matter and collaborates in psychological operations.” (Manual de Campanha EB20-MC-10.201, Brazilian Army)
9 The pre-deployment training is carried at the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Centre (CCOPAB).
tion. The document also mapped the main NGOs, IO’s (and agencies) and single governments’ agencies acting in the AoR. In the final document it was also listed an analysis of the stakeholders; mechanisms, best practices and platforms for civil-military coordination in the MINUSTAH; and CIMIC funding possibilities.

As the Mandate’s deadline gets closer (complete withdrawal planed for December 2016) the so-called transition/hand-over phase speeds up with the execution of projects and delivering local ownership to the Haitian population. Two of these projects called our attention because they express how the informal channels of cooperation ease problems of interorganizational coordination in Haiti. The project “Honra e Respeito em Bel Air” (Honour and Respect in Bel Air) is managed by the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio. This project is funded by the governments of Norway and Canada and aims to bring drinking water and waste collection to the poorest parts of Haiti. The NGO used to often require a convoy or military support to carry its activities. According to the Viva Rio coordinators, the military support was decisive for the success of the project, especially in the beginning. Eduarda Hamann, Viva Rio’s former coordinator argued that “(...) there is a strong and permanent interaction with the brazilian battalion”. Viva Rio’s founder Rubem César Fernandes agrees with Eduarda Hamann and adds that the cooperation through informal channels and personal contacts with the military component was fundamental for the success of the project. Other project that called our attention was the partnership between the BRABAT and the Child’s Pastoral10; the project, mostly funded by the Brazilian government, consists in bringing basic medical care to the Haitian population and promotes a debate within the Haitian government on how to improve the Health System. In this project, the BRABAT helped with the relocation of a IDP camp (Internally Displaced People), offering technical courses, educational talks, and housing.

The practice of informal networking seems to foster mutual trust, enhance interorganizational coordination and speed up the delivery of local ownership to the Haitian population. The G9, realizing that these informal channels were useful, redirected the community demands to the responsible local subunits, thus creating a direct channel between the local population/NGOs and the subunits’ commander, enhancing trust. The order of priority was delegated to the subunit and the G9 became a facilitator, coordinator and advisor to the local subunits, creating a better flow of information and command and control management. The technical courses also became very decentralized, with the local subunits organizing together with the local

10 Child’s Pastoral founder Dra. Zilda Arns Neumann died in Haiti during the 2010’s earthquake.
community. The consequences of the decentralization were the increasing amount of interactions and informal channels of communications between the subunits and the local population/NGOs with the subsequent enhancement of trust of these actors in the subunit’s commander; the simplification of coordination and prioritization of activities; and the empowerment of the local community and the subunit, speeding up the pace of how the local population’s demands were addressed.

Final Remarks

A great variety of organizations take part in peacekeeping and peacebuilding Missions, including UN Agencies, NGO’s, militaries, local civil society actors, State actors, etc. We can recognize that these organizations have different and sometimes conflicting views, organizational cultures, missions, etc. Nevertheless, they are dependent, to some extent, on each other to accomplish their individual missions. Therefore, interorganizational coordination is a key element for the success of peace operations.

The organizations involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding Missions have sometimes distinctive understanding of concepts and norms. These conflicting standards include basic norms of sovereignty, democracy, human rights, local ownership, etc. Peace missions are stark dependent on conformity of the understanding of those norms for its legitimacy. Therefore, if the organizations involved in the Mission lack common understanding or conflict heavily on this normative standards, they will fail to guarantee the necessary support (legitimacy) and resources to successfully accomplish the Mission. In this institutional environment these organizations are evaluated in regard to their adherence to collective standards and norms, ability and efficiency to perform tasks, provide goods, and most of all deliver local ownership.

Based on interviews, primary and secondary literature, we argued in this article that cooperation in the MINUSTAH successfully occurs using informal channels between military and NGO’s. The NGO’s have a flexible, informal approach and are focused on short-term projects destined to strengthen local ownership. On the other hand, UN Agencies’ lack of coordination and the few projects directed to create local ownership from below are caused by the inherent UN’s interorganizational complexity and an understandable focus on developing Haitian national institutions.

Finally, it is argued that Organizational Theory offers consistent approaches to understand the complexity of interorganizational cooperation in
PKOs. The MINUSTAH presents an interesting case for informal cooperation as means to deliver short-term results and increase local ownership. This does not mean that every peacebuilding mission will be the same. However, applying Organizational Theory helps to shed light on factors that may enable or inhibit optimal interorganizational coordination among UN Agencies, the Military and NGO’s in regard to the local specificities.

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ABSTRACT
How far Organization Theory can shed light on complex peacekeeping operations, observing the explanatory power and differences among more hierarchically-based approaches and network theory? It also makes the case for further research on why and how local elites, experienced with foreign intervention, hijack international organizations to advance their own interests.

KEYWORDS
Organization Theory; MINUSTAH; Elites.
THE PLACE FOR COMBATING CORRUPTION ON THE MERCOSUR AGENDA (2003-2015)

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Leonardo Granato\textsuperscript{2}

1 Introduction

Corruptions is among many of the problems facing modern societies, affecting all countries, without distinction of geographic region, level of development or wealth, political system, or any other possible criteria. As conceived by Leal (2013, 2015) and Leal and Silva (2014), corruption is a phenomenon of complex nature and multidimensional character which has serious consequences for the country and its citizens\textsuperscript{3}, affecting governability, weakening

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\textsuperscript{3} Conceptually, it is worth mentioning that specialized literature on the issue of corruption can be considered relatively recent, within the field of social sciences. According to Avritzer and Filgueiras (2011), a first approach to this problem dates back to the 1950s, when a functionalist analysis based on the premise that the lack of political institutionalization promoted corruption and privileging has become hegemonic sustained by modernizing solutions. Since the 1980s, in the context of market liberalization and liberal state reforms, an economic approach of this phenomenon was imposed, which assumed that the political analysis of corruption must adopt the premises of the economic method, focusing itself at those political actors who seek to maximize their income at the expense of public resources. Nowadays, a political approach to corruption has emerged that promotes the understanding of this problem from the point of view of
the democratic state of law and the legitimacy of institutions, and breaking core values such as integrity, ethics and confidence in public authorities.4

In this context, it is essential to emphasize the fact that corruption, in its public state facet, emerges and is strengthened at the expense of the patrimony of the State and, therefore, of resources destined to the formulation and implementation of public policies in general and, in particular, of those aiming at meeting the basic needs of the most vulnerable sectors of society. From that derives the need to rescue the implications of corruption not only on the political economy of developing countries, but also for social policy and, transversely, to the world of political philosophy, of human values. In this order of ideas, considering that a great part of studies on corruption has been developed from the reality of the developed world, and the market paradigm, it is important to argue about the need to conduct studies that adopt a “specific, peripheral and Latin American” approach or focus on the theme, as well as case studies that allow us to critically reflect on the degree of commitment of the continent’s governments to mitigate a problem that weakens public action of the State aimed at achieving social justice.

Adopting a plural and multidisciplinary approach of corruption allows us to think and study it through its different edges, nuances and expressions. In this paper, firstly, corruption is thought of as a political problem, public and global, from which necessarily follows its character of an intermestic issue (Putnam 1996) or “international concern” (Ferreira and Morosini 2013). Therefore, the participation of the state, the public policies and resources are justified, given the understanding that, unlike the rest of the problems, there are no private remedies or solutions and, even less, strictly national ones. As such, this approach allows us to comprehend why, facing this transnational phenomenon, that knows no borders5 and that erodes the most basic building elements of the relations between state and society, after almost fifteen years of international efforts, of intergovernmental cooperation, there has been the construction and development of common parameters for fighting corruption, beginning with the harmonization of national legislation.

Second, the study of such cooperative efforts against corruption seeks to be geographically situated in the Latin American reality, due to the need

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4 To further read about these questions, see Leal (2006); Berthin Seles (2008); Granato and Oddone (2010); Wieland and Artigas (2007).

5 This terminology is not used in the sense of “disavow” itself, but of “using” and “seize on” of national boundaries, symbol of state sovereignty and of state action, as a “means” to “escape” or flee from state persecution in repression of transnational crimes in general.
to increase the knowledge about regional experiences in dealing with this scourge. As well as to other countries and continents, for Latin America in particular, in conjunction with the transition from authoritarian regimes to more democratic systems, intergovernmental cooperation has revealed itself to be one of the inducing processes of new measures to combat corruption and to the improvement of existing ones, guaranteeing the multilateralism, still under construction, of a minimum normative standard on the continent.

The results of this process that began with discussions about bribery within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) at the end of the 1980s, and continued to hemispheric level in the Organization of American States (OAS), and at the global level, in the United Nations (UN) itself, can only be evaluated over time. Nevertheless, as Berthin notes, these efforts “already form part of a basic platform from which you can launch and designing other initiatives with medium and larger reach perhaps more strategic and within the cycle framework of public policies for transparency and against corruption” (Berthin Siles 2008, 148).

In this anti-corruption context, in which the most important expressions are the Inter-American Convention and the United Nations Convention on the subject, the aim of this study is to analyze the place occupied by this issue on the Mercosur agenda. Also, it aims to identify its institutional manifestations, in the period 2003-2015, understanding that the fight against corruption should no longer be thought of as an end in itself, but that it should be considered a strategic component of governability. In this sense, this is due to the fact that the efforts to carry forward this struggle promote the improvement of the public sector control over the members of the regional integration process, aimed at strengthening the institutional capabilities of the latter.

This objective, which seeks to be fulfilled from a survey, observation and documentary analysis, is justified, in the first place, because all member countries (full and associate) are also signatories of the international treaties mentioned above; second, regarding the period under study, because it could be expected that, since the years 2002/2003, the member countries of Mercosur would began to handle anti-corruption efforts undertaken nationally within the framework of the Mechanism for Follow-up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC), and in respect of the UN Convention itself; and, third, only because after the “reformulation” of Mercosur from 2003 onwards, the adoption of new challenging

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6 Acronym for “Mercado Común del Sur”, an intergovernmental process of regional integration, comprising Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela as full members, Bolivia (in process of admission) and Chile, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Guyana and Surinam as associate members.
themes was made due to the mercantilist scheme of the neoliberal stage, in
which the fight against corruption could be framed. Finally, it is important to
note, as well, the absence of academic research that link corruption and Mer-
cosur from an institutional perspective of integration.

Regarding the article description, it is divided into four parts, includ-
ing this introduction and conclusions. In the second section, the evolution of
the process of construction of common spaces for fighting corruption, ma-
terialized in the Conventions of the OAS of 1996 and the UN, 2003 will be
addressed from a historical perspective. The third section is intended to ana-
lyze the place occupied by the anti-corruption topic in the regional agenda of
Mercosur, as well as its manifestations in the scope of the bloc’s institutional
structure. Finally, the final comments will be held, from a reflection on the
challenges to be faced by Mercosur countries.

2 The Fight Against Corruption in the Hemispheric and Inter-
national Agendas

Until the early 1990s, the moment in which the search for an interna-
tional standard against bribery and corruption was affirmed, the fight against
the scourge of corruption did not integrate the international agenda. This was
due to the understanding held by many countries that this matter should be
addressed within the context of each national reality.

As it can be understood by the reading of Kochi (2002), the genesis
of such an intention can be found in the United States, particularly in the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Acts of 1977 (FCPA), which penalized the payment of
bribes of American firms to public foreign officials. According to the author,
the FCPA was born as a measure to restore the confidence of firms and the
US government, after a series of investigations that occurred in the 1970s
revealed that over 400 Americans companies had made illegal payments to
foreign public officials, politicians and political parties for an amount exceed-
ing $300 million (Kochi 2002).

As in most countries bribery was considered an offense only when it
was practiced with national officials, and not when it involved foreign officials
(being possible to deduct from tax declaration the amount of the bribe deliv-
ered across national borders). Since the entry into force of the FCPA, many
Americans companies claimed the existence of a competitive disadvantage
compared to its rivals from Europe and Japan, mainly. For this reason, at
the request of the private sector, the US government would begin, according
to Vargas (2004), to press for including the issue of foreign bribery on the
agenda of the main multilateral forums of the time, among them, the OECD and the UN. Notwithstanding, for many countries, the goal of reaching an agreement on this issue was seen as an attempt of extending US unilateral policy out of its territory. The lack of consensus within the two organizations made the drafts of an eventual agreement in the matter left without effect and, consequently, the issue stayed buried for nearly two decades.

At the end of the 1980s, the international context seemed to give signs of change with respect to addressing issues such as bribery and corruption. Glynn, Kobrin and Naím (1997) cite examples of such a change: the approval of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, and the start of discussions and negotiations within the OECD of an agreement that prohibited and sanctioned bribery made by domestic companies to foreign public officials.

From President William Clinton’s rise in 1993, the fight against bribery and corruption, understood as the internationalization of the rules of the FCPA, has become one of the priority areas of US international action. According to authors such as Elliot (1997) and Kochi (2002), the main concern of the government, in a context of deregulation and liberalization of trade and investment, was to provide “fairer” framework in which American companies could compete, suppressing any “competitive disadvantage” that the FCPA could lead to the Northern country companies against their foreign rivals.

Thus, until 1994, as a product of multiple discussions and negotiations, it was approved within the OECD, the recommendation that all member states took the necessary measures aimed at detecting, preventing and combating bribery of foreign public officials who were linked to international commercial transactions. The next step was, in December 1997, the approval of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions that penalizes offering, promising or giving bribes to foreign public officials in order to obtain or retain international business transactions.

In parallel to the negotiation process of anti-corruption guidelines of the OECD, in the hemispheric sphere, the OAS would also carry a similar path. In 1992, the OAS General Assembly commissioned to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council that the issue of corrupt practices in international trade were incorporated to the agenda on the economic and social challenges for the decade of the “1990s and to prepare a study on the harmful effects of corrupt practices”. Until 1994, a series of discussions within the

7  For further information see George, Lacey and Birmele (2000).
8  See Resolution n. 1159 (XXII-0/92) of the OAS General Assembly. Available at: http://www.
body prepared the necessary conditions for the General Assembly to instruct the Permanent Council to establish a new Working Group, called “Probity and Public Ethics,” which would have as its initial tasks to make recommendations on legal mechanisms to control the problem of corruption with full respect for the sovereignty of member states.9

Another important step in the institutionalization of the fight against corruption within the Inter-American sphere occurred from the inclusion of this item on the agenda of the First Summit of the Americas which was held in Miami, Florida, in December 1994. In the very Declaration of Principles of this Summit it was established that “effective democracy requires corruption to be tackled in an integral manner, as it is a factor of social disintegration and distortion of the economic system that undermines the legitimacy of political institutions.”10

The summit adopted 59 mandates based on 23 issues, including the fight against corruption. It was recognized that “the problem of corruption is nowadays a matter of primary interest not only in this Hemisphere, but in all regions of the world.”11 During the Summit, an Action Plan was formulated in which there is a chapter devoted to the problem of corruption. In this chapter, the heads of state committed themselves, among other things, to develop in the OAS, with due regard to pertinent treaties and relevant national laws, a hemispheric approach to acts of corruption in the public and private sectors, through the negotiation of a new hemispheric agreement or of new arrangements within existing frameworks for international cooperation.12

Regarding the last point, the development in the OAS of a “hemispheric approach” on acts of corruption, a draft convention was presented to a group of experts of the aforementioned body. This group, together with the Inter-American Juridical Committee, made remarks that enabled, as a result of successive meetings in Washington, to reach a final version and the subsequent approval, in 1996, of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. The Convention was a binding instrument by which the signatory countries pledged to promote changes in their national legislation to coordinate in

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a plurilateral manner in the fight against the scourge in question (Manfroni 1997; Huber 2002).

The Inter-American Convention against Corruption entered into force in 1997\textsuperscript{13}, becoming the first international treaty of its kind. That same year, the OAS approved the creation of the Inter-American Program of Cooperation to Fight Corruption\textsuperscript{14} that, according to López (2003), give an organic and functional sense combating mentioned scourge within the organization, and in 2002 came into force the mechanism to follow up on the commitments made by States Parties (MESICIC).

For its part, one year after, in 2003, it was approved the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the first global instrument legally binding in the fight against corruption, introducing a thorough set of standards, measures and regulations that may be applied by all countries to reinforce their legal frameworks and regulations on the matter. According to López (2003), the Convention began to be gestated during the celebration of the United Nations General Assembly in December 2000, at which the need for such a multilateral organization to promote the adoption of an “effective international legal instrument against corruption” was recognized\textsuperscript{15}. The negotiation of the treaty was in charge of a deputy commission of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and took place between January 2002 and October 2003, the year in which the approval of the draft agreement took place and the start of signatures at the conference held in Merida, Mexico, 9-11 December 2003. In the case of Latin America countries, only Cuba and Honduras did not sign the Convention during the opening of the signatures.

In short, the trajectory described reveals the growing importance that the fight against corruption has acquired in the international arena. As mentioned in the introduction of this work, the intermestic character of this phenomenon is manifest in the mandate of the Conventions aforementioned to establish intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms to fight corruption in a more effective way\textsuperscript{16}. Thus, in the next section, the work will be guided to investigate whether the fight against this issue of common concern occupied

\textsuperscript{13} The conditions of signatures and ratifications can be found at: https://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/firmas/b-58.html. Accessed August 30, 2015.


\textsuperscript{16} Such cooperation can express itself in different ways, which can range from the exchange of good practices, extradition or asset recovery to mutual legal assistance, among others.
a place on the Mercosur agenda, in the 2003-2015 period and, in that case, what were the most significant results in institutional terms.

3 Fighting Corruption in the Mercosur Agenda

After the analysis of the documentary survey carried out, it is essential to make clear, in addition to the formal question of commitment taken on the Inter-American Convention and the United Nations Convention, the reasons why, in this article, underlies the idea that the fight against corruption “should” have occupied “a place” on the Mercosur agenda. To explain these reasons it will be needed to reassemble the set of ideas on regional integration that inspires this work, as well as the necessary overlaps between the state, development, social policy and corruption.

3.1 State, integration and development: Mercosur

First, it is pertinent to argue that investigating the existence of mechanisms for cooperation against corruption within Mercosur derives from the understanding of regional integration. In this sense, regional integration, unlike understood by those who conceive it as a mere associative process created for opening new markets, is a political project that can contribute to the social and economic development of member countries, in a context of global capitalism.

For that matter, there is a tradition in Latin American literature exalting the political nature of regional integration (Puig 1986; Lanús 1972). First, this nature is linked to the fact that, in a context in which the natural movement of states is to “close themselves” within their boundaries for self-preservation and survival, regional integration, when seen as an instrument that strengthens state capacity, emerges as a counter-movement product of the will and political rationality of the actors involved (Gonçalves 2013). In this sense, the search for convergence between different objectives, interests and expectations of the States involved in the project, and the creation of institutional mechanisms through which the differences and conflicts between them could be channeled, reveals undoubtedly the complexity of integration.

Second, such political nature of integration in Latin America is also related to the “emancipatory” ideal (Dussel 1973; Quijano 2002) and with the possibility to articulate a “joint defense” against the very capitalist system that had put the countries of the continent, fragile and with disarticulated productive structures, on the periphery of world geopolitics (Jaguaribe 1973; Guim-
arães 2002; Ferrer 2006). In other words, the condition of the periphery of capitalism, underdeveloped and dependent on central countries; the coexistence within the same geopolitical continental space with a hegemonic power; and the “latinoamericanidad” or the idea of a “community of solidarity fate”, explain, according to Paradiso (2008; 2009), the three structural factors that comprise this unifying ideal, which are development (economic dimension), autonomy (political dimension) and equality (cultural dimension).

According to that, regional integration is a complex process which, as warned by Puig (1986), should be driven in all its various possible ways, not only in its economic dimension, calling for an “integral” conception of integration that favors the creation of common values and goals, as well as the strengthening of state capacities oriented to the welfare of the peoples. It is precisely from this perspective that was formulated the assumption that dealing with corruption, a factor that erodes the ideals of development, autonomy and equality of the preceding paragraph, should have a place on the agenda of one of the main contemporary integration processes of the continent: Mercosur.

Generally speaking, one can say that the process of integration within Mercosur is based on the traditional strategic cooperation between Argentina and Brazil; on the historic achievement of both actors of having eliminated the possibility of conflict with the neighboring country. Mercosur began with the return of democracies in the 1980s, and has adapted itself to the neoliberal globalization. After 2003, with the arrival of the governments of Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Lula (2003-2006, 2007-2010), this bloc was then “reformulated”, acquiring a much broader character than merely economic or commercial, as originally written in Asuncion Treaty of 1991 (Granato 2015).

This expansion or resizing of the integration process found its direction in converting itself on a tool in service of the national development projects of member countries, having in the social and productive inclusions, in the deepening of the rapprochement process among societies and in the creation of a common identity, its main dimensions. One of the main objectives of the Mercosur integration process since 2003 has been the construction of a common regional space, which, in addition to expanding the opportunities for jobs generation, investment, energy, infrastructure and trade, would become a real strategy for productive development and social welfare. That is, ultimately, the integration model that was driven by Brazil-Argentina alliance, with significant support from the rest of the member countries, and embodied in the so-called “Buenos Aires Consensus” and “Puerto Iguazu Commitment”, of October 2003 and November 2005, respectively.

Thus, this “change of view” on how to conceive and organize the Mer-
cosur and the resulting policies, had a strong impact on the objectives of the bloc. From that time on, the bloc would no longer be confined to the economic and trade chapter, but new dimensions would emerge, encouraging progress in various subjects. With this new way of understanding integration, both in its multidimensional aspect as well as an empowering instrument of state capacities, it would seem natural that the States Parties would have devoted part of their cooperative efforts to addressing the issue of corruption. Also, already at the same Consensus of Buenos Aires, the high representatives of Brazil and Argentina recognized the “strategic role” of the State as well as the importance of “strengthening its institutions, professionalizing public administration, improving its response capacity, increasing its effectiveness and ensuring greater transparency in decision-making processes”\(^{17}\). Then, in the next subsection, we will seek to confirm if there was a genuine concern or not with the anti-corruption cooperation within the bloc, in the studied period.

### 3.2 An Anti-Corruption Policy in Mercosur?

In order to empirically verify if the fight against corruption took place on the Mercosur agenda, accompanied by concrete institutional manifestations, an exhaustive research data was carried, raising all official documents that would allow an analysis of the issue\(^{18}\). So, it was corroborated: first, the absence of a convention, treaty or special statement on the matter at the subregional level\(^{19}\); second, a survey of joint statements by the presidents of States Parties and associates of the bloc\(^{20}\) was made in the period 2003-2015; and,

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18 Thus, it is worth adding that we found a lack of specialized academic work on the subject with similar objectives to the ones proposed in this article.

19 It is worth mentioning that there are other experiences of regional integration that do have an agreement of this type. Among such, one may cite the case of the European Union (EU), which adopted the Convention on the fight against acts of corruption involving officials of the European Communities or the Member States of the EU, of 1997; the Southern African Development Community, which approved the Protocol Against Corruption, of 2001; and the Andean Community, which approved, by Decision no. 668, 2007, the Andean Plan to Fight Corruption.

20 As established in the Protocol of Ouro Preto, the Council of the Common Market (Mercosur higher body, which bears the political leadership of the integration process, composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economy) will meet as often as it sees fit, being expected to do so at least once every six months with the participation of the presidents of the States parties. As a result of such meetings (ordinary or extraordinary), joint statements or declarations are issued. It should be clarified, too, that such documents were collected from the search engine/
third, we sought to identify if such communications explicitly cited concerns regarding the matter.

Of the 34 analyzed statements, only 5 refer to the issue of corruption. In the first statement of December 17th, 2004, the presidents stressed, in paragraph 20, “the key role that the fight against corruption and impunity has to consolidate and strengthen our democracies”. In the joint statement of December 9th, 2005, the leaders expressed “the strong commitment of their governments to fight corruption, and to promote greater cooperation in the areas of mutual legal assistance, when appropriate, in cases of extradition, recovery of assets and money derived from corruption” (item 6).

In a way, given the temporal proximity of the signature and entry into force of the UN Convention against Corruption with the statements cited above, it would be possible to identify the placement of this issue on the regional agenda as a result of the “momentum” and of the mobilization generated by that global instrument. Moreover, it is important to mention, as well, that such joint demonstrations of 2004 and 2005 replicated the interest that had been observed in each country to achieve a convergence of measures needed to prevent corruption in their respective national contexts, within the state apparatus21. Yet, between 2004 and 2005, it is possible to identify, in addition, the creation of two institutional bodies of Mercosur with direct implications for the prevention, investigation and punishment of corrupt practices. One is the Special Meeting of Governmental Organisations of Internal Control (REOGCI), approved by CMC Decision no. 34, 16 December 2004; and the second is the Special Meeting of Public Prosecutors of Mercosur (REPM), approved by CMC Decision no. 10 of June 19th, 2005.

Regarding the REOGCI, which only became operational in 2006, the importance of articulating joint efforts by the control agencies of each of the Mercosur member countries on the issue is unquestionable. In spite of that, the survey and analysis of documents related to the seven meetings held so far, between 2006 and 201522, suggests that only in 2014, after resuming


21 From the results of a complementary normative survey conducted as part of this work, it is possible to identify a clear commitment from the different countries of Mercosur with the production of rules, at least for federal or national level, adjusted to emerging standards from the OAS and the UN Conventions. It is possible to identify, especially after 1996, the year of approval of the first convention, a tendency to comply with minimum standards for prevention, especially those relating to ethics and integrity, transparency, access to public information and spaces and public participation processes.

22 In this case, the search engine “Documents Online” from the site of the Secretariat of Mercosur was also used, as well as the site of REOGCI: http://www.reogci.org
the meetings, which were not carried out since 2009\textsuperscript{23}, some progress was shown.

At the 2014 meeting, held in Buenos Aires, the creation of a Centre for Research, Training, Development and Internal Control of Mercosur was agreed, aimed to reach concrete progress in the training and exchange of best practices; and a proposal to consider the “Review Peer” among government agencies of internal control was made, an issue that was postponed at the 2015 meeting because its implementation was not considered convenient within the group, “given the different operating realities of the organs”, leaving open the possibility that the bloc’s member countries engaged in a review of actions bilaterally. Unfortunately, this reflects the lack of political will to establish mature and genuine interdependence relations in this area, especially considering that the differences in the Inter-American system are much greater than the differences between the Mercosur countries. Nevertheless, the peer monitoring mechanism has been operating without major difficulties\textsuperscript{24}.

Regarding the REMPM, although it is stated that the fight against corruption is a mission, function and main goal of the Public Ministries of Mercosur, from the survey of the agendas of the 22 uninterrupted meetings held between 2006 and 2015, no proposals of concrete articulation for the improvement of the fight against this problem have emerged\textsuperscript{25}. It is worth mentioning that not even the “Agreement on the Mercosur Order for Detention and Delivery Procedures”, approved by CMC Decision no. 48 of December 16\textsuperscript{th}, 2010, to facilitate the arrest of fugitives, has been implemented yet.

Returning to the sequence of Presidential declarations proposed at the beginning of this section, already in the joint declaration of June 29\textsuperscript{th},

\textsuperscript{23} As an additional data, it should be pointed out that in 2012 took place in Montevideo, the First Meeting of Supreme Audit Bodies on Corruption in Mercosur, organized by the Board of Transparency and Public Ethics (Junta de Transparencia y Ética Pública - JUTEP) of Uruguay.

\textsuperscript{24} In this context, it is not striking that the creation of a superior body of public control in Mercosur is still a pending task. It is clear that the Economic-Social Consultative Forum, through the Recommendation no. 3 of September 12\textsuperscript{th}, 2012, urged the study of measures to conduct the creation and operation of a supreme audit institution with expertise in the audit and inspection of the accounts and operations of the agencies and funds of Mercosur. However, an advance that does deserve to be mentioned is the approval by CMC Decision no. 15 of July 16\textsuperscript{th}, 2015, of the compendium of “General Standards for Mercosur officials”, which provides a code of ethics, standards of conduct and a disciplinary system.

\textsuperscript{25} Either way, it should be added that the role of public prosecutor in criminal proceedings, combating drug trafficking and money laundering, restitution of stolen motor vehicles, cyber-crime, human trafficking, among others, are examples of the issues the REMPM have been working on, and which are somehow linked to the fight against corruption.
2007, the presidents reaffirmed their commitment to the fight against corruption and welcomed the inclusion of the topic in the Political Consultation and Coordination Forum schedule (FCCP)\textsuperscript{26}. In addition, the leaders also noted the importance of “cooperation as a means of fighting corruption” and reaffirmed “the commitment to the fight against corruption as an essential requirement to strengthen and protect the democratic system, consolidate institutional legitimacy and as a mechanism to enhance the integral development of our nations” (item 13).

On the other hand, having made a survey of the data produced in the 62 meetings of the FCCP between 2007 and 2015\textsuperscript{27}, some discouraging data emerged. In December 2007, by the Act no. 7, the proposal of the Uruguayan National Coordination in exercise of the Presidency Pro Tempore of the FCCP to create a “Specialized Meeting of competent authorities in the area of the Fight against Corruption” was approved, in order to foster dialogue among the organs of States Parties, through exchange of experience and technical cooperation on the most effective ways and methods to prevent, detect, investigate and punish acts of corruption, in order to establish itself as an instance for coordinating common positions in the field. This proposal was presented to the Common Market Council, but it was never approved, and since this year until 2015, the initial impetus revealed in Mercosur to coordinate joint efforts in the fight against corruption seems to have decreased over time.

The only exception recorded in this period 2007-2015, is the joint statement of June 29\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, in which the presidents reiterated their willingness to continue to work together in harmonizing their respective national regulations relevant to the fight against corruption and transnational organized crime through the implementation of the recommendations and guidelines within the framework of the OAS and the UN Conventions on the field. Either way, this political rhetoric does not seem to have been accompanied by efforts and initiatives of cooperation within Mercosur, with the exception of the aforementioned Agreement on Mercosur Detention Order.

Finally, in 2015, probably under the strong influence of the Brazilian Pro Tempore Presidency of the bloc\textsuperscript{28}, in their statement of July 17\textsuperscript{th}, the pres-

\textsuperscript{26} The FCCP is an auxiliary organ of the Common Market Council, created to contribute to the consolidation and expansion of the political dimension of the bloc, as well as to deepen the dialogue between States Parties and between them and partner countries on issues of foreign policy and common political agenda.

\textsuperscript{27} For that it was also used the search engine “Documents Online” of the Secretariat of Mercosur site.

\textsuperscript{28} In line with the regulations of the new Anti-Corruption Act, no. 12.846, of 2013, by Decree no. 8420 of March 18\textsuperscript{th}, 2015 (at national level), and the Special Declaration on Transparency
idents supported the decision of the Ministers of Justice of the States Parties and associates. The decision was to advance the negotiation of a protocol on mutual legal assistance in civil and administrative proceedings against corruption, stressing the goal of aligning it to the most advanced anti-corruption policies in order to face corruption with a broader approach.

According to our investigation, despite the mandate to deepen intergovernmental cooperation in the fight against corruption of the OAS and the UN Conventions, as well as the new integrationist “momentum” inaugurated in the sub-region since 2003, the efforts to place the issue of the fight against corruption on the Mercosur agenda have revealed themselves in a certain way to be timid and insufficient. Even though we cannot argue against the importance of the creation of instances such as the REOGCI and REMPM, or of the establishment of measures on judicial cooperation in this area, the multifaceted and transversal character of corruption, which crosses all aspects of state functions, private sector and citizenship, justifies the need of creating specialized instances that function as coordinating centers of the various efforts that have been under development, frequently in a disconnected manner, relating to the prevention, investigation and sanction of acts of corruption.

Despite the numerous cases of corruption that took place in the Mercosur countries during and after the period investigated, the political will externalized by governments to align their national regulations to the recommendations, standards and commitments made in the OAS and UN Conventions, does not seem to have been replicated in the sphere of regional integration. One possible explanation might be found in the fact that members have privileged treatment of the theme in the Inter-American level in detriment of Mercosur. Another possible explanation is linked to the very political nature addressed in the first subsection. Probably the different visions and goals for the integration process have prevented a firmer action on this issue. However, as could be verified in this subsection, there seems to have been revealed, during the studied period, an inability of Mercosur States to articulate joint efforts aimed at improving their public administrations by preventing and combating corruption.

and Combat of Corruption issued within the framework of the Third Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) held in San Jose, Costa Rica, in January 2015 (at the regional level).

To verify if the issue of fighting corruption was a concern of this meeting prior to the aforementioned initiative, a survey of the agendas of the 23 meetings held between 2003 and 2014 was conducted. The lack of presence of this issue in such agendas is an indicative, somehow, of the lack of priority accorded by Mercosur to judicial cooperation in anti-corruption matters.
4 Conclusions

In the present study we sought to address the issue of intergovernmental cooperation regarding prevention and combating of corruption by investigating whether such a theme occupied a place on the Mercosur agenda. For that, the study relied on two major structural foundations. First, it is important to highlight the commitments taken by the countries of the Southern bloc with international organizations like the UN and the OAS, which have been developing, over the past few decades, important initiatives in order to coordinate joint efforts in the fight against corruption.

Addressing a wide range of aspects, the specialized conventions within the framework of such institutions have proved to be an important stimulus for the adoption of anti-corruption measures by Latin American countries in general, and in South America ones in particular. So, member countries have taken the commitment to deepen cooperation and coordination as established in these Conventions, being expected to articulate actions at the regional and subregional level. Consequently, it was logical that in Mercosur actions regarding this issue were developed.

The second foundation of this study is linked to the need to study the phenomenon of corruption in the Latin American region from a peripheral perspective; a perspective that inspired the redesign of the objectives of Mercosur during the studied period. This perspective, as studied, conceives regional integration as a tool for strengthening state capacities and of multiple dimensions. Thus, it could be expected that in a period in which the political discourse favored the strategic role of the state, and acknowledged that integration could contribute to the social and economic development of member countries, the anti-corruption cooperation would have had a place on the bloc’s agenda.

Through a survey and documentary analysis, it was possible to prove that preventing and combating corruption has been a theme of scarce presence on the Mercosur agenda in the 2003-2015 period, and limited to the discursive sphere, with timid demonstrations in the institutional architecture. Although a willingness of governments to adopt measures regarding the issue in question was seen, the prospect of designing and approving a complementary and convergent fight plan with national efforts that member countries have been carrying out in the framework of the OAS and the UN Conventions has become abstract. Although, of course, there is no standard or rule that establishes that the issue has to be dealt with inside Mercosur, it is expected that, given the implications of the negative consequences of this phenomenon for contemporary societies, the bloc would commit, in addition to complying with international standards on the matter, to think of alternatives for preventing corruption.
adjusted to the realities and particularities of the member States.

We can only hope that future studies in this field will provide new elements to discuss the terms of what might be expected of an agreement that reaffirms the prevention and fight against corruption as a permanent policy within subregional level. Also, that it will serve as a vector in axiological and objective terms, for the generation of specific policies in this area; as well as for the creation of a specialized instance in the institutional architecture of the bloc, which contributes to channeling the national efforts of specialized organizations and agencies in each state.

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ABSTRACT
The study of anti-corruption policies is a relatively new phenomenon in Latin America. Having in mind that the Inter-American and the United Nations Conventions on the combating of corruption, of 1996 and 2003, respectively, establish the need to deepen intergovernmental cooperation in a complementary and convergent manner to national efforts in this regard, this paper proposes a study of the place that the fight against corruption has had on the Mercosur agenda in the period of 2003-2015, and of its expressions related to the institutionality of the bloc.

KEYWORDS
Public Policies; Corruption; Regional Integration; Mercosur.
PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) was the first center dedicated to the study and research in International Relations in Southern Brazil. It was established in August 1999 at the ILEA/UFRGS aiming the argumentative and innovative study of the main transformations within the post-Cold War international system. Since 2014, it is located at the Faculty of Economics of UFRGS (FCE-UFRGS). In parallel, NERINT has sought ways to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options to consolidate an autonomous international presence for the country, from the perspective of the developing world. Brazil’s choice of an “active, affirmiative, and proactive diplomacy” at the beginning of the 21st century has converged with projections and studies put forward over numerous seminars and publications organized by NERINT.

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