

# MOZAMBIQUE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SAMORA MACHEL AND JOAQUIM CHISSANO GOVERNMENTS

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## Introduction

The article analyses Mozambique's foreign policy during the governments of Samora Machel (1975-1986) and Joaquim Chissano (1987-2005), the first two governments in the post-independence period. Mozambique is a peripheral country in the hierarchy of the international capitalist division of labour, specializing in the production of raw materials, with a poorly diversified economy that exports primary products. In the hierarchy of the international system, it can be classified as a vulnerable or fragile State, with a tendency towards authoritarian regimes, experiencing conflicts and violent wars of groups that compete with the State. Despite being from the same party, the Samora and Chissano governments had different political-economic and ideological characteristics that are reflected in Mozambican foreign policy, being influenced by the fate of the Cold War. In the foreign policy decision-making process in Mozambique, the State responded more to external and international pressures than to internal inputs. Foreign policy was rarely the result of or influenced by demands from Mozambican civil society, even though most decisions were taken on behalf of the people.

In Southern Africa, Mozambique took the place of a secondary power against the economic-military hegemony of South Africa and Rhodesia of Ian Smith, its main adversaries, as well as against Tanzania, Zambia and Angola, its regional political-military and ideological partners. The Mozambican State entered international politics after independence in 1975, calling itself the People's Republic of Mozambique (RPM), with a one-party Marxist-Leninist

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government led by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which was confused with the Mozambican State itself. State.

In the RPM, the leaders of FRELIMO were at the same time the leaders of the State. The borders between the executive, legislative and judicial powers were porous, commanded by the Party-State that centralized decisions in the country. The government system was presidential, directed by the president of the republic (PR) and executive decisions were taken by the Council of Ministers. The legislature consisted of the People's Assembly, made up of deputies from the ruling party. The judicial power was constituted by the courts, subordinated to the executive power. This political-bureaucratic model prevailed in Mozambique between 1975 and 1990, although there were occasional changes in the Constitution, such as the introduction of the figure and position of Prime Minister from 1987 onwards.

From 1991 on, there were significant political and economic changes with the change of the Constitution: the country was renamed the Republic of Mozambique (RM), adopting the multiparty system and economic liberalism, but maintaining the presidential regime with the broad powers of the PR. In 1994, the first multiparty general elections took place, won by the Frelimo Party, with no alternation in power. The elections were contested by the opposition, which alleged irregularities and electoral fraud, but after negotiations ended up accepting the results. To decentralize power, the first municipal elections were held in 1999, which were boycotted by the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), the main opposition party, in which Frelimo won. Frelimo managed all municipalities. Until 2005, the two largest parties dominated politics and parliament – Frelimo and Renamo. Since the introduction of multipartyism, the country has held presidential, legislative, and municipal elections at regular intervals.

## Methodology

The article used the comparative method, combined with the techniques of bibliographic review and documental research. It was inspired by the comparative foreign policy of Rosenau (1968) – in the text *Comparative Foreign Policy: fad, fantasy, or field?* – which is based on the analysis of the behaviour of States and their choices in international affairs, to build a general theory of foreign policy. In Rosenau's (1968) perspective, comparative foreign policy assesses the impact of international variables on domestic processes. This analyst distinguishes the study of comparative foreign policy from the comparative study of foreign policy. More than a detail, the study of comparative foreign policy is a legitimate enterprise that can lead to a

disciplined field of inquiry, while the study of comparative foreign policy turns out to be an ambiguous term, a passing fad.

Foreign policy phenomena can be studied in many ways and for certain purposes. On the other hand, the comparative analysis of foreign policy is not a subject, it is a method. The comparative method is useful for generating and testing propositions about foreign policy behaviour that apply to two or more political systems. Only by identifying similarities and differences in foreign policy behaviour, from a particular case to higher levels of generalization (Rosenau, 1968).

The comparative study of foreign policy is based on the comparison of two or more States facing the same phenomenon, thus, the comparison is a method and not an object of study. In comparative foreign policy, it is about comparing characteristics in the decision-making process in foreign policy between two or more States. The comparison cannot be made between two or more political systems, but between two concrete actions in foreign policy. Hence the difference between a comparative study of foreign policy and comparative foreign policy (Rosenau, 1968).

The comparative analysis of the foreign policy of the Samora and Chissano governments helps us to understand the historical, political-economic, and social processes that Mozambique has gone through, the similarities and differences. But also, to analyse the trajectories and the results. This analysis makes it possible to understand the differences, the trajectories, the internal and internal changes that led Chissano and Samora to make the same or different decisions in the face of the same phenomenon. Although they are of two different chronological times, they are consecutive, and similarities can be found, as they are part of the same historical moment or historical moments close to the same State.

## Theory

The article assumes that foreign policy is the result of the interactive dynamics between the domestic and international environments – inter-domestic level, and seeks to understand the decision-making processes (Putnam, 2010; Figueira, 2011). It follows this perspective throughout the text, making the two environments interact. To comparatively analyse Mozambique's external relations in the governments of Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano, the logic of Putnam's two-level games (2010) was moved. In his fundamental article on domestic politics and international relations, Putnam (2010) demonstrates that these two dimensions are inextricably

linked and that the theories that existed until then did not take this link into account, particularly those that placed the state at the centre and as the main actor in foreign policy.

From this point of view, to obtain an international agreement, the heads of state and government reconcile the interests of domestic politics with those of international politics, which the author calls the “two-level game”, a metaphor to explain the interactions between the different dimensions. domestic and international. The author emphasizes the role of preferences, alliances, institutions and domestic practices, strategies and tactics of negotiators, uncertainties, domestic repercussions of external pressures, as well as the interests of the chief negotiator.

As a rule, each negotiator believes that his interests are the interests of the state and that everything he does is in the interests of the nation. Good deals would be those that successfully combine domestic and international pressures. Partial analyses, either purely domestic or purely international, account for the reality of States. Only general equilibrium theories that combine the interaction of domestic and international factors – the two-level game – can understand the reality experienced by States (Putnam, 2010).

From this perspective, the political struggle in international negotiations can be understood as a two-level game. At the national level –1, domestic groups pursue their goals by pressing the government to adopt policies favourable to their interests, while at the international level –2, governments seek to maximize their own abilities to satisfy domestic pressures and minimize the adverse consequences of external constraints. Neither of the two levels can be ignored by decision makers because their countries remain both interdependent and sovereign. Each national political leader plays on both boards: domestic and international. On the domestic board and behind the leader are political parties, parliamentarians, representatives of national interest and pressure groups and political advisers to the leader himself. On the external board are foreign counterparts, diplomats, and other international advisors (Putnam, 2010).

In Mozambique’s foreign policy, the heads of state – Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano – represented the Mozambican government and people, but also the interests of the political, ideological, and economic elites of the Frelimo party. Both Samora and Chissano sought to balance the interests of the Mozambican people and the Frelimo party on the one hand (level I) and the interests of the international counterpart (level II). The Samora Machel government balanced itself between the domestic demands of the people and the party (level I), at the same time it was the target of regional and international external pressure from its partners such as the

USSR, Tanzania, Zambia, ANC and even enemy governments, South Africa, Rhodesia, Malawi, or the USA (level II). Putnam's two-tier logic (2010) can be moved in negotiations such as the Incomáti Agreement between the Samora government and the apartheid regime in South Africa, as well as in the Chissano government's negotiations with the International Monetary Fund/World Bank (IMF/WB).

In the one-party socialist regime, there was no political opposition, civil society, or pressure groups in Mozambique. Even though Renamo exerted pressure and opposition to the Mozambican State through civil war. The Frelimo government did not recognize Renamo as a Mozambican opposition movement, classifying it as "armed bandits". In this way, the Mozambican State only responded to external pressure from its international political-military cooperation partners: the USSR and neighbouring friendly and enemy states. The Samora Government representing the Mozambican State was a founding member of the Frontline States (ELF) and the Southern African Development Coordination (SADCC) and was part of the Socialist Bloc. It adopted a joint anti-colonial and anti-apartheid foreign policy agenda for the liberation of Southern Africa with Tanzania, Zambia, and Angola as its main friends and supporters.

In the context of the Cold War and the liberation of Southern Africa, Mozambique supported the struggle of Black nationalist movements ZANU and ZAPU in the struggle for Zimbabwe's independence, as well as the ANC's struggle against the apartheid regime<sup>2</sup>. The Mozambican state had as enemies the apartheid regime of South Africa, Rhodesia of Ian Smith, and Malawi of Kamuzu Banda, who supported the Renamo war. These friendly and enemy nationalist states and movements exerted pressure on the Mozambican state and influenced its political decisions.

In turn, in the economic-financial aid negotiations with the Bretton Woods institutions, the Chissano government had to balance the interests of the Mozambican people and the Frelimo political-economic elite on the one hand (level I) and, on the other, the pressures external resources from the IMF/WB and the Western world (level II) to effect changes in the Constitution and transition to the multiparty system, opening the country's economy to the international market and implementing structural adjustment and privatization policies.

The same two-tier game took place during the peace agreement negotiations with Renamo. At the domestic level, Chissano had to negotiate

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<sup>2</sup> *Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) e Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) e African National Congress (ANC).*

with Frelimo's more radical ideological wing while simultaneously counterbalancing Renamo's demands. On the other hand, at the international level, the Government had to deal with pressure from international mediators to end the armed conflict. In these negotiations, Chissano diplomacy was successful at both levels: internally it managed to "pacify" Renamo and maintain a political and government system favourable to Frelimo, as well as obtaining international aid and the forgiveness of Mozambique's external debt with the main donors.

## Mozambican Foreign Policy Principles and Orientation

Mozambique's foreign policy, its guidelines and principles were defined for the first time at the Third Frelimo Congress in 1977 and influenced by external, regional and domestic factors, including the fight against European imperialism and Portuguese colonialism, international solidarity with peoples oppressed by white minorities in Southern Africa, the colonial annexations of the territories of the Arab Republic of Western Sahara, of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste at the international level.

The context of the Cold War and its dynamics in Southern Africa were decisive in the definition of the external relations of the Mozambican State, among which: the hegemony of the government of white minorities in South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia, the South African, Rhodesian aggressions and Malawians to the Mozambican people, the installation and reinforcement of military bases along the coast of Mozambique and the deployment of naval forces in the Mozambique Channel as an intimidation strategy to curb their revolutionary impetus. In the domestic sphere, the internal war waged by Renamo, which had South African, Rhodesian, and North American support. Mozambique had been unanimously admitted to the OAU and was actively engaged in active cooperation and solution of African and international problems, promoting the deepening of anti-imperialism (Frelimo, 1977). It was in this context of political and military confrontation that Frelimo defined the principles and guidelines for Mozambique's foreign policy.

In its foreign policy, the People's Republic of Mozambique strictly applies the principles of Frelimo's political line. In this context, the People's Republic of Mozambique gives priority to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the countries that have always been committed to our side. During the Transition Frelimo agreed to establish diplomatic relations since the proclamation of Independence with African, socialist, Asian, and European countries that have always supported us. The People's Republic

of Mozambique has established and develops relations of friendship and cooperation in all countries based on the principles of mutual respect for territorial sovereignty and integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and reciprocity of benefits (Frelimo, 1977: 81).

This foreign policy was a response to the rejection and blockade of the Western world. Thus, Frelimo approached the USSR and socialist bloc states such as eastern Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, Congo-Kinshasa, Cuba, China, Vietnam, North Korea, Burundi, Somalia. It had as regional allies the neighbouring states Tanzania and Zambia, nationalist movements such as ZANU, ZAPU, ANC SWAPO. It also strengthened relations with Portuguese-speaking African nationalist movements in former Portuguese colonies, with state visits to Angola, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau.

Veloso (2007) considers that the desire to achieve rapid development and to satisfy the basic needs of the people in a short space of time led the Mozambican State to align itself with its natural allies, which had supported and sided with the Frelimo armed struggle. However, the alignment with the socialist bloc, which aimed at solving internal problems, relegated to the background and even antagonized the US and its close allies and made it lose sight of the strategic objective that was the development of the country<sup>3</sup>.

The choice of Marxism aimed to gain massive support from the USSR and the socialist camp, through scientific socialism to solve the people's problems. Such choices aroused hostility from the West and from various regions of the Third World, including Africa. The USSR and its allies saw Mozambique as an ideal territory to exercise geostrategic control over the immense theatre of operations that was Southern Africa. To this end, it made investments in the region and was willing to invest much more (Veloso, 2007).

Vieira (1990) already understood that the foreign policy of a country or party is the result of the conceptions, perspectives, objectives, and limits of the pursued action and combines the duty to be, wanting to be with what it is possible to be<sup>4</sup>. As well as that it obeys class interests, philosophical

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<sup>3</sup> Jacinto Veloso was a member of Frelimo and a fighter in the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonization. After independence, he held various government positions in the Samora and Chissano governments. He was national director of the Information Services and Minister of State Security in the Samora Machel government. From 1984 to 1994 he was Minister of International Cooperation, having carried out negotiations for the establishment of peace in Southern Africa in the Incomati Agreement and with the Ronald Reagan Government. In the Chissano Government, he was Minister of Information and a member of the National Defence and Security Council of the Mozambican parliament.

<sup>4</sup> Sérgio Vieira was a member of Frelimo and a fighter in the Mozambican liberation struggle,



and ideological conceptions, but it is also subordinated at the national and international level to economic, military, and strategic imperatives. From the point of view of this history of Frelimo and Mozambique, foreign policy was developed in the tension between the means and objectives of the policy, thus becoming one of the criteria for evaluating independence and consequences.

Abrahamsson & Nilsson (1994) argue that the foreign and security policy formulated by Frelimo was based on the analysis of power relations and contradictions existing during the colonial period. Frelimo had two opponents to its struggle for economic development and political independence. On the one hand, there was colonial oppression, considered a natural consequence of capitalism, and on the other, white racism in Southern Africa, the South African and Rhodesian regimes. Hence its anti-imperialist and anti-racist policy.

It was within the framework of the common strategy of the Southern African States against racist regimes that Mozambique developed its foreign policy and actively engaged with Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, and Angola, forming the ELF and then the SADCC. At the same time, the Mozambican State strengthened the ties of friendship and good neighbourliness with neighbouring countries and tried to cooperate with Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana. On the other hand, Mozambique participated in the Non-Aligned Movement (MNA) and resolutely claimed to refuse intimidation and support the just struggle of peoples for the realization of their rights (Frelimo, 1977).

This foreign policy was officially in force until 2010, when the principles and guidelines of the State's foreign policy were reformulated. From the mid-1980s and particularly in the 1990s, a change in the perspective of the Mozambican Government's external relations can be seen with the negotiations with the apartheid regime, the distance from the USSR with Machel's visit to Washington and London for meetings with Regan and Thatcher and, the consequent approximation to the capitalist bloc with negotiations and Mozambique's adherence to the policies of the IMF/WB.

## Foreign Policy of the Samora Government (1975-1986)

The Samora government begins in June 1975, in a context dominated by the Cold War and bipolar dispute between the USSR and the USA, as

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having held various positions in the Samora Government and the Chissano Government. Graduated in Political Science in Algeria, where he was a Frelimo representative. He was director of the Centre for African Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University, published books and articles on Mozambique in Southern Africa.



well as the regional tension in Southern Africa between apartheid South Africa, Rhodesia, Malawi and Kenya on one side and on the other, the Marxist governments of Mozambique and Angola, Tanzania and Zambia, as well as the internal armed conflict waged by Renamo at the domestic level. The foreign policy of the Mozambican State was defined by FRELIMO in 1977 at its Third Congress. It was influenced by the regional and international environment, with its own agenda defined by the party-state, the result of liberation diplomacy, of international solidarity with oppressed peoples. As well as Samora's personal commitment and engagement with the Southern African regional agenda, among the members of the Frontline States (ELF) and after the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (Langa, Sacavinda, 2019).

The Samora Governance was centralized in the single party of a Marxist-Leninist nature. The PR took foreign policy decisions, after going through the Frelimo Committee, the hard core of the Party-State and the Council of Ministers, with little or no contestation or opposition. The Party's ideology guided the state. In 1976, the state closed the border with Rhodesia, becoming the first and only one to apply the sanctions determined by the UN against the Ian Smith regime. This decision deprived Mozambique of revenues valued at millions of dollars annually from the taxes and fees it charged for the transit of goods from Rhodesia to its territory and vice versa through ports and railways.

One of the few times in which "popular" internal pressures influenced foreign policy decisions was the Incomáti Agreement in 1984, signed between Samora Machel and the apartheid regime. Pressure came from foreign intellectuals and cadres who cooperated with the Mozambican government, having left Mozambique in protest the Agreement. Even so, the Agreement seemed more like a strategic and calculation decision by Samora than a result of popular outcry, as the survival of the Government and regime itself was at stake in the face of South African attacks and bombings on Maputo. The negotiations were proposed and encouraged by the US when it opened its embassy in Maputo, which wanted to see the conflict between the Samora government, and the apartheid regime resolved.

The foreign policy of the Samora government represented a continuation of FRELIMO's diplomacy of making more friends and fewer enemies. However, Mozambique's foreign relations were aimed at the European, Asian and Cuba socialist blocs. Mozambique's external relations were confused with those of the Frelimo party. Zeca (2015) states that foreign policy and diplomacy were aimed at raising support for the liberation struggle, denouncing, and isolating the Portuguese colonial regime at the

international level in UN and Organization of African Unity (OAU) forums. Mozambique had two opponents: the Western capitalist system and the white minority governments of the region. Regional cooperation and the liberation of neighbouring states were preconditions for Mozambique's economic and future development.

Massangaie (2017) argued that Mozambique's foreign policy aimed to create more friends and fewer enemies in the context of the ideological bipolarity of the Cold War. Portugal's refusal to comply with the UN resolution on the self-determination of peoples, the support that the Portuguese received from the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) and the ideological conflict of the Cold War influenced the foreign policy decisions taken by Frelimo. On the other hand, the threats posed by the South African and Rhodesian regimes, the political-economic orientation adopted by Frelimo after independence, also had influences on the foreign policy of the Government of independent Mozambique.

Mozambique's foreign policy under the Samora Machel government was characterized by liberation diplomacy against colonization in Africa, particularly in the Southern region, against the minority apartheid regimes in South Africa and Ian Smith in Rhodesia, as well as international activism and solidarity with occupied and oppressed nations such as the Republics of Western Sahara, Palestine, and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. The Government of Samora Machel energetically engages and supports materially and militarily the ZAPU and Rhodesia and later the ANC of South Africa, allowing the use of its territory as a training and transit base for its guerrillas.

According to Christie (1996), Samora denounced these regimes in several international conferences, including the UN. Over the years, the Samora government managed to garner support from the USSR and China, who were disputing hegemony and areas of influence in the socialist bloc, seeking to influence countries in Africa and Asia. In addition to the European and Asian Socialist Bloc countries, the Mozambican state also requested the support of European capitalist countries such as Sweden, Norway, Finland, and the Netherlands, in addition to the countries of the Eastern European socialist bloc (Christie, 1996).

Although Mozambique was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (MNA), in 1977, during the Third Congress of FRELIMO, it became a Frelimo party, officially adopting the Marxist-Leninist perspective and the socialist development model centrally planned by the State, as well as defining its foreign policy for the first time (Frelimo, 1977; Christie, 1996; Ferrão, 2007; Cuco, 2016). The Samora government made clear its struggle against colonial domination, its anti-colonial and anti-racist character, denouncing European

colonization and neo-colonial interference by European powers in African nations, as well as the Rhodesian white minority regimes and South African apartheid in Southern Africa.

In the Samora government, the decision-making process in Mozambique's foreign policy took place at the state and party level, the so-called democratic centralism. Issues were discussed in the Council of Ministers; the Central Committee of the Party and decisions were taken collectively. According to Hama Thay (2020), Samora Machel's leadership was democratic, participatory, charismatic, situational, and contingent<sup>5</sup>. Samora had a universalist vision of well-being for all the people, constituting a democratic leadership, with debates and joint decision-making between the leader and his direct collaborators on strategic issues. In his view, Machel's approach to leadership and governance has become one of the main focuses in organizing political and social thought in Mozambique.

Ferrão (2007), pointed to Samora as having an enormous capacity for analysis, decision-making power, and fixed ideas<sup>6</sup>. He highlights the existence of a military discipline in the Government inherited from FRELIMO – first fulfilling the mission, then complaining – as well as the absence of analysis of the country's realities and the absence of internal debate.

By establishing a one-party regime, Frelimo prevented the creation of an alternative to its political program, as well as the existence of an institutional space for a legal opposition, creating a situation of political exclusion for all those who did not agree with the dominant options. By transforming itself into a Marxist-Leninist party, Frelimo abandoned the practice of participatory democracy with the populations that had been established during the colonial struggle and in the early years of independence (Lalá, 2002). The Samora government's diplomacy was marked by marked tensions, such as the expulsion of US diplomats accused of spying for the CIA, as well as its positioning on China's side in the conflict with Taiwan, accusing the latter country of representing the capitalist interests of the US (Ferrão, 2007).

Among the most notable events that took place while I was Secretary General of the MNE was the expulsion of a group of American embassy

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<sup>5</sup> António Hama Thay is a retired general of the Mozambican Armed Forces, he has been a member of the State since independence, having held positions in different Mozambican governments, as well as a Frelimo deputy.

<sup>6</sup> Valeriano Ferrão was a Frelimo guerilla fighter since the armed struggle against Portuguese colonization and after independence was Secretary of the Council of Ministers, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and afterwards Mozambique's Ambassador to the US. These positions were held during Samora Machel's government.

employees who were CIA agents. Even today I think that such an operation was unnecessary, as all embassies in any country in the world always have a CIA station that is tolerated to a certain degree. And, on the other hand, the countries' intelligence services decide with their CIA counterparts. It is part of the game. SNAP should have joined the game. It did not, and the result is that Mozambique was played as a pawn in the cold war that pitted the United States of America against the Soviet bloc, as it was a country in this bloc that practically imposed the measure applied by the Government of Mozambique (Ferrão, 2007: 88).

Mozambique opened an embassy in Moscow, but not in Washington, something Americans would not forget. Also, the government's policy of nationalization created more animosity with Washington, which enacted an embargo and prohibited any type of economic assistance to Mozambique (Ferrão, 2007). On the other hand, Frelimo was a traditional ally of China, as it had received military and logistical support during the fight against Portuguese colonization and at decisive moments, such as during Operation "Nó Górdio", the largest ever launched by Portuguese troops during the war. colonial.

## Liberation Diplomacy

The Samora government took place after ten years of armed struggle for liberation against Portuguese colonization, in the international scenario of the Cold War and bipolar dispute between the socialist and capitalist world. In a one-party regime that was confused with the state, the Samora government faced hostilities and external aggression from the governments of the neighbouring apartheid states of South Africa, Rhodesia under Ian Smith, and Malawi under Kamuzu Banda and, internally, the Renamo's destabilization war, characterized by armed attacks on populations and social and economic infrastructure. Renamo was conceived and created in Rhodesia and had its main base in this country, from which it launched attacks against Mozambique. It received support from these countries and from the Western capitalist world and adopted this model (Christie, 1996; Minter, 1998).

To face this scenario, Samora sought external support inside and outside Africa. It relied on neighbouring countries that militarily helped the FRELIMO liberation struggle such as Tanzania and Zambia, on continental countries such as Algeria and on the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that supported it financially and diplomatically. The main support to Mozambique came from the European Socialist Bloc, from Moscow, technical, logistical,

and military cooperation. At this juncture, Mozambique and Samora Machel implemented liberation diplomacy, actively engaging in the liberation of Zimbabwe and South Africa from the domination of minority apartheid regimes, even though they were aware of the economic-military superiority of these adversaries. In its policy of international solidarity, Mozambique and Machel become founding members of the ELF in 1976 and years later it is replaced by SADCC in 1980, after Rhodesia's independence and its renaming as Zimbabwe.

After independence, Samora made trips to European countries seeking support for the newly independent country, but he failed to sensitize their governments and failed to gain support from the Western capitalist world. In 1977, at the Third FRELIMO Congress held in Maputo, at which the guerrillas of the liberation struggle and the new members met for the first time, the Government officially adopted Marxism-Leninism and the centrally planned socialist economy as official State policy and economic development model, hoping to obtain support from the European and Asian socialist bloc. It starts to receive some logistical-military support from the Socialist Bloc to fight Renamo and fortify its defences in the face of neighbouring external threats, in the context of the Cold War.

Despite having limited economic resources and having made significant investment in the army, the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FPLM) did not have great capabilities and military intelligence in the face of the material and economic superiority of enemies outside their national borders (Castellano Da Silva, 2017). This internationalist argues that Mozambique was a secondary power in Southern Africa and was only central to regional relations because of the inspiration that Frelimo brought from the independence struggle and the theoretical and practical support that the Front gave to state and non-state forces fighting for transformation of the South African regional order. His analysis of Mozambique's foreign policy points to the period from 1975 to 1988 as the moment of state building, highlighting the role of foreign policy-making elites. His perspective considers that the closing of the country's border with Ian Smith's Rhodesia in 1976 by the Government of Samora Machel – applying the sanctions decreed by the UN against the Rhodesian regime – constituted the first major act of Mozambique's foreign policy.

Such a sanction forced Rhodesia to use South African ports and railways to transport all its imports and exports, causing damage to both the Rhodesian and Mozambican economies. This was an ideological and impetuous decision of the Samora government's foreign policy, which did not have the desired effects, as Mozambique was the only country to apply UN sanctions. It had

drastic effects for Mozambique: the retaliation from Rhodesia that intensified the attacks and bombings installing terror in the center of Mozambique and loss of revenue of millions of US dollars, sacrificing the Mozambican people.

In the geopolitics of Southern Africa, the Samora government had four adversaries: the well-equipped South African armed forces, the Rhodesian troops, the young pioneers who constituted the military arm of President Banda of Malawi, and the Renamo guerrillas, and the population in a war of destabilization. In addition to the military support of the socialist bloc, particularly the USSR, China, North Korea, the Mozambican State also had the presence of battalions of troops from friendly neighbouring states such as Tanzania and Zambia, and, from 1980 onwards, it had the support of troops from Zimbabwe. Even so, this military and logistical support was insufficient in the face of internal and external threats.

## Defence Structures

The FPLM included the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the three branches: army, air force and navy. Mozambique's military capabilities were stable during the Samora government, with a poorly equipped army, but moralized for having defeated the well-equipped Portuguese army. Due to the war and attacks by neighbouring states, there was a militarization of the country and investments in war material with fighter planes, helicopters, anti-aircraft artillery, military training of young people at home and abroad and training of MiG pilots to act in the defence of the territory. Later, the FPLM are transformed into the Armed Forces of Mozambique (FAM).

Castellano da Silva (2017) points out that in the Samora government there was an increase in military capabilities with expenditures in the order of 40% of the country's budget, supported by partners such as the USSR, which enabled the modernization of various sectors. Even so, the various weapons were not used efficiently due to lack of training and preparation of the forces, as well as lack of discipline in military posts, economic resources, and more expressive foreign aid, limiting the combat capabilities of their forces.

Borges Coelho and Macaringue (2002) state that, in addition to regular troops, the Samora Government established an army with five infantry brigades, one of them tanks and some heavy artillery units. Two regular battalions trained in Tanzania; a few platoons hastily formed in Zambia. Later, special battalions were created in strategic locations in the south, center and north of the country, the famous Nova Vida battalions formed in Zambia, Nyanga trained by the Zimbabweans, Dayane, and the Independent Transport

Brigade. In addition to air bases in the south of the country, equipped with hundreds of tanks and BTR battle tanks. Created in 1975 under the name *Força Aérea Popular da Libertação (FAPL)*, the Mozambican air force received support from Cuba and the USSR, particularly from Soviet aircraft to support the Government in the civil war. It had bases in Beira, Nacala and Nampula and a fleet of combat aircraft composed of MiG17, MiG21 and MiG23, MI8, MI24, MI25 helicopters, acquired from the Soviet Union.

In 1979, mandatory military service was instituted. There were Chinese military instructors in Maputo who led courses aimed at transforming Frelimo guerrilla commanders into the first officers of the new regular army. Military aid from the Socialist Bloc only arrived after Mozambique had adhered to the path of socialist development at the FRELIMO Congress of 1977, after which a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed between Mozambique and the USSR for a period of twenty years. Adherence to socialism was a *sine qua non* for Soviet military support. After the Treaty, significant amounts of Soviet military equipment, artillery systems, radar, armoured vehicles, and tanks arrived in Maputo. Between 1977-1980, cadres of the new army attended courses in the USSR, but also in Cuba, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). At the same time, Mozambican officers began courses with Soviet instructors in Mozambique and the USSR (Borges Coelho; Macaringue, 2002).

In the civil-military war between the Mozambican State and Renamo, at times, the country had foreign military forces in the territory. There were presence of troops and military battalions from several African and European countries in Mozambique for combat, training and instruction of Mozambican troops and officers. Tanzanian troops acted in the north of the country, in Cabo-Delgado. From the 1980s onwards, Zimbabwean troops operated in the central provinces of Manica and Sofala, repaying the assistance received from FRELIMO during the armed struggle against the Rhodesian regime before its independence. The Samora government had the support of Zimbabwean military battalions that patrolled the border between the two countries, particularly the railway line linking the port of Beira to Zimbabwe, who were authorized to enter Mozambican territory, pursue and bomb Renamo positions.

The Samora Government also had Soviet, North Korean, Chinese, Cuban and East German military officers. Renamo had the support of South African Boer battalions, Rhodesians, Malawians, Kenyan and American officers. The Mozambican civil-military war revealed the geopolitics of the Cold War. On the Government's side was the European and Soviet socialist world and on the Renamo side were representatives of the capitalist world such



as Portugal, USA, France, Great Britain, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Kenya and Malawi and others who provided economic support, financially, logistically, and militarily to their counterparts in Mozambique. Due to the armed conflict and internal and external threats, Mozambique has become a militarized country and society.

## Coercive Structures

In 1975, the People's Police of Mozambique (PPM) were created, responsible for public security through Police Stations and Posts and the Criminal Investigation Police (PIC) subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior. The State established a capacity for coercion in the urban space thanks to political mobilization, through socialist grassroots structures, ranging from the *Chief of Ten Houses*, *Chief of Quartier*, *Militia Groups*, *Dynamized Group*, *Neighbourhood Circle*, *District Circle*, *Tribunals Popular* and *Party Cells* in government institutions and public enterprises, in addition to advanced checkpoints and military barracks.

Such structures for mobilizing, controlling, and monitoring the population proved to be quite effective, some of which remain in operation to this day. The Frelimo government had an excellent capacity to coerce the populations, inherited from the time of armed struggle and reinforced with the socialist organization and administration of the territory. In addition to the political mobilization arms of the Frelimo Party constituted by OJM and OMM, the State had a structure of social control that began in the neighbourhoods and ended at the highest levels, consisting of a Chief of ten houses, followed by the Chief of the Quartier, Dynamic Group, Neighbourhood Secretary, Neighbourhood Circle, as well as Party Cells in all state-owned institutions and companies and even in hospitals.

The Mozambican State had an internal coercive capacity, conquered shortly after independence with the "Operation Cleaning" conducted in 1974 during the Transitional Government and the "Operation Production" in 1983, as well as the creation of "Reeducation Camps" that removed thousands of people considered unproductive from the urban space to make them productive and useful to society (Quembo, 2015). These Operations and Camps were coercive mechanisms of urban management, to reverse the rural exodus, decongest cities, reduce urban problems, and remove from those areas' individuals considered unproductive, who could question and cause instability to the regime and at the same time increase production of food in the countryside, sending them to rural areas.

Gradually, attacks by Renamo and the South African and Rhodesian apartheid regime undermined military capabilities. The control model (socialist structure of society) and the military battalions provided certain security in urban areas. Even so, there were cases of banditry on the outskirts of large cities. To curb urban banditry, the government instituted checkpoints and guides for traveling citizens. Anyone traveling more than 60 km should obtain a walking guide from the neighbourhood authorities authorizing and justifying the reason for the trip. Only with the walking guide could citizens buy bus tickets. In addition to this mechanism, an armed police force was created, the militiamen, who conducted individually or in pairs the night guard in the neighbourhoods, armed with machine guns.

In addition to the Ministry of Defence, the National Service for Popular Security (SNASP) was created, a military and paramilitary intelligence agency of the Government to guarantee the security of the State, having superpowers determined by the Constitution, reporting only to the PR. SNAP was the government's secret police that provided the State with strategic information and was supposed to protect the country's sovereignty and independence. This body acted like Soviet and North Korean-style spy agencies in the identification, arrest and even elimination of subjects who contested the party and the state internally and externally.

It was a fundamental organ in coercion, having imprisoned thousands of Mozambicans who were sent to re-education camps and others having disappeared at the hands of its agents, being therefore quite feared. SNASP became famous inside and outside the country, having even acted in Portugal, South Africa, Malawi, Kenya, and Tanzania to imprison and even physically eliminate "enemies of the State", Frelimo dissidents and Renamo representatives in those countries. This entire structure of civil, paramilitary, and military control prevented the population and individuals from questioning and criticizing Frelimo, the government, and its leaders, for fear of being arrested and tortured as reactionaries.

According to Gaspar (2015), legitimized by the ideological struggle of the Cold War, defence and security strategies during the one-party regime shaped the legal and institutional framework, as well as successive armed conflicts contributed to creating a culture of secrecy that it was incorporated into the Constitution of the Republic, the Defence and Security Policy, the National Defence Law, and the Press Law, among other instruments. In this way, national security and the right to information went on opposite sides. The Government's military capabilities Samora have declined over time due to external pressures caused by attacks by the apartheid regime and Ian Smith's Rhodesia, allied to Renamo's war of destabilization. As one moved towards

the interior regions of the country, the central and party power was shrinking.

Socialism was not widespread in rural areas and was not understood by the illiterate population. As socialism progressed towards the interior and north of the country, socialism was losing strength and could not cope with social reality, even though the party-state had tried to implement it through Communal Villages and Re-educations Camps and transferred groups urban areas to the interior and regions close to the borders. Lalá (2002) points to economic devastation, social chaos in rural areas as reasons for the increasing loss of legitimacy of the State, as well as its absence, ineffectiveness throughout the national territory and the inability to protect populations and provide humanitarian aid to alleviate extreme poverty.

Mithá (2012) analyses the subjective dimension of politics and the behaviour of individuals during the Samora and Chissano governments, showing the existence of a strong proximity to the State sustained by Frelimo, particularly in urban areas. On the other hand, the rural area – different from the urban area controlled by the central power – escaped the control of the State, which reacted violently and messed with the dispersed social fabric that was vulnerable to the “enemy”. Inspired by Tanzanian African socialism - Ujamaa, the model of society implemented by the party-State in Mozambique encountered resistance and even opposition among the rural population in the most remote areas and attached to traditional values. It was in these regions that Renamo rallied its sympathizers, as well as attacked and increased the number of guerrillas to its war, through abductions and forced incorporation of children, young people and men and women.

## Changes in the State's Foreign Policy

The beginning of the 1980s marks a turning point in Mozambique's foreign policy, in a clear attempt at autonomy from the USSR and approximation to the capitalist world. The different food, military and economic crises caused by the Renamo destabilization war, the South African and Rhodesian aggressions and the insufficiency of Soviet support led Samora to a historic turn. As the situation worsened, Mozambique applied to become a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), but its entry was vetoed by the USSR, in retaliation for the Samora Government's attempt to balance itself as a “non-aligned” state, trying to raise support from both socialist and capitalist blocs. With the veto, Mozambique found itself deprived of the socialist bloc's economic and logistical resources that it needed so much at the time.

The USSR's decision leads Mozambique to try to get closer to the capitalist world in search of financial support, at a time when the economic ultraliberalism of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher was expanding its influence around the world, attracting adepts in the Third World (Abrahamsson; Nilsson, 1994). Samora concluded that the country's situation was unsustainable in the face of South African ground attacks and aerial bombings and their support for Renamo's war of destabilization that killed the population, instituted terror, and destroyed economic and social infrastructure. Allied to this situation was the survival of the government and regime itself. Samora decided to start negotiations with the apartheid regime with a view to stopping the attacks and support for Renamo.

After years of preparation and negotiations by the core of advisors, strategically, Samora signed the Incomáti Agreement with the South African regime in March 1984, a non-aggression and good-neighbourly agreement, in which Mozambique committed to deactivate the ANC bases on its territory and South Africa to cease its support for Renamo. This decision displeased Mozambique's partners and friends in the region, Tanzania and Zambia and their heads of state who refuse to participate in the signing ceremony of the Agreement. The ANC and the Black South African population felt betrayed by Samora. The Incomáti Agreement was considered a betrayal by the ANC, South African Communist Party, Black South African population, and other anti-apartheid movements, including Black American movements.

Lalá (2002) argues that the Agreement with South Africa ignored the internal dimension of the Mozambican conflict, by marginalizing Renamo, one of the belligerent parties and part of the problem. Despite having been created by Rhodesia as an instrument of destabilization and then supported by South Africa and always dependent on external support to remain an operational military force, over the years Renamo has gained popular support, particularly from groups that felt excluded or marginalized by the policies of the Frelimo Government.

According to Ferrão (1997), negotiations for the Agreement began in 1982 with the visit of the Assistant Undersecretary for African Affairs of the US Department of State Frank Wisner to Maputo, who encouraged the opening of the Mozambican embassy in the US and the opening of negotiations with the apartheid regime to stop South African aggression. Even with the beginning of the dialogue, the South African aggressions against Mozambique did not stop and in 1983, the South Africans bombed Matola.

That same year, Samora called the Mozambican ambassadors in Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe to Maputo and appointed a commission composed of them to select future ambassadors in the various countries where

Mozambique was going to open embassies. The movement of ambassadors by the Government aimed to develop relations with the US and other countries, make Mozambique known, revive the solidarity groups that had supported FRELIMO in the colonial war and block Renamo. In March 1984, Samora summoned all Mozambican ambassadors to Maputo to attend the signing of the Incomáti Agreement. The signing of the Agreement in a public ceremony was a clear message to the South African people that from now on they would not count on the help of Mozambique (Ferrão, 2007). Disappointed and in retaliation for the Incomáti Agreement, university professors and researchers from South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and other nationalities who lived in Mozambique and supported Mozambican institutions left the country, which was once again suffering from the exodus of technical staff.

Months later, Samora begins the first negotiations with the IMF and WB in Washington to obtain economic and financial assistance and signs the first agreement that would be implemented in the following years. Mozambique is admitted as a member at that meeting and that same year, the US sends five million dollars to support the private sector of agriculture (Ferrão, 2007). It is against this backdrop that in 1985 Samora travels to Washington and London for the historic encounters with Reagan and Thatcher that had infuriated the Soviets.

According to Ferrão (2007), in 1985, Samora is invited for an official working visit to the US. Samora's visits to Washington and Downing Street were of a political nature, to address Mozambique's bilateral relations with the two powers, and did not include any economic agreement. Even so, Samora met with representatives of the IMF and WB. Renamo had sympathizers and dedicated support in the two rival parties in the US, as did the apartheid regime. In 1986 there were Mozambicans working at the IMF/WB.

Despite the change in the country's foreign policy, the attempt at autonomy from Moscow, the signing of the non-aggression pact with apartheid and rapprochement with the Western world and the Bretton Woods Institutions, Mozambican diplomacy ignored Renamo and refused to negotiate with this counterrevolutionary movement. Samora continues the rhetoric against Renamo, classifying the armed conflict as a "war of destabilization, calling its guerrillas "armed bandits", "lakes of colonialism and imperialism", not granting any kind of truce, believing in the military solution against this movement, dragging the conflict for years.

When analysing African Marxist military regimes, Visentini (2020) puts forward the hypothesis that the revolutionary processes had autochthonous roots and that the connection with the Soviet camp was a later instrumental element, although indispensable, with Moscow's interest being limited. The

military ethos of African governments in Marxist-Leninist socialism and the elements that were familiar to it – centralization and discipline – were useful for the realization of the program they proposed to execute. The appeal of African revolutionary governments to Marxism-Leninism served as a source of international support in the context of the Cold War, in a context in which the USSR, China and the socialist community in general represented the only consistent source of military supplies, legitimation, support political and economic. These were the conditions necessary for their survival. However, Soviet aid, in addition to creating dependence, was restricted to the military field, being insufficient in the economic-financial field (Visentini, 2020). In his view, without the construction of the State, the existence of ruling elites and the social transformations promoted by revolutionary processes, there would be no international role for Mozambique. In this way, the author highlights the regional impact of the Mozambican revolutionary process and regime, which generated trends and countertrends, as well as internationalized violent conflicts and civil wars.

The charismatic leadership of Samora Machel, the excessive centralization in the decision-making process in the hands of the PR and the hard core of the party prevented Mozambican counterintelligence actions in predicting attacks from enemy states such as South Africa and Rhodesia, as well as the recognition of the nationalist character. and the existence of an internal support base for the war promoted by Renamo, classifying them as “armed bandits”.

## Foreign Policy of the Chissano Government (1987-2005)

Chissano became President of the People’s Republic of Mozambique in 1987, succeeding Samora Machel, in a direct transition from Frelimo. Chissano was a head of state with strong political experience; he had been Prime Minister of the Transitional Government from 1974 to 1975, MNE during the Samora Machel Government, and had occupied functions in FRELIMO delegations abroad during the colonial struggle. But it comes at a turbulent time after Machel’s death and during Mozambique’s worst crisis. The country was torn apart by the fratricidal war with Renamo, with the social and economic infrastructures destroyed by the war of destabilization and without support from the socialist world that was in unprecedented crisis.

The Joaquim Chissano government was marked by the political-economic transition, characterized by the abandonment of the socialist model and the opening of Mozambique to the free market economy. It is in

the Chissano Governance that Mozambique's cooperation with the Bretton Woods Institutions, initiated by Samora Machel in 1984, took effect and accelerated. The State initiated a series of structural adjustment policies, following the IMF/WB primer, which consisted of opening the market to imports from the capitalist world, in the privatization of various sectors of the Mozambican economy, in the resizing and privatization of large public companies, industries and factories, reduction in the number of workers.

From 1990 onwards, Mozambique changed its political-economic system and the Constitution adhering to liberalism and multipartyism. In 1992, the General Peace Agreement (AGP) was signed, putting an end to the civil war between Frelimo and Renamo that had lasted 16 years. In 1994, the first multi-party general elections – presidential and legislative – were held, which were won by Frelimo, with no alternation of political power. The approved electoral law benefited the party that was already in power. Thus, there were no significant changes in the political life of the country, which continued with the same socialist environment and structure: services, institutions, and public companies' partisan with active Frelimo cells, including in hospitals.

There was an accelerated systemic economic change in the country with the full adherence to the IMF/WB policies and its structural adjustment recipes. The political elite remained in power and tried to transform itself into an economic elite. With the money distributed by the Bretton Woods Institutions, there was a wave of privatization without national entrepreneurs "from scratch", which transformed the old comrades and leaders of Frelimo party-state into the "new bosses". Socialist comrades become entrepreneurs by snapping up public enterprises through privatization, without having experience in business management.

There was an unsuccessful attempt by the party-state to transform the national political elite into an economic elite. In banks and credit unions, loans were granted only to Party-State members and without guarantee of return, ignoring small non-partisan national investors. Years later, the financial system registered economic scandals because of large bank loans that were never paid off. Most industries, companies, services, and banks privatized by national entrepreneurs linked to Frelimo will declare bankruptcy years later due to mismanagement and competition from investors and foreign companies that offer modernized services, of better quality and at competitive prices. Thus, a Mozambican middle class was born without its own money, originating from the privatization of industries, companies, services and public banks, whose capital came from economic-financial scandals and the appropriation of goods and services from the former socialist state.

The Foreign Policy of the Chissano Government was characterized



by the opening of Mozambique to the policies of the IMF and WB and to international trade with the Western capitalist world. With Chissano, cooperation with institutions of the capitalist world took place, whose conversations began in the previous government of Samora Machel. The Chissano Government was able to ease the tensions between Mozambique and the Western capitalist world, particularly with the US and the International Community. Mozambique had started to receive a series of technicians and co-operators' from the Western capitalist world, as well as foreign investment, in exchange for the country's adhesion to the market economy (Hanlon, 1997).

However, Chissano's foreign policy had its consequences in the economic and labour sector, with privatizations leading millions of Mozambican workers to unemployment, the closing of important national industries and factories, which were considered obsolete or outdated by the implemented capitalist model. To open its economy to the international market and to apply the guidelines of the IMF and WB, the textile industry, the cashew industry that occupied the top places in the world loses its competition to the detriment of cashew nut exports from India and Brazil. Thus, Mozambique starts to import products that were previously produced nationally. In 1992 there is a change in the country's foreign policy in relation to the Timorese issue, when Mozambique and Indonesia sign a cooperation agreement, formalizing the establishment of diplomatic relations.

This decision drew criticism from Mozambican civil society and protest from the Timor-Leste Revolutionary Front (FRETILIN). Faced with the controversy, Frelimo argues that the Mozambican state has always sought to establish diplomatic relations with all states, including those whose ideology is contrary to its own. This change of position was consistent with the economic pragmatism of the Chissano Government, which saw Indonesia as a strong player in Southeast Asia and a future trading partner, as well as anticipated, trying to prevent Indonesia from supporting Renamo in opening Mozambique to the multiparty system (Sá; De Lucca, 2021). With the end of the armed conflict, the Chissano Government's foreign policy shifts the focus of war efforts to economic development and poverty alleviation, aiming to obtain international aid and foreign debt forgiveness for its developmental project.

## Coercive Structures

During the war, to guarantee security, the transport companies had their own private militias ranging from 15 to 60 men who guaranteed the

security of the columns on long-distance, interprovincial trips. These militias were made up of ex-soldiers from both sides and deserters, armed with guns and machine guns or even anti-aircraft guns. They travelled in vans at the front and at the end of the bus columns. Sometimes, small cannons or anti-aircraft guns were attached to the roof of these trucks or vans to demonstrate firepower to the enemy.

Many of these businesspeople were Frelimo members or sympathizers and made contributions to the army and the Party. Those company carriers that were not in the “scheme” were left unprotected and did not have the monitoring and proper protection of the Mozambican army, being the target of frequent attacks that resulted in deaths, injuries and loss of buses and trucks and other damages with goods, goods, and services. Under the Chissano Government, the National Service for Popular Security (SNASP) – the state’s intelligence agency and secret police – was transformed into the State Information and Security Service (SISE) in 1991, maintaining the same powers and *modus operandi*. Both SNASP and SISE had superpowers determined by the Constitution, reporting only to the PR.

Soon after, at the end of 1992, the PPM was transformed into the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM), in the context of the revision of the 1990 Constitution and the AGP in 1992. In 1999, the Rapid Intervention Force (FIR) was created, a special unit and reserve guarantee of public order, destined to combat declared violence whose resolution went beyond the normal means of action. The FIR was particularly active in dispersing peaceful civil society demonstrations. There are no significant changes in the security defence forces - PRM, PIC and SISE - they maintain the same powers and forms of action. Despite the democratization process that began in 1990, the socialist control structure was maintained, although it lost force with the end of the armed conflict.

Despite the democratization that began in 1990, the socialist control structure remained in society, although it lost its vigour with the end of the armed conflict. This structure was always used to issue declarations of residence, an important document for obtaining an identity card and passport, as well as for enrolling in educational institutions, opening bank accounts, etc. The same structure was used annually in the process of recruiting young people for compulsory military service (SMO) as places for the census of future young men. There has always been political use of these institutions and spaces, particularly during electoral periods for the purposes of political mobilization and organization, and even Frelimo party campaigns. Military registration and subsequent recruitment were and continued to be powerful instruments of coercion on young people, as they define their future. Going to

the “troop” or not can insert young people into the army and into future jobs that require military training such as border guards, forest reserves, customs, customs, private security companies or delay their studies in high school or university. Often, the SMO was used as a punishment for young people who were considered rebels or who sympathized with the opposition.

With the formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (FADM) after the AGP, Mozambique received support from Western countries such as Portugal, France, Great Britain, and Zimbabwe, which provided instructors and battalion training to form the new army, but the Mozambican Government did not maximize such aid, having accepted only training in the demining area. Of the 30,000 men planned, the FADM consisted of around 12,000 men (Borges Coelho; Macaringue, 2002). Renamo guerrillas were never integrated into the FADM, as predicted by the AGP.

In 2003, PRM had about twenty thousand agents, in a country with more than 25 million people, 1 agent for every 1,250 citizens, a small number to prevent and fight crime in Mozambique, in a context in which repression was the word most pronounced by police spokespeople and the country had signed and ratified all international conventions on civil and political rights (Centro de Integridade Pública, 2016). This civil society organization was concerned about the militarization of police training in basic, medium, and higher education centers, with few hours of theoretical education related to human rights and the use of the AK-47 as an official weapon, including by cadets in training. The change in the Constitution in 2004 recognized the legal pluralism and traditional authorities that were valued and promoted by the State that had persecuted them in the past and claimed by Renamo.

## Defence Structures

With the end of the armed conflict, military capabilities were reduced due to the stress of war. With the GPA and the political-ideological shift towards the capitalist market economy, support from the traditional military partners Cuba and the USSR ceased. Without their support, the air force is the sector that suffered the most from budget cuts, being reduced to a symbolic force and the aircraft are left in precarious conditions and without maintenance at the air bases. On the other hand, it is necessary to link the decrease in military capabilities to the change in the scope of security, which, in addition to its strategic-military character, also began to encompass human security, something that impacted the expenditures that States made with the armed forces.

In August 1994, a new army was created, the Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) from the integration of the FAM and Renamo guerrillas, with two generals appointed to lead the troops, one from Frelimo and the other from Renamo. However, Renamo forces and their leaders were never incorporated into the FADM. With the end of the armed conflict, the army loses relevance and investments, sending defence and security forces to barracks and barracks. The country's agenda focuses on reconstruction and economic development. The military arsenal inherited from the socialist period and the civil war becomes obsolete and is dismantled, sold little by little on the parallel market.

After the AGP and the formation of a national army, there was a disinvestment in Mozambique's military capabilities. There was a process of demobilization of former army personnel and Renamo guerrillas and formation of a single army of 30,000 men under the terms of the AGP. Military training and training as well as its fortification with new equipment was left aside, not being a priority. Gradually, strategic parts of the war arsenal, engines and turbines of combat planes and Soviet helicopters and other parts were being sold on the parallel market, particularly in South Africa. Part of the military bases and barracks were deactivated, giving way to housing, roads, state infrastructure and the deactivated air bases or transformed into commercial airports. According to the FADM (2022), the Mozambican army participated in peacekeeping operations in Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Timor-Leste, as well as in 1997 it participated in joint Blue Hungwe operations in Zimbabwe and Blue Crane in Africa. of the South in 1999.

Part of the military figures were awarded new ranks and others went into reserve. In fact, confidence and a climate of peace discouraged military investment, in a country that was still facing drought threats and the population was suffering from hunger. Gradually there was a rejuvenation of the military forces, with the transition to the reserve of high-ranking soldiers and the introduction of mandatory military service annually for young people who turn eighteen years of age. Regarding defence, the 1992 GPA provided for the presence of multinational troops in Mozambican territory – blue helmets – under ONUMOZ until the first multiparty general elections were held in 1994. As well as the creation of a single army with thirty thousand men, of which half came from the FAM and the other half from Renamo and its transformation into FADM, with a clear numerical reduction in the number of military personnel.

## Final Remarks

Mozambique's foreign policy was influenced by the domestic, regional, and international scenario: the destabilization war, the hegemony of apartheid regimes in Southern Africa and the bipolar dispute of the Cold War. The Samora Machel government, marked the revolutionary period of construction of the Mozambican state, being characterized by a foreign policy and diplomacy of liberation, committed to the anti-colonial struggle, against the hegemony of minority governments of apartheid in Southern Africa, for the international solidarity and a firm stance on international issues such as Western Sahara, Timor-Leste, and Palestine. Influenced by socialism in a one-party regime, the foreign policy of the Samora government was the target of internal and external pressures from the global bipolarization of the Cold War: the Renamo destabilization war and aggressions by the neighbouring states of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Malawi.

External relations were intense and initiative-taking, inserting Mozambique into Southern Africa, the African continent, and the international scene – through the creation and participation in regional forums and organizations such as the ELF and SADCC – making it a political protagonist and fundamental actor, influencing the destinations in the region. As Soviet military support was insufficient for the four fronts of conflict, without economic aid and technology transfer, Mozambique had taken a turn in its foreign policy with the Incomáti Agreement and the beginning of IMF and WB negotiations. The Cold War, international factors, regional dynamics, and national circumstances influenced Mozambique's foreign policy.

The Chissano government was marked by the country's political-economic transition, end of socialism and external imposition – of the multiparty model, structural adjustment policies, capitalist market economy – from the Western world and Bretton Woods institutions, in exchange for economic aid. There were changes in the paradigm and agenda of Mozambique's foreign policy, which had become dependent on international aid, without autonomy and foreign policy was dictated from the outside in. There was a redefinition of the regional and international role of Mozambique, highlighting the regional and international foreign policy agenda, liberal development of SADC and the IMF/WB. Mozambique ceased to be an important regional and Soviet socialist player and had become a pawn of Western capitalism. Even after the introduction of multipartyism and democratization, Mozambique's foreign policy continued to be linked to the political-ideological interests of the ruling party and without the participation of non-state actors. Political-party and personal trust had been main criteria for the appointment of the MNE and

ambassadors.

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## ABSTRACT

The article analyses the Mozambican foreign policy in the Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano Governments. It uses as a method Rosenau's comparative foreign policy analysis and the theoretical contributions of Putnam's two-level game logic. The Samora government's foreign policy was one of regional liberation, antiapartheid and solidarity with oppressed states and peoples. Engaged in the Socialist Bloc, the Mozambican State faced internal and external constraints from the Cold War. Decisions were ideological, centred on the charismatic leader and President of the Republic. With his own agenda, Samora knew how to manage popular will with nationalizations, but Marxism-Leninism imposed military doctrine and diplomatic inflexibility. The Chissano Government's external relations were one of political-economic pragmatism, it sought new ideologies and opened itself up to dialogue and negotiations with unlikely partners. Considered a technocrat and an excellent diplomat, Chissano knew how to negotiate the end of the civil war, political-economic opening and help from the Western world. However, he made unpopular decisions: structural adjustment policies, transition from socialism to capitalism and changes to the Constitution. There were profound changes between the two Governments: from being an important regional political player and Soviet pawn, Mozambique became dependent on international aid and redefined its role, becoming a regional strategic economic partner, whose foreign policy agenda came to be influenced by international economic bodies.

## KEYWORDS

Comparative Foreign Policy; Mozambique; Samora Machel; Joaquim Chissano.

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