BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONVERGENCE OF SISBIN AND ZOPACAS

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Introduction
This communication aims to address Brazilian perspectives on the convergence between Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN, in Portuguese), a Brazilian State institutional arrangement in the national defense sector established in 1999, and the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS, in Portuguese), a multilateral negotiation mechanism approved by the United Nations (UN), in 1986, following the initiative of Brazilian diplomacy. This paper, therefore, aims at analyzing the convergence of a country’s internal and external security and defense policies in a given regional context.

The ZOPACAS was created by a Brazilian initiative at the UN, which approved it in the context of the Cold War, the paradigm in force concerning decisions in International Politics at that time. Brazil was then initiating a democratization process, and the Zone of Peace and Cooperation was one of its new diplomatic initiatives.

As will be made explicit in this communication, SISBIN’s creation in 1999 is part of the Brazilian State democratization and reform process, which in the same year created the Ministry of Defense (MD), bringing together the three military Forces under a single ministerial structure. Also in 1999, the Military House was abolished and replaced by the Institutional Security Cabinet of the

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Presidency of the Republic (GSIPR, in Portuguese) which encompasses the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN, in Portuguese), SISBIN’s central body.

The White Paper on National Defense (LBDN, in Portuguese) (Brasil 2012), Brazil’s MD document, published in 2012, mentions SISBIN and ZOPACAS, what justifies the present research as one of the ways in which scholars and the Brazilian society can know more about and further increase their participation in the country’s international security and national defense public policies.

In this sense, the following sections seek to explain the relations between SISBIN and ZOPACAS in the Brazilian defense thought.

The low integration and effectiveness of ZOPACAS

In the context of the Cold War, Brazil successfully proposed, in 1986, the creation of ZOPACAS, bringing together South American and African countries, aiming at preventing the proliferation of nuclear and mass destruction weapons in the region, as well as military intervention from countries outside the South Atlantic zone.

The LBDN (ibid., 36) offers the following presentation for the Zone of Peace and Cooperation:

“Founded in 1986 by the United Nations, ZOPACAS has currently 24 members – South Africa, Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uruguay. In diplomatic terms, ZOPACAS’ enhancement is important for the country’s defense”.

Miyamoto (1987), evaluating ZOPACAS’ foundation at that time, was skeptical in relation to its efficacy and effectiveness and presented the following reasons for his skepticism:

“[…] the possibility of achieving a real zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic will only become a reality when some points are met: at the internal level of the States, the supremacy of the civil over the military order; at the global level, the obedience to international conventions by the great powers, respecting the sovereignty of the countries in the area; at the regional level, the resolution of the
Malvinas Islands problem; the definite burial of expansionist military projects based on geopolitical theories; at the Western African side, the end of the apartheid in South Africa and the independence of Namibia with the withdrawal of South African troops from this country. When these aspirations become concrete realities, it will be possible to speak, without any fear, of regional integration, in lasting agreements of any kind, and in a zone of peace on both sides of the great Atlantic lake”.

In the twenty-six years since ZOPACAS’ creation there have been only seven multilateral meetings, which represented small steps towards the achievement of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic. The first meeting took place in Rio de Janeiro, in 1988, when its initial operation was established. The second was in Abuja, Nigeria, in 1990, when a new design for the ZOPACAS was discussed, especially in face of the end of the Cold War, when South Atlantic lost its relative importance, since the area was like a counterpoint to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) activities, which in turn also lost part of its reason for existence in such historical context. Currently, such trend is being revised, as it will be reflected on later.

The third meeting took place in Brasilia in 1994, when a new basis to justify ZOPACAS was once more discussed and the proposals included emphasizing economic cooperation, maritime environment and the region’s denuclearization. The fourth meeting was held in 1996, in Cape Town, South Africa, and the fifth meeting, in 1998, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, where the cooperation agenda was further structured. However, it lacked an organizational infrastructure able to give ZOPACAS sustainability and effectiveness.

It would take almost a decade for the sixth meeting to take place and it was held in Luanda, Angola, in 2007, with the participation of all twenty-four member countries, which expressed the general will to revitalize the ZOPACAS. Nevertheless, it took almost seven years for the seventh meeting to take place in Montevideo, Uruguay (January 2013). In that meeting, it was discussed the political instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Guinea-Bissau. ZOPACAS’ inefficacy in situations like those was somehow ratified since it was suggested that other multilateral arrangements – African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community
of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) – took charge in promoting peace in the region.

Therefore, there is a multiplicity of multilateral mechanisms for international negotiation in Africa that can, to some extent, make innocuous the search for certain regional conflicts’ solutions through these means.

In summary, according to Kornegay (2013, 89), since its creation, ZOPACAS’ agenda may be summarized in the following points:

• Economic cooperation in eradicating poverty by creating partnerships for sustainable development, trade, investment and tourism;
• Crime prevention and combating drug trafficking, illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and transnational organized crime, including piracy;
• Peace, stability and security, including conflict prevention and peace-building within the Zone;
• Scientific research, environmental and marine issues;
• Cross-cutting issues and means of implementation;
• And the need for an implementation and follow-up mechanism.

Maintaining South Atlantic as a Zone of Peace at the present moment has been rather an attribute of the low economic, political and military interest in the region by the military powers, particularly those that make up NATO. However, recent discoveries of oil and other mineral resources in South Atlantic countries might change this scenario of relative peace.

“In summary, there is an Africa that is increasingly internationalized and definitely not marginal. It is at the center of a very strong competition of interests and stakeholders from all parts of the globe. If foreign direct investment grows consistently, coming from both large financial and productive firms, it is also true that these investments are driven by certain logic of Africa’s territorial occupation by the great powers, multilateral institutions and influential global economic groups anchored in state foundations.” (Saraiva 2008).

Saraiva (2010) also argues that in the case of African States, the whole continent must overcome four historic challenges, namely: first, the “low rates of power alternation within the continent” that induce to “dubious regimes and governments, going through a very slow process of institutionalization”; second,
the “international drug trafficking penetration” associated with armed conflicts in the continent, making Africa a trafficking corridor of people and drugs; third, the social exclusion and poverty barriers, despite significant economic growth in recent decades; and, fourth, internal policies, at times supported by “humanitarian aid” that promotes more continuity than stimulates changes, making the African societies somehow “dependent” of external “solutions”, undermining their autonomy and effective independence.

Some of ZOPACAS’ strategic interests for Brazil are below analyzed.

**Current Brazilian strategic interests in ZOPACAS**

The low level of Brazilian participation within ZOPACAS can be justified in part by the economic perspective, since analyzing Brazilian policy towards Africa in the post-Cold War period, it is noted that “Africa’s participation in Brazilian trade flows decreased from 7.8% to 2.81% in exports and from 13.6% to 3% in imports” (Ribeiro 2010).

This partly justifies, at least from the economic perspective, a low adherence and effectiveness of ZOPACAS since its creation as part of the Brazilian diplomatic action. In Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government (1995-2002), Brazil also had not been interested in a more intense economic exchange with the African continent, as explained by Ribeiro (ibid): “despite the fact that several African countries registered, between 1993-2002, an overall rate growth of 3.7% against less than 1% in previous years, no substantial change is observed in the Brazilian diplomatic actions towards the region”.

According to Ribeiro (ibid), Brazilian economy growth rates in the 1990’s were lower than in the previous decade, what led to “the closure of Brazilian diplomatic offices abroad, and particularly in the African continent, signalizing, on one hand, the weaknesses of the Union budget and, on the other, the foreign policy priorities”. This means that ZOPACAS was also not a priority in that period.

During the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Africa regained its importance for the Brazilian diplomacy, a reality manifested in the reopening of deactivated embassies, the inauguration of diplomatic missions across the continent and the opening of African diplomatic offices in Brazil (ibid). Thus, for Ribeiro (ibid), “both CLCP and ZOPACAS keep serving as a
potential locus of intersection between the various economic integration processes underway in the South Atlantic region”.

Therefore, it is prudent to take into account the words of former Brazilian ambassador Luiz A. P. Souto Maior, who noticed, in this analysis of “the World order and Brazil” (2003), that “transforming a little more than symbolic solidarity into effective participation in a concrete process of negotiations is extremely arduous”. This applies to both Brazil and other countries regarding the efforts to make the ZOPACAS more effective.

From the Brazilian perspective, the “Brazilian security agenda in relation to the African continent is still not significant. National foreign policy demonstrates a cautious positioning in relation to the deepening of military diplomacy and a more active participation in mediating African conflicts” (Migon and Santos 2012, 150). Both Migon and Santos suggest that in Brazil-Africa relations the “density of Brazilian presence is apparently associated with the political stability of the country considered, verifying that in most volatile areas this one is restricted to military presence and, even then, under the UN aegis” (ibid, 51). They complement their analysis stating that,

“The ‘option for Africa’ in the context of Brazilian foreign relations is something not yet fully institutionalized. In other words, there is a significant list of government actions, including actions of presidential diplomacy, without, however, such reality being effectively integrated into the national Politic and Strategy, in particular in the sector of S&P (security and protection), formally explicit.” (ibid, 151)

Therefore, despite its low efficiency, ZOPACAS may be important for the countries of the region as a multilateral forum for addressing regional issues with minimal interference from countries outside the South Atlantic, especially in a future scenario in which the developed countries decide to militarily intervene aiming to ensure access to markets, oil and mineral resources, as indicated by Lima (2011), who refers to a discussion within NATO to transform the entire Atlantic basin in an area under the organization’s influence. It is clear, therefore, that Brazilian initiatives in this regional scenario are not isolated, and that the actions of other major global players are taken into consideration in the Brazilian diplomatic calculus.
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Costa (2012) demonstrates that there is an inflection point in Brazilian foreign policy which expands itself beyond South America towards the South Atlantic. In this sense, Brazil’s projection to South Atlantic, particularly in the geopolitical perspective, represents a new strategic scenario that goes beyond South America regional integration (ibid).

“This expansion of its regional and strategic surroundings match the new scale of interests, opportunities and influence of a country that establishes itself as a global economic power and which has in the domain and exploration of maritime resources one of the most promising sources of wealth […] The main effects of this new position are the increase in scale and the diversification of final destinations to products, of technology and of Brazilian culture abroad, as well as greater visibility and strengthening of the country’s position in the international scene, in the global governance bodies and in the most relevant global issues.” (ibid, 11)

For Costa (ibid), such amplification of Brazil’s strategic surroundings occurred mainly due to its scientific and technological development, enabling a diplomatic action until now successful as far as the creation of the Blue Amazon is concerned. This corresponds to South Atlantic’s waters on Brazilian possession.

“However, if in the research and diplomacy fields the country has advanced at a rapid pace, it is striking the fragility of the second pillar of its strategy of projection in the world and in particular in the South Atlantic, which is the specific field of security and defense issues and operational capabilities of the armed forces to exercise deterrence power.” (ibid, 20)

It is clear, therefore, that Brazil has a selective policy towards African countries and that its capacity for action in security and defense in the South Atlantic is limited.

Next, SISBIN’s efficacy to meet the demands presented by these strategic relations between Brazil and Africa in the South Atlantic region is analyzed.

**Intelligences (dis)articulations in Brazil**
The LBDN, in the words of Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, is a “milestone
of transparency in defense related issues, through which our citizens will be able to know the State’s actions in such area, as well as the country’s challenges to improve its defense in the coming decades” (Brasil 2012, 7). Still in its LBDN’s message, Dilma Rousseff classifies it as “another [positive] result of Brazil’s democratic development” (ibid., 7), and adds that “defense will be increasingly present on the national agenda […]. Its reading will indicate, above all, that Defense and Democracy form a virtuous circle in the new Brazil that we are building” (ibid., 7).

According to Brazil’s Minister of Defense, Celso Amorim, the LBDN “adds itself to the National Defense Strategy and the National Defense Policy as clarifying document on defense activities in Brazil (ibid., 8), which should be hallmarks not only for relations between the Brazilian society and its Armed Forces, but equally between Brazil and other countries, inside and outside South America’s region, aiming to provide political transparency in national and international military affairs”.

It is important to remember that the basis of the Defense White Papers is the exercise of democracy within and outside the country, to the extent that in this document the national security’s objectives are explicit. Due to this, it is important that all ZOPACAS countries present their Defense White Papers considering each country’s specific and reciprocal objectives in the regional security and national defense context.

The Defense White Papers contextualize the strategic environment and presents an assessment about South Atlantic’s reality in the Brazilian point of view, stressing that “Brazil also devotes, together with its West African neighbors, special attention to the construction of a cooperative environment in South Atlantic under the auspices of South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS)” (ibid., 35) [italics added].

On the other hand, the LBND points to the “need to strengthen the mechanisms for dialogue between the MD and Itamaraty in the sense of approaching their intelligences and joint planning” (ibid., 49) [italics added].

The MD has a complex structure of intelligence that involves the Armed Forces and its participation in the Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN) through the Defense Intelligence System (SINDE, in Portuguese), created through Normative Decree 295/MD of 3 June 2002 (Brazil 2012). In its turn, of SISBIN, the Law nº 9.833/1999 “integrates planning and execution
actions of intelligence activities in the country, with the purpose of providing the President subsidies on issues of national interest.”

The LBDN affirms in a footnote that the Board of Foreign Affairs and National Defense (CREDEN, in Portuguese) has “the duty of formulating public policies and guidelines for subjects related to the areas of Federal Government’s National Defense and foreign relations” (ibid., 77). The CREDEN is chaired by the Chief Minister of GSIPR, to which the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) is subordinated, with ABIN being SISBIN’s central organ. ABIN, Brazilian Intelligence’s central body, is subordinated to GSIPR, whose competences, according to Provisional Measure nº 1.911-10, from September 24, 1999 (Brasil 1999a), are below described:

Art. 6° The Office of Institutional Security of the Presidency has as its attributions:
I – assist directly and immediately the President in the performance of her duties;
II – prevent the occurrence and articulate the management of crisis, in the event of serious and imminent threat to institutional stability;
III – perform personal consultation on military and security subjects;
IV – coordinate activities of federal intelligence and information security;
V – safeguard, assured the exercise of police power, the personal security of the Head of State, the Republic’s Vice-President and their families, the Presidency essential organs’ chiefs and of other authorities or persons when determined by the President of the Republic, as well as the safety of the presidential palaces and the President and Vice-President’s residences.

Amorim (2011), analyzing the law that created SISBIN/ABIN, points out that the Intelligence Activities (AI, in Portuguese) “in the country have prerogatives for classified actions, which on one hand is important to safeguard certain Brazilian strategic interests, but, on the other hand, may set precedents for illegal actions by the public agents in this process”, therefore, in such field of actions in any State, there will always be suspicion, both by part of national society as well as internationally. It is a field adjacent to war and diplomacy, in which totalitarian attitudes may be present and actions in illegality may be conducted under the pretext of State secret.

Analyzing the law, it is clear that the GSIPR guarantees the country’s institutional security and the leading figure of the Presidency, which seems to be too broad on one side, and on other, excessively specific for an organ with
ministerial status. This points to certain ambiguity of roles and a possible emptiness of its functions.

It may be the case that the preciousness concerning the safety of the personal figure of the head of state does not conciliate with the broader responsibilities on matters of national defense and international security, making GSIPR’s duties ambiguous and overly wide, eventually emptying it in its attempt to be a “super-advisory and defense board of the Presidency”. For these ambiguities, it might become ignored by the supreme head of Executive and, consequently, by other ministries, including the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.

If this occurs, GSIPR and ABIN, and consequently SISBIN, would lack effectiveness alongside government structures and in the eyes of the Brazilian State. Amorim (2011) points out that the Provisional Measure nº 1.911-10/1999 (ibid.), which is about the “creation of GSI/PR makes explicit a process of democratic opening and accommodation of military structures in the executive’s exercise of power, and demarcates, in the scope of Law, its prerogatives of legal action”.

It is worth noting the complex structures of government in the country, which are fragmented between different interest groups, shaping a governance field in which some groups may prevail in relation to others in the political leadership of the State and society.

Amorim (2012c) discusses the difficult state integration between GSIPR, ABIN and SISBIN, “which, in turn, is composed of representatives from the Staff (‘Casa Civil’ or ‘Civil House’), GSI/PR, ABIN and ten other ministries considered by the legislation to have responsibilities related to the AI” (ibid.). In this way that the problem of integration under the State

“is somehow due to the complexity of the procedural organization of the Brazilian State’s political power, fractionated in diverse organisms, each one holding a portion of this power, which is partly ballasted in privileged knowledge of certain exclusivity by the public officer in certain given issue. Not always such officer is willing to share this knowledge with other agents, public or private, because of bureaucratic power control in the hands of the state apparatus, or for other reasons, hindering secret services integration under the proper state power.” (ibid.)
For Amorim (ibid.), the “decision-making process – the command itself – is complex, in a way that neither are there extreme authoritarianism of isolated groups or people, nor are there decisions without reflecting great interest groups”.

As a result, one must consider the different intelligence integration levels in SISBIN, a fact in part recognized in the very LBDN in relation to intelligence activities of the MD and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which must be better articulated through SISBIN, which in this case would be extensive to the other bodies comprising the System. It must also be considered SISBIN levels of integration with the government represented by the head of the Executive power and its powers in the scope of foreign affairs, defense and intelligence.

“It is perceived that, despite advances in each of the institutional and organizational dimensions analyzed, there is the need for a maturation still to be provided in the scope of AI in Brazil, in its inclusion in a Democratic State, in order to guarantee and secure the rights won by Brazilian society.” (Amorim 2012c)

On the domestic front, Brazil established in 1999 SISBIN as part of the Brazilian society’s democratization process, however, Amorim (ibid.) ponders that this society has difficulty to publicly discuss its intelligence services, either by lack of knowledge and/or prejudice:

“The absence of an intense public debate about AIs institutionalization in Brazil points to certain civil society, even from specific government sectors, disinterest in relation to the institutional security issue, sometimes feeding stigmas related to the AIs within the contemporary Brazilian State.”

The LBDN points out, albeit superficially, some of Brazilian public policies’ guidelines in defense and in the relations between SINDE/MD, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ intelligence service and SISBIN/ABIN/GSIPR established in Brazilian legislation, showing that the Brazilian State seeks transparency in its policies and actions in such strategic sectors. And in this sense it acts “bearing in mind the shield of constitutional guarantees underpinning the construction of Brazilian diplomacy insofar as there is a
structural paradox between the secret activities of the State and the freedom of individuals and organizations” (Amorim 2011).

After having showed the Intelligences’ integration difficulties in the Brazilian State, some considerations about SISBIN’s effectiveness in the South Atlantic context follow.

**SISBIN in South Atlantic regional security context**

Both initiatives of Brazilian society in its democratization process, the SISBIN internally and ZOPACAS externally, do not have, yet, an effective convergence where is considered Brazilian government’s legislation, policies and actions.

From the Brazilian perspective, convergence between SISBIN and ZOPACAS is complex: on one side, there is a diversity of countries comprising the Zone of Peace and specificities in the external and internal demands of each of these societies; and, on the other side, SISBIN is not yet properly an organ that reflects the country’s integrated action in the strategic intelligence area, especially bearing in mind the realm of International Relations.

To Brazil, there is also a demand for improvement in the internally exchange of strategic information through SISBIN, and, moreover, on the external level with the countries that compose ZOPACAS. From the Brazilian perspective, SISBIN and ZOPACAS, in a certain way, virtually do not communicate, failing to take advantage of mutual synergies in defense and security.

In the case of SISBIN, there are gaps that could be addressed through proactive and preventive actions in various areas that involve cooperation between AI of each ZOPACAS’ countries. On the other hand, saved the appropriate specificities, the legal architecture that underlies SISBIN could also serve as inspiration for other countries in the construction of democratic models for their own AIs, not only on the internal level, but also in the relations between ZOPACAS’ countries. However, procedural challenges of intelligence law would continue, which are the experiential aspects of each specific situation, where integration and effectiveness have not been achieved yet, as the Brazilian case demonstrates, both internally and externally.

Cooperation between SISBIN and other countries of ZOPACAS would allow appropriate treatment to the “new defense and security issues of the region”, within each country and between them, which involves mineral
resources (the main ones being the oil from Gulf of Guinea and the Brazilian pre-salt), the infrastructures of each country and the ones shared between them, the fight against transnational organized crime (drugs, arms and human trafficking, smuggling), conflicts involving migration, work and land ownership, socio-environmental conflicts, the very institutional security of each country, Science, Technology and Innovation, legislation and national and international politics for the Sea, among other relevant issues of the post-Cold War era.

However, it must be considered that in the context of national institutions and international relations of each country participating in the Zone of Peace, there is a diversity of interests in State Intelligence, and its relationship with civil society is also varied and complex, and somehow still does not reflect a perfect participatory democracy. This is an important constraint that hinders actions between these various secret services in ZOPACAS, pointing to a weakness in this level of integration on international security in South Atlantic.

To conciliate the needs of defense and security with the promotion of democracy – guaranteeing citizens’ fundamental rights internally, and respecting state sovereignty and the self-determination principle externally – has been a contemporary challenge to the States comprising the South Atlantic basin.

Internally to each one of the ZOPACAS’ countries there is always the risk of one type of Intelligence action serving projects of power, authoritarianism and violence, totally averse to both the democratic processes and the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts, which infringes the principles of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation.

It could also, at the limit, become a pretext for military action from countries within the South Atlantic basin, when not from countries outside the region, under the excuse of providing assurance to the institutional stability in a country where the AI has failed its purposes of being an instrument for democratic peace building.

It must be remembered that an outside intervention in the region would also break ZOPACAS’ foundations. Thus, if in only one country the AI do not keep the respect for democratic institutions and to other peoples’ sovereignty, such fact would raise constant suspicions not only in this nation, but, in the
case of ZOPACAS, also in all other South Atlantic basin’s partners, bringing instability to regional peace.

Amorim (2012a) considers that espionage/counterespionage activities permeate human society in historical and anthropological perspectives, always raising suspicions, promoting betrayals and fears, and contributing to ethnocentric and xenophobic attitudes, what form a sort of cultural background, an ethos and pathos, which deserve an appropriate attention not always given in the power relations’ field.

“This way, despite all the exaggeration that may be considered in the exercise of these types of activities, the societies that set them in motion were seeking what they believed to be the best for themselves, however contradictory and ambiguous might have been the forms of such attempts. In fact, violence has its ambiguities and contradictions, since it serves for the most different purposes, among an array of possibilities ranging from annihilation of a human group to its own structuration.”

Human forces, integrative and destructive at the same time, which gain institutional, national, continental and global dimensions, and make themselves present in both peace and war, are part of the vitality of human relations and politics at various scales.

Amorim (2012b) analyzing some Brazilian prospects of democratic cooperation in regional security of SISBIN in the context of UNASUR argues that

“The Activities of Intelligence (AI) considered from a quite broad and generic point of view to an ethos and pathos closely related to the nature of power exercise and government in a society […]. This point of view is a way to understand AI in each country, exercised in accordance with the strategic objectives established by their respective government and societies, which certainly reveal antagonistic positions between States, but also common interests, and, sometimes, constructs for peace and security in a certain region.”

To move away from mutual distrust and to approach the cooperation SISBIN/ZOPACAS involves a shift in paradigm in relation to the very AIs’ foundations, which in a classic context of International Relations would be an internal issue to each country, even though there might be repercussions at the
outside level from Intelligence actions of each State. This is also the case of the Armed Forces and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of each country, which are internal organs whose actions may also affect the International Security plan. Another mindset construction on the field of AI, in general and in the context of ZOPACAS in particular, would have a key role in conflict prevention and peace building in the region, especially if there is an articulation of interests between the participant countries around the political meanings of the suggested “new threats”.

An interesting initiative would be the organization of a university that considers issues relevant to the South Atlantic and ZOPACAS. NATO, for instance, has the NATO Defense College established in 1951, which is an institution dedicated to forming military. In ZOPACAS’ case, in contrast to NATO, an initiative in this direction would not be limited only to defense and formation of military but could also include education for civilians in issues relevant to the Zone of Peace and Cooperation, aiming at its further integration and efficacy.

In this sense, it is worth remembering that the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) has the Center for Defense Strategic Studies of the South American Defense Council (CEED/CDS, in Portuguese), as well as the South American Institute of Government in Health (ISAGS, in Portuguese).

Amorim (ibid.) even suggests as an “utopia, for example, the creation of a future south American agency of intelligence that could integrate supranational actions in the fight against drug and human trafficking and other transnational crimes”, the same proposition could fit in the context of South Atlantic countries through ZOPACAS, one “integrated intelligence agency of South Atlantic” which in itself would carry vectors of integration and, possibly, efficacy to the Zone of Peace, without its necessary militarization, as it is set out for the region.

This level of cooperation is utopic, according to Amorim (2012a), because “espionage/counterespionage activities relate themselves to the exercise of power and to the use or threat of use of violence, with a particularity which is of always having as framework the values of a particular human group in relation to others”, what obviously makes sensitive the collaboration in this context of social life. Hence the necessity for others paradigms and mindsets in
Intelligence, mainly aimed to regional cooperation, preventing violence and reducing mistrusts, what is desired by ZOPACAS.

The SISBIN/UNASUR context is analogous to SISBIN/ZOPACAS, thus it is possible to apply for both the conclusions presented by Amorim (2012b) that

“the Brazilian case points tasks to be fulfilled by the region’s countries in terms of AI integration and regulation in a Democratic State, and since it is one of the most advanced countries on this issue in South America [and South Atlantic], asymmetries in terms of AI become explicit between countries of UNASUR [and ZOPACAS], pointing to future challenges to democracy consolidation in the region.”

Initiatives of transparency and democracy in the context of ZOPACAS would intensify changes between member States and, therefore, its efficacy. Furthermore, in the Brazilian case, bringing greater integration, efficacy and alignment of regional security structures in South Atlantic, as advocated by the country’s public documents, would justify the use of public resources in Intelligence and Defense. This is a situation also desirable to the other countries of the region, evidently.

Finally, it is important to highlight a dimension not less important of politics convergence between SISBIN and ZOPACAS, from a Brazilian perspective. It is about the relations between international migration flows and institutional security systems of the country.

Amorim (2012d) considers that

“Brazil, in terms of migration policies, has still been marked by the economic and institutional security paradigms, despite the Brazilian State’s reform in relation to the intelligence services in the country […] Nonetheless, this problem is not unique to Brazil, permeating all developed countries, making possible to state that such situation, in the moment, is emblematic and structural.”

ZOPACAS, as other multilateral mechanisms of international politics, includes not only the movement of goods, but also the flow of people. In the Brazilian case, it is necessary to overcome prejudices concerning the peoples of African origin and the poor, especially if it wants to advance regional security
and integration. This is not a simple task as it requires the transformation of mentalities that sometimes lies deep rooted in the Brazilian history and culture.

Conclusion

The creation of ZOPACAS in 1986 was a Brazilian initiative in the inception of its re-democratization process, still in the Cold War context, even if it would symbolically end only three years later, what immediately demanded the reformulation of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation’s objectives. During its 27 years of existence, ZOPACAS is marked by low effectiveness and little interest from member countries.

Brazil, in particular, has not prioritized Africa in its foreign policy, and just recently, in Lula and Dilma governments, there have been new initiatives in relation to the African continent, indicating a growing strategic interest from Brazil, especially after the discovery of oil in deep waters of the South Atlantic.

Such Brazilian strategic interest in ZOPACAS is declared in its LBDN, which also recognizes the country’s lack of efficiency concerning Intelligence structure for the region, mainly involving the SINDE and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ intelligence services, with information exchanges through SISBIN.

For its part, SISBIN is still an incomplete work of the Brazilian State and lacks effectiveness in its relation with the State itself and with the Brazilian society. The integration of intelligence products from the various secret services that comprise it is fragile regarding the construction, achievements and monitoring of public policies in the area of International Security and Defense.

On the other hand, in the short term, given the diversity of countries that form ZOPACAS and the plurality of interests involved, it is unlikely that regional cooperation within the intelligence sphere comes to be established between the member countries of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation, reinforcing the traditional mutual distrusts in this sector of international security.

More than international policies for an effective Peace that allows the pacific coexistence between the peoples of the Earth, what is necessary is the construction of new mentalities and, therefore, of a New Policy not guided by fear and mistrust.
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ABSTRACT
Brazil successfully proposed the creation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone in 1986, gathering countries of South America and Africa and aiming to stop the spreading of nuclear weapons within the region, along with its consequent militarization. In 1999, the Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN) was created as part of a process of democratization of Brazilian society. However, considering the respective historical and institutional contexts of these two initiatives, there is no effective convergence between them yet. On one side, there is a diversity of sometimes conflicting interests between countries part of ZOPACAS, with their societies' internal and external demands; on the other, the Brazilian perspective, SISBIN still does not reflect an integrated action of Brazil in the field of strategic intelligence outside the country's limits, especially in the South Atlantic.

KEYWORDS
SISBIN; ZOPACAS; Intelligence; South Atlantic; International Security.

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