FROM SLAVEHOLDERS' MONARCHY TO PAULISTA REPUBLIC, BRAZIL 1850-1894

Jens Hentschke

The events leading to the abolition of slavery (1888) and establishment of the republic (1889) in Brazil have already been examined in detail in other studies about this theme¹, therefore the task of this article shall not be a simple repetition and recollection of well-known facts. On the contrary, I intend to define the historical place of the above-mentioned revolutionary events in the process of transformation of Brazil from (colonial) feudalism to (industrial) capitalism, which, in my opinion, began with the Pombaline reforms in the second half of the eighteenth century and lasted, at least, until 1830/37. I present arguments to support the hypothesis that the rupture of 1888/89 was the result of a nation-wide process of crisis impacting both the socio-economic foundations and the state-political superstructure of the "tropical empire." In contrast to common opinions², it is to be stressed that Brazil entered this process not only after 1870, but already in 1850. Referring to the country as a whole, the crisis was latent until the end of the Paraguayan War and turned then into its open phase. What happened in 1888/89 and found its conclusion not before the take-over of political power by the coffee oligarchy of São Paulo in 1894 - the latter a very often neglected fact - can only be understood by analyzing the mutual interaction of economy, politics and ideology in the several phases of the considered period. This requires an evaluation of the character and effectivity of slavery, the changing class structure, the challenge and collapse of the political system, and the reflection of the main problems the country was confronted with, in the prisma of political-ideological conceptions of the opponent social groups and their institutions. For this reason, it is necessary to consider the revolution of 1888-1894 with regard to its historical "preconditions" since independence as well as consequences for the economic and political development of Brazil after 1894. In addition, one has to take into account the mutual interaction between internal and external factors. In other words:

Jens Hentschke é professor da Wilhelm Heck University, Rostock Alemanha.

the revolutionary process of transition from slavery to free labor, from monarchy to republic, from one to another stage of capitalist development can only be exactly characterized by connecting national history and global historical processes (the character of the epoch from 1789 to 1917)³. For this purpose, I will use methods and terms of comparative history of revolution, as they were developed by the "Leipzig School" (Interdisziplinäres Zentrum für Revolutionsforschung-IZR).⁴

It must be emphasized, however, that the discussion of the above-mentioned topics in this article cannot be considered conclusive, but rather as a contribution to the ongoing process of scholarly exchange of opinions.

SOME INTRODUCTORY THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE NECESSARY:

The abolition of slavery and the establishment of the republic represent an important partial step in the transformation of Brazil from (colonial) feudalism to (industrial) capitalism, that is from one to another socio-economic formation.

Capitalism was born from and matured for a long time in the womb of the feudal mode of production. From the late eighteenth century on, but especially with the period under consideration, the Brazilian empire became more and more advanced in pregnancy with the new mode of production. But the feudal womb could only be breached when those forces, which are potentially midwives of the new society and grow up within the ancien régime, were strong enough to give capitalism birth. But this act never be realized in one step, by one (bourgeois) revolution.

Capitalism assumes different forms or types in the course of its historical evolution. In each of its stages, advancing forces of production were loaded with chains of backward, feudal or semi-feudal (and in general pre-capitalist) relations of production (or at least relicts of them). The latter hindered at a certain point their further development, but they were maintained by the institutions of the political superstructure. The growing contradictions were more or less consequently resolved in a dialectic process of revolution and reform.

If the capitalist mode of production runs over different phases of maturity, this is also valid for the development of the bourgeoisie as a class, for the bourgeois type of revolutions and the bourgeois hegemony. The process of change of the socio-economic formation always includes several bourgeois (and bourgeois-democratic) revolutions, which consti-

tute a cycle. No single bourgeois revolution can simultaneously resolve all of the principal questions of the latter, i.e. implement immediately (industrial) capitalism.

By taking into account the exact socio-economic and political content of the struggles in the different phases as well as the corresponding hegemonic forces, the Brazilian cycle of bourgeois revolutions can be subdivided in the following way:

First phase: 1789/1822 - 1848/49 - anti-colonial and proto-bourgeois phase.

Second phase: 1850 - 1888/89 (-94) - abolitionist-republican and bourgeois phase.

Third phase: 1894 - 1930/37 - anti-oligarchical; anti-imperialist and bourgeois phase.

THE ARTICLE REPRESENTS A CASE STUDY OF THE SECOND OF THIS CYCLE.

Whether the change of the social formation is "completed" or not - a question which is not to be discussed here - can only be determined at the end of a whole cycle; in Brazil, in 1930/37.

If a single revolution is deemed incomplete, as it was in 1888/89 (-94) as well as in 1822, this is only measurable by what was already possible and necessary in this partial step.

Using the anticolonial emancipation as the starting point for the Brazilian bourgeois cycle of revolutions, one can agree with Kossok that is non-completion

(...) not only concerns socio-economic problems because of the maintenance of semifeudal relations of production, but had no less important political-institutional aspects, because the de facto exclusion of the undeveloped bourgeoisie from power hindered the process of forming complementary and harmoniously developed bourgeois institutions in the political superstructure (character and mechanism of the state, the party system, etc.).⁵

Consequently, the main problem in the period of post-emancipation (from 1822 until about 1850), which was in conformity with the essence of the conflicts in the whole nineteenth century, namely the objective task of completing the bourgeois revolution, the question of how capitalism could be carried through - by evolution or revolution - was at first decided in favor of the way of reform and conservation. This especially applies to

Brazil where, in contrast to Hispanic America, independence was not the culmination of a nation-wide struggle for liberation, but a mere formal act, a conservative to the question of power and the state from "above".

Until the last third of the nineteenth century the landowning aristocracy was able to stabilize the status quo established with independence. The decisive moment in this context was without doubt that Brazil benefited from the upswing of the international economy following the industrial revolution in Europe and North America. But Brazil could only profit from this boom by specializing in the exportation of tropical agricultural products for the capitalist world market and the importation of consumer goods from the developed capitalist countries. Because of the predominance of the plantation among numerous coexisting forms of production, and the narrowness of the domestic market, this was the only alternative for the landed property. With the increasing polarization of the world market into an agricultural and an industrial field of production during the period of capitalist free competition, Brazil turned into one of the former, into a semi-colony of advanced England.

Negro slavery, with the Brazilian plantation economy was based on, represented "an economic category of paramount importance"⁶ for the development of the capitalist social order on a world-wide scale. However, the fact that slavery is based on the international division of labor and the character of the institution itself hindered the implementation of the capitalist mode of production in Brazil. The plantation slavery was "*by no means an immediate preliminary stage for the transition to industrial capitalism. It represented the dominance of trading capitalism...*"⁷ Marx emphasized that plantations are always trade-speculations, producing for the world market. The capitalism mode of production would exist, but only *formally*, because Negro slavery excludes free wage labor, the basis of capitalism production. But those who realize their business with Negro slaves are capitalists. The form of production they introduced did not grow out of slavery, but was grafted upon it. In this case capitalist and landowner can be determined as one and the other was grafted upon it. In this case capitalist and landowner can be determined as one and the same person⁸. He earns a rent from his land and a capitalist profit for the effective application and exploitation of the slaves (and the soil), without already being able to distinguish between the several forms of surplus value⁹.

The identity of landowner and capitalist had to mold the Sociopolitical thought of the Brazilian fazendeiros as Carvalho Franco and Fernandes proved in their sociological studies¹⁰.

It has been said that Brazil became a semi-colony of Great Britain, but the dialectic of this process must not be disregarded. The fact that big industry and world trade expanded rapidly on a capitalist, still very extendible basis in breadth and depth and finally reached the countries of Latin America, catalyzed there processes of transition, in the course of which the objective conditions matured for the further transformation from pre-capitalist to capitalist social relations. These processes of transition were typical of the initial phase of capitalist development in the European countries.¹¹

Those forces began to mature and to organize, though slowly, which formed the potential of a new revolutionary attempt to implement capitalism: artisans, dependent peasants, slaves, who altogether wanted to convert into independent small freeholders, pushed liberal circles of the ruling class to struggle for the elimination of colonial-feudal relicts. Their aspirations coincided, at first, with the interests of British capital. Though this development was already visible in the popular movements of the thirties and forties culminating in the Revolução Praieira (1848/49), the decisive points for the further liquidation of the ancien régime in Brazil, stage by stage, were only shifted with the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade in 1850.

* * *

THE PROHIBITION OF THE SLAVE TRADE HAD TWO VERY IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES:

First, the economic existence of the slaveholding plantation owners was directly effected.¹² The extreme exploitation of the Brazilian slave class prevented slave breeding, as in the USA. From 1800 to 1850 the mortality rate was higher than the birth rate in the same period.¹³ The question of an alternative labor force became an eminent problem, but not all fazendeiros immediately perceived its importance. This is also due to the coincident shift of the economic center from the sugar producing Northeast to the coffee producing Center-South¹⁴ (and, beginning in the 1870s, within the latter, from the Parahyba Valley in the province of Rio de Janeiro to the western regions of São Paulo).¹⁵ While the prices of sugar continued to drop after 1850,¹⁶ coffee already made up half of Brazil's whole exports. "*From now on the state finances and progresses in the industrial development depended upon the coffee.*"¹⁷ The following situation arose: the prices

for slaves quickly increased and the Northeast was not able to pay them nor to attract European immigrants, because the hierarchically stratified society did not offer foreigners any chance of economic and social ascent. Therefore the Northeast already face an open crisis while the coffee planters of São Paulo could avert it for the time being by purchasing slaves from the Northeast. This resulted in an intensive slave trade within Brazil during the period from 1850-1880.¹⁸ Brazil followed the pattern of the USA, where the expansion of the cotton plantations in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas withdrew slaves from Virginia to the Carolinas. It was no wonder that in 1850 Araújo Lima warned that the above described situation, as in the USA, would provoke an antagonism between provinces with and without slaves.¹⁹ But even if the coffee-barons kept moaning that a prohibition of the interprovincial slave trade would cut their rights of property, they understood that the crisis was latent. The search for an alternative force of labor led to a new immigration policy.²⁰ The European immigrants (in São Paulo above all Italians, in South Brazil mostly Germans), as numerous studies have proven, played an outstanding role the capitalist development of Brazil.²¹

Second, a considerable part of the wealth accumulated by the fazendeiros through the production of coffee (and sugar cane), which had been invested up to this time in the Negro trade, became available for investment in agriculture and trade, but also for first industrial business, and became therefore one of the fundamental sources of the primitive accumulation of capital.²²

Both processes, which are closely related to each other, led to decisive socioeconomic changes, which undermined the foundations of the ancien régime without already affecting the political stability of the empire (period of "conciliação").²³

Commerce received a new impetus, the issue of bank notes increased considerably, and in 1853 the six existing note banks were fused to form the Banco do Brasil.²⁴

In 1851 alone 11 companies were founded, and by 1859 another 135²⁵ had been created.

A still small but influential group of foreigners and Brazilians associated with them²⁶ promoted road and railroad construction after 1850. In 1854 and 1855 the first two railroad lines were inaugurated.²⁷ By 1872, 932 kilometers of tracks existed.²⁸ Railroads are important indicators of the development of capitalism because they force the transition to a barter economy and thereby convert the agricultural production into merchandise production. But they are also indicators of the character of

agriculture. In Brazil, they connected, as branch terminal lines, the big fazendas with the overseas ports and consequently proved predominance of the interests of free traders, of planters, and export merchants.²⁹

In addition, the inauguration of the first telegraph in 1852³⁰ and regular steam navigation between England and Brazil in 1851³¹ contributed to international communication.

The 1850s represent not only of social mobility; in this time, new social groupings (a nascent small and middle industrial bourgeoisie as well as a future working class) slowly began to develop. They still had not been marked by a stable class character, but instead were subjected to a fast process of differentiation.

In a slave country, the development of first industrial enterprises naturally lasted for a long time. This is why the contradiction between capital and labor was hardly noticeable (until the 1890s), while the contrast between capital and slavery, which overlapped it, was felt all the more. For this reason, abolitionism began to turn from an until now predominantly external (British pressure) into an internal phenomenon: immediately after the elimination of the slave trade the Sociedade contra o Tráfico de Africanos (Society against the Negro Trade) developed a project to free newborn children of slaves, to prohibit the purchase of slaves and their separation from their own family.³² However, no single suggestion submitted to the Parliament came to be voted upon, but instead regulations to promote the breeding of slaves were issued.³³ In 1862, Perdigão Malheiro devised a plan to warn the government against a thoughtless, sudden abolition. It would be necessary to "transform" the institution slowly.³⁴ In 1865 the Visconde de Jequitinhonha submitted a project to the Senate that provided for the abolition of slavery without compensation within 15 years after the promulgation of a corresponding law. One year later, Tavares Bastos advocated abolition in the House of Representatives.³⁵ Public opinion was decisively abolitionist. In the whole country, debating clubs were founded and newspaper articles appealed for the abolition of the institution.

In addition, Brazil became internationally more and more isolated as a slave country after serfdom in Russia was abolished in 1861 and Negro slavery in the USA in 1863.³⁶ In the latter case, in particular the revolutionary form of the liquidation of the institution had to alert the Brazilian throne. A few years later, in 1868, the Ten Years War in Cuba began, during which slavery in the eastern part of the island was also eliminated in a revolutionary way.

The fact that the landowning aristocracy was unable to act as a

national class, even during a time of firm consolidation of the regime, was due the mutual and dialectic influence of the economic development, the political-institutional character of the latifundista state, and the lack of a national homogeneity. The smoldering social contradictions inevitably had to come into open conflict.

But this process is even more complicated and complex: since the beginning of the primitive accumulation of capital, but principally during the last third of the nineteenth century, the slaveholding landowning aristocracy began to be differentiated. This process has much in common with the separation of the English aristocracy into an old and a new nobility prior to the English bourgeois revolution. The majority of the Brazilian aristocracy kept its pre-capitalist physiognomy. It predominated on the *engenhos* of the interior of the northeastern provinces. A small minority, however, mostly represented by the coffee planters of São Paulo - who will henceforth be referred to as Paulistas - joined the beginning capitalist development by investing directly in the surplus production of towns. But it still guarded carefully its a land monopoly. Only very slowly - in the rhythm in which the capitalist mode of production became predominant - did these planters develop a typical capitalist investment behavior, above all in the agricultural sector. In contrast to the semi-feudal latifundia, landed property and the uniformly-run economy on the Paulista fazenda increasingly coincided (transition from what was in Prussian Germany the *Grundherrschaft* to a type of *Gutswirtschaft*). The new coffee plantations of São Paulo, indeed, would not have been possible without capitalist development. Of course, the application of wage labor is the most important criterion of capitalist agriculture, and in general the labor force had not yet assumed merchandise form. However, one has to take into consideration forms of transition, like slaves paid for their work, as well as the combination of slave labor with free labor in the form of the *colonato* the latter a wide-spread phenomenon and a key for the fazendeiro to minimize the detrimental consequences of the measures of gradual abolition.³⁷

To a certain extent it is justified to say that the transition of the plantation oligarchy of São Paulo to the "Prussian way" of capitalist development in agriculture had been prepared, though the above mentioned integration of Brazilian agriculture into the capitalist world market, of course, never allowed such a strong orientation toward international competition as the Prussian junker did as a big capitalist agrarian. The process of becoming an agrarian bourgeoisie lasted until the epoch-turning events of 1917 (1918), or not until of the Brazilian bourgeois cycle of revolutions.

The Paraguayan War (1865-1870) turned out to be a catalyst for the smoldering contradictions between the socioeconomic basis and the state-political superstructure, between ascendent productive forces and retarded relations of production. It effected the transition from a latent crisis to an open crisis of the monarchy, of the whole political system and the regional forces which dominated it.

Internal and external factors bearing on this war and accompanying events could be contemplated in three respects:

First, the war again put the slave question on the agenda and gave new impetus to abolitionism.

In order to provide more soldiers for warfare, state-owned slaves were granted freedom in 1866³⁸ and individuals who did not want to serve in the military sent slaves in their place. These slave-soldiers were manumitted by the crown.³⁹ After adopting a series of less important laws, the government was compelled to pass the *Lei do Ventre Livre* (Law of the Free Womb) on November 28, 1871, which emancipated all newborn children from that day forth. This was merely a compromise for the monarchy that intended to continue as it had in the past without being able to do so. It is only logical that the law had to be pushed through Parliament against a strong opposition of the slaveholders. The *Lei do Ventre Livre* constituted, after the prohibition of the transatlantic slave trade, another blow against the institution. All its sources, external as well as internal, had dried out. Ramos observed, now "the cycle of total abolition"⁴⁰ began. The will of the broad popular masses to bury the institution was expressed elsewhere: in the parliament, in the press, by the slave unrest, or in abolitionist societies, clubs, and newspapers that were founded in large numbers.

Second, the traditional pillars of oligarchical power - party system, church, and army - came into crisis.

In the 1860s, the decadence of the traditional two-party system⁴¹ became evident; the Liga Progressista, a compromise between liberals and moderate conservatives governing since 1862, suffered a fiasco. The radical elements of the Liberal Party separated from the *Liga*, which fell into ruin at the end of the sixties, and created a radical-liberal movement, which led an oppositional campaign in 1866. Their forum was the newspaper *Opinião Liberal*, which published the program of the radicals up

until 1866⁴². The empire either had to accept the progressive program of the *Opinião Liberal* or to maintain the status quo. Emperor Pedro II dissolved the parliament, which in his eyes was still too liberal, and appointed a conservative cabinet on July 16, 1868.⁴³ The radicals had now definitely parted with the monarchical policy and founded the Partido Liberal Radical in 1868.

Between 1872 and 1875 a conflict arose between church and crown. It was not a direct consequence of the war, but fell into this beginning open crisis and contributed to it. The essence of this conflict was the fact that the bishops of Recife and Belém defended the new strategy of the First Vatican Council, that is an increasing ultramontanism, and thereby attacked the long lasting patronage of the Portuguese and then Brazilian crown over the state-church. Pedro II sentenced the bishops first to forced labor. The proportions which the conflict assumed, along with the perception that the church as an institution was actually an ally of the emperor, forced him to transform the original penalty into simple prison terms, and, finally, to pardon and rehabilitate the clergymen. Consequently, the conflict ended in defeat for the emperor. His already precarious authority had been weakened further. From now on, the church remained relatively indifferent to the fate of the monarchy.⁴⁴

Between 1884 and 1889, another conflict shook the moribund monarchy: the so-called "military question". The roots of this conflict must be traced back to the Paraguayan War. Officers as well as civil urban classes perceived the technological backwardness of the country - especially in the army -, the demographic and economic disparities between the eastern and western regions, the inefficiency of bureaucracy and nepotism, and finally the obsolescence of the system of labor. War production stimulated capital formation and industrial growth. So it strengthened the towns and thus the urban middle classes.

In the interest of an accelerated capitalist development, more and more military engineers were trained, mainly at the *Escola Militar* in Rio de Janeiro.⁴⁵ In addition to the increasing professionalization, the war changed the social structure of the army. In the seventies, more than 20,000 Negros and mulattos, former slaves, filled the lower ranks.⁴⁶ Military careers became more and more attractive to members of the middle classes, commercial sectors, and lower civil servants, who, because of their birth and social position, did not see any other possibility of social ascent than joining the army. Many of them came from the backward provinces. At the Military School of Praia Vermelha, they were educated in military as well as socio-political affairs free of charge.⁴⁷

Between 1884 and 1887 there occurred a series of clashes linked, superficially, to demands by officers for freedom to discuss military and political affairs in public. The essence of this conflict was that the military began to participate in both of the main social movements: abolitionist and republican,⁴⁸ as clearly demonstrated in the activities and programs of the Military Club, founded on June 26, 1887.⁴⁹ Consequently, the culminating point of the "military question" was reached with the overthrow of the monarchy in 1889.

Third, due to the international republican climate (fall of Napoleon III and the proclamation of the Third Republic in France; the Revolution of 1868 in Spain; the popular war under liberal leadership against Emperor Maximilian in Mexico, and the Civil War in the USA) parts of the young industrial bourgeoisie and middle classes, which necessarily connected the question of slavery to the question of the existence of the political system began to institutionalize. In 1870, the first republican clubs and newspapers were founded, and on June 3, 1870, the Partido Republicano Paulista. However, from the very beginning big fazendeiros not only joined the republican movement, but dominated it, as will be explained later.

It was not a coincidence that since 1870 internal and external factors indissolubly flew together and led to crisis. With the 1870s the worldwide transition from the free competition of capitalism to monopoly capitalism began. The transition of Brazil from manufactory to industrial capitalism, which had been initiated in the fifties, was promoted by these factors. The industrial revolution functioned as the transmitting element between the two processes of transition between different levels of capitalist development linked to each other by large-scale enterprise and world trade. It had the result that the precapitalist structures in the Latin American colonies and semicolonies were undermined, overlapped, and transformed.⁵⁰ The internal forces of capitalist development grew stronger.

In agriculture, merchandise production was gradually gaining ground:

Brazilian population increased in numbers and density, a necessary precondition for the division of labor between town and country, industry and agriculture, between the several branches etc. and, consequently, for the enlargement of the domestic market.⁵¹

Coffee was also a catalyst for revolution in the transportation system, inspiring the railroad construction. The railroads replaced ox carts

and mule convoys. It shortened the time of transport and reduced the costs. The new transportation system both created and eliminated jobs. It facilitated merchandise circulation and allowed for the further expansion of the coffee economy. Finally, it supplied the new plantations of western São Paulo with immigrant wage-laborers.⁵²

Steam navigation, river and coastal shipping were rationalized and the international commerce improved. In 1885, there existed 131 telegraph offices and 7500 kilometers of cable in 13 Brazilian provinces.⁵³ New groups connected with trade were created. Their role, however, was not yet defined, but they identified to a great extent with the interests of landed property.⁵⁴ New banks, transportation and insurance companies were organized just to fulfil the demands of the coffee economy.

A progressive demographic evolution, the growth of the domestic market, the technical revolution in the transportation system, increasing commercial activities, in short all the economic and social changes, caused a growing urbanization, primarily in the economically expansive provinces of the coffee complex. Small towns in the monocultural regions turned more and more into supply centers and small seaports had a great prosperity.⁵⁵

Another principal criterion of the growth of the merchandise production, yet to be examined, would be the extent to which the per capita volume of foreign trade increased.

After the extremely modest beginnings of the fifties and sixties an embryonic industry grew up, despite an insufficient policy of protective duties. This is due to the cheap raw materials and labor in a period of high demand. The general instability of the balance of payments and the fall of the exchange rate also contributed to this growth. The latter phenomenon led to a rise in the price of imported goods. Therefore it promoted greater industrial development.⁵⁶ In addition, there was the local production of a raw material which was important for the installation of an industry, namely the production of cotton. During the whole second half of the nineteenth century and beyond, the textile industry was the most important branch, though, as Stein emphasizes, even here the competitiveness on the foreign market played a greater role than the internal demand.⁵⁷

*The expanding factory islands of free wage labor represented the beginning of class formation of the industrial bourgeoisie (mainly out of export merchants, importers, an small retail dealers and artisans - J.H.) as well as the proletariat and initiated a new stage of development of capitalism in Brazil.*⁵⁸

Nevertheless, the contradiction between capital and labor continued to be subordinated to the fundamental contradiction between capital and slavery. The more decidedly this latter contradiction could be resolved, the sooner capitalism would be established.

In this time, the insufficiency of slavery as the pre-capitalist basis of world market production became evident. Slavery was an obstacle for the further capitalist development of Brazil. The competition of the Brazilian manufacturers with entrepreneurs on a higher technical level and therefore on a higher level of productivity required technical progress. The exploitation of the enslaved human machines had natural limits. Two problems are important for understanding Brazil's dilemma: on the one hand, the nascent industrialization could not assume an independent character, because of the "historical delay" of Brazil and the dominating interests of export-oriented agriculture. Therefore it was reduced to the takeover of single elements of the industrial revolution in Europe and the USA, of rationalized methods, the importation of industrial capital, etc.⁵⁹ On the other hand, even the mere application of results of technical progress to the existing structure of society had to remain limited. *"Slavery and industrial revolution were mutually exclusive, because it was impossible for slaves who were tyrannically oppressed and kept ignorant to use expensive machinery"*.⁶⁰ And the vicious circle closes, if one takes the fact that the whole economic development, including further progresses in industrialization, essentially depended upon the development of agriculture as the main source of the primitive accumulation of capital.

*The contradiction between forces of production and social relations, the incompatibility of slavery and industrialization, slavery and consolidation of the bourgeois nation made it clear that the abolition of slavery was the most important precondition for the further material and intellectual progress of the country.*⁶¹ Even imperial politicians recognized this,⁶² but the government did not hear their admonishing appeals. In 1885 it freed all slaves over 60 years of age. Again, this was only a compromise.

The industrial revolution became the principal motor for a bourgeois revolution, which would have a dual character, being due to the differences in the socio-economic development of the different regions of Brazil. In the most advanced areas of the country (central and parts of southern Brazil), a bourgeois revolution *within* capitalism for the further consolidation of an incipient (factory) capitalism was set on the agenda. In the backward regions of the northeast, however, tasks of the "classical" type of the bourgeois revolution *within* feudalism (or manufactory

capitalism) *against* feudalism (and pre-capitalist social relations in general) still had to be resolved.⁶³

In addition to this process and simultaneously to it, a world-wide differentiation between the several capitalist countries was noticable, and this, again, in a dual sense: first, the advanced industrial powers developed at a different pace (Germany and the USA faster than Great Britain and France as traditional colonial powers). This provoked a struggle for the redistribution of the international sources of raw materials, markets and spheres of influence and became therefore an essential motor for the imperialist recolonization of Brazil on the basis of an already existing preimperialist dependency. Second, and as a result of the further polarization of the world market, the trench between all these capitalist centers and the "periphery" broadened. External oppression, or at least the threat of foreign rule, created new contradictions in Latin America.⁶⁴

* * *

When Brazil entered a new phase of the bourgeois cycle of revolution, the rising industrial bourgeoisie and the urban middle classes were confronted with a new situation. The old political conceptions were no longer suitable. French positivism was decisive for the production of ideology because it outlined a socially representative and authoritarian system of order, through which "social unrest" would be prevented. At the same time, the dictates of industrial and technical progress could be carried through.⁶⁵ The temporal relevance of French positivism is not at least explicable by the fact that it was received by those parts of the army which became important forces in Brazilian society. The essence of "military" positivism, however, was that the "young officers" and cadets usually picked out authoritarian ideas and connotations of Comte's theory. The positivist conception of a republican dictatorship, for example, was interpreted according to their own judgement. They asserted that by concentrating political power in one hand, ideally in their hands, and by eliminating any kind of parliament could a stable and prosperous republic be guaranteed.⁶⁶

The bourgeoisie objectively was predestined to lead the bourgeois revolution, not at least because there was a relative coincidence of its class interests and the interests of the whole nation in the struggle against slavery and thus against the ancien régime.⁶⁷ Until the end of the eighties, this negative consent led and held socially extreme heterogeneous forces together under bourgeois leadership: a minority of *usineiros* and *engenheiros* of the Northeast having been able to transform their system

of labor - by founding it upon the basis of local free labor (*moradores, moradores de condição, lavradores, corumbás*),⁶⁸ the young industrial bourgeoisie, the urban middle classes within and outside the army, the rising proletariat, and the slave class. Out of this broad spectrum of different social classes two principal groups stand out, which grew larger in number and interacted with each other on the same battlefield, but were strictly divided by the question of whose the act of emancipation should be: the bourgeois and the popular movement.⁶⁹ Both groups were again very heterogeneous in themselves. This is why the corresponding classes played - depending on their maturity and constitution as class at all and on the economic and political weight resulting from it - a different role in the revolutionary process.

The bourgeois movement was primarily, though not exclusively, represented by a conglomerate of republican parties in the several provinces. The decisive influence was exerted by the Partido Republicano Paulista, which was dominated by the coffee oligarchy from its inception.

*The causes, which moved the Paulistas in the early seventies to support the republic, were derived from the following: first, a certain part of the slaveholders was disappointed by the monarchy's inability to secure the stability of the institution of slavery. Second, the Paulista fazendeiros hoped that by establishing the republic they could get rid of the representatives of the old landed aristocracy of the Northeast, which was connected to the imperial court and dominated the state machinery.*⁷⁰

The industrial bourgeoisie and middle classes as a whole remained under the dominance of the liberals. Nevertheless, one could find both of the following tendencies of the liberal camp within the republican parties: a modest one, that nearly unconditionally represented the interests of the planters (Q. Bocayuva, R. Barbosa), and a radical, positivist, and to a certain extent democratic one (A. Falcão, A. da Silva Jardim),⁷¹ out of which a revolutionary democratic intelligence later crystallized. In this time the latter was no more than a dependent component of the revolutionary process and had only regional influence ("School of Recife").⁷² But even the radicals avoided mobilizing the masses toward a North American or Cuban solution to the slave question, advocating mere social reform instead. So, the Brazilian bourgeoisie chose to subordinate itself to the conservative line of the mighty Paulistas.⁷³

The popular movement of the late second empire was hardly organized, institutionalized, and coordinated in itself. In my opinion, there were no forces that really struggled for a democratic alternative of capitalist development, above all an accordingly interested and "conscious"

peasantry. The peasantry⁷⁴ had to remain alone as a potential force for revolution, as long as it lacked a political leadership and a program that would also include the agrarian question. Because the farmers themselves could not produce either one, and as the working class was not yet able to take on the leadership of the peasantry, this task fell to petty-bourgeois intellectual forces like those that existed under Morelos and Hidalgo in Mexico in 1910-1917. The main weakness of the abolitionist movement consisted, however, in the limitedness of the agrarian program. Only André Rebouças recognized that it was necessary to connect the abolition of slavery with the democratization of the soil.⁷⁵ That is why the struggle for emancipation and for a republic remained confined to the towns and large plantations. A (messianistic) rural movement of nation-wide importance first appeared in Canudos in 1896/97.

Nevertheless, the masses actively and constantly participated in the general-democratic movement for abolition and republic. First of all, the popular movement was represented by the slave resistance. When the crisis reached its point of culmination in the late eighties, the slaves intervened directly - and to a large extent independently - in the political events by fleeing from the plantations. In this situation, the left wing of the bourgeois emancipation movement (J. do Patrocínio, J. Bonifácio, A. Bento) supported the slaves' resistance thereby exerting the necessary pressure from "below" on the monarchy and canalizing the revolutionary forces at the same time. In São Paulo, a massive illegal movement was set up, which devoted itself to the precise organization, armament, and lodging of the slaves in the towns.⁷⁶ From the fall of 1887, the escapes from the plantations assumed such a mass character that the notorious *capitães-de-mato*, slave hunters, and even police contingents proved unable to control the situation. Brutal supervisors were executed and armed struggles between the slaves and the province police, but also between the angry population of the towns and the police broke out. So the gulf broadened between fazendeiros and government on the one hand, and the planters and public on the other.⁷⁷

When the escapes extend to Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais in March/April 1888, the further maintenance of the institution became impossible.⁷⁸ In this revolutionary situation, the army refused to pursue the Negroes and, while Pedro II visited Europe, the chief of the Military Club, Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, turned to Princess Isabel with a petition to abolish slavery.⁷⁹ On May 13, 1888, the *Lei Aurea* (Golden Law) brought slavery to an end in Brazil - and in Latin America in general.

* * *

THIS IS THE PLACE TO DIGRESS.

For the purpose of explaining the phenomenon of the *fazendeiro-emancipacionista* in the late eighties, a consideration of the socio-economic and political background is necessary.

Holloway proved in an interesting analysis that in 1887, the adequate number of slaves necessary to meet the needs of the expanding coffee production still existed. Thereafter, the maintenance of the institution was no longer compatible with the function of the coffee economy.⁸⁰ But there is another factor one has to take into consideration to explain the steep upturn São Paulo experienced: the intensification which accompanied the extensive enlargement of the coffee plantations. This was due to the nature of coffee as well as to the initiative of the planters.

The effective exploitation of the soil led to a high degree of capitalization⁸¹ in the coffee production. Expensive investments are only necessary at the beginning, when the plantation is founded. From the fifth to the thirteenth year, the fazendeiro "reaps the fruits of his work". During this time he has to reinvest only a small part of the increasing returns. Capital became available for commercial and industrial investment, but also for the "purchase" of European immigrants and for mechanization as possibilities to replace the lost slave labor. Technical modernization eliminated a number of jobs, attracted immigrants, and improved the quality of the coffee, which, again, resulted in higher prices.⁸²

The Paulistas faced up to the objective demands and demonstrated business skills. "*Their interest in the slavery was a function of their interest in production*",⁸³ and when the slave labor did not continue to produce enough profit this necessitated changes in the form of production. The system of free labor soon proved to be more profitable for the fazendeiro than slavery. From then on he considered his possessions a source of capital. He therefore did not exhaust either the soil or the human labor force, but applied his capital in a more and more productive way and thereby produced a profit.

Carvalho Franco⁸⁴ and Fernandes⁸⁵ assert the opinion that the successful planter could recognize his interests and his economic role only in the course of a period of transition, which could not be marked by the dualism of two different types of societies, confronted by each other, but by the connection of the ancien régime and the capitalist society, the direct slavery and the modern wage slavery.

Socio-psychologically considered, a conflict had to arise for the fazendeiro: each growth was for him first a step forward on the way of

regression, construction at the expense of demolition. That is correct. If Fernandes, however, concludes that when the "landowner, becoming a bourgeois," emerged out of the "agrarian", the "*fazendeiro de café*" was no longer the "*homem de lavoura*",⁸⁶ he does not recognize that it concerns only the personifications of the conserving-reforming way of capitalist development. The subject of that development appears in Fernandes' statement as its mere object. It is necessary, however, to ask what the "*fazendeiro de café*" retained from the "*homem de lavoura*", what he retained from the old in the new. The basis of the old "slave and master order" was only incompletely destroyed. It was replaced by a leasehold system of semi-slavish nature. Precapitalist relations of production and patriarchal relations survived. From all relationships concerning property, the abolition eliminated only the possession of man by man.⁸⁷ Further capitalist development should reveal that the coffee oligarchy by no means had national interests in view. They only intended to secure the existence and expansion of the export-oriented plantation economy, and this with the least possible break. This was first of all "the nature of their interests." Dean is completely right in saying there would not have existed a higher developed capitalist mentality in São Paulo than anywhere else in Brazil.⁸⁸

Now the political dimensions of the situation should be considered. From the very beginning, the Paulistas knew about the tremendous importance the government could have as an instrument of political-economic activity. The policy of the provincial government of São Paulo, which was under the total control of the coffee oligarchy, evidently reveals this. Its task, however, changed during and by the process of gradual abolition: at first concerned with the prevention of this step, at least in the eighties, the postponement of the unavoidable and its preparation by appropriate political-administrative measures was the focus of their interest. Adapting to the new situation, São Paulo became the economic center of the nation and the position of the Paulistas as a social group increased. They dominated the bourgeois-republican movement in Brazil and captured seats in the national parliament for their advocates. Thus they began to control the state machinery of the empire and could delay, accelerate, and sanction the socio-economic changes to a certain extent.

Holloway proved an apparent discordance in the activities of the Paulistas on the provincial and national level by considering the Prado family: Antônio da Silva Prado, one of the most important planters of São Paulo, as the Minister of Agriculture of the imperial government, was at the head of the fight against the abolitionist tide, while he and his brother Martinho, president of the Sociedade Promotora da Imigração (Society

for the Promotion of Immigration), developed the immigration programs of the provincial and imperial governments.⁸⁹ But, of course, it has to be added, that there was also a business maneuver, a "bargaining" for the amount of and procedures for compensation, that is, for capital hiding beneath those practices of postponement. Holloway is right in seeing in this vacillating turn of the fazendeiros into the abolitionist movement an important key to understanding how the planter considered the problem: "*If the moral and humanitarian arguments of the urban ideologues had motivated the planter-turned-abolitionist, he might logically have acted on such principles to free his slaves outright*".

He was, however, "*motivated rather, by the economic fact of the successful immigration programme and by the political fact of disruptive abolitionist agitation*".⁹⁰

But both facts did not only "coincide."⁹¹ This has to be expressed clearer to take away a connotation inherent in this statement, after which the abolition in the last instance seems to be the work of the planter himself. The *possibility* of the fazendeiro - on the basis of the real correlation of forces within the bourgeois-republican movement - to manipulate the official party and to a certain extent, but only to a certain extent, state policy, is only one aspect. On the other hand, the growing abolitionist movement forced the fazendeiro to transform his system of labor forces. It had an accelerating and ultimately decisive effect on the action of the coffee oligarchy, because it was a real manifestation of the pressure of the masses, that pushed the planters beyond their original, narrow class objectives. When the slaves themselves left the fazendas en masse - and not earlier - the last slaveholding fazendeiros also joined the national abolitionist movement and converted into *emancipacionistas*. By the "law of necessity, (emphasis J.H.)" as a depressed planter confessed. An increasingly independent popular movement commanded respect, because a further deferment of abolition could conjure up a growing anarchy and even a democratic revolution. And these consequences were more dangerous than a mere emancipation of the slaves,⁹² especially since abolition would meanwhile no longer lead to an economic break.

* * *

With the *Lei Aurea* the emancipation struggle of the slaves came to an end. With their personal freedom the slaves had reached the only and yarned for aim of their fight, which was not directed against the ancien régime itself, but only against the institution of slavery. This is why aboli-

tion was sufficient to take the revolutionary situation in March/April 1888 its revolutionary explosive force. However, slavery had carried the monarchy. Therefore the slaves put a mechanism in motion or, at least, they accelerated it, which went far beyond their actual goals. Even if the slaves themselves hardly played a role in the further struggle for the republic - considering the "*guarda negra*", just the opposite happened⁹³ - the mass escapes became the trigger for the revolutionary events of 1889.

As expected, the broad abolitionist camp disintegrated; republicanism had always moved in the shadow of abolitionism.⁹⁴ Now the struggle for the conquest of political power set on the agenda. Surely, being due to its weakness, but above all the fear of the revolutionary popular masses, the bourgeoisie considered the growing revolution, which it had manipulated, with an increasing mistrust. For this reason, the bourgeoisie put its hopes in the initiative and action of the army and supported the officers during the "military question".⁹⁵ With the revolutionary situation in spring 1888, however, yet before its minimal class goals were taking shape, the bourgeois hegemonic factor collapsed entirely. In the face of the simultaneous weakness of the popular movement, the struggle for the republic was marked by a phenomenon that can be expressed with the term "social substitution of hegemony": instead of the bourgeoisie, genetically prebourgeois class forces occupied its place as hegemon of the revolution. This implied the non-completion of this revolution in the same points as recorded for the anti-colonial emancipation, however on an incomparably higher level of capitalist development.

The flareup of the popular movement shattered also the scruples of the coffee oligarchy about a military-led political upheaval. Therefore it resorted to the help of the army to make political and social reforms practicable. Reforms which should avert even the slightest danger of a democratic revolution and exclude the masses from participation in future political decision-making.⁹⁶

The military, of course, also saw the weakness and inconsequence of the bourgeois elements, the absence of a broad party of the bourgeoisie on a national level, and the willingness of the Paulistas to compromise, and took the revolutionary initiative in 1889.

Soon it became clear, that the military turned out to be not a Pretorian guard of the planters, but development into an independent power factor and also tried to implement its own aims. It appeared to be the case that what actually transpired was the substitution of the hegemony of a social class faction, namely of the Paulistas, by an institution, by the army, acting in the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie. The

latter phenomenon, the "institutional substitution of hegemony", is typical for periods of transition with extremely instable relationships of class forces and still relatively immature class structures.⁹⁷

The compromise between Paulistas and the army, consequently, had to end up in a struggle for the definitive solution of the question of hegemony and power. This struggle became the decisive axis on which the political development of Brazil between 1889 and 1894 turned. The fate of the revolution had to be decided - in the positive or negative form - to that extent, whether and how, it was possible to "demilitarize" the revolutionary process.⁹⁸ There was only one option opened to the bourgeoisie: it had to use the contradictions, compulsorily arising between landed property and the military, for its own interests. In the face of the real correlation of forces, it could not, however, be sufficient to lean on the army or parts of it and to start fighting with them against the coffee oligarchy, but it was inevitable to overcome revolutionary abstinence and to form a united front with the popular masses.

* * *

If the contradiction between the Paulistas and the military dominated in the early years of the republic, at the same time a series of other secondary contradictions emerged, which had already fermented in Brazilian society for a longer time. They were only concealed by the struggle for abolition and the republic. The political panorama of the country turned out to be overshadowed by the conflicts between the different regionalist currents of the oligarchy (especially Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo) and between several republican (Q. Bocayuva, A. Lobo, R. Barbosa) as well as positivist tendencies ("military" and "civil" positivists). In addition, there existed contradictions within the army ("young officers" against the older military), within the navy (mostly personal rivalries between leading admirals), and between both main branches of the armed forces (simplified: positivist, highly professionalized officers coming from the middle classes and now dominating the state apparatus against aristocratic, monarchial-oriented navy officers that felt deprived of their traditional privileges). However strong the contradictions were, common objectives of the army, Paulistas, bourgeoisie and middle classes remained the decisive fight against the monarchial reaction, culminating in the Civil War (1893-1895)⁹⁹ as well as the suppression of the popular masses (for example, the sailors' uprisings in 1891/92).¹⁰⁰ The working classes were the only mourners of the interest struggles among the ben-

efficiaries of the new regime established behind their back (consequences of the chronic financial crisis). All these conflicts were connected to each other and impeded a fast consolidation of the young republic.

* * *

The Achilles heel in the relations between the Paulistas and the military was the respect for or disregard of the federalist principle by the central government. The autonomy of its federal state was the main precondition for the coffee oligarchy to strengthen the basis of its economic and indirect political power and to fight for the direct power in Brazil.

The at first provisional and later elected government of Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca can be considered a transitional government. Deodoro, chief of the military club, educated in the esprit de corps of the imperial army, who, in spite of his membership in the Partido Conservador, showed a patriotic attitude, though no certain political-ideological conception, was a proven officer.¹⁰¹ But he had no understanding of even the basic problems which were involved in running a country. He governed Brazil like a regiment. Soon his ministers received extraordinary authorities and full control of policy in their departments. From January 2, 1890, the executive was completely separated from the administrative policy. This led to stubborn personal interest struggles between the politicians.¹⁰² Brazilian politics began to assume personalist trends. The crisis within the provisional government was caused by the banking reform elaborated by Ruy Barbosa and passed on January 17, 1890. It was judged a failure and provoked the first enormous economic crisis of the republic, the *Encilhamento*.

In order to understand the changing relations between the military and the Paulistas, it is necessary to explain this project in a bit more detail: Barbosa was right to advocate an accelerated industrial development and diversification of the agricultural sector in order to overcome instability. But in no way did he want to touch the large latifundias. Instead of tackling the unresolved agrarian question as the principal cause of merchandise-money relations and the narrowness of the domestic market, Barbosa tried to eliminate the symptom resulting from it and already felt during the empire, namely, the lack of circulation funds. The situation in the first years of the republic had still been aggravated, because the state provided credits for the "prejudiced" agriculture. The higher wage costs arising from the employment of free immigrants and semi-slavish tenants and share-tenants, should not be paid from the rent of the fazendeiro, but out

of the national budget. In order to provide the missing capital for a brisk industrial development, fiduciary money was brought on the market. But by giving the printing rights and even the right to resell them to several private banks, the state deprived itself of the monopoly of printing paper money. Therefore, it was unable to control the inflation soon surpassing the needs of the country. Exactly this control, however, was intended. In addition, an artificially promoted inflation could only be controlled and the printed paper money only be repurchased if a real economic growth was guaranteed. This, however, was hardly possible in a country that lived from its export returns and therefore was extremely dependent on the fluctuations of the world market.¹⁰³

The resulting era of fictive prosperity - accomplished by speculation and corruption even within the government - lasted only for a few months. Already in late 1891 the house of cards broke down. Bankruptcies were frequent.¹⁰⁴ No wonder the government was caught in the crossfire of opposition.

At first the financial policy of the Deodoro administration thoroughly catered to the interests of the Paulista planters, because the printing of bank notes led to a redistribution of the national finances in their favor, namely in a double sense: first, because of the reduction of real incomes, the wages, and, second, because of the possibility of using the difference between the income of foreign currency and the wages, taxes, prices, and even credits, etc., that are paid in depreciated national currency. Soon, however, it became noticeable that this chaotic financial policy on a longer term led to an economic and, consequently, also political destabilization of the whole system. And this was the pledge of the economic prosperity of São Paulo.

The political situation became more and more grave. The Congress elected on November, 15, 1890, developed from its very beginning into the scene of the fight between the bourgeoisie and middle classes - on the side of the Paulistas - against the abuses of the military.¹⁰⁵ When Deodoro finally tried to use his power for personal purposes and to force the congress to sanction these activities, the government resigned on January 17, 1891. Thereupon Deodoro appointed the conservative cabinet of the unpopular and monarchically-oriented Barão de Lucena. The new prime minister was not able to bring the economic and political crisis under control. On the contrary, the anarchy grew and the threat of counter-revolution became more dangerous than ever.¹⁰⁶

In this situation, on the eve of the presidential elections of February 1891, São Paulo decided not to support the candidacy of Deodoro, but to nominate the fazendeiro and its own governor, Dr. Prudente José

de Moraes Barros. Thereupon the relations between the military at the top of the government and its hitherto powerful supporters behind the scenes changed: when the empire was overthrown, the provisional government appointed high-ranking officers as military governors. The bourgeois and oligarchical forces had no other choice but to accept them. Only São Paulo was an exception. Deodoro recognized the junta under civil control, appointed by the Paulistas themselves. São Paulo also defended successfully the independence of its local police forces, while some other state governments had to yield the command of its own armed forces to officers of the army determined by Deodoro. Moreover, the contingent of São Paulo's local troops could be enlarged.¹⁰⁷

In the elections Prudente was defeated by Deodoro. The bourgeois representatives of the Constituent Assembly knew very well that, if Prudente should be elected, the Paulistas would still not have enough power to put through his presidency by necessarily armed force against the military. They were convinced a revolt of the army would then follow, with the dissolution of the assembly and the proclamation of Deodoro as dictator. This is why his election seemed to be *"the lesser of two evils"*.¹⁰⁸

Deodoro considered Prudente's candidacy an inexcusable insult and reacted with hostility toward the coffee oligarchy after the election. Prime Minister Lucena tried to undermine the positions of the powerful Partido Republicano Paulista, deposed the governor of São Paulo and sent troops there. The most important fazendeiros thereafter were compelled to sign a manifesto against the government of Deodoro.¹⁰⁹

The continuing clashes between the military and the government of São Paulo on the one hand, and between the president and the congress on the other led to the dissolution of the parliament by Deodoro (November 3, 1891) and the erection of a "provisional dictatorship."¹¹⁰ All the different social components of the broad republican collecting movement abruptly found themselves together again. All over the country resistance against the despotism flamed up.¹¹¹ Three weeks later, the navy together with dissident sectors of the army revolted and threatened to bombard the city of Rio de Janeiro if Deodoro would not leave office. In view of the hopelessness of his situation, he did so on November 23, 1891.¹¹²

* * *

The assumption of the political power by Floriano Peixoto, the vice-president of the republic, was more than the change of one officer and his adherents to another and his followers, though the practices of

the Floriano government, superficially considered, may have been similar to those of Deodoro.¹¹³ Floriano Peixoto, who came from a less privileged planter family of the Northeast, represented rather the positivist-oriented "young officers." He was an alumnus of the military academy, had been promoted from first lieutenant to lieutenant-coronel during the Paraguayan War, and after 1870 he had engaged himself as a member of the Partido Liberal in the abolitionist movement. But the very ambitious Floriano Peixoto was thoroughly contradictory in himself. His political conceptions very often seemed to be indifferent. He didn't belong directly to the generation of the "young officers", had held high positions in the imperial state apparatus, and he jumped on the republican bandwagon only at the last minute.¹¹⁴ The decisive fact, however, is that with the government of Floriano Peixoto the "young officers" tried to implement their socio-political conceptions.

Soon after November 23, 1891, Peixoto began with the erection of a positivist dictatorship. All governors having supported Deodoro were deposed, even if they now intended to follow the new government. In different federal states the local assemblies and authorities were dissolved. *"Side by side with one large coup d'état there were twenty smaller ones"*,¹¹⁵ Bello ascertains. "Young officers" took over the offices of the unseated governors. These officers, the positivist-oriented middle classes and even the local oligarchies, including the Paulistas, applauded Peixoto. São Paulo's planters understood that they depended on his orders to the troops Deodoro had stationed in the state. First they had to regain control of their provincial government. Therefore, but also because of the fact that Peixoto at the beginning respected the autonomy of São Paulo, they were, in return for this guarantee, willing to support the vice-president in the expected presidential elections.¹¹⁶

The dictatorial conduct of Peixoto was soon manifested. It was to clear the way for the economic progress of the country and this could not only mean fighting against the monarchical counter-revolution, but also against the forces that blocked an accelerated capitalist development. Therefore the divergencies within the ruling classes increased.

The congress remained a center of opposition; the opponent faction, however, changed. Under Deodoro the representatives of the radical bourgeois wing had resisted the despotism of the president. The positivist conception of the "young officers" around Peixoto contradicted the principles of "democratic" republicanism and political liberalism that were advocated by those politicians educated in the liberal traditions of the empire. The republic had practically inherited them. They dominated in

the parliament and the Council of Ministers. When Peixoto tried to overcome the crisis of the *Encilhamento* by a change in the economic and financial policy in 1892, he encountered that newly born "*class of businessmen, of adventurers, of gamblers and speculators in the markets and in foreign exchange*"¹¹⁷ that used its influence in and on the congress to bring about the failure of the altogether cautious project of Peixoto. The young industry was to be promoted by protective tariff rates and credits. Furthermore, Peixoto wanted to regain the printing monopoly and begin to skim off the surplus of paper money, thereby reestablishing a certain control over the banking system.¹¹⁸

In the interest of the economic and political consolidation of the republic, the Paulistas first supported the change in the economic policy of the government. However when it became evident that Peixoto intended to reach the stabilization of the national finances by a growing centralization and, therefore, new infringements of the autonomy of São Paulo - the only possibility he had - there again developed a stubborn conflict between the government and the Paulistas.¹¹⁹

In addition to all those who opposed the dictatorship but not the republican regime, Peixoto was confronted with his most avowed enemies, the monarchists. Among them were mighty landowners, slaveholders, a part of the high-ranking army officers, and nearly the whole navy, as well as stockjobbers and those entrepreneurs, having been closely associated with the imperial court and having enjoyed its protection. In the face of the unpopularity of the monarchy in Brazil, they very often posed as the most zealous adherents of the republic.¹²⁰ They attacked the Peixoto government from its very beginning, but without any success. The "Iron Marshal", as Peixoto soon was called by them, nipped any resistance in the bud.¹²¹

Floriano Peixoto - like his counterpart in Rio Grande do Sul, Júlio de Castilhos - has been widely defamed in the historical literature. He was not a "military despot" like Deodoro¹²² and his dictatorship not a shift to the chronic caudilismo of the continent¹²³ or the beginning of the "rule by pronunciamento".¹²⁴ In the situation Brazil in 1892/94 was faced with, the energetic and armed defense of the republic was the focus of interest. "*Under the conditions of the consolidation of the monarchial forces, the finance crisis and the rebellion in the states, an electoral campaign involved danger for the republic and could lead to the unification of all its enemies.*"¹²⁵ Peixoto swore to defend the republic responsibly and in any case not to resign like Deodoro. But his situation was precarious. He had to defend his regime against all sides.¹²⁶

During the dictatorship of the "young officers", there really existed

the potential for a bourgeois revolution led by the military. The officers resolved to a great extent the political-institutional task of the revolution, the state question, and tackled the industrialization.¹²⁷ But this potential had to decay because the military lacked a strong social basis. Disappointed, because the military went its own way after 1889 instead of being submissive as expected, the bourgeoisie turned against a "political army" and betrayed its own revolution the second time. One can precisely exemplify this attitude in the person of Ruy Barbosa. Once welcoming the confrontation of the army with the empire, he now denied the military would have any right, especially the right to influence the government or let alone to dictate its course.¹²⁸

The representatives of the radical wing of the bourgeoisie also avoided mobilizing the popular masses in an hour of grave danger for the republic. But even if they had thought of such a step, probably it would have been fruitless. The republic did not bring the people essential improvements of working and living conditions.

When the Civil War began in 1893, the Paulistas conceived the actually existing possibility of "demilitarizing" the revolution in their own interest - in the negative form. For this reason, they had to unify their forces with the government instead of confronting it. Peixoto was dependent on the support of São Paulo as much as the Paulistas were on the army. In return for support, he would have to yield political power to São Paulo's representative. The "unity" of the Paulistas and the military became the all-deciding precondition of the definitive solution of the question of hegemony and power.

* * *

In the course of the war, Prudente was elected president. If it was possible to smoothen his way to the Catete palace - against the still-powerful military - then this was not only due to the above mentioned dependency of the government on São Paulo, but also to the systematic preparation of this step by the Paulistas.

First, they were skilled in utilizing the disagreements and rivalries among the officers and branches of the armed forces and to play them off of each other.¹²⁹

Second, São Paulo's local police forces were expanded by the fazendeiros, since they regained control over their state government. This gave them the support to put through their economic and political demands against the government as well as to march together with the federal troops

against the monarchial reaction. Now they were also able to react successfully in the case of an intervention "from below" and could, consequently, take over the "alternative function" hitherto fulfilled by the military. The local armed forces were also used to manipulate the election itself.¹³⁰

Third, the Paulista planter and senator Francisco Glicério together with other "historical republicans" (generation of 1870) of the modest wing of the different republican parties founded the Partido Republicano Federal in July 1893. It was no more than a nation-wide instrument, entirely dominated by the Paulistas, to realize the election of its presidential candidate.¹³¹

After assuming office, Prudente, though willing to make indispensable compromises,¹³² acted quickly and consequently:

First, he definitely "demilitarized" the revolution by reducing the numbers of the federal armed forces and the expenditures for them, and by promoting politically less engaged officers.¹³³

Second, he continued to arm São Paulo.¹³⁴

And third, he managed to pacify the battlefield of Rio Grande do Sul in 1895.¹³⁵

After Prudent's peace negotiations and the resignation of Glicério from the Partido Republicano Federal, the latter entirely split, proof of the fact that it was not a class party, but only a socially very heterogeneous electoral alliance.

The assumption of political power by São Paulo's coffee oligarchy on November 15, 1894 marked - after the rupture of 1888¹³⁶ - another essential preliminary decision in favor of the "Prussian way" of the development of capitalism in agriculture, or, the conserving-reforming way of capitalist development in general.

This way was also blessed by the constitution of 1891 to a large extent copied from the USA. One has only to look at the federal principle and the unchanged territorial division of the country, the tax and soil policy, the administration of the transportation system, the distribution of authority among the three powers, and the representation of the states in both chambers of the congress. And it is no contradiction if this constitution was federalist as well as presidentialist.¹³⁷ But it was only practicable for the coffee oligarchy if the planters had the direct political power in Brazil or could rule by deputies as was the case in some Hispanic American republics. The military, however, as already shown, did not turn out to be a complaisant instrument, a Pretorian guard, but used the far-reaching procuratories, the basic law assured the president of the republic, in their own interest. Moreover, the army aspired repeatedly to a constitutional reform to realize their aims.¹³⁸ And since they did not get the majority of

votes in the congress necessary for such a step, they resorted to an open violation of the so well reasoned basic law. The problem did not consist in the fact that presidentialism was denied by the planters because it contradicted federalism, but in the non-existing identity of class forces that stood behind federal presidency and states, executive and legislative, Supreme Court and courts of the states, presidentialism and federalism. This explains why the Paulistas, once in power after 1894, kept presidentialism as the most adequate complement to federalism and thereafter ruled as kind of "presidential dictators."¹³⁹

Under Paulista rule, the popular masses remained excluded from political decision-making. Only 3 percent of the Brazilian population were entitled to vote,¹⁴⁰ and only registered voters could themselves be elected. The national congress, dominated by the moderate liberals and submissive to the coffee oligarchy, played only a pseudo-democratic role. One would hardly find any social legislation enacted in these years and thereafter.¹⁴¹

So there was no other possibility for the urban and rural working classes to put through even the most modest democratic aspirations except by organizing outside of the law. The proletariat, growing with industrialization, was confronted from the very beginning and at the same time with two enemies, the mighty coffee oligarchy and the domestic and foreign bourgeoisie making use of pre-capitalist methods of exploitation (peonage in the textile industry) and the state repressive tactics. It passed through a process of political-ideological clarification, in the course of which the first nation-wide and independent proletarian organizations were founded: in 1902 the Partido Socialista and in 1906/08 the Confederação Operária Brasileira.

Thereby the Brazilian bourgeoisie came between imperialist powers and the working class since its formation. This further restricted its revolutionary potential.¹⁴²

* * *

In conclusion, it can be said that the regional oligarchies of São Paulo (and Minas Gerais) hermetically decided the fate of the country, as it is expressed by the empirical-concrete term of "Old Republic". With the abolition of slavery and the establishment of the republic, capitalist development, however, got its minimal conditions in base and superstructure. It proceeded slowly at first, accelerated during the course of and after World War I, but always in a deformed way. The rule of the oligarchies began to prove more and more an obstacle. The interests of

the hegemonical planters and the strengthening industrial bourgeoisie increasingly diverged. The Paulista republic converted - especially with the 1920s - into the new theater of their conflicts. At the same time, the country was shaken by the contradictions between the petty-bourgeois democratic movement of the "young officers" (tenentismo) and the oligarchies; the unfied bourgeoisie and the rising proleteriati; the Brazilian nation defending its independence and the foreign capital, above all of Great Britain, Germany, and the US, to a growing extent penetrating Brazil and there rivaling each other. These fronts overlapping each other determined the third anti-oligarchial - anti-imperialist and bourgeois-democratic phase of the Brazilian bourgeois cycle of revolution.¹⁴³

Finally, it must be emphasized that the relevance of the Brazilian revolution of 1888/89 (-94) arises from the fact that it signals its simultaneity with other (in a limited manner) comparable movements (Chile 1886-91, Argentina 1891/92-1916, Nicaragua 1893-1909, Cuba 1895-98/1901, Ecuador 1895-1916, Columbia / Panama 1899-1902, Uruguay 1903-17/19) a new (comp. independence revolution, 1850s, 1870s) subcontinental situation of transformation in the field of tension of the completing transition from laissez-faire to monopoly capitalism. A fact in future studies about this period should merit more attention.

NOTAS E REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS

1. See Maria Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil, 1889-1964* (Stanford, 1966); George C. A. Boehrer, *Da monarquia à república, História do Partido Republicano Paulista (1870-1889)* (Rio de Janeiro, 1957); Armin Bollinger, *Die Sklavenbefreiung in Brasilien* (Erweiterte Fassung aus Lateinamerika-Symposium 1968), 2nd ed., (Zürich, 1969); Robert Conrad, *Os últimos anos da escravidão no Brasil, 1850-1888* (Rio de Janeiro, 1975); T.H. Fulano, *Der Sturz des Kaiserthrones in Brasilien und seine Folgen auf politischem und kirchlichem Gebiete* (Köln, 1862); June Edith Hahner, *Officers and Civilians in Brazil, 1889-1898* (Ph.d. diss., Cornell University, 1966); Jürgen Hell, *Der brasilianische Kaffeeplantagenkomplex im Widerspruch von versklavter und freier Arbeit (1850-1870), Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika*, (hereinafter AALA), 11:1 (1983), 141-150; Jürgen Hell, "Die Sklavenemanzipation in Brasilien (1870-1888)," AALA, 10:3 (1982), 519-530; Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, ed. *História Geral da civilização brasileira*, 3 parts (11 vols) (São Paulo, 1960, passim) II (5 vols), III (4 vols); Percy Alvin Martin, "Causes of the Collapse of the Brazilian Empire," HAIR, 4:1 (1921) 4-48; Robert G. Nachman, "Positivism, Modernization and Middle Class in Brazil", HAHR, 57:1 (1977), 1-23; Senado Federal

(of Brazil), ed., *O parlamento e a evolução nacional* (3ª série: 1871-1889), 6 vols., (Brasília, 1979); Charles Willis Simmons, *Marshal Deodoro and the Fall of Dom Pedro II*, (Durham, 1966); Nelson Werneck Sodré, *Panorama do segundo império* (São Paulo; Recife; Porto Alegre, 1939); Arthur Thompson, *Guerra civil do Brasil de 1893-1895: Vida e morte de Saldanha da Gama*, (Rio de Janeiro, 1933); Robert B. Toplin, "Upheaval, Violence and the Abolition of Slavery in Brazil: The Case of São Paulo," HAHR, 49:4 (1969), 639-655, to mention only a few important studies of relatively general character.

2. See Buarque de Holanda, *História geral*, II.5, p. 7-8.
3. See A. N. Cistozvonov, "Über die stadial-regionale Methode bei der vergleichenden Erforschung der bürgerlichen Revolutionen des 16.-18. Jahrhunderts in Europa," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* (hereinafter ZfG), 26:1 (1978), 5-34, see especially p.9.
4. Manfred Kossok, "Vergleichende Revolutionsgeschichte der Neuzeit. Forschungsprobleme und Kontroversen," ZfG, 26:5 (1978), 5-34; Manfred Kossok and Walter Markov, "Zur Methodologie der vergleichenden Revolutionsgeschichte der Neuzeit," in Manfred Kossok, ed., *Studien zur vergleichenden Revolutionsgeschichte, 1500-1917*, (Berlin, 1974), pp. 1-28.
5. Manfred Kossok, "Historische Gemeinsamkeiten und Besonderheiten in Lateinamerika von der Unabhängigkeitsrevolution bis zur Gegenwart," in ZfG, 20:8 (1972), 925.
6. (Karl) Marx to Pavel Vasilyevich Annenkov, Brussels, December 28, (1846), in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, 42 vols. (New York, 1975), XXXVIII, p. 102.
7. Max Zeiske, "Sozialökonomische Entwicklung und demokratische Bewegung im bürgerlichen Übergangsprozess Lateinamerikas, 1852-1917. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Kampfes um die Alternativen in der Entwicklung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft," (diss. B-Habilitation, Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig, 1979) pp. 84/85.
8. See Karl Marx, "Theorien über den Mehrwert (Vierter Band des "Kapitals"). Zweiter Teil," in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, 42 vols. (Berlin, 1954), XXVI.2, p.299.
9. Karl Marx, *Capital. A Critique of Political Economy*, 3 vols. (Chicago, 1909), III p.934.
10. See Maria Sylvia de Carvalho Franco, *Homens livres na ordem escravocrata*, (São Paulo, 1969); Florestan Fernandes, *A revolução burguesa no Brasil. Ensaio de interpretação sociológica*, 3rd ed., (Rio de Janeiro, 1981).
11. Wolfgang Küttler, "Bürgerliche Revolutionen in der Epoche des Imperialismus," in Manfred Kossok, ed., *Revolutionen der Neuzeit, 1500-1917*, (Berlin, 1982), p. 95.
12. see Elsa Brunelli, *Los Negros en América*, (Buenos Aires, 1941), p. 95.
13. Celso Furtado, *Formación Económica del Brasil*, (México, 1962), pp. 124-125.

14. See Peter L. Eisenberg, "Abolishing Slavery: The Process on Pernambuco's Sugar Plantations," HAHR, 52:4 (1972), 580-597; J.H. Galloway, "The Last Years of Slavery on the Sugar Plantations of Northeastern Brazil," HAHR, 51:4 (1971), 586-605; Hell, *Die Sklavenemanzipation*, p. 520.
15. See Richard Morse, *From Community to Metropolis: A Biography of São Paulo, Brazil*, (Gainesville, 1958), p. 167; Stanley Stein, "The Passing of the Coffee Plantation in the Paraíba Valley," HAHR, 33:3 (1953), 331-364.
16. Eisenberg, *Abolishing Slavery*, p. 583.
17. Hell, *Der brasilianische Kaffeeplantagenkimplex*, p. 141.
18. Eisenberg, *Abolishing Slavery*, pp. 583-584; André Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment Latin America*, (New York, 1967), p. 168; Herbert S. Klein, "The Internal Slave Trade in Nineteenth Century Brazil: A Study of Slave Importation into Rio de Janeiro in 1852," HAHR, 51:4 (1971), 567-585.
19. Hell, *Der brasilianische Kaffeeplantagenkomplex*, o. 145.
20. Caio Prado, Junior, *Evolução Política do Brasil: e outros estudos*, 2nd ed, (São Paulo, 1957), p. 248.
21. See Antônio Carlos Bernardo, "Sociedade técnica e industrialização - uma abordagem da sociedade paulista na 1ª república," *Anais da História* (hereinafter AdH), 2 (1970), 70.
22. W.I. Ermolajewa, ed., *Ocerki istorii Brazílii*, (Moscow, 1962), p. 165; Caio Prado, Jr. *Evolução Política*, p. 85.
23. Richard Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil (1850-1914)*, (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 23-24, 27.
24. Prado, Jr., *Evolução política*, p. 86.
25. Graham, *Britain and the Onset of modernization*, p. 25.
26. See Richard Graham, "Mauá and Anglo-Brazilian Diplomacy, 1862-1863," in HAHR, 42:2 (1962), 199-211.
27. Stanley Stein, *The Brazilian Cotton Manufacture*, (Cambridge, 1957), p. 7.
28. Boris I. Koval', *Istoriia brazil'skogo proletariata (1857-1967)*, (Moscow, 1968), p. 48.
29. See Stein, *The Brazilian Cotton Manufacture*, p. 7.
30. Prado, Jr., *Evolução Política*, p. 86.
31. Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernization*, p. 24.
32. Brunelli, *Los negros*, p. 96; Artur Ramos, "O negro no Brasil. Escravidão e história social," in: *Estudios de história de América* (México, 1948), p. 177.
33. Bollinger, *Die Sklavenbefreiung*, p. 16.
34. Brunelli, *Los negros*, p. 96; Ramos, "O negro no Brasil," p. 177.
35. Ramos, *O negro no Brasil*, pp. 177-178.
36. Bollinger, *Die Sklavenbefreiung*, p. 17.
37. See Buarque de Holanda, II.1, p. 260.

38. Hell, *Die Sklavenemanzipation*, p. 524.
39. Brunelli, *Los negros*, p. 96.
40. Ramos, *O negro no Brasil*, p. 128.
41. See Boehrer, *Da monarquia à república*, p. 25; John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America*, (Stanford, 1964), p. 191; Franklin de Oliveira, *Revolução e contra-revolução no Brasil*, 3rd ed. (Rio de Janeiro, 1962), p. 27.
42. Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, p. 35; Boehrer, *Da Monarquia à república*, pp. 23-24; Prado, Jr., *Evolução política*, p. 93.
43. Bollinger, *Die Sklavenbefreiung*, p. 18; Prado Jr., *Evolução política*, p. 93.
44. See Boehrer, *Da monarquia à república*, pp. 252, 255, 258-261; George C. A. Boehrer, "The Church and the Overthrow of the Brazilian Monarchy," HAHR, 48:3 (1968), 380-401; Sérgio Guerra and Alberto Prieto, *Crônicas latinoamericanas: Brasil*, (Unpublished manuscript, Havana), p. 195-196.
45. Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernization*, p. 28; Johnson, *The Military*, pp. 189-190.
46. Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, p. 41; Buarque de Holanda, *História Geral*, II. 5, p. 329; Toplin, *Upheaval*, pp. 650-651.
47. Buarque de Holanda, *História Geral*, II. 5, p. 329; Erich Kalwa, "Der brasilianische Tenentismo: Die Armee im nationalen bürgerlichen Revolutionszyklus (1889-1930)," (diss. A, Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig, 1977), p. 37.
48. Kalwa, *Der brasilianische Tenentismo*, pp. 29-30.
49. See *ibid.*, pp. 48, 51.
50. Küttler, *Bürgerliche Revolutionen*, p. 414.
51. See Nathaniel Leff and Herbert Klein, "O crescimento da população não-européia do início do desenvolvimento: O Brasil do século XIX," AdH, 6 (1974), 59-63.
52. Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernization*, pp. 29-30; Hell, *Die Sklavenemanzipation*, p. 522.
53. Hell, *Die Sklavenemanzipation*, p. 522.
54. Nelson Werneck Sodré, *Introdução à revolução brasileira*, 2nd ed., (Rio de Janeiro, 1963), pp. 44-45.
55. Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernization*, p. 32.
56. Caio Prado, Jr., *Historia económica del Brasil*, (B. Aires, 1960), pp. 294-295.
57. Stein, *The Brazilian Cotton Manufacture*, p. 49.
58. Hell, *Die Sklavenemanzipation*, p. 522.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 520.
60. *Ibid.*
61. *Ibid.*, p. 523.
62. This can be pursued up to the last cabinet of the Visconde de Ouro Preto, who assumed office on June 7, 1889. His far-reaching reform program was rejected by a large majority of the Parliament. See: Senado Federal, O

- Parlamento*, I, pp. 15-162; Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernization*, p. 40; Percy Alvin Martin, "Federalism in Brazil," *HAHR* 18:2 (1938), p. 156; Caio Prado, Jr., *Evolución política del Brasil*, (Buenos Aires; Montevideo, 1964), p. 120.
63. See Kossok, *Vergleichende Revolutionsgeschichte*, pp. 91; Kossok and Markov, *Zur Methodologie*, p. 11.
64. Küttler, *Bürgerliche Revolutionen*, p. 414.
65. See Kalwa, *Der brasilianische Tenentismo*, pp. 36-37, 39; Nachman, *Positivism*, pp. 5-10.
66. Kalwa, *Der brasilianische Tenentismo*, pp. 37, 39, 44.
67. See Kossok, *Vergleichende Revolutionsgeschichte*, p. 22.
68. Eisenberg, *Abolishing Slavery*, pp. 588-591; Galloway, *The Last Years of Slavery*, pp. 600-601, 605; Hell, *Die Sklavenemanzipation*, p. 522.
69. Hell, *Die Sklavenemanzipation*, p. 523.
70. Ermolajewa, *Ocerki*, p. 193.
71. See Boehrer, *Da monarquia à república*, pp. 195 passim.
72. See João Cruz Costa, *Esbozo de una historia de las ideas en Brazil*, (México, Buenos Aires, 1957), pp. 48-55.
73. See Boehrer, *Da monarquia à república*, pp. 197 passim.
74. To speak of a "peasantry" in the Brazil of the late nineteenth century is already a problem, because this very heterogeneous rural population can't be compared at all with its European counterparts. The predominance of the big latifundia prevented the arising of the "classical" European agrarian dualism, result of the bourgeois dissolution of the peasantry. See Rui Facó, *Cangaceiros e fanáticos*, 2nd ed., (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), p. 17.
75. Hell, *Die Sklavenemanzipation*, p. 525.
76. Conrad, *Os últimos anos*, pp. 293-298, 301; Hell, *Die Sklavenemanzipation*, p. 526-527; Toplin, *Upheaval*, p. 643.
77. Conrad, *Os últimos anos*, pp. 291-293, 305; Hell, *Die Sklavenemanzipation*, p. 527; Toplin, *Upheaval*, p. 644-646, 649-650.
78. Toplin, *Upheaval*, p. 643.
79. Bollinger, *Die Sklavenbefreiung*, pp. 19-20; Conrad, *Os últimos anos*, pp. 305-306; Kalwa, *Der brasilianische Tenentismo*, pp. 33-35; Martin, *Causes of the Collapse*, p. 34; Toplin, *Upheaval*, pp. 648-651.
80. Thomas Holloway, "Immigration and Abolition of Slavery: The Transition from Slave Work to Free Labor in the Coffee-Zone of São Paulo," in Dauril Alden and Warren Dean, ed., *Essay Concerning the Socio-economic History of Brazil and Portuguese India*, (Gainesville, 1977), pp. 152-156.
81. Furtado, *Formación Económica*, p. 121.
82. Hell, *Die Sklavenemanzipation*, p. 522.
83. Holloway, *Immigration and Abolition*, p. 176.
84. Carvalho Franco, *Homens livres*, pp. 224-225.
85. Fernandes, *A revolução burguesa*, p. 113.
86. Ibid.

87. Jürgen Hell "Die Sklavenzeit: Brazilianische Geschichte von 1500-1889," unpublished manuscript, p. 183.
88. Warren Dean, *The Industrialization of São Paulo, 1880-1945*, (Austin, 1969), p. 38.
89. Holloway, *Immigration and Abolition*, pp. 167-168.
90. Ibid, p. 174.
91. Ibid, p. 176.
92. Toplin, *Upheaval*, pp. 654-655.
93. Ermolajewa, *Ocerki*, p. 199.
94. Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, p. 37.
95. Boehrer, *Da Monarquia à República*, p. 279.
96. See Ibid, pp. 276-280.
97. Kossok, *Vergleichende Revolutionsgeschichte*, p. 21.
98. Ibid.
99. See Moniz Bandeira, *Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil (dois séculos de história)*, 2nd. ed. (Rio de Janeiro, 1978), pp. 142-145; Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, pp. 110-136; Guerra and Prieto, *Crônicas*, pp. 206-208; Hahner, *Officers and Civilians*, pp. 78-101; June Edith Hahner, "The Paulista Rise to Power: A Civilian Group Ends Military Rule," *HAHR*, 47:2 (1967), 159-161; Percy Alvin Martin, "Brazil," in Fred Rippy, ed., *Argentina, Brazil, and Chile since Independence*, (Washington, 1935) pp. 228-233; *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States Transmitted to the Congress with the Annual Message of the President*, Washington, 1894, pp. 36-38, 48-49, 63-77, 84, 138, 148; Murilo Ribeiro Lopes, *Rui Barbosa e a Marinha*, (Rio de Janeiro, 1953), p. 13; Thompson, *Guerra Civil*.
100. Ermolajewa, *Ocerki*, pp. 212-213.
101. Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, pp. 42-43, 49.
102. Simmons, *Marshal Deodoro*, pp. 142-143.
103. See Cruz Costa, *Esbozo*, p. 91; Prado, Jr., *Historia económica*, pp. 248-249; Steven Topik, "The Evolution of the Economic Role of the Brazilian State, 1889-1930," in *Technical Paper Series*, no. 15, (Austin, 1978), pp. 2-3.
104. Prado Jr., *Historia económica*, p. 250.
105. Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, p. 81; Fulano, *Der Sturz des Kaiserthrones*, pp. 164-166; Hahner, *Officers and Civilians*, p. 56-57.
106. Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, pp. 82-83; Guerra and Prieto, *Crônicas*, p. 203; Ermolajewa, *Ocerki*, p. 210.
107. See Hahner, *Officers and Civilians*, pp. 48-50; Hahner, *The Paulista Rise*, pp. 151, 153-155.
108. See Hahner, *Officers and Civilians*, pp. 62-63; Martin, *Brazil*, p. 226; Simmons, *Marshal Deodoro*, p. 150.
109. See Hahner, *Officers and Civilians*, p. 61; Hahner, *The Paulista Rise*, p. 156-157.

110. Bandeira, *Presença dos Estados Unidos*, p. 140; Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, p. 86; Fulano, *Der Sturz des Kaiserthrones*, pp. 168-172; Guerra and Prieto, *Crônicas*, p. 205; Hahner, *Officers and Civilians*, p. 63; Martin, *Brazil*, p. 226-227; Ermolajewa, *Ocerki*, pp. 210-211; Simmons, *Marshal Deodoro*, p. 156.
111. Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, p. 87; Ermolajewa, *Ocerki*, p. 211; Hahner, *Officers and Civilians*, pp. 68-71; Martin, *Brazil*, p. 227; Simmons, *Marshal Deodoro*, pp. 157-158.
112. Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, p. 87; Hahner, *Officers and Civilians*, pp. 65-66; Hahner, *The Paulista Rise*, p. 158; Simmons, *Marshal Deodoro*, pp. 150, 157-158.
113. See Martin, *Brazil*, p. 228.
114. Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, pp. 49, 89-94.
115. Ibid, p. 96; see also Hahner, *Officers and Civilians*, p. 73; Martin, *Brazil*, p. 228; Simmons, *Marshal Deodoro*, p. 160.
116. Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, pp. 96, 97, 101; Guerra and Prieto, *Crônicas*, p. 205; Hahner, *The Paulista Rise*, p. 158.
117. Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, p. 102.
118. Ibid, pp. 103-104; Guerra and Prieto, *Crônicas*, pp. 205-206; Topik, *The Evolution*, p. 3.
119. Hahner, *The Paulista Rise*, p. 158.
120. Ermolajewa, *Ocerki*, pp. 213-214.
121. Bandeira, *Presença dos Estados Unidos*, p. 141; Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, pp. 97-100; Hahner, *Officers and Civilians*, pp. 76-78; Martin, *Brazil*, p. 228; Simmons, *Marshal Deodoro*, p. 160.
122. Martin, *Brazil*, p. 234.
123. Francisco Morales Padrón, "El mundo brasileño", in: *Estudios Americanos*, no. 48 (1955), p. 269.
124. Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, p. 101.
125. Ermolajewa, *Ocerki*, p. 214; see also Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, p. 97; Martin, *Brazil*, pp. 228-229.
126. Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, pp. 100, 106.
127. Kalwa, *Der brasilianische Tenentismo*, p. 10.
128. See Ibid, p. 57.
129. Hahner, *The Paulista Rise*, p. 165.
130. Ibid, pp. 149-150; Kalwa, *Der brasilianische Tenentismo*, p. 89.
131. Dushee de Abranches, *Governos e congressos da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil. Apontamentos biográficos sobre todos os presidentes e vice presidentes da República, ministros de estado e senadores e deputados do Congresso Nacional. 1889 a 1917*. 2 vols. (São Paulo, 1918), I, 30-33; Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, pp. 105-106; Hahner, *The Paulista Rise*, p. 162.
132. See Hahner, *The Paulista Rise*, pp. 163-165.
133. See Hahner, *Officers and Civilians*, p. 266.

134. See Ibid.

135. Buarque de Holanda, *História Geral*, p. 110; Thompson, *Guerra Civil*, p. 315-343.

136. See Zeuske, *Sozialökonomische Entwicklung*, pp. 166-167.

137. See Ermolajewa, *Ocerki*, p. 207.

138. Hahner, *The Paulista Rise*, p. 162.

139. Kalwa, *Der brasilianische Tenentismo*, p. 62.

140. Guerra and Prieto, *Crônicas*, p. 204; see Ermolajewa, *Ocerki*, p. 208.

141. See Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, p. 56; Johnson, *Military and Society*, p. 192; Sodré, *Introdução à revolução*, p. 48-49.

142. Adalbert Dessau, ed., *Latinamerika im antiimperialistischen Kampf: Probleme eines Kontinents*, (Berlin, 1978), pp. 25-32.

143. Hell, *Die Sklavenemanzipation*, p. 528.