INTRODUCTION

International Relations have been increasingly concerned about the role of regions in the distribution of global power and regional systems as unit of analysis that enables theoretical and empirical progress in the subject. Southern global regions, including Africa, have been one of the most important parts of this process, raising the attention of the Brazilian foreign policy and academic community. However, the understanding of the Southern regional systems’ dynamics evolution leaves space for important advances, among them, a clearer interpretation over how and why regional systems change and what is the role of foreign policies from systemic units in this process. Studies about regions have focused almost exclusively on regional powers analysis and much little on the stance of secondary powers in current orders. Perhaps these analytical difficulties (lack of a bottom-up perspective of the regional relations) even have impact on the difficulties advancing integration processes in the global South, which often lack the representation of minor powers’ interests. The Southern Africa case follows such pattern and available analysis focus predominantly on South Africa, with scarce understanding of the characteristics and causes of other systemic units’ behavior. Despite the importance for regional and continental relations, little is known about the regional foreign policy of countries like Angola, a secondary strong

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power, whose actions impact significantly on the regional dynamics. In this context, the research aims at answering how the foreign policy of Angola evolved facing the transformations in the regional system as from 1975 (year of its independence). More specifically, what does explain the Angolan foreign policy facing the regional orders established in 1975-88 and 1989-2010? Assess Angola’s role in the Southern Africa international relations is fundamental to understand the magnitude of the challenges faced by the regional order centered on South Africa. Between 1975 and 1988, Angola was the most threatening secondary power of the region, given its revolutionary attitude against the actual conservative order and Angola’s capacity of attracting extra regional forces to the disputes involving its domestic conflict. After 1989, Angola remained an important player in regional policy, mainly in the security area, and increased significantly its State capacities since 2002, what generated important impacts on its foreign policy.

The argument hereby sustained is that regional foreign policies of main or secondary regional powers can be understood by the country’s position in favor of the continuity or change of the systemic order and its impetus for action for the fulfillment of such project. Regional foreign policy, in turn, is derived from a complex process of construction of the State, whereupon foreign policy defining elites (EDPE) will look for materializing their political projects and will answer to internal and external pressure according to the State capacities available. Between 1975 and 1988, Angolan EPDEs looked for deploying a developmental political project of strengthening the State (though without success) and changing the conservative regional order characterized by South Africa dominance. High internal and external pressures were responded to with a big momentum for action, mostly from the availability of natural resources (oil) and foreign support (USSR and Cuba). After a brief interregnum of accommodation of the external pressure and attempts to internal dialog, the 1989-2010 period observed a renewed impulse for changing the former liberal regional order also centered on South Africa and for overcoming internal and external pressure through the increase of State capacities then. After the lowering pressure on both fronts, Angola adopted a less impetuous, more restrained and keen foreign policy, regarding significant changes

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2 The analytical model adopted by the study enhances the role of the construction of the State as changing factor in the regional system. One of the ways the construction of the State impacts on the regional system is by means of the systemic units’ foreign policy. States act facing established systemic orders (formal and informal institutions that sustain the establishment of rules about behavior and benefits’ distribution in the system) according to its EDPEs’ interests and the pressures (threats and power asymmetry) that they face internally and externally. Although the availability of natural resources and foreign support helps in the capacity of action in some countries, actual State capacities available for the governing elites on the coercion scope, capital
in the regional order.

The first section of this article addresses Angola’s foreign policy facing the regional order between 1975 and 1988, enhancing the process of construction of the State (context, State capacities and State-society relations) and an assessment of its foreign policy making (EDPE political project and its security against internal and external pressure) and execution (posture towards status quo and impetus for action in the system). The second section does the same to the 1989-2010 period. The conclusion brings about the results, which constitute a wider study involving foreign policy in the Southern Africa regional system. (Castellano da Silva 2015)

**STATE, ELITES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN ANGOLA (1975-1988)**

The Southern Africa regional system order, as it was formed since the 20th century, began to gradually be centered on South Africa and be sustained by four basic pillars, maintained until the decline of the apartheid at the end of the 1980 decade. On the political pillar, the conservative order was based on the inheritance of the colonial system on territorial status quo and on the defense of sovereignty by the State, followed by a system of governance centered on the strongest States. In the economic field, conservatism (protectionism and mercantilism) concurred with liberalism, since the last one favored the centrality of South Africa’s position. Such centrality was sustained because of logistical (infrastructure) and financial axis, and commercial relations centered on the Rand economic pole. On the social pillar, the conservative order was based on socio cultural dominance by the elites bounded to the colonial project and on discriminatory and segregationist systems. In the security sphere, the primacy of national security was maintained, with special attention to security challenges produced by the movements for national liberation. The independence of Angola and other regional revisionist countries represented the growing contestation of the order centered on South Africa.

and legitimacy will define the sustainability of external action and the conditions of natural resources’ extraction in the society (Castellano da Silva 2015).

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3 For analytical purposes, systemic orders can be assessed in the political, economic, social and security axis. The order’s political base embodies values, rules and institutions that conduct the system’s territorial distribution, the principles that conduct the diplomatic relations and the guarantee of the States’ political surviving. The economic base concerns values, rules and institutions that conduct the subject of the economic relations (trade and goods and services’ flow principles). The social base indicates values, rules and institutions bounded to the social relations’ subject and to the priority established for regional populations’ different kinds of rights. The order’s security base is related to values, rules and institutions that regulate the organization and behavior over the security matter.
Nevertheless, the interests and conditions of action of those new States would be determined by their particular processes of State construction.

**The Built of the State in Angola (1975-1988)**

Angola, previously the jewel of the Portuguese colony (Birmingham 2002, 137), became the center of the African geopolitics in 1975. The war that followed Alvor Agreement (January 1975) lasted almost thirty years after its independence (in November 1975) and became a spiral of conflicts that, at least until 1989, centralized the regional and global dispute in the continent. Angola was the stage of intermediate regional (South Africa and Zaire) and global powers (Cuba), as well as global great powers’ (USA, USSR and China) strategic interests. Such international relevance, notwithstanding, was subjected to complex local and regional dynamics and lost impulse in the end of the 1980 decade. Its economic potential⁴ and strategic geographical position, with wide coastal area and several connections that integrate the inner part, contributed to the ongoing relevance of Angola in the regional geopolitics. Besides that, the complexity of the movements for national liberation composition and the increasing insertion and support of regional and global actors granted visibility to its position. The movements emerged from the politicization of ethnic identities predominant in Angola (kongo, mbundu and ovimbundu)⁵ and admitted secular ideological aspects in a diverse way. However, their identification with wider nationalist political ideologies increased, mainly coming from the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).⁶

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⁴ The country has quite significant oil, gas, diamonds and water’s reserves. Its weather and land enables great agricultural fertility, represented in the coffee production.

⁵ The ethnic differentiation was increased during the colonization, resulting in three main groups. The kongo shared the ancestry of the Kongo Kingdom and lived on the border with Zaire (inclusively they widely adopted the usage of French). The mbundu had bigger interaction with the Portuguese and cultural assimilation. They were associated to modern and Western urban mixed populations. The ovimbundu were originated from the central upland from where they were removed to serve as labor for Northern coffee plantations, what increased the conflict’s potential with the other groups. As the socialization was grounded in these relations, political identity and mobilization had a big connection with those divisions. The People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), created in 1956, had support ground on the mbundu (20% of the population, predominantly around the capital); The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), emerged in 1963, was bounded to the kongo population (mostly on the North); and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), was based on the support of the ovimbundu population (40% of the population, prevails on the Center-South) (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 145).

⁶ Unlike UNITA and FNLA, MPLA looked for articulating a national Project. MPLA’s approved in 1974 project, in the Inter-regional Conference for Militants, guided this process through the education of the people in free areas, including the alphabetization and the teaching of Ango-
That movement assumed the Leninist-Marxist nationalist ideology and raised support from USSR, Cuba and East Germany, since the 1960 decade, which was fortified as it got closer to its independence (Shubin 2008, 15). Its rivals, in turn, remained tied to particularistic identities and raised support from USA and China.7

MPLA’s victory in the liberation war, after the Carnation Revolution in Portugal (1974), and the disruption of the Alvor Agreement (it established a transition government) by a quick and violent removal of the Portuguese, led to the construction of a revolutionary State. With the era of the peaceful independences coming to an end (1960 decade), the promise of the rise of movements for national liberation that increased their performance in the 1970 decade, in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, was to overcome the maxim of Nkrumah: “Seek foremost for the political realm and all the rest will be given to you as a supplement” (Mazrui 2010, 125). It was necessary a full State, economy and State-society relations reform, in search for autonomy and development. The embrace of the scientific socialism and a restructuring of the State, based, leastwise projected, in the Marxism-Leninism was the alternative seen as more adequate by movements as the MPLA and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). At the Party’s First Congress in 1977, MPLA adopted the Marxism-Leninism and declared itself a vanguard party. Nevertheless, the process was constrained because of low State and society capacities and various external and internal pressures. Finally, in the mid-1980s the Marxism-Leninism ideal had to be increasingly abandoned on behalf of surviving.

**State Capacity: coercion, capital and legitimacy**

The main challenges for the construction of the Angolan State were linked to the reduced capacities inherited from the Portuguese colonial State (including the destruction caused by the liberation war) and to the challenges that came up with the internal war, supported by foreign forces. In the new State project, the priorities were to set national order and to promote econom-
ic capacity, by means of a politically educated and mobilized society. In the reconstruction tasks, Cuba was fundamental to reduce the power vacuum in the military, administrative, medical, educational and security public services (Birmingham 1992, 52).

The coercive capability challenges were significant because of the need for building a national army from the liberation forces, which had to be capable of facing similar capacity rival armed forces. Two moves were adopted for this task: (i) the construction of a sturdy army based on the identity of the MPLA (FAPLA - Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) and (ii) the direct cover by outward security forces in the inner combat, achieving a differentiated combat experience. The alliance with Cuba was central to the goal of organizing defense forces that could protect 2000 kilometers of border with Zaire and the same distance with Namibia. The attempt to increase the coercive capability was complemented by the participation of popular militiamen (structured in the liberation war) in urban and rural defense against terror campaigns of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). However, the difficulty of penetrating the Southern territory still remained, which came to be controlled by UNITA and South Africa, and of keeping control over Cabinda, an exclave at Congo-Kinshasa Northern shore, of great wealth of oil (half of the national petroleum) and known by the presence of separatist groups' activities (Front for the Liberation of the Exclave of Cabinda – FLEC), supported by the French intelligence service.

Regarding the capital sphere, what matters is that Portugal, since 1915 (First World War context), had incremented the colony economical exploration, increasing investments in infrastructure for access and leakage of products like coffee, diamonds and oil. Along with the independence and the adoption of Marxism-Leninism, came the nationalization of farms and business abandoned by the Portuguese during the liberation war (most of them headed for Portugal, Brazil and South Africa). The government tried to establish a centrally planned economy, which looked for the State reconstruction and wars efforts maintenance. It nationalized the central bank, reappointed

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8 In August 1976, an agreement between Angola and Cuba guaranteed the continuity of FAPLA’s training. The biggest challenge was building forces “strong enough on the ground to withstand the SADF - Africa’s best NATO equipped army” (Wolfers and Bergerol 1983, 130).

9 Portugal built the Benguela railway (started in 1911 and finished in 1921) to offer the transportation logistics of the Katanga region in Congo up to the Port of Lobito. It initiated the diamonds’ extraction with the creation of the Diamond Company of Angola, in 1917, and increased coffee and other goods’ (fishing and manufacture) and forced cultivations’ production (besides coffee there was corn, bean and wheat). The oil production increased as from the 1950 decade, and in the 1960s foreign companies started investing in the sector, mostly North-American.
as People’s Bank of Angola, and embraced industrialization incentive politics as a tool to build socialism. The project foresaw the labor joint, which would rise from local population, including from old rival groups and exiled Angolans (Wolfers and Bergerol 1983, 110–11). Nevertheless, there was some difficulties to improve “[...] because of the lack of capital (diverted to defense), qualified labor, spare parts and inputs and the destabilizing effects caused by South Africa and UNITA’s sabotage, besides its own managing incapacity” (Visentini 2012, 71). Thus, due to the economy’s precarious state (after the liberation war and along with the civil war), lack of bureaucratic capacity and reduced economic support from the communist bloc, that model was gradually abandoned. In the mid-1980s, there was an inclination to the market forces: the growing influence from western economy could be seen in the oil companies, banks, food and transportation processing.

The State legitimacy, in turn, was grounded in MPLA’s authority and identity and in distributional politics. The main attempt was building a politically educated society and that it would rebuke the fragmenting attitude of insurgent groups like UNITA and FLEC. MPLA looked for instigating the idea of nation, enhancing the civility in the party and in the revolutionary element as basis for national culture. Africanism was tolerated and encouraged towards historical rescue (to relive the major traditional Angolan languages), although religions were harassed (Marcum 1987, 75). However, there was little integration and national identity wasn’t enough. The increase of the State distributional capacity was directed to the social rights. Health and education were prioritized. In 1975, the Constitution already ensured for all the right to health care; the National Health Service was institutionalized and, in two years, health services became fully public. On the education field, in 1975 there was an educational reorganization project that reassembled the liberation war, when circa 90% of the population was illiterate in Portuguese. MPLA’s Congress, in 1977, initiated the process of restructuring the Angolan educational system and created a model that integrated regular students and workers. Also, it encouraged access to university education in order to prepare a task force for the party and officers for FAPLA. Notwithstanding, Eastern and Southern populations complained about the marginalization on

10 The focus on preventive medicine and on the people’s education, with Cuban support, enabled the integration of the traditional medicine to the scientific medicine. Provincial hospitals were reformed and sustained by health centers in smaller towns. In terms of human resources, there was a big challenge, since 90% of the expatriated abandoned their jobs in essential services of the State. Cuba provided doctors and technicians while Angolans were trained. Eastern German, USSR, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Netherlands also sent volunteers. Massive campaigns of vaccination executed by volunteers were fulfilled (one of them, from 1977, was awarded by the World Health Organization (WHO)).
the part of the central government and turned out being the recruitment basis of UNITA, generating obstacles to MPLA and the State legitimacy.

State-society relations

The MPLA party dominated politics in Angola since 1975. Following Marxist-Leninist principles, the party was embedded in all of the States and public life’s spheres. The government was composed by the party’s leadership, mainly ruled by urban educated groups, usually mbundu and mulattos elites, even though it would encourage the rise of national interests over tribal and ethnic loyalties. (Wolfers and Bergerol 1983, 123–4; Malaquias 2000, 109). Therefore it refused to accept the usage of affirmative action to guarantee political participation of other ethnic groups in the government (Marcum 1987, 75). MPLA’s political project aimed at establishing an egalitarian society, a planned and industrialized economy, and national autonomy and development. More than a simple ideological alignment, the Marxist-Leninist model was attractive as “[...] promise of governmental efficiency, authority, and social discipline in the Soviet model” (Keller 1987, 11). Its top priorities were political education and economical reorganization. However, its capacity for such was low and the goals aimed by the State had to be gradually more flexible, and the envisioned autonomy turned out being put in second place facing the State’s need for surviving and for maintaining its unity (before internal fragmentation) and the regime’s (before alternative movements/parties).12

MPLA articulated alliances in a power strategy of popular participation that sought approaching society through popular committees and masses’ organizations. Despite that, because of MPLA’s predominantly urban formation basis, groups distant from the capital turned out to be excluded from the party’s structure and became sources for the opposition (Marcum 1987, 74).13 The difficulty in terms of dialogue with rural regions far from

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11 In February 1977, MPLA opened the Party’s National School and declared adherence to the scientific socialism. In the first MPLA’s Congress, in December 1977, it opened the MPLA-PT (Work’s Party, in Portuguese, Partido do Trabalho). This adopted a pyramidal organizational form and assumed political, economic and social leading role over the State (Marcum 1987, 72–3).

12 The dependence on the Cuban and Soviet support and on Western capitals resulted, concomitantly, in the loss of State autonomy facing external pressure and in the flexibility of its internal (Marxism-Leninism) and external (developmental regional order) revolutionary political project.

13 For example, tensions came up in the relationship with the workers articulated in the National Union of Angolan Workers (UNTA – in Portuguese, União Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos), as MPLA supported the syndical centralization and the vertical organizations to
Luanda, the reduced participation of the peasants in the political process and tensions with some workers contributed to the strengthening of more threatening opposing groups. After MPLA’s stabilization in power, its biggest internal challenge came to be UNITA\(^{14}\) (and FLEC in a minor degree), since the governing elite was never timely able to consolidate the State’s power along all the territory because of the constant war (perhaps with the exception of the 1976-1978 period) (Malaquias 1999, 24). Even with these existing difficulties in the construction of State’s capacities, internal and external threats could be confronted due to foreign support, including for the extraction of their abundant natural resources (oil), which bailed revolutionary regional politics.

**Elites and Regional Foreign Policy in Angola (1975-1988)**

Angolan regional foreign policy derived from this ample process of State construction and from the centrality of MPLA’s elites. The president figure was relevant to the formulation of central guidelines of foreign policy. However, the party and its internal organs established the political objectives and primal action lines. The main decision spheres of MPLA were three: (i) the Party’s Congress, which gathered an assembly of delegates and established general political guidance; (ii) the Central Committee, which formulated specific politics in areas of its secretariat’s responsibility, including the Foreign Policy and Defense and Security departments; and (iii) the Political Bureau, organ elected by the Central Committee and more influent from the party, possessed the power of supervision of partisan policy implementation (that is, possessed great interference in the agenda). Relations between party and Executive ruled the foreign policy decision process. If the president, standing as the party’s president and head of government, was constrained by MPLA’s political-ideological action lines, he also had the capability of affecting the foreign policy by his particularities in the sense of implementation and by means of eventual agency spaces. Besides the president and the party, militaries turned out becoming gradually a vital input source both in domestic and foreign politics, due to internal and external security challenges (Malaquias

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14 UNITA did not have a clear political platform neither an ideological position. It maintained an ethnical speech of alignment to the *ovimbundu* and other Western and Southern Angolan groups (Tvedten 1997, 30–1). Peoples from these regions resented this pattern due to marginalization in the central government’s politics since the colonial era. However, the group detained an important charismatic leadership, Jonas Savimbi, and significant foreign support, what enabled it an effective reorganization after 1975’s defeat.

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include every worker in fields of activities. UNTA criticized the government’s management for not implementing a workers’ democratic participation in the production supervision (Wolfers and Bergerol 1983, 118–121).
Besides that, the existing pressures at the EDPE contributed to the conformation of the regional policy. The main pressures throughout the period were originated in the relations between internal groups (UNITA, FLEC) and their external allies (South Africa, Zaire, USA). South Africa stood out as the guarantor of the conservative regional order, who noticed in Angola a great threat to the maintenance of such order. Zaire, a secondary action country from the region, also noticed in Angola threats to the stability of a conservative order of neocolonial profile. Although great defenders of the liberal international order, the US prioritized regional stability and its gradual and safe transition to a liberal order, moving away from the possibility of radicalisms. Everyone’s actions, nevertheless, only tended to increase the regional tensions, once they made use of the force and had found, in Angola, a State and regime determined to guarantee its autonomy.

As a consequence, between 1975 and 1988 Angolan regional foreign policy was based on the attempt of transforming of the regional order as a means of increasing the State and the regime’s chances of surviving. In the long term, such strategy enabled the construction of a regional environment gradually favorable to the Angolan State unity and territorial integrity. The fulfillment of this strategy followed various fronts. Bargain instruments, as the support to the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) and to the African National Congress (ANC), were seen in a double way. Primarily, they were ideologically relevant, as a revolutionary and solidarity pan-African form (Marcum 1987, 79). Secondly, and most important, both movements were taken as bargain instruments facing UNITA’s main supporters. The revolutionary solidarity, although, was only one of three instruments adopted in the big regional strategy. The second of them was the configuration of regional alliances, what resulted in its ingress to the Frontline States (FLS) and the articulation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). At last, there was basic support from all those action fronts: the politics of strengthening State’s capacity (above all military) and the guarantee of constant support by extra regional allies’ forces, assessors and equipment. This instrument capacitated Angola’s action in every scenario, including if both the previous ones would fail. It served as a means of assuring its survival facing the internal forces in Cabinda and in the South and the aggressive regional rivals (South Africa and Zaire). However, the revolutionary regional project gradually lost its impetus, due to South-African inflexion and reduced State capacity (added to the expectations of reduction of foreign support) to afford the changing’s internal and external costs.
Elites and Regional Foreign Policy in Neto (1975-1979)

During the brief government of Agostinho Neto, the EDPE were gradually structured in the party’s main leaderships, as already seen before. The rhetoric of non-alignment and independence of the president gave the initial tone of the external action. Neto’s position could be seen in the autonomist politics against USSR, since this country had been reluctant about offering support to the party on the threshold of the independence. Neto’s vice and MPLA’s ideological politician, Lúcio Lara, recalls that only after MPLA had obtained Yugoslavia’s support (armaments) and bigger support from Cuba was that relations with USSR got better (Brittain 1996, 1). Neto looked for untying Angola from the Eastern-Western dispute and its cooperation with Cuba was privileged, since it was surrounded by the Third World ideal (Neto visited Cuba in 1976 and 1977, and Fidel and Raul Castro visited Angola in 1977). Neto’s political posture, as a priority, was guaranteeing its internal domain stability and finding resources for that. Nevertheless, with the acting of foreign forces, it got increasingly clear the difficulty of reaching stability without a foreign policy clearly revolutionary and active.

Internal and external to MPLA regime pressures were significant in that initial period. The conflicitive experience of the independence process – which occurred with great external mismanagement of regional rivals (Zaire and South Africa) and of extra regional powers (USA, USSR and Cuba) – and

15 For example, with the internal economic difficulties, Neto allowed the continuity of Western companies’ operations in Angola seeking the opening of diplomatic channels with the US.

16 The party’s influential leaders’ most revolutionary positioning, like Lúcio Lara, Iko Carreira and Paulo Jorge, kept growing stronger. These leaderships noticed Zaire and South Africa’s actions as part of the Cold War confrontation and in the context of a neocolonial domination in Africa. The more natural alternative would be the increment of the alliance with USSR and Cuba (Malaquias 1999, 25).

17 After the Portuguese’s removal in the beginning of 1975, MPLA sought guaranteeing control over the capital Luanda as means of assuring the State’s authority. The other groups equally noticed the relevance of this strategy and headed to the capital (Birmingham 1992, 49). FNLA followed through the North sustained by 1200 men from Zaire, meanwhile UNITA took South with South-African support.

18 The US disrespected the Alvor Agreement and sent, already in January 1975, US$300 thousand in aid to FNLA, mediated by CIA’s station in Zaire. In response, Eastern European countries sent weapons and equipment to MPLA, what was reinforced by the Soviet support, closer to independence. Foreign military attaches, Cubans overall, also served as support to the movement. UNITA received in the same epoch around US$32 million in secret aid from the US to avoid Luanda’s control by MPLA (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 148–9). The support was, however, insufficient to take the capital from MPLA, which counted with the increase of Cuban forces (2000 troops), that helped in the blockage of the Southern offensive and in the expulsion of FNLA, which was already penetrating the capital.
resulted in MPLA still unstable victory concurred. After the independence, the more significant pressures to EDPE’s security, therefore, were bounded to the State and the regime’s consolidation. Internally, threats to Neto’s leadership emerged within MPLA through Nito Alves’ radical movement, that looked for removing the group from Luanda (more moderated and, relatively, intransigent) from power, ascribing a coup d’état on May 27, 1977. More than a competition among the elites, social pressure from rival groups became constant, coming from FNLA, FLEC and, mostly, UNITA. Externally, there were direct attacks from South Africa, which had as pretext SWAPO’s demobilization, and the continuity of the support to UNITA’s reorganization. In the North, Zaire retreated after FNLA’s defeat, but remained harmful to Neto’s leadership.

As a consequence, Neto and MPLA’s summit implanted a vindicatory and proactive regional foreign policy to assure the existence of the State and MPLA’s recognition. For such, the foreign policy should serve as instrument for the victory in the civil war, what, in turn, implied the transformation of the regional order. It was sought at the same time (i) the recent independent States’ sovereignty defense, (ii) the construction of regional mechanisms of development distribution (SADCC) guided by the imperative of the regional populations’ social rights and (iii) the construction of a regional security framework based on solidarity, that was sustained on the comprehension that their own security was linked to the ones of allied neighboring groups and States.

The less costly action was sustained on the establishment of regional alliances with FLS, complemented by an attempt of mediation and regional dialog with South Africa and Zaire. Personally, Neto believed there was space for mediation. He initially interpreted that “[...] state’s territorial integrity ultimately depended on its ability to establish good relations with neighboring states” (Malaquias 1999, 25). Such stance was increasingly less viable as the responses from his neighbors did not align to cooperation expectations (South Africa’s Total Strategy) and as the party’s hard line assumed major role. The result was the gradual growth of military operations on Northern

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19 The attempt soon failed due to poor planning, to insufficient support by the population and military and to the opposition on the part of Cuban forces (Birmingham 1992, 73–76). The movement served to accelerate the State’s reform politics finished in the adoption of the Marxism-Leninism in 1977.

20 South Africa supported UNITA’s resurgence and its bases’ expansion in Cuando-Cubango (Southeast) to the central uplands, where infrastructural axis (Benguela railway) was located.

21 Besides that, on July 21, 1978, Neto stated that he did not have reserves in establishing diplomatic relations with the USA. Washington, although, maintained the precondition of the Cubans’ exit and the internal reconciliation with its proxy UNITA.
and Southern fronts as complement and alternative to the diplomatic initiative. At the Northern front, Shaba I and Shaba II wars were indicative of the opposing and reacting to the conservative regional forces’ impulsive posture. This was represented by two armed conflicts that occurred in 1977 and 1978, respectively, that were MPLA’s answer to the invasion Zaire’s troops. At the Southern front, the defense and opposition to the South-African order policy was based in the increasing support to movements for national liberations opposing to the apartheid regime, which identified in MPLA the its regional order’s principal enemy.

**Elites and Regional Foreign Policy in Dos Santos (1979-1988)**

Along with Agostinho Neto’s death on September 10, 1979, the rise of José Eduardo dos Santos represented the exhaustion of the negotiated option and the advance of the defensive and combative regional policy suggested by the party’s hard line. Dos Santos carried personal bounds with the communist bloc. He was an oil engineer graduated in the USSR, what increased his proximity with that country and Cuba, making it easier the increment of cooperation to confront internal challenges. Dos Santos sought centralizing the foreign policy decision process by establishing, in 1984, a Defense and Security Council (chaired by the president himself), which came to be the nation’s highest decision organ (Hodges 2004, 53). The institution shows the increment of the centrality of a closed and nearby group to the president in the process of foreign policy definition.

Besides that, Dos Santos’ insecurity facing the inner elites contributed to a closer alignment with the USSR and Cuba. Dos Santos worried about the deterioration of the internal situation and was in a more fragile position because he was young (37) and hadn’t participated significantly in the liberation war. There was the need for creating a political base more solid and establishing command and leadership over the militaries. USSR and Cuba, in turn, then had more interests in acting in the Angolan conflict. In refer-

22 In March 1977, Neto gave Angolan tacit support to the invasion of Zaire by thousands of katangueses to the Katanga province (current Shaba). The so-called National Front for the Liberation of Congo (FNLA)’s Tigers took Mobutu unprepared and unwarned. However, due to the great importance of Shaba to Zaire’s economy and to the world investments in the country (Kolwezi, focus of the attacks, was one of the cities with greater copper reserves in Zaire), a coordinated intervention by the Western was launched and guaranteed Mobutu’s protection in both occasions.

23 The first, to confront the North-American foreign policy’s growing conservatism. The second, in order to strengthen its leadership position in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in a time of international economic crisis. The renewed alliance with USSR and Cuba proved itself
ring to armed conflicts, the pressure on the North turned out giving in space for the conflagrations on the South. The Northern front settled down due to the results of the Shaba Wars and the Southern front became definitely the main stage of the war. It was in that time that South Africa expanded its involvement in the Angolan conflict. South-African forces occupied the country’s South and declared public support to UNITA and guaranteed a protector shield to the group’s operations, now even more impactful. Extra regional pressure came from the linkage’s North-American policy, which involved Angola directly in the bargain for Namibia’s Independence, putting Cuban presence as bargaining chip to the South-Africa’s removal from the Southern territories. This diplomatic constructive engagement, that rhetorically tried to build a momentum of trust and distancing with the apartheid, was complemented by a strategic engagement with the Reagan Doctrine.

The growth of internal and foreign threats took José Eduardo dos Santos, in an initial moment, to deepen their alliance with USSR. Three months after assuming presidency, he traveled to that country seeking guarantee of the Soviet help’s abidance. The military support guaranteed the sustainability of MPLA’s domestic and regional politics (BRITTAIIN, 1986). The fundamental to face new challenges to the State’s stability, overall on Southern of the territory.

24 In spite of showing the tension level that Angola and Zaire lived back then, the Shaba wars enabled and agreement between both countries in mid 1978. Zaire compromised to not provide aid for UNITA, FLEC and FNLA – while Angola promised to disarm the Tigers and stress efforts to reopen the Benguela railway (Leogrande 1980, 27). Mobutu’s promise was only partially fulfilled (it remained as aid logistical axis to UNITA and supported destabilizing minor groups, like the Resistance Military Committee of Angola), but Zaire moved away from the Southern Africa region, sustaining indirect participation, to return and participate actively in the regional dynamics only in the 1990 decade.

25 In 1979, UNITA was already reorganized by the South African Defense Force (SADF) and looked for operating in the Center-South of the country, with the purpose of causing great devastation to the economic activities, blocking the Benguela railway, attacking agricultural production and villages in the productive region of the central upland, and planning operations on the North to break governmental access to the oil and diamonds’ exploration (Malaquias 1999, 28). Its scorched earth strategies, robbery, loot and sabotage of medical trucks took millions to death and hunger. In response, MPLA dealt with the populations regimented by UNITA with equal cruelty, recalling the liberation war profile. Between 1982-83, UNITA and South Africa’s attacks intensified and a big part of Cunene province was taken. In 1983, UNITA attacked Cangamba, at Moxico province, with South-African aerial support (which was testing new equipment). That year finished with the South-African units 300 km inside the country (Chan 1990, 57–9).

26 These trips were repeated as UNITA’s threats grew (1983, 1986 and 1988). In 1986, Dos Santos signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union.

27 However, there was little communist economic support, once Angola, like Mozambique, was not part of the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). Consequently, there
last one maintained the position of significant transformation of the order to more distributive principles. It is certain that because of the difficulties maintaining the program for strengthening State’s capacities, Dos Santos tried to assess P. W. Botha’s dialog capability in the negotiations that led to the Lusaka Agreement in 1984. However, due to the difficulty of a regional dialoged exit’s consolidation, Angola, as an answer, looked for resuming a survival fight with Soviet and Cuban support. The intensity of the armed conflicts increased since 1985, with bigger South-African involvement and North-American support to UNITA. Only when Angolan troops inputted great defeat to South-African forces in Angola’s South there were bigger conditions for a negotiated solution. That would occur in the 1987/1988 battles, overall at Cuito Cuanavale. More scathing negotiations began in May 1988, when USA and USSR “were increasingly in accord on the need for settlements of ‘regional conflicts’ ” (Minter 1994, 49).

The tripartite agreement was seen by Angola and South Africa as beneficial. South Africa could see the exit of 50 thousand Cubans and gave in to the inevitable independence of Namibia. Angola could see itself free from the South-African threat on the Southern borders and didn’t need to compromise at the moment to any agreement involving UNITA, weakened by the withdrawal of its main supporter. The US, on the other hand, saw the diplomacy of constructive engagement as a victory, in spite of the destruction that it and its counterpart (Reagan Doctrine) had brought to the region. With the perspective of the South-African regression and the transformation of the regional order, Angolan foreign policy ambitions for change and its impetus for action was the need to find support from Western capitals, what increased the State’s vulnerability.

28 The agreement foresaw the removal of the South-African forces from Angola, which would keep SWAPO’s activities under control. South Africa should also embrace the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)’s Resolution 432, about the independence of Namibia. Nevertheless, just as in Nkomati, South Africa did not honor its compromises; it took it more than a year to withdraw its troops and never stopped sustaining UNITA.

29 In 1985, in the Mavinga Battle, MPLA waged a big scale military operation complemented by previous diplomatic strategies of approaching with UNITA’s supporter countries, like Morocco, Zaire and Ivory Coast. South Africa abandoned at once the negotiated solution and mobilized military support (including aerial) to UNITA’s forces, saving FAPLA’s advancement group and setting the restart point of direct military interventions in South Africa (Chan 1990, 57–9).

30 In 1986, the US openly provided US$25 million for Savimbi (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 149). Reagan provided sophisticated weapons to UNITA’s forces, like Stinger anti-aerial missiles (one of Savimbi’s greatest wishes expressed in a trip to Washington occurred in January 1986). The costs of low intensity wars were low only for the Pentagon, as they left a devastating mark in human lives and negative impacts on development for the third world countries, given its contra-revolutionary strategy (Birmingham 1992, 84; Klare 1985 on-line).
were temporarily reduced.

To sum up, and in Neto’s era (1975-79), MPLA’s unstable political leadership tried to find some compensation on the strengthening of the State capacities policy and distributive politics that were reproduced in a developmental regional project. The increasingly internal and external pressures were responded to with high impetus of regional action for change. With the rise of Dos Santos (1979-88), the relative increment of the coercive capacities and its bigger foreign support guaranteed the reaction to great external pressure capacity by means of an even more impulsive support politics to SWAPO and ANC and military reaction against South-African invasion. In counterpart, at the time of the transition in 1988, the reduction of external pressure with the retraction of South Africa enabled the reduction of the impetus for action and the flexibility of the regional project (accepting the linkage and greater dialog with the West).

STATES, ELITES AND FOREIGN POLICY IN ANGOLA (1989-2010)

At Southern Africa, the transition of the global order in the post-Cold War and apartheid regime in South Africa concurred to the emergence of a regional order of liberal nature that worked in favor of the remaining of the South-African centrality. The human rights’ defense and the accepting of foreign mismanagement came to coexist in an unstable way with the principle of respect for the States’ negative sovereignty (juridical). Economic liberalization, represented by the implementation of structural adjustment programs, was adopted, even in the old socialist or Marxist-Leninist regimes, and the regional integration institutions embraced its fundamentals. The “good” governance principle and the development of welfare slant programs, and often unlinked to jobs and income for the population alternatives, kept acquiring priority. Human safety passed from a rhetoric discussion to a national security forces’ reform justification and as foundation to the management of regional security. With miscellaneous impetus, Angola kept positioned in favor for the change of the status quo fundamentals, seeking the construction of a sovereignty of the weakest (juridical and empirical) defense order, which would prioritize the guarantee of social rights and that would sustain a collective security (regional and national) perspective. Its stance facing the regional order can be understood by the study of the construction of the State process and of the interests and the EDPEs’ security.

The end of the Cold War brought with it great challenges for Angola. Like South Africa, Angola gradually would lose its strategic importance in the global systemic competition. Its main allies experienced State fragmentation (USSR and Eastern European countries) or isolation (Cuba). On the other hand, the challenge was accompanied by the distension of the regional order and the opening of action spaces for the country. With South Africa’s transition and the guarantee of a less offensive to MPLA’s interests in regional order, the government could focus its energies in the solution of the inner conflict. Moreover, the global liberal order more actively defended by the one superpower left (US) reduced the earnings in affording the economic and political costs of Jonas Savimbi’s violent enterprise. After, the abundance of strategic natural resources and the relevance of its position in the South Atlantic would make Angola get back its global strategic role for traditional (US) and emerging powers (China, Brazil and Russia).

Internally, the challenges were more important due to the economic, social and human destruction generated by decades of war and the continuity of conflagrations in different fronts. The scale of the problem continued draining resources that could be destined for development politics. Since the beginning of the 1990 decade, Angola established four big transitions, “from war to peace and reconciliation; from humanitarian emergency to rehabilitation, recovery and development; from an authoritarian, one-party system of governance to pluralist democracy; and from a command economy to one based on the laws of the market” (Hodges 2004, 199). An even bigger challenge was confronting those transitions simultaneously (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 141). The first movement was initiated in December 1990, when the Party’s Congress renounced formally to the Marxism-Leninism and consolidated, in May 1991, a constitutional reform that promulgated a democratic and multiparty State. The reform opened space for an electoral legislation that sustained the elections of September 1992. In the same month, a new constitutional review was approved, establishing governmental decentralization mechanisms. Concomitantly, the country’s name was altered to Republic of Angola. Furthermore, the challenges resulted in increasing State capacity efforts, what enabled the nation to stabilize itself internally and made possible more audacious politics in regional and continental degrees.

State Capacity: coercion, capital and legitimacy

Angola was the last country of Southern Africa’s interactions core to stabilize its civil war. The extension and depth of its armed conflict provided
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to the country great capacities differential, but also considerable challenges. To concerning the coercion, with the Tri-party Agreement and the consequent removal of the Cuban troops, Angola became more and more solitary in the combat against the (then predominant) internal security threats. That reality was faced by means of great investments in the modernization of the Angolan Armed Forces (name adopted after 1992). In spite of the past cooperation with most of the regional countries, threats from internal guerilla groups operating in national and foreign land (in general, supported by rival regimes), during all the period, legitimized increasing expenses with defense and the embracement of robust armed forces and of an equipment profile that approaches capacities for regular war. During the war against UNITA, Angola developed one of the continent’s most powerful Armed Forces (Jane’s 2009, 5), which, until 2002, were established in three of its four neighboring States (DRC, Congo and Namibia), with occasional fights in the border with Zambia. After 1999, the increase of the oil prices enabled a relative modernization process of the AAF, overall the army’s and the aeronautics’, within a period that also embraced the final phase of the fight against UNITA. Since the beginning of the efforts to oppose UNITA’s operations resumption, there was the acquisition of new equipment and new training and doctrinal modernization programs. After 2002, the new Angolan Security Sector Reform

31 The armed forces reform began in the 1990 decade with the first UNITA’s integration of insurgents in the national institutions and the posterior downsizing of the forces and reduction of military expenses. The reform failed as occurred the resumption of the conflicts on UNITA’s part in 1998.

32 Between 1998 and 2000, it was bought from the Warsaw Pact’s stocks 320 MBTs (Main Battle Tanks), 160 AIFVs (Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles), more than 100 pieces of artillery, 46 multi-rochet launcher, some Sukhoi Su-22 Fitter airplanes (reinforcing the stock of these airplanes already existent) and some Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters. Qualitative advances also were obtained by the acquisition of some units of more modern equipment, as the Sukhoi Su-27 Flankek fighter aircraft (Jane’s 2009).

33 There was the training of the AAF on Portugal’s part in the 1990-decade and, most of all, by South-African and North-American private military companies since 1993. It even can be mentioned a training military agreement firmed in 2000 with Russia, regarding technical support for the usage of just bought equipments from former ex-USSR countries.

34 If until the 1990 decade the Angolan military doctrine put together aspects from the Portuguese military thinking, the Soviet, the Cuban and the Warsaw Pact schools, in the mid-1990s the resumption of war on UNITA’s part provoked a subtle alteration in that profile. The foreign assistance from Executive Outcomes enabled a refinement of the Soviet era style, through the creation of new Handling Operational Groups, of reduced aspects. It is about reduced type formation battalions and with conventional capacity, though much faster and more flexible. Such reality made possible to defeat the insurgents as if it were a conventional threat in 2000, modifying its combat mobility profile, the guerilla. Thus, it is enhanced that, despite the formation was specialized in the mobility profile, the conventional strategy remained present in the AAF and visible through the army’s size and the last acquisitions’ profile (MBTs).
(SSR) included the integration of a little part of the rebel forces and was accomplished almost without foreign support, besides currently being based on the more concrete effort of structuring a national army. As a partial result of that strengthening process, Angola was enabled for the position of regional power (Castellano da Silva 2012).

In the capital sphere, the availability of natural resources generated great opportunities and challenges for the strengthening of the State. The availability of oil financed the AAF reform process and enabled the autonomy of the State in the definition of the strategy adopted in the conflict. Furthermore, after 2002 the Angolan economy was directly benefited because of the end of the civil war and the increase in the oil prices with the proximity of the Iraq War. Diamonds also bring a certain comfort to the Angolan economy, mostly after the approval of the origin certification scheme of the mineral through the 2003’s Kimberley Process (introduced by the resolution 55/56/2003 from AGNU). Notwithstanding, the availability of natural resources equally caused at least three big challenges to the strengthening of the State, namely: (i) collaborated directly for the continuity almost undetermined of armed conflicts; (ii) the availability of “easy” resources slowed the economy’s diversification process and the increment of capital accumulation; and (iii) contributed, as a consequence, to the detachment of the State from society. The economic dependence from natural resources and the destruction of other economic sectors (fishing, coffee production and industry) with the war

35 The demobilization program looked for reintegrating approximately 100 thousand UNITA’s men to the society. From these, only 5 thousand would be admitted in the armed forces and in the national politics. In the biggest ranks, 30 UNITA’s generals were incorporated to the AAF and three UNITA’s brigadiers were established in the Angolan National Politics (PNA).

36 That, upon the former priorities of (i) increasing the armed forces’ professionalism, mostly the army’s; (ii) rising soldiers’ combat readiness; (iii) incrementing the personnel and the equipment’s organization, control and registration; (iv) growing the discipline imposition; and (v) improving the soldiers’ life conditions and increasing the literacy rates among the militarieds (Jane’s 2009, 71).

37 The oil funded the central government’s action while the diamonds (mostly alluvial, of easy access) gave life for the continuity of Savimbi’s operations for almost three decades, begetting between 1992 and 2000 circa US$4 billion in revenue (Billon 2001, 69).

38 The victory in the war did not implicate the establishment of economic diversification and internal development, but guaranteed the continuity of enclave economy based on natural resources, in which the oil segment corresponds to almost 60% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

39 The natural resources garnered to the State action capability without accounting to the society, as it had “autonomous” and undefined funding capacity. Also there are few limits for corruption, considering it is estimated that billions of annual dollars derived from the oil economy are not accounted (Global Witness 2002).
denote the demand for development of other sectors of the national economy.

In the legitimacy sphere, the difficulties derived from civil war (destruction and leakage of resources), tied to scarcity of human resources, led to big bureaucratic problems. Although there were significant investments in the coercive capacity and increase of natural resources’ proceeds, the State had difficulties in expanding its presence over the territory and performing basic tasks. In the 1990 decade, lacks of incoming made bureaucracy operate frequently on a voluntary basis or extorting populations.\textsuperscript{40} The providing of public services, like health, education, transportation and communication, was equally damaged due to years of war and the economic liberalization process.\textsuperscript{41} On the other hand, political rights were broadened since the Bicesse Accords from May 1991, enabling the establishment of constitutional reforms and multiparty elections, although only partially respected. After the civil war, because of the necessity of the political forces’ accommodation, a new legislative election to the National Assembly (unicameral parliament) happened just in September 2008.\textsuperscript{42} Notwithstanding, national identity has been slowly reconstituted. The unity is sustained by the role of politics for an integrated and educated in the official language and in the civic traditions’ national army construction.

\textit{The State-Society Relations}

Even though constitutional and political reforms have been imple-

\textsuperscript{40} The period between 1991 and 1992 was of big euphoria, what can be observed by the number of voters (91\% of the electorate) that participated on the legislative election on September 1992. However, the presidential election’s results (40\% for Savimbi and 49\% for Dos Santos) were not satisfactory to the UNITA’s leader, who abandoned the second turn and returned to the armed battle.

\textsuperscript{41} The end of the armed conflict did not elide the habitation difficulties of previously battled regions, as almost four million Angolans were moved internally (2,6 million only after 1998). The proliferation of landmines affects millions of individuals’ lives and harms the soils’ cultivation. Some studies put Angola in the worst world positions as of number of amputees. The public health, education and access to basic services’ situation is dreadful. The employment level is still insufficient, wherein the informal segment corresponds to almost 60\% of the economy (Bauer and Taylor 2005, 141, 147). In the justice sphere, the constitutionally expected Supreme Court was established only in 2008. The difficulties affect inclusively the common justice, which suffers of lack of boards and low payment.

\textsuperscript{42} MPLA obtained 191 of 120 chairs (81,63\% of the votes), while UNITA (then consolidated Isaias Samakuva’s leadership) was the second more voted party, guaranteeing only 16 chairs (10,39\% of the votes) (EISA 2009). The presidential elections scheduled for 2009 were postponed due to 2010’s constitutional reform and the changing of the rules for the election of the president. The new Constitution established that the president becomes automatically the leader of the party with bigger stand at the National Assembly (AGO 2010, art. 109) (i)).
mented since the beginning of the 1990 decade, MPLA remains with absolut e dominance in the parliament and centralizes a big part of the political decisions on the president. According to Birmingham (2002, 177), “from being a single party state with a disaffected opposition thinly scattered in the provinces and abroad, Angola became a presidential state in which power emanated from the palace”. Besides pointing positions for the ministries, the president assured the prerogative of pointing governors for the 18 provinces, thus controlling the national Executive and guaranteeing dominance over MPLA.

The main State-society relation dilemma was based in the continuity of UNITA’s armed insurgence. After the Lusaka Agreement’s failure pacifying Savimbi, the war resumed in 1998. If UNITA had already been defeated by conventional means, in 2000, the adoption of guerilla tactics by the insurgent group brought an impasse for the conflict, which was only broken in February 2002, with Jonas Savimbi’s death in combat and with the AAF’s military victory. Consequently, the formal cease-fire was established in Luena (April 4, 2002) and followed by the UNITA demobilization. Another overcome security threat was the one present in the Cabinda enclave (FLEC), demobilized in 2006. At last, the organized crime is one more internal security problem in Angola and involves diamonds, narcotics and light weapons’ traffic. The main networks were established during the conflict against UNITA and the Congos wars and still remain in the present time (Jane’s 2009, 16). The mobilization of the civil society is fragile, given the fundamental worry about the livelihoods. However, after the 1990 decade restrictions for NGOs were abolished and religious groups and liberal institutions constituted themselves as means of an opposition platform to the government. In response to signals of new pressure, the government supports the emergence of organizations, like Eduardo dos Santos Foundation’s (FESA), which work as point of stand to the government. The increase of State capacities start as from mid-1990 and the big pressure against the governing elite oscillation in the period (high initial pressure, followed by the distension of the threats) can help explaining EDPE’s choices for changes in the regional foreign policy.

**Elites and Regional Foreign Policy in Angola (1989-2010)**

After the abrasion caused by decades of internal and external wars, the 1990s witnessed the reduction of MPLA’s power as a foreign policy defin-
ing institution. Concomitantly to the dissolution of the State’s Marxist-Leninist structure and the relative loss of space by the party, the president turned out acquiring an increasing role, almost exclusive in the foreign policy defining. The Futungo de Belas Palace, however, received inputs from important actors. While the Foreign Affairs Ministry faced big difficulties, along with a bad trained and little effective bureaucracy, the militaries turned out collecting great respectability in the foreign policy. It’s about a national institution with great bureaucratic capability and competence, acquired throughout the years of investment in the 1980 and 1990 decades (circa 25% of the budget). Its regional negotiations credibility took soldier-diplomats to acquire roles as ambassadors in important places, like New York (Gen. Antonio Fanca “Ndalu”, ex-commandant of the General Staff) and South Africa (Gen. Alexandre Rodrigues Kito, ex-minister from the inland) (Malaquias 2002, 14).

Dos Santos’ preponderance and the military’s active participation defined State’s security as an increasingly priority in the foreign policy agenda, competing with the valorization of regional security. Low competition between elites made UNITA and FLEC’s armed operations the State’s main concern during the whole period. The focus was to extrapolate national borders and look for attacking the support sources of those armed groups. After the rebel groups’ defeat, the political elites seem to get back to solving internal problems tied to the reconstruction of State capacities and economic development. Its regional policy, as a consequence, was derived from this major problem: engaging in the system as a means of guaranteeing internal stability.

Therefore, Angolan regional policy for the post-Cold War period has focused on situations that are bounded directly to internal problems, related to the construction of the State. Its participation in DRC and Congo-Brazzaville wars (related to the broadening of regional borders), and the alliance with Namibia and the penetration of Zambia’s territory (to suppress UNITA’s forces) are indicators that seem to sustain such perception (Khadiagala 2001, 147). Moreover, the partnership between China and the US have mirrored this posture of using diplomacy in a pragmatic way as facilitator of the construction of the State process, currently based on the economic growth centered on the high commodities’ trade flow and on infrastructure investments. Such stance converges with the idea that there’s the necessity of “a form of Marshal Plan for the reconstruction of the country, which, in many respects, must involve the participation of the international community” (Dos Anjos 2008, 10).

Being “the mistrust a marking characteristic in the relations among individuals and institutions” (José 2011, 103), Angolan actions in the regional system seek, primarily, its own stability and survival. There was the recognition of the clear “connection between domestic security, regime survival, and
regional and international politics” (Malaquias 2011, 5–6). Notwithstanding, Angola succeeded throughout the period great victory in its foreign policy and the relative transformation of the regional system for its own safety, from an environment surrounded by enemies to a region relatively stable to consolidate its interests.

**Elites and Regional Foreign Policy in Dos Santos, transition period (1989-2002)**

Along with the regime’s liberalization and MPLA’s ideological transition, president José Eduardo dos Santos assumed leading role in the foreign policy formulation and execution. Besides that, the army became “an executor of the government’s foreign policy, particularly when it involves the use of force at the regional level” (Malaquias 2002, 17). MPLA, even though had reduced its relative role in the foreign policy formulation, acted as important articulator of Angola’s international image recovery.44

The main challenges for the EDPE’s security were linked to internal pressures from the civil war. Primarily, it is important to stress that the transition from a proxy conflict to an internal conflict was gradual and limited, given the continuity of external participation and support side by side. However, the conflict’s focus gradually was transferred to the domestic dynamics. In 1989, Dos Santos gave sign of renewed disposition for initiating a second track of negotiations over the conflict in Angola, that is, the phase of resolution of the domestic conflict. Reduction of regional pressure, combined with bigger extra regional engagement (USA, USSR and Portugal) and sharp domestic challenges (economic crisis) gave space for a bigger compromising with a balanced agreement, firmed in Bicesse in April 199145 (Malaquias 1999, 33–36). Yet, the Bicesse Accord just confirmed the end of the proxy stage tendency from Angola war and not the accommodation of the internal conflict.46 With the Lusaka Protocol (November 1994), the international

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44  MPLA’s general secretary, João Lourenço, took on a pro-active function in foreign policy and sought to improve the party’s prestige. He visited various countries in the 1990 decade (US, China, Portugal, France, South-Africa, Israel) to reaffirm relations and to guarantee credibility for the Angolan peace process.

45  On April 25, 1990, Dos Santos’ government announced it would start direct negotiations with UNITA, mediated by Portugal. The US and the USSR notified Savimbi and the minister of foreign affairs of Angola, Pedro de Castro Van Dunem, that they would not provide military and financial support anymore to their allies if the war went on. At last, on May 31, 1991, the Bicesse Accord was signed. It foresaw democratic transition in the country and the end of foreign military support for the parts in conflict (Bekoe 2008).

46  The elections were internationally supervised and happened in 1992, but the results were
Community assumed higher participation in the process and power-sharing arrangements were adopted (Stedman, Rotchild, and Cousens 2002)\(^47\). Yet, the civil war was restored four years later, thanks to UNITA’s renewed financing capacity by means of diamonds’ traffic. Savimbi was obstinate to take the power and didn’t glimpse a possible solution if not the military victory.

In response, Angola’s regional foreign policy in this period acquired a militant character against UNITA and the establishment of a regional collective security primal principle, at least on the Northern borders. Active diplomatic actions were aimed to shake Savimbi’s credibility.\(^48\) Angola’s regional actions still focused on establishing a direct relation between regional order and domestic stability, and due to the growing accommodation of the Southern borders, Angola’s impetuous performance took shape on the Northern regional borders. It waged military operations in 1997 to strike Mobutu’s regime in Zaire and Pascal Lissouba’s in Congo-Brazzaville (both UNITA’s supporters), and, in 1998, to defend Laurent Kabila’s regime in DRC. In the First Congo War, Angola had very particular interests to engage. It was about capturing Joseph Savimbi, demobilizing UNITA’s secret army, which came back to war after 1994 and 1995 conciliations (it was believed that 15 thousand men were operating in Zaire), and breaking its diamonds’ trading networks. Angola had a great leading role, giving in logistic help and assistance in Kinshasa’s capture.\(^49\) In the Second Congo War, Angolan actions reproduced the

\(^47\) UNITA would disarm its combatants, who next would be attached to the national army and would compromise in devolving its administration areas to the central government (Hodges 2001, 61). MPLA offered posts in the government and in the national army with the purpose of creating a Unity and National Conciliation Government (GURN), besides giving the post of vice-president for Savimbi. The cease-fire would be observed by 7500 troops from the UN.

\(^48\) João Lourenço, for example, went on meetings with President Mbeki in January 2000 to show Angola’s dissatisfaction towards destabilizing operations perpetrated in the country by South-Africans. The Fowler Report suggested, yet, that UNITA continued obtaining weapons from South-Africa, accusing a delegation from UNITA for coming to the country in August 1999 and obtaining an anti-aerial battery of 35mm (UN 2000, para. 30). Moreover, Angola declared boycott to the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) 36th meeting in Togo, due to that country’s support to UNITA (Malaquias 2002, 17).

\(^49\) Angola decided to enter the war in December 1996 and sent observers to the Bukavu region (Eastern of Zaire). In January and February of 1997 several Angolan freighters, produced in Russia, took soldiers and weapons from Luanda to Kigali (Malaquias 2002, 23; McKinley 1997). In February 1977, 2000 and 3000 troops arrived from Katanga’s Tigers, coming from Angola and passing through Rwanda. There was, still, in April 1997, an effort from Angola’s
Angola’s regional foreign policy: changes facing the systemic order (1975-2010)

Regional security principle and the defense of allied countries’ juridical and empirical sovereignty. Angola had genuinely security interests to engage in the conflict\(^50\), even though its engagement had been profitable.\(^51\) Despite the low number and the poor maintenance situation of the forces employed in Congo (2,4 to 5 thousand men), its aerial power was a decisive advantage in the war and guarantee of Kinshasa’s defense (Reyntjens 2009, 199; ICG 2000, 4; Turner 2002). Angola’s impetuous defense action of a regional order that would bail its internal security was, nevertheless, at its final days. The efforts concentration to the internal conflict’s military solution and the threats’ accommodation noticed over the region reduced its impetus for action in the following period.

Elites and Regional Foreign Policy in Dos Santos, post-Cold War (2002-2010)

Along with the settling of almost thirty years of civil and regional war, Angola emerged as the utmost winner of the conflict, having defeated its main regional rivals. The result, forth above, was followed by a quantitative and qualitative reorganization of the AAF that, in terms of military capacity, positioned the State as an emergent regional power in Southern Africa. On the other hand, Angolan political institutions remained archaic and its economic structure is still widely based on the exports of natural resources. Moreover, Angola’s foreign policy characteristics don’t seem to indicate an interest by the country’s part in assuming a leading role in the regional system or in accomplishing extreme changes in the systemic order. Truly, the exces-

50 Primarily, there was a debit with the katangueses that had fought in the first Congo War in assistance of MPLA. Secondly, Angola noticed the necessity of waging a new particular war with UNITA, which was getting close to Uganda and Rwanda – with the organization’s vice-president’ trips to Kigali and Savimbi’s to Uganda. That way, Angola had every interest in avoiding DRC becoming again a nook of supplement lines (diamonds) to UNITA. Thirdly, Angola wanted to protect its own territory (mostly the Cabinda region, rich in oil and disconnected from the Angolan territory) – considering that Uganda and Rwanda sent troops to Bas-Congo, in the Angolan yard.

51 Agreements between Laurent Kabila and José Eduardo dos Santos’ governments allowed the establishment of a joint venture between Sonangol (60%) and COMIEX (40%) for the supply of gasoline to DRC and the future joint oil exploration on both countries’ coasts. Besides that, the Angolan government “demanded compensations, in the form of diamonds concession, for military expenses incurred when helping the Congolese government” (Nest 2006, 51).
sive emphasis given by Luanda to the maintenance of internal security and reduced external pressure resulted in a foreign policy of declining impetus. More and more Angola only interferes in regional politics in case its internal stability is at stake. As the preexistent pressures tended to decline, its performance has followed more and more the same path.

From a formal point, Angolan foreign policy’s goals are wide, and prioritize, among other themes, “[...] the reinforcement of African identity and the strengthening of African States’ action in favor of the empowerment of African peoples’ cultural [sic] patrimony”. Furthermore, the country aims “[...] the participation, within the regional or international organizations’ framework, in peace maintenance forces and in military cooperation and collective security systems [sic]” (AGO 2010, Art. 3, my emphasis). In fact, some authors enhance the proactive role of Angolan diplomacy in the regional problems solution. That cements a “picture of a country as a partner for stability and security” (José 2011, 114,122). José Eduardo dos Santos’ presidential diplomacy concurred to such prestigious position. The president had an “acknowledged leadership in the continent, what has been useful to broaden the country’s political credibility and endorse the trust in the guidelines and compromises taken by the government” (José 2011, 151).

Nevertheless, the announced goals, in practice, remain restricted by MPLA-PT’s government primal interests through the maintaining of the nation’s internal security and by the absence of external pressure towards Angola to act. After 2002, the last militarized pressure to the State and to the political elite was the one prevailing in the Cabinda52 enclave and the repositioning of military capacity and intelligence authorized military offensives that culminated in the defeat of most part of FLEC’s53 forces. In spite of the end of internal conflicts, Angola grounds its position facing the regional order security axis in its national security.54 An exception to this isolationist

52 It is worth reminding and reiterating that the control over the historical conflict in the region had already been obtained by Angolan interventions in DRC (1997 and 1998) and in Convo-Brazzavile (1997). However, the separatism came back to the security agenda when FLEC’s forces pressured Portugal’s government to facilitate the enclave’s independence, by means of the kidnapping of Portuguese citizens. In response, MPLA, even highlighting it would not give the enclave’s independence in, showed disposition for negotiation. This more flexible posture was abandoned in 2002, when the demobilization of troops in the Congos and the victory against UNITA enabled the displacement of troops for the separatism’s military suppression.

53 In the beginning of 2004, the rebels were practically vanquished, considering that military bases and guerilla’s leaders had been captured. The situation initiated peace attempts, the creation of a Cabindese Forum for Dialog (FCD), the amnesty of all the insurgents and the movement’s demilitarization. The peace agreement was established in August 2006, with the directive that the enclave would remain part of Angola, acknowledging a special status.

54 This concept stems from the historical experience with civil war, when the greatest threat to
profile may be noticed in the recent situation in DRC\textsuperscript{55} (besides Ivory Coast and Guinea-Bissau)\textsuperscript{56} in which the country looked for reaffirming a position aligned to national security. However, though it can signalize an eventual inflexion in the Angolan foreign policy, such behaviors are even more timid and weren’t grounded in any of those cases.\textsuperscript{57} As an example of this hesitant posture, president Dos Santos, once listing Angolan foreign policy’s main structuring, in a speech from 2011, mentions regional integration only as the tenth point and very generically, without explaining Southern Africa or the African continent (dos Santos 2011). This posture can also be explained by the remaining difficulties on letting Angola project its power and canvass recognition as regional leader.

Yet, the relative Angolan isolation spoils its own international insertion, as “the increase of Angola’s influence capability can’t be achieved through isolation or the pretentious resources’ self-sufficiency” (José 2011, 123). On the other hand, this posture also suppresses, in the short term, the possibility of its rising as regional power ending up in a hegemonic war in search for a revision of the regional order (Castellano da Silva and Brancher 2015).\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{55} Angola declared, in August 2006, that 30 thousand troops were prepared in the Angolan Cabinda province to be used against any new Rwandan invasion to Congo (STRATFOR 2006). That happened even when UNITA’s threats had already been demobilized.

\textsuperscript{56} The Angolan government’s emphatic positioning in the electoral crisis of Ivory Coast in 2011 – in favor of Laurent Gbagbo’s government stability and of a solution given by the African countries of peaceful and negotiated profile themselves – showed Angola’s more ambitious interests in continental politics. Furthermore, in March 2011, Angola started commanding the armed forces’ reform mission in Guinea-Bissau (MISSANG), as part of a politics, announced in 2009, that seeks the creation of mechanisms that increment regional security in the zone under the scope of the Gulf of Guinea Council (José 2011, 205,254).

\textsuperscript{57} In the case of Ivory Coast, the Angolan posture did not resulted in a politics articulated with other countries that shared its position in defense of president Laurent Gbagbo, what signalized limits to the recognition of the Angolan leading role in continental politics. Besides that, in Guinea-Bissau’s situation, internal and external pressures led the Angolan government to the closure of its operations on April 10, 2012, making way to the consolidation of the April 12’s military coup (UN 2012). Posteriorly, in DRC, Angola would see itself relatively dislocated from the diplomatic articulations that established a new UN’s intervention brigade (FIB) in Congo in 2013, a force integrated by South-Africa, Tanzania and Malawi, whose mandate presents unprecedented offensive character.

\textsuperscript{58} Meanwhile the national reconstruction efforts are sustained by high economic growth, Angola will be relatively satisfied with the limits of the region’s economic-commercial cooperation and with the current conflicts resolution alternatives. It is emphasized that Angola has recurrently postponed its adhesion to the Southern African Development Community’s
In synthesis, in the beginning of the 1990s, in order to respond to the State capacities’ instability the resumption of the armed battles on the part of UNITA Angola increased investments in the coercive State capacities, within an environment of greater MPLA legitimacy, due to the relative political democratization. MPLA’s elite, then dismissed from the Marxist-Leninist project, continued looking for the transformation of the regional order, excluded from the increasing alignment to the economic order based on the market. The continuity of high internal pressures, tied to external threats, was answered with great impetus for action on the region, by means of a regional security perspective bounded to the State’s own protection. After 2002, the reduction of internal and external security threats enabled the decrease of the country’s regional ambitions and the transference of the political focus to the reconstruction of internal capacities, given the challenges left by the civil war.

CONCLUSION

Between 1975 and 1988, Angola’s regional foreign policy was marked by a revolutionary posture, interested in big transformations in the regional order and performed with great impetus to the accomplishment of that goal, including direct and indirect military means. The origins of this foreign policy were located in the big internal and external threats faced by MPLA’s government of developmental profile, both during Agostinho Neto’s and José Eduardo dos Santos’ presidency. In the last case, the pressures became even more relevant given the success of South Africa’s destabilizing operations and UNITA’s strengthening. The active regional response was bailed by the State capacities’ strengthening politics, but overall by Cuba, USSR and Eastern European countries’ great foreign support, mainly in the coercive sphere. The revolutionary position in the region was gradually reduced by the prospect of changing in the regional order and by the solving the internal conflict priority. Between 1989 and 2010, foreign policy went from a brief isolationist interregnum, because of peace negotiations, to an impetuous posture in the region aiming guaranteeing regional security as part of its own internal security, given the resumption of armed confrontation on UNITA’s part in the end of the 1990 decade. The strengthening of State capacities’ enabled active external action, which decreased as external and domestic pressures (social insurgent

(SADC) Free Trade Area (VerAngola 2014), but does not show an alternative for this project (currently centered in the South-African economy). These points complement each other with the increase of the Pretoria-Luanda axis’ relations, strengthened with the rise of Jacob Zuma’s government, who has historical connections with Angola and that chose that country as the destination of its first official visit as South-African president in 2010.
groups) started to decline. MPLA’s elite currently has a reformist posture, but relatively subjected to the former order, as it’s recovering from almost thirty years of civil war (leaving out the years of the liberation war).

Finally, there’s still one question about the future: if the regional order was seen as directly associated to domestic conditions, what will be its foreign positioning profile after internal stability? It’s still soon to assess if Angola’s interests in the regional order will change or not and if its impetus will remain still or be expanded. Nevertheless, as there’s economic development and internal political stabilization, Angola leans on giving more attention to regional dynamics and increasing its impetus for action, just as South Africa did after the accommodation of the apartheid’s transition forces. On the other side, its posture concerning the status quo at the present time is much more inclined for the current liberal order, what can benefit economic and political elites. Therefore, although Angola’s tendency in the future is to perform more actively in the region, its alignment will possibly concur to the maintenance of the status quo, if not, with punctual reforms.

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Angola’s regional foreign policy: changes facing the systemic order (1975-2010)


ABSTRACT
The article addresses Angola’s foreign policy towards Southern Africa (1975–2010) and assesses its posture facing the changing order of the regional system and explanations for such behavior, linked to the process of construction of the State and the interests and security of the elites that define foreign policy.

KEYWORDS
Angola; Foreign Policy; Southern Africa.

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