

NATIONAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT: DIALOGUES BETWEEN THE MEANING OF HÉLIO JAGUARIBE'S "AUTONOMY" CONCEPT AND THE NATIONAL STRATEGY OF DEFENSE

Pedro Nogueira da Gama Correio¹

Introduction

According to Ferrater Mora, in the philosophical vocabulary, the term “autonomy” is generally used in two ways. First, there is the ontological meaning, in which it is assumed that certain areas of reality are independent, governed by a set of distinct rules and laws. Autonomy does not imply that a given scope is not governed by the rules and laws of another scope, in whole or in part. There is also the ethical meaning. It is said, for example, that a moral law is autonomous when its foundation is in itself, being the proper reason for its legality. In other words, it is related to the condition of the human will to self-determine, according to rules or moral laws defined by man himself, being free from strange or exogenous influences that subject him (Mora 2001, 234-235).

According to the Houaiss Dictionary of the Portuguese Language, the word “autonomy” is polysemic and has different meanings. It concerns man's ability to self-govern. In its legal sense, it relates to the right of an individual to make decisions freely or the right of an institution to determine the rules of its conduct, without any external restrictions or impositions. In the fields of International Law and International Relations, it relates to a country's recognized right to be guided and act according to its own laws. Regarding this last meaning, the inevitable proximity to the concept of “sovereignty” is noticeable (Houaiss 2004, 351).

In his abundant studies on the economic, political and social development of Brazil, contemporary international relations and matters of

¹ PhD in International Political Economy from Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). Post Doctoral Researcher at Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército (ECEME), Brazil.

national security and defense, the political scientist and sociologist Hélio Jaguaribe presented several reflections on the problem of “autonomy” in Brazil since it integrates a world system of States and is inserted within the capitalist economic system.

There is a dearth of deeper research in Brazil with a similar theme about the political scientist within the field of Defense studies. It is certainly noted that the studies based on Jaguaribe’s work have focused, to a large extent, on the analysis of his ISEB intellectual production, being concentrated in the field of Politics and Economics, particularly with regard to Economic Development. It is pertinent, therefore, to take a look at the intellectual work of a relevant “Brazil interpreter” like Jaguaribe who deals with issues that interrelate Development and National Defense.

What are the meanings attributed by Jaguaribe to “autonomy” in Brazil? And to what extent do your ideas about “autonomy” dialogue with the main public policies related to the theme of defense, formulated in Brazil in recent decades: the National Policy of Defense and, in particular, the National Strategy of Defense in its different versions?

Hélio Jaguaribe: Biographical Notes

Hélio Jaguaribe Gomes de Matos (Paiva 2010) was born on April 23rd, 1923 in Rio de Janeiro, then the Federal District, and died on September 9th, 2018 in Rio de Janeiro. He was 95 years-old. His parents were Francisco Jaguaribe de Matos and Francelina Santos Jaguaribe de Matos. Hélio Jaguaribe was a student at Santo Inácio College and graduated in Law from PUC, the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, in 1946. Then he worked at the law firm of San Tiago Dantas. Later, together with Reynaldo Reis, he opened his own law firm.

His intellectual eclecticism, a mark of his trajectory, was revealed from an early age. He became responsible for the culture supplement “A Quinta Página”, at *Jornal do Comércio* newspaper, in 1949, created with the support of the modernist poet Augusto Frederico Schmidt. This important journalistic media provided visibility to various analyzes of Brazilian culture, formulated by a group of intellectuals such as Israel Klabin, Oscar Lorenzo Fernandez, Jorge Serpa Filho, Roland Corbisier and others. Among the themes addressed by Jaguaribe in his articles, fascism, clientelism and ideological politics must be highlighted.

In 1952, Jaguaribe and other intellectuals, residing in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, began to meet on the last weekend of each month in the Itatiaia

National Park. In a space provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, this select group met in order to examine and reflect on issues and problems that Brazilian society should address in order to overcome underdevelopment. The "Itatiaia group", as it became known, in its five meetings, counted on the presence, besides Jaguaribe himself, of thinkers such as Cândido Mendes de Almeida, Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, Oscar Lorenzo Fernandez, Inácio Rangel, Israel Klabin, Rômulo Almeida, Heitor Lima Rocha, Evaldo Correia Lima and Ottolmy da Costa Strauch, from Rio de Janeiro, in addition to Roland Corbisier, Vicente Ferreira da Silva, Ângelo Simões de Arruda, Almeida Sales, Paulo Edmundo de Sousa Queiroz and Miguel Reale, residing in São Paulo, among others.

In 1953, part of the "Itatiaia group", particularly those who lived in Rio de Janeiro, along with Roland Corbisier, who moved to the federal capital in 1954, was responsible for organizing and founding the Brazilian Institute of Economics, Sociology and Politics (IBESP). Jaguaribe was its secretary-general. Through self-financing, in 1953 and in the following three years, IBESP published five editions of the so-called "Cadernos do Nosso Tempo", a magazine that gathered essays on society and economics. His essays summarized the main ideas of IBESP and pointed to the need for structural reforms in the Brazilian State. Among Jaguaribe's articles, *The Brazilian crisis*, published in October / December 1953, and *For a national development policy*, featured in the last issue of the magazine, in January / March 1956, should be highlighted.

IBESP members wanted to have an influence on government decisions regarding development. So, they decided to expand their action. Counting on the crucial contribution of the educator Anísio Teixeira, who, in 1955, fulfilled a significant role in the Ministry of Education, the Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies (ISEB) was established in this ministry by a government decree. Although formally linked, ISEB did not suffer direct interference from the minister, Cândido Mota Filho at that time. In order to materialize his ideas, one of the main initiatives of the ISEB was to institute a regular course, especially aimed at the public servers chosen by public service agencies, covering themes of economics, politics, sociology, philosophy and history, lasting one academic year.

With an advisory board, a board of trustees and the departments of economics, philosophy, history and sociology and political science, the last one headed by Jaguaribe, ISEB organized publications, conferences and courses given by its members, such as Jaguaribe himself, Corbisier, Evaldo Correia Lima, Álvaro Vieira Pinto, Cândido Mendes de Almeida and Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, as well as other intellectuals in line with their ideas and reflections, such as Nelson Werneck Sodré and Celso Furtado. In this way, ISEB has consolidated itself as one of the most relevant centers of thought and debate on

issues related to nationalism, development and industrialization. From these debates, a fundamental concept was born, “national-developmentalism”.

It should be emphasized that, being a cultural institution created in 1955 as an office of the Ministry of Education and Culture, ISEB (Abreu 2010) was intended for the study, teaching and dissemination of social sciences, based on the foundational idea the understanding and the critical analysis of the Brazilian reality and the development of theoretical instruments that would allow the encouragement and promotion of national development, understood as the overcoming by the country of its colonial and underdeveloped condition, achievable only through an autonomous and growing industrialization. According to the ISEB ideology, development policy should be nationalist, the only one capable of leading to emancipation and sovereignty, and supported by the national industrial bourgeoisie, by the proletariat, by technical and administrative groups and by intellectuals, as opposed to the mercantile and landowning bourgeoisie and to the large portion of the “parasitic” middle class.

According to Jaguaribe himself, in an interview to the program “Political Memory” of TV Câmara (2020), held on May 13th, 2003, the “soul” of ISEB was its set of studies to frame an industrial vision. National industrial development should have a virtuous “alliance between the industrial bourgeoisie, the urban proletariat and the technical middle class”. In this interview, Jaguaribe describes an opposition between social classes, but not in the traditional “bourgeois versus workers” sense. The cleavage had a different nature: “technical middle class versus clientelistic middle class; industrial versus commercial bourgeoisie; industrial proletariat versus peasantry domesticated by the landowners”. Described in another way, there was a division in society between “backwardness” and “modernity” (Câmara dos Deputados 2020).

By publishing *Nationalism in the present day in Brazil*, at the end of 1958, Jaguaribe ended up precipitating a crisis within the ISEB. In this book, Jaguaribe was averse to what he considered a radicalism of positions that appropriated nationalism and made it symbolically contrary to the participation of foreign capital in the dynamics of Brazilian development. The criticism of the book was not originated in the ISEB, but in movements led by newspapers and the National Students Union (UNE). These movements objected to Jaguaribe’s analysis of oil and petrochemical policy and its alignment in favor of the exploitation by the private sector. According to Jaguaribe, these foreign investments would help overcome the problem of technical and capital precariousness, thus proving to be useful and profitable. Supporting his argument in defense of private companies, there was the thesis in which the Brazilian State was incapable, from a management point of view, due to its clientelistic and notary nature, the result of underdevelopment.

The debate culminated in an internal crisis that basically highlighted the dispute over the ISEB's real purpose. After changes in the institute's structure, Jaguaribe noticed that such changes were unfavorable to him. In 1959, Jaguaribe decided to move away from ISEB.

Between 1959 and 1964, Jaguaribe acted as an entrepreneur, expanding the Companhia Ferro e Aço de Vitória, held by his family. With the beginning of the military regime in March 1964, he condemned the overthrow of President João Goulart, resigned as president of the steel company and left the country, going to teach sociology in the United States. He was a professor at Harvard University between 1964 and 1966, at Stanford University between 1966 and 1967 and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology between 1968 and 1969. Returning to Brazil in 1969, he took over as Director of International Affairs at Faculdades Integradas Cândido Mendes.

Based on a lecture given in 1973, held at the Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro, Jaguaribe published the book *Brazil: crises and alternatives* next year. The theme was an analytical study on the crisis of populism and the military regime after 1964. In this book, he recovered part of his developmental ideas.

It emphasized the old idea about the need of foreign capital flow. The promotion of development from a mostly state enterprise would not have been possible due to the lack of conditions of populist governments between the 1940s and 1960s, as a consequence of the crisis that affected Brazil in the 1960s. Following this logic, Jaguaribe pointed to the participation of foreign capital in the positive economic results of the military regime.

Jaguaribe coordinated a project in 1985, commissioned by José Sarney's government, entitled "Brasil 2000". Next year the study was published under a new title, *Brazil 2000: for a new social pact*. According to the report, Brazil was in a similar situation as compared to African and Asian countries in terms of social welfare conditions, regardless of occupying the position of the eighth world economy. For example, 65% of the Brazilian population was subject to hunger and lived in precarious conditions. In addition to the diagnosis, the study had a propositional focus, by establishing a strategy to raise the population's living standards over 15 years in order to reach similar levels found in countries like Greece and Spain. This strategy was aimed to attack four focal points: food production, job creation, raising wages, expanding and speeding up social services.

The second part of the study was published in 1988. *Brazil: reform or chaos* showed a disturbing picture for the country's situation. Based on documents, statistics and comparisons, the new study showed an aggravation of social ills year after year, which would lead to social chaos in the early 1990s. As the social

investments necessary to reverse the scenario were considered unrealizable, this study prescribed the following: the renegotiation of the external debt, the increase in the tax burden and the restructuring of the Brazilian State.

Along with André Franco Montoro, José Richa and José Serra, Jaguaribe founded, in the middle of 1988, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB). In his party performance, he had participated in the campaign for the Presidency of the Republic of Mario Covas and worked in the national directory and in the party's executive committee.

A new picture of the situation and problems in Brazil, pointing out a series of alternatives and options, was published by Jaguaribe in 1989, *Brazil alternatives*. Jaguaribe decided to participate more strongly in political life by taking part, in April 1992, together with other members of the PSDB, such as Celso Lafer and Sérgio Paulo Rouanet, in the second ministerial staff of the Fernando Collor de Mello government. Thus, he left the party positions and assumed the Secretariat of Science and Technology. However, with the opening of the president's impeachment process, approved by the Câmara dos Deputados on September 29th of the same year, Jaguaribe resigned his position and no longer acted in politics directly. His participation, from then on, became exclusively academic.

As an example of its enormous versatility and culture, Jaguaribe started in 1994 a research and historical analysis project. Directing several social scientists and historians, this project was published in 1999, with the following title: *A critical study of history*. The Portuguese version was published in 2001. In general, the work involved a critical analysis of seventeen civilizations, from ancient to contemporary ages, seeking to identify the conditions of its emergence, heyday and eventual decline.

In *Brazil: alternatives and solutions*, launched in 2002, the political scientist presented reflections on the new international order and its problems at the dawn of the new century, the possible ways for Brazil to overcome its limitations and an analysis of South America on the Latin American scenario. In 2003, Jaguaribe conveyed the IEPES dean to Francisco Weffort and had become dean emeritus of the institution.

According to Jaguaribe himself, in the article *Brief news about his own work* in 2000, the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset was one of the main intellectual references of his education. The philosopher's work led him to become interested in German thought and reflections developed between the last decades of the 19th century and the 1930s.

In his ninety-five years of life, Hélio Jaguaribe has accumulated numerous honors and awards: doctor *honoris causa* in philosophy at the

Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz, Germany, in 1983, for his work in the social sciences and for his studies on Latin America; honorary doctor at the Federal University of Paraíba, in 1992; Grand Cross of the National Order of Scientific Merit, in 1996; Order of Cultural Merit granted by the Ministry of Culture, in 1999, for its work in favor of Brazil cultural development; honorary doctor at the University of Buenos Aires in 2001; professor emeritus of the Army Command and General Staff College (ECEME) in 2003; finally, but not least, he was elected to occupy the seat number 11 of the *Academia Brasileira de Letras*, succeeding Celso Furtado, in 2005.

The Concept of "Autonomy" in Hélio Jaguaribe's Work

Held in the Chilean city of Viña del Mar, between January 7th and 11th, 1979, the Seminar "Latin America and the New International Economic Order" featured the presentation of a study by Hélio Jaguaribe entitled *Peripheral autonomy and centric hegemony* (Jaguaribe 1986). The publication in the magazine *Estudios internacionales* took place in the same year. Considering some of the references prospected for the purposes of this research, the importance of Jaguaribe study is noticeable. An accurate examination of the text is essential for an understanding of the political scientist's reflections on the theme of "autonomy".

For Jaguaribe, the country's autonomy is closely and directly related to what he describes as "technical and entrepreneurial". Such autonomy would not be envisaged until a central plan was established that would provide a break with the dominance of transnational corporations over technological innovations and markets.

In the contemporary peripheral world, conditions are completely different. On the one hand, universalization and instant information, with regard to consumption styles in central countries, produce imitative forms that are inescapable in peripheral countries, which reduce their capacity for investment and are encouraged to use directly or indirectly imported products and processes. On the other hand, the degree of international control of transnationals over technological innovation and markets makes it practically impossible, in open societies and not subjected to imperative central planning, to develop a national effort in favor of technical and business autonomy (Jaguaribe 1986, 44-45).

But that effort would not be enough. As long as the elites and middle classes of the peripheral countries mirror their expectations and consumption

habits in the central countries, a significant fraction of the national income, in an environment of general internal poverty, would remain absorbed, not allowing internal conditions for a multiplier effect encompassing development and technical, academic, business and industrial success in favor of “autonomy”.

In addition to these psychosomatic, political and technical-economic difficulties, there is an extraordinary increase in the minimum levels of critical mass for successful technical and business emancipation. The order of magnitude of the domestic markets, to compensate for the international control of manufacturers and the market, exercised by transnational companies, assumes semi-continental proportions, or requires integrative mechanisms of extraordinary efficiency and a high degree of consensus. [...] All of these conditions are almost impossible to gather and maintain for a sufficiently long period. Even in countries like Brazil and Mexico, where national dimensions would allow such an effort, social, economic and political conditions do not lead to an adequate relationship between elites and the masses to induce and sustain sufficient motivations for technical and business autonomy. The elites and the middle classes, in order to maintain their expectations of consumption in the existing general conditions of poverty, absorb immeasurable proportions of the national income, imposing on the masses, with the support of coercive means, miserable patterns of survival. Thus, complementary relations that induce technical and business autonomy are not generated, but the opposite occurs, internal conditions that increase technical and business dependence and, through these, international dependence (Jaguaribe 1986, 45).

In the political scientist's view, modern national states are an innovation based on a virtuous arrangement involving three fundamental aspects: the common historical-cultural background, based on a common technical basis, which is not detailed by Jaguaribe, and an impersonal and indirect relationship, in general, among its members, but which aims for constancy and fidelity.

Modern national states are a relatively new form of organization for society, which differs in general from all historical precedents. The basic characteristic of the modern national state is the combination, from a common historical-cultural background, often on a common technical basis, of an interrelation between its members. This interrelation must be impersonal and indirect and tends to be in fact privileged and almost exhaustive and, axiologically, it postulates as deserving of supreme loyalty and dedication (Jaguaribe 1986, 59).

Like a template, he understands that societies function as systems

composed by four subsystems (participatory, cultural, economic and political). These have specific functions that are related to each other. Each subsystem generates products that feed the other subsystems, acting as inputs. In turn, it is fed by specific products from the other subsystems. Finally, societies are politically and culturally limited by their respective national states.

The characteristics of the national state, already enunciated, constitute a decisive political-cultural factor in framing society and its subsystems. Society, as it is widely recognized and as I have had the opportunity to exhibit in other works, is analytically a system of four subsystems: participatory, cultural, economic and political. Each subsystem performs certain macro-functions: the participatory system produces actors, roles and status; the cultural, beliefs and symbols; the economic, utility; and the political, commands. Analytically, the subsystems maintain input-output relationships with each other. The participatory subsystem receives in exchange for its products (actors, roles, status) integrative values from cultural; internal order and external defense from political; and consumer facilities from economic (Jaguaribe 1986, 60-61).

According to Jaguaribe, the world state system, at the end of the 1970s, was divided into two large "empires", composed of a group of countries commanded by one of the superpowers: the American Empire and the Soviet Empire. Therefore, international relations developed between empires constituted an "inter-imperial system" and within each empire integrated an "intra-imperial system".

For the political scientist, both intra-imperial systems were in crisis, although with different characteristics. In the American case, the crisis was related to the dependence of national states on the "imperial center" and the growing problems to pursue an autonomous condition. These problems were particularly serious for peripheral states, on the fringe of development. This phenomenon was originated and accentuated due to the continued contamination of the dynamics between the internal subsystems of national states by inputs and products from other states, especially those from political and cultural nature. The most notorious example would be the role of transnational companies within peripheral states.

However, [...] it happens that the national states that are part of the American intra-imperial system are in crisis (the same is true in the Soviet). This crisis basically results from growing difficulties that these national states, especially those in the periphery, are currently facing to achieve their autonomy. [...] Fundamentally, this fact is related to the exchange of inputs and products

between the subsystems of the national society. Dependence on the imperial center is particularly asymmetrical for societies on the periphery of the system and affects the interaction of their subsystems, because it substitutes for external inputs and products some of the basic inputs and products from the cultural and political subsystems of such societies. The most common form of this pathological system, in the American intra-imperial system, is the growing importance of transnational companies' role in the dependent societies of the system (Jaguaribe 1986, 62-63).

Therefore, the main issue would involve the cultural subsystem. With the most dynamic sectors of the economy basically in the hands of transnational companies, scientific and technological inputs would come from the center, causing a gradual weakening of the national cultural subsystem and mandatorily threatening the capacity of the other subsystems. In other words, a cultural "underdevelopment" would inexorably generate negative effects on the political, economic and social capacity of peripheral societies.

Actually, what is at stake is something very different, which affects a subsystem apparently not very involved in the process: the cultural subsystem. As the economic subsystem starts to be operated, in the most dynamic way, by foreign branches or is under the control of its headquarters, its scientific-technological inputs also come from metropolitan countries. Thereby, the main input that the economic subsystem of a modern society receives from its cultural subsystem starts to come from the cultural subsystem of another society, which is the centric one. [...] Indeed, with the atrophy of its cultural subsystem, this society is also beginning to lose its capacity to regulate its political and social functions, both evaluatively and normatively (Jaguaribe 1986, 63-64).

In the case of the societies of the central countries belonging to the American intra-imperial system, a similar harmful consequence would occur in their political subsystem with the loss of autonomy of their defense in the external sphere, making them increasingly dependent on the political subsystem of the "imperial center".

According to this reasoning, there would be a conflict between the state form and its internal subsystems, which shape and organize societies, and the multiple and intricate relationships involving the various subsystems within the intra-imperial system.

Also pathological effects, although less virulent, affect societies that are part of the intra-imperial system that retain their economic and cultural

vitality, such as the European countries affiliated with NATO. This happens when a basic product of its political subsystem, such as external defense, is guaranteed by the imperial center's political subsystem. [...] The national form of society organization is factually and axiologically oriented to accentuate the autonomy of the system and the interdependence of its subsystems. The atrophy of the cultural subsystem due to the loss of the scientific and technological guidance function, as occurs in peripheral societies, and also the atrophy of the political subsystem, with the loss of its external defense function (the case of NATO), or even, of its internal ordering function, (the case of many peripheral countries), raises an irremediable crisis in national states. The national form of society organization is no longer compatible with the new realities that characterize contemporary societies in the imperial subsystem (Jaguaribe 1986, 64-65).

For Jaguaribe, on the one hand, the most pernicious consequence of the loss and, ultimately, the end of the autonomy of a peripheral state would be to restrict itself to a territory and a market, defined by the "imperial center", and crumbling as a nation.

This crisis, although of different shape and degree, affects both peripheral and centric societies. With the increasing and evident unfeasibility of their autonomy, for almost all national structures, the peripheral societies lose meaning and society itself ceases to exist as a social project, reducing itself to a territory and a market, determined from the outside in (Jaguaribe 1986, 65).

On the other hand, the influence of external subsystems would bring gains to societies and central elites.

The effect of this type of crisis is the gradual loss, on the part of such societies, of their sense of collective project, transforming them, from a process for themselves, into a process in itself, in the form of a territorial market, which is determined from the outside in. The effects corresponding to this deterioration of society are the importation, from the metropolitan center, of the values of legitimacy and integration, which acquire an intransitive utilitarian sense, at the service of the metropolitan elites and their local agents (Jaguaribe 1986, 66).

In line with previous reflections, Jaguaribe reinforces the thesis that the loss of autonomy by States and their societies in order to ensure their capacity for external defense would generate inconsistencies. Even in developed societies, in the economic sense, there would be relevant mismatches between

the meaning of a State from the political-formal point of view of its sovereignty, its role as organizer of an administrative and economic space and its sense of cultural protection of a collectivity.

The other dimension of the crisis of national states that affects central countries and, cumulatively, dependent countries on the periphery, refers to the political subsystem in its capacity to guarantee the external defense of the respective society. For developed societies, which participated in the economic and cultural center of the American imperial system, the effect of this crisis is the establishment of a contradiction between the sovereign aspect formally preserved by the national state and the effective sense of a simply regional administration that is such State. These societies retain their collective viability, as a system of human interaction, endowed with their own culture and economic self-sufficiency. However, they are reduced to nations only in a cultural sense and no longer in a politically sovereign sense, as is the case of the Helvetica Confederation, with its cantons and its ethnic-cultural communities (Jaguaribe 1986, 66).

The quarrel between the two imperial systems mobilizes the United States not only to consolidate, but to expand its resources of power, as well as its political, military, economic, technological and geopolitical scope. To this end, it submits the States sovereignty within its system to its interests.

[...] In this (the intra-imperial dimension) there are two types of limits, the first of which is the result of the inter-imperial problem and consists of the need, for the United States, to guarantee for itself conditions that meet its imperatives of external defense, not only in the immediate military sense, but also including the other essential elements for the maintenance of an appropriate military capacity, both in economic-technological, geopolitical, socio-political and other terms. That is why the need to impose, through the system, on its intra-imperial relations, certain restrictions on the State's political sovereignty within its sphere (Jaguaribe 1986, 68-69).

For Jaguaribe, the American operation in the intra-imperial sphere would aim to meet the demands of its productive structure. Firstly, it would be necessary to guarantee access to raw materials and their sources, as well as to fundamental, therefore strategic, inputs, with low availability in the American territory itself. In addition, it would be necessary to have easier access to international markets, both for exports and for the flow of national production, thus accumulating foreign exchange, and for minimum maintenance of economic growth and technological development. As a consequence, the State's sovereignty within the US imperial system is also economically subjected.

The second critical boundary of the United States in the intra-imperial dimension concerns its productive needs. The imperatives for maintaining the American productive system have three main aspects. The first refers to the access preservation to raw materials and other essential inputs for the American community, which are not found in sufficient quantities in the metropolitan territory. The second refers to the foreign markets for American products, both in order to guarantee a complementary demand from the domestic one, and, above all, to meet the growing demands of the balance of payments, in order to generate sufficient external payment capacity. The third aspect concerns the internal production process itself, which, for economic, social and political reasons, must maintain certain minimum rates of growth and preserve the dynamism of the economy, including with regard to development and technological innovation. This second critical limit in American intra-imperial relations imposes, like the previous one, certain restrictions, now from an economic nature, on the sovereignty of the states belonging to the system (Jaguaribe 1986, 69).

In this sense, Jaguaribe highlights another contradictory aspect: if the social development of the center is deeply connected, from an ethical and ideological points of view, to the social development of other countries, including those in the periphery, the mechanism that would guarantee the development of the center and the building of free, democratic and more egalitarian societies would end up feeding its opposite in the periphery. This thought, according to the political scientist, would similarly apply to an internal analysis of each society, in which elites are privileged to the detriment of the largest portion of the population.

No socio-humanist project can nowadays preserve its validity and its consequent capacity for social effectiveness if it is restricted to select minorities, whether in terms of class, within a society, or in terms of countries, at the international level. If the material advantages, obtained by the centric countries from the current unequal division of opportunities in the world, facilitate to them the economic prerequisites necessary for the construction of an egalitarian, free and non-repressive society, this same international inequity invalidates, on the other hand, ethically and ideologically, all attempts for social development. [...] The social development of centric countries is inextricably supportive to the general development of the world and its peripheral majorities (Jaguaribe 1986, 78-79).

There would be degrees of autonomy for the states that are part of the American intra-imperial system, depending on the compatibility of these states

to certain conditions. In a first set of conditions, referring to the skills of a State, there would be national viability and international permissibility, conditions that the sociologist does not break down. A second set refers to the ability to execute. They are divided in two alternatives: first, a relative autonomy in internal technical-business terms; second, an alternative through concessions by the center, made them possible, in large part, due to ethnic and cultural similarities between countries and their societies.

[...] The intra-imperial (American) system allows an appreciable margin of autonomy to countries that satisfy certain requirements and relate economically and culturally in terms compatible with the basic interests and values of the imperial center. [...] The requirements for autonomy are of two kinds: qualifying and exercising. The qualifications have two conditions: (1) national viability; (2) international permissibility. The enforcers impose an alternative: a) or candidates for autonomy achieve satisfactory technical-business autonomy, internally or b) compensatively, they have favorable conditions in their relations with the imperial center, especially through identifications of an ethnic-cultural order (Jaguaribe 1986, 79).

However, for most peripheral states, subject to the logic of the negative influence of the American cultural subsystem, restricted access to such conditions made the building of an autonomous process extremely difficult.

Inside a center-periphery relationship that tends to be structured according to the culturalist model, the conditions of autonomy for peripheral countries become difficult to achieve, depriving almost all of them of access to such situation. In fact, only a very limited number of peripheral countries are able to satisfy, in principle, cumulatively, the qualification and exercise requirements to which I referred earlier. They are also unable to relate to the imperial center in economic and cultural terms compatible with their basic interests and values (Jaguaribe 1986, 80-81).

Finally, attention should be drawn to a study carried out by Jaguaribe on the Malvinas crisis and war, published in 1985, entitled *Reflections on the South Atlantic: Latin America and Brazil in view of the disarticulation of the inter-American system*. Despite having been written shortly after the Malvinas crisis, under the influence of the perspectives of the historical situation, there are important reflections by the political scientist regarding the theme of “autonomy”, which is the subject of discussion in this article.

The study was divided into the following parts: initially, Jaguaribe performs a brief analysis of the triggering events; then, it discusses the most relevant issues observed from its developments in the inter-American and Latin

American environment and in relation to the interests and problems of Brazil's national security. Finally, it presents conclusions, in particular, regarding a new national defense strategy and the indispensable requirements to shorten the country's situation of vulnerability.

In the item "Brazil: lack of preparation for the defense" of the "Conclusions" part, Jaguaribe emphasizes that, considering the need to acquire new and modern military equipment, the country should, in principle, favor the development of the national industry for this purpose. However, in the absence of immediate service conditions for domestic production, the demand should be met by importing the equipment. The main objective would be "to ensure international credibility to our defensive capacity". Although countries like Brazil were not up to a military confrontation with one of the superpowers, he considers it urgent not only to guarantee some level of autonomy to meet self-defense conditions, but also to seek external alliances in the form of an "integrated defense system of South America".

The equipping of the Brazilian defense, therefore, is today significantly inferior to what the country's technological-economic conditions could allow. That is why the need for a drastic revision of our defensive re-equipment policy. It is important, as Ministers Maximiliano da Fonseca and Délio Jardim rightly pointed out, to guide our policy of defensive re-equipment by the principle of giving total primacy to the development of the national military equipment industry. But it is also important, as the aforementioned authorities realistically admitted, to acquire abroad, while internal production is not available, the most sophisticated equipment required to ensure international credibility for our defensive capacity. [...] As a final consideration on this topic, it should be noted that, under contemporary conditions, and for a country like Brazil, the self-defense requirements linked to the purpose of ensuring a reasonable level of international autonomy are markedly independent of the East-West conflict. Countries like Brazil, alone or in the context of coalitions such as what could and should be an integrated defense system in South America, cannot directly confront the superpowers. As already mentioned in this study, to these countries, the strategic balance between the superpowers is convenient. If, to the world unhappiness, this balance is disrupted, Brazil and other countries in the region will necessarily have to align themselves with the United States against the Soviet Union (Jaguaribe 1985, 59-60).

Considering Jaguaribe's ideas, briefly presented here, it is important to ask whether concerns of this nature would have been addressed and unfolded in those that are the main public policy documents related to the theme of Brazil's defense: the National Policy of Defense (PND) and the National Strategy of Defense (END).

Defense Policies and Strategies in Brazil

From the mid-1990s, Brazilian defense area started to contemplate a set of political, economic, diplomatic and military rules and apparatus, whose definition, structuring and operationalization had repercussions not only in the country itself, but in the other countries in its surroundings and, in a broad sense, in the international system.

In order to establish ties of cooperation and trust not only between States, externally, but also between State and society, internally, it is reasonable to regard the flow of information and transparency about the national defense policies of a specific State as something essential. In Brazil, the predominant political-discursive apparatus whose objective was and remains to present, clarify and publicize the national defense environment are the National Policy of Defense (PND), the National Strategy of Defense (END) and the White Paper on National Defense (LBDN).

According to Section II of Chapter II of Complementary Law No. 97 of June 9th, 1999 and considering the amendments provided for in Complementary Law No. 136 of August 25th, 2010, the Executive Branch has the obligation to bring the mentioned documents to the National Congress in order to be examined. The sending of the documents, duly updated, must occur periodically, every four years, starting in 2012. Thus, the 2016 versions, currently in force, were submitted by the President of the Republic, Michel Temer, to the appreciation of the National Congress through Message No. 2 of 2017 (Message No. 616, of November 18th, 2016, at the origin). On December 14th, 2018, Congress enacted Legislative Decree No. 179 of 2018, making the documents official. The latest versions, which remain under evaluation by the Congress until now, were sent by the Executive on July 22nd, 2020. A brief description of the documents, highlighting their importance for the purposes of this article, is presented below.

Originally, under the name of National Defense Policy, the first version was developed under the Fernando Henrique Cardoso government, in 1996. In its subsequent updates, in 2005, 2012, 2016 and 2020, its name was changed to National Policy of Defense, emphasizing the precedence of the “national” aspect. As National Policy of Defense, it was approved by Decree No. 5,484, of June 30th, 2005.

It is a document that establishes general, high-level conditions for the planning of actions aimed at national defense, therefore oriented towards potential external threats. He points to directions and guidelines for training

and employment in both military and civilian areas that make up the "National Power". Basically, it determines the objectives, called "National Objectives of Defense" and guides the State on what must be done to achieve them. In the 2012 version, right in the Introduction, there is an emphasis on an important assumption, considered fundamental: "the defense of the country is inseparable from its development, providing it with the indispensable shield" (Brasil 2012c).

The "National Objectives of Defense" are detailed in Chapter 6 of the PND in the form of eleven general points. Its transcription is as follows: i) to guarantee sovereignty, national heritage and territorial integrity; ii) to defend national interests and Brazilian people, goods and resources abroad; iii) contribute to the preservation of national cohesion and unity; iv) contribute to regional stability; v) contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security; vi) intensify Brazil's projection in the concert of nations and its greater insertion in international decision-making processes; vii) to keep the Armed Forces modern, integrated, trained and balanced, and with professionalism increasing, operating jointly and properly deployed in the national territory; viii) to make Brazilian society aware of the importance of defense matters in the country; ix) to develop the national defense industry, oriented towards obtaining autonomy in indispensable technologies; x) structuring the Armed Forces around capabilities, providing them with personnel and material compatible with strategic and operational planning; and xi) develop the potential of defense logistics and national mobilization. These basic items are at the heart of the PND, officially directing and defining what Brazilian society aims for national defense. For the purposes of this research, it should be highlighted the ninth item that associates industrial development with sensitive technological autonomy among the essential purposes pursued.

In general, if the PND establishes "what to do" in the defense area, the National Strategy of Defense, also known by the acronym END, defines "how to do it". In other words, END deals with the systematic execution and implementation of the objectives determined by the PND.

As of the creation of the Ministerial Committee for the Formulation of the National Strategy of Defense by presidential decree on September 6th, 2007, the design and development of the END and the updating of the 2005 PND was made official. The chairmanship of the committee was under the responsibility of Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim, and his coordination to the Chief Minister of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs, Roberto Mangabeira Unger. The committee included the Ministers of Finance, Planning, Budget & Management and Science & Technology, in addition to the commanders of the Armed Forces (Navy, Army and Air Force), assisted by their own General Staff. Additionally, in its article 3, the committee president's prerogative was

foreseen to invite “specialists or representatives of other bodies and entities, public or private, as well as citizens of recognized knowledge in the field of defense, to participate in the meetings and provide advice on specific themes” (Brazil 2007).

The need for the modernization of means and war materials was an old demand of the Armed Forces, according to Patrícia Capelini Borelli (Borelli in Saint-Pierre and Vitelli 2018, 377-386). In the years 2006 and 2007, the tense situation was aggravated by a huge crisis experienced by the Brazilian air transport sector, known at the time as an “air blackout”, reflecting the sector’s collapse due to serious structural failures. The crisis in civil aviation shed light on the various problems within the Armed Forces, such as wage dissatisfaction, long working hours, among others. In particular, it highlighted the lack of knowledge of political representatives in relation to military issues. Thus, at the same time that a solution to the “aerial chaos” was sought, the reformulation of the defense sector entered the political agenda. In this sense, the structuring of the END and the updating of the PND can be understood as political initiatives with the aim of reforming the defense area, after a long time lacking in prioritization, definitions and investments.

In a complementary manner, the international situation and the most relevant role aspired by Brazil should be emphasized. The Brazilian coordination of the UN Peace Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) from 2004 (United Nations Brazil 2017), the historic ambition to occupy a permanent seat in a reformed United Nations Security Council (Brazil 2014) and the creation on December 16th, 2008 of the South American Defense Council by UNASUR member countries (Brazil 2008b), as part of the necessary conditions to promote regional integration, are examples of this leading role assumed by Brazil. Therefore, an invigorated defense industrial base would not only reduce the country’s technological dependence, especially in relation to the “indispensable technologies”, but, above all, it would be a crucial instrument in the country’s performance in its new international role. Internally, the implementation of *Stricto Sensu* postgraduate courses, focused on National Defense, in establishments of high studies of the Armed Forces - the first course created was the Master in Military Sciences of the Army Command and General Staff College (ECEME) in 2001 (Brazil 2016) - as well as the creation of the first Brazilian undergraduate course in the area, the bachelor’s degree in Defense and International Strategic Management (DGEI) from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) in 2009 (Brazil 2008c), were among the outstanding initiatives related to the country’s concern with defense issues.

Approved in its first version by Decree No. 6,703 of December 18th, 2008, the END was revised in 2012 and 2016. As previously mentioned, the

latest version, sent in 2020, is subject to evaluation by the National Congress.

In the 2012 version of the document, END is divided into two main parts: the first entitled "Systematic Formulation", followed by "Implementation Measures". It was created to promote an update and modernization of the defense structure of Brazil. It presents twenty five guidelines, organized according to three aspects known as "structuring axes": the reorganization of the Armed Forces, the restructuring of the national industry directed towards defense materials and defense equipments and, finally, the maintenance of mandatory military service.

We must emphasize the "National Strategy of Defense and National Strategy of Development" part in which the inseparable link between these two public policies is established, one reinforcing and stimulating the other, in line with the essential purposes of the PND. The construction of its own development model necessarily involves the country's ability to "say no" to external pressures and threats. Thus, "national independence" is the fundamental principle to guide both defense and development projects, with an emphasis on achieving "autonomous technological training" and "mastery of sensitive technologies", especially in the space, cyber and nuclear sectors, qualified in END as "strategic".

The second structuring axis, "Reorganization of the Defense Industrial Base", seeks to ensure that the needs for military products and equipment of the Brazilian Armed Forces are based on technological capacity of national domain and, preferably, that they are employed in both military and civil environments, which means a dual application.

A closer examination of the second axis shows that the restructuring of Brazilian defense materials and defense equipment industry seeks to "promote the development of a military-university-business complex" (Brazil 2008a). Consequently, the promotion of research and technological development is associated with the idea of autonomy. Said more explicitly, the essential idea is not limited to meet the demand of the Brazilian Armed Forces only. Based on national human, technological and industrial resources, it shall be possible to build a virtuous connection between defense and national development. This aspect is highlighted in the 2008 document, establishing a modernizing direction by encouraging innovation, productive investment and technological autonomy.

We conclude, therefore, that the internal actions related to the promotion of studies and research in the area of Defense, the strengthening of the positive link between Defense and Development and the search for technical autonomy and strategic thinking by Brazil, as provided for in the PND and END, meet the concerns and paths pointed out by Jaguaribe in his reflections previously analyzed in this article.

Patrícia Capelini Borelli (2018) was responsible for writing the “National Strategy of Defense” entry in the *Dictionary of Security and Defense*, published in 2018 and organized by Héctor Luis Saint-Pierre and Marina Gisela Vitelli.

In line with what was mentioned earlier, the first version of the END was published in 2008, according to Borelli. In recent times, there were few official documents dealing with the topic. They were restricted to the political sphere, such as the National Defense Policy, from 1996, which was later restructured as the National Policy of Defense (PND) in 2005.

The END recommends the need for national industry and human resources, which should be qualified in science and technology, to be subsidized by the Brazilian State. Similarly, it points to the urgency of criteria to be defined for an aligned international trade policy, which means centralized purchases and technological integration between the Brazilian Navy, Brazilian Army and Brazilian Air Force. The reason would be the potential dual use of technologies, for both military and civilian purposes, in line with the idea of “technological overflow”. But Borelli draws attention to the lack of details in relation to the processes described and budgetary issues.

In general, the END represents not only a policy proposal for the military sector, but an articulation between defense policy and economic policy, especially that directed to development. But, for Alcides Costa Vaz, there is a lack of continuity between the first version, of 2008, and its subsequent updates, which ends up implying weaknesses (Vaz in Saint-Pierre and Vitelli 2018, 69-77).

On the one hand, the document would highlight the principle of independence, “effected by the mobilization of physical, economic and human resources, for investment in the country’s productive potential”. Following the same logic, dependent is “who does not have the domain of sensitive technologies, both for defense and development”. This principle was maintained in the 2012 version. On the other hand, the 2016 edition would have significantly reduced the autonomist focus, restricting it to the objective of stimulating the productive and technological autonomy of the defense area. Aiming at this end, it proposes the strengthening of the defense science and technology area and that the production chain of the defense industrial base must be sustainable.

Borelli argues that END was an advance in the diagnosis and definition of purposes for the defense area in alliance with several production sectors of society. However, she recognizes the existence of questions about the possibilities of its implementation considering the countless obstacles, such as, for example, the extent of investments and the willingness to carry them out by the Brazilian State.

Defense and Development: Theoretical Aspects

In order to guide the understanding of the relationship between defense and development, in this section I addressed a set of theories, starting from the broader reflections of International Political Economy and then analyzing ideas focused on defense economic studies.

Susan Strange was one of the leading intellectuals in the 20th century in English language. Considered one of the founders of International Political Economy studies, in her book called *States and markets*, Strange articulates culture, political science and economy by conceptualizing that the "structural power" of a State inside the interstate system depends on four fundamental sources: control over security; control over production; control over credit; and, finally, control over knowledge, beliefs and ideas. In this sense, it proposes a conception of history in which politics and economics are viscerally intertwined (Strange 1994, 25-26).

This conception is in line with International Political Economy, a field of knowledge that was developed in the 20th century and interprets international relations from the intricate interactions between politics and economics, reflecting on power and wealth in the political and international economic system (Jackson 2018, 229-230).

Robert Gilpin proposes that wars are an indelible mark of international conflicts and power struggles. Gilpin understands that, in order to guarantee a permanent hegemony in the interstate system, several central countries have mobilized heavy investments in defense. According to this comprehension, the accumulation of political, economic and military power is crucial to achieve and consolidate a hegemonic position (Gilpin 1987).

Still in the perception of International Political Economy studies, José Luís Fiori says that, in the process of modern States birth, from the 16th century onwards, the "war game" and its financing were at the root of the overlap between power and wealth and their concentration (Fiori 2004).

According to economist Ariela Diniz Cordeiro Leske, from the point of view of defense economic studies, understood as a set of rational and systematic reflections on the aspects and economic implications related to the area of defense, two macro-aspects should be highlighted (Leske in Saint-Pierre and Vitelli 2018b, 315-325).

Generally speaking, the first aspect understands that military spending and defense investments stimulate the growth of the economy due to a positive multiplier effect, which would be featured as a "military Keynesianism". For

this aspect, defended by economists E. Macnair, James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler (1995), J. Paul Dunne and Eftychia Nikolaidou (2001) and Carlos Martí Sempere (2015), the side effects of military and defense investments, which means their externalities have a positive nature. They are often linked to the following factors: training of human resources, industrial training, technological spillovers to other sectors of the economy and security. Due to the multiplier effect on aggregate demand, these factors would broadly stimulate the growth of the economy. Such dynamics would be particularly important in situations of high level of unemployment, since an increase in aggregate demand would tend to cause increases in production and employment.

The second macro-aspect understands that, depending on the conjuncture, causes and effects do not necessarily follow this order or generate positive results. For economists Christos Kollias and George Manolas (2004), it would be economic growth to stimulate the increase in military spending and investment in defense and not the other way around. This increase would be explained by a greater demand by the population for security and made possible by the increase in national income. In addition, according to political scientist Uk Heo (2010), there would also be the possibility of a trade-off, which means, in a context of budget constraint, that increased spending in one area would result in a reduction in others. Thus, expenditure on production, health and education, among others, would tend to rival military spending and defense investments.

For defenders of “military Keynesianism”, military demand is considered a source of relevant innovation. According to this logic, military spending tends to strengthen companies’ innovation capacity. This action can occur directly, through investments in Research & Development (R&D) or indirectly, by the premises of the military to companies.

From World War II, until the mid-1970s, there was an intense process in several countries, such as the United States, of defense innovation with significant effects on the rest of the economy. Sensitive technological projects, such as microelectronics, aeronautics, nuclear energy, information technology, among others, involved several private companies, laboratories and military research centers, universities and highly qualified professionals, with subsidized non-refundable financing, oriented according to the demands of the Armed Forces. These projects had an impact on the creation of new technological paradigms. Despite the preliminary military objectives, the deployment of its use in the civilian environment was remarkable. This process generated the concept of “technological overflow”. However, Leske points out that, from the mid-1960s, the main technological developments, such as the internet, semiconductors and different information and communication technologies,

were developed in the civil sphere, thus conquering technological prominence. Therefore, the sense of "technological overflow" would have been inverted, with the vanguard coming from the civil industry starting to improve the defense sector (Leske in Saint-Pierre and Vitelli 2018a, 85-101).

For Alcides Costa Vaz, the concept of "strategic autonomy" (Vaz in Saint-Pierre and Vitelli 2018, 69-77) presents different readings, even though they are close. As a foreign policy guiding for a country, the concept refers to its position in the international system and its ability to behave independently in relation to matters connected to its essential strategic interests. In this sense, it concerns the freedom of a State to plan, implement, decide and act in the international system, expressing its independence in relation to other States and other international actors.

In view of the interests and objectives importance to be pursued in the international environment which achievement is considered to be fundamental to the pursuit and reach of other interests and objectives, the ability and competence of a State to determine and execute policies, particularly in the external context, which are supported by the defense and security structure, acquire a primordial strategic significance. Still, autonomy and its strategic component have a relational dimension, since they are linked to the state's capacity to agree, diverge, dissuade, withdraw and confront other States and external actors in order to guarantee the promotion of its interests and objectives.

Conceptually, "strategic autonomy" may act as a guide for a defense and security policy, but not necessarily. Although certain countries have sufficient resources of power and can be converted in such a way as to aim, materialize and maintain a condition of "strategic autonomy", such countries may not explicitly allude to this condition or be willing to promote it. For instance, they may decide to prioritize their foreign policy and actions abroad based on multilateralism and collective or community initiatives for security and defense.

Regardless of the performance, Vaz points out three important aspects of "strategic autonomy" that must be highlighted. The first concerns the political sphere, related to freedom and the ability to uphold national sovereignty, to decide and act abroad in favor of the State's defense and security. The second refers to the economic sphere, in particular to the industrial and technological base, related to the several skills, competences and knowledge, aimed at the national development of the indispensable means for defense and security, starting from the essential premise of promoting a modern and competitive defense industry. Finally, the operational sphere, which means the capacity of the State to design, manage and use its resources, from a material and technological point of view, in an effective manner, in favor of its interests and objectives, including military force when necessary.

It is relevant to point out that Vaz mentions Hélió Jaguaribe and his work, *Peripheral autonomy and centric hegemony*, highlighting the diagnosis and prescription made by the political scientist regarding the Brazilian insertion in the context of the Cold War. According to Vaz, once the asymmetrical aspect of world hegemony is recognized, the Brazilian State should gradually seek to expand its autonomy through an increase in its power resources and participatory action in multilateral forums in which the most important international issues were scheduled.

Recognizing the complex articulation between politics, economy and defense in the world system, as well as inside the states, the theoretical approaches here briefly described, especially those related to “technological overflow” and its positive effects in national defense development, whether in the search for industrial autonomy, or in the creation of knowledge and original thinking, contribute to the interpretation of Jaguaribe’s ideas and proposals, as well as in the understanding of similarities and differences in Jaguaribe’s work to the National Policy of Defense and the National Strategy of Defense.

Final Remarks

Among the new objects, problems and approaches of History, whose reflection began in the 1970s, studies involving economic development, national defense and international relations, as well as their implications, can be considered among the most relevant. A special care of the work developed in this article was to reconcile my main research object nowadays, the intellectual path of political scientist Hélió Jaguaribe, with the aforementioned studies, as well as his theoretical and methodological instruments. The chosen object examined was part Jaguaribe’s intellectual work in the early 1980s and the potential dialogues with the main public policies approved in the country in the national defense area. Based on the analysis made, it is possible to conclude that, in the end, the objective was achieved.

Jaguaribe is undoubtedly one of the great “interpreters” of Brazil. Almost seventy years after his first ideas and theories were formulated, in agreement or in divergence with some other intellectuals of equal importance that shared with him the aspirations of Brazilian development in the capitalist way, it is possible to say that his ideals are far from being realized. However, these ideals are still alive and the problems of development and defense remain as central themes in the national public debate today.

In this sense, the initiative to expand and disseminate research in the area of Defense and the constitution of a formal collection for public

consultation by the Army Command and General Staff College, which unfold in studies involving relevant characters from history of ideas and national intellectual history, represent a work of unquestionable importance for the efforts to understand and seek potential alternatives and proposals regarding the development, defense and international relations of Brazil.

REFERENCES

- Abreu, Alzira Alves de. 2010. "Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (ISEB)". In: Abreu, Alzira Alves de., *et al.* (coords.). *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro – Pós-1930*. Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC. Access on Dec. 30, 2020. <http://cpdoc.fgv.br/>.
- Borelli, Patrícia Capelini. 2018. "Estratégia Nacional de Defesa". In: Saint-Pierre, Héctor Luis; Vitelli, Marina Gisela (org.). *Dicionário de segurança e defesa*. São Paulo: Editora Unesp, Imprensa Oficial do Estado, p. 377-386.
- Brasil. 2005. "Decreto nº 5.484, de 30 de junho de 2005". *Aprova a Política de Defesa Nacional, e dá outras providências*. Access on Oct. 22, 2019. http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2005/decreto/d5484.htm.
- Brasil. 2007. "Decreto de 6 de setembro de 2007". Institui o Comitê Ministerial de Formulação da Estratégia Nacional de Defesa. *Presidência da República*. Brasília. Access on Oct. 18, 2019. http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2007/Dnn/Dnn11341.htm.
- Brasil. 2008a. "Decreto nº 6.703, de 18 de dezembro de 2008". Aprova a Estratégia Nacional de Defesa, e dá outras providências. *Presidência da República*. Brasília. Access on Oct. 22, 2019. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2008/Decreto/D6703.html.
- Brasil. 2008b. "Decisión para el Establecimiento del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano de la UNASUR". *Ministério das Relações Exteriores*. Brasília, 2008b. Accessed on Jul. 11, 2020. http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/ed_integracao/docs_UNASUL/DEC.2008.CDS.pdf.
- Brasil. 2012a. "Estratégia Nacional de Defesa". *Ministério da Defesa*. Brasília, DF: MD. Access on Oct. 18, 2019. <http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2012/mes07/end.pdf>.
- Brasil. 2012b. "Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional". *Ministério da Defesa*. Brasília, DF: MS. Access on Oct. 18, 2019. <http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2012/mes07/lbndn.pdf>.

- Brasil. 2012c. “Política Nacional de Defesa”. *Ministério da Defesa*. Brasília, DF: MS. Access on Oct. 18, 2019. <http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2012/mes07/pnd.pdf>.
- Brasil. 2014. “O Brasil e o Conselho de Segurança da ONU”. *Ministério das Relações Exteriores*. Brasília, 2014. Access on Jul. 11, 2020. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/politica-externa/paz-e-seguranca-internacionais/137-o-brasil-e-o-conselho-de-seguranca-das-nacoes-unidas>.
- Brasil. 2016. “Regimento interno do Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências Militares – Stricto Sensu”. *Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército*. Rio de Janeiro. Access on Jul. 11, 2020. <http://www.eceme.eb.mil.br/pt/instituto-meira-mattos-imm>.
- Brasil. 2028c. “História do curso de DGEI”. *Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro*. Rio de Janeiro. Access on Jul. 11, 2020. <http://irid.ufrj.br/index.php/graduacao/defesa-e-gestao-estrategica-internacional/historia-dgei>.
- Câmara dos Deputados do Brasil. 2020. *Hélio Jaguaribe – Cientista Político*. Brasília, 2020. Access on Dec. 20, 2020. <https://www2.camara.leg.br/a-camara/documentos-e-pesquisa/arquivo/historia-oral/Memoria%20Politica/Depoimentos/helio-jaguaribe/texto>.
- Corrêa, Glauco Corbari. 2014. “A Política de Defesa do Brasil no Século XXI”. *Coleção Meira Mattos Revista das Ciências Militares*, v. 8, n. 31, p. 29-38, jan./abr. 2014.
- Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro. 2019. *Hélio Jaguaribe de Matos*. Access on Oct. 31, 2019. <http://www.fgv.br/cpd/doc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/helio-jaguaribe-de-matos>.
- Dunne, J. P.; Nikolaidou, E. 2001. “Military spending and economic growth: a demand and supply model for Greece, 1960-1996”. *Defense and peace economics special issue*, v. 12, n. 1, 2001.
- Fiori, José Luís. 2004. “Formação, expansão e limites do poder global”. In: Fiori, José Luís (org.). *O poder americano*. Petrópolis: Ed. Vozes, p. 11-64.
- Fiori, José Luís. 2008. “O sistema interestatal capitalista no início do século XXI”. In: Fiori, José Luís; Medeiros, Carlos; Serrano, Franklin (org.). *O mito do colapso do poder americano*. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Record, p. 11-70.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1987. *The political economy of the international relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Heo, U. 2010. "The relationship between defense spending and economic growth in the United States". *Political Research Quarterly*, v. 63, n. 4, 2010.
- Houaiss, Antônio; Villar, Mauro de Salles; Franco, Francisco Manoel de Mello. 2004. "Autonomia". In: *Dicionário Houaiss da língua portuguesa*. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva.
- Jackson, Robert. 2018. *Introdução às relações internacionais*. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar.
- Jaguaribe, Hélio. 1985. *Reflexões sobre o Atlântico Sul: América Latina e Brasil ante a desarticulação do sistema interamericano*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Paz e Terra, Instituto de Estudos Políticos e Sociais.
- Jaguaribe, Hélio. 1986. *O novo cenário internacional: conjunto de estudos*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Guanabara.
- Jaguaribe, Hélio. 2004. "Defesa nacional: desafios e possíveis respostas do Brasil". In: Pinto, J. R. de A.; Rocha, A. J. R. da; Silva, R. D. P. da (org.). *Reflexões sobre defesa e segurança: uma estratégia para o Brasil. Série Pensamento Brasileiro sobre Segurança e Defesa*. v. 1. Brasília: Ministério da Defesa, Secretaria de Estudos e de Cooperação. Access on Oct. 31, 2019. <http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/colecao/reflexao.pdf>.
- Jaguaribe, Hélio. 2005. *Urgências e perspectivas do Brasil*. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão.
- Kollias, C.; Manolas, G.; Paleologou, S-M. 2004. "Defense expenditure and economic growth in the European Union: a causality analysis". *Journal of Policy Modeling*, v. 26, n. 5, 2004.
- Leske, Ariela Diniz Cordeiro. 2018a. "Base industrial de defesa". In: Saint-Pierre, Héctor Luis; Vitelli, Marina Gisela (org.). *Dicionário de segurança e defesa*. São Paulo: Editora Unesp, Imprensa Oficial do Estado, p. 85-101.
- Leske, Ariela Diniz Cordeiro. 2018b. "Economia de defesa". In: Saint-Pierre, Héctor Luis; Vitelli, Marina Gisela (org.). *Dicionário de segurança e defesa*. São Paulo: Editora Unesp, Imprensa Oficial do Estado, p. 315-325.
- Macnair, E.; Murdoch, C.; Sandler, T. 1995. "Growth and defense: pooled estimates for the NATO Alliance 1951-1988". *Southern Economic Journal*, v. 6, n. 1, 1995.
- Mora, J. Ferrater. 2001. *Dicionário de Filosofia*. São Paulo: Edições Loyola.
- Paiva, Márcia; Sousa e Silva, Cláudio Araújo de. 2019. "Hélio Jaguaribe". In: Abreu, Alzira Alves de et al (coords.). *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico*

- Brasileiro – Pós-1930*. Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC, 2010. Access on Oct. 31, 2019. <http://cpdoc.fgv.br/>.
- Saint-Pierre, Héctor Luis; Vitelli, Marina Gisela (org.). 2018. *Dicionário de segurança e defesa*. São Paulo: Editora Unesp, Imprensa Oficial do Estado
- Sempere, C. M. 2015. "Survey of performance issues in defense innovation". *Defense and peace economics*, v. 28, n. 3, 2015.
- Strange, Susan. 1994. *States and markets*. 2a ed. Londres: Pinter Press.
- Vaz, Alcides Costa. 2018. "Autonomia estratégica". In: Saint-Pierre, Héctor Luis; Vitelli, Marina Gisela (org.). *Dicionário de segurança e defesa*. São Paulo: Editora Unesp, Imprensa Oficial do Estado, p. 69-77.

ABSTRACT

In his studies on development, international relations and national defense issues, political scientist Hélio Jaguaribe reflected on Brazil's "autonomy" since the country is inserted in the interstate capitalist system. First approved in 2008, the National Defense Strategy was created with the aim of promoting a modernization of the Brazilian defense structure. This article proposes to understand the meanings of "autonomy" in the strategic thinking of Jaguaribe. In addition, it presents a potential dialogue between his formulations and the guidelines of the National Defense Strategy in its different versions.

KEYWORDS

Defense; Development; Hélio Jaguaribe.

Received on February 26, 2021

Accepted on March 12, 2021