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ABOUT THE JOURNAL

The Brazilian Journal of African Studies is a biannual publication, in digital and printed format, dedicated to the research, reflection and propagation of original scientific articles with emphasis on the analysis of International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations and Schools of Thought. RBEA is essentially academic, linked to the Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

The RBEA has as target audience researches, professors and students interested in the specificities of the African continent and its international insertion. Alongside such perspective, the Journal intends to expand the debate about the Brazilian projection world widely, the Brazilian cooperation efforts (including in the Defense field) with the African countries in the South Atlantic perimeter and the construction of a regional identity in face of a scenario of geopolitical transformations.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira

August/2017

Publishing its third number, BJAS enters its second year of existence, and is already consolidated. The acceptance in several indexes, the receiving of articles by reputed authors from Brazil and abroad and the growing demand of the public for its content are proof of that. In this edition, the topic of greater prominence is Security and Development in Africa.

The world order that came to be in the decades that followed the Second World War, as contradictory as it may sound, created some consensus. The more industrialized regions of the world were exhausted by the War and the less developed ones were beginning their decolonization and identity redefinition processes. Therefore, all needed more cooperation and less confrontation. The Cold War led to a systemic balance and, when it ended, new challenges. Among these, the main one is the rebuilding of the international system itself. And this rebuilding must rely on a coherent and well-crafted strategy.

In this scenario, the African states will need to establish their concepts of internal order, its regional and global role. And they will not be able to do so individually. Conflicts of a new kind disorganize some states, while others increase their levels of dependence on foreign elements. On the other hand, the destabilization processes affect the African middle powers and influence a possible reconfiguration of a new world power balance.

The third number of the BJAS seeks, thus, to evaluate, the new challenges the continent faces. Yoslán Silverio González, in his work *Brexit, the EU and strategic uncertainties: short, medium and long term implications for Sub-Saharan Africa*, analyses the uncertainties created by the weakening of the European integration in the relations with Africa. Fátima Chimarizeni, in *Iran-Africa relations: Opportunities and prospects for Iran*, discusses how the African space became a strategic alternative for Iran in its quest for political and diplomatic support, besides its search for economic relations

in order to relieve the onus imposed by the sanctions.

In the article *The International Criminal Court (ICC), Impunity and the Rise of a Siege Mentality among Kenya's Kleptocracy*, Westen K Shilaho analyses how the entry by the International Criminal Court (ICC) into Kenya's post-electoral disputes of 2007/2008 affected the penalties among Kenya's politicians and influenced the results of the 2013 election. Shilaho argues that the accusation of prominent Kenyans by the ICC for atrocities committed during the post-electoral violence was the first attempt to break a vicious impunity cycle deeply entrenched in the country's political body.

Ekpotuatin Charles Ariye and Laz Etemike, in turn, using the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon over Bakassi as a case study, focus their study on the issue of the application of alternative means as complements to the judicial options, adjudications and arbitration in the resolution of disputes/conflicts in the article titled *Contextualizing the use of the diplomatic alternative in conflict resolution in the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over Bakassi 1994-2006*. Also related to security matters that involve Nigeria, Osakue Stevenson Omoera, Adesina Lukuman Azeez and Roselyn Vona Doghudje analyze *The Mass Media's Bearing on the Resolution of Post-Independence Security Issues in Nigeria*. According to the authors, the mass media have been suggested to have the capacity to contribute meaningfully towards assisting security institutions in eliminating or checking the security challenges faced by the country.

Lang Michael Kpughe critically discusses the treatment of the German missions in Cameroon, both in British and French areas, during the Mandate and Trusteeship periods, focusing especially in the opposing attitudes of both administering powers towards the missions in their spheres of influence in the article *The plight of German missions in Mandate Cameroon: an historical analysis*. Walter Gam Nkwi, in turn, in *Migration and Identity in Southwest Region of Cameroon: the Graffie Factor, c.1930s-1996*, analyses the dynamics of internal migration, taking the case of Bamenda Grassfielders migrants in coastal Cameroon and stresses on how such migrations gave rise to the identity puzzle between those who were branded as the graffie and their host.

In the article *Nelson Mandela's Prestige Diplomacy in South Africa (1994-1999)*, Pedro Vinícius Pereira Brites and Yuri Debrai Padilha analyze the foreign policy of the Nelson Mandela administration following a new international structure in the post-Cold War, mapping the actors involved in this environment and the indicators and variables that conditioned the foreign policy of the country. Anselmo Otavio analyses the importance of the South Atlantic in the post-apartheid South-African foreign policy, arguing that the increased interest in the South Atlantic is, in truth, result of the

appreciation of the South-South relations by South Africa in the article *From Mandela to Zuma: the importance of the Southern Atlantic region for South Africa's foreign policy*. Finally, Ana Luiza de Oliveira e Silva, in “*The only reality in Black Africa back then*”: Boubou Hama and the integration between technique and spirituality, discusses the case of the intellectual Boubou Hama, in Niger of the 1900s, who worked for the preservation and promotion of a cultural framework. According to the author, under the impacts of colonization, Hama wished Africa to know its own values and conceptions of the world.

This number also includes two book reviews. The book *Reimagining Pan-Africanism: distinguished Mwalimu Nyerere lecture series 2009-2013*, by Wole Soyinka and Samir Amin, is presented by Ermelinda Liberato, while the work *Geometrias da Memória: configurações pós-coloniais*, by António Sousa Ribeiro and Margarida Calafate Ribeiro, is presented by Fernanda Salomão Vilar.

BJAS publishes an electronic bilingual version (Portuguese and English) and an English printed version. Thus, we hope to receive the contribution of colleagues from Brazil and abroad, with whom we intend to establish bonds to the advancement of the knowledge and the building of a Southern vision about the African continent and the relations with it.

We thank the Edition Assistants Rafaela Serpa and Salvatore Xerri and the team of CEBRAFRICA, that worked on the translation of the articles. We also thank Guilherme Thudium, Felipe Giordani, Cecília Maieron and Bruno Ronchi for the collaboration in the translation and revision of the English texts.

BREXIT, THE EU AND STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTIES: SHORT, MEDIUM AND LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Yoslán Silverio González¹

The European Union (EU) has been a fundamental actor in the economic and political relations with the African countries. EU's foreign policy towards Africa has been particularly affected by French and British colonial past. The history of the economic relations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the African continent has been shaped by a series of multilateral agreements – the Yaoundé Conventions, adopted under French influence, and the Lomé Conventions, starting on 1975 –, and, with the entry of the UK in the EEC (1973), the community had to renegotiate the ancient commercial agreements to incorporate the former British territories as “beneficiaries” of these agreements.

On 2000, a new agreement was signed, the Cotonou Agreement, which should be seen as a step forward towards the adoption of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), negotiations that should have been concluded in 2007. This kind of fourth generation or free trade agreement generated distress among African countries, because of the impact of these regulations to national economies. By the time of signing the agreements, the Europeans did not have what they initially wanted; they just had isolated agreements with a handful of African countries. It required seven more years of EU pressure to widen the existing agreements to the level of sub regional blocs and other African entities – some of them created just for that goal, violating their own sub regional economic organizations.

From the standpoint of political relations, from 2000 onwards the EU has established the summit EU-AU, which, not by accident, coincided with the same periods that the Europeans aimed to renegotiate these free

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trade agreements: 2000, 2007, 2010 and 2014. Nevertheless, France and the UK maintained their own maneuvering tools of foreign policy: the francophone zone and the *Commonwealth*, respectively. Both foreign policy tools had guaranteed the strengthening of the ties between Paris and London with their own post-colonial influence areas aside of the consensual foreign policy guidelines in the EU.

The seemingly inevitable departure of the UK from the European integrationist bloc will strongly redefine the basis of this juridical-institutional boundary that established, regulated, managed and controlled not only the economic relations, but also the political ones between EU and Africa. According to Cuban experts such as Eduardo Perera Gómez, PhD and professor of Philosophy and History at the University of Havana, it is still possible that the UK does not leave the EU, since the referendum is non-binding, the British institutions could block the process of getting out, and leaving the bloc could generate immensurable negative consequences.² Notwithstanding, this work follows the premise that the concrete separation between London and Brussels will have a series of repercussions to the Sub-Saharan zone. This is precisely the central goal here: to pursue the possible scenarios to European and British policies post-Brexit. The paper addresses a series of variables – such as policy relations, trade and economic relations, security and defense, and bilateral relations – which will be used to indicate tangential scenarios – most probable and alternatives – that will shape the new political, economic and military relations between these actors and Africa.

The British referendum of June 23, 2016, yielded a favorable balance for *Brexit* in face of the European integration system. The voting took place in a context of acute international economic crisis, as a result of the falling oil and commodity prices, the migrant crisis and a multitude of conflicts in its immediate geographical space.

Therefore, there are a number of uncertainties about the regional and international consequences for the economic and political levels and for the integration mechanism that may emerge after the materialization of the UK's departure from EU. Although Africa is not the center of the debate over how the new alliances between the EU and the UK will be articulated, it is vital for Africans to know how these relations will be (re)defined in order to clarify how they will fit into this new international context.

² PhD. Eduardo Pereira's presentation on "Implicaciones internacionales y regionales del Brexit" seminary realized at CIPI on July 12th, 2016.

Political Definitions

Without a doubt, significant political changes and redefinitions are to be expected. There should be, for example, a reformulation of the EU's relations with the AU now without the weight of the British presence. In the same sense, there will be a re-launch of the UK's foreign policy towards the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with the strengthening of the *Commonwealth* because the UK will no longer be part of the bilateral political dialogue already established between Europeans and Africans.

- The possible scenarios for the relations with the continent in the political dimension could be:
- Political relations between the EU and the AU may suffer a series of impasses, with a tendency to retreat since foreign policy priorities will not be focused on the African continent. This is evidenced in the lack of systematicity in the accomplishment of the summits of Head of State and Government.
- France is, however, in an advantageous position to push its own foreign policy and security agendas towards the African continent because of the consolidation of its role within the EU.
- London's policy towards Africa is no longer a priority due to the essential recomposition of its external relations with its strategic partners; this will also be marked by a relative loss of its political influence in the international system.
- The UK as part of the EU could have an impact on shaping policies towards Francophone countries and/or sub regions, for example, through Official Development Assistance (ODA) or civilian and military missions. The departure, however, will make it difficult to extend their political and economic influence to these areas.
- The EU could change its policy of sanctions against Zimbabwe, taking into account the British absence and the different positions that exist within the organization related to this country. The UK is isolated in its positions against the government of Robert Mugabe.

A total of 18 African nations are part of the *Commonwealth*, a mechanism that offers a number of economic and political advantages to its member countries. In the context of the referendum, resident citizens in the UK from the Commonwealth countries were able to participate in the voting process. This is an example of the strong presence of the African Diaspora in that country. According to Alex Vines, head of the African

Program at *Chatham House* in London, the new British government will seek to reformulate and strengthen this particular mechanism.³

According to the IMF, this device will contribute to the world economy more than the EU itself⁴ until around 2019. This is an interesting statement, but it raises more doubts than answers, since the Commonwealth's former economic space is not exclusive to the British anymore. Many of its countries – both Caribbean and African – are also linked through trade agreements to EU.

- The Commonwealth is revived and becomes the main instrument of political dialogue with its sphere of influence in the SSA, but it is still not a viable alternative to the EU.
- In medium term, the UK cannot articulate a multilateral mechanism with the AU at the level of Heads of State and Government Summits like there are with other international actors.
- Its political influence in Africa decreases considerably in favor of France.

Undoubtedly, the departure of the UK from the EU will revitalize France's position in the African continent, since it will not only have its traditional control mechanisms in the Francophone zone, but it will also have the institutional "support" that EU can offer. The UK, on the other hand, will have to redesign its foreign policy instruments to avoid losing even more influence in the African continent.

In terms of political-diplomatic relations, France continues to consolidate the bilateral mechanism of the France-Africa Summits to increase its areas of influence in the continent beyond the Francophone zones. In the same way, it maintains its presence in the solution of eventual political conflicts, mainly where its interests are in danger.

Behavior of economic variables

The impacts on the world economy will translate into greater volatility in the financial markets, in a decline in economic activity and it will affect trade relations. This scenario adds new uncertainties to the development of the world economy already in crisis.

³ *Africa faces up to Brexit vote*. Available in: <http://www.dw.com/en/africa-faces-up-to-brexit-vote/a00>

⁴ *BREXIT aftermath: How it affects Nigeria*. 26 de junio de 2016. Available in: <http://sunnewsonline.com/brexit-aftermath-how-it-affects-nigeria/>

One of the variables of greater uncertainty relates to energy supplies. How would the Brexit and the decline of British demand, followed by the decline of Europe demand in general, affect world hydrocarbons market prices? Will there be a redefinition of market share in the import of oil to the EU? Will it increase the effects on energy supply? When the referendum results were published, the price of oil barrel fell by 6%.

The major British oil companies – Shell (also Dutch-owned) and British Petroleum (BP) – have been hit hard by the falling of oil prices. Shell, in particular, has reduced its production in Nigeria also because of the attacks by armed groups in the Delta region. Therefore, as the oil market is influenced by financial speculation, this situation contributes to the prolonging of the non-recovery of oil prices and, consequently, to the maintenance of the economic crisis.

The main African economies, and hence the continent as a whole, have already been suffering the consequences of the global economic crisis since the collapse of hydrocarbons and commodity prices. These impacts have been evidenced by a decrease in state budgets, the devaluation of national currencies, external indebtedness and the decline in exports. The *Brexit* variable undoubtedly incorporates new elements to the general deepening of the crisis.

The analysis can be based on two levels: the impact of *Brexit* in the world economy and the consequences of the increase of British internal economic crisis. This second variable is significant, especially for several African countries, due to the strong ties between them and the 5th world economy. The economic repercussions, however, will not be the same for all African countries. The most affected will be those with a greater dependence on the British market.

There have also been impacts in the financial sector. The devaluation of the pound sterling has forced the adoption of some measures by the African central banks. This is the case of the Central Bank of Mauritania, that saw itself in a position to have to increase its reserves in gold and US dollars to reduce its exposure towards the British Pound. While in other cases, there has been a devaluation of national currencies in relation to the pound and to the euro.

Economic-commercial relations

The EU was in an advanced process of negotiation of the **Economic Partnership Agreements** (EPAs) with African regional groups. These trade treaties raise a full liberalization of trade in goods, services and investment.

Currently, this customs process should be carried in a gradual and controlled manner, in a process that is expected to end by 2022. In July 2014, the 16 states of West Africa signed the EPA of which the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) are part. Also in July 2014, negotiations were successfully concluded with the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and in October 2014, the Eastern African Community (EAC) concluded negotiations with the EU. The agreement with SADC was signed on June 10 2016, while the EAC agreement has yet to be ratified by the European Council.

On its turn, the agreement with the Central African Economic Community (CEMAC) raises 80% of liberalization of EU export to this sub region and the suppression of customs duties on agricultural products over a period of 15 years. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has not signed the EPA, only Cameroon signed a bilateral and provisional agreement in 2009. Ali Bongo, President of the Republic of Congo, was appointed in May 2015 to negotiate the terms of the agreement between the EU and the rest of the countries of the Sub region, which should be enforced on August 4, 2016. It should be noted that the Council of the EU had promised €6.5 billion in the period between 2015 and 2020 for development projects in the EPA Development Program (EPADP) guidelines. This would be a summary update of this complex process of free trade agreements negotiations pushed by the EU towards Africa, some still being ratified by the European Council.

At the level of economic and trade relations, the regulatory framework of the EPAs is one of the most controversial issues in the new European context after Brexit, which raises questions about its legal framework. Within the EU, the UK is the main trading partner of several African countries and this trend should not disappear. Immediately, there will be no change in economic-trade relations because there is still a margin of at least two years to define how relations between the EU and Great Britain will be reestablished. Therefore, the same trade regulations continue to operate.

Now, what will be the regulatory framework that will define the UK's specific economic relations with the ACP countries, in particular the African ones, when the UK's departure from the EU becomes official? Undoubtedly, the EU will continue to lead the process of EPA's negotiation and implementation with each one of the African sub regions, putting the British in a disadvantageous position in the African market. The EU should not renegotiate new EPA's agreements due to the complexity and the delay of the process, which has been signed with the EU and the sub regional

blocs (with African reluctance), since these agreements have not been materialized yet. It is therefore unlikely that the EU will renegotiate such free trade agreements to avoid prejudice for the UK.

This will also vary according to the model of the UK's future relationship with the EU. One of the variants handled is linked to the *European Free Trade Area* (EFTA), which includes European non-EU member states and thus maintain the same prerogatives. In this way, London would maintain access to the European market. Once advanced in this sense, the economic ties between Africa, the EU and the UK will be reconstituted. Unquestionably, however, the economic value of Africa within the EU will notably decrease.

Several outputs can be noted regarding the economic-trade relations:

- According to the Institute for Economic Affairs, the UK maintains its obligations under the free trade agreements it has signed as an EU member state, even after Brexit.
- Long-term renegotiation of EPAs will occur.
- UK is excluded from EPAs.
- Several African countries that have not ratified EPAs bilaterally won't sign it. In a general sense, these free trade agreements are being questioned.
- There is a decline in British economic presence in Africa as a result of the internal crisis. The impossibility of increasing their levels of investment and imports is used by other international players with a strong presence in the continent to expand their areas of influence.⁵
- This does not mean that the UK will not be a major player in economic and trade matters for those African countries where its presence has been historic.
- The EU strengthens its economic-trade relations with African countries, especially in the French market, where it is consolidate as the main destination of African exports.

Although the framework of “new” economic-trade relations between the UK and African countries will continue to be based on free trade, the deepening antagonism with the EU and the competition for market shares would give some advantages to African economies because

⁵ There is a wide variety of extracontinental actors with interests in African continent: traditional ones such as the United States, China and Japan - the situation in France will be broadened - as well as new actors or “emerging” ones such as India, Brazil, Turkey, Israel and Russia.

they can choose between the “best” buyers. One sector that may benefit from these antagonisms may be the agriculture sector, because the EU advocated subsidy policies for its agricultural producers in prejudice to African producers, while the UK was opposed to it⁶. Another contradictory element may be reflected in the tariff policies adopted by the British government, especially if they are more “beneficial” than the current customs policy established by the EU.

One could experience the repetition of a similar scenario to that of the 1960s, when Britain’s entry into the EEC had been blocked due to the country’s economic decline and the decline in trade between Great Britain and the Commonwealth, in favor of economic and trade ties with the successful CEE⁷. This historical background would reaffirm the tendency that the departure of the UK from the EU will mean the decline of its economic-trade relations with the African countries in favor of – more institutionalized – relations with its neighboring European countries.

Foreign investment

In recent years, there has been a downward trend that shows that Africa has not attracted large flows of foreign direct investment, especially since the outbreak of the 2008 crisis. In this new context, a rebound is not to be expected. This trend of European investment is the opposite to that shown by the Chinese capital:

- African countries will have less access to foreign capital from Europe and especially from the UK. This will have effects on infrastructural development programs driven by European capital.
- The devaluation of the pound sterling has meant a reduction in the foreign direct investment value and also reduced the amount of international reserves of some African countries.

Migration

The migration issue has been a key aspect of the EU-AU relationship, especially in the current context of the refugee crisis that is taking place

6 The British were opposed to EU agricultural subsidy policies (Common Agricultural Policy, CAP) because they were not an agricultural country and therefore they did not have to pay for these costs.

7 Fernando Montoya Cerio. *El Brexit, ficción o realidad: impacto sobre la PCSD de la UE*. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 64bis/2016, July 24th 2016. p. 3. Available in: http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2016/DIEEEO64bis-2016_Brexit_MontoyaCerio.pdf

around the European borders, and for which the current solution – besides the military one in the Mediterranean Sea – has been the relocation of illegal migrants between EU members according to different quotas. This means that once the departure of the UK is approved, it will generate difficulties to “resettle” the illegal immigrants who arrive at their borders using an EU member (mainly from France) as a way of arrival. This situation creates a legal problem regarding how this procedure is to be carried out, since they will have to be returned to their countries of origin or to a third country outside the EU.

- The EU countries continue to be affected by the refugee crisis around their borders, and the expulsion of migrants in irregular conditions is now a consolidate measure that is being undertaken.
- Britain’s anti-immigrant stances are in the context of a much stricter new immigration policy against illegal immigration of sub-Saharan nationals across Europe.

The remittances are one of the sources of income for African countries as a result of the Diaspora that is essentially embedded in EU labor markets. The fall in the value of the pound sterling, which reached its lowest point since 1985 in comparison to the dollar, has been an immediate consequence of the failure of the “*remain*”. This situation, more than the implications in international financial markets, in the most direct way has meant the reduction of purchasing power and therefore of the reduction of remittances from the UK in terms of absolute value.

- The trend towards the reduction of remittances from the European countries and the UK is maintained due to the economic crisis and the devaluation of both the pound sterling and the euro.


Official Development Aid

The UK is one of the main contributors to the EU general budget in this section, contributing 14.68% to the European Development Fund (EDF). The loss of this financing will mean a redistribution of the quota taken by each country, increasing the weight over Germany and France, countries that together with Italy, contribute 20.58%, 17.81% and 12.53%, respectively.

Now, given the context of economic crisis presented by several countries in the bloc, the most likely will be a significant reduction of the entire EU budget. This contraction will in turn result in a further cut in

the EDF, much of which is used to drive development programs in African countries, that have been traditionally limited and with a high political conditionality: respect for human rights, multiparty and free elections, human rights, among other issues that have always been political tools of pressure and internal interference⁸.

Graphic 1: EDF contribuion by countries



- EU funding is reduced, and hence the amounts destined to EDF, which will lead to greater political conditionalities for accessing them.
- The new conservative government in London makes further cuts to Africa's Official Development Assistance (ODA).
- This will mean greater funding problems for AU and its organizations and agencies, which depend on external financing.
- Much of the socioeconomic programs and donations to African institutions and agencies – AU and RECs – will be paralyzed or eliminated.

Influence on economic and political integration processes in SSA

⁸ *Le Brexit: Quelles conséquences pour l'Afrique?* Available in: <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2016/06/23-le-brexit-consequences-pour-lafrrique-sy-sow>

Although the African sub regional economic and political organizations for integration emerged inspired in part on the European integration process, Brexit will not mean a challenge to the integration in Africa. Pan-Africanism is strongly supported by the African Union and this strengthening integration is indicated in its long-term strategy called *Agenda 2063*.

- Brexit has given rise to a new secessionist feeling in several parts of SSA, but that does not transcend the level of political declarations.
- The AU, to further promote the integrationist cause in the African continent uses the EU's "institutional fragmentation" process as a strengthening mechanism.
- It is absolutely unlikely that any African country plan its "separation" from the African Union.

The economic position of France in SSA post-Brexit may present as follows:

- In the economic sphere and above all due to the effective implementation of the EPAs, France increases its trade with the countries of its traditional influence zone.
- Bilaterally, Paris increases its foreign investments in the subcontinent due to the greater guarantees for its companies within the framework of the EPAs. While the amount of ODA directed through the European Development Fund decreases.
- France has guaranteed the African markets and, in this sense, the dependence of those countries on the EU market, specifically the French one. This is especially true for Francophone countries.
- The CFA franc remains a financial instrument by France to control the monetary policies and economies of the countries within its area of influence in West and Central Africa.
- The French transnational companies continue to be present in wide sectors of the African economy controlling banking, finance, transport and telecommunications, mainly in francophone countries.

Security and defense dimension

One of the most controversial aspects within the EU has been the adoption of a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) that responds to the interests of its 28 member states. This mechanism has had cohesion problems due to the different interests in foreign security and defense policies between Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain – the rest of the member states lack a proactive foreign policy towards Africa. The implementation of the “*leave*” may benefit a better coordination in terms of security and defense between France and Germany, but at the same time the reduction of the general budget or the reluctance to a greater contribution of the other states, will affect military and civilian missions that the EU already has on African soil.

The Britain military presence in Africa and in military/civilian EU missions

While the UK did not retain a large and strong military presence in Africa – as the French did –, its armed forces have been present in several conflict scenarios in Africa either by providing troops or logistical support, bilaterally or multilaterally.

In a historical perspective, the British spearheaded military intervention for the “warfare” against piracy in the Aden Gulf since 2008. At the same time, supported the EU missions to: the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003, 2006), Chad (2008, 2009), and to Central African Republic (2014, 2015). In addition, the Britain secret service has been operating in alliance with the CIA, for example in the warfare against terrorism. The last example was in Nigeria following the massive kidnappings of Boko Haram. They have also been active in EU civilian operations.

In comparison with France, the Britain military presence is limited, although they have deployed bilaterally several military units in Sierra Leone and in Kenya, as well as a small group of military personnel in South Africa for advising on peace maintenance operations. The British Army is active through the *British Peace Support Team* (BPST) and the *British Army Training Unit Kenya* (BATUK), both in Kenya, and the *International Military Assistance Training Team* (IMATT), in Sierra Leone. The missions in Kenya are focused on military assistance to the armed forces, logistical support, clearing of minefields and training of Kenyan military personnel through joint military exercises. In the case of Sierra Leone, its actions focus on the development of the national armed forces⁹.

The following table shows the approximate number of troops deployed by the EU in only 10 missions in Africa (according to data from the EU General Staff) and how much of these personnel are British. Fernando

⁹ British Army. *The British Army in Africa*. Available in: <http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22724.aspx>

Montoya Cerio, of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, argues that the effects of the British withdrawal will not be very strong because of the insignificance of their numbers, but in fact it is not only the troops but also the logistics and the financing issues in these missions that matter.

Table 1. Great Britain's contribution to EU missions in Africa¹⁰

	Mission	Period	Military/ Civil	Effective	UK Con- tribution
1	EUNAFVOR ATALANTA	Somalia since 2008	M	545	64
2	EUTM SOMALIA	2010	M	185	4
3	EUCAP NESTOR (Africa Horn)	Djibouti, Somalia, Seychelles and Tanzania since 2012	C	43	7
4	EUSEC RDC	Since 2005	C	10	1
5	EUCAP SAHEL NIGER	2012	C	50	1
6	EUTM MALI	2013	M	561	30
7	EUCAM RCA	Central African Republic 2015	M	70+5	0
8	EUCAP SAHEL MALI	2014	C	73	2
9	EUBAM LIBIA	2013	C	2	0
10	EUNAFVOR MEd-op SOPHIA	Mediterranean 2015	M	1341	80
Total	10			2885	189

Another element to be taken into account will be security and defense expenditure. Although these are not part of the EU's general budget, it is agreed that the most contributors with budget are almost the same as the main quotas in this sector. In this sense, the highest percentages in defense items are only five of the EU 28 states, representing more than 70% of this budget: Germany (21.5%), UK (17.6%), France (15.4%), Italy (11.2%) and Spain (7.7%).

Fernando Montoya Cerio states that the cost of leaving the UK, considering 17.6% of the defense budget "would be a minimal amount,"

¹⁰ Self elaboration with data offer by Fernando Montoya Cerio. Ob. cit., p. 12 and 13.

"which would easily assume that the rest of the EU countries could safely take over the British amount. Only the UK represents the budget of almost 15 EU countries. When we make an analysis of how much each of the countries contribute, we would have that the total of the first group only represents 1.8%, while the whole second group represents 18.8% therefore in any case, these countries would be forced to almost double their contribution, which is not likely.

At the first EU summit following the outcome of Brexit, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, began to call on European governments to advance in defense cooperation and to contribute more to guarantee collective security in the new global strategy for the EU's foreign and security policy.

In accordance to its diplomatic statements in the last years, Great Britain had blocked a greater cooperation in defense rejecting any idea of creating a European Army, joint military capacities, or the creation of an EU barracks, trying to avoid the duplication with NATO¹². These initiatives can move forward in a new framework of security policy.

Table 2. Contribution of member states to security expenditure¹³

Countries with less than 0,5%	Subtotal	% total
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Croatia, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Slovakia	10	1.8
Countries with less than 3%	Subtotal	% total
Austria, Greece, Belgium, Portugal, Czech Republic, Romania, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Poland, Hungary	11	18,8%
Countries with 4%	Subtotal	% total
Netherlands	1	4%
Total	22	20.64%

According to researcher Daniel Keohane of the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zürich, the departure of the UK would make European cooperation in security much more difficult to reach since it can only work

¹¹ Fernando Montoya Cerio. Ob. cit., p. 17

¹² Mogherini pide a los países de la UE más cooperación en defensa en una nueva estrategia global de seguridad. BRUSELAS, EUROPA PRESS, June 28th, 2016. Available in: <https://es.noticias.yahoo.com/mogherini-pide-pa%C3%91n-defensa-estrategia-global-151502808.html>

¹³ Denmark does not contribute with defense expenses. Table: Self elaboration with data offered by Fernando Montoya Cerio. Ob. cit., p. 16 y 17.

based on an agreement between Berlin, London and Paris¹⁴. However, this level of coordination did not always exist and, with the absence of London, the rest of the actors could agree much faster. The researcher calls attention to the role of the UK through the EU's "most successful military mission"¹⁵: the anti-piracy operation in Somalia. It highlights this example to indicate that perhaps the Britain withdrawal will introduce elements of inefficiency in EU missions.

Possible scenarios for the EU, the UK and France in security and defense are:

- With the *Britain exit*, there is a cessation of both military and civilian presence of the UK in the EU missions on Africa. In accordance with a professor of international relations at the University of Nottingham, it will mean a loss of international status for UK and would be "devastating" for its diplomacy¹⁶.
- The British withdrawal does not necessarily mean the cessation of its military and security relations with the EU, nor the withdrawal of its troops from African soil. Because in fact, there is a background policy dating back to the 1990s called the *P3 Initiative*, which suggest a principle of "shared responsibilities" between the US, France and the UK in common "threats", which currently are terrorism and migration. In fact, both Berlin, Paris and London have agreed to increase military budgets to face these issues in Africa and the Middle East.
- France succeeds in achieving greater participation of the EU in peacekeeping missions in Africa, in terms of financial, logistical and personnel, specifically by some countries of the bloc, such as Germany and Spain. There are strong contradictions between member states about the increase of the contribution to the defense budget.
- There is a significant reduction in defense budgets, which will have repercussions on further military deployment of EU missions in Africa and will mean further financial cuts to AU missions¹⁷.

¹⁴ Daniel Keohane. *European Defense and Brexit: A Tale of Three Cities*. March 1st, 2016. Available in: <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=62922>

¹⁵Idem.

¹⁶ Catherine Gegout. *Brexit would be death knell for British influence in the world*. May 18th, 2016. Disponible en: <http://theconversation.com/brexit-would-be-death-knell-for-british-influence-in-the-world-58890>

¹⁷ In the beginning of 2016, the EU announced the reduction of 20% of the budget allocated to AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

- Nonetheless, the EU continues with its peacekeeping missions and civil missions in the prevention and resolution of conflict in the area, although with a serious funding restriction. It continues to limit the European approach of linking security to development, which means that security must be improved as a condition for improving the economic situation and reducing poverty.
- The EU continues to be affected by the migration crisis from Sub-Saharan Africa. It maintains the issues of migration, terrorism and other transnational crime as threats to its security. The criminalization of illegal migration and an EU's military response to narrow these flows are maintained. In this regard, Paris, Rome and Madrid are promoting a stronger agenda within the EU to curb illegal Sub-Saharan migratory flows.
- The struggle against terrorism throughout the Sahel area and the struggle against "piracy" on the shores of the Gulf of Aden continue to be prioritized as the EU's policy towards the SSA region. Around these two axes, relations between the EU and the UK are articulated.
- The EU is engaged in a reformulation of its CSDP that enables to continue to "attend" its security "priorities" in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa. The absence of the English makes it possible to move towards a greater consensus on the CSDP.
- The financial resources that London destine to EU could be used to develop a more aggressive military policy in Africa on a bilateral basis, following its own geostrategic and security interests.
- The level of coordination between France and the UK in terms of security and defense policy towards Africa will decline considerably¹⁸, although some cooperation will be maintained.
- Paris retains its traditional military presence in the bases deployed in Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Cameroon, Chad and Djibouti. As a result of its anti-terrorism speech, France maintains its military operations in the area, such as the Operation Barkhane in the Sahel, with greater troop employment with the aim of carrying out cross-borders actions between Mauritania and Chad, at the same time as they ratify

¹⁸ Richard G. Whitman. Brexit or Bremain: what future for the UK's European diplomatic strategy? p. 527-528. Available in: <http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/International-Affairs-Brexit-or-Bremain.pdf>

defense agreements with these countries and increase their role in training African soldiers.

- The UK can push for a stronger military agenda regarding Africa – signing new military collaboration agreements, engaging African troop training and increasing intelligence activities – with the aim of rescuing influence areas¹⁹.
- The military presence of both Spain and Germany in EU missions in Africa will increase significantly.

UK as a contributor to UN missions

UK is among the first five contributors to UN peacekeeping missions, accounting for 6.68%²⁰. This country still retains its seat on the Security Council, with the right to the veto and also is an important member of NATO. Regarding its performance as part of the UN missions, it emphasizes its participation in Somalia – 70 personnel of the *Force Troop Command, 1st Division and Field Army* – with the goal of overthrowing the Somali terrorist group Al Shabaab, and they also have other personnel in charge of Medical, logistics and engineering services. In addition, some 300 troops were deployed in the conflict in South Sudan²¹.

- Although the British military presence in Africa is insignificant compared to the US and French troops, its exit from the EU and also the withdrawal of its troops – civilian and military – from the EU missions will not mean its exit at all of the continent. UK will remain as part of the UN missions, through NATO in correlation with the US or by bilateral defense agreements such as Kenya's.

Bilateral relations

Economic relations between the UK and SSA are not symmetrical;

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 528

²⁰ The first place is for United States (28.38%), then there is Japan (10.83%), France (7.22%) and Germany (7.14%). After the Great Britain, in the sixth place, there is China (6.64%), then Italy (4.45%), Russia (3.15%), Canada (2.98%) and the last one is Spain (2.97%). See: *Financing Peacekeeping*. Available in: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml>

²¹ *British Army team in Somalia on UN peacekeeping duties*. May 2nd, 2016. Available in: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-36183932> y Ben Riley-Smith.

David Cameron: UK troops to go to Africa to help counter extremists. New York, September 27th, 2015. Available in: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/11895048/David-Cameron-UK-troops-to-go-to-Africa-to-help-counter-extremists.html>

they depend on the sub region, sector and country. The countries that depend the most on the UK market are Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa – the last one is the EU's main trading partner in the African continent. However, even interdependent economies may be affected by a UK economic recession. Zimbabwe is one example of this difficult economic situation, since it depends both on South Africa and on the UK, making it doubly affected.

Ghana

Economic relations between the UK and Ghana are particularly strong. Ghana has the month of October 2016 as the deadline for the signature of EPA's agreement. In the Brexit context, it is assumed that this country can renegotiate a more beneficial agreement with the EU and a bilateral agreement with London²² more functional to its interests.

Ghana's Foreign Minister, Hannah Tetteh said that the main effects of Brexit would be on trade, but it will not be instantaneous because the legal process of the UK exit from EU has not yet been concluded. In addition, Ghana will begin the negotiations with the UK to establish a bilateral trade agreement.²³

Nigeria

Nigeria is the main producer and exporter of oil in the SSA. Nigerian economy has been deeply affected by the fall of oil prices and by the reduction of its production – from more than 2 million bpd to 1.4 million bpd – due to the actions of several armed groups in the Niger's Delta. This combination of factors has also produced the devaluation of the national currency – the Naira – and the reduction of state budgets. Aggravating the whole situation there is the atmosphere of uncertainty around the Brexit and its impacts on Nigerian economy.

The economic ties between Nigeria and the UK are very strong. The trade volume between the two countries was 8.52 trillion dollars in 2015 and during the same year, British investments were 1.4 billion dollars. Nigeria is the second commercial partner of the UK in Africa after South Africa, probably because of its historical colonial past. This country is also part of

22 *After Brexit EU Ambassador aims to allay Ghanaian fears*. June 28th 2016. Available in: <http://pulse.com.gh/business/after-brexit-eu-ambassador-aims-to-allay-ghanaian-fears-id5202211.html>

23 Ismail Akwei. *Buhari shocked by Cameron's resignation as Africa assesses Brexit impact*. July 24th, 2016. Available in: <http://www.africanews.com/2016/06/24/buhari-shocked-by-cameron-s-resignation-as-africa-assesses-brexit-impact/>

the *British Commonwealth*.

Forecasts indicate a significant impact of about \$ 25 billion on investment and trade by 2020.²⁴ This will also be conditioned by a renegotiation of trade agreements.

According to Professor Bola Akinterinwa, General Director of Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), the main impact will be on economy, while the British exit will endanger the EPA signed with the EU. He also argued that a weakening of the European economy, in a general sense, will affect the EU aid because London is one of the main supporters of these programs in Africa²⁵.

Related to trade flow, foreign direct investment and migration, the trends would be:

- The decline of trade.
- The reduction of British GDP will mean a contraction of its investments in development projects in Nigeria.
- Visa restrictions are expected in Nigeria within the framework of more restrictive migration policies²⁶.

The symbolism of the British referendum – an “example” of Western democracy that is not applicable to other regions – is an inspiration for political-armed movements seeking to “separate” from central authority. There have already been statements from the *Nigeria Delta Avengers* (NDA) group seeking the secession of the Niger Delta area from the Nigerian federal government. Of course the conditions are very different from the Brexit because, in this case, the separation of a region within a country is being considered; it is not the same as the separation from a political and economic bloc. The political repercussions are very different. In any case, the influence of Brexit and its multiple interpretations can benefit this type of local demand.

A clear allusion to the British referendum is the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), group in the Nigerian Southeast region that is mostly Igbo and with an “independence” feeling on Biafra region²⁷, they began a

24 Brexit may affect \$25bn UK investment target in Nigeria. EXX Africa Report. Available in: <https://www.today.ng/news/national/145432/brexit-affect-25b-investment-target-nigeria-report>

25 BREXIT aftermath: How it affects Nigeria. Jun 26th 2016. Available in: <http://sunnewsonline.com/brexit-aftermath-how-it-affects-nigeria/>

26 Jerrywright Ukwu. 7 potential impact of Brexit on Nigeria. Available in: <https://www.naij.com/870440-top-7-effects-of-uks-eu-exit-on-nigerian-visa-applicants-and-investment.html>

27 Between 1967 and 1970 there was the first civil war in Nigeria known as Biafra's War and that was the root of the unilateral declaration of Biafra's Independence. Despite of losing the

campaign with the slogan “Biafrefxit”. The Abuja government has radically refused to pay any attention to these political statements, but tensions in the area are scaling.

- Secessionist demands are increasing in the Biafra region. As a result of the government’s refusal, the political tensions become more acute between the separatist partisans and the central authorities. Added to this scenario are the military actions of other groups in Niger Delta.

On June 20th, the Nigerian Central Bank introduced a more “flexible” monetary policy, increasing the binding between the naira (NGN) and the dollar in the order of NGN 197 per dollar²⁸ (June 17th, 2016). The Nigerian government measure of “strengthening” the Naira against the dollar has been contrary to the IMF purpose of further devaluation. This policy has been curbing the domestic impact of the economic crisis, but an additional element has now been introduced: the conjunctural devaluation of the pound sterling.

Although the government has been able to handle the situation with an intervention in financial market, protecting the national currency, the volatility of the international financial sector (following the Brexit) does not make this situation sustainable in favor of the Nigerian naira. Therefore, before the British referendum the pound sterling was NGN 281.49 and then, after the results, it devalued to NGN 414.70. And so did the dollar, that devalued from NGN 197 to a rate between 281 and 283²⁹ (June-July 2016). This indicates the strong devaluation of the naira.

- The Nigerian state’s foreign currency reserves decreases, weakening its precarious financial situation even further.
- The government’s monetary policy of strengthening the naira does not guarantee greater levels of devaluation of the national currency.

South Africa

Trade relations between South Africa and EU have been strengthened as a result of the signing of a Strategic Partnership Agreement. Europeans signed the regional EPA within the framework of the SADC. With this in

war, this separatist feeling has not been eliminated.


28 The naira (NGN) is divided in 100 kobs. (1 € = 220 NGN, in september 2015). Since june 2015 some measures have been taken to defend the currency devaluation.

29 Central Bank of Nigeria. *Nigerian Naira Exchange Rate*. Available in: <http://www.cenbank.org/rates/ExchRateByCurrency.asp>.

mind, the access to the British market has been part of all agreements signed with South Africa – as well in the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement as in the Economic Partnership between the Southern African Customs Union members plus Mozambique. The EU institutional framework will not guarantee this access anymore.

During 2015, South Africa sent 24% of its manufacturing production to the UK, as well as 35% of its agricultural exports. The UK buys 10% of South Africa's wine exportation, as well as 10% of its citrus fruits and 21% of its grapes. The total volume of exportation was valued in 14.2 billion dollars. The tourism sector will also be affected, since 18% of the tourists who visits the country are British.

Graphic 2: South Africa's main exportation products to the EU³⁰



As an example, during 2015, 80% of the whiskey consumed in South Africa came from the UK, which indicates a high level of linkage between the two economies. A total of 45.6% of the foreign direct investments received by South Africa came from this same European country.

If the UK remains in the European Economic Area or EFTA, South Africa will be benefited by the existing agreements between them. It is not likely that London establishes new bilateral trade agreements³¹.

- A positive aspect for South Africa is the possible reduction of agricultural subsidies or the renegotiation of a free trade agreement with the UK³².

30 Asmita Parshotam, Cyril Prinsloo y Elizabeth Sidiropoulos. *Would a Brexit matter for South Africa?* Available in: <http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/does-a-brexit-matter-for-south-africa>

31 Dewald van Rensburg. *How Brexit may affect SA economy*. June 26th 2016. Available in: <http://city-press.news24.com/Business/how-brexit-may-affect-sa-economy-20160626>

32 *Five ways Brexit can impact South Africa*. News24Wire, June 29th, 2016. Available in:

According to *North West University*, in the worst scenarios of a 5% recession in the British economy and a 10% drop in its imports, South African economy would fall only 0.1%. Given the strong commercial ties between both countries, however, the real impact may not be as optimistic as anticipated.

The South African economy is the most industrialized in African continent, and it was already in recession before the Brexit was confirmed, therefore this situation will worsen the economic crisis in the country.

Financial system

The South African financial system has suffered immediately the consequences due to the continuous decline of the national currency – the rand – which fell 8%. By June 2016 the rand had lost 21% of its value compared to the dollar.

In any case, the rand has shown an oscillatory tendency. This indicates that, conjuncturally, its performance has been improved, but in other contexts it has been devalued, for instance it was R14.37 in relation to the dollar, and soon fell to R15.86, followed by a recovery to an exchange rate of 14.89. The pound sterling has depreciated 4% compared to the rand (1 GBP = 19.2714 ZAR, July 4th). In any case, the sterling's versatility creates levels of financial uncertainty.

This is explained by the strong financial ties between Johannesburg and London³³, through the large number of South African companies based in the *Londoner city*. According to a study by *UniCredit*, British banks claim that the accounts of South African entities own 178% of the country's foreign reserves. Therefore the effects that will be produced in South African companies located in London³⁴ should be very significant.

Kenya

Diplomatic relations between London and Nairobi were marked by a number of contradictions. The Western powers criticize the Kenyan government alleging political “repression” and the controversial judicial process against the country's president and the vice-president.

<http://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/128544/five-ways-brexit-can-impact-south-africa/>

33 *Brexit and its impact on Nigeria, Kenya South Africa*. Available in: <http://thenationonline.net/brexit-impact-nigeria-kenya-south-africa>

34 Lily Kuo y Yomi Kazeem. *Brexit will be terrible for Africa's largest economies*. Quartz Africa, June 24, 2016. Available in: <http://qz.com/715710/brexit-could-be-terrible-for-africas-largest-economies/>

Regarding economic-trade relations, it should be noted that Great Britain is the third largest export market for Kenya and it is an important ally in East African. The announcement of the UK exit from the EU did not have an immediate impact on the stability of the Kenyan market.

One of the main products of exportation to the British market is that of flowers. Horticulture is an important branch of Kenyan exports. A third part of EU's flower imports originate in this country bound for Holland and Great Britain.

The main concern has been to have delays in the implementation of the EPA with the EAC, and that it was extended, during the process of reinstitutionalization between the EU and Great Britain. The *Kenya Flowers Association* has expressed this concern because it could cause serious losses to Kenyan floral industry, estimated in nearly \$ 38 million per month³⁵.

There is a strong British presence in the country, both as residents and as tourists, and Kenya receives a significant amount of British investments in agriculture (mainly in the tobacco and coffee sectors) as well as in the oil and gas industry.

In the same way, the financial British sector in this sub region has an important center in this country. For these reasons, the financial turbulence generated in London after the announcement of the failure of the *Brexit* generated serious doubts in Nairobi, where the national currency – the shilling – was devalued³⁶. Patrick Njoroge, the president of the Central Bank of Kenya, declared that there would be effects and that they would not be in a position to maneuver a better situation³⁷. The devaluation of the currency causes an enhancement of the importations and therefore increases the price of the products to consume. If the economic crisis in Great Britain gets worse and the demand is reduced, this situation inside Kenya will continue.

Conclusion

To conclude, the current political framework in the EU following the confirmation of Britain's abandonment of the bloc necessarily introduces

35 *Brexit and its impact on Nigeria, Kenya South Africa*. Available in: <http://thenationonline.net/brexit-impact-nigeria-kenya-south-africa/>

36 Since 2011 shilling has been devalued. In this year, the exchange rate raises from 83 shillings a dollar to 100 shillings a dollar, and then in september 2015, it was 105 shillings a dollar.

37 Lily Kuo y Yomi Kazeem. *Brexit will be terrible for Africa's largest economies*. Quartz Africa, June 24, 2016. Disponible en: <http://qz.com/715710/brexit-could-be-terrible-for-africas-largest-economies/>

new scenarios with high levels of uncertainty. It goes through the questioning of the process of integration itself in Europe. It raises the possibility of new states calling the Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. It raises the questioning of the new economic and financial dynamics and their impact on the world economy. Finally, it points towards the legislative framework in which the relations between the EU and the Great Britain will be established.

The definition of all these aspects is essential for African countries, which are aside of this process, but their level of interdependence with Europe affects them directly. The redefinition of EU-Great Britain relations will necessarily imply a change in its foreign policy projection towards the SSA, mainly due to the return of the British-European antagonism in areas of influence. An eminent British withdrawal will be essentially exploited by France, which will strengthen its political and economic positions in SSA.

There are sharply contradictions – especially between UK and France – about the areas of coordination, such as in the military frame because of security and defense issues. In economic terms, the main dilemma will be centered on free trade agreements and how the British will be inserted into trade legislation already controlled by Europeans.

Despite the outcome of this current institutional crisis in the EU, Great Britain will remain permanent member of the UN Security Council, with veto power, a key contributor within NATO and an important ally of the United States. These premises will be decisive in any decision of the British foreign policy towards the SSA.

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ABSTRACT

The article analyses the effects the possible exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union could bring to the African continent. It considers political, economic and security elements comprehensively, through both multilateral and bilateral relations. It also explores how the influence of other European countries over Africa could shift because of the changes a British exit from the EU would bring to the continent's scenario. The article builds these analyses through the observation of different scenarios, some more optimistic than others.

KEYWORDS

Brexit; Multilateral relations; Bilateral relations; Politics; Economy; Security.

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IRAN-AFRICA RELATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR IRAN

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In a political world featured by many sorts of alliances, Iran has sought the gathering of power in order to defend itself from economic sanctions imposed upon it by United States of America along with other members of the United Nations such as United Kingdom, France, Russia and China. Its turn towards Africa was one of the way-out strategies taken by Ahmadinejad in order to overcome the negative economic impact originated from the sanctions. Nonetheless, the rise to power of a leadership seemingly more turned to solve the nuclear issue directly with the Western states places the Iran-Africa Relationship in a fragile condition considering Iran's foreign policy priorities.

The time-frame of this work encompasses the year 2006. By then, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had passed the Resolution 1696 on Iran aimed at pressuring Iran to stop its uranium enrichment program. Although that was not the first wave of sanctions the country faced, it stood as the first measure taken by the international group that has brought with it political, economic and social consequences for Iran. One of them is the partial economic isolation of Iran from the vast world market.

2015 was chosen because, on that year, the United Nations adopted Security Council Resolution 2231 setting out a schedule for the suspension and eventual lift of UN sanctions against that country. During the period under study, most western countries avoided economic, diplomatic and military relations with Iran bringing economic hardships to that country. In order to lessen those hardships, Iran turned to its traditional allies such as China and Russia. Apart from that, Iran turned its eyes to Africa where it looked for political and diplomatic support and economic relations in

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order to relieve the burden imposed by the sanctions as Western states were unanimous in their diplomatic pressure against Iran for, they regarded the Iranian nuclear issue as a direct threat against them.

The specific aim was to achieve a further understanding of the opportunities and prospects resulting from the Iranian foreign policy directed toward the African continent, specifically to the Western and Eastern regions of Africa. Iran has resorted to some African states in order to set itself away from the isolation it is compelled to face (Taylor 2010). By 2008 for instance, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed his willingness to strengthen Iranian relations with African states apart from those Iran had already relations with (Murithi 2013). Indeed, the Iranian foreign policy was driven towards promoting a feverish interaction between Iran and some African countries from 2005 onwards (Warner 2011).

In this work, I argue that, although the central actor of the Iranian political power is the Supreme Leader, the president is considered a key player as he is able to draw the domestic and international policies according to what he defines as priority, even though in a constrained domestic political environment. Although Iran keeps its relations with Africa, a sizeable change characterizes that relation. Nonetheless, the strategic relevance of the Iranian partnership with the African states is well known and preserved by Iran. Obviously, the major interest of the Rouhani administration was to free Iran from isolation.

Therefore, recently Iranian's foreign policy has been massively focused on resolving the nuclear issue compared to other issues. Nonetheless, it is up to president Rouhani to ensure or not a deep degree of Iranian engagement in Africa. That is, though the nuclear negotiations are as important as making partners, it is a Rouhani challenge to retain strong ties between Iran and African states while responding to the Western demands on the nuclear issue. Thus, Iran could get the opportunity to assure the African states partnership and it could rely on them in order to guarantee its influence and presence in the region.

The work has used the qualitative research design in which the triangulation method was applied. An analyst triangulation was used. It aimed at interpreting the different ways of seeing the data on Iran foreign policy toward Africa raised by different authors. Likewise, a data analysis of secondary sources of information such as e-journals, books and journal was applied. The main goal was to bring about a clear understanding of West and East Africa's relationship with Iran. Therefore, due to their particularity of holding both economic and military relations with Iran, states of those regions such as Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Eritrea were taken as object of analysis. Basically, an analysis of the Iranian foreign policy toward those

regions and the response of those African states were analysed.

Domestic Problems and External Solutions: Iran's resorting to Africa

As most of the countries in the International System, economic and social issues influence Iran's domestic and foreign politics (Karshenas & Hakimian 2008). Internally, the economic sanctions imposed on it have negatively impacted its economy (Zangeneh 2003)². Actually, its economy has been declining since mid of 1970s. The Iranian economy has relied mostly on the oil industry (Karshenas & Hakimian 2008). However, due to sanctions, the oil industry has crumbled. The fact that its economy relies on only one commodity turns the Iranian economic situation complicated as there is no diversification, in terms of its produced goods for exports. Likewise, there is little number of skilled workers. Therefore, its productivity level is low. As a result unemployment level is rampant and living standard is at the lowest level (Karshenas & Hakimian 2008).

Therefore, as a survival strategy to overcome its domestic problems, Iran strengthened its relations with states which held good political and economic relations, such as Russia, China and some African States. Taking it into consideration, the Western states have drawn a line which Iran has to cross in order for them to ease the sanctions and re-establish the normal economic and political relations with it. Iran at some points in time has been willing to do otherwise. Visibly it has seen itself, therefore, in need of resorting to other states in order to guarantee its survival, domestically and internationally. So, here come the African states.

African states such as Nigeria, Senegal, Eritrea, and Sudan have been basically facing common challenges related to the low level of their socio-economic development. Those states regard their poor condition as somehow a legacy of colonization (Nyikal 2005). Thus, they have seen Iran as a partner for solving together those problems as it has also undergone through external influence in the past and can retain resources that can

2 Since 2006, four waves of economic sanctions have been imposed on Iran. In December 2006, after Tehran's failure to comply incentives endorsed by the UNSC, the Council imposed sanctions on Iran's trade in sensitive nuclear materials and technology. In 2007, the previous sanctions were intensified through a package whereby specific officials were named as targets of the sanctions and additional sanctions were added against Iranian financial institutions. In March 2008, the Security Council passed Resolution 1803 to reaffirm and uphold previous sanctions. And, by April 2010, it appeared that Russia and China - Iran's traditional supporters on the Security Council reconsidered their tolerance of Iran's nuclear program as the USA, France, and Great Britain pushed for a resolution approving more sanctions (Global Policy Forum 2015).

be deployed in their countries³. Thus, the establishment of cooperation in the economic and military sectors through the materialization of political agreements have shaped those states' relations. Thus, the security cooperation between Iran and some of the African states, for instance, has manifested through military assistance (Murithi 2013). Then, throughout those developing states' cooperation the rhetoric against the West is used, by Iran, as catalyst to spur that relationship (Murithi 2013; Rubin 2013). Nonetheless, both sides need each other to assure the boost of their economic and military area.

Nonetheless, over the last couple of years, that commitment has visibly decreased under the rule of President Hassan Rouhani, regardless of his past public expression affirming his willingness to expand it (Chimbelu 2010). As such, given the essential role the African states hold as Iranian partners overseas as well as the substantial variation of the Iranian political standing towards those partners, resulting from different policies chosen by the current president, the question to what extent the president is influential on drawing out the Iranian foreign politics towards Africa should be considered.

Historical Perspective of Iran and Africa Relations

Deep historical ties characterize the relationship between Iran and Africa. Their relationship, essentially, goes back to the era of Empire. Back in ninth century Persia-African relations were mostly featured by trade between both people: Persian and African (Murithi 2013). By the 16th century, there were Persian migrants settlements in urban areas in East Africa as well as visits of Persian merchants therein (Murithi 2013). During the Pahlavi Shah Era, the relationship was featured by good economic relations between Iran and some African states, such as South Africa (Onderco 2012).

Hence, based on what have been some of the main driving factors in Iran's relationship with Africa, its anti-imperialism conception of foreign policy for instance, the Islamic state even supported some African independence movements. The 1974 Iranian oil revenue surplus was used to support that cause. Even South African movements benefited from it. Therefore, energy and common political standing have been some of the driving factors in Iran's relationship with Africa.

In the aftermaths of the Islamic Revolution (1979), the Iranian

³ Although Iran faces economic problems its level of development allows it to interact with other states and share the knowledge in different areas it has held. Then, Iran is not as developed as the Western states; however, it holds experience in technical and military sectors which are shared with other states it cooperates with.

foreign policy towards Africa was featured by continuity. In fact, there has been noticeable continuation regarding the preservation of good relationship between African states and Iran. The succeeding leaders in Iran did not undermine the alliance Iran established with African states. Then, Iran-Africa relations have been featured by the use of political means by the former to reach out the latter (Rubin 2013). The fact that both sides belonged to a non-alignment movement – holding the same conception of anti-imperialism and played the role of revolution bastion - stood as the main ideological factor that strengthened their relationship (Onderco 2012). As a result of this stand taken by Iran, it holds a position of observer member in the African Union (AU). Through this position, Iran secures the support of some of the member states of AU as it has the ability to interact with as many of them as possible (Kobi 2011). The consequences of those interactions are reflected in the observable alliance between Iran and some African states and their endless support to Iranian ventures in other organizations such as IAEA other than UN.

Same Foreign Policy Role and more Partners

Over the years, the Iran-Africa relationship has, in fact, evolved. Then, along with continuation of positive relations, there has been a considerable widening of range of African states interacting with Iran. Thus, Iran has interacted with states from each one of the African regions, mostly positively. This interaction entails different sorts of relations between both entities. It involves diplomatic, political, military and trade exchanges. It has, therefore, resulted in significant Iranian presence in Africa (ITIC 2009). It has aimed at fulfilling Iran's diplomatic, economic and religious goals (Haji-Yousefi 2010).

Then, taking a non-alignment standing, the Iranian rhetoric against the West has allowed it to get some African states that share the same perception regarding it as partners. Additionally, the union of the developing states (based on South rhetoric) aiming to achieve economic growth stand as the pillar of the cooperation (Warner 2011). Nevertheless, the efficiency of this interaction is rather questionable. Yet, official visits of diplomats from Iran to states such as Nigeria and Senegal as well as the other way around have increased (Modell & Asher 2013; Taylor 2010).

Being the major power in West Africa, Nigeria's privileged position in key international institutions - such as its membership of the IAEA and the UNSC has led Iran to build up relation with it (Rubin 2013; Mcanenny 2014). Thus, Iran has agreed to share nuclear technology for the production of electricity with Nigeria (Chimbelu 2010). Furthermore, in June of 2014,

during a meeting headed by Iran's Minister of Industry and his Nigerian counterpart, the two nations agreed to seek closer cooperation in areas including mining, industry, oil, engineering, and nuclear technology (Mcanenny 2014). This illustrates the tremendous political commitment shown by both parties in that regard.

Actually, Iran has been reaching out to African countries as it stands an entity which takes initiatives that are positively received by the African countries. Iran's actions in Senegal focus largely on economics, with an emphasis on promises of aid to set up factories and various projects (Chimbelu 2010). Essentially, it includes the extension of a 120 million dollar line of credit from the Export Development Bank of Iran to Senegal for the purchase of Iranian tractors (Kobi 2011). For Taylor (2010), those measures reflect the economic interests of the Senegalese elite. Nevertheless, Senegal has recently served as "Iran's gateway to Africa" as the USD 16 million in exports to Senegal in 2009 constituted a greater volume of trade than that of Iran and all other West African countries combined (Kobi 2011; Rubin 2013).

Sudan has a geo-strategic location - lying in the Red Sea - that enhances its standing as Iran's strong ally in the East Africa Region (Mcanney 2014). According to (ITIC 2009), the ultimate aim of the partnership is to enable Iran to establish an active naval presence in the Red Sea leading to the Gulf of Eilat and the Suez Canal. Through this, Iran is liable to exploit its use of the ports therein for any activity. It includes political activity against Israel, moderate Arab countries and to respond, should its nuclear facilities be attacked.

Additionally, there have been political agreements in the military sector between Iran and Sudan whereby the former has openly pledged to supply weaponry to the latter. Hence, the Sudanese defence minister after visiting Iran, in January 2007, affirmed in September 2007 that Iran was one of Sudan's main suppliers of weapons (ITCT 2009). According to Modell & Asher (2013), Iran has entered into an agreement with Sudan to train Sudanese National Islamic Front troops and intelligence officers in Tehran as part of Sudan's effort to establish the Sudanese Popular Defense Forces. It has also built the Yarmouk Military Industrial Complex; an arms manufacturing facility bombed in October 2012, and has reportedly entered into several other joint military projects. All of it illustrates the deep bilateral military ties between both states.

With regard to Eritrea, one of the milestones in the relations between the two countries was the May 2008 visit of Isaias Afworki, the Eritrean president, to Iran and his meeting with Ahmadinejad. That meeting ended with the signing of agreements and Memorandum of Understanding

between both entities (ITIC 2009). The scope of those agreements lay in the increasing of trade ties between Eritrea and Iran and expanding and encouraging Iranian investment in Eritrea's agricultural, mining, and energy sectors (Mcanenny 2014). Resultantly, in 2008, the Iranian Bank for Export Development gave Eritrea \$35 million in credit to promote trade relations between the two countries. As gratitude, the Eritrean foreign minister expressed support for Iran's nuclear program when the Iranian minister visited the UN (ITIC 2009).

Notably, the major interest of the African countries here has been to get one more partner able to provide them the needed resources to solve their critical domestic problems. Facing dire rates of poverty, underdevelopment, and lack of security coupled with the existent political will and efforts to overcome that scenario, those countries see in Iran as one of gateway for these. Here, the sharing of common view of the world concerning the loaded dislike for the West as it bears the bad image of past imperialism stands as crucial incentive for the fostering of that relationship. Additionally, the military sector is taken as a relevant area to establish as well as enhance cooperation ties between the states above mentioned. Therefore it allows the consolidation of Iranian presence in some regions of Africa.

Moreover, worthy to note is the difference in existing degrees of interaction regarding Iran and the African states. As such, compared to other African regions, the East African and the West African states are the ones that have recently interacted most with Iran. Apart from sharing of historic ties with Iran, the East African states have recently shared political relations with it. Actually, states originated from those two African regions such as Eritrea, Sudan, Nigeria, Senegal and so on, have economic as well as military ties with Iran (Mcanenny 2014). Sometimes, the religious component is also incorporated in those interactions (Kobi 2011).

Unlike them, the Sub-Saharan states such as Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Malawi, Malawi and Namibia have been interacting with Iran mostly in economic areas. Hence, the seeking of uranium in latter states by Iran, in order to supply its nuclear venture, constitutes its main interest therein (Onderco 2012). The exchange of uranium deposits, thus, has been the condition put by Iran upon some African states in order to concede to them economic or even military resources (Solomon 2015). Resultantly, the outreach of the African mining states stands as one of the Iranian strategies towards the continent.

Iran's Engagement in Africa: A Foreign Policy Left in the Past?

Basically, the raising of Iran's deep engagement with Africa has been witnessed since 2005. Then, the rise of President Ahmadinejad to power (2005-2013) transformed the dynamics of that relationship (Rubin 2013). Actually, that was reinforced through the enormous deployment of Iranian presence in Africa by political, economic, military and religious means (Kobi 2011; Mcanney 2014). Here, the Ahmadinejad presidency, different from his predecessors, brought out a foreign policy of strong engagement with Africa which was materialized through Iran's excessive involvement in Africa (Rubin 2011). It aimed at securing the already existent alliance and making more allies therein. It was operationalized through Ahmadinejad's constant official visits to Africa; the African leaders' visits to Iran; as well as the Iran's hosting of an Iran-Africa Conference in Teheran in 2008. For ITIC (2009), those moves revealed Iran's seeking of allies in order to operationalize its national interests in the International System – to establish itself as a regional power in the Middle East. It also meant an Iranian run away from the economic sanctions it had been subjected by the UNSC since 2006.

On one side of the relation stands Iran, providing those states with economic and military resources it holds, which it, can use to leverage its interests there. On the other hand, there is a process involving those states payback to Iran's "support". That is visibly materialized in terms of those states political allegiance as well as their support over resolutions against Iran in the United Nations (UN) as well as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) when it comes to the contentious Nuclear Program; an issue in which Iran acutely needs their support.

The Iranian foreign policy for many years was featured by alliance between the external powers and a less autonomous state. Above and beyond, Iran's politics was based on the excessive dependence on the US aid, in order to preserve the political security of Mohammad Reza Shah. Over the years, the major concern of the Shah was to keep his own comfort zone (Haji-Yousefi 2010).

Nonetheless, only after its coming into existence as an Islamic Republic, the situation underwent a transformation. By this time, the foreign policy of Iran changed for a strongly autonomous one. It was clearly defined in its Constitution and noted through Iran's actions in the IS. Indeed, only after the establishment of an Islamic Republic, it effected a U turn in Iran's foreign policy. The new Constitution of the Islamic Republic was essentially a reflection of a new view of the new leaders governing Iran's politics. As

such, based on article 152 of the new Constitution new principles upon which the country was to be governed, were laid down.

Thus, the religious element was introduced in Iran's politics by the Revolutionary leadership. Strikingly, it has since then been used as a vehicle to achieve Iran's national interests (DeLand 2001). It has been used for establishment of alliances regionally and transnationally. At the regional level, Iran has allied itself with state's leaders that share the same religious orientation. Then, its alliance with Syria stands as a reflection of that instance. Though Syria is not a theocratic state as Iran, the very fact that its president belongs to a Shiite segment of Islam confers him one of the premises to uphold relations with the Iranian regime. On the other hand, Iran has supported Islamic groups such as Hamas in Gaza Strip. Although the Shiite feature is not as fundamental for the sustainability of that relation, the spread of Islamic revolution stands as the main Iranian goal backing that organization. Iran holds the same pattern of interaction with its Middle East allies. That has, also, been exported to reach places beyond its regional borders. When coping with Africa, it is observed that Iran's pattern is followed. This is exemplified by the strong religious ties Iran holds with Sudan and Eritrea.

Nonetheless, some authors argue that Iran's foreign policy adopted since 1979 is loaded with controversy. For some of them, the addition of religious elements brings out an ideological component of its foreign policy. Then, the ideological components have been placed in the lieu of the realistic ones as drivers of Iran's foreign policy (DeLand 2001; Ahmadi 2008).

This controversy can be found in Iran's 1979 Constitution in Article 152. Yet the Iranian Constitution principles undoubtedly suggest that religion is as important to Iran as any other tool to drive its relation with other states (Ahmadi 2008). Indeed, none of those principles suggest that religion constitutes the crucial component of the Iranian foreign policy. Contrary, through analysis of the Iranian ventures in the IS, it can be noted that there is noticeable openness of various means to undertake its foreign policy in which the religion does not stand as a core component. This is certainly perceived by Iran's alliance with states, among many, such as Nigeria and Senegal, that are neither Islamic nor have Muslim people in the leadership front. It, in fact, shows the Iran's pursuance of its national interests.

As result of the negativity loaded in the US response to the Iranian supportive standing on fighting terrorism, the Iranian President, Ahmadinejad adopted a completely different posture from his predecessors, towards the US and the West (Ramazani 2009). Bearing in mind the heavy political atmosphere then, he turned to be confrontational towards the

Western powers (Shanahan 2005). According to him, his predecessors were weak in dealing with the West and it was time for Iran to sort out its problems itself on the principle of independence from external powers' influence. Since then, the upheld Iranian approach of foreign policy was featured by a new trend. Hence, the "third world" states started to be seen as fundamental partners to establish alliance with Iran. This was, essentially, the materialization of the Third Worldism principle accurately stated in its 1979 Constitution. Then, apart from Latin America, Africa was put into the reach of Iran's new external policies.

The recently elected Iranian president (2013), Hassan Rouhani, differently from his predecessor, has adopted another approach towards the West (Bazoobandi 2014). Being conscious of the dire domestic economic situation thereby is directly affected by the heavy sanctions imposed on Iran's economy; he has expressed through many actions his strong will to revert this scenario. Thus, Rouhani strongly believes that the key to expand Iran's role in the region is to strengthen its economy. The economic sector is certainly one of the integral components of national power (Shanahan 2015). Then, one of the ways to achieve this economic interest, according to him, is the reaching of a comprehensive deal on the nuclear issue (Bazoobandi 2014). As result of it is the pragmatic standing Iran has recently taken on the IS. Hence, the Rouhani administration has seen Iran's distancing from its previous direct confrontational stance as the suitable strategy to regain its international legitimacy as a state. His approach, then, has been strong on the resorting of diplomatic means of dialogue with the West instead of launching fierce threats as it was previously. Nonetheless, the above illustrated Iranian foreign policy's change of approach does not suggest its automatic change of interests in the IS. Instead, it has acknowledged the importance of the economic strength's primacy as a necessary condition to attain power politically.

What about Africa?

Resultantly, the new standing coming from the current Iranian leadership has undermined the existing Iran-Africa relations. Then, recently the "third worldism" principle transformed into action has been clearly weakened as more focus has been given to the Iranian nuclear deal with the West. Nonetheless, the strategic relevance of Africa for Iran has not changed. It is seen in the preservation of the ties it once had with those states in spite of the reduction of support.

Essentially, though the relationship between Iran and the African states has registered a considerable improvement during the Ahmadinejad

era, the same involvement is not witnessed during the current Rouhani's presidency. Although Rouhani has expressed his willingness to keep Iran-Africa relations on the same path, the previous flexible relations between both are yet to come back to the previous stage or even gain new dynamic (Hammond 2013; PressTv 2014). Accordingly, Rouhani has so far reaffirmed his commitment toward Africa. Nonetheless, that commitment is witnessed mostly in terms of political speeches. Actually, Rouhani's practical focus has been, instead, mostly on the nuclear issue than on concrete actions envisioning extending Iranian bonds with African states. Moreover, Rouhani's "engagement" with the West, instead of Africa, unlikely Ahmadinejad's one, puts Africa behind in respect to Iran's current foreign policy priorities.

The noticeable change on Rouhani's foreign policy approach clearly suggests the abandoning on emphasis of some of Iran's foreign policy principles, leading to enhancement of others. In order to secure Iran's economic interests, President Rouhani has opted to turn Iran's attention to the West underplaying the Third Worldism, a much praised principle by Ahmadinejad. Although, there was an officially expressed willingness to keep up the relations with the African states, he has manifestly been less engaged with African issues compared to Ahmadinejad. It clearly illustrates the reduction of Iran's economic participation in Africa. It also shows Iran's loss of the opportunity to enhance its presence in Africans regions.

In fact, Rouhani has neither travelled to Africa very often nor invited very often African officials to Iran, apart from the latest presence of his Prime Minister in Africa. Important to note is that, despite the decrease of direct contact with African states, the political and geo-strategic relevance of Africa to Iran remains unchanged. As such, the safeguarding of that stake will concretely remain as one of Iran's national interest, thus sustaining African relevance to Iran.

Conclusion

Although some of the African states have experienced a closer relationship with Iran, this trend has lately reduced. Evidently the complexity of Iranian domestic politics as well as the huge focus the Iranian government has deposited on the nuclear negotiations is curbing it from bolstering its relations with the African states, making it part of standby partners of Iran. It is more than clear that each president of Iran has driven Iran's foreign policy according to his own understanding of what should be the right path for Iran. In this regard, some of them have looked more or even less to some states in the International System. For the case of Iran relationship

with the African states, Ahmadinejad had been defending, throughout his mandate, Iran's engagement with some of African states based in the conception of third Worldism that is stated in Iran's constitution. Nonetheless, not eliminating the principle, however not giving much attention in that is Rouhani, concerned with the well-being of Iranian state and adopting a more pragmatic standing. This standing consists of solving impediments of Iranian economic growth. To undertake this goal he has been compelled to relegate some Iran's allies to the second stage compared to the states involved in the negotiations of nuclear issue. An issue which if strategically solved may benefit Iran's economy through its adherence to the world economy with no need to face economic sanctions imposed by the international community.

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ABSTRACT

This paper describes the panorama of the relations between Iran and Africa through the years of 2006 and 2015. During the studied period, most western countries avoided economic, diplomatic and military actions with Iran, leading the country to economic hardships. In order to reduce this difficulties, Iran turned to its traditional allies, such as China and Russia and, especially, looked to the African continent, where it sought political and diplomatic support and the economic relations needed to lessen the burden imposed by the sanctions. However, since the election of President Rouhani, this posture began to be altered, seeking to approach the western countries in order to rid Iran from isolation.

KEYWORDS

Iran; Africa; Iranian Foreign Policy; economic sanctions

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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC), IMPUNITY AND THE RISE OF A SIEGE MENTALITY AMONG KENYA'S KLEPTOCRACY¹

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Introduction

How has the ICC influenced Kenya's politics following the naming of six prominent Kenyans in 2010 that the local media referred to as the 'Ocampo Six', suspected masterminds of the 2007-2008 postelection violence? The entry by the ICC into Kenya's violently disputed elections in 2007 unsettled Kenya's political elite attuned to impunity so much that Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto presented a joint presidential candidacy during the 2013 elections under Jubilee coalition, cynically referred to as the "alliance of the accused", so as to try and gain leverage over the ICC. An attempt by the ICC to accord justice to victims of atrocities committed during disputed elections in 2007, was the first frontal confrontation against impunity deeply entrenched in the country's body politic owing to ethnicised politics, compromised judiciary and weak and even dysfunctional institutions. Kenya's judiciary is yet to evolve into an independent institution following years of interference by the executive dating back to the one party autocracy. However, despite expectations among a section of Kenyan populace that the ICC would deliver justice to the victims of egregious human rights violations, this was not to be. The hope that the ICC would dent impunity normative in the body politic remains a mirage. Kenyatta and Ruto politically exploited their charges at the ICC and by so doing exacerbated ethnic polarisation. Confronted by an unprecedented legal hurdle, Kenyatta and Ruto formed an ethnic alliance, ascended to power

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on a joint presidential ticket and reinforced ethnicity, a vector for political mobilisation and consequent violence since Kenya's return to multiparty politics in 1991. Although instrumentalisation of ethnicity for political gain predates Kenya's independence in 1963, the deleterious interface of ethnicity, contestation for power and economic opportunities gained a foothold under Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's first president (1963-1978) (Karimi and Ochieng 1980). Since December 2010, when six Kenyan suspects were named as masterminds of the 2007-2008 postelection violence, the ICC remains an overarching variable in Kenya's politics owing to elusive accountability for atrocities committed in the wake of the disputed presidential results in 2007.

The disputed 2013 presidential victory by Kenyatta and Ruto, at the time indicted by the ICC, raised questions pertaining to the rule of law, normative and inclusive politics based on accountability and probity that the 2010 Constitution was expected to make part of Kenya's political culture. Implementation of the constitution has faced impediments since promulgation because Kenyatta, an offshoot of Kenya's plutocracy, stands to lose in the event a reformed state comes into being. This sense of self-preservation is untenable because Kenya's stability depends on establishment of the rule of law and justice. The collapse of Kenya's two cases before the ICC, the first against Uhuru Kenyatta and the second against William Ruto and Joshua Sang, preceded by dropping of charges against three other suspects, is two pronged. It exposes deficiencies of the ICC, a legal as well as political institution. It also illustrates the vulnerability of the ICC before suspects that are powerful state actors. Such accused easily maximise control of state apparatus to torpedo the course of justice for victims of mass atrocities. Kenyans that initially invested confidence in the ICC as a dispenser of justice are forced to have second thoughts.

Inability by both the local judiciary and the ICC to identify and prosecute masterminds of the 2007-2008 atrocities, poses a threat to Kenya's democratisation process. As a Court of last resort, the ICC intervened because Kenya was unable and unwilling to try those liable for organising and perpetrating the violence. Lack of political will is linked to Kenya's unresolved historical injustices such as political assassinations, state sponsored violence, land dispossession and related ethnic violence, economic crimes, and endemic corruption. The realisation of the constitution of Kenya 2010 is a culmination of efforts for state restructure spanning the entire postcolonial period. The absence of political will poses the greatest threat to Kenya's stability. Uhuru Kenyatta's reluctance to facilitate implementation of the constitution and the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) report are illustrations of hostility against both retributive and

restorative justice. The report was submitted to Kenyatta in 2013 amid allegations of doctoring. The office of the president was accused of exerting pressure on local commissioners to expunge sections of the report that adversely implicated Jomo Kenyatta in historical land injustices across the country (The Star June 4 2013). To date the report lies in abeyance. Neither has the report been widely circulated to the public as stipulated by the law. The report presents a case of conflict of interest to Kenyatta, son of Kenya's first president. The report adversely mentions Kenyatta and Ruto in relation to the 2007-2008 postelection violence although no recommendations were made against them (The Final Report of the TJRC of Kenya 2013; *The Star* June 3 2013).

The notion that resolution of Kenya's postcolonial upheavals might lie with the international community through institutions such as the ICC is misplaced. In fact such an approach could prove inimical to Kenya's stability, a country historically sharply divided along ethnic lines. At the same time it can be argued that institutionalised impunity owing to blatant disregard for the rule of law and exploitation of violence for political and economic advantage poses a risk to Kenya's stability unless checked. Impunity has entrenched a culture of violence in the country's politics because those who engage in violence invariably get away with it. Insidiously they are rewarded with appointment or election to public office. Of concern is that Kenya's judiciary has proven ineffective throughout the country's independence. It is even complicit in the edification of impunity by focusing on crimes by poor and less influential people while ignoring crimes by high and mighty or even shielding such people from accountability despite evidence of errant behaviour. In what seems to be a grotesque inversion of events, the judiciary seems to protect the powerful from the powerless. Kenya's democratisation is precarious because of lack of impartiality in the application of the rule of law. Despite some judicial reform following the post-election violence, the judiciary has not yet won wider appeal as a disinterested arbiter of political and other disputes because of corruption, tribalism and partisanship (IWPR April 17 2014).

The article is seminal in the sense that it analyses the nexus of Kenya's indigenous capital, spoils politics, violence and elusive justice. It shows how this linkage played itself out in international criminal justice and Kenya's international relations following the naming of Kenyatta, Ruto and others as masterminds of crimes against humanity during the 2007-2008 postelection violence. Kenya's engagement with the ICC prominently thrust Kenya's domestic politics into African and international politics owing to the indictment high profile politicians. Daniel Moi, Kenya's second president and Jomo Kenyatta's longest serving vice president, politically

mentored both the younger Kenyatta and Ruto. He inherited a one party autocracy, that he sustained through institutional collapse and deft manipulation of ethnicity. The joint presidential candidature of Kenyatta and Ruto was backed by Mwai Kibaki, Moi's successor and vice for a decade. Unable to change Kenya's political and economic trajectory, Kenya almost plunged into civil war under Kibaki over disputed presidential elections following heightened ethnic polarisation. Kenyatta-Moi-Kibaki political axis dominates Kenya's politics and is the nucleus of local capital owing to its vast economic interests traversing the entire economic gamut. Kenya's politics and economic control is in a grip of a tiny coterie of individuals related by blood, economic interests and more insidiously by their ability to mobilise ethnically for further economic and political gain. This plutocracy is impervious to accountability and wary of the ICC. In Kenya's political system, the personal, here used to mean selfish economic interests, the communal and the political are intertwined and reinforce neopatrimonialism. In this polity, the political elite exploit local and communal anxieties, cultural differences, even primordial ones, and genuine concerns for personal gain. It was against this background that Kenyatta and Ruto easily mobilised their respective tribes against the ICC and opponents by turning personal legal woes into communal and then national threats and burdens. The two politicians were central to Moi's ill-fated so-called generational transition in 2002. Then Moi unsuccessfully tried to hoist Kenyatta, a political neophyte, on Kenyans as his successor. Although the ICC rendered the ethnic alliance between Kenyatta and Ruto a matter of political survival, Kenyatta and Ruto could easily enter into an entente ahead of the 2013 elections because both are of the *ancien régime* extraction (Shilaho 2013).

The article highlights a treacherous terrain in which politics and international criminal justice coalesce. A legal analysis of the ICC with a specific focus on the Kenyan cases is not what this article is about. It is confined to the politics of the cases specifically the cynical manipulation of the cases by tribal barons at the expense of justice. The ICC legal threat made Kenya's kleptocracy feel besieged. It compelled Kenyatta and Ruto, who were on opposing sides during the disputed 2007 elections, to form an ethnic alliance between Kikuyu and Kalenjin, their respective tribes. It did not matter that these politicians were indicted for allegedly mobilising gangs from their respective ethnic groups to commit atrocities against 'enemy tribes', in effect each other's supporters, during the ensuing ethnic violence. Ruto was indicted for mobilising "Kalenjin warriors" to drive Kikuyu out of the Rift Valley region while Kenyatta was indicted for mobilising and sponsoring a rag tag Kikuyu militia, *mungiki*, to retaliate against opposition supporters, who included members of Luhya, Luo and Kalenjin ethnic

groups in Naivasha and other Kikuyu dominated parts of the Rift Valley. Consequently the two were separately charged as co-perpetrators in crimes that included organising and financing murder, displacement, persecution, rape and other inhuman acts committed during the post-election violence (ICC 2015a; ICC 2013b).

Victory for Kenyatta and Ruto during the 2013 elections was indispensable. It was required to salvage their political careers, evade possible incarceration and defend the economic and political interests of Kenya's plutocracy. A combination of these three factors trumped the Constitution, and specifically Chapter six on leadership and integrity that demanded high moral and ethical standards for those aspiring for and occupying public office. Once the high court and electoral body cleared Kenyatta and Ruto to vie for the highest office in the land despite facing egregious criminal charges, the moral bar that the constitution was expected to instil in the country's politics and public life did not see the light of day.

In the second section, I argue that Kenyan politics thrives on personal rule logic that undergirds politics across Africa. The ICC politics dovetailed with ethnicity to determine the outcome of Kenya's 2013 elections³. The section does not intend to portray Kenya and Africa as undifferentiated but to underscore the notion that the individual operates within the communal and this largely affects politics in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is for this reason that Kenyan politicians are able to mobilise along tribal fault lines to win elections and even evade justice. Save for South Africa, to name but one, African polities are largely rural, and peasantry. Consequently, workers and peasants seem to lack consciousness to mobilise along crosscutting interests and challenge the predatory political elite. The influence of kinship politics characterised by clanism, ethnicity, regionalism and religion trumps horizontal political organisation and mobilisation. The fusion of society and state makes it hard for politics to be organised along crosscutting interests. This logic puts into perspective the controversial ascendancy of Kenyatta and Ruto to power despite facing criminal charges before the ICC.

In Kenya, a culture of impunity is deeply entrenched as seen through lack of political will to prosecute those responsible for vicious cyclic tribal violence in the 1990s and specifically the masterminds of the 2007-2008 atrocities. The ICC intervened in Kenya under the principle of complementarity, because Kenya was "unable and unwilling" to prosecute high ranking state officials implicated in atrocities committed during the 2007-2008 postelection violence in which an estimated 1 333 people were killed and over 600 000 displaced (Republic of Kenya 2008a). Even among

³ For a nuanced analysis of Kenya's 2013 elections see Shilaho 2013.

the low and middle level perpetrators none has been prosecuted (Brown and Sriram 2012; Human Rights Watch 2011).

In the subsequent sections, I focus on the nexus between politics and international criminal justice, the Kenyan situation at the ICC and highlight duplicity among Kenya's politicians through a Special Tribunal for Kenya versus The Hague debate. Initially some politicians publicly expressed preference for the ICC option, including Ruto. Some of these politicians even voted against and defeated an amendment bill, and effectively the Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill. The bill would have anchored the tribunal in the Constitution to cushion it against executive manipulation. Opponents of a local mechanism for resolution of the conflict expediently changed tune and identified scapegoats once the ICC swung into action. They accused the Court of imperial tendencies and meddling in Kenya's internal affairs, thus its sovereignty. In Kenya's deeply ethnically divided society, "truth" concerning the narrative of the post-election violence was lost during the 2013 elections campaigns that, like previous ones, specifically since the advent of multiparty politics, dangerously split the country into ethnic enclaves. So highly politicised did the ICC cases become that the question of justice for victims became disputable, if not, non-existent in the whole controversy.

The Logic of African Politics

According to Chabal and Daloz (1999) the importance of vertical links and the notion of the individual are salient in African politics. In the estimation of the two Africanists, the individual rationality in Sub-Saharan African politics is based on the communal logic. This means that in as much as Africans act in their individual capacities, their behaviour is greatly influenced by the mores, values and norms of the communities in which they exist. It is for this reason that Chabal and Daloz observed that students of African politics cannot understand how politics operates in Africa *sui generis*, in and of itself, divorced from the rest of the society. This is because African politics have their own logic even if it appears perverse and inimical to people's wellbeing. The communal logic entails political behaviour that citizens in consolidated democracies would not easily understand (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 155). Firstly, the individual acts in concert with the psychological, social and religious foundations of the local community. Secondly, relations of power in Africa depend on a shared notion that the political is communal (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 156). This explains why democracy and multiparty elections are seen in the context of communal rather than individual mould characterised by competing manifestos and

visions for a country. These manifestos are elaborate on issues concerning the electorate but even these are read through the prism of tribal, clan, regional and religious fault lines. Kenya's elections reflect tribal voting patterns akin to an ethnic census since kinship and tribal ties override cross cutting social, political and economic concerns (Shilaho 2014). Once a politician has the command of his ethnic group, he considers himself or herself as influential in national politics on that very basis but not on the strength of their programmatic politics. Superficially, the controversial results of the 2013 elections despite crimes against humanity charges against Kenyatta and Ruto would imply that majority of Kenya's voted against their interests by disregarding questions of probity, accountability and justice. However, the link between the personal, the communal and the national in this polity illuminates the outcome of the 2013 elections.

The intention here is not to allude to a herd mentality among Kenyan voters and overlook the role of manifestos and policies. The argument is that even economic and social concerns are aggregated along ethno-regional fault-lines and invariably the ethnic affiliations of candidates, especially presidential ones, matter more than the issues they purport to champion. The ethnicity factor remains overarching during presidential elections in spite of devolution of some power and resources to the periphery, county governments, under the 2010 Constitution because the centre has not sought to de-ethnise the politics (Shilaho 2015). Regionalism, that in most cases overlaps with ethnicity, and religion are other axes for political mobilisation. Hyden argues that the salience of "community-centred networks" in African politics stems from the inability of class-based identity politics to emerge and dislodge kinship ties (Hyden 2006: 55). Jackson and Rosberg (1984: 421) identify such a political system as personal rule defined as "a distinctive type of political system in which the rivalries and struggles of powerful and wilful men, rather than impersonal institutions, ideologies, personal policies, or class interests, are fundamental in shaping political life".

Chabal and Daloz (1999: 158) argue that the act of voting in multiparty elections must be seen as part of informal relations of political exchange that has a direct bearing on the results. The electorate vote for 'one of their own', that is, an ethno-regional presidential candidate in anticipation of disproportionately benefiting from public goods colloquially referred to as "development" or "national cake" in Kenya's political parlance once he or she ascends to power. Although Africa's politics is mostly affected by vertical links, this is not unique to Africa. What distinguishes Africa is that this is a compelling factor,

What is significant in Africa is the extent to which vertical and/or personalised, relations actually drive the very logic of political system. It is not just that politics are swayed by personal considerations or that the personal is manipulated for political reasons. It is also, and perhaps more importantly, that the overall aim of politics is to affect the nature of such personal relations (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 158).

The ICC, Neopatrimonialism and Tribal Mobilisation

Owing to the influence of neopatrimonialism, it was not possible for Kenyan politicians to regard the ICC cases as strictly legal issues. This does not imply that the ICC is a purely legal institution. Being a multilateral institution and given that the Rome Statute allows the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to refer cases to the ICC and defer those before it, it is untenable to describe the ICC as a purely legal institution. Kenya, a country in which politics is not institutionalised, politicians cynically invoke identity, and specifically, ethnicity, to plead victimhood and evade accountability. Unchecked for long, the practice has precipitated institutional atrophy and endemic impunity. Kenyatta, Ruto and supporters accused the ICC of targeting Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic groups. They reduced the 2013 elections to a referendum on the ICC. They interpreted their victory as repudiation of the ICC and assertion of Kenya's sovereignty.

The two politicians easily mobilised ethnically because the society spills over into the state. Tribalism coupled with patronage-clientelism, a variant of neopatrimonialism, defines Kenya's political system. In neopatrimonialism, the patron or "Big Man" often the president, exercises authority through rewards to his clients. These clients are the "Big Man's" supporters whose influence and power are hinged on loyalty to the "Big Man" and ethno-regionalism. They prop up the "Big Man" through mobilisation of co-ethnics to vote for the incumbent or a rival in case of a fall out with the incumbent and defend the regime no matter what. Rewards come in the form of appointments in the bureaucracy, extraction of rents through government tenders and even the right to act with impunity. This political behaviour is also known as prebendalism (van de Walle 1994: 133-134; Hyden 2006: 102). In the Kenyan political context, these rewards almost exclusively go to allies from the president's ethnic group pivotal in defending one of "our own" against losing power to "enemy" tribes.

Rent Seeking and Accountability

Rent seeking is the *raison d'être* of spoils politics and refers to a

situation in which the ruler, in concert with a clique of allies, take advantage of control of the state to illicitly benefit themselves through prebends (van de Walle 1994: 133-134; Widner 1994: 53). Neopatrimonialism nurtures impunity, entrenches patronage, corruption and undermines the rule of law thus rendering state institutions dysfunctional since it thrives on a rigid dichotomy of "Big Men-Little People" (Russell 1999). The cumulative effect of this divide on democratic consolidation in Kenya is deleterious. "Big Men" and their allies maintain a grip on power, perpetrate rent-seeking politics and act with impunity as they balkanise the polity into tribal enclaves. A sense of false consciousness makes the poor to think that tribal politics is beneficial to them and cannot mobilise collectively to enforce accountability on predatory politicians (Jackson and Rosberg 1984).

Expounding on the personal rule logic, Chabal and Daloz (1999: 161) are of the view that ultimately the legitimacy of neopatrimonialism depends on the ability of the "Big Man" to deliver on expectations of clients in micro-networks of patronage and clientelism. The national good is subsumed under the immediate gratification of the clients at the expense of development programmes. The "Big Man's" continued stay at the helm depends on the sustenance of these networks even if they cause adverse economic consequences including poverty for the rest of the society (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 161). The one party statism was defined by state personalisation and privatisation of the economy. The corollary was removal of oversight bodies to check excesses attendant to exercise of power by the "Big Man" who officially carried the designation, president. Despite a shift from single party to multiparty politics, the one party rule legacy still influences Kenya's politics. Attributes of this legacy include criminalisation of basic freedoms such as freedom of expression, assembly, protest and disregard for the rule of law. As such, Kenya's polity is archetypal of the unique communal logic that undergirds sub-Saharan African politics. South Africa's history of *apartheid* and the presence of a significant white population in the country make it untenable to analyse its politics in the same prism as the other countries in this region. The inability of Kenya to organise politics along cross cutting interests has seen the evolution of politicised ethnicity into the ideology of "tribalism" that renders institutions germane for a functioning democracy dysfunctional.

Personal rule defined Africa's autocratic single party rule and military dictatorships and still holds sway in Kenya under multiparty politics because of continued informalisation rather than institutionalisation of politics. It is inconceivable that in a rational legal authority, a person accused of crimes against humanity charges could be eligible to stand as a presidential candidate, let alone a controversial victory by a joint presidential ticket by

two ICC indictees. Such charges would most likely deal a death knell to the political career of the accused in a polity informed by the rule of law and normative leadership. A rational legal authority is the polar opposite of personal rule. The former is a polity in which “the public sphere is carefully distinguished from the private sphere; written laws and bureaucratic institutions routinise the exercise of authority and protect individuals and their property from the whims of capricious leaders” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 62).

The ICC and its Disputed Legitimacy

The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, international criminal tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) or Cambodia Tribunal or Khmer Rouge Tribunal among other judicial processes preceded the permanent legal institution, International Criminal Court (ICC). The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials showed that international criminal justice helps in securing peace by delegitimizing and incapacitating spoilers. The flipside is that this very aspect of international criminal justice makes the ICC a portent instrument of warfare that escalates rather than mitigates conflict (Nouwen 2013: 177). Kastner shares the same position and observes that the ICC “... has the potential to contribute to ending grave crimes but also bears the danger of prolonging a conflict by adding to the insecurity of the warring parties” (Kastner 2010: 134). Nouwen argues that the ICC judicial system is inherently flawed in the sense that unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICC does not deal with those who have been vanquished thus providing a battlefield over which protagonists seek to defeat one another (Nouwen 2013: 177).

The ICC allowed the two indictees to pursue their political ends as long as they met their obligations as suspects. It reduced the cases to a political duel among ethnically fragmented politicians. The Court did not remove suspects and later the accused from Kenya’s political matrix under the premise that its jurisdiction was restricted to the legal but not politics of the disputed presidential elections. The 2013 elections therefore provided yet another stage for ethno-regional political elite to contest for power against a background of the unfinished business of the 2007 disputed elections. Kenyatta and Ruto framed the ICC and their main presidential challenger, Raila Odinga as enemies of Kenya’s sovereignty. They accused Odinga of working in concert with a section of civil society and ‘imperialists’ to

fabricate charges against them. By adhering to the Rome Statute, the ICC inadvertently accelerated rather than lowered the tensions in the country's politics. However, had the ICC removed the two from the local political scene it would have inflamed passions among their supporters. It was a catch 22 Situation. It was consistent with the Rome Treaty for suspects and accused persons to be free as long as they honoured summonses and had no arrest warrants against them. However, never before had indicted persons before the ICC been let free until they were acquitted or allowed to attend court proceeding via video link underscoring the fact that the ICC is influenced by geopolitics.

The Rome Statute that provides a legal framework for the ICC came into effect on July 1 2002, and like most laws, does not apply retroactively. Significantly, the AU's 2004-2005 Strategic Plan underscores commitment to ensure ratification of the Rome Treaty by all AU member states (Coalition for the International Criminal Court-CICC, n.d.). Indeed the AU Constitutive Act Article 4(h) recognises intervention amidst grave human rights violations in a member state. It reads thus, "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" (Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000). Kenya voluntarily signed the Rome Statute in 1999 and ratified it in 2005 thus becoming the 98th State Party. Kenya domesticated the Rome Statute through International Crimes Act 2008, effectively becoming part of Kenya's laws (Republic of Kenya 2008b). The ICC was set up to try the masterminds of egregious crimes including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. These are often too powerful to be tried by judicial systems in their respective countries (Roth 2014). Unlike previous ad hoc UN tribunals, the ICC is "...a permanent infrastructure with the ability to monitor crimes and act accordingly as the need arises" (Musila 2009: 12). It targets the powerful since suspects of crimes under the Rome Statute jurisdiction are influential state actors and warlords that have the capacity to compromise national judicial systems.

The ICC addresses mass atrocities committed by individuals. To avoid prosecution ruthless national leaders too often threaten, corrupt or compromise judges and prosecutors at home, but those in The Hague should be beyond the reach of such obstructionism. The ICC is meant as a Court of last resort for victims and survivors who cannot find justice in their own country and as a deterrent to leaders who have little to fear from domestic prosecution (Roth 2014).

A Clash between the ICC and 'Africa'

The ICC is perennially on a collision course with most African rulers primarily because it targets prominent state actors and non-state actors and most of the atrocities under its jurisdiction disproportionately occur in Africa principally owing to weak states characterised by institutional atrophy, tribal politics, and local judiciaries too compromised to impartially dispense justice thus pervasive impunity. Fundamentally, the legacy of slavery, colonialism, and *apartheid* makes some Africans suspicious of the intentions of multilateral bodies dominated by Westerners the ICC inclusive. In recent memory, before the ICC came into being, grave atrocities seemed to be concentrated in Latin America under military juntas and then Eastern Europe most evocatively in the Balkans in the early 1990s. Despite the preponderance of weak judiciaries that are no more than appendages of the executive, African rulers accuse the ICC of unfairly targeting them while ignoring atrocities elsewhere in the world. The accusation evokes the spectre of imperialism and encroachment on the sovereignty of African countries by an institution that these politicians regard as an adjunct of the West to keep them in check. It is trite that sovereignty is not an absolute otherwise there would be no need for international instruments and norms. 'Sovereignty as responsibility' is the norm in international relations. 'This means that where large numbers of populations suffer extreme deprivation and are threatened with death, the international community-obligated by normative standards of humanitarian and human rights-cannot be expected to watch passively and do not respond. Humanitarian intervention then becomes imperative (Deng 2010: 354).

The accusation that the ICC is biased against African rulers is half the truth. Of the 124 members of the Assembly of States Parties, countries that have ratified the Rome Statute 34 are African states, forming the largest bloc. African judges serve within the Court. Africa is also represented by officials in the Office of the Chief Prosecutor headed by a Gambian, Fatou Bensouda. As such, the ICC can hardly be described as anti-African institution based on its composition (Roth 2014). Moreover, more than 800 civil society groups from Africa are members of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) that translates into one third of its global membership (CICC n.d). Importantly, victims of atrocities and human rights groups in Africa support the intervention by the ICC in Africa since it creates hope for justice that is elusive in local judiciaries (HRW 2014; Roth 2014).

Proponents of the ICC intervention in African conflicts cite these facts to dispute the notion that the Court was formed with rogue African

states in mind. Out of the nine African situations, that is, African countries whose citizens currently cases before the ICC, have had before or on whose soil the crimes within the ambit of the ICC jurisdiction were committed, five are self-referral in the sense that the state in question asked the Court to intervene. The wholesale dismissal of the Court as an imperial institution is political. However, the ICC has not been enthusiastic in dealing with mass atrocities in other parts of the world such as Palestine/Israel, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Iraq thus lending credibility to its critics. Self-referral situations are Uganda, Mali, Central African Republic (CAR) I and II and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). But self-referral cases do not necessarily mean the states concerned are supportive of international criminal justice. These self-referral cases involve rebels fighting against governments and so do not necessarily indicate confidence in the Court by the governments in question (Simmons and Danner 2009: 243). The duplicity with which some Africa rulers relate to the Court is indicative of self-preservation rather than confidence in the ICC. In referring cases involving rebels to the Court, the government runs the risk of having its officials investigated and prosecuted as well thus the word "Situation" refers to the whole gamut of the conflict as opposed to individual cases of wrong doing (Simmons and Danner 2010: 230-231).

Yoweri Museveni referred ringleaders of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a terror ragtag army that for years committed atrocities in northern Uganda, to the ICC and had LRA's commander Dominic Ongwen handed over to the ICC in 2015 upon surrendering. However, Museveni was not keen on the Court investigating atrocities by Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF). He was Uhuru Kenyatta's most vociferous backer in the latter's tirades against the Court and is one of the most acerbic critics of the institution. He is on record having described the ICC as "a bunch of useless people" (BBC News May 12, 2016).

The Darfur, Sudan and Libya situations are exceptions because the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referred them to the Court as permitted by the Rome Statute (Hoile 2014: 66-67). In principle, the ICC has jurisdiction over a crime committed by a citizen of a member state or on the territory of a member state or if the situation is referred to the Court by the UNSC (Roth 2014). This, in effect, means the ICC "may potentially assume jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed anywhere in the world" (Kastner 2010: 131). Kenya was the first country in which the ICC Chief Prosecutor initiated investigations on his own volition under the *proprio motu* powers granted by Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute that allows the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation without a referral to the State Party or the UNSC (Rome Statute of International

Criminal Court 2002; Hoile 2014: 312). Ivory Coast was the second such situation. However, the ICC critics observe that European countries are the greatest funders of the ICC that gives them leverage over the Court and this calls into question its impartiality (Hoile 2014: 15-18, 37). Critics take issue the three veto wielding members of UNSC, that is the US, Russia and China for having the power to refer cases to the ICC, as part of the Permanent 5 (P5), yet do not recognise the ICC since they have not ratified the Rome Statute. Furthermore, although most European countries are signatories to the Rome Treaty, the fact that major nations such as Russia, Israel, China and India are not, denies the Court international legitimacy and emboldens critics' accusation of selective justice.

The Kenyan Cases before the ICC

Kenya and most other African countries ratified the Rome Statute apparently as an expression of aversion against impunity and affirmation of the rule of law.

In 2005, the African Commission on Human and People's Rights issued a resolution on ending impunity in Africa and on the domestication and implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC. It called on civil society organisations in Africa to work together and develop partnerships that further respect the rule of law internationally and strengthen the Statute (CICC n.d.).

Kenya's successive governments beginning with that of Mwai Kibaki and then Uhuru Kenyatta, tried to have cases facing Kenyan suspects either deferred or terminated. The AU launched a strident attack against the Court that threw the credibility and legitimacy of the court into doubt. Kenya ratified the Rome Statute against a background of its post-colonial history characterised by a culture of impunity. Political assassinations, state violence, politically instigated ethnic violence, extrajudicial executions, land grabbing and official grand larceny blot Kenya's post-colonial period but the masterminds and perpetrators did not face justice (Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) 1998; KHRC 2011; Republic of Kenya 1992; 1999; 2008a; 2008c). The Rome Statute finds expression in Kenya's laws under International Crimes Act (Republic of Kenya 2010; Republic of Kenya 2008b). Significantly, Kenya's laws do not accord immunity to the country's president accused of crimes covered by the Rome Treaty under Article 143(4) of the Constitution of Kenya (Republic of Kenya 2010: 88-89).

Kenya's cases at the ICC highlighted the fact that the institution has a delicate balancing act to do in navigating a dicey terrain of politics, the

law and geostrategic interests in an attempt to ensure justice for victims of mass atrocities in Africa. It is instructive that since inception in 2002, the ICC has convicted only nine suspects, warlords and a former vice president of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) an indication that international criminal justice is skewed, intractable, protracted and expensive, financially and emotionally.

The ICC is likely to lose confidence among Kenyan and other victims following its inability to successfully prosecute suspected masterminds of the 2007-2008 post-election violence. Although Kenyatta had the dubious distinction as the first sitting president to appear before the Court when he was summoned for a "status conference" in October 2014, the withdrawal of charges against him in December 2014 and subsequently against Ruto in April 2016 for lack of sufficient evidence to ensure successful prosecutions is two pronged. It dampens hopes of the victims of ever finding justice. It also implies that state power indeed provides ammunition with which to fight against the Court since most of the witnesses inexplicably recanted their testimonies while potential ones, ring leaders of the *mungiki* militia, died through extrajudicial executions or were disappeared. These people attended a State House meeting and other meetings in which retaliatory attacks against opposition supporters were planned (ICC 2015b). The judges and prosecutor decried witness tampering in the Ruto case as well (KHRC April 7 2017). A climate of witness interference in which the government was implicated contributed to the collapse of the two cases besides loopholes in investigations carried out by the prosecutor's office under Luis Moreno-Ocampo. Human Rights Watch observed that, "with the Kenyatta case closed, the scope of justice the ICC can deliver to Kenya's victims is greatly reduced" (HRW 2014). Witness interference in the William Ruto case compelled the Court to issue arrest warrants against three Kenyans (ICC 2015c; ICC 2013a). Worth noting is that the ICC vacated charges against Kenyatta, Ruto and his co accused, Sang, but did not acquit them. It means that in the event new evidence is found in both cases the charges could be reinstated. This inconclusiveness of the cases and resolution of the 2007-2008 postelection violence cements the ICC in Kenya's politics for years to come.

A Local Tribunal versus The ICC

Kenyatta and Ruto voted for a constitutional amendment bill meant to facilitate the formation of a special tribunal in February 2009. However, with the benefit of hindsight, they were not committed to a local resolution to the 2007-2008 post-election atrocities. Before he was indicted, Ruto

publicly expressed preference for The Hague judicial process as opposed to a special tribunal (*The Standard* April 5 2011). MPs allied to him and predominantly Kalenjin in ethnic affiliation and drawn from the Rift Valley region, voted against and defeated the motion while singing in rhyme, “Don’t be Vague, let’s go to The Hague” (*Standard Digital* February 16 2012). Kenyatta’s fellow Kikuyu allies, almost exclusively from Mount Kenya region, also voted against the bill (*The Star* March 12 2011). These politicians and civil society preferred the ICC option but for different reasons. Civil society argued that the government had neither the capacity nor political will to set up a credible special tribunal while Ruto and his supporters feared that such a tribunal would be biased against them. At the time, Ruto had not closed ranks with Kenyatta and Kibaki having been on the opposing sides of the 2007 electoral contest, and thus the post-election violence. He feared that a tribunal would be turned into a witch-hunt having been unofficially widely adversely mentioned as the mastermind of atrocities against Kikuyu resident in the Rift Valley region. So strong were the allegations that Ruto voluntarily travelled to The Hague but was unsuccessful in meeting the Chief Prosecutor to “clear his name” and possibly pre-empt being named among the suspected masterminds of the violence (*CapitalNews* November 4 2010).

Mutual suspicion among Kenya’s political elite and a legacy of impunity paved the way for the ICC intervention in Kenya’s conflict. Ruto and allies preferred the ICC not so much because they believed in the rule of law and justice for victims of the 2007-2008 postelection violence as because they thought that it would take as long as “ninety years” before the cases were concluded. Ruto was on record as saying that by that time “we shall all be dead” (*Daily Nation* October 16 2013). Kenyatta, Kibaki and supporters imagined that the ICC would implicate Raila Odinga and other prominent Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party politicians for having called for mass action in protest against what they described as a stolen presidential victory. This politics of recrimination, suspicion, blame casting and expediency saw mass action, a constitutionally guaranteed form of protest, criminalised. Blame shifting played itself out during Ruto’s trial. Through his defence, Ruto tried to shift blame and responsibility to Kibaki with regard to the 2007-2008 postelection violence. He accused Kibaki of polarising the country through tribalism after he ascended to power in 2002 that snowballed into violence in 2007-2008 (*Daily Nation* October 31 2013). Furthermore, through his defence and then close ally Charles Keter, Ruto accused some officials in the government in which he serves as Deputy President, carryovers of the Kibaki administration, of scouting for witnesses, bribing and coaching them so as to testify against Ruto before

the Waki commission and then at the ICC (*CapitalNews* October 16 2013).

An ally of Kenyatta, a loquacious and divisive fellow Kikuyu, Moses Kuria, sensationally publicly confessed in 2015 that he and a hawk, a presidential candidate in 2013 and Kibaki hatchet woman, Martha Karua, procured and coached ICC witnesses against Ruto (*CapitalNews* September 24 2015). Hence politicians' support for The Hague was neither about justice for the victims of the atrocities nor aversion against impunity. Ruto and supporters feared being implicated in the post-election crimes and so hoped to buy time through the ICC judicial process while Kibaki, Kenyatta and their supporters hoped that the ICC would implicate their opponents in the ODM. The ICC seemed to have been aware of this undercurrent politics. Thus it was even handed in its indictment in the sense that of the "Ocampo six" three were from each side of the political divide during the 2007 electoral contest. This decision also seemed more political than purely legal and its zero conviction rate in Kenya underscores the view. Thereafter the Court indicted four, two from each side following confirmation of charges hearings. This aroused panic and catalysed the closing of ranks by erstwhile ethnic rivals, Kalenjin and Kikuyu.

Conclusion

The ICC was initially hailed across Kenya's ethnic divide as a welcome intervention in the country's violently disputed presidential elections in 2007. However, Kenyatta and Ruto as ethno-regional "Big Men", exploited their influence in their respective ethnic groups, Kikuyu and Kalenjin, to whip up ethnic sentiment and mobilise against the ICC and their local political rivals. Once in power, they took advantage of control of state apparatus as leverage over the ICC. The result was derailment of justice for the victims of the 2007-2008 postelection violence. The Kenyan cases demonstrated how difficult it is for the ICC to operate in a polity in which impunity and tribalism hold sway. For the first time, Kenya's kleptocracy appeared vulnerable before a judicial system they could not directly influence and interfere with. However, the collapse of both cases affirmed its capacity to fight back and extricate itself from the jaws of international criminal justice and trump efforts towards attainment of sustainable peace, justice, healing and reconciliation. Although the Rome Statute established the ICC as a legal institution to address the highest forms of crimes that is war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, the Court has to grapple with *realpolitik*. The controversial election of Kenyatta and Ruto into the presidency, while indicted, the first the world over, exposed the limitations of the ICC until then viewed not only in Kenya but also elsewhere as the bulwark against

impunity. The less impressive record of the ICC in convicting suspects since inception in 2002 was underscored in the Kenyan cases following non-confirmation of charges, and dropping of charges. As such, there is likelihood that victims of atrocities may lose confidence in the Court leaving them with no recourse for justice especially in Africa characterised by weak and dysfunctional judicial systems.

The challenge that Kenya faces is inability to institutionalise compromise and remove zero sum politics from elections. The rule of law must inform Kenya's public life to ensure resolution of long standing disputes some of whose seeds lie in the colonial period while others were sowed and nurtured in the immediate postcolonial period by Jomo Kenyatta's continued ethnicisation of the state. As evidenced by the results of the 2013 elections that polarised the country further, it is a daunting challenge. Uhuru Kenyatta, a scion of Kenyatta and the core of Kenya's plutocracy and Ruto have no capacity to lead in issues of justice, healing, and reconciliation since they ascended to power on an ethno-regional political axis for self-preservation, that is, to insulate themselves from prosecution. The two are political creatures and beneficiaries of a political system that stands in need of reform and so have neither the political will nor incentive to transform it. Once more, the 2013 elections underscored the fact that Kenya is so tribally balkanised that it lacks collective norms, and a sense of national identity to guide citizens in electing leaders.

The political elite reify ethnic differences and avariciously exploit them since it is almost impossible for them to be held to account as they pursue rent-seeking opportunities and engage in corruption while shielding under the idiom of tribalism. What appears as anachronistic political behaviour coexists with modernity. Kenya's democratisation process has to contend with a self-replicating plutocratic dynasty with vested interests in the status quo. The international criminal justice system is retributive and so cannot reform Kenya's moral fabric and by extension its flawed politics. That responsibility lies with Kenyans who first have to identify along cross cutting challenges of poverty, unemployment, poor quality of public services, lack of infrastructural facilities, insecurity and identify leadership concerned with their collective wellbeing as opposed to parochial self-interest couched under tribalism. Transcendence from retrogressive primordial politics steeped in ethnicity, regionalism and even religion is sine qua non of holding opportunistic and cynical political elite to account.

Expectations concerning what the ICC could achieve were ambitious and reminiscent of a people that felt hopeless with regard to the ability of the local judiciary to prosecute a rogue political elite but who schizophrenically hoped that the ICC would "fix" politicians from the "enemy" tribe. For

practical and logistical reasons, the ICC can only do so much in Kenyans' quest for justice and nation building. In fact it could pose a risk to the fragile state by inadvertently getting enmeshed in ethnic divisions. The collapse of the cases against Kenyatta, Ruto and Sang preceded by dropping of charges against three of the "Ocampo six" exposes limitations of a legalistic approach to Kenya's political challenges. What is required is remedial of Kenya's flawed national character through implementation of reform envisaged under the 2010 constitutional dispensation to ensure ethnic inclusivity and long-term political stability a challenge that requires leadership inspired by the imaginary of Kenya's oneness that is currently lacking. The oligarchy has the capacity to impede justice by canvassing support locally through expedient ethnic alliances, across Africa and internationally against the ICC. This spurious form of Pan Africanism entrenches impunity at the expense of victims of mass atrocities in Africa. Retributive justice might be inimical to Kenya's social cohesion but a deeply entrenched culture of impunity that has reproduced violence throughout the country's post-colonial period could easily result in state collapse.

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ABSTRACT

Did the entry by the International Criminal Court (ICC) into the 2007-2008 postelection dispute ruffle feathers among Kenya's politicians and influence the results of the 2013 elections? This article argues that the indictment of prominent Kenyans by the ICC for atrocities committed during the postelection violence was the first attempt to break a vicious cycle of impunity deeply entrenched in the country's body politic. However, the indictees exploited cases against them to exacerbate ethnic fault lines, polarise the country and ensure the controversial victory by Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto during the 2013 elections despite facing egregious charges before the ICC. Crucially, the ICC precipitated uncertainty and trepidation among Kenya's kleptocrats in power since 1963, the year of Kenya's independence. Kenyatta's controversial presidential victory in 2013 was both personal and oligarchic as it ensured continued stranglehold on Kenya's political and economic spheres by a self-reproducing plutocracy. With control of state apparatus, Kenyatta and Ruto successfully fought back against the threat posed by the ICC. The article analyses ICC politics impunity, and ethnic politics through the prism of Kenya's cases before the ICC.

KEYWORDS

Kenya; ICC; Africa; international criminal justice; ethnicity; tribalism; impunity; violence; crime; oligarchy

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THE MASS MEDIA'S BEARING ON THE RESOLUTION OF POST-INDEPENDENCE SECURITY ISSUES IN NIGERIA

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Introduction

At the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference where African territories were divided among the European imperial powers, the disparate communities that were known to have been within the Niger Basin area of Africa came under the sphere of control and exploitation of the British (de Blij & Muller 2003). Thus, the British colonialists formally and effectively occupied all the territories that are today known as Nigeria by claiming political hegemony over the peoples of the original separate nation-states, including the Yoruba Kingdom, Edo Kingdom, Hausa Kingdom, among other states to the west and south of Lake Chad. To ensure an effective rule, the British divided the various ethnic nationalities and kingdoms into southern and northern protectorates with different styles of rule and different goals or aspirations for the peoples in the two protectorates (Nnoli 1978).

However, by 1914, the British colonialists, through Lord Lugard (originally Frederick John Dealtry Lugard), created Nigeria by amalgamating the northern and southern protectorates, thereby, bringing together diverse peoples and regions into an artificial political entity with a little or no basis for commonality or nationality. Arguably, this lack of feeling of nationhood

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or the lack of national identity has endured and has been the bane of Nigeria's aspiration for progress and development. The lack of commitment to the Nigerian project, which the British foisted on the peoples that have continued to see themselves as markedly different from one another, has significantly shaped the history of Nigeria, inducing different crises and insurgencies that have threatened the its unity. Even after gaining independence from the British colonialists on October 1st, 1960, the peoples of Nigeria could not see themselves as one and work together for the rapid socio-economic and socio-political of the country.

The umbrage and bitterness that welled up in the late 1960s led to the civil war of 1967-1970, which almost tore Nigeria into splinters, but the agitations of the different peoples continue even till now, and a clear indication of this is the springing up of violent militias and terror groups among the ethnic or regional groups with furtive ideologies and political goals. Also implicated in this issue was the incursion of the military into governance for more than thirty years. Even though Nigeria has re-achieved civil rule since 1999, and has been managing the inchoate democracy for more than seventeen years, it continues to grapple with the issues of pettiness, animosity and struggle for the central political power among the different ethnic groups. All these have manifested in gargantuan crises and insurgencies, which incessantly put the unity and security of the country on tenterhooks. The overarching question that could be asked about this situation is: what have been the contributions of the mass media towards resolving or mitigating the security problems that have been plaguing and threatening the unity and corporate existence of Nigeria? This article seeks to provide an answer to this question.

Objectives of the Study

1. To assess the roles or contributions of the Nigerian mass media in mitigating or resolving the security challenges of insurgencies facing the country in the post-independence era (through the ways and manners they report the security issues).
2. To examine the basic strategies the Nigerian mass media have been adopting or could adopt to resolve or douse the security challenges that are threatening the unity and continuous existence of the country.
3. To determine the relationship between the media and the military or the security institutions that are charged with the responsibility of dousing or resolving security threats.

Research Questions

1. What are the roles or contributions of the Nigerian mass media in mitigating or resolving the security challenges of insurgencies facing the country in the post-independence era (through the ways and manners they report the security issues)?
2. What are the basic strategies the Nigerian mass media have been adopting or could adopt to resolve or douse the security challenges that are threatening the unity and continuous existence of the country?
3. What is the relationship between the media and the military or the security institutions that are charged with the responsibility of dousing or resolving security threats?

Theoretical Outlook

Two major theories of mass communication explain and support the expected roles or contributions of the mass media in the resolution or attenuation of any form of threat to a nation's security. These are: the agenda setting and framing theories. Agenda setting theory refers to the idea that the emphasis that the mass media place on certain topics and the importance that people attribute to these topics are correlated (McCombs and Shaw 1972). The concept of priming is often understood as an extension of agenda setting, as it describes the supposed effect that media reporting has on people's opinions regarding the issues in the public domain: "By making some issues more salient in people's mind (agenda setting), the mass media could also shape the considerations that people take into account when making judgments about political candidates or issues (priming)" (McCombs and Shaw 1972). Relatively, "the mass media are significantly more than the only purveyor of information and opinion. They may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling their audience what to think about" (Cohen 1963). This underscores why the mass media could influence the extent to which we hear and think about the incidences of security threats in the Nigerian nation.

Indeed, the media could influence perceptions on the security situations in a nation by dictating the way we know and think about the security threats. This is supported by the framing theory. Frames are patterns of interpretation offered by the media. Accordingly, the concept of framing consistently offers a way to describe the power of a communicating

text (Entman 1993; Iyengar 1996). Framing is, therefore, based on the assumption that the way an issue is characterized in media reporting – positively, negatively or neutral – could influence people’s perception regarding that particular issue. As Entman (1993) noted, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.” Thus, the media could exaggerate; could escalate or mitigate; could raise panic and could soothe people’s emotions by the way they report and describe security threats or attacks and their perpetrators.

Methodology

In assessing the real or actual contributions of the Nigeria media to the resolution or mitigation of the threats of post-independence challenges particularly that of Boko Haram insurgencies, to the Nigeria’s national security, a triangulation of methods was adopted. Content analysis was adopted to analyze the reportage of the insurgencies in the Nigeria mass media with the aim of evaluating the impact of the news reports. The outcome of this constituted the basis for in-depth interviews (IDIs) with major stakeholders within Nigerian security institutions, who were purposively selected. Thus, 92 editions of two purposively selected Nigerian daily newspapers: *The Punch* and *Daily Trust* were analyzed. Forty six (46) editions each of these newspapers between 1st of September 2012 and 28th February 2013 formed the first sample of the study to measure the pattern of coverage of the Boko Haram insurgencies and any other security challenges that occurred during the period. Twenty military officers were also purposively selected for IDIs with the intention of examining their perceptions of the coverage of threats to national security by the Nigeria mass media. The IDIs were also aimed at establishing the nature of the relationship between the media and the military with the goal of determining whether or not the kind of relationship between the two institutions influences the extent to which the media have been contributing towards the resolutions of the security challenges facing the country.

Understanding National Security: Some Perspectives

Defining the concept of national security continues to be difficult because many factors underline its capacity at all levels of perception, and thus, cannot be restricted to a single definition due to its changing nature from

one nation-state to another. Therefore, national security is a complex concept that is now being understood not only from the militarized perspective but also from a humanitarian perspective. Essentially, there are two major perspectives of understanding what national security stands for. The first perspective, commonly referred to as the Clausewitzian conceptualization of national security, is military-centred, statist, and parochial. It emphasizes the balance of power, balance of terror, containment, deterrence, flexible response and mutually assured destruction (Baylis & Ranger 1992).

It is probably in the foregoing context that Luciani (1988; 1990) conceived of national security as “the ability to withstand aggression from abroad.” In other words, it is the ability of a nation-state to ward-off all forms of threat to its survival; the sustenance of its people as well as the ability of a state to protect its legitimate interests with all measures, including war. On this wisdom, national security is the decision-making process concerned with the identification of potential and actual threats, and the mobilization of resources in the frame that promptly ensures the safety and stability of the nation-state, while simultaneously, enhancing the promotion of national development, including the integrity of national territory and institutions (Luciani 1990).

Fundamentally, the militarist/statist conceptualization of national security prides itself in the preservation of the nation-state: the territorial integrity and sovereignty and, therefore, focus on the roles of defence and security institutions (agencies). According to Lippmann quoted in Romm (1993), “a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war.” In the same vein, Maier (1990) argues that “national security... is best defined as the capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes is necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity, and well-being”.

The second perspective of understanding national security is known as the humanitarian perspective. It is a broader conceptualization of national security. According to Imobighe (1998), it (i.e., human security) emphasizes the security of individuals rather than the state. It entails the improvement in the lives of citizens in terms of freedom, education, healthcare, environmental protection, infrastructure and other amenities. It supports the protection of people from severe and pervasive threats and situations. The Commission on Human Security (2003) affirms further that it (i.e., human security) stresses on the creation of political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity. Drawing on this perspective, national security could be seen as the creation of conditions

that contribute to a nation's political, social and economic consolidation and ensure its territorial integrity, its acquisition of capabilities to sustain these conditions, safeguard freedom of options and capabilities to survive in a volatile security environment.

It is the humanist conceptualization of national security that advocates for the improvement in the lives of citizens in terms of freedom, education, healthcare, environmental protection, infrastructure and other facilities. Thus, a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that threatens drastically and over a brief time span to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state or threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private nongovernmental entities (Ullman quoted in Romm 1993). The point here is that the conceptualization of national security remains dynamic, fluid and multi-directional, but it is considered critical to the survival of any nation-state. It embodies external security (safeguarding the nation from foreign threats), and internal security (within the state). It also highlights the maintenance of economic, military, political and diplomatic power over its peers and neighbouring countries (Imobighe 1998). This means that national security cannot be linked or associated with national defence only; as it covers a wide range of aspects that require the cooperation and understanding of the state, its forces, institutions and the public. Therefore, national security in contemporary world means a situation where a nation-state or country seeks to incorporate human and societal security as a priority apart from national defence, thereby centring the fundamentals of security on the maintenance of peace and the eradication of conflict (Solomon 2007).

Post-Independence Security Issues in the Nigerian State

National security is a function of governance (part of the fundamental objectives and directive principles of the state, as it is entrenched in the 1999 *Nigerian Constitution* (as amended)). Accordingly, it is the foundation of good governance, social welfare and economic development of a country and its people. Imobighe asserts that governance is the effective management of national affairs of a country at all levels of its functioning and execution, aimed at maintaining the integrity of the nation and the security of its people. To achieve good governance, it behoves the authorities to exercise political, economic and judicial procedures in a manner, which ensures that the people are given their freedom to fulfil their duties and resolve their disputes as it is allowed in the written constitution. That is a sure way to achieve good governance, but national security could be threatened when there is a high level of poverty, deprivation, and injustice in any nation-state.

National security in the Nigerian state has been severally threatened since its independence by multidimensional issues. The challenges range from ethnic mistrust and bigotry, religious acrimonies, ethnic and border disputes to political hooliganism and violence as well as all forms of insurgencies against constituted authorities. These challenges threatened the oneness of the nation in the first republic to the extent that it led to the incursion of the military into governance; the military using the excuse of coming in to safeguard the integrity and continuous existence of the nation. However, in post-independence Nigeria, the real threats to its national security are no more limited to threats from other nation-states, but have been consistently built around internal crises and violence emanating from religious, ethnic and political acrimonies or differences. The most virulent of the challenges to Nigeria's national security is now terrorism as exemplified by a group of pseudo-Islamic extremists known as Boko Haram sects.

Kiras (2009) has conceptualized terrorism as the sustained use of violence against symbolic or civilian targets by small groups for political and social purposes, such as inspiring fear, drawing widespread attention to a political grievance, and/or provoking a draconian or unsustainable response. It aims at instilling fear among adversaries and intimidating third party persons who may or may not be direct targets. It may have a political, ideological or religious motivation or a combination of the three stratagems. As a consequence, terrorism becomes a calculated violence usually against symbolic targets, designed to deliver a political or religious message. Some of the goals of the terrorists include winning popular support, radicalising the populace, provoking the attacked people and government to act rashly; attracting recruits, polarizing the public opinion, demonstrating their ability to cause pain, or undermining governments (Onuoha 2015).

Terrorists challenge the legitimacy of the political authority by resorting to fear, surprise, violence or threat of violence to achieve their goals through coercion, illegal and immoral use of force, transnational violence and internationalization of a conflict or demand along with the covert use or coverage by the media. It is a political violence against non-combatants or symbolic targets designed to communicate a message to the broader audience (Sinno 2011). The foregoing partly describes the operations of the Boko Haram sect(s) since it started its nefarious attacks on Nigeria in 2009; attacks that have resulted in the wanton destruction of lives and properties in parts of country, thereby threatening its national security (Omoera & Ogah 2016).

Mass Media and National Security: An Analysis of Relationship

The emergence of Boko Haram as one of the toughest challenges to national security in Nigeria, with its vicious attacks on the populace, has demonstrated that the traditional threats to national security have metamorphosed into what cannot be contained by military forces or security institutions alone. The nature of the operations of Boko Haram sect(s) and many other insurgent groups in Nigeria, for instance, has shown that the Nigerian post-independence security problems require the collaboration of security organizations, which are state run such as the Nigerian army, the Nigerian police, the Department of State Security Service (DSS), etc., with non-state run bodies such as the media, the civilian joint task force (JTF), vigilantes, civil society groups, among others, whose combined efforts and expertises could help to mitigate, if not eradicate the terrorization of Nigeria. A robust combination of ‘soft power’, including intelligence reporting as represented by the mass media and ‘hard power’ as symbolized by the military or security institutions could be a very profitable joint effort that could help to douse the tense situations the terror groups have created in parts of the country.

This is in realization that the mass media are an important institution of any society (Uyo 1987). Their value in contemporary society is underscored by the premium placed on them as the “fourth estate of the realm” (Akinfeleye 2003). As the fourth estate of the realm, the 1999 *Nigerian Constitution* (as amended) gives the Nigerian media statutory roles of monitoring the performance or responsibility of the government to the people. It holds that:

The press, radio, television, and other agencies of the mass media shall at all times be free to uphold the fundamental objectives contained in this chapter and uphold the responsibility and accountability of the government to the people (Federal Government of Nigeria 2011).

These statutory roles given to the Nigeria media are, of course, an integral part of the functions of the mass media as an important social institution. Such functions include: surveillance of the environment (watchman), correlation of parts of society in response to the environment (forum), transmission of cultural heritage from one generation to another (teacher) and entertainment (Lasswell (1948) and Wright (1958) quoted in Uyo 1987). In analyzing the relationship between national security and the media, the function of the latter in respect of the surveillance of the environment requires further elucidation. By the surveillance of society, it

is meant that “mass media watch over, guard and alert society of impending problems and often proffer the way forward (Odigbo 2003).

The point being made is that the media exercise surveillance over the environment and alert members of society to the realities of their environment. The media, more often than not, report what is wrong with/in society and make concrete plans or create platforms to redress such inadequacies. In other words, surveillance of the environment means that the media provide information and alert their heterogeneous audience(s) of the changes that take place around them. In so doing, the media consistently survey the environment and convey salient issues or mediated messages to the audience in order to reduce uncertainties, thereby enabling people to react to conflicts or changes in a rational way. This is why they (the media) are commonly referred to as the fourth estate of the realm.

Given the tenacity and commitment with which the modern mass media have performed the foregoing roles, particularly that of the surveillance of society, in different parts of the world, the media have been generally considered as very powerful. It is an established fact that the mass media express and at the same time shape public opinion. They (re) construct images, perceptions and beliefs (Dahlgren 2007). Mass media educate people, correct misconceptions and give a better understanding of situations. As a mediator, the media provide outlets, offer solutions and build confidence. They are the main sources of most people's view of the world (Uyo 1987). Mass media are the most potent tools by means of which the masses ventilate their feelings and views on any issue of the day. Hence, the mass media could build public support regarding any government policy; they could effectively help to maintain contact and understanding between the government and the people; between rural areas and the cities; and among nation-states.

Nationally, the media are an important integrative agency. They are a powerful force as an educator, agitator, mobilizer, motivator, and entertainer. Their power could be great and immeasurable. They could create a feeling of involvement and participation. It is through them that the national agenda of the day is presented to the nation. They are a kind of national forum for the continuous debates on issues, which are a *sine qua non* for every society that seeks to improve on the living conditions of its people (Amoda 1978). The point being made is that they set the agenda for national discourse. This explains why “the mass media force attention to certain issues. They build up public images of political figures. They are constantly presenting objects, which suggest what individuals in the mass should think about, know about, and have feelings about” (Lang and Lang quoted in McCombs and Shaw 1972).

The pertinent question at this juncture is: where do the media come into the resolution of the challenges of national security? Perhaps, the answer lies in the fact that the mass media are expected to work within the nationalistic and preventive frameworks in order to be able to check the threats on national security. There are various strategies for maintaining national security. Such strategies include the military approach; non-military approach; carrot and stick approach; development and governance approach; preventive diplomacy (intelligence gathering and sharing); and nationalistic approach. The nationalistic approach, in which the mass media have great roles to play, entails mass mobilization and it is information-driven. It is about intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing. It requires the media to set agenda for security policies and obtain public support for the security policies. It also requires the media to change people's perceptions about security issues through supportive framing. It entails propaganda against the vendors of insecurity, while engaging the whole nation with the government and the military in decision making and policy formulation regarding national security.

Thus, the mass media are expected to be used as a soft power in the processes or attempts at resolving the challenges of national security. Indeed, information (communication) as an instrument of soft power is increasingly becoming a strategic instrument within the context of a grand strategy because the media and the security sphere are dependent on one another, and security institutions, such as governments, depend on public support for their activities and opinion building (Copley 1984). It is in this regard that we consider information purveyance as the fourth element of national power besides economic, military and diplomatic powers.

At any rate, soft power is the ability to obtain the outcome one seeks by attraction and persuasion rather than by coercion (Gilboa 2005). Power in contemporary times is the ability to change the behaviour of the nation-state and the people to be able to control the political environment through mediation. Power is becoming less coercive as military power has its limitations due to factors such as cost, time and place. Rather than using force to settle issues, to force perpetrators of dastardly acts to act in the manner one wants, soft power could be used to shape beliefs and preferences (Crelinsten 2005). Accordingly, for an efficient use of the concept of soft power, it is imperative for any nation-state to use information and communication technologies (ICTs) to deliver its message(s) and intent(s) to its own public, its neighbours and the world in general.

The media is an integral part of this soft power infrastructure, which could aid faster and more effective information dissemination, thereby helping a nation or its people interact and integrate at several levels.

This is because soft power in today’s world helps to build and manage perceptions in very significant ways. Thus, information, as an element of power disseminated through media, is a psychological dimension that could be effectively used for winning a war or resolving conflicts. To this end, the media could be used to generate political action aside from being an apparatus of national security. In this regard, the media could help to focus the attention of the public on a particular issue, and then help to frame and construct an understanding or perspective on the subject.

Results and Analysis

Content analysis

To assess or understand the contributions or roles of the Nigerian media in the resolution or mitigation of the security challenges threatening the continuous existence of the nation, the patterns and manners in which the media have been reporting the security challenges were analyzed as presented below:

Table 1: Framing of Boko Haram Insurgency Group(s) by the Nigerian Media

Framing Categories	Daily Trust	The Punch	Total
Terrorist Group	19 (46%)	18 (60%)	37 (53%)
Ethnic Crusaders	4 (10%)	3 (10%)	7 (10%)
Freedom Fighters	3 (7%)	-	3 (4%)
Militant Groups	2 (5%)	-	2 (3%)
Political Thugs	9 (22%)	1 (3%)	10 (14%)
Islamic Fundamentalists	4 (10%)	8 (27%)	12 (16%)
Total	41 (100%)	30 (100%)	71 (100%)

Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of the framing categories by the selected newspapers.

Out of the 71 total news items reported by *Daily Trust* and *The Punch*, 37(53%) framed the Boko Haram sect as terrorist groups, 7(10%) stories framed them as ethnic crusaders, 3 (4%) framed them as freedom fighters, 2(3%) framed the sect as militant groups, 10 (14%) framed them as political thugs and 12 (16%) framed Boko Haram sect(s) as Islamic fundamentalists. Specifically, out of 41 news items that the *Daily Trust* reported, 19 (46%)

framed Boko Haram sect(s) as terrorists groups, 4(10%) as ethnic crusaders, 3(7%) as freedom fighters, 9 (22%) framed the sect(s) as political thugs and 4 (10%) as Islamic fundamentalists. Also, out of 30 news items reported by *The Punch*, 18 (60%) stories framed the sect(s) as terrorist groups, 3 (10%) as ethnic crusaders, 1(3%) framed Boko Haram as political thugs and 8 (27%) as Islamic fundamentalists.

Table 2: Causal Evaluation of Boko Haram Insurgencies by the Nigerian Media

Casual Evaluation	<i>Daily Trust</i>	<i>The Punch</i>	Total
Marginalisation of the North	12 (28%)	14 (47%)	26 (38%)
Stabilize the Country	1 (3%)	-	1 (1%)
Islamise the Country	5 (12%)	7 (23%)	12 (18%)
Initiate Disintegration	23 (57%)	9 (30%)	32 (43%)
Total	41 (100%)	30 (100%)	71 (100%)

Table 2 shows the frequency distribution of framing categories in terms of causal evaluation. From 41 news items published by the *Daily Trust*, 12 (28%) was caused to marginalize the north, 1(3%) to stabilize the country, 5(12%) represented the causal evaluation to Islamise the country and 23 (57%) to initiate disintegration. Also, from 30 news items published by *The Punch*, 14 (47%) framed Boko Haram as aiming at marginalizing the north, 7 (23%) to Islamise the country and 9 (30%) to initiate disintegration. Overall, from a total of 71 news items published by *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* during the period under investigation, 26(38%) was aimed at the marginalisation of the north, 1 (1%) to stabilise the country, 12(18%) to Islamise the country and 32 (43%) to initiate disintegration.

Table 3: Moral Evaluation of Boko Haram Sect(s) by the Nigerian Media

Moral Evaluation	<i>Daily Trust</i>	<i>The Punch</i>	Total
Boko Haram Sect(s) are Devilish	1 (2%)	3 (10%)	4 (6%)
Boko Haram Sect(s) are Dangerous	8 (20%)	8 (27%)	16 (23%)
Boko Haram Sect(s) are Wicked	9 (22%)	8 (27%)	17 (24%)
Boko Haram Sect(s) are Inconsiderate	15 (37%)	4 (13%)	19 (25%)

Moral Evaluation	<i>Daily Trust</i>	<i>The Punch</i>	Total
Boko Haram Sect(s) are Ungodly	8 (19%)	7 (23%)	15 (21%)
Total	41 (100%)	30 (100%)	71 (100%)

Table 3 shows the frequency distribution of the framing categories in terms of moral evaluation by the selected mass media outlets. Out of 41 news items published by the *Daily Trust*, 1(2%) see Boko Haram sect(s) as devilish, 8 (20%) conceive Boko Haram sect(s) as dangerous, 9(22%) consider them as wicked while 15(37%) and 8 (19%) regard Boko Haram sect(s) to be inconsiderate and ungodly respectively. Out of the 30 news items published by *The Punch* during the period of under study, 3(10%) consider the sect(s) to be devilish, 8(27%) consider them as dangerous, 8 (27%) consider them as been wicked while 4(13%) news items frame them as inconsiderate and 7(23%) consider them as ungodly. Generally however, 4 (6%) of the total editions of the two newspapers analysed established Boko Haram sect(s) as devilish, 16 (23%) perceive them as dangerous, 17(24%) consider them as wicked, while 19(25%) regard them as inconsiderate and 15 (21%) established them as ungodly.

Table 4: Treatment Evaluation of Boko Haram Sect(s) by the Nigerian Media

Treatment Evaluation	<i>Daily Trust</i>	<i>The Punch</i>	Total
Given Amnesty	17 (42%)	8 (27%)	25 (35%)
Treated with Stick and Instrument of Government	15 (37%)	20 (66%)	35 (51%)
Should be Ignored	9 (21%)	2 (7%)	11 (14%)
Total	41 (100%)	30 (100%)	71 (100%)

Table 4 shows the frequency distribution of the framing categories in terms of treatment evaluation by the two selected newspapers. Out of the total 71 news items published by *Daily Trust* and *The Punch*, 25 (35%) accounted that the Boko Haram sect(s) be given amnesty, 35 (52%) said they should be treated with stick and instrument of government and 11 (14%) said the sect(s) should be ignored. Specifically, out of the 41 news items reported by the *Daily Trust*, 17 (42%) said they should be given amnesty while 15 (37%) said they should be treated with stick and instrument of government and 9 (21%) said they should be ignored. Furthermore, out of the 30 news items reported by *The Punch*, 8(27%) said they should be given

amnesty while 20 (66%) said the Boko Haram sect(s) should be treated with stick and instrument of government and 2 (11%) opined that they should be ignored.

Table 5: Direction of Stories on Boko Haram Conflicts by the Nigerian Media

Direction	<i>Daily Trust</i>	<i>The Punch</i>	Total
Unfavourable	37 (90%)	19 (64%)	56 (77%)
Favourable	1 (3%)	1 (3%)	2 (3%)
Moderate	3 (7%)	10 (33%)	13 (20%)
Total	41 (100%)	30 (100%)	71 (100%)

Figure 1: Bar Chart Showing the Direction of Coverage by the Two Nigerian Newspapers




Table 5 and Figure 1 present the direction with which the coverage of Boko Haram conflicts were reported. Out of 71 total news items, 56 (77%) were unfavourable, meaning condemning Boko Haram action while 2 (3%) were favourable, meaning supporting the acts and 13 (20%) were moderate. Specifically, out of 41 news items that the *Daily Trust* reported during the period under investigation, 37 (90%) condemned the acts (unfavourable), 1 (3%) supported Boko Haram sect (s)' action (favourable) while 3 (7%) neither condemned nor supported the acts (moderate). Out of the 30 news items published by *The Punch* to report Boko Haram sect(s)' activities, 19 (64%) were unfavourable (condemned the Boko Haram sect(s)' action), 1

(3%) were favourable (supported the action) and 10 (33%) were moderate.

In-depth Interviews

On the effect of newspaper reportage of Boko Haram, the military personnel that were interviewed had the opinion that media reports on the security situation in Nigeria, particularly on Boko Haram has presented a reality of an unsafe society. A majority of them noted that media's reportage of the security situation in the country has exacerbated the situation rather than mitigate it because the reports have caused gratuitous panic among the Nigerian populace. They also argued that it has brought about self-fulfilling propensity that makes Boko Haram sect(s) to be more dangerous and violent, igniting similar or more violence that worsens the security situation in the country. Concerning the military's perception of the media, one of the military personnel interviewed captured the opinion of security institutions in a very insightful way:

The Nigeria media have an intrinsic propensity for sensationalism. They exhibit a Machiavellian urge to 'hit arses' by all cost. They have the tendency to exhibit a surprising naivety vis-à-vis the imperative of national security, and by induction [extension] the sovereignty of the state. The typical military is burdened with the following puzzle: "Is there an unspoken Fatwa to publish or perish, which somehow hangs over the head of the fourth realm of the state like the proverbial "swords of Damocles"?"

Furthermore, the military personnel describe the media's perception of the military as follows:

The military displays a distinct proclivity for paranoid or schizophrenic behaviour and is mostly hostile. The military practices excessive caution with the media as a result of an unduly long memory of past travesties by the media. The in-built military practice of granting access to information on a need to know basis fails to take cognizance of the needs of the media. And this is the bane of the relationship between the two major institutions in the affairs of national security, and thus our national security suffers a major blow instead of being guaranteed.

The above two quotes represent the chief opinions of the military or security institutions about the media and their failure to support the military in mitigating all forms of security problems that have confronted the Nigerian state since independence. It captures the frosty relationship between the military and the media that have been hampering the efforts at

resolving post-independence security challenges, which threaten the unity of the country. It captures the mistrust, misunderstanding and impatience that have characterized the relationship between the media and the military, and which, according to one of the military personnel who was interviewed, is age-long. He asserted that “much need to be done to disabuse the characteristics of the military in the past and the current realities on the ground about the military if the two (that is, the military and the media) must work together or assist each other in resolving the problem of insurgencies, which is threatening the peace of the Nigeria.”

Further Discussion and Conclusion

The study revealed that the media are giving a wide coverage and attention to the security challenges of insurgencies and terrorism that have threatened/are still threatening the continued existence of Nigeria. That means they are performing their statutory roles of providing the needful information for the survival of individuals in the Nigerian state. This is in line with the observation of Hess & Kalb (2003) who emphasized that the media should never be in the business of burying bad news, although some amount of decency and good judgment should be expected. The terrorists need attention, and the media cannot avoid giving them while they perform their statutory roles of informing the public. The media cover terrorism; they are likely to incite more terrorism, which produces more media coverage (Barnhurst 1991b). Hence, this complex situation tends to embolden or encourage terror groups, particularly Boko Haram sect(s) to perpetrate more nefarious activities.

Although most of the stories reported in the media, particularly in the *Daily Trust* and *The Punch* condemned Boko Haram sect(s)' attacks and threats, they (the news reports) negatively impacted on national security since the ways the media framed the attacks and their perpetrators tended to raise moral panic and make the terrorist sect(s) to appear more violent and invincible. A majority of the respondents in the IDIs agreed that newspapers' framing of Boko Haram sect(s)' activities escalates the security situation in Nigeria by making them more deviant. For instance, the military does not see the media as partnering meaningfully and honestly with them in making effort at resolving the threats of the post- independence security problems threatening the existence of Nigeria. There is appears to be a big mutual distrust between the media and the military, which has hampered and still hampering the cooperation of the two critical institutions in resolving the security challenges facing the nation. In view of the foregoing, the study posits that in spite of the robustness of the Nigerian media, they

are yet to have a significant bearing on the elimination of security problems in post-independence Nigeria. Hence, the call for, among other things, a greater synergy between security institutions and mass media outfits in the country to achieve the deliverables.

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ABSTRACT

Conceptualising national security continues to be a taxing undertaking as a range of factors point up its capacity at all levels of perception, and thus, cannot be restricted to a single definition due to its changing nature from one nation-state to another. Therefore, national security remains dynamic, fluid and multi-directional, but it is critical to the survival of any nation-state. In post-independence Nigeria, security threats to its national interests not only involve conventional threats such as the ones from other nation-states but also non-state actors and activities such as terrorists, arms dealers, pirates, heists, drug traffickers, kidnappers, street gangster insurgencies, border disputes and ethnic militias. Over the past fifty six years or so, traditional threats to national security in Nigeria have metamorphosed into grave security behemoths, which apparently cannot be eliminated by military forces or security institutions alone. The mass media have been suggested to have the capacity to contribute meaningfully towards assisting security institutions in eliminating or checking the security challenges, which the country is confronted with. Perhaps, this is because the media are an integral part of the soft power infrastructure, which could facilitate the dissemination of information in a fast and effective way, thereby helping a nation such as Nigeria to put together the appropriate political action that is aimed at entrenching the desired national security. Deploying the agenda setting and framing theories, this article undertakes an appraisal of whether or not the Nigerian mass media (specifically, Daily Trust and The Punch) have made impactful contributions toward the resolution of security issues in post-independence Nigeria, with a particular reference to the Boko Haram sect(s)' insurgencies. It employs analytic, in-depth interviews (IDIs) and historical methods to look at some media reports on the insurgencies with the aim to evaluate their impact on the security of the Nigerian state. The study argued that in spite of the robustness of the Nigerian media, they are yet to have a significant bearing on the elimination of security problems in post-independence Nigeria. Hence, the call for, among other things, a greater synergy between security institutions and mass media outfits in the country to achieve the deliverables.

KEYWORDS

National security; Security institutions; Post-independence Nigeria; Media reportage; Soft power; Terrorism; Boko Haram; Security threats.

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CONTEXTUALIZING THE USE OF THE DIPLOMATIC ALTERNATIVE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE DISPUTE BETWEEN NIGERIA AND CAMEROON OVER BAKASSI 1994-2006

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Introduction

The techniques and Institutions available for resolving international disputes generally fall into the two distinct categories of Judicial and Diplomatic means. Whereas the former involves adjudication and arbitration with the use of special courts and tribunals such as the international court of justice (ICJ), the international criminal court (ICC), international tribunal of the sea e.t.c, the latter is embodied in the instruments of diplomacy, including negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and commissions of inquiry (Menkel-Meadow 2012; Brownlie 2009). In this study, the intent is to bring to light the robust use of the Diplomatic option in arriving at the peaceful and amicable resolution of the Bakassi Peninsula conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon. The work follows a comparative case study structure, using the Nigeria-Cameroon case as a point in understanding better the application and efficacy of alternative measures of dispute resolution. It would be recalled that the ICJ's ruling of 2002 could not alone, finally settle this conflict. Therefore, it becomes important to ascertain what other measures were applied before resolution could be achieved. This will interest discerning observers, who might want

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to have a full and better grasp of the events that led up to the amicable end of this conflict. To this end the work is designed along this line for cohesion and good comprehension; introduction, the theoretical discourse, contextualizing the dispute, ownership claims, adjudication, resolution through alternative means, and finally, the conclusion. Furthermore, it is hinged on the use of secondary source materials, such as books, journal articles, media reports, as well as government papers, with a view towards generating new empirical data on this subject.

The Theoretical Discourse

According to Brierly (1963) the problem of effecting the peaceful settlement of a dispute between two states admits of two alternative methods of approach. He informs that we may either induce the disputing parties to accept terms of settlement which are dictated to them by some third party, or we may persuade them to come together and agree on terms of settlement for themselves. This intellectual argument intersects with the manner of settlement of the territorial conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula between 1994 and 2008. Within this period, the dispute passed through several recognized lines of dispute resolution from adjudication through mediation, and to finally a negotiated process of settlement. This last phase of negotiated settlement is of particular interest in the light of the understanding that it came after terms of resolution of the dispute had been handed down to both parties earlier by an impartial arbiter, in this case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), through its Judgment on the matter of October 2002.

Further discourse on the place and role of diplomacy as an alternative and complementary mechanism in the settlement of disputes has been suggested. For instance, according to Collier (1996), more than ninety-nine percent of international disputes must be settled in the end by negotiation. Similarly, Berridge (2005: 121-122) in underscoring the importance of bilateralism says that 'bilateral diplomacy is...relevant in the contemporary world in that usually when negotiations take place, it is much easier on a face to face basis whereby leaders do come together and discuss issues of importance...' In the same vein Allee and Huth (2006) in explaining the merits of bilateralism in dispute resolution offers that the two sides to a dispute have the flexibility to fashion out their desired terms of settlement, and at the same time exercise considerable control over the settlement outcome, by negotiating directly. They add further that in direct negotiations, both sides can also control, at least in part, the information concerning the bargaining process, and the timing of final settlement.

Vinuales and Bentolila (2012) employ the interaction between judicial and non-judicial means of enforcing investment awards in explaining the diplomatic alternative for dispute resolution. They furnish us with the use of diplomatic exchanges and manoeuvres in the amicable settlement of disputes citing the examples of *Aucoven v. Venezuela*, where Mexico, the home state of the former, took a number of diplomatic steps to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the dispute through meeting with Venezuelan government officials to work out viable and mutually acceptable modalities for settlement. Other instances referred to where such an approach was applied are given as the *Petrobart v The Kyrgyz Republic* and the *Azurix v. CMS* cases. Also, Brownlie (2009) in identifying and explaining the varieties of instruments useful apart from adjudication, in the peaceful settlement of international disputes has offered that, the first and classical mode of settlement is negotiation, which involves a direct and bilateral process. Emphasizing its synergy with adjudication, he adds that negotiation can produce a settlement in accordance with legal criteria or with a combination of both legal and political criteria. Like Brownlie, Dinkle (2011) also characterizes diplomacy as the most ancient form of alternative dispute resolution mechanism. He avers that it involves bringing together parties to a dispute in order to arrive at a meaningful conclusion for both without violence, using negotiation instead of weapons.

On his part Rupesinghe (1995) says that the failings of the rationalist traditional and linear approach to dispute mitigation calls for alternative mechanism. Consequently, he advocates for multi-track diplomacy, which he articulates as a better model to address the underlying causes of modern conflicts, conflicts which he says are more diverse and intra-state in character following the demise of bipolarity in the late 1980s. The notion here is that, given that modern conflicts are diffused and multi-layered, mitigation should be designed along several diplomatic tracks. What is clear in Rupesinghe's articulation, despite his cynicism towards linear diplomacy, is that diplomacy, whether linear or multi-track is essential for the construction of a cohesive framework for preventive action and conflict/dispute resolution. The importance and use of multi-track diplomacy in dispute resolution is also supported by Akin and Brahm (2005). They posit that Third parties in Track I and Track II diplomacy can provide several different roles in the de-escalation of conflicts, by playing the role of mediator, initiate negotiation, generate support for an agreement, and reach and sustain agreements so as to prevent conflicts from occurring.

Carrie Menkel-Meadow (2012) brings to our understanding the fact that all of the basic and foundational processes of conflict resolution, including negotiation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, fact-finding,

conciliation, enquiries, complex multi-party consensus-building, and public policy formation and negotiation have been and are being utilized in ... dispute resolution. She opine that these processes are applied in private, public and hybrid environments of dispute and conflict resolution.

We can discern from the foregoing, a clear understanding of the importance and usefulness of the diplomatic mechanism as a veritable part of the formal dispute resolution process, beside the legal forms of arbitration and adjudication, involving, negotiation, mediation, and the use of Good Offices, forms which were employed prominently in the resolution of this conflict.

Contextualizing the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute

These two African countries have had troubled relations over the years as a result of differences concerning their common border, especially the 2,300 kilometers land boundary extending from Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula, as well as the maritime aspect located in the Gulf of Guinea. The issues at stake had always been about arriving at a clear and acceptable delineation of the boundary from North to South as well as rights over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula and sea reserves, and the fate of local populations along the stretch of the border. On the Bakassi Peninsula, Osita Eze (2007: 2) says that ‘the issue of its ownership has been a protracted dispute that had involved several attempts by leaders and representatives of both countries to resolve it.’ In the same vein, Ate (1992) offers that ‘in one form or the other, the dispute has engaged the attention of almost all Nigerian governments since 1960.’ Indeed, it is instructive to note that over the years the claims by both countries to the Peninsula have engendered tensions to the extent that in 1981 the two countries were almost at the brink of war. This scenario was to play out again in the 1990s as Nigerian and Cameroonian troops clashed severally (Baye 2010) eventually leading to Cameroon’s formal application to the ICJ to intervene in 1994. This section examines the different dimensions of the events associated with the contentious boundary between the two states, identifying the evolutionary trajectory of the dispute, and outlines the claims of ownership of the Peninsula by both sides prior to when the dispute came before the ICJ for adjudication.

An Appraisal of the numerous arrangements of Bakassi since 1884

The roots of this dispute are located in the historical European

imperialistic designs of the 19th and 20th centuries, especially, the colonial enterprises of the Germans, the French and the British. According to Anyu (2007: 41) the Bakassi Peninsula conflict is one of Africa's throwbacks to the colonial demarcation of the continent'. It would be recalled that the Cameroons was split between Britain and France following its capture from Germany in 1916, and then subsequently held as a mandate of the League of Nations (Ntamark 2002). Following World War II the Cameroons were administered as Trust Territories of the UN, with a Trusteeship agreement settled in December 1946. It has been observed that until 1960, both the Northern and Southern Cameroons, were in fact administered as part of Nigeria; the Southern Cameroons as part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria until becoming a semi-autonomous region in 1954 and gaining full regional status in 1958, while the Northern Cameroons was governed as part of the Northern Region of Nigeria (Martin 2001: xxxvi).

An appraisal of the numerous arrangements from 1884 reveals some legal and pseudo-legal issues. The first is that from the pre-1913 agreements, we can discern that the Bakassi Peninsula was administered as part of British possessions. However, going by the 1913 settlement between Britain and Germany, the area of Bakassi effectively became a German territory. Secondly, Germany, as a result of the war of 1914 could not take physical control of the Bakassi territory and as such the 1913 agreement could not be ratified, allowing the British in the event to seize adjoining parts of German territory of Cameroon and administered them as part and parcel of colonial Nigeria up to 1960. This scenario has influenced some commentators to opine that the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty is not binding on Nigeria (Ate 1992; Akinjide 1994). As a matter of fact, Akinjide who was a Minister of Justice in Nigeria argued that the Anglo-German Treaty was not binding since the Order-in-Council of November 22, 1913, which came into force on January 1, 1914, amalgamating the Northern and Southern Protectorates into a single Protectorate of Nigeria came into being after the Treaty. Moreover, it is also argued that the Treaty lapsed with the War and that under the terms of the Versailles settlement as provided for in Article 289, Britain ought to have made effort to revive pre-war bilateral Treaties with Germany, since Britain took no steps to do so then in the terminology of Article 289 it was and remained abrogated, and therefore Cameroon could not succeed to the Treaty (Eze 2007). As plausible as these arguments may sound, the fact of the principle of *Uti Possidetis*, in International Law, which relates to the sanctity of colonial boundaries, a principle which the OAU (AU) Charter adopted in 1963 suggests that Cameroon has a right to succeed to the treaty, especially when considered against the understanding that France, with its League and UN investitures, agreed other settlements

with Britain after the two wars, and remained as the Colonial Master, not Germany, of Cameroon up to her independence. We now take this general understanding of the colonial attributes of the dispute to examine the various claims to the territory by Nigeria and Cameroon.

For Nigeria, she premised her claim to the territory largely on the various Anglo-German correspondences (Exchange of Notes) of the 1880s, as well as the Treaties of protection between the British and the indigenous Kings and Chiefs of the area. Nigeria argued that the legal situation at the time of her independence in 1960 from Britain was such that, she inherited the original title of Bakassi which was vested in the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar and that this title was not affected by the Anglo-German Treaty of March 11, 1913. According to Ofonagoro (2013), this view by Nigeria was anchored on the notion that the 1884 Treaty of Protection between Britain and the King and Chiefs of Old Calabar did not entitle the British Monarch to alienate the territory of the Efik (indigenous) Kingdom, without the approval of the Efik King and Chiefs as landowners. Summer (2004) captures Nigeria's four points claim to title over the peninsula:

1. Long occupation by Nigeria and by Nigerian nationals constituting an historical consolidation of title and conforming to the original title of the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar which became vested in Nigeria at the time of independence.
2. Effective administration by Nigeria, acting as Sovereign, and an absence of protest.
3. Manifestations of Sovereignty by Nigeria together with the acquiescence by Cameroon to Nigerian Sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula.
4. Recognition of Nigerian Sovereignty by Cameroon

Conversely, Cameroon predicated her claim mainly on the Anglo-German Treaty of 1913 which defined the spheres of control in the area between the two colonial powers. She also hinged her basis on two agreements signed in the 1970s that she had with Nigeria in the form of the Yaounde II Declaration of April 4, 1971, and the Maroua Declaration of June 1, 1975 (Ate 1992: 152-162). These arrangements were devised to outline the maritime boundary between the two countries. The settlement line was drawn through the Cross River estuary to the West of the peninsula, effectively placing Bakassi on Cameroonian territory. Ofonagoro (2013) sums up the Cameroonian basis of claim on these grounds:

1. The Anglo-German Agreement of March 11, 1913, relating to the settlement of their Colonial Frontier between Yola and the Sea and the Regulation of Navigation on the Cross River.
2. The Anglo-German Agreement of April 12, 1913 regarding the boundary of Nigeria and Cameroon from Yola to the Sea.
3. The Yaounde II Declaration of April 4, 1971, following that of Yaounde I of August 14, 1970.
4. The Lagos Declaration of June 21, 1971.
5. The Kano Declaration of September 1, 1974 delimiting a 4-kilometre buffer corridor, i.e. 2 kilometres on either side of the line joining Fairway landing buoy to buoys No. 1, 2 and 3 of the Calabar Channel.
6. The Maroua Declaration of June 1, 1975, which extends the course of the Boundary from point 12 to point G.

The foregoing represents the general claims that both countries relied on as Cameroon instituted litigation at the International Court of Justice, in the process submitting its entire set of border-related disputes with Nigeria before the World Court for adjudication.

The failure of Adjudication

Matters between Nigeria and Cameroon came to a head over the peninsula in 1993 when Nigerian troops entered and occupied the area. Following a series of further border incursions that provoked shootings from both sides in the process resulting in casualties and deaths recorded on each side. Cameroon formally on March 24, 1994 instituted a suit against Nigeria at the International Court of Justice, at the Hague, seeking an injunction for the expulsion of Nigerian troops, which it said were occupying its territory and to restrain Nigeria from laying claim to Sovereignty over the Peninsula (Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor 2006).

Both countries agreed and accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in line with the provisions of the Statute of the Court as outlined in Article 36, which states *inter-alia* in paragraph 2 that 'the states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes...' (www.icj-cij.org). Before the Court both parties made arguments based on treaties, history, effective control, as well as *Uti Possidetis* (Sumner 2004). Indeed in their respective final presentations before the

Court, Cameroon on her part asked for the following prayers: that the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria was determined by the Anglo-German Agreement of March 11, 1913; that in consequence, sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula is Cameroonian. Conversely, Nigeria requested the Court to adjudicate and declare that 'sovereignty over the Peninsula is vested in the Federal Republic of Nigeria; and that Nigeria's sovereignty over Bakassi extends up to the boundary with Cameroon (THISDAY Nigerian Newspaper 2002).

Following a little over eight years of examining the matter, the ICJ delivered judgment on October 10, 2002, deciding that the very important issue of sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula rested with Cameroon and not Nigeria. The Court hinged her decision on the same old colonial agreements and settlements between Britain and Germany (Lacey and Banerjee 2002). Consequently, the Court directed Nigeria to withdraw all administrative, police and military personnel unconditionally from Cameroonian territory including the Bakassi Peninsula. It equally requested Cameroon to do likewise along the land boundary from Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula on areas which pursuant to the judgment were under the sovereignty of Nigeria (Baye 2010). Furthermore, the Court settled the land boundaries between the two countries from Lake Chad in the North to Bakassi in the South. However Bekker (2003) says that the Court could not specify an actual location of their maritime boundary off the Coast of Equatorial Guinea.

Responses to the ICJ's Ruling

The Court's decision satisfied the prayers of Cameroon for sovereignty over Bakassi, so naturally, it was Nigeria that had a reason to question and raise objections to the judgment. The emergent scenario was one of domestic reluctance from both the government and informed public opinion to accept the decision. The implication of the judgment clearly is that Nigeria had lost the territory completely to Cameroon. Consequently, the immediate reaction was that Nigeria rejected the ruling with a rhetoric that could apparently suggest recourse to war to hold on to the territory (Friends of the Earth 2003). Indeed, in an official government statement days after the judgment, Nigeria according to Llamzon (2007) appeared to accept aspects of the Court's decision it considered favourable, and rejected other parts it felt uncomfortable with. The government of President Obasanjo pleaded Nigeria's constitutional provisions as a federal state as a case for non-compliance. The argument was that since all land and territorial makeup of the country is specified in the constitution, then the federal (central) government alone can not give up the Bakassi territory without

the necessary inputs from the state and national assemblies to amend the constitution (Africa News Service 2003). In explaining this position, President Obasanjo says thus ‘we want peace, but the interest of Nigeria will not be sacrificed....What may be legally right may not be politically expedient’ (Vanguard Nigerian Newspaper 2002).

Clearly, Nigeria’s position on the judgment was an ambivalent one of deliberate indifference where she neither wholeheartedly accepted nor rejected the decision of the Court. In the official statement of the government released via the office of the special assistant to the president on National Orientation and Public Affairs, the summary states as follows:

‘Having studied the judgement as entered by the Court, it is apparent that a lot of fundamental facts were not taken into consideration in arriving at their declaration. Most disturbing of these being the difficulties arising from the Orders contained in the judgement, particularly, the Order relating to Nigerian communities in which their ancestral homes were adjudged to be in Cameroonian Territory but which are expected to maintain cultural, trade and religious affiliations with their kith and kin in Nigeria. Nigeria takes cognizance of these serious implications and therefore appeals to all her citizens at home and abroad to remain calm, positive and constructive until we can find a peaceful solution to the boundary issue between Nigeria and Cameroon. We appreciate and thank the Secretary General of the United Nations for brokering meeting at the highest political level between Nigeria and Cameroon before the judgement was delivered and for offering his good offices to broker a similar meeting now that the judgement has been delivered with a view to effecting reconciliation, normalization of relations and good neighborliness. Nigeria thanks all leaders of the international community who have expressed concern over the issue and re-assures them that she will spare no efforts to maintain peace between Nigeria and Cameroon and indeed in the entire region. However, Government wishes to assure Nigerians of its constitutional commitment to protect its citizenry. On no account will Nigeria abandon her people and their interests. For Nigeria, it is not a matter of oil or natural resources on land or in coastal waters; it is a matter of the welfare and well-being of her people on their land. We assure the people of Bakassi and all other communities similarly affected by the judgement of the International Court of Justice on the support and solidarity of all other Nigerians. Nigeria will do everything possible to maintain peace in Bakassi or any other part of the border with Cameroon and will continue to avail itself of the good office of the Secretary-General of the United Nation and other well meaning leaders of the International community to achieve peace and to maintain harmony and good neighborliness’ (The Guardian Nigerian Newspaper 2002).

This veiled threat to reject the judgment by the government of Nigeria resonated further in some aspects of the population. We could discern that post judgment rhetoric from informed public commentators

was troubling and recalcitrant, coupled with internal political pressures on the government not to respect the Court's decision (Asobie 2003). The general picture was one in which such forces called on the government not to consider handing over the territory to Cameroon under any guise, arguing that historical antecedents and long period of occupation warrants Nigeria to hold on to the territory (Okoh 2006). This recalcitrant position of Nigeria was worrisome when considered against an earlier agreement between the leaders of the two countries before the judgment of October 10, 2002. Llamzon (2007) informs that President Biya of Cameroon reported that he and President Obasanjo had an understanding to accept the judgment of the Court in a meeting with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on September 5 2002. This position is clearly supported by a UN press statement to that effect even though Nigeria denied the existment of any such agreement (UN Press Release 2002). Generally, Cameroon took Nigeria's stance with relative calm, with her minister for communication, Jacques Ndongu calling on his countrymen to absorb the reaction of Nigeria to the ruling with 'calm, dignity and serenity' (Cameroon Television (CRTV) Online 2002).

On the whole, this was the general scenario following the judgment of the Court on October 2002. Nigeria was expected to comply and quickly set in motion the machinery for ceding the territory to Cameroon as directed by the Court. However, the domestic constrains identified earlier prevented the leadership of the day to act as expected, so that it was left for the international community and other peace loving and well meaning bodies to broker further interactions and understandings between the two countries. **Conflict, it is claimed can neither be positive nor negative; rather, it is the response of the parties involved that determines its outcome. In this case, there was therefore the need to allow for diplomatic means to resolve the deadlock (see Adedayo 2013: 59). This is where the alternative means becomes imperative in resolving conflict.**

Resolution through Alternative Means

We can recall that the good offices role of the UN Secretary-General had been put to use even before the judgment of October 2002. This was applied further after the judgment to make the parties to agree on an implementation plan that will facilitate an acceptable and amicable settlement. Meanwhile, following Nigeria's ambivalence toward the Court's decision, the international community developed interest in seeing to the compliance of the ICJ's judgment. This display of naked defiance by Nigeria prompted fears from many quarters that enforcing the ruling may present

glitches (Anyu 2007). As a result, the United States, France and Britain, all, exerted diplomatic pressures on Nigeria to abide by the ruling of the Court. Britain in particular through her High Commissioner to Nigeria buttressed the fact that 'ICJ judgments are binding and not subject to appeal, so that Nigeria has an obligation under the United Nations Charter to comply with the judgment' (Agence France –Presse 2002). In the same vein, the British Foreign Minister for Africa met with the Nigerian Ambassador to remind him of President Obasanjo's earlier promise to abide by the Court's ruling (Llamzon 2007).

In subsequent years, the United Nations and its Secretary-General became the pivot around which the settlement efforts were revolved, thus, easing tension and renewing brotherly relations between Nigeria and Cameroon. Following the judgment, a series of bilateral meetings brokered by the UN were held between both parties from which both countries requested for a UN Joint Commission to be established to look at all possible implications of the ruling. Under the auspices of the Secretary-General's good offices role, the first of such achievements was on November 15, 2002 in Geneva when both Presidents in a joint communiqué agreed not only to the setting up of their Mixed Commission, but also 'to consider ways of following up on the ICJ ruling and moving the process forward' (Eze 2007), protect the rights of the people in the affected areas, and propose a workable solution (Llamzon 2007). Again, on January 31, 2004, after a Tripartite Summit in Geneva, both Presidents Biya and Obasanjo, and the Secretary-General issued a joint communiqué, in which they adopted a comprehensive settlement plan up to 2005. This progressive plan also involved the smooth and gradual withdrawal of all civilian, military and police forces from affected areas. Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General called on the international community to provide assistance within the purview of preventive diplomacy for the bilateral efforts of the two countries, particularly, funds for boundary demarcation and confidence building measures (Eze 2007). **Indeed, the Mixed Commission and the Greentree Agreement of 2006 acting as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms engendered lasting reconciliation and peace between the two disputing countries.**

The Mixed Commission

As noted above it is at the behest of the two countries that the Mixed Commission came into being. Chaired by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the Mixed Commission met eighteen times between 2002 and 2007 every two months on an alternating basis in Abuja and Yaounde comprising delegations from both

parties and with the following as its mandate: the demarcation of the land boundary between the two countries; the withdrawal of civil administration, military and police forces and transfer of authority in relevant areas along the boundary; the eventual demilitarization of the Bakassi peninsula; the need to protect the rights of the affected populations in both countries; the development of projects to promote joint economic ventures and cross-border cooperation; and the reactivation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (Baye 2010). To achieve this set mandate, the Commission went further to establish sub commissions and working groups made up of experts from both countries and the United Nations covering the following areas of, boundary demarcation including maritime; population; civil administration and police forces; as well as complete withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Bakassi Peninsula (Eze 2007).

The first task of the Mixed Commission was the demarcation of the land boundary between the two countries from the North to the South. To this end in 2003 it embarked on field visits to the Land boundary, the Lake Chad area, and the Bakassi Peninsula. By January 2004, the working group on the withdrawal of civilian, military and police forces completed its assignment and effected transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area to Cameroon. In this same spirit, the process of disengagement and handover of authority as stipulated in the Court's judgment was implemented with respect to other contested areas of their boundary. Both states, employing a give and take format, traded villages across their long mutual border in 2004, and 2006 (The Tide Online Nigerian Newspaper 2006). Indeed in a public statement through her National Boundary Commission, Nigeria affirmed the resolve by both parties to implement the decision on the Lake Chad Region, the land boundary from the lake to the sea and their maritime boundary. The statement further added that field work on the land boundary, including mapping and identification of pillars in accordance with the decision was also being implemented (Llamzon 2007).

On the aspect of joint economic cross-border cooperation, the Mixed Commission monitored the construction of border markets and roads linking the two countries. However, in as much as all appeared smooth sailing and on track, the thorny issue of the oil-rich Bakassi could not be resolved timely and amicably like the other areas. According to Borzello (2004), Nigeria could not respect two disengagement timetables set out by the Commission, as thousands of Nigerians in the Peninsula were disillusioned, unsure of their citizenship with many wanting to remain Nigerians due to their cultural and economic ties with the country. So that by January 2006, the Bakassi Peninsula was still under Nigerian control with Nigeria putting forward arguments that her withdrawal would lead to the

breakdown of law and order. Additionally, Nigeria proposed a referendum to decide the sovereignty of the peninsula since the people on the Peninsula prefer to remain in Nigeria (Eboh 2005).

This logjam over Bakassi's sovereignty became a source of great concern probably due to its rich hydrocarbon resources. As a matter of fact, strong internal opposition towards relinquishing the area to Cameroon increased in Nigeria. The Tide Online (2006) reported that there were calls on the government of Obasanjo to go to war, with this school of Nigerians arguing that it is against the national interest of the country with regard to security and economic considerations to abide by the Court's decision in its entirety. Interestingly anti-war proponents cautioned against the calls for war, pointing out the consequences of such an action on women, children and youths in general (Asobie 2003). Furthermore, they offered that 'the principle of good faith' in international relations demands that Nigeria should adhere to the ICJ's judgment and respect her words of honour embedded in the Diplomatic Notes of 1962 (Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor 2006). This was the general state of events following the work of the Mixed Commission which led to the peaceful settlement of other aspects of the boundaries between the two parties. With sovereignty over Bakassi still unresolved, it took intensive mediation efforts by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to bring the two parties together to set out a comprehensive agreement in consonance with the ICJ's ruling.

The Greentree Agreement as basis for final resolution

Brokered by the UN Secretary General and witnessed by Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, this last comprehensive agreement came out of a summit in June 2006 at Greentree, United States of America. Its task was to work out modalities for the withdrawal of Nigerian troops and transfer authority to Cameroon (Gambari 2007). Under its general terms, Nigerian troops are to withdraw within a time frame of ninety days, while a transition period of two years provided for Cameroonian administration to take over from Nigerians. It also provided for Nigerians living in the Peninsula to remain there under a special arrangement for four years after which Cameroon takes over full control. It became the basis for final resolution of the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula and formally put an end to a tricky and tempestuous series of events that had all the hallmarks of potentially degenerating into an all out war situation. Commenting on the significance of this arrangement, Kofi Annan observes that 'with today's Agreement... a comprehensive resolution of the dispute is within our grasp; the momentum achieved must be sustained' (UN Press Release 2006).

This Agreement as the basis for the final resolution of the dispute and the decisive point of compliance to the ICJs ruling of 2002 ensued that by 1 August 2006 according to the BBC, Nigeria began withdrawing her about 3,000 troops from the area in line with the provisions of this settlement to pull out troops within 90 days. This move by Nigeria set the pace for Cameroon to subsequently send in her civil administration and regain the peninsula (The Washington Times 2006). However, a face saving measure in the agreement made provision for a time table for complete and final hand over in June 2008, allowing for Nigeria to maintain its presence in 18 percent of the area from 2006 to 2008, and on the part of Cameroon, she was to follow a code of conduct for the treatment of the local Nigerian population pending their resettlement (This Day Nigerian Newspaper 2006). This fourteen years quest for peaceful resolution of this border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon climaxed on 14 August 2008 with the Treaty of Calabar between the two which marked the total pull out of all forms of Nigeria's civilian and police forces from the Bakassi Peninsula as enshrined in the Greentree settlement.

Conclusion

With regard to the territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon, what we see is the application of diplomatic mechanisms for final resolution based on the ruling of the ICJ, a ruling which in itself could not yield instant settlement. As such, as a means of moving forward the process of resolution along the lines of the judgment, the diplomatic approach had to be adopted. It proved successful in bringing together the parties under a bilateral umbrella brokered by a third party, and making them to agree to mutually acceptable terms of final resolution.

It must be emphasized that alternative dispute resolution mechanism is a standout mechanism for paecebuilding. According to Lederachi (1995:19) (quoted by Adedayo 2013: 52) paecebuilding is a concept that encompasses or generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages that can transform conflict situations towards sustainable peace attainment. This supports the view that it is difficult to have a single analysis for the trends of international conflict prevention. We could thus arrive at the conclusion that through multiple procedures conflict can be transformed in a constructive way in order to provide and build an enabling environment for sustainable peace.

The alternative mechanism is hence best suitable to resolve conflicts in Africa. Africa has, and is still witnessing scores of violent conflicts. Such conflicts took different dimensions; including ethnic, religious, political and

boundary issues, all of which have negatively impacted the development of the continent. Therefore, to tackle the scourge of conflicts in Africa, the alternative diplomatic mechanism which was applied successfully in the Nigeria – Cameroon case remains an essential tool for preventing, resolving and managing conflicts.

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ABSTRACT

This study focuses on the subject of the application of alternative means as a complement to the judicial, adjudication and arbitration options in the resolution of disputes/conflicts. The Nigeria-Cameroon conflict over Bakassi is used as a case in point. By blending the theoretical perspectives on the diplomacy/negotiation approach with the reality of this case it argues that the application of alternative dispute resolution mechanism, in this instance, facilitated a long lasting and negotiated settlement, which led to amicable and final resolution. With the understanding that dispute/conflict resolution seeks to find solutions acceptable to both parties to achieve peaceful coexistence, the question arises as to whether the ICJ's ruling in itself was able to amicably resolve the dispute? What we find is that the Ruling of 2002 did not in itself lead to instant settlement, rather it drew negative responses from Nigeria, so that it took the intervention of stakeholders in the international system, especially the Western countries, and particularly the UN and its then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to activate the UN machinery to put in place direct bilateral talks between Nigeria and Cameroon to iron out their differences. The emergent Mixed Commission and the Greentree Agreement of 2006 ensured the achievement of reconciliation, lasting peace and final resolution along the lines of the ICJ's Judgment of 2002.

KEYWORDS

Conflict; Nigeria; Cameroon; Resolution; Diplomatic; Alternative; Bakassi; ICJ.

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THE PLIGHT OF GERMAN MISSIONS IN MANDATE CAMEROON: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

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Introductory Background

The German annexation of Cameroon in 1884 marked the beginning of the exploitation and Germanization of the territory. While the exploitative German colonial agenda was motivated by economic exigencies at home, the policy of Germanization emerged within the context of national self-image that was running its course in nineteenth-century Europe. Germany, like other colonial powers, manifested a faulty feeling of what Etim (2014: 197) describes as a “moral and racial superiority” over Africans. Bringing Africans to the same level of civilization with Europeans, according to European colonial philosophy, required that colonialism be given a civilizing perspective. This civilizing agenda, it should be noted, turned out to be a common goal for both missionaries and colonial governments. Indeed the civilization of Africans was central to governments and mission agencies. It was in this context of baseless cultural arrogance that the missionization of Africa unfolded, with funds and security offered by colonial governments. Clearly, missionaries approved and promoted the pseudo-scientific colonial goal of Europeanizing Africa through the imposition of European culture, religion and philosophy. According to Pawlikova-Vilhanova (2007: 258), Christianity provided access to a Western civilization and culture pattern which was bound to subjugate African society.

There was complicity between colonial governments and missions in the cultural imperialism that coursed in Africa (Woodberry 2008; Strayer 1976). By 1884 when Germany annexed Cameroon and other territories, the exploitation and civilization of African societies had become a hallmark

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of German colonial policy (Harry 1968: 364). Achieving this dual objective in Cameroon required collusion between the colonial government and the missions. In fact, justifications for the preference that was given to German missions to missionize in Cameroon were expressed in light of the exigencies of the German nation. At this time, there was a deepening nationalist spirit in Germany with which German missions identified (Ryland 2013). In this context of a nationalist agenda at the forefront of German colonial advocacy came German mission agencies to Cameroon. These German missions were mission agencies born at a time when processes of nationalization of religion and religionization of Germany were running their course. The missionaries employed by missions that emerged in this context were among the intervening actors in the process of the contact between religion and state, characterized by efforts at nation building. So, the missions that were captioned as “German” and that were allowed to carry out mission work in Cameroon were those that were concerned with the building of German nationalism. It is clear that what it took to be ranked a German mission was not just mission agencies with German roots and in the hands of German missionaries. It also concerned missions that accrued from the Protestant Reformation, which as a whole was celebrated as pre-history of the German national unity. Little wonder, there was the identification of the German nation with the history of Protestantism.

During the over thirty years of German colonialism in Cameroon, German mission agencies such as the Basel Mission, German Baptist Mission, German Pallotine Fathers and German Sacred Heart Fathers evangelized in the territory in ways that enhanced the dual colonial agenda of exploitation and pseudo-civilization. On the eve of the First World War which triggered Cameroon’s transition from a German colony to a Mandate of the League of Nations, the missions could not be dissociated from the German colonial enterprise. Their neutrality and supranationality which the 1910 World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh attempted to proclaim had faded. Indeed rival colonial powers, Britain and France especially, understood German missions as natural partners of German colonialism. This was the context in which German missions came to be defined on the eve of the First World War. It was therefore highly likely that during this period that was marked by what Goosen (2010: 27) aptly describes as “missionary imperialism”, a war between rival colonial powers could not have allowed the nationalist-oriented German missions indifferent (Haupt 2008). While their nationalism caused them to support the German colonial effort, the Allied Powers saw missionaries as natural targets if complete ascendancy over Germany had to be attained.

Little wonder German missions’ property and missionaries were

targeted by the invading Allied Forces during the 1914-1916 military operations in Cameroon. Sadly, the ecumenical movement that ensued from the Edinburgh Conference lacked the capacity to protect the German missionary enterprise from destruction. But there were efforts at the Paris Peace Conference and in other circles to rescue German missions. This explains why some provisions of the Versailles Treaty and Mandate Agreements were intended to protect these missions from complete destruction. This occurred at a time when Britain and France were chosen as administering powers over the two sections of the partitioned Cameroon and whose duty it was to implement the legal provisions relating to missions. Irrespective of this the two administering powers placed many obstacles on the path of German missions. The Mandate Systems rather turned out to be a period when the foundational work of German missionary enterprise shrank considerably.

Because of the lack of previous research, it is exigent to enrich the literature on German missions in Cameroon by investigating their plight during the Mandate period when the territory enjoyed an international administrative status under the League of Nations (1922-1945). Existing scholarship reveals that too much generalization in church historiography has veiled and obscured some events that had an equally great impact in the history of Christianity. The plight of German missions in mandate Cameroon remains one of such neglected and overlooked areas of Cameroon's church history. Besides, the literature critiquing the Mandate System provides only thin discussions on Cameroon (Pedersen 2006; Wright 1930; Logan 1928). There are equally general works on Cameroon history having some portions devoted to the mandate period (Abwa 2000; Fanso 1989; Ngho 1996; LeVine 1968). So far the historiographical debate has more or less omitted the German mission agencies. This paper analyses the Mandate System in Cameroon from a missions' perspective as an effort at filling this scholarly gap.

German Missionary Enterprise in Cameroon: Some History

Mission work in Cameroon by German mission agencies began shortly after the annexation of the territory in 1884. But missionary work in the territory preceded German annexation given that the planting of the Christian faith is traced to the 1840s when the English Baptist missionaries began Christianizing the southern region of the would-be Cameroonian territory. In 1879 as Efoua (1981) notes, the English Baptists were joined by the American Presbyterian Mission (APM) whose pioneer missionaries started work among the Bulu. In 1884 Germany annexed Cameroon

and forced the English Baptists to leave the territory probably because of heightened colonial rivalries with Britain and due to the desire to rely on German missions in attaining her civilization colonial agenda. With the exception of the APM, the German Government preferred German missions to work in Cameroon.

Consequently, the pre-war Christian landscape in Cameroon became dominated by German Protestant and Catholic missions. The Basel Mission which was one of such missions replaced the English Baptists in Cameroon in 1886 (Werner 1969: 11; Harry 1968: 364). When the Native Baptists left behind by the English Baptists severed links with the Basel Mission in 1889, they were placed under the Neuruppine or German Baptist Mission. The latter took over Baptist churches and sent missionaries to Cameroon among them Carl Bender, Paul Gebauer, C. Hofmeister Rhode, Adolf Orther and Herman Kayser. Thanks to these men, the Baptists managed 12 mission stations, 32 schools, 100 teachers, 160 church buildings and 23 missionaries on the eve of the war (Funtteh 2008: 23).

As regards the Catholics, their missionary efforts were represented in Cameroon by the German Pallotine Fathers who began work in the territory in 1890 (LeVine 1964: 73). In all, the Pallotines had 157,934 faithful, 17,650 catechumens and 19,576 pupils on the eve of the war. This was the outcome of the work carried out by 34 priests, 36 brothers, 29 sisters and about 223 indigenous catechists (Messina & Slageren 2005: 146-147). In 1912, the Sacred Heart Fathers from Germany joined the Pallotines in Cameroon. They were given the task to plant the Catholic faith in the interior of the territory (Ndi 2005). In order to render the work of the Sacred Heart Fathers more evident, the Adamawa Apostolic Prefecture was created in 1914 and placed under them.

It is clear from the preceding that after 30 years of German imperial rule, missionary work in Cameroon was thriving. Apart from the APM, all the other missions had German origins. These German Protestant and Catholic missions were operating mission stations, schools, health units and provided many other services. By 1913, for instance, there were 631 mission schools, with 49,000 pupils throughout German Cameroon (LeVine 1964: 72). Of course, it was a very fruitful period from the mission perspective as thousands of people had converted to Christianity. It was this strong presence of German missions in Cameroon that pushed some scholars to associate them with German colonialism (Pierard 1993: 5). In fact, collusion between missions and the colonial government was to some extent the hallmark of German colonial enterprise. This lends credibility to Strayer's observation that missionaries willingly served colonial regimes (1976). No wonder the Entente Forces characterized German missions as nothing more than an

“arm of the German colonialism”. Accordingly, missions became the target of Allied military operations during the First World War.

World War One and the Question of German Missions’ Neutrality

This section highlights the importance of the First World War in coming to an understanding of the plight of German missions in Cameroon. It deals with and seeks to present explanations as to why the First World War threatened the German missionary enterprise to its very foundation irrespective of growing ecumenism and claims for missions’ neutrality and supranationality. In 1914 war broke out between imperial Germany and a number of other colonial powers. Fought in Cameroon from 1914 to 1916, this war resulted in devastating consequences for the German missionary enterprise. For close to two years, the Allied Forces moved through the territory and disrupted mission work by closing mission stations, schools, health services and deporting almost all missionaries working under German missions. By February 1916 when military operations folded up, the war had convulsed all aspects of mission work in occupied Cameroon, with some mission property suffering heavy destruction. The war presented a challenge to Catholic and Protestant missions even as they sought to respond to the exigencies of total warfare. Efoua (1981: 54) observes that almost all missionaries were deported to the Queens Ferry concentration camp from where they were repatriated to their countries of origin. For instance, the Basel Mission station at Sakbayeme was almost completely destroyed during the war, and its debris was used to construct retrenchments. In addition, the Sakbayeme residential home for missionaries was transformed into a fort by the Allied Forces (Messina & Slageren 2005: 91).

This dragging into crisis of a missionary movement that had flourished for close to thirty-years at a time of international missionary cooperation and claims of missions’ neutrality begs for further analysis. There were two opposing contexts on which the plight of missions hinged: the relationship between missions and German colonialism which was used by Allied Powers as a basis for defining German missions and the new ecumenical movement with its questioned description of missions as neutral and supranational. Germans were caught between their patriotic tendencies that manifested as support for the German colonial enterprise and the required abidance to the ecumenical prescription of neutrality in the mission field. The expectation in German missionary circles was that the international ecumenism and mission cooperation could rescue them from Allied mistreatment. As military operations unfolded, it soon became evident

that the defining of missions as natural partners of German colonialism was having an edge over their understanding as neutral and supranational, with no loyalty to Germany. As such, Britain and France built on this missions' complicity with German colonialism to subject them to mistreatment in the course of the war. In Cameroon it was a near impossibility to establish a wall of separation between missions and German colonialism, especially its civilizing agenda, despite open claims by missionaries that they did not liaise their work with the spread of Western civilization. In Allied thinking, a German defeat could not be complete without subjugating German mission agencies. Pierard corroborates this thinking, noting that, "As soon as the Allies subdued the colonial possessions, they began rounding up the missionaries who served under the German boards."

It was in vein that German missionaries in Cameroon waited for international missionary solidarity to rescue them from the Allies. The ecumenical spirit that was established at the 1910 Edinburgh Conference had seemingly collapsed when faced with the stresses of the war. Even the Continuation Committee (some of whose members were German missionaries) which was created to continue the promotion of missionary cooperation and to act as guarantor of their protection had ceased to function by 1917, with no effort to come to the assistance of German missions in Cameroon. Faced with no opposition, the Allies simply overlooked the ecumenical concept of neutrality, claiming that German missions were not supranational. By placing the responsibility for the outbreak of the war on German shoulders, Allies openly accused German missions for their participation in bringing about the war. For the Allies therefore, military assaults on the property of missions and the internment and deportation of missionaries were justified acts in the context of a war in which missionaries were not neutral. Worth noting is the fact that the Allies were backed in their anti-mission actions by their home mission boards. This was enough evidence that missionary solidarity had been shattered by the war as missions belonging to competing colonial powers took sides in a war having a negative imprint on mission work.

A response from German mission circles was expected. In August 1914, the authorities of the Basel Mission and German Baptist Mission received a manifesto from the German Evangelical Missions Assistance Agency whose goal was to protect German Protestant missions. Signed by twenty-nine German theologians and missionary leaders, the manifesto rejected Allied claims that Germany and its missions were responsible for the outbreak of the war. The manifesto also denounced atrocities on thriving German missions, regretting the absence of an ecumenical spirit in such a trying moment (Pierard). Prompt reactions to this strongly worded manifesto

came from British and French mission leaders. Apart from supporting the positions taken by their countries on the issue of the First World War, they challenged the neutrality of German missions, arguing that the mistreatment to which they were subjected was justified. These counter accusations dragged on as the German missionary enterprise in Cameroon was being ruined. In 1916 when military operations ended following the defeat and ousting of the Germans, their mission work had been orphaned. There was no single German missionary left in the territory. While waiting for the outcome of the war in Europe, Britain and France partitioned Cameroon, and remained consistent in mistreating German missions. With the end of the war in 1918 and preparations for post-war peace talks at Paris, an international crusade was launched to rescue missions from total destruction.

From World War 1 to the Mandates: Legal Perspectives on German Missions

The end of World War I was a political setting for the creation of the Mandate System by the League of Nations. These events were a cornerstone of post-war arrangements at the Paris Peace Conference, with the question of German missions dragged into the deliberations and final outcomes of the process. In this section, I focus in some depth on the struggle to rescue German missions in Cameroon in a context of post-war arrangements that was marked by a clash between Anglo-French imperial ambitions and a galvanized ecumenical spirit. While Anglo-French imperial goals threatened the continuity of the German missionary enterprise in Cameroon, the rising ecumenism after the end of the war was committed to rescuing German missions from total destruction. Did the pursuance of imperial goals by Britain and France destroy German missions in Cameroon or did the ecumenical response offer them protection? The response to this question is found in Anglo-French post-war attitude towards the missions and the ecumenical reaction at a time when peace negotiations were running their course at the Paris Peace Conference.

With the end of military operations in November 1918 and the almost inexistence of the ecumenical movement, Britain and France brought to the fore their imperial ambitions in Cameroon, which among other things involved efforts at confiscating and annexing the orphaned German mission assets. Both powers even sought to officially terminate the work of these missions and to invite specific nationals to take over. This policy was inherent in imperial thought since they had a burning desire to annex the German territories seized during WWI. In the French section, efforts were made to replace German missions with French ones. The work

of the German Pallotine Fathers and their property was handed over to the French Holy Ghost missionaries while the Paris Evangelical Mission (PEM) succeeded the Basel Mission and the German Baptist Mission. There was some caution in the British sphere as no expedient action was taken to replace German missions with British ones. It appears Britain wanted that the transition from war to peace should run its course before taking final decisions on the missions. But the prohibition of German missionaries from working in the territory remained. This led to the decline of the Christian communities and the revival of traditional religious practices, specifically secret societies, which missionaries considered as pagan (Werner 1968: 48). In the face of this clerical challenge, Islam was making substantial gains, especially in the Western Grasslands where there were no missionaries.

The above dilemmas facing Germans in Cameroon were similar to what was transpiring in German East Africa, Togoland and German South West Africa. This accounts for the rise of a special ecumenical spirit intended to influence the deliberations at the Paris Peace Conference in view of limiting the damage. The new ecumenical movement was represented by the Emergency Committee of Cooperating Missions (ECCM) which came into existence in 1918. But during the first months of deliberations at Paris, the weight of the committee was not yet evident given that it was still struggling to gain international recognition. Consequently, statesmen at Paris, based on imperial concerns, resolved to confiscate all foreign properties belonging to German missions and use the proceeds from the sale of these to settle German debts to Allied governments (Pierard 1998: 18). Reversing this resolution became the main struggle of the ECCM since its implementation would have meant the total destruction of German mission work. The leaders of the Committee rushed to Paris and worked behind the scenes to reverse the situation. It represented the peak of the clash between imperial concerns and missionary neutrality, with national sentiment edging the ecumenical spirit.

While in Paris, those at the forefront of the ECCM insisted that a clause protecting German missions be added to the Versailles Treaty that was still under preparation. But as Spohn and Sauer (2009) note, the statesmen rather called on German missions to assume their share of responsibility for the outbreak of the war. To Britain and France, the properties of German missions in the former colonies were perceived as the spoils of war to be shared among the victors. By partitioning Cameroon in 1916, Britain and France had hoped to annex these territories together with the property of the missions. By this time, representatives of the ECCM had worked from behind the scenes to drag the question of German missions into the political deliberations for post-war international law. The deliberations caused the

statesmen to review the resolution earlier taken, this time around granting some protection to German missions in the colonies. It is Article 438 of the Versailles Treaty that carries this clause protecting missions. It reads:

The Allied and Associated Powers agree that where Christian religious missions were being maintained by German societies or persons in territory belonging to them, or of which the government is entrusted to them in accordance with the present Treaty, the property which these missions or missionary societies possessed, including that of trading societies whose profits were devoted to the support of missions, shall continue to be devoted to missionary purposes. In order to ensure the due execution of this undertaking the Allied and Associated Governments will hand over such property to boards of trustees appointed by or approved by the Governments and composed of persons holding the faith of the Mission whose property is involved. The Allied and Associated Governments, while continuing to maintain full control as to the individuals by whom the Missions are conducted, will safeguard the interests of such Missions (Treaty of Versailles 1919).

The foregoing resolution represented a theoretical achievement in the struggle for the survival of the German missionary enterprise in Cameroon and elsewhere. This was disturbing for France and Britain who had already adopted hostile measures towards German missions in Cameroon. It was now their duty to safeguard the interests of such missions by ensuring that there was continuity. It represented a check on the religious imperial ambitions of both powers in Cameroon, and it was hoped that this would bring to an end the post-war assaults on German missions. In a rare moment, the ideal of missionary freedom and neutrality was gaining recognition.

In order to ensure the practical implementation of this clause in the colonies, officials of the ECCM did everything to encourage participants at the Paris Peace Conference to factor such guarantees for missions' protection in the rules and regulations governing the League of Nations mandates. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided among other things that the mandatory should guarantee freedom of conscience and religion on behalf of the League. Regarding Cameroon, Britain and France signed separate mandate agreements with the League. The agreements, in the light of Article 438 of the Versailles Treaty and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, went further to guarantee the protection of German missions. In both agreements, the article read:

The Mandatory shall ensure in the territory complete freedom of conscience and the exercise of all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality; missionaries who are nationals of states members of the League of Nations shall be free to enter the territory

and to travel and reside therein, to acquire and possess property, to erect religious buildings and to open schools throughout the territory; it being understood, however, that the mandatory shall have the right to exercise such control as may be necessary for the maintenance of public order and good government, and to take all measures required for such control (Rubin 1971: 198).

This article of the Mandate Agreement as well as those enshrined in the Versailles Treaty and Covenant of the League therefore provided that British and French colonial mandate authorities should act as protectors of German missions in the two Cameroonian territories placed under their administration. Indeed the Paris Peace Conference and the ensuing League of Nations created an international legal basis for agreement on the protection of German missionary enterprise in the two mandated territories of Cameroon. As such, there was an international law guaranteeing the survival of German missions and whose implementation rested on the shoulders of Britain and France under the supervision of the League. The latter, in 1921, put in place the Permanent Mandate Commission, charged with overseeing this system of international supervision. The ecumenical movement which further gained steam was expected to ensure that the legal protection for the missions achieved during the post-war deliberations was not transgressed by the Mandatories and the League. Whether or not the trio (colonial mandate authorities, League of Nations and the ecumenical movement) acted in defense of German missions, as provided by the above legal parameters, is the focus of the remaining two sections of this paper.

These sections concentrate on the actions undertaken by the Mandatories in the two mandated territories in regard to German missions. The latter's persistent difficulties in spite the existence of a legal protection basis is relevant for an assessment of the Mandate System and its deficiencies. The Mandatories charged with the implementation of the missions' protection laws played a significant role in creating the League of Nations and the Mandate System itself. They went on to express the will to be mandated with the territory of the former German colony Cameroon, which had been partitioned into British and French Cameroons. The League approved the partition and mandated both powers in 1922 with the portions of Cameroon they had received in the course of the partition. Existing scholarship reveals that the two mandatory administrations were not clearly distinguishable from colonial administrations (Fanso 1989; Ngho 1996; LeVine 1964). This was expected given that the Mandatories manifested huge colonial desires which they placed above international law.

German Missions' Treatment in British Cameroon

In British Cameroon, a final policy towards the German missions had to be adopted from 1922 when the Mandate System went operational. In total violation of the legal provisions of the Versailles Treaty, the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Mandate Agreement that were designed to protect Christian missions from the colonial desires of the Mandatories, British mandatory colonial officials adopted the policy of inviting British missionary agencies to replace the German ones (Ndi 2005: 38). Colonial exigencies at the time made Britain not to accept the return of the German missionaries to her sphere, since the fashioning of the Mandate System did not mean the end of colonialism. Matz (2005: 50) is right in his observation that the deficiencies of the League of Nations Mandate System cannot be analyzed without building on the colonial realities at that time. Little wonder Matz perceives the Mandate System as an "instrument of imperial power policy" (2005: 50). This context permits us to understand the recourse to British missions to replace German ones in British Cameroon, with the League doing almost nothing to check such gross violation of international law. British colonial mandate authorities in the territory were worried about the possibility of German mission agencies working towards promoting German interest if they were allowed to return. The anti-German missions' policy was also a product of appeals by some traditional rulers (with whom the British were already collaborating) for British missionaries to replace German ones.

The German Sacred Heart Fathers and the Pallotine Fathers both of the Catholic faith tradition were the first victims of the anti-German missions' policy. In a letter to the Colonial Office, Herbert Ruxton in his capacity as Resident requested for a British Catholic Mission to replace the two German Catholic mission agencies. Without any hesitation, the Colonial Office approved the request and its choice fell on the London-based Mill Hill Mission (Ndi 2005: 39). This was followed by talks involving the Colonial Office, Mill Hill Mission and the Vatican in view of obtaining an ecclesiastical clearance. Sadly, the Permanent Mandate Commission and the two German missions that were to be replaced were not part of these negotiations. The laws designed to protect these missions were flagrantly violated. In 1922, Mill Hill Missionaries under the leadership of Fr John William Campling effectively replaced the Pallotine and Sacred Heart Missionaries. These English missionaries also inherited the property of their German counterparts. The laws which provided that the Mandatory should protect the interest of German missions and to hand over their property to boards of trustees were overlooked by the British. This illegal

replacement and property confiscation amounted to a total destruction of the foundational work of German Catholic mission societies in the British sphere of Cameroon. The successful implementation of this imperially-motivated policy also hinged on the absence of the Catholic missions in the ecumenical movement at the time. So, the efforts of ecumenical gatherings to rescue German missions focused on the Protestant ones that adhered to the ecumenical spirit.

Recourse to British missions to replace German Protestant missions met with fierce ecumenical resistance. British colonial mandate authorities overlooked the neutrality of the Basel and Baptist missions and their legality to pursue mission work in British Cameroon. What followed were efforts for British missions to take over the work and property of German Protestant missions. The remaining Protestant missionaries in the internment camps were repatriated at a time when measures were being taken for British missions to replace German ones. Reverends Rhode and Bender who were seen as obstacles to British imperial mission policies were expelled from the territory in spite the fact that they did not have German roots (Helga 1999). The British Baptist Mission was then invited by Resident Ruxton through the Colonial Office to take over the work of the German Baptist Mission. As the English Baptists were preparing to come to Cameroon, the International Missionary Council (IMC) which was created in 1921 from the ruins of the ECCM condemned the decision, arguing that it was underpinned by selfish British colonial desires. In 1924, during the Conference of Missionary Societies in Europe and America held in Birmingham, obstacles to evangelization in Africa were discussed. The recourse to British missions to replace German ones, especially in Cameroon was denounced. Given that the conference took place in British, its organizers requested the Colonial Office to lift the ban on German missionaries operating in Africa and to stop handing over their property to British missions. In response, the Colonial Office said measures were to be taken to end discrimination against German Protestant missions. This was how the transfer of the works of the German Baptists to the British Baptists was foiled, following the lifting of the restrictions in late 1924. In 1928, Baptist Missionaries officially returned to British Cameroon, and by 1935 they had constituted themselves into the Cameroon Baptist Mission (CBM).

At the same time, there were similar efforts to stop Basel Missionaries from resuming work in the British sphere of Cameroon. The guarantees for missionary freedom enshrined in the regulations governing the League of Nations mandates meant nothing to the British. By 1922, all Basel Missionaries had been forced out of Cameroon, with the church abandoned in the hands of indigenous clerics who appealed to the Basel

Mission to send some of the missionaries back to Cameroon (Werner 1969: 58). Since an embargo prohibited German Missionaries from working in Cameroon, the Basel Mission, as Werner (1969: 58) notes, made fruitless negotiations for American Presbyterians to step in. Thus pushed to the wall, Basel Mission authorities took the matter to ecumenical circles. In 1923, pressure from the IMC had caused Britain to soften its position. The policy of inviting a British mission to replace the Basel Mission was abandoned. Rather, the British allowed the Basel Mission to continue its work, insisting that only missionaries not having German roots be deployed. So, the Basel Mission, under Swiss missionaries, resumed work in British Cameroon, as the struggle to lift the ban on German missionaries continued.

This struggle was championed by the IMC and missionary advocates. Through their efforts, the British government in 1924 lifted the embargo on mission work by German missionaries in its possessions. The Colonial Office and the Resident for British Southern Cameroons then abolished all restrictions which had been placed on the Basel Mission since the war. In December 1925 Reverend Adolf Vielhauer arrived in Cameroon from Basel to coordinate Basel Mission work in Cameroon. Through discussions with the Resident in Buea, the Basel Mission received its property back, marking the end of the crisis period. The ensuing freedom of missionizing in the territory was only threatened by the Second World War. During the war, restrictions were placed on German missionaries and they were interned and forcibly deported (Werner 1969: 79). They returned only during the Trusteeship period when the passions of war had subsided. These deportations, it should be stressed, violated the missionaries' freedom enshrined in the regulations governing the League of Nations mandates.

While Protestant missions were successful in the struggle to return to British Cameroon, the two German Catholic ones, namely, Pallotine Fathers and Sacred Heart Fathers, did not. The Protestants had benefitted from the ecumenical pressure that was mounted on the British government. By not being part of the ecumenical movement, Catholic missions could only rely on the Vatican. The latter it should be noted lacked the potential to challenge the restrictions on German missions imposed by the British government. By yielding to such a policy irrespective of its violation of international law on missionaries' freedom and protection, the Vatican had colluded with the British in destroying the foundational work of the Pallotine Fathers and Sacred Heart Fathers. Their property was taken over by the Mill Hill Missionaries. There are specific colonial reasons as to why the legal provisions for the protection of German missions were largely transgressed by British colonial mandate authorities. In particular, attention has been drawn to the degermanization policies and civilizing agendas of

both powers whose attainment could only come at the detriment of the legal provisions of the Mandate System.

Dilemmas in French Cameroon

In the French mandate of Cameroon, there was no near prospect of German missions being allowed to resume their work. Even missionary dialogue and debate that ensued from the ecumenical movement were not strong enough to cause the French to respect laws governing League of Nations mandates. While pursuing a policy of degermanization directed, in part, towards the elimination of German mission work after the end of the war, French colonial mandate authorities worked towards replacing German missions with French ones. A ban was placed on mission work by German nationals and the properties of their missions were taken over by French societies.

Overlooking all existing agreements, French colonial mandate authorities launched an assault on the long German Catholic mission (Pallotine Fathers) that was present in French Cameroon. The Holy Ghost Fathers from Paris were invited to replace the German Pallotine Fathers (Messina and Slageren 2005: 153). This was the handiwork of successive colonial administrators such as General Aymerich and Lucien Fourneau who battled hard to replace German missions with French ones. With the effective take off of the Mandate System in 1922, France entered into formal talks with Rome in view of rendering the takeover official. Ensuing from this was the Pope's appointment of French man, Mgr Francois Xavier Vogt as the Apostolic Administrator of Cameroon in 1922. This amounted to the total elimination of the German Pallotine Fathers' work in the French mandate of Cameroon. They were never permitted to return to the territory. Although the Vatican was involved in the replacement negotiations, it is clear that the provision of article 22 of the peace treaty granting freedom of work in the mandated territories to German missions was transgressed. Being a largely Catholic state and given its good ties with the Vatican, France destroyed the foundational work of German Catholic missions, overlooking the freedom of mission work provisions enshrined in the Mandate Agreement.

Concerning the two German Protestant missions in French Cameroon, namely, the Basel Mission and German Baptist Mission, their work was taken over by the Paris Evangelical Mission. On their arrival, the French Protestants were given the freedom to take control over the totality of the properties left behind by the Basel and Baptist Missionaries. In fact, the mission stations, schools, church buildings and thousands of Christians that were under the charge of the German Protestant missions

were in total illegality transferred to the Paris Evangelical Mission by French colonial mandate authorities. The provision of Article 348 requiring that the properties which the German missions possessed be placed under a board of trustees was flagrantly violated. This policy of replacing German missions with French ones also went against Article 7 of the Mandate Agreement which made it mandatory on the French mandate colonial authorities to ensure that missionaries were accorded the freedom to carry out mission work in the territory. Rather, German Protestant missionaries were denied entry into French Cameroon; a policy that caused the German Protestant missionary enterprise to collapse.

Without doubt, the French colonial administrators in Cameroon had allowed their national passions to rise above the concern to ensure the continuity of German mission work. The nationalism, materialism and the pursuance of imperial desires which characterized the French mandate administration combined to produce an anti-German missions' agenda. Little wonder the neutrality of these missions claimed by the ecumenical movement was overlooked by the French who argued that missionaries could not be dissociated from German colonialism. In fact, the dismantling of German mission work in French Cameroon was the handiwork of Commissioner Jules Gaston Carde who headed the mandate administration from 1919 to 1923 (Abwa 2000). This degermanization of mission work was continued from 1923 to 1933 by Theodore Paul Marchand. Throughout the territory, French became the official language through which mission work was conducted, thus reinforcing the ban on German missionaries to return to the territory.

The ecumenical ideal, in spite its growth and ensuing gatherings, lacked the capacity to check French destruction of the foundational work of German missions. It is important to note that the two French missions (Holy Ghost Fathers and Paris Evangelical Mission) that replaced the German missions were not yet part of the ecumenical movement. Their collusion with the French government in the destruction of German mission work at a time of growing ecumenism is not in doubt. The authorities of these French missions cannot claim that they were not aware of Article 438 of the Versailles Treaty, Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 7 of the Mandate Agreement. They worked closely with their government in violating these legal provisions that were framed with the intent of protecting German missions.

The League of Nations whose role it was to ensure that these legal provisions were strictly respected certainly failed to do its job. As a matter of fact, the League was indifferent to the French ruining of the German missionary enterprise. Given their volatility to unlawful French colonial

desires and considering the limitations of the ecumenical movement, German clerics expected the League of Nations, especially its Mandate Commission, to rally behind them in the defense of their neutrality and supranational status. But the League had been brought under the dominance of imperial powers that were concerned with the defense of their harmful nationalism ideologies, even if this did not conform to the vision and mission of the League. In French thinking at the time, as Kissinger (1994: 235) rightly observes, the main purpose of the League of Nations was to work against German interest, not to promote it. France was in a position of political, military, economic and social vulnerability in the context of two successive humiliating defeats inflicted by Germany. The latter, no doubt, was not in the good books of France, and limiting Germany's expansion in all spheres was a core French goal. The neutrality of the German missions and the legal instruments for their protection therefore meant nothing to French colonial mandate authorities.

The League, under the heavy weight of French influence, could not defend the interest of German missions placed under French administration. Rightly therefore, Susan Pedersen (2006: 560) observes that "mandatory administrations were not distinguishable from colonial administrations." This historian refuses to see the Mandate System as "a system of governance", on the basis of its flaws. If one should go by the complicity of the Mandate System authorities, especially the Mandate Commission, to the total destruction of German missions in French Cameroon, then the conclusion by Mandate System scholars that the system was merely a disguised form of imperial annexation is tenable. The French mandate administration, as Cameroon history scholars concluded in their separate studies, was not different from French colonial administration in its colonies (Abwa 2000; LeVine 1964; Fanzo 1989; Ngoh 1996). In his massive study on mandate and trusteeship French Cameroon, Daniel Abwa (2000: 95) insists that French policy was tailored towards francisizing the territory by replacing German aspects with French ones. The Mandate Commission could not prevent this from happening. In the thinking of Pedersen (2006: 565), the Commission could do very little about the oversight of Mandatory powers. It could only denounce without taking action. The initial absence of a German representative in the Commission made this overlooking of the interest of German missions to progress without any formal condemnation from the Commission. Expectedly, German mission work had shrunk on the eve of World War 2 with no hope of restoration.

Conclusion

The post-World War I peace treaties and the ensuing League of Nations alongside its Mandate System provided legal instruments for the protection of the interest of German mission work in the mandated territories. In the British and French mandates of Cameroon, both mandate administrations were expected to conform to the agreements signed by the two mandatories with the League. One provision of the agreements (Article 7) guaranteed freedom of mission work, including German missions. The colonial mandate administrations in the two territories overlooked these legal instruments and opted for policies that were detrimental to the German missions. There was the recourse to British and French mission agencies to replace German ones, with little or no objection from the League. The provisions of the mandate system relating to missions were hypocritical. German missions in Cameroon were assigned to Britain and France with a mandate under League supervision, to ensure their protection and sustenance. What that meant was ambiguous, given that a provision of Article 43⁸ prohibited mission work by German nationals. Building on this ambiguity and their colonial ambitions, British and French colonial mandate authorities shattered the foundation of German missions.

While the totality of German mission work was terminated in French Cameroon, the British limited the hostility only to Catholic missions as the mission work of Protestant missions was restored in the 1920s. Clearly, the mission endeavor by German missionaries in both territories suffered enormously in a context of a complacent League, a non inclusive and weak ecumenical movement and the pursuance of imperial desires by the two Mandatories. Consequently German missionaries' ambition to establish self-governing, self-supporting and self-propagating churches in Cameroon suffered mightily. Only the Basel Mission and Baptist missionaries were able to establish the Presbyterian Church in Cameroon and the Cameroon Baptist Convention respectively in the British sphere. The efforts of the other missions ended in total failure, as the triple mission agenda was continued by British and French mission agencies. This study therefore adds to the body of literature critiquing the Mandate System. It has used the question of German missions as a case study to support the scholarly stance that the mandate system was a disguised form of imperial annexation.

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ABSTRACT

The First World War and its resultant Mandate and Trusteeship systems greatly affected the German mission enterprise in Cameroon. Apart from causing the forceful ousting of German missionaries from Cameroon, the British and the French whom the League of Nations and United Nations successively chose as administering powers within the Mandate and Trusteeship frameworks adopted hostile policies towards German missions. From the beginning of the war to the post-Second World War era, the foundation of German missions was seriously threatened. This paper critically examines the treatment of German missions in both British and French Cameroons during the Mandate and Trusteeship periods, focusing especially on the opposing attitudes of both administering powers towards the missions in their spheres of influence. The paper establishes that the administering powers' treatment of German missions, which was underpinned by imperial and nationalist exigencies, roiled the attainment of the triple missionization agenda of planting self-supporting, self-governing and self-evangelizing churches. It thus argues that the First World War triggered the mistreatment of German missions, with some missions forced to terminate their activities while others were allowed to continue their mission work under difficult conditions.

KEYWORDS

Cameroon; First World War; German Missions; Second World War; Mandate System; Trusteeship System.

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MIGRATION AND IDENTITY IN SOUTHWEST REGION OF CAMEROON: THE GRAFFIE FACTOR, c.1930s-1996

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Introduction

Issues pertaining to migration form part of the most salient topics in Africa today (IOM 2004). Although most of the literature tends to examine migration through the lenses of South-North movements, there have been considerable migrations within the continent of Africa itself (Bakewell & De Haas 2007). Its ramifications are seen in social, cultural and political domains. The colonial rule affected the migration of people considerably because of the creation of mines and plantations and the existence of auxiliary services like drivers, gardeners, housemaids and messengers (Cordell & Piche 1996). The long run effect of such movements was the politicisation of identity. The recent upsurge of *ivoirite* denoting the “true Ivoirians” as opposed to the “other” in 1995, and the *makwerekwere* in South Africa, coined to describe settler immigrants tickles us to the perennial issue of migration and politicization of identity which has been given birth by the colonial and post colonial regimes (Whitman, 2000). In the Central/West Africans state of Cameroon the concepts of *allogenes* and *autochthones* was evoked to include and exclude some of the citizens (Nouvelle Expression 1996; Awasum 1998; Nyamnjoh and Geschiere 1998). This article is a contribution to such ongoing debates which is pecked on migration and politicization of identity. Its specific contribution lies in the fact that it shows the layers of how migratory flows have contributed to the problematisation of identity. In most African states, settler immigrant population is merely mentioned and the net flow of these migrants into areas of identity contestation has not been given adequate attention. The pith

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and ernel of this paper therefore argues that the colonial history of each of African states which precipitated new patterns of migration could contribute to a better understanding of recent politicization of identity. It appears to be the legacy of the colonial and post-independence institutions and elite actions that make identity a feasible political tool but underneath lays a rich history of migration which has hitherto not been excavated by scholars and researchers of Cameroon. If we are to understand migration and identity globally, we must first examine salient migratory flows over time and space.

This article focuses on the migration of Bamenda Grassfielders to the littoral quadrant of Cameroon and how they have in time and space maintained their identity in a socio-heterogeneous setting. It argues that although the concept of *graffie* which became a strong term in the lingo of most Cameroonians in 1990s had its foundations stretched back into the 1930s. *Graffie* is a creolized word which means people from the Bamenda Grassfields. Its meaning is sniping. It is sniping in the sense that it refers to people from the Bamenda Grassfields who are more backward as compared to the more civilized coastal people. It is also borne out of spite as the people who are more enterprising and entrepreneurial than the coastal people. Geographically, the region known as the Bamenda Grassfields is occupied with savannah and interspersed with forests in the valleys. The Germans code named it the Grassfields as opposed to the forest region. Despite the scholarly attention which has been given to the immigrants' population phenomenon by scholars in contemporary Cameroon, it has not been well historicized (Awsum 1998; Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997, 2003; Nyamnjoh and Geschiere 1998.). This essay is an attempt to demonstrate that the name *graffie* had been constructed over the years due to sustained population migration from the Northwest region to the coastal region of Cameroon. The coastal region has a plantation complex as well as industries which acted as a cynosure that attracted the population from this area (Rudin 1938:248; Fanso 1989). The Bamenda region lacks any meaningful industries of any kind and so the ecology cannot harness its growing entrepreneurial population. Thus the lives of the people here is coloured by constant mobility.

Two concepts underscore the discussions in this article. These are identity and migration. Identity is a complex concept and appears to have gained its prominence only in modern sociological thought. Sociologists dealing with that concept in the 1970s were pre-occupied with the "me" in trying to investigate the avenues through which interpersonal relations created the self in an individual. Cooper (2005), writing on identity, maintain that 'everybody seeks an identity', adding that 'identity is fluid, constructed and contested'. In other words identity is not bounded or rigid, it is created

depending on time, context and circumstance. The authors also argue ‘not for a more precise word to replace identity but rather for the use of a range of conceptual tools adequate to understand a range of practices and processes’ (Cooper 2005). According to Cerulo (1997) many works have tended to refocus what obtained in the 1970s by shifting attention from the individual to the collective identities’. While agreeing with Cerulo and others who belong to this school of thought, this article scrutinizes the practices and processes that create identities amongst the Bamenda Grassfielders while they are out of their areas of origin especially in southwest coastal Cameroon. What they held on that made them what they are or thought they were and how they blend with what their host also possess in the course of their migration is quite crucial in the essay.

There is no shortage of work on labour migration. Broadly speaking the red lines of the scholars could be categorized into three major parts. First, these scholars have shown us that migrations are not new to Africa and have been rural-rural; rural-urban, urban-rural. Secondly that Africa is a continent of considerable migration and people movements are dictated by political, social, economic and religious factors. Thirdly since the imposition of colonial rule in Africa, most migration has been dictated by labour. (Amin 1974; Adepoju 1977, 1998, 2010, Harris 1994; Davidson 1954; Van Onselen 1976).

In what follows in this article, I will sketch the history of migration of the ethnic groups of the region during the colonial and post colonial period while paying attention to migratory waves, and the factors which explain why the people migrated to the various places. The article will further examine the migrant-host relationship especially in coastal Cameroon and how the Bamenda Grassfielders have tried to hold tight to their identity while out of their area of origin in a melting pot of many cultures in the region. The article ends with a conclusion and a bibliography.

Methodology

According to Thomas (2002: 272), ‘the importance and significance of methodology lies in the fact that the issue of what is studied is intimately connected with the question of how it is studied’. In the writing of this article I built and drew on my previous article (Nkwi 2014) in which I sketched and analyse the migration of Bamenda Grassfielders to Europe, America and Asia showing how they have been constructing home out of home in those diasporic places. I also draw from other scholars and my article on identity which focuses on shifting identity on Cameroon football (Nkwi 2014). Appreciably, I have added to my previous argument the *graffie*

factor in the migratory waves and settlement of Bamenda Grassfielders in Southwest region of Cameroon.

The National archives located in Buea, Southwest region of Cameroon was useful. From that archive, I gathered the League of Nations reports as well as United Nations Trusteeship and visiting missions' reports. These reports show statistically how the migrants from the Bamenda Grassfields had been settling in the plantation coastal area over the years especially during the Mandate and Trusteeship periods.

My personal observation during the heydays of political liberalisation was also relevant. I have lived in the Southwest plantation coastal Cameroons since 1993 when I was admitted into the University of Buea to read history at the undergraduate level. After that I was enrolled for the Masters program which I completed in record time and was recruited to teach back in the same Department. My discipline background and many years were to shape and sharpen my thoughts. During the long uninterrupted period I observed that Grassfielders, held very strongly to their identity by forming cultural associations and interestingly inter-married with people from other indigenous groups. They also held annual cultural meetings, print almanacs and appear in their traditional regalia. Some have opened beer parlours and give and give ethnic labels as tag names. For instance, the *Afo-a-Kom* embassy; Moghamo drinking spot; Aghem Inn. All these denote a struggle to hold onto their identity.

Locating the Bamenda Grassfields in the Geo-politics of Cameroon

The term Bamenda Grassfields dates back to the period of the German colonization (1884-1916). It is used to connote that part of the hinterlands that was characterised with high altitude and grassy nature. Except for the forest galleries the area is full of beautiful grassy scenery. The indigenous population of the area immigrated from various directions and broadly speaking these groups can be placed under five major headings: Tikar, Widikum, Chamba, Tiv and Mbembe. Table one below shows the major groups of the region.

Table 1: Different Ethnic Groups of the Bamenda Grassfields

Ethnic Group	Population
Tikar	Kom, Nso, Oku, Mbiame, Wiya, Tang, War, Bum, Bafut, Mbaw, Fungom, Mmen, Bamunka, Babungo, Bamesi, Bamesing, Bambalang, Bamali, Bafani, Baba, Bangola, Big Babanki, Babanki-Tungo

Widekum	Esimbi, Beba-Befang, Mankon, Ngemba, Ngie, Ngwo, Mogamo, Meta
Chamba	Bali-Nyonga, Bali-Kumbat, Bali-Gangsin, Bali-Gashu, Bali Gham
Tiv	Aghem Federation
Mbembe	Mbembe, Misaje, Mfumte

SOURCE: Paul Nchoji Nkwi (1987), *Traditional Diplomacy: A Study of Inter-Chiefdom Relations in the Western Grassfields, North West Province of Cameroon* (Yaounde, Cameroon: Department of Sociology, University of Yaounde), 15

From the table above it could be seen that under the five major groups of the area the Tikars are the most populated in terms of the sub ethnic groups while the Widekum and Chamba come second. The least are the Tiv and Mbembe. These ethnic groups collectively constitute the Bamenda Grassfields. The lives of the people of this region is coloured by migration. In the pre-colonial period they mostly migrated to Northern Nigeria where they traded in kola-nut and in return bought spices and clothes. Exceptionally, they will also venture to the Bight of Biafra where they sold livestock and bought Dane guns and palm oil. During the colonial period they migrated to coastal Cameroon where there was a plantation complex. The post colonial period saw new migration destinations to Europe and America.

Much has been researched and written on the Bamenda Grassfields but from the perspectives of anthropologists, sociologists, and to a very less extent, historians (Chliver 1961, 1963, 1966, 1967 and 1981; Chilver and Kaberry 1967 and 1970; Kopytoff 1973 & 1972 Nkwi 1976; Nkwi and Warnier 1982; Kopytoff 1972 & 1973; Rowlands 1978; Pelican 2006). These readings as excellent as they appear to be are coloured by the backgrounds of the authors and although most of them implicitly dealt with migration they have not explicitly addressed the issue of migration and migrants' identity within a complex diverse milieu, a gap which this article sets out to fill. Their geographical migration during the colonial migration was mostly south bound.

Southward Movements

Generally, southward migration from the hinterlands of Africa South of the Sahara to coastal areas has been going for a very long time. Coastal cities and or towns became attractive to the youthful population during the colonial period and beyond for several reasons. One of such

reasons was that these cities became the citadel of colonial administration and so many people migrated to work in such areas as clerks, messengers, cooks, drivers, prostitutes, labour to work on the roads and nurses.

The case of Cameroon was not an exemption. The creation of a plantation complex around the Mount Cameroon region with its rich volcanic soils began far back in the 1880s, once the Germans discovered the rich soils. The area became a beehive of plantations of various types. There were palm plantations, bananas, pepper, cocoa and rubber. These plantations attracted labour both from the hinterland of Cameroon and beyond. There were French Cameroonians, Togolese, Nigerians, Ghanaians, Sierra-Leoneans, Liberians (Konings 1998 and 2001; Rudin 1938).

Besides, the colonial policies which were geared towards infrastructural developments also attracted migrants. The policy to construct roads which were to link the hinterlands and the coast brought in many migrants. The clerical services as well as auxiliary services of cooks, gardeners, housemaids, drivers, all combined to bring in migrants. As a result between the 1930s and 1960s, the Southwest Coastal Cameroon became a melting pot of many migrant cultures. Significantly, the plantations attracted by far the highest number of labour migrants in this region. Amongst the labour migrants, the Bamenda Grassfields migrants appeared to have surpassed most of the other migrants. Table two below shows the number of the migrants in waves between the wars. Essentially, the table shows the migrant population from the four main divisions of the Cameroon Province between 1926 and 1938 and how the numbers were increasing or decreasing over the years.

Table 2: Plantation labour and Division of Origin, 1926-1938

Year	Victoria	Kumba	Mamfe	Bamenda	French Came- roonians	Others	Total
1926	780	2214	1063	1698	6330	63	12128
1927	732	3230	1687	1965	5342	17	12953
1928	434	3798	1441	3577	4925	233	14408
1929	804	2887	1495	3183	4214	287	12866
1930	305	2045	918	2064	3395	233	9040
1931	267	1688	914	1905	2855	592	8319
1932	308	1984	704	2264	4172	992	10994
1933	361	1784	870	2413	4434	281	10123

Year	Victoria	Kumba	Mamfe	Bamenda	French Came- roonians	Others	Total
1934	446	2097	1162	3271	4913	538	12417
1935	689	2854	1650	4832	5251	415	15691
1936	775	3292	2148	6066	5179	661	18120
1937	1078	3153	2653	6322	4992	774	19590
1938	1097	3253	3771	7800	4805	2509	25119

SOURCE: These figures were gotten from the League of Nations Annual Reports found in the Buea National Archives, Buea, Cameroon for the years 1926 to 1938

From the table above several observations could be deduced. First within the other divisions of the Cameroon Province, the Bamenda division supplied quite a significant number to the plantations. This could be understood from the fact that the division was the largest in terms of geographical area and also it was the most populous of all the divisions. In contrast, the Victoria division with the smallest surface area supplied the least population. Another reason which has been advanced by researchers is that the land on which the plantations were opened was expropriated from the indigenous people of Victoria division with little or no compensation (Rudin 1938). In disappointment they were not willing to work in the plantations. It could have as well been that the population was not as significant in numbers that of the Kumba division which was almost competing with Bamenda division in terms of the population.

The table also shows the multi-ethnic nature of the migrant labour which the Bamenda migrants found themselves. From 1938 to 1947 statistics of labour migrants are missing. This has been very hard to understand but it could be speculated that the international scenario which was tense in the late 1930s leading up to the Second World War in 1939 disrupted many things. One of these was the dead of the League of Nations in 1939. It was only in 1945 that a new international organisation, the United Nations Organisation was created. The Cameroon Development Corporation was created in 1946 and from 1948 to 1969 the company religiously kept its records (Epale 1985). Table three shows the growth of labour migrants during the trusteeship period and post independence. In the flux of many cultures, each one attempts out of consciousness to keep its unique features. It was in such circumstances that the Bamenda labour migrants attempted to maintain their identity in this complex situation.

Table 3: CDC Divisional Analysis

Year	Victoria	Kumba	Mamfe	Bamenda	French Came-rooms	Others	Total
1948	1529	3445	2146	4816	2662	3202	17910
1949	1394	2665	2377	5745	2321	4538	19456
1950	1291	2531	2301	6166	2426	4074	19005
1952	1846	3856	3169	8941	2115	5508	25569
1953	1028	2825	3073	8193	1958	7085	24970
1954	820	2362	2930	8762	1582	7248	25030
1955	658	2426	2806	7965	1369	6070	21664
1956	573	1708	2323	6605	1005	5242	17793
1957	524	1754	2251	6416	895	5498	17472
1958	584	1685	2426	6944	861	6012	18501
1959	588	1534	2341	6140	802	4944	16285
1960	581	1537	2588	7246	808	4705	17468
1961	588	1602	2664	7167	835	4238	17094
1962	561	1585	2449	6936	732	3187	15430
1963	548	1628	2280	6454	672	816	12378
1964	565	1900	2268	6461	764	738	12716
1965	589	1809	2414	6669	676	614	12651
1966	556	1678	2248	6004	623	450	11559
1967	611	1719	2305	6009	622	422	11688
1968	716	1976	2350	6516	690	316	12564
1969	950	2312	2933	7487	753	310	14745

SOURCE: CDC Annual Reports

The Migrants'-Hosts Relationship and the creation of identity

The numerical superiority of the Bamenda Grassfielder migrants determined their relationship with their hosts especially in the plantation area. The plantations in particular have attracted a lot of labour migrants from the Bamenda Grassfields over time and space as tables two and three have shown above. The Bamenda Grassfielders were overall majority migrant population in the plantation region. From the beginning the migrants and host relationships was cordial between the southwest minority and Northwest majority. Researchers who have work on estate labour have

reached a consensus, that all was fine (Ardener et.al. 1960; Delancey 1973; Konings 1996, 1998, 2001). According to these authors both groups exercised a high level of cordiality in inter-ethnic relations encapsulated in the membership of churches and trade unions. They also coordinated to fight any form of labour exploitation like the CDC workers strike in 1940s (Konings 2001). The government policy and church to promote a multi-ethnic state helped in cementing relations between the Bamenda Grassfields' migrants and their host. Their language which is Pidgin English, a lingua franca of creole origin helped in keeping the two groups together. These 'horse-riding' relations did not go on *sine die*.

The effects of the continuous increase of the Bamenda migrants in the Southwest plantations soon turned dramatic and sour. Crucial to the souring of relations was the ethnicity and politics of identity and belonging which the government of Cameroon was playing in the 1990s. (Nkwi 2006). While initially the Bamenda migrants who had migrated to the plantations worked and returned to their areas of origin in the long run many preferred to retire and stayed on in the coastal zones. Reasons for such choices could be found in the fact that they preferred the fertile soils; modernity than their "backward villages". This drove most workers to find accommodation in nearby villages and towns which were however near to the plantations. The Bamenda migrant population was soon joined by friends, relatives and in-laws and this mainly because of fertile land which they were given by the host to cultivate. This soon swelled the populations of Bamenda migrants. The land that was initially bought at a giveaway prices soon became commercialised and so the settler population mostly the Bamenda migrants became so aggressive in getting the land.

The resulting effect of all these was obvious. The host population started envying the Bamenda migrants. This was because of the entrepreneurial nature of the settlers from Bamenda and also because the settler population had no respect for the local authorities and laws of the host. They were also envied because of their steady seduction of local women and their unwillingness to meaningfully carry out any investment in the host community. The general perception of the Bamenda migrant was that the Bamenda Grassfielders were only interested in the exploitation and dominating local population, while continuing to be loyal to their own ethnic group, which was ultimately evidenced by their frequent desire either to return home at the end of their working life or to be buried in the land of their ancestors or formed ethnic associations in which they practiced their culture.

In the 1990s following the re-democratisation process the government of Cameroon decided to exploit this antagonism in her divide-

and rule policy. The government gave birth to a new constitution which was an anti-thesis of the 1972 which guaranteed the protection of all citizens of the country to freely settle wherever was their choice in Cameroon. The 1996 constitution rather promised state protection for all the minorities as the elections were approaching. What was striking was not that the constitution had promised to protect minorities. Rather it was the fact that it had stretched the traditional meaning of minority to such exaggerated proportions beyond the mental imaginations of any person. It appeared and more so certain that the minority groups will have to rely on the government for survival. The South westerner did just that against the Bamenda migrant majority settler and shifted towards the ruling government and its party against the opposition. Of course the new constitution had boosted the protection of the South westerner and poured petrol to the already existing tension flames between the Southwest minority and Bamenda immigrants. Yet the population of the migrants from Bamenda were overwhelming even to tilt the elections results in the favour of the opposition with its stronghold based in Bamenda.

Thus during the 26 January 1996 municipal elections the Southwest pro-ruling party elites lost to the SDF, which was the main opposition party and having Bamenda as its base swept most of the key urban constituencies of the region. The wheel of the impact of Bamenda immigrants had turned full circumference. Asked over a radio interview why this happened, the highest civil servant of the region, His Excellency, Governor Oben Peter Ashu responded that it was because of the settler immigrant population from the Northwest region of Cameroon. Immediately, the Bamenda migrants were branded as “come-no-goes”. In other words they were likened to scabies, a stubborn skin affliction which last for a long time. The insinuation by the governor that opposition won many constituencies because of migrant population remains a debate. What is certain is that the demographic weight of Bamenda Grassfielder migrants’ in the region was telling.

Put in proper perspectives, the Bamenda Grassfielders and South westerners have deeper historical antagonism which predates the 1990s. In 1950s VIKUMA was formed which stood for Victoria, Kumba and Mamfe, the three divisions of the Cameroons under the British colonial administration (Nkwi 2006). This was to fight against the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) which was based in the Bamenda Grassfield zone and which was accused for victimising people from the forest region. These were the handiwork of political and traditional elites in these divisions. In the 1990s its parallel was the Southwest Elites Association (SWELA). In the wake of political pluralism in 1990, the political elites of the Southwest region in an attempt to frustrate the ambitions and will of strangers who

opposed the status quo ante formed an association, SWELA, in 1991 which they described as apolitical (Nkwi 2006). Yet its underground objectives suggests that it was a political association formed to resist the Bamenda Grassfields people who were filling in the Southwest region. In the midst of all these associations, the *graffie* man resisted, by staying and hanging onto his identity. The next section focuses on how the *graffie* man/woman has been creating and coping with their identity in the midst of multifarious ethnic groups in the littoral quadrant of Cameroon.

The Creation and coping with Identity

In the midst of multiple cultures the Grassfielders set to maintain their identity. One of the ways which led immigrants to feel and belong was ethnic and cultural associations. Scholars have researched on the formation of tribal and cultural associations (Little 1972; Geschiere & Gugler 1998: 309-319; Gugler 2002). Below is the profile of an indigenous group, Kom, a domineering indigenous group in the Bamenda Grassfields whose formation, experience and *modus operandi* is representative of one of the main arguments in this article.

Kom is the second largest ethnic group in the Bamenda Grassfields (Fanso 1989), whose population had been migrating to the plantations is Kom. In 1966, the Kom migrants formed an ethnic association known as the Kom Union. Its head quarter was in Buea. The membership of that association was opened to civil servants and migrant labour from Kom living not only in Buea but also in Kumba, Victoria, Tiko, Mutengene, all coastal areas which attract migrants from the Bamenda Grassfields. A significant and relevant thing which concerns the association is the fact that Kom people had started practising their culture through song and dances, of which the most popular was *njang*. *Njang* is traditional folklore music. Most of the time the music and songs referred to important historical events. Those who danced and sang *njang* were men and women, girls and boys. Traditional instruments like metal gongs and a small drum are used during the choreography (Nkwi 2010). The venue of the meeting which was in the compound of the oldest Kom person was also known as Kom palace. And the compound was a meeting point for all Kom who were found in Mamfe, Kumba, Buea and Victoria.

Identity was the most relevant thing that underscored such association and monthly meetings were held. Monthly contributions and condolence fees was compulsory. Above all there was a constitution which had its by-laws, scrupulously followed by their members. Just as Schipper (1999: 2) has observed that 'throughout the centuries, human beings have

created binaries, devising images of themselves as opposites of others and have embedded such images in stories, songs and other forms of expressions', Kom people also drank palm wine (a milky-like liquid tapped from a palm tree) and ate their traditional meals which consist of fufu corn and roast chicken (*abain ni gwei e katign e*). In that meeting Kom socialized as they did in their villages. By doing so they included and excluded others who did not belong to their group. The point here is that Kom people were identifying themselves through their culture but outside of Kom and at the same time constructing a home from home in the course of their geographical mobility.

Wherever the Bamenda Grassfielders found themselves in the coast or elsewhere in Cameroon in general, they remained loyal to their identity. Taming and domesticating these places and spaces as in plantations and coast signified the creation of new homes, seen and understood as a way of coping with life and culture outside the areas of origin. The final place was home where they would eventually prefer to end their lives. Here they can be viewed as 'essentialist' for the lack of a better word, from their garments. But in other respects they change as they consumed new commodities in new locales. The need to *Komify* in the case of Kom, or *Nsoify* in the case of Nso or to *Wehify* in the case of Weh or *Isuify* in the case of Isu in distant places suggests the notion of 'virtual' and 'real' a situation which could be quite ambiguous.

The real Kom or Nso or Aghem or Weh was the one that had geographically mapped out boundaries. The ethnic groups formed tribal and/or cultural associations which resemble those that were found in their areas of origin. This was not new in the history of such associations in Africa. But what was important and relevant as far as their associations were concerned was that they created the feeling of belonging to home and thereby through such associations created home out of home. Furthermore, such associations also existed to remind those who have not migrated that their kith and kin who have migrated should not be forgotten. As a matter of fact, these associations participated in developmental projects back at home. When the sojourn of the migrants was over, they could be welcome at home as heroes and heroines because they had at least participated in keeping the society move forward in their absence. Some excellent works have been conducted elsewhere in Africa in what has generally be lumped up as 'rural-urban connection' (Gugler 1961).

Such associations existed in the minds of the migrants, who belonged to networks of belonging and solidarity. The whole issue is far from simple. While a student in Holland I attended several meetings of the Bamenda Grassfielders. The Kom people always wanted to confirm their

Komness. There were many who could barely speak the Kom language. Some were married to European wives. That prompted us to critically engage in the question of Kom identity, not as a geographical one but the one that identified Kom people as Kom. The essentiality of Kom identity does not lie in language alone or culture per se but more in the craving for belonging. These are indicators that over the years the movement of people in and out of the Bamenda Grassfields and their encounters have added a new dimension to their identity. As Nyamnjoh (2014) has argued concerning cultural identity '... identity could be imagined and real ... in a way it is an invitation to contemplate a de-territorialised mode of belonging where relations matter more than birthplaces in whether or not one feels at home'. Pelican further maintain that,

... pre-colonial and post colonial identities in Cameroon and throughout Africa are complex, negotiated and relational experiences that call for a nuanced rather than an essentialist articulation of identity and belonging. With the Tikar... as well as any group in Cameroon and Africa being authentic is a function of the way race, place, culture, class and gender define and prescribe, include and exclude. These social hierarchies assume different forms depending on encounters, power relations and prevalent notions of personhood, agency and community (Nyamnjoh 2014 & Pelican 2006).

It can be argued thus that most of the Bamenda Grassfielders' migrants' identity has started to shift from the essentialist standpoint that maintained them as being frozen in geographic terms. Their continuous creation of identity in the coastal plantations also brings up the primordial argument which according to Appadurai (2006) maintains that 'all group sentiments that involve a strong sense of group identity, of 'we-ness', draw on those attachments that bind small, intimate collectivities, usually those based on kinship or its extensions. Ideas of collective identity based on shared claims to blood, soil or language draw their affective force from the sentiments that bind small groups' Appadurai here was referring to the thesis that people who have a strong sense of togetherness derive their inspiration from kinship, language and geographical origin.

Conclusion

Migration the world over is not a new phenomenon. It spans the entire life of humanity. Many factors have been responsible for the movement of people from one region to the other. In pre-colonial African societies people migrated in search of food, trade by barter and sometimes

because of natural disasters. The colonial migrations were more dictated by the colonial policies which included amongst others the opening of plantations and mining of diamonds, bauxite, manganese and gold. The colonial administration also imposed taxes which Africans were condemned to pay in order for the colonial machinery to be greased. Education and the opening of new public services all combined individually and collectively to caused migration of people in different directions. Labour migration thus became one of the dynamics which underscored migrations during the colonial period. In the post colonial period migratory trends which had been put in place by the colonial administration continued albeit with some changes.

In Cameroon, the opening of a plantation complex in the littoral quadrant attracted the migration of labour from the Bamenda Grassfields. This region which became a labour exporting zone saw its people moving down to the plantations in their numbers. Like their counterparts from other regions of Cameroon, the Grassfielders set out to construct their identity in the midst of many other cultures. They held on to the key cultural features of their homes and thus were constructing home out of home. This article has concluded that despite the many people and their cultures in the coastal Southwest Cameroon the Bamenda Grassfielders have held onto their identity. It further contended that the concept *graffie* which became quite fashionable in 1990s to pejoratively mean Bamenda man and ambiguously mean any enterprising and virile people had deeper historical roots which has not been accorded in migratory history of the phenomenon. As the world is becoming more and more interconnected with accelerated mobility of human beings, ideas and cultures, the implication is that unique identities are becoming under threat and runs the risk of being eradicated. As the article has amply demonstrated, while the Bamenda Grassfielders inter marriage with hosts and other related persons one can hardly talk about confined and frozen identity. And thus it will be appropriate to see identity like Cooper as a constructed phenomenon which is fluid and contested. On a final note the paper has just started the study of the identity construction of the Bamenda Grassfielders in the coast. The study of other labour migrants from other parts of Cameroon might show some parallels as well as similarities. Whatever the case may be, whether constructed or fluid, identity is so strong a phenomenon that cannot be ignored in writing the history of migration of any region of the world.

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ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the dynamics of internal migration taking the case of Bamenda Grassfielders' migrants in coastal Cameroon and stresses on how such migrations gave rise to the identity puzzle between those who were branded as the *graffie* and their host. It questions how the politicization of identity can be understood within the historical and political dynamics of Cameroon. The article further maintains that at the onset of the British colonial rule many people from this region migrated to the industrial complex of coastal Cameroon as plantation labour as well as auxiliary labour in other colonial services. After work in these services they retired and became enterprising to the chagrin of their host. They were thus derogatorily branded as *graffie*. Using the concept of identity in migration the article questions why and how the *graffie* have coped with their identity in heterogeneous spaces like the South west region of Cameroon.

KEYWORDS

Migration; Identity; *graffie*; Cameroon.

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NELSON MANDELA'S PRESTIGE DIPLOMACY IN SOUTH AFRICA (1994-1999)

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This paper aims to analyze the elaboration and decision-making process of South African foreign policy during the Government of Nelson Mandela, from 1994 to 1999. This period is marked by the reintegration of South Africa into the international community after the end of the *Apartheid* regime that had remained in force in the country since 1948. The election of Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela (1994-1999) of the *African National Congress* (ANC) marks this transition and opens the way for South Africa to seek the reorientation of its foreign policy towards the African continent.

Having in mind the aforementioned period, marked by the end of the Cold War and the resulting changes of the process of erosion of the international order after the USSR collapse, this research seeks to evaluate how the South African Foreign Policy in Mandela's government tried to reposition the country in this context. This study considers the variables and indicators, internal and external, that influenced and conditioned the country's foreign policy in that time, as well as the main actors responsible for conducting foreign policy. It should be noted that presidential diplomacy played a fundamental role in the country's international insertion in this context. For this reason, the role of Mandela will be an object of special attention.

The concept of foreign policy adopted in this paper fits in the realistic perspective of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). In this sense, it is understood that the foreign policy of the states points to the country's main

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objectives and lines of action, as well as it is composed by the strategies that this actor will adopt in the face of the variations in international dynamics, i.e. evaluating the relative power which each state holds in comparison to others (Figueira 2011). Thus, unlike the ecumenical point of view that gives more weight to internal dynamics in the formulation of foreign policy, it is understood in this paper that foreign policy is a product of national interest and it is based on rational calculations of opportunities for international insertion.

To achieve its goal, this study is divided into two main sections. The first part analyzes the historical evolution of South Africa's international insertion in order to understand the main foreign policy frameworks of the *Apartheid* regime. The second section is dedicated to foreign policy analysis of Nelson Mandela's government (1994-1999). In this way, the aim is to evaluate the country's foreign policy and the role of presidential diplomacy in reorienting the country's international insertion in the aforementioned period.

The importance of studying the recent past of *Apartheid* and segregationist colonization in South Africa will be highlighted towards the end of this work as a vital step into achieving a better understanding of contemporary matters. In addition, the main actors involved in South African decision-making also will be highlighted, as will the main indicators of the economic situation analyzed.

From colonization to South African *Apartheid*: regional detachment and sub-imperialism

The international insertion of South Africa is limited by its geostrategic position and by the type of relationship that was established with its neighbors during colonization and *apartheid*. Thus, in order to verify how these issues have impacted on Mandela's foreign policy, this section is devoted to elaborating a brief history of the evolution of South Africa and the characteristics of foreign policy during the racist regime.

Located in the southernmost part of the African continent, South Africa, surrounded by the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, has a history strongly marked by the *Apartheid* regime and the Calvinist (Dutch, French and German) and English colonization. Its first records of colonization are linked to the Portuguese, around the 15th and 16th centuries, when the Cape Town's geopolitical potential was already recognized, as a region which served as a fueling station for vessels on the route between Europe and Asia. This locality was the first region of Southern Africa to be occupied

by Europeans. At the beginning of the 16th century, the Portuguese empire had already lost space and competitiveness for the Dutch, for these had more developed boats and techniques (UNESCO 2010).

Dutch colonization began through the Dutch East India Company in mid-1652, and it was located in what is now known as Cape Town. The place served as a food supply point for Dutch vessels. These settlers dominated lands and brought slaves from various countries (Mozambique, Madagascar and India), and enslaved, expelled or even exterminated some of the local natives through conflicts or also through diseases brought by Europeans. Due to this, some of these local natives, called by *Khoisan*, migrated to the northeast of the country. Such migration also occurred due to racist practices carried out by the respective settlers who were instructed to relate minimally to the African population that already inhabited the place (Branco 2003).

Around 1795, due to structural changes in the international system resulting from the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte, the British Empire, in a moment of great expansion, decided to invest in the conquest of the Cape. They dominated the Cape of Good Hope and, established on eastern South Africa, they implemented the capitalist mode of production in the region. Even with the advancement of the capitalist establishment, the Calvinist settlers decided to remain in the country and remain integrated to South Africa (Braga 2011).

Such Dutch peasants who occupied present-day Cape Town, also called *boêres* by the English, were discontented with regard to the hostility and the British way of life, a feeling aggravated after the British Parliament's abolition of slavery (1807), which intensified the conflict of interests between Englishmen and Calvinists, as presented in Branco's thesis: the *boêres* did not accept the fact that the ex-slaves were put on an equal position with the Christians, which, according to them, contravened the laws of God (Branco 2003).

In addition, the *boêres* no longer received special treatment by the metropolis, due to administrative and commercial issues and there was a lack of support by the Company in assisting them in conflicts with local population. In this context, the group developed a consciousness and identity of its own, preserving their rural way of life and the religion brought by their ancestors, with no desire of returning to Europe. In this sense, the *boêres* manifested an Africanized feeling of belonging to a certain African territory and decided to migrate to other regions of the country, later called The Free State of Orange and the Republic of the Transvaal (Branco 2003).

During the 19th century, a series of conflicts took place on the African territory. The rise of the Zulu group, consolidated by the union of three local

clans, caused the so-called *crushing* of other ethnic groups occupying the territory near the coast of the Indian Ocean. Due to the expansion of the Zulus, members of other ethnic groups sought refuge in the Cape Colony, looking for a job with the English. The migration of the *Afrikaners* also resulted in clashes with other groups of different ethnic groups, in addition to enslaving other blacks in the region. Seeking autonomy for their way of life, the *Afrikaners* founded two republics: the Free State of Orange and the Transvaal, both slave states, Calvinist and Dutch-speaking (Visentini 2012).

In the second half of the aforementioned century, about 6,000 Indian immigrants arrived in the city of Natal. In this way, the South African territory was under the British, Calvinists and Zulus, added to Indians and other ethnic groups that looked for jobs working for segregationist whites. At the time mentioned, the country's black population was 10 times greater than the white population. After the discovery of diamond deposits (1865), the British, who occupied most territories, conquered Afrikaner republics, contributing to the increase of rivalry between other peoples, dominating, at the end of this century, much of the local mining industry. Thus, at the end of the 19th century, English dominated economic and militarily much of the African territory (Braga 2011).

The beginning of the 20th century was marked by the end of the conflicts between the English and the *boêres*, and a law was approved by the British Parliament on May 31, 1910 (South Africa 2016), originating the South African Union and entailing a series of consequences.

The country's constitution contained principles that would profoundly affect the course of South African history: English and Dutch were recognized as official languages; a unitary state and the parliamentary system were established; some peculiar laws of each province were maintained, especially those concerning the racial question. Louis Botha became the prime minister of a country with 4 million blacks, 500,000 mestizos, 150,000 Indians and 1,275,000 whites (Braga 2011: 66 our translation).

The racial segregation and the white elite's sense of superiority had been present in South Africa since the arrival of the Calvinists, and when they became independent from the British Crown, they developed a segregationist legislation. One example is the *Native Plan Act* (1913), which divided the territory of South Africa into two parts: 93% of the territory was designated exclusively for the white minority, which at that time represented 10% of the population. The black population, which corresponded to 75% of the population, was left with only 7% of the territory (Pereira 2010).

As a reaction to the new republic and to the South African Party,

which had taken control of the government, in 1912 the *African National Congress* (ANC) was created, a party organized by black intellectuals seeking for the liberation of their peoples. Already in 1914, the National Party was founded, formed by *Afrikaners* and farmers who advocated for the noninterference of the English in the region. The white elite motivated by capitalism as a mode of production contributed to the rapid growth of the country and monopolized local control (Braga 2012). The demographic formation and social arrangement established between these elites and the majority of the population eventually laid the foundation for the social segmentation instituted in the 1940s.

Despite all historical contexts, *Apartheid* was effectively instituted in 1948, when the Reunited National Party, represented by *Afrikaners*, won the presidential elections. The new government introduced the segregationist regime through a series of laws that limited Black people's share of urban spaces, education and other areas of society, aiming at the development of industry and the creation of *homelands* for the Black. In response to this oppression and inspired by the acts of civil disobedience advocated by Ghandi (Braga 2011), the ANC expanded its scope of action against discriminatory laws, creating the so-called *Freedom Charter* (1955) written by leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo (Pereira 2010).

During the 1960s, according to Rizzi and Schütz (2014), the country acted in the international setting seeking to intensify political, military and economic relations with other countries with white ethnic domain. Internally however, the government intensified its violence in order to suppress the expansion of increasingly popular anti-regime movements, and turned the activities of the ANC and other black liberation parties illegal. Given this scenario, the leaders of these movements decided to head towards armed struggle, and started looking for economic, military and political support abroad (Graham 2010).

Identified as a terrorist by the South African government on returning trip from Europe in search of allies, leader Nelson Mandela was arrested in April 1964 and sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant, who had already acted as a lawyer, represented himself in the landmark Rivonia Trial, justifying a large part of his actions (Braga 2011).

The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices - submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in defense of our people, our future, and our freedom (Umkhonto We Sizwe 1961).

The establishment of *Apartheid* is a central element to determine the

kind of alignment that the country would adopt at the international level. In the context of the Cold War, the country chose to approach the Western Bloc. This alignment constitutes a pillar for action at the regional level, especially since the outbreak of independence movements on the African continent. In this framework, South Africa acted as a sub-imperialist power³, aimed to ensure that neighbors did not form governments aligned with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or nationalists. That is, the *apartheid* regime operated as an extension of the imperialist powers on the continent, acting mainly in alignment with the United States of America (USA) and England. Until the 1970 decade, in addition to interfering with liberation and independence movements in southern Africa, as well as interfering directly in the cases of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia, South Africa also implemented protectionist measures aiming at ensuring economic, political and military power against Marxist movements in the region.

In terms of international context, the 1970s were marked by the erosion of American hegemony. The country was struggling with the Vietnam War, as well as a financial crisis in the aftermath of the golden age of capitalism post-World War II. For this reason, Richard Nixon's government (1969-1974) decided to adopt a policy in which regional allies were encouraged to play a greater role in addressing regional security problems. In the face of this, the USSR, in turn, chose to deepen its ties to revolutionary and nationalist movements in the so-called Third World (Visentini 2010).

On the African continent, the combination of the two superpowers' actions represented a radicalization of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary tendencies in the struggles of independence. The most significant independence process was in Angola, which from 1960 to 1975 received some US\$ 54 million from the USSR (Höring 2015). Besides being a country with great potential in terms of natural resources, it was the site of a war of independence in which South Africa took direct action and opened space for the generalization of the conflict in Southern Africa. The sub-imperialist profile of the *Apartheid* regime, fighting against the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), is quite a symbol of South Africa's profile of regional insertion.

In contrast to the 1960s, when South Africa achieved a jump in economic growth, reaching a position among the ten largest economies

³ The concept of sub-imperialism refers to the fact that after World War II regional economic centers such as South Africa emerged and although they had relative economic and political autonomy in regards to global economic centers, they aligned with hegemonic powers, acting as gendarmerie for imperialist interests in their respective regions. In Brazil, the work of Ruy Mauro Marini (1962) establishes an in-depth discussion of these processes.

in the world according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Pereira 2010), the crises of the 1970s hit the South African economy.

In addition to the independence of Angola, the process of independence in Mozambique, also governed by a Marxist party and directed against the *apartheid* regime, brought challenges to regional governance in South Africa. The influence of the USSR and Cuba in these regions motivated the significant and insufficient increase in South African government investments in military equipment. In this war, South African army troops did not resist the conflicts against about 40,000 Cuban soldiers, 30,000 Angolans, 1,000 tanks, 1600 anti-aircraft missiles, 1,000 armed vehicles and thousands of weapons such as AK-47 and its modifications, grenades, mortars and other Soviet armaments (Shubin 2008).

With its involvement in the civil war in Angola and its support of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), South Africa's military spending amounted to about 5% of the country's GDP and more than 18% of public expenditures in the years of 1977 and 1978. In the ensuing years, 1980 and 1989, due to clashes against Angola, Mozambique and Namibia, military spending represented 4% of GDP and 13% of South African government spending. In 1989, expenditures on Defense and Security fell sharply, a fact that already indicated the decline of the *Apartheid* regime (Batchelo and Saal 1999).

The military might of South Africa was called into question in 1988, when the country was defeated in battle against Angola, which had Cuban and Soviet support. The end of this conflict, known as the Cuito-Cuinavale battle, resulted in the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops from Angola (Pereira 2007).

Another relevant event in line with the independence of the former Portuguese colonies was the end of the Bretton Woods agreements (1945-1971) after the demise of the dollar-gold standard (Fernandes 2015), as well as economic and trade sanctions suggested by the United Nations (UN). The loss of relevance of gold as the ballast of world economy directly affected the South African economy and fueled its economic crisis (Braga 2010).

In addition to these international factors, national constraints have also contributed to the collapse of the regime. As detailed in Pablo Braga's (2011) thesis in 1976, high school students organized a series of protests against the segregationist educational model that forced the teaching of *Afrikaans*, the official language of *Afrikaners*, in schools. The protesters were met with aggression by police officers, and dozens of students (an estimate not yet revealed precisely) were killed and hundreds more were injured. The date kicked off what became known as the "Soweto Uprising", as the

tragedy prompted a series of demonstrations and rebellions by students and by militants then backed by former ANC members and the armed wing of the party, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) (1961). In this way, the uprising increased the tension between government and Black militancy and gained greater attention in the international scenario (Braga 2011).

The *Apartheid* regime already had difficulties in maintaining the costs of its isolation; the “separate development” that had taken place in previous decades no longer addressed the local economy, which was also compromised by the high costs of the defense and national security sectors, largely focused on the conflict with Angola. In addition, the country lost important international trading partners. The Soweto Uprising contributed to a series of international campaigns against *Apartheid* and also to the only UN sanction imposed against the South African regime, in 1984 (Pereira 2007).

Still regarding the costs of maintaining the regime, between the 1960s and 1990s, the South African government invested heavily in the Defense and Security sectors. In 1960, the defense industry spending equaled 7% of government spending, and as early as 1966 this budget accounted for about 15.5%. As for security spending, they accounted for 22% in 1963, reaching a high point of 24.3% in 1968. In the 1990s, security spending fell to 18% of government spending (Mohammed 1999).

In the second half of the 1980s, South Africa had a high unemployment rate, among whites and blacks, and the economic crisis forced the South African government to think about adjustments to the segregationist regime. Thus, in 1986, in an attempt to obtain the maintenance of the regime, some laws that restricted the mobility, housing and employment of Black people in white territory were abolished. These adjustments were meant to give an idea of a pseudo-opening of the regime, but the strategy was designed in order to maintain the regime and put an end to the civil demonstrations (Visentini 2012).

In 1989, Frederik W. De Klerk rose to power in what would be the beginning of the last *Apartheid* government in South Africa. In 1990, racist-based laws were abolished, the legalization of Black resistance parties was approved, the exiles were repatriated and political prisoners were released, including Nelson Mandela. This was the beginning of the negotiations between the white government and the Black. Even though it organized sabotage attempts directed at the ANC, the government eventually decreed the end of *Apartheid* in South Africa and the beginning of a new era for the nation (Pereira 2010).

In this way, it can be observed that the foreign policy developed

during the *apartheid* regime was restrained by the need to maintain the regime itself. Thus, the country acted as a sub-imperialist regional power, with the aim to ensure that Black movements and communist groups did not gain strength in the region. In this way, South Africa did not constitute a space for rapprochement with neighboring countries. Understanding such detachment is crucial for understanding the country's post-*apartheid* actions.

Foreign policy in Nelson Mandela government (1994-1999): primary objectives and external constraints

The previous section sought to assess in general terms the historical evolution of South Africa's external insertion until Nelson Mandela came to power (1994-1999). Thus, as a complementary analytical effort, this section seeks to analyze which main actions the South African government sought to undertake during the period and how these objectives were conditioned by the international conjuncture at that time.

April 1994 marked the first democratic elections for the presidency of South Africa. Mandela was elected with 62.65% of the votes, a few months after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize (1993) with Frederik De Klerk – both of them received the award due to their work towards the end of the *Apartheid* regime and the beginning of a new and democratic South Africa (Visentini 2012). The newly elected president, one of the great icons of the fight against racism, had taken up the challenge of leading the long-awaited New South Africa in a post-*apartheid* scenario in the midst of a post-Cold War multipolar international system.

Facing the real challenge of designing a new South Africa, the president had to deal with the severe wounds left by the segregationist past. However, it is worth noting that, once released from prison, Mandela was already a part of the group which was rethinking how to formulate policies for the new South Africa. In 1993, in the run-up to the 1994 elections, the ANC already presented the developed guidelines for the basis of foreign policy in the new South African diplomacy (Gallas 2007). As presented by Nelson Mandela, in an article published in the journal *Foreign Affairs* (1993)

The pillars upon which our foreign policy will rest are the following beliefs: (1) that issues of human rights are central to international relations and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental; (2) that just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide; (3) that considerations of justice and respect

for international law should guide the relations between nations; (4) that peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally agreed and nonviolent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be employed; (5) that the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our foreign-policy choices; (6) that economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world. These convictions stand in stark contrast to how, for nearly five decades, *apartheid* South Africa disastrously conducted its international relations (Mandela 1993: 87).

It must be noted that the presented objectives are in contrast with the guidelines that ruled the external insertion of South Africa during the *apartheid* regime. Despite this fact, it is important to emphasize that the government of Nelson Mandela was characterized by being one of national unification. After electing a president, Nelson Mandela's party, due to not having reached two thirds of the general votes, had to grant the position of vice-presidency to the National Party, a place filled by the ex-head of government of the previous regime, Frederik de Klerk. Thus, the alliance with De Klerk meant that the reformulation of the constitution, the restructuring of the country would have to be done in convergence with the other parties (Rizzi and Schütz 2014). Although the conceptual perspective adopted here understands that the external insertion of a country is a synthesis of the national objectives, therefore relatively unrelated to the domestic disputes, the observation of the internal political scene shows that this new South Africa is a country of national unification and not one of complete rupture with previous structures.

As stated by Daniel Gallas (2007), the new South Africa presented new political and economic principles, but also had new constraints related to the internal environment. The new government was more accessible to the population, which resulted in more demands, such as those by trade unionists, NGOs and academic centers. The analysis written by Gallas emphasizes the internal indicators carefully, resulting in the diagnosis of the following four indicators:

Internal disputes between bureaucrats of different state departments and the confusion about the institutional role of each government cell; the greater involvement of Parliament in the definition of foreign policy; the greater participation of civil society in the definition of foreign policy – one of the pillars defended by the ANC during the *apartheid* years; and finally the importance that the President's cabinet gained in defining the country's diplomatic line, due to the image of Nelson Mandela (Gallas 2010: 21, our translation).

Still in terms of the country's economic reality and taking the above-mentioned analysis as a counterpoint, Ian Taylor's study (2016) portrays an economic reality of the new Africa slightly different from Africa during the previous years, since the country was still having high rates of budget deficit, hampering the country's economy and making it difficult to implement programs that sought income redistribution to reverse inequality inherited by the segregationist regime (Taylor 2016).

[...] the National Party government had increased the country's budget deficit from 0.9 percent of the GDP in 1989-90 to 10.8 percent in 1993-94 through a "rashness of reckless spending" which had its roots in the emergencies of the 1980s (interview with Terreblanche July 15, 1999). During this period, large sums were spent on defense and security, while corruption became endemic (Taylor 2016: 18).

In terms of internal bureaucratic disputes related to international policy, the adjustments in the scope of action of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) relate to adjustments in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department of Defense (DoD). Due to the reformulation of these departments, disagreements about the performance of these sectors were generated.

The DFA prioritized the establishment of good bilateral relations, and not with a purely economist bias of attracting foreign capital. The DTI, by reducing its trade missions in many countries, left several tasks in charge of DFA officials overseas. Admittedly, these officials did not have the necessary training and knowledge in the field of foreign trade to conduct the negotiations, Affairs (SAIIA), the Institute for Global (Gallas 2007: 22, our translation).

It is important to emphasize that several bureaucrats who were in government were characterized by either holding history of supporting the old regime, seeking to maintain the resources of the white, or lacking the technical capacity to hold the office they occupied, as a result of institutionalized racial exclusion in education during the *Apartheid* (Gallas 2007).

As for the second point analyzed by Gallas (2007), regarding the more active participation of the parliament in international affairs, this is due to the majority of the congressmen being members of the ANC, filling 266 of the 400 seats. The Parliament, with a majority bound to ANC, was one of the key actors for the signing of trade agreements with the European Union (EU), where the interests of union and agricultural sectors would

be represented by South African congressmen. In addition, the Parliament also had an influence on the recognition of the People's Republic of China and, not with standing, on the arms trade. The third observation relates to the great visibility that the government of Pretoria made possible for civil society, giving unions more legitimacy, although they often criticized some political actions carried out by Mandela and undesired by the mostly black population (Gallas 2007).

The main actors in civil society who engaged in the formulation of South African foreign policy were non-governmental organizations and academic centers. Among the most important entities are the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD, former Foundation for Global Dialogue), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS, former Institute for Defense Policy), the Center for Policy Studies, the Center for International Political Studies and the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes. (Gallas 2007: 25, our translation).

Regarding the fourth and last point of the analysis, referring to the internal constraints of South Africa's foreign policy, between 1994 and 1999, it can be noted that the presidential diplomatic role assigned to Nelson Mandela, who represented an emblematic image of struggle and resistance against *Apartheid* and gained great prestige in the international scene. Madiba, as the Xhosas referred to Mandela, had already used his image and recognition in the search for international support during negotiations with the former regime, pressing for international sanctions to be maintained until the end of the negotiations. With the end of the regime, Mandela resumed his quest for cooperation and capacity building with several countries, necessary actions for the proper functioning of public policies designed to address human rights, the environment, regional economic growth, the offer and redistribution of jobs in South Africa (Gallas 2007).

Despite the end of the regime, Mandela's government still saw inequality growing in his country, and a high level of unemployment still plagued the Black community, due to policies developed during the *Apartheid* regime, such as a low level of education, which made it difficult for Black people to find a place in the labor market (Visentini 2012). As a response to this problem, which affected the country's internal development, the government launched the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Program (GEAR) (1996), with proposals for economic growth, greater job offer, and an increase in exports of manufacturing goods (Rizzi and Schütz 2014). Despite Mandela's efforts and attempts to repair the country's economic inequality, his government faced the economic reality of the

previous government, which sometimes made it impossible to implement programs that proposed the redistribution of labor income as a priority point (Taylor 2016) .

In terms of the international situation, the scenario at that time introduced some structural challenges for Pretoria. The end of the USSR and the consolidation of the United States of America as the sole power formed a new international order led by Washington. In this context, Mandela's South Africa sought to conform to the precepts of this new order. In economic terms, the country tried to adapt to the Washington Consensus and the neoliberal prescriptions. Thus Mandela sought to assure to the international community that the change of political regime did not represent a deep rupture in the country's cooperation with western powers or with international organizations. In terms of security, the new international agenda indicated the priority for the so-called new issues, terrorism, drugs and human rights. The country, which had already abdicated of its nuclear program for war purposes in order to reintegrate itself into the international community, sought to maintain the image of a collaborative regional power. It should be noted that the international context in the early 1990s was quite unfavorable for the African continent. Africa was not among the strategic priorities of the Great Powers, especially not for the USA. It was thus difficult to attract foreign investment and strategic partnerships to the continent. For this reason, Mandela sought to use his prestige as a lever to approach the West. In this sense, there is no rupture with the type of approach to the international community that was being conducted by De Klerk.

At the regional level, the country had to face the debt of decades of interventionism led by the racist regime. Thus, the construction of a regional policy had as its primary objective the quest to overcome the historical distrust of neighbors. The Mandela Government had to face this major challenge in order to consolidate its new African foreign policy. On the one hand, the country sought to strengthen a regional policy based on the defense of human rights, democracy and the integration of the continent to the global market. On the other hand, it had to secure a regional leadership position in a period marked by a number of security crises on the continent, making sure that a more assertive attitude did not reignite the fears of sub-imperialist politics.

The main alternative to this impasse was to seek to legitimize its regional actions through the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Thus, in face of the security crises that broke out in southern Africa during this time, the country ensured that the measures adopted were taken via the regional body.

Among the security crises faced by the country in this period, two

stand out. The first was the crisis in Zaire (later, Democratic Republic of Congo). With the outbreak of the conflict, and the involvement of other states such as Uganda and Rwanda, Pretoria diverged from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia, who eventually sent troops to Congo in 1998 (Rizzi and Schutz 2014). South Africa was against this intervention and only later, through SADC, did it validate the military actions of its neighbors. The country's concern was a generalization of the conflict contaminating Southern Africa. It should be noted that Mandela's position was opposed to Mugabe's, leader of Zimbabwe and first to express support for the Congo. Here we note the dispute for regional leadership between Zimbabwe and South Africa.

The second crisis that deserves attention is that of Lesotho between September 1998 and May 1999. Following the controversies and protests regarding the election results, in which the Lesotho Congress Party for Democracy won with a large majority and secured 79 out of 80 seats, President Mandela authorized, via SADC, the use of military forces⁴ to contain the protests. This intervention in the neighboring country, allegedly carried out with the aim of "restoring democracy and legality" was observed by neighbors as a hegemonic action. It should be noted that the decision to intervene, even at the risk of fueling the fears of the neighbors, shows that Mandela's government had as one of its priority objectives the consolidation of regional leadership. In this context, President Mandela sought to use his prestige with the international community to strengthen his actions at the regional level.

In addition to his recognition of presidential diplomacy, Mandela saw great importance in diplomatic representations through consular channels and through international organizations and fora. As for the representation of the country, there were 30 diplomatic missions around the world under the *apartheid* government in 1990, which jumped to 124 diplomatic missions in 1996 (Rizzi and Schütz 2014). In regards to its activities in fora and international organizations, the country intensified its participation in these arenas, aiming to disseminate and fulfill the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1951), democracy and the environment.

In South Africa's new foreign policy, post-*apartheid* (1994) and post-Cold War (1991), the projection of the country was sought in a continental and global way, and South Africa was a member of 45 international institutions in total, including UN Conferences, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), SADC, and others. The country joined the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, in the context of the UN, and began to claim for a place among the permanent seats of the United Nations Security Council, taking

⁴ South Africa sent 700 troops to contain the rebellion in this country which in an enclave inside of South Africa.

the role of spokesperson for the interests of the African continent in regard to the organization (Visentini 2012).

New South Africa began to act in an internationally active way, such that, in addition to a greater approach to the US, mainly during the Clinton administration (Gallas 2007) and the EU, it also approached Canada and New Zealand in campaigns against the trade and use of landmines. Prioritizing strategic relations with the promising People's Republic of China in 1996, the country subtracted its relations with Taiwan, which until then had close trade and economic ties with South Africa and the ANC, ranking between the five major importers of South African products. Gallas (2007) corroborates the neglect of South African representatives on the issue of human rights involving the government in Beijing, striving for the best relationship between the People's Republic of China and South Africa.

Despite maintaining its links with the US, it is important to note that the new South African policy has not cast aside allies in the struggle against *Apartheid*, maintaining relations with isolated countries by the Americans, such as Sudan and Cuba (Visentini 2012, our translation).

In addition to the above-mentioned cases, the country also approached Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Libya, Sudan and Cuba, due to the support given by those in the struggles against the former regime, and it also strengthened its relations with India and other countries in the developing Global South (Rizzi and Schütz 2014). Nevertheless, the Mandela government also had to act, directly or indirectly, in conflicts in the southern region of the African continent, as had occurred in armed disputes in Angola, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Congo, Burundi and Lesotho (Gallas 2007).

Although the concept is controversial, South Africa can be classified as a medium power⁵. This can be said especially because the country started acting as leader of the region and abdicated its sub-imperialist actions. It should be noted that in the context of the 1990s, because of the collapse of the USSR, the US relationship with regional powers changed drastically. There was no more condescendence towards the autonomist projects of these countries. In the case of South Africa, which had developed a nuclear program, there was pressure for the country to remain more discreet in its regional performance.

Mandela's foreign policy was aligned with the view of the ANC, which was also in a period of reconstruction, since during the former regime its main representations were exiled, imprisoned or even disappeared.

⁵ The debate over medium powers is vast. In general lines, a medium power can be defined as a unit of the International System with the power ability to act in a more assertive way, but this ability is limited if compared to that of the Great Powers, whose scope of action is global. Roughly, they are units of the system which prioritize to act in a regional level.

In 1991, Mandela took command of the ANC, being present in internal negotiations with members of the party, as well as in the international scope, discussing the programs of the party, international sanctions, constitutional reform and economic questions. The leader, along with the ANC, praised for a foreign policy that was non-interventionist and more focused on human security, democracy and African integration (Gallas 2007).

It should be noted that the international context at the time limited South Africa's international insertion options. The end of the USSR and the spread of the cult of globalization and neoliberalism pushed countries to adopt a liberalizing agenda. In any case, Mandela's government sought to establish a fairly ecumenical foreign policy, based on the diversification of international partners.

The ANC is in power until now. After Mandela, Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008) was elected to the presidency of South Africa. At that time, the country's central concern, both domestically and externally, turned to policies combating the high level of unemployment and, especially, the great outbreak of the AIDS epidemic. The HIV virus spread over a large part of the continent and forced the South African government, which found the country's life expectancy at age 56, to rethink its public policies for health (Visentini 2012).

Thabo Mbeki would step down as president in his penultimate year of office due to internal issues in his party. The following year, in 2009, Jacob Zuma, a Zulu, was elected president of the country. Unlike Brazil, the South African presidential elections occur every 5 years, and they also have the right to a re-election. In this way, the current ANC leader is in the presidency until now and still faces problems with inequality in the country, since the white elite continues to own much of the economic power in South Africa (Visentini 2012). According to a study published in *The Standard*, only 10 percent of the stock market in South Africa belongs to Black South Africans, who currently account for 80 percent of the population, almost all of South Africa's 54 million people.

Final thoughts

The foreign policy of the Mandela government was based on the search for the regularization of the state's external relations with the international community. In this sense, it opted for the diversification of external partners. If, on the one hand, the Mandela government extended ties with the western bloc and sought to insert the state into the economic liberalization era, on the other hand, it maintained relations with states

considered pariah such as Cuba, Vietnam and China.

In terms of the operationalization of this foreign policy, it is noted that the president himself was responsible for using a prestige diplomacy to redesign the international image of South Africa. For this reason, the foreign policy was very personal-based, although the ANC and the Congress performed leading roles in the formulation of foreign policy.

At the regional level, the country had to restructure its relations with its neighbors. In this sense, the actions in the crises of Angola and Zimbabwe, for example, demonstrate a tendency to seek a leading role in the region. However, in this period, the interventionist heritage of the racist regime was still quite present. Thus, Southern Africa became a priority area in Mandela's external agenda. Despite this, it can be said that it was during his time in office that the foundation of what would form South Africa's performance in the regional context in the subsequent decades can be found. It should be noted that the Mandela government, representative of dismantling the racist regime, did not substantially alter the foreign policy that had already been conducted in the government of De Klerk. In other words, there was a tendency for continuity. However, the option for SADC as a priority area for legitimizing actions at the regional level seems to indicate that the path of regional insertion had then been consolidated as the priority mechanism of the South African Foreign Policy for Africa.

Finally, although this research didn't intend to touch on issues such as the interactions between domestic actors, the rearrangements between elites and the effects on foreign policy, since a predominant realistic view on foreign policy has been embraced, this is an important indicator to understand the internal political scenario and the reasons for maintaining the essence of the country's international performance even when dealing with structural changes. In this sense, the perspective that external performance remains relatively unrelated to internal changes is confirmed. Despite this, Mandela's Foreign Policy represented the beginning of a shift in South Africa's external performance which, over subsequent governments, distanced itself more and more from the prevailing profile of the *apartheid* regime.

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyze the foreign policy of Nelson Mandela's government in the wake of a new post-Cold War international structure, from 1994 to 1999, mapping the actors involved in this environment and the indicators and variables that conditioned the foreign policy of the country.

KEYWORDS

South African Foreign Policy; South African *apartheid*; Government Nelson Mandela.

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FROM MANDELA TO ZUMA: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN ATLANTIC REGION FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Anselmo Otavio¹

Introduction

As it is known, Ceuta's conquest by Portugal in 1415 initiated the discovery and, consequently, strategic transformation of the Southern Atlantic region by European powers. It is important to consider, first, that these actions were a process, since from the 14th century the necessary conditions for maritime expansion were being created by Portugal. Secondly, the arrival at Ceuta represented not the end, but the beginning of a phase marked by the search for an alternative maritime route that would connect Europe to India and would grant the Portuguese Crown access to spices from India's territory.

Although this process was initiated by Portugal, it is a fact that, throughout the centuries, countries like Spain, the Netherlands and England have also pursued the same development. From then, the territories belonging to the South Atlantic coast have been impacted by European powers, since, due to colonization, they were encompassed by different political and economic dynamics. While Lisbon connected Brazilian and Angolan territories through a relationship based on the purchase and sale of slave labor, the Netherlands at first, England later, comprised the Cape Colony to the Afro-Asian dynamic, keeping this territory's interactions circumscribed to their respective colonies in the Asian side.

Overall, it can be considered that the Cape Colony's time under Dutch and British control was the first moment of South Africa's European-orchestrated relationship with the Southern Atlantic. On one hand, South

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African territory was imposed a role as a refueling station for Dutch and British navigators who were either on their way to Asia or returning to Europe and needed supplies. On the other hand, the Cape Colony became a part of one of the main maritime lines of communication between the East and the West and, because it belonged to countries which had their possessions concentrated in Asia, it privileged the Indian Ocean as compared to the Southern Atlantic. An example can be found on the interactions between Cape Colony and India, which was controlled by England and provided labor to work on South African diamond and gold mines.

A second moment of interaction between South Africa and the Southern Atlantic was during the National Party (NP) rule. Over NP's six administrations – Malan (1948-1954), Strydom (1954-1958), Verwoerd (1958-1966), Vorster (1966-1978), Botha (1978-1989) and De Klerk (1989-1993) – racial segregation (*apartheid*) was the main principle of South Africa's acting. While internally the use of racist laws and violence towards anti-*apartheid* movements were examples of how these governments tried to keep the regime safe, internationally the denial of its condition as African country, the need to be seen as a Western country and its interest in approaching capitalist powers were Pretoria's choices to perpetuate the racist regime.

Pretoria's close relationship with capitalist powers impacted South Africa's approach to the Southern Atlantic region. In fact, aside from maintaining its focus on the Indian Ocean, South African governments began to consider the need to include the Southern Atlantic region in the Cold War dynamics. It began to defend the creation of the South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) as a vital step, considering that if South Africa became controlled by communist regimes, which were advancing in the region, the Cape Route would be managed by the Soviet Union, a matter that would affect not only the connection of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, but would also have an impact on oil imports from the Persian Gulf to the capitalist bloc. In other words, through this discourse South Africa was trying to militarize the Southern Atlantic, considering SATO fundamental for the continuity of the *apartheid* regime, once its existence would preclude any type of maritime attack to South African soil.

Unlike such moments, a third period of this interaction can be identified in the post-*apartheid* regimes, when the process of broadening the country's international relations took place. In this sense, the goal of this article is to analyze the interaction between South Africa and the Southern Atlantic throughout the Mandela (1994-1998), Mbeki (1999-2008) and Zuma (2009-) administrations. Making use of a vast and specific literature, this article proposes that South Africa's increasing interest towards the

Southern Atlantic region is in fact a reflection of its appreciation of South-South relations.

The Mandela administration and the maintenance of the Southern Atlantic region as low priority

In general, it is possible to note that the foreign policy of the Mandela administration (1994-1999) had three main objectives. The first and, in a way, the most obvious, was the rupture with the foreign policy conduct adopted by Pretoria until then. The signs of this transformation had been already indicated in an article written by Mandela in 1993, that is, before he took office as South Africa's president. The document, published by *Foreign Affairs* under the title *South Africa's Future Foreign Policy*, highlighted the need for South Africa to accompany the changing scenario post-Cold War.

From Mandela's point of view, matters such as human rights, democracy, the primacy of international law, the search for peace through non-violent mechanisms and the economic interdependence between countries would become more and more important in the post-Cold War setting. Another point raised by Mandela was South African appreciation of African aspirations, notably economic development and the fight against extreme poverty. Roughly, when Mandela actually became president, other issues were introduced to South African foreign policy, such as the appreciation of multilateralism, the respect to other countries' sovereignty, and the search for non-violent interstate conflict resolution (Lipton 2009). However, the main points presented in the *Foreign Affairs* article kept relevant.

In a way, the behavior previously described reflected the synchrony between Freedom Charter – a document created in 1955 where the main aspirations of the African National Congress (ANC) were outlined, in a time of struggle against the *apartheid* regime – and the need to adapt South Africa to the international post-Cold War scenario. On the one hand, *Freedom Charter* (1955) highlighted the appreciation of freedom, democracy, and conflict resolution through peaceful means, among other things. On the other hand, the transition process from the racist regime to multiracial democracy in South Africa was happening simultaneously to the end of the East-West dispute, which pushed the advancing of free trade, as well as liberal democracy, human rights, respect for the environment, among other values honored by the West. In other words, Pretoria was redirecting its foreign policy in order not only to break from the *apartheid* regime's international behavior, but also in order to align with the points estimated

by Western countries, gaining the title of a country with “*strong moral dimension*” (Van Wyk 2002: 182), or being called “*a good international citizen*” (Hamill and Lee 2001: 33).

A second goal of Mandela's administration was aligned with the achievement of a prominent role for the transformation of the African continent through the reaffirmation of South Africa as an African country. An example can be found in South Africa trying to be more participative at the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and trying to make it harmonic with objectives such as democracy, development and peace. As indicated by Mandela, “peace, stability and democracy are necessary conditions for development” (Mandela 1998).

South Africa's attempt at being more present in the continent, either through the Organization of African Unity, through SADC or through agreements with African countries, is closely related to two aspects of its post-*apartheid* history. The first is the desire to be more active in conflict resolution, to be more integrated to the continent and, consequently, to be concerned with the continent's future. An example of this sense of belonging is Mandela's speech at Finland's Parliament, when he stated that “first and foremost, we are part of the African continent, and Africa's problems are our problems” (Mandela 1999).

The second aspect, in contrast, has to do with South Africa's necessity of finding in the African continent solutions to its own internal post-*apartheid* problems. In fact, while trying to strengthen diplomatic ties with those countries which during the racist regime had been supporting South African liberation movements, Pretoria found that a closer relationship with such states could be a solution to its own socio-economic issues inherited from the *apartheid* regimes, as well as a way for expanding South African companies' market (Ngwenya 2011).

In sum, Mandela's administration (1994-1999) symbolized changes for South Africa, among which was the priority given to regional insertion. Unlike NP's administrations previously, which directly or indirectly searched for interaction through imposition, coercion and war (Pereira 2012; Visentini and Pereira 2010; Branco 2003), Mandela's South Africa valued cooperation and regional and continental peace.

Along with this interest for regional insertion, a third and last objective of South African foreign policy during Mandela was that of being more active in the international level. One of the country's new administration's first initiatives was to approach old allies who fought against the former racist regime (Ngwenya 2011) and to look for admission or readmission into international organizations. In fact, while regionally

Pretoria was seeking for admission into OAU and SADC, internationally it was joining the *Commonwealth*, the United Nations (UN) the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), G-77 and others (Dirco 1996).

The result was a successful policy in terms of international relations when compared to the policies that had been previously attempted. During the *apartheid* regime South Africa had only 30 diplomatic missions around the world, while in 1996 the country already counted 124 missions and was part of 45 International Organizations (Barber 2005). On the one hand, this success can be related to the exercise of universality in its foreign policy, as well as its choice of strategic partners².

In terms of universality, an example of that is the fact that South Africa interacted on the one hand with the United States and on the other with Iran, Cuba and Libya. Those last countries had helped the ANC in its fight against *apartheid*, but they were seen as rogue or pariah states by Washington (Hamill and Lee 2001). In terms of strategic partnerships, the breaking of relations with Taiwan and the strengthening of ties with the People's Republic of China is a highlight of this policy, as China would later become an important political and economic partner of South Africa.

There was an expectation that the Southern Atlantic region would be a part of South Africa's new international insertion plan. It would be a way of opposing the former regime's proposal of SATO and also of showing that Pretoria no longer vowed for the militarization of this region, but searched for cooperation instead. Such change can be found at South Africa's and Namibia's joining of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS), whose fourth meeting happened on Cape Town in 1996. Under the title "*Bridging the South Atlantic*", this meeting indicated the need to consolidate the Southern Atlantic region as an economic space favoring development and valuing greater economic, technological and academic cooperation, as well as the establishment of communication between South American and African countries that were part of the initiative (Penha 2011).

The fact that South Africa and Brazil were both interested in strengthening diplomatic and economic ties also contributed to this expectation about the Southern Atlantic region. While in office, Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) adopted a policy of selective partnerships which elected South Africa and Nigeria as its strategic partners in Africa. In the case of Nigeria, Cardoso was mainly concerned with economic relations: a commercial mission was sent to Lagos and a multi-sector meeting was held in Brasilia. As for South Africa, Brazil's idea

² According to Schraeder (2001: 234), "the universality principle highlights South Africa's will to establish diplomatic relations with all countries of the world, independently of national or external policies adopted by those countries".

was to establish a free-trade agreement with the country that was Africa's main economy at the time (Pimentel 2000). There were two presidential visits between the countries during that time; the first in 1996 when Cardoso met with Mandela in Pretoria and the second in 1998 when the South African president visited Brazil (Reis 2008).

However, even though there was a common interest from both sides of the Atlantic, and even though South Africa had a plan for international insertion, the Southern Atlantic region in fact remained in the background. This can be understood through the interaction of three features: South Africa's interest for a greater regional role, its defense policy and its limited military budget. A reflection of this is found in South African Defense Force (SADF)'s transformation into South African National Defense Force (SANDF), a change marked by three characteristics. The first one was a paradigm shift about the concept of security – from traditional security to human security (Kangwanja 2006). The second referred to the inclusion in military personnel of ex-combatants of the *apartheid* regime (Stapleton 2010). The third and last one was the decrease of resources spent with the Armed Forces. In 1990, the Armed Force's budget was equivalent to 3.9% of the country's GDP, while in 1998 SANDF's budget was the equivalent of 1.4% of South Africa's GDP (SIPRI 2016).

Along with the previously listed characteristics, there has also been a prioritization of regional insertion, notably in terms of Southern African security issues. This tendency can be first noticed with the creation of "*Defense in a Democracy White Paper on National Defense for the Republic of South Africa*", the main document of South Africa's Defense, which indicates that Pretoria should prioritize regional stability, for "South Africa has a common destiny with Southern Africa" (SANDF 1996: 20).


In parallel to the *White Paper*, another example is the creation of the Organ on Politics Defense and Security (OPDS) in 1996, aiming at building peace and stability in the Southern part of the continent through the integration of military and human security. Finally, the priority of regional security is connected with Mandela's government's participation in regional conflict resolution. The president acted as mediator in talks between Mobutu Sese Seko's authoritarian regime (1965-1996) and the insurgent group *Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo* (AFDL) under the leadership of Laurent Kabila, during the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Kabemba 2007). In another conflict resolution participation, South African National Defense Force took part in peace enforcement in the Kingdom of Lesotho, when the country was about to enter a political crisis in its second general elections after major-general Lekhanya's rule (1986-1993).

A Mandela administration choice that contributed to keeping the Southern Atlantic region in a secondary position was the orientation of the *South Africa Navy* (SAN), which had gone through budgetary and contingent cuts (from 6.500 to 4.500) (Wessels 2010). In general, either due to a reduction of its resources – which made SAN prioritize acting in certain areas – or due to a possibility of greater interaction with other Navies, in fact what happened during the Mandela administration was a tendency to prioritize ties with Western powers and *Commonwealth* member countries, instead of Southern Atlantic countries. From 1994 to 1998, Pretoria took part in naval exercises in its maritime coast along with USA, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands and others. South Africa also took part, along with Germany, in a military exercise called *Good Hope*, which involved both countries' air forces in 1994. It also participated in training courses with the United States and France, and it maintained a close relationship with *Commonwealth* countries such as India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Mauritius, Kenya and Singapore (Manganyi 2014; Wessels 2010).

During the same period, South Africa tried to strengthen its ties with other Indian Ocean countries through the creation of the *Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation* (IOR-ARC) in a meeting at the Mauritius Islands, with the objective of strengthening political and regional ties among its members. Unlike this approach, relations between SAN and Navies of the other margin of the Atlantic have been scanty. The main occasions were when South Africa participated in UNITAS maritime exercises in 1996 – a series of exercises designed by the United States and South American countries – and when it took part in ATLASUR in 1997. In that same year, SAN celebrated its 75th anniversary with the presence of 36 countries, out of which only three were from South America (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay) (Manganyi 2014; Wessels 2010).


Apart from the security focus, the continuity of the South Atlantic's secondary position in South Africa's policies can be noticed by analyzing the country's economic interactions during the Mandela administration. Although there was an interest in MERCOSUL (this was one of Mandela's goals when he travelled to South America in 1998), what happened in reality was the priority of regional trade or trade with Asian and Northern countries. The increase of commercial flows among regional countries was expected, since, as previously noted, the "new" South Africa had a regional insertion policy. However, what we highlight here is Pretoria's other international trade partners, as seen below:

Image 1 – South Africa's exports (in Rands and by economic bloc)



Source: Created by the author based on data from DTISA (2017)

Image 2 – South Africa's imports (in Rands and by economic bloc)



Source: Created by the author based on data from DTISA (2017)

According to data from the *Department of Trade and Industry of South Africa* (DTISA), both in terms of imports and in terms of exports the European Union and the *North American Free Trade Agreement* (NAFTA) have maintained their position as South Africa's main commercial partners. They are the only blocs to which South Africa exports more than ZAR\$20,000,000,000 (DTISA 2016). In a contrasting figure, between

1994 and 1998 there were low levels of trade between South Africa and MERCOSUL, a fact that, along with the military devaluation, has kept the Southern Atlantic region as a secondary route if compared, for example, with the Indian Ocean.

African Renaissance, African Agenda and a new look towards the Southern Atlantic region

As previously stated, the changes adopted by the Mandela administration turned South Africa's new international insertion to a diametrically opposite direction if compared to PN administrations. An example can be found in the priority given to the African continent, which during the *apartheid* regime was considered relevant only in terms of the continuity of the racist regime. Another example is the new South African goal of expanding its international relations, which had been, until then, limited to relations with Western powers.

In general, when we analyze the almost ten years when Mbeki presided the country (1999-2008), it is possible to find forms of continuity in terms of foreign policy as compared to his predecessor. A first case is the valuing of human rights and democracy, both of them issues related with Mbeki's critique of military and one-party governments, considered diachronic in 21st century Africa³. The belief that conflict resolution should be carried out by non-violent means and the appraisal of multilateralism and universalism to fundament the choice of strategic partnerships were other examples of the points in Mbeki administration's foreign policy which resembled that of Mandela.

The adoption of universalism and multilateralism would turn out to be strategic for the Mbeki administration. On the one hand, it was important for South Africa's regional insertion, since it demonstrated some flexibility in South African actions and, consequently, granted Pretoria the possibility of approaching African countries that followed a diametrically opposite way from that of South Africa – such as, for instance, Zimbabwe – but that were politically and historically relevant actors in the continent. In other words, universalism and multilateralism generated non-confrontation with some African countries and were both important means of unlinking South Africa's image as a pro-Western country, a “lackey of the United States or any other Western country” (Landsberg 2000: 119).

3 In a speech at Abuja in 2000, Mbeki said that “tyrants fear the masses and always try to demobilize them through propaganda, corruption and terror. Our task as progressive people is to oppose tyrants”.

On the other hand, the maintenance of good relations with many African countries was seen as necessary for the promotion of a new African political ideology for the 21st century (Nabudere 2001), most commonly referred to as *African Renaissance*. Hlophe and Landsberg (1999) highlight two dimensions of *African Renaissance*. The first one is the relationship between this renaissance and the Ghanaian term “*Sankofa*”, which meant moving South Africa and the African continent towards a prosperous future, which would be reached through the valuing and recovery of an African past dating back to before the European invasion. The second is the importance of the interaction between democracy and economic development, a relation which would create a stable and favorable base for economic growth, granting Africa a new role in globalization.

These dimensions indicated by Hlophe and Landsberg (1999) are key for *African renaissance* and had been fostered by Mbeki even before he took office. In his speech at the United Nation University in 1998, *The African Renaissance, South Africa and the World*, he presents, in fact, *African Renaissance* to the world. In this speech, it is possible to notice that Mbeki's proposed return to a pre-European past had the objective of reconstructing African dignity, an important feeling in terms of the combat to the existing stigma of a continent eternally dependent of charity from the outside world, incapable of fighting its own problems and passive to dictatorship governments.

Besides, this speech strengthened the view defended by Mbeki that there is a relation between economic development and democracy, and it also demonstrated to the world that the African continent had been trying to adapt to neoliberal conditioning and needed to create new partnerships with industrialized countries. In a way, the expectation for *African Renaissance* was that economic ties with industrialized countries and their interest for the continent's natural resources could be availed. In other words, it was considered that the success or failure of this doctrine was related to the dynamics of the partnership, or in Landsberg terms (2005: 740) to the “*mutual accountability*” or “*mutual responsibility*”, in the way that there shouldn't be any form of paternalism between African and industrialized countries (Landsberg 2005).

As president, Mbeki sought the consubstantiation of the mutual responsibility dynamics signaled by the *African Renaissance*. In regional terms, Pretoria turned to the creation of NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development), an initiative for the promotion of the continent's economic development, which was received enthusiastically by Western powers (Bujra 2004), as it accepted globalization, neoliberalism and all of its conditionings, but on the other hand indicated democracy and conflict

prevention as preconditions for the development of the African continent (NEPAD 2001). Besides NEPAD, South African government acted intensely for the transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). In this respect, points such as the respect for human rights, democracy, good governance, as well as Pretoria's proposed structure model, *Pan-continentalism*, were included in AU (Landsberg 2012c; CAAU, 2000)⁴.

On one hand, if the creation of NEPAD and a transition from OAU to AU symbolized the consubstantiation of the *African Renaissance*; on the other hand, they turned into important tools for the elevation of *African Renaissance* into a new level, commonly known as the African Agenda. Generally, the African Agenda can be understood as a phase of continuity and growth of the *African Renaissance*. Continuity, because it has remained faithful to the incentive and creation of democratic systems by African countries, to the efforts for peace and security in the continent and to efforts leading to economic development, among other objectives defended by this doctrine of African renovation (Landsberg 2007; Kondlo and Landsberg 2007).

The African Agenda can also be understood as a phase of growth of the *African Renaissance*, because in regional terms it aims at intensifying South Africa's interactions with African countries. In this case, it becomes clear that through its growth the African Agenda has become an important tool for a greater integration of South Africa to the continent. An example can be found in the incentive to South African companies to invest in Africa. In fact, small investments by companies such as *Checkers*, *Game an Makro*, *Protea Hotels*, *Debonairs*, *Nandos and Steers*, *Truworths and Weoolworths*, *Standard Bank/Stanbic and Multichoice*, and greater investments by *MTN*, *Vodacom*, *Transnet*, *Eskom*, *AngloGold Ashanti*, *Randgold Resources*, *Sasol* and *PetroSA*, have become more frequent (Comnimos, Daniel and Lutchman 2007). Besides, in commercial terms, the African Agenda has not only promoted trade among various African countries, but it also has turned South Africa into the second greatest buyer of products exported by countries such as Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Lesotho and Malawi.

At the same time, *African Renaissance* has also enabled South Africa to have a greater role internationally. In terms of the mutual responsibility dynamics, it is possible to notice a distinction established by the Mbeki administration concerning South African expectations of its North-South and South-South interactions. In terms of North-South relations, South

4 Pan-continentalism is understood as "the process through which states unite to create new norms, principles, institutions, political structures, and agree to live according to these norms and structures in harmony with each other" (Landsberg 2012c)

African expectations were to break from Afro-pessimism, presenting instead the image of a continent in transformation and inviting rich countries to be a part of this renovation process. One of the main examples of this is the promotion of NEPAD as part of the OECD and G8 agendas, both seen by Pretoria as financiers of this development Project (Bujra 2004). Such activism, apart from strengthening the country's image as part of the African continent, also guaranteed Pretoria the status of Africa's "voice" in the post-Cold War world.

Concerning South-South relations, besides the appreciation of groups which South Africa had become part of during the Mandela administration – G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement – the Mbeki administration integrated South Africa into other groups, such as the *Forum for China-Africa Co-operation* (FOCAC), the *New Asian-African Strategic Partnership* (NAASP), the *New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership* (NAASP), the *Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation* (IOR-ARC), the IBSA Forum and others. On the one hand, Pretoria's interest to be part of these groups guaranteed its integration with countries such as China, Russia, Brazil, India and other emerging powers. On the other hand, it altered South African perception of the Southern Atlantic region, since the country would seek a greater interaction with Brazil.

An example of this can be found by analyzing the IBSA Forum, composed by South Africa, Brazil and India. Its symbols walk side by side with three major South African interests. The first one is the strengthening of strategic partnerships with countries belonging to other regions, in this case South America and Asia. The second refers to the goal of being a more active country in global governance, since the existence of this forum is closely related to points such as the United Nations Security Council reform, defense and respect of international laws, and diplomacy as the best way for conflict resolution (Declaração de Brasília 2003). Finally, the third interest would be South Africa's role in the process of expansion of the interstate system, that is, its geostrategic importance between the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. However, unlike previous moments, when the country was tied to Western powers, with the *African Renaissance* its geographic specificity became an asset for South-South relations.

In security terms, it is also possible to notice South Africa's appreciation of the Southern Atlantic region. An example is the renovation of the *South African Navy* (SAN), involving the increase of contingents, the acquisition of new ships and submarines and, in 2006, the release of the "*Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy*" (MDSAN), a document that demonstrated the importance of South Africa as a bi-oceanic country and the necessity of maintaining its maritime surroundings safe from possible

threats (SAN 2006). The renovation of SAN and the adoption of MDSAN granted South Africa an increase in multilateral exercises, which during the Mandela administration were fewer and mostly accomplished with *Commonwealth* members.

Specifically in terms of South-South relations, a highlight is ATLASUR, which aims to create greater cooperation and exchange of experiences between the Navies of Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and South Africa. During the Mbeki administration, ATLASUR V happened in 2002, ATLASUR VI in 2006 and ATLASUR VII in 2008, with the V and VII at the South African coast. Besides ATLASUR, another prominent exercise was IBSAMAR, which initially took place in Cape Town (2008), having cooperation and mutual respect between Brazil, South Africa and India as its main objectives, as well as the development and perfecting of naval tactics and of doctrines for the defense of terrestrial platforms, and the conduction of operations fighting threats to member-countries (Manganyi 2014; Wessels 2010).

In parallel to the political-diplomatic (IBSA) and security (SAN) scopes, economically there has also been a greater interaction between South Africa and South America. According to data from DTI (2017), it is possible to notice an increase in commercial exchange between Pretoria and Mercosul. In terms of South African exports, if in 1999 Pretoria had exported ZAR\$1,690,464,320 to Mercosul countries, in 2009 this amount was reaching ZAR\$4,170,128,695. In terms of South African imports, the same period saw an increase from ZAR\$3,663,047,110 to ZAR\$19,034,871,129, a growth that shows the continuity of the deficit.

It is important to highlight that in the Afro-Asian dynamics, when trade between South Africa and the SAARC are analyzed, the economic relation tends to favor South Africans. In 1999, South African imports amounted to ZAR\$1,928,439,495 and exports to ZAR\$2,112,101,117. In 2009, the values were ZAR\$17,025,128,128 and ZAR\$19,500,726,004 respectively (DTI 2017). However, even though the economic relation between South Africa and SAARC members is more interesting to Pretoria in terms of its surplus, it is a fact that political-diplomatic initiatives for the approximation of the regions (such as ASA) and the creation of military exercises involving South Atlantic countries (such as ATLASUR) or IBSA members (such as IBSAMAR) are events that, in general, demonstrate South Africa's greater interest for the Southern Atlantic region.

The Southern Atlantic region during the Zuma administration (2009-2014): continuity or decrease in importance?

After Mbeki's resignation and Motlanthe's brief administration (2008-2009), Zuma took office (2009-)⁵. On the short term, some changes were speculated both internally and externally, as Zuma was supported by groups such as the *Congress of South African Trade Unions* (COSATU), *South African Communist Party* (SACP), and *ANC Youth League* (ANCYL), all opposed to policies adopted by the previous administration. It is important to note that ANCYL under Julius Malema (2008-2012) claimed for the abandonment of free trade and for the nationalization of banks and mining industries (Hughes 2011).

Internally, it was expected from the Zuma administration to act towards the curtailment of unemployment, better access and improvement of public health and education; that is, solutions to challenges inherited from the *apartheid* regime which had not been solved by previous administrations. In terms of South Africa's international relations, there were also expectations, especially when the *Department of Foreign Affairs* (DFA) was transformed into *Department of International Relations and Cooperation* (DIRCO). In sum, this change was meant to, internally, convince South African population that foreign policy is important for the country, and externally, to show African countries that South Africa would keep faithful to the non-hegemonic character of its role in the continent (Landsberg 2010).

However, when we analyze the Zuma administration, we find a level of continuity in South Africa's foreign policy. This can be observed by the fact that democracy, economic development, respect to multilateralism, non-violent conflict resolution, as well as the diversification and increase of strategic partnerships – all features that had been guiding South Africa's post-*apartheid* performance – remain as its most important policy points (Landsberg 2012b, 2012a). Besides, the prioritization of the African continent remained, symbolized by the maintenance and intensification of the African Agenda. This can be found in the search for creating peace in the continent, either through *peacekeeping* or *peacemaking* operations, or through support for the reconstruction of countries after conflicts (Landsberg 2010, 2012b, 2012a).

Beyond security, examples can be found in the creation or

⁵ According to Landsberg (2012a: 8), support to RECs and the maintenance of Africa as a priority were two of the many characteristics which, "in sum, the change from Mbeki to Motlanthe was marked by the continuity and not by change".

maintenance of bilateral economic agreements, so-called *Business Forums*, signed with countries such as Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Namibia, Zambia and, notably, Angola, the first African country visited by the South African president, along with a delegation of 150 businessmen, the largest number in an official visit until then. Another example of economic relations are the projects carried out by the Zuma administration: the strengthening of SADC *Free Trade Area* (SADC-FTA) – inaugurated during the Mbeki administration – and the construction of a free trade zone based on the integration of SADC, *East African Community* (EAC) and the *Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa* (COMESA). In terms of infrastructure, such initiatives were followed by the *Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative* (PICI) and the *Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa* (PIDA)⁶.

Still in economic terms, however, South Africa's relation to the rest of the world was different with Zuma in its positioning towards commercial partners. Evidently, the European Union is still South Africa's main commercial partner, but from 2005 to 2015 China surpassed the United States and became the African country's second largest commercial partner. In fact, while in 2005 South African exports to the U.S. and China were, respectively, ZAR\$ 30,456,024,154 and ZAR\$ 8,456,249,474; in 2015, they amounted to ZAR\$ 78,570,360,988 and ZAR\$ 94,375,122,871, respectively. Besides, during the same period South African imports from the United States corresponded to ZAR\$ 30,259,829,171 in 2005 and from China ZAR\$ 32,070,892,524; while in 2015 they were ZAR\$ 76,283,766,177 (USA) and ZAR\$ 199,392,013,145 (China) (DTI 2017).

In general, China's transformation into South Africa's second main commercial partner can be understood as a result of the African Agenda, since from the Mbeki administration there was the goal of establishing closer ties with emerging powers. With Zuma, the main result of this orientation was South Africa's joining of the BRIC group, which became BRICS after its admission. Although economically South Africa lags behind the other BRICS members, its status as regional power with a sophisticated

⁶According to PIDA (2012: 1-2), "Africa's infrastructure needs are starkly apparent: power demand will increase from 590 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2010, to more than 3,100 TWh in 2040, corresponding to an average annual growth rate of nearly 6%. To keep pace, installed power generation capacity must rise from present levels of 125 gigawatts (GW; comparable with the United Kingdom) to almost 700 GW in 2040. Transport volumes will increase 6–8 times, with a particularly strong increase of up to 14 times for some landlocked countries. Port throughput will rise from 265 million tons in 2009, to more than 2 billion tons in 2040. Water needs will push some river basins—including the Nile, Niger, Orange and Volta basins—to the ecological brink. Information and communications technology (ICT) demand will swell by a factor of 20 before 2020 as Africa catches up with broadband. Demand, around 300 gigabits per second in 2009, will reach 6,000 gigabits per second by 2018".

infrastructure network, as well as its commercial, technical and financial dynamics (Kornegay 2010) and its geographic position (bi-oceanic) were all qualities that demonstrated its relevance for the group.

In a way, South Africa's joining of the BRICS had an impact on its view of the Southern Atlantic region. An example can be found in Pretoria's commercial relations with MERCOSUL member countries. Although South Africa's trade with Asian partners is much more intense, with exports in 2016 reaching ZAR\$ 56,220,593,206 and imports reaching ZAR\$ 49,657,068,748 (DTISA 2017), its trade with MERCOSUL are increasingly growing. According to DTISA (2017), while in 2009 South Africa's exports to the bloc were of ZAR\$ 4,170,128,695, in 2016 they corresponded to ZAR\$ 9,269,141,468. Besides, South African imports also increased, from ZAR\$ 19,034,871,129 in 2009 to ZAR\$ 36,455,821,023 in 2016, showing how the Southern Atlantic region is still an important commercial route for both sides.

The tendency to value the South Atlantic basin can also be observed in South Africa's Security and Defense policies, which, in line with its foreign policy, also represent a continuity of a process started by the former administration. On the one hand, an initial resemblance is the decrease of resources available to SANF. In fact, while Mbeki's administration invested less than 2% of the GDP in the Armed Forces, Zuma would invest even less, reaching the lowest levels from 2011, with only 1.1% (SIPRI 2016).

On the other hand, even though there was a smaller amount of resources available, a second resemblance to the Mbeki administration was the maintenance of the *Maritime Doctrine for the SA Navy* (MDSAN) and, notably, the refurbishing of the *South African Navy* (SAN), through an increase in the number of contingents and the acquisition of new ships and submarines. Since the first year of Zuma's administration, 2009, the contingents were reaching 6.000, with three submarines, four new frigates, two *gun-boats (ex-strike craft)*, three *mine-hunters*, one *combat support ship* and one *hydrographic survey ship* (Wessels 2010).

Aside from this refurbishing being relevant for the protection of the country's strategic environment, it is fundamental for the country's interest in becoming more active in IBSAMAR exercises, initiated during the Mbeki administration in Cape Town (2008), which have continued in the Zuma administration. IBSAMAR II, III and V, carried out in 2010, 2013 and 2016, respectively, happened in the South African coast. In parallel, a second initiative adopted during the Zuma administration which indirectly involves the Southern Atlantic is *Operation Phakisa*, created in 2014, which, although focused on Education and Health, also comprises four projects directed at the South Atlantic coast.

The first one refers to aquiculture, with the main goal of obtaining a greater use of natural fishing resources of the South African coast⁷. The second refers to improving the flow of ships to the South African coast, with the objective of benefiting the industrial sector that handles the maintenance of ships at the ports. The third project is aimed at the prospection and exploitation of *offshore* petroleum and gas, since researches demonstrate the existence of reserves that could reach 9 billion barrels of oil and 11 billion of natural gas – numbers which would make South Africa self-sufficient of these resources for, at least, 40 and 350 years, respectively. Lastly, the fourth project is related to South Africa's intention of protecting this region legally by creating means (around ten) to promote maritime environmental protection of illegal activities (Operation Phakisa 2014).

Final Thoughts

When we analyze Mandela (1994-1999), Mbeki (1999-2008) and Zuma (2009-) administrations, it becomes clear that there is a South African ambition for a new international insertion, marked by a rupture with the foreign policy adopted by the *apartheid* regime. In the regional setting, the ANC administrations have tried to transform South Africa into an element for the provision of continental stability, engaging with peace operations and dialogue, fighting underdevelopment and its maladies, trying to change Africa's condition as a marginalized continent in the globalization process and breaking with its own previous regional isolation by participating in the renovation of the continent. A result can be seen in South Africa's increased diplomatic relations with diverse African countries, as well as its active role in the creation of NEPAD and in the transformation of the OAU into AU.

In parallel with changes in the regional level, post-*apartheid* South Africa has looked for a greater political insertion internationally, supported not only by North-South relations but also by South-South relations. Although it values its partnerships with the United States and the European Union, two of Pretoria's main economic partners, it has become clear, especially since the Mbeki administration, that South Africa is interested in strengthening its economic and political ties with countries such as Brazil, India, China and Russia. Such goal has led the country to change its view of the South Atlantic Ocean.

⁷“The Aquaculture work stream has underlined the high growth potential of South Africa's aquaculture sector due to increasing demand for fish. While aquaculture contributes to almost half of the global fish supply, it contributes less than 1% of South Africa's fish supply” (Operation Phakisa 2016).

Evidently, there are variations in the ANC administrations. It is clear, for instance, that the Mandela administration did not show a greater interest on the Southern Atlantic basin. However, administrations since Mbeki have shown the tendency to change this perspective. Initiatives such as the IBSA, the interest in developing maritime exercises such as IBSAMAR, the goal to strengthen economic ties with South America and South Africa's admission to BRICS are some of the elements that show a greater appreciation of the Southern Atlantic region.

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims at analyzing the importance of the Southern Atlantic region in South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy and raises the hypothesis that the increase of South Africa's interest on the South Atlantic in fact is a result of its appreciation of South-South relations. The methodology was worked through a revision of a variety of bibliography.

KEYWORDS

South Africa post-apartheid; Southern Atlantic; Foreign Policy.

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“THE ONLY REALITY IN BLACK AFRICA BACK THEN”: BOUBOU HAMA AND THE INTEGRATION BETWEEN TECHNIQUE AND SPIRITUALITY

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Introduction

This article approaches the ideas of a man called Boubou Hama. His life was marked by an active intellectual and political trajectory in Niger, former French colony in West Africa. In a controversial date (1906 or 1909), Boubou Hama was born in a village of Songhay ²ethnic group called Fonéki; as a child, he attended schools of the colonial administration until graduating in the *École Normale Supérieure William Ponty* – the biggest and most important educational institution of *Afrique Occidentale Française* [French West Africa / FWA] – as the first professor in the colonial Niger. After working as a professor for almost twenty years, Boubou Hama launched himself, in the 1940s, into political life, working actively in the first Niger's party – Parti Progressiste Nigérien, [Nigerian Progressist Party / NPP]. After the country's independence, in 1960, he remained extremely close to the first president, Diori Hamani, occupying different important jobs, as the presidency of the National Assembly, the presidency of the *Conseil National de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique* [National Council of Scientific and Technical Research], and the directory of the *Centre Régional de Documentation pour la Tradition Orale de l'Ouest Africain* [Regional Center of Documentation for Oral Tradition of West Africa / RCDTO], to name just a few. Boubou Hama remained in public life until his imprisonment in 1974, when a military coup, perpetrated by Seyni Kountché, took place. His written work is monumental and it addresses different thematics, denoting

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² I opted for maintaining the French spelling used in Boubou Hama's work when we refer to human groups of Western Africa.

a proficuous intellectual production that does not end until his death, in 1982.

This short biography aims to present an important character of the Nigerian history, so little known in our country. In the core of Boubou Hama's intellectual projects – which were inseparable from his political projects -, education and culture had a fundamental role. For him, the safeguard and the dissemination of properly “African” knowledge, as he called, were essential for the response process to the colonial domination, as well as the uprising process of the black continent in relation to Europe and the rest of the world. In this direction, Boubou Hama was a man who worked intensively so that present cultures of his country became known. While he saw himself and his initiatives as parts of a bigger enterprise of rescue and preservation of traditions, he also used them to develop his own projects.

With this work, I believe I could contribute for the knowledge of a less studied part of Africa's history and its inhabitants. From a questioning about how an important character of Niger understood current “traditional” cultures in his region and how he proposed to use them in his own time, I divided the development of this article in three parts. In a first moment, for contextualization, I will show some information about Niger on the eve and at the beginning of the colonial occupation. Secondly, I will discuss some of Boubou Hama's conceptions about “traditional knowledge”, that is, how this man elaborated the idea of a “Nigerian culture”, which he understood as being present before the colonial times and remained present in his own epoch. Finally, I will examine some aspects about the impacts of colonization on knowledge and its dissemination, analyzing what Boubou Hama proposed in this sense. In time, it should be clear that all translations presented here are my own, and the original texts are available in the footnotes.

Niger: an overview of before and after the colonial occupation

The current country called Niger is located simultaneously in the central and West portion of Africa, and it is the largest country in this part of the continent. Its territory extends through the Sahara as well as through the Sahel, it is bordered by other seven countries and it does not have, therefore, exits neither for the Mediterranean nor for the Atlantic. Such geographic portion was the stage of dynamic and complex internal commercial networks, that developed from the VII century, embracing all the Sahel region of West Africa and that, by Trans-Saharan routes, arrived at the Maghreb (Northern

part of the continent) and the Middle East (Hernandez 2008, 33-36). In this sense, Moraes Farias still calls attention for the exchanges, loans and cultural modifications occurred among different peoples, for example, by commercial contacts, and also warning about the malleability and fluidity that, so many times, are not considered by historiography (Moraes Farias 2006: 225).

It is diverse the populations that end up composing the contemporary Nigerian face, which many were nomads – even if having subsequent settlements and populational establishments – and are different from each other. Even if it is necessary to relativize the idea of ‘unity’ between any human groups in that West Africa’s region, we can name, for example, some that are preponderant in Boubou Hama’s work: the Tuaregue group, Peul, Hausa and Zarma-Shonghay. Niger, on the eve of the colonial occupation, came close to the image of an intersection of different people and cultures, once the peoples, its localization and movements did not circumscribe to a certain area forcedly fixed by the colonizers. However, by the end of the XIX century, the European occupation arrived, demarcating the region that lately would be known as the ‘colony of Niger’. Many of its inhabitants continued to know and refer to themselves by its ethnical compositions; however, in general, all individuals circumscribed to the recent delimited zone came to be known as ‘Nigerians’.

It is true that the European endowments in the West Africa region are prior to the Berlin Conference itself (1884-1885), as demonstrated by the fact that the inhabitants of the *Quatre Communes* [Four Councils] of Senegal – named Dakar, Gorée, Saint-Louis and Rufisque –, called *les originaires* [the originals], had some citizen rights, including the right to vote, as soon as 1848 (Cooper 2014, 6). However, it was during the third French Republic, established after the fall of Napoleon III and maintained between 1871 and 1940, that it was established the colonial organizations more fully defined. Fundamental for the French logistic in the African continent, such administrative unities were the following: the *Afrique Occidentale Française* [French West Africa / FWA], built in 1895 and composed, in its complete shape, by the colonies of Senegal, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Guinea, Soudan (currently Mali), Upper Volta (currently Burkina Faso), Dahomey (current Benin) and Niger, and the *Afrique Équatoriale Française* [French Equatorial Africa / FEA], formed in 1910 and integrated by the colonies of Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Chad and Ubangi-Shari.

In the interior of the West portion of the African continent ruled by the French, Niger emerges as a territory that felt violently, through bloody combats that aimed to resist the colonial occupation, the inescapable presence of the European troops. Amidst a huge outpouring of blood that

marked not only the expeditions destined for the colonial conquer, but also the consequent attempts of resistance by the locals, this dry and inhospitable region that would be called ‘the colony of Niger’ succumbed – a little late in comparison with the other territories – to the French advancements. In this sense, initially a military territory (1900-1921) and a colony afterwards (1922-1960), Niger is described by Boubou Hama as being “the perfect colonial type for exploration”, in which peanut, cotton, rubber and skins composed the products of interest to the colonial market (Hama 1974: 103).

Beyond the rules of the market, there were still other French established regimes to which the autochthonous were exposed to that shows the way how the colonial government provoked changes in the structure of the Nigerian society. Among them, I would like to call attention for the implementation of an educational system, controlled by the colonial administration, to where the children from the most diverse localities should be sent to. Such system had a fundamental importance for the constitution of literate elite that was present in the political scene not only before, but after independence. The colonial education was also present in the trajectory of life of Boubou Hama himself, acting as a factor of profound relevance in the intellectual path of this man of culture that was so interested about education, working strongly for the safeguard and propagation of the people’s culture knowledge of the Niger region.

Traditional knowledge and the idea of a “Nigerian culture”

A preliminary elucidation is needed: the term ‘traditional’ is changeable; we also cannot affirm that people and societies remained statically not even before, nor during the colonization, in the same way that we should not understand ‘traditional’ as being a concept of a single definition throughout the times. In this sense, the question that we propose is what Boubou Hama himself understood for that word. Generally, in his texts, such notion refers to the pre-colonial period, but as he considers a more extensively temporality, marked by many different characteristics, as well as by different mutations, Boubou Hama sometimes used differentiations that specified his idea; for example, “Songhay tradition”, “Islamic tradition”, or even adding differences; such as “the Islamic tradition of Sonni Ali Ber’s epoch”.

Beyond that, it is possible to note that the distinction proposed by Hobsbawn between tradition (unchangeable) and costume (changeable) (Hobsbawn 1984: 9-23) does not apply to this case, once Boubou Hama tends to use both terms organically and even interchangeably. In general terms, for him, “traditional knowledge” is a macro idea that inserts a

series of comprehensions, capacities, foundations and information present between societies in the African continent – for which he uses many times the bigger term ‘Africans’ - before the establishment of Europeans and the colonies’ formation (in the formal sense of the term), Obviously, such knowledge also spread during the colonial period, something that proves for the possibility that Boubou Hama had to access them, as we shall see. Given such premises, and in the light of the examples in this man’s texts, the question that interest us to examine is: what was considered as knowledge in the “Nigerian” societies in the pre-colonial period?

In the following excerpt, Boubou Hama shows some characteristics of the Gana Empire (of Soninké origins and the first of the three great empires of West Africa, *circa* the III and XIII century) and the Mossi reign (established from the XII century in the current region of Burkina Faso and with which Boubou Hama himself had contact in his passage, when he was a child, by Ouagadougou³) in relation to the “religious” practices. These two cases serve as examples of what he called “animist society”, which identifies internally a type of specific knowledge. In his words:

In the old [empire of] Gana, the royal fetiche are deposited in a sacred forest. But each region, each village had its tutelar genious. Each family, each caste, had its science or its particular cult.

In the Mossi Empire, it was the Moro Naba, supreme chief of the cult, that had the main fetish of the Empire and, with them, the supreme knowledge that guides the priests and the responsible for political life.

The animist society, emanation of its “superstructure”, inside the same conception of life and man, is strongly integrated with private cults in which action is taken at the level of the individual, the family and the castes.

It is in these base cells that they initiated in art, science, in a professional practice. The initiation regarding the people, the children of the people, it is made in associations or, without social distinction, these children dedicated themselves to the practice of a certain philosophy of life, that of “know what to say” and “know what to do”⁴ (Hama 1978: 13).

³The period lived in Ouagadougou is reported by Boubou Hama in the first volume of his autobiography, titled *Kotia-Nima*.

⁴« Dans l’ancien Ghana les fétiches royaux sont déposés dans une forêt sacrée. Mais chaque région, chaque village avaient leur génie tutulaire [sic]. Chaque famille, chaque caste avaient sa science ou son culte particuliers [sic]. Dans l’Empire Mossi, c’est le Moro Naba qui est le chef suprême du culte, c’est lui qui détient les fétiches principaux de l’Empire et avec eux, la suprême connaissance qui guide les prêtres et les responsables de la vie politique. La société animiste, émanation de sa ‘super-structure’, dans la même conception de la vie et de l’homme, est fortement intégrée dans les cultes particuliers où s’exécute l’action au niveau de l’individu, de la famille et des castes. C’est dans ces cellules de base qu’on s’initie à l’art, à la science, à la pratique d’un métier. L’initiation en direction du peuple, des enfants du peuple se fait dans des associations ou, sans distinction de rang social, ces enfants se livrent

In the text's content, it is notable that words like 'fetish', 'sacred', 'genius', 'cult' and 'priest' are connected with other terms such as 'knowledge' (or 'science'), 'politics', 'conception of life' and 'action', denoting the proximity that it relates to what we will call the 'spiritual' scope and 'technical' scope. Also, regarding the children's learning, the "know what to say" (which relates to the acquisition of knowledge) and the "know what to do" (relating to the learning of an expertise or profession) are considered as a philosophy of life. All these elements are, therefore, connected; for Boubou Hama, such connection seems to be established a long time ago, given its rescue from the antique Ghana Empire. In addition, according to the excerpt analyzed, there was a social, familiar and political organization, which epicenter was found in the cult practice and in the presence of a tutelar genius; that is, the technic was strongly linked to those conceptions belonging to the spiritual sphere. In short, I would like to suggest that, when we think of Boubou Hama's understanding concerning the idea of a traditional "knowledge", we should have in mind the inseparability between all those aspects.

In this same direction, we can imply that, in this man's conception about that context, all spheres of life could be comprehended from "religious" background – that can be an inadequately word, but it is the word that he uses in many of his texts –, or still, that were submersed in a spiritual "dimension". According with Boubou Hama, "animism was, before the arrival of Europe in some of our countries, the only religion that guided the lives of the family and the collectivities. Therefore, it ruled the individual's behavior and society itself. All, in the Black Africa, was made in the framing of our conceptions of life and world"⁵ (Hama 1968: 53). By using the term "everything", Boubou Hama truly reveals the far reach that he considered that the spiritual conception had in relation to people's lives, in its most diverse fields. The reading of his texts also allows to understand what he comprehended by the term "animism", something that embraced conceptions of the world (*Weltanschauung*) that were different not only from Islamism (received, modified and adapted to the Africa' Sub-Saharan context since the XI century) as much as from Christianity (introduced since the contact with Europeans). An essential characteristic from this understanding was the integration of all things; individuals and society, part and everything:

à la pratique d'une certaine philosophie de la vie, à celle du 'savoir dire' et 'savoir faire'. »

5 "L'animisme était, avant l'arrivée de l'Europe dans certains de nos pays, la seule religion qui régissait la vie de la famille et des collectivités. Celle-ci réglait, alors, le comportement des individus et de la société elle-même. Tout, en Afrique Noire, se faisait dans le cadre de nos conceptions de la vie et du monde".

Animism bases the direction of society about its conception of life and the world, about the individual unity imbricated in the group unity, about the “partial” that gains form with the everything that formed it and from which it does not separates from. If “I have your hair or the clothe that touched your body, I have the last completely.”

[...] For animism, there is no remission of sins, because each fault affects the whole of creation, for which are responsible, simultaneously, the individual and the society that assist him⁶ (Hama 1978: 11-12).

This type of social conception also echoes in the way Amadjoy Hampâté Bâ presents the religious vision of the world postulated by African traditions, that presupposed a connection between the visible and invisible universe: “In the interior of this vast cosmic unity, everything is connected, everything is solidary, and man’s behavior with himself and in relation with the world that surrounds him (mineral, vegetal, animal worlds and human society) is object of a very precise ritual regulation which forms can vary according to the ethnics or regions.” (Hampâté Bâ 1980: 173). Equally, we see Léopold Sédar Senghor describes African society as collectivist and communitary, within which someone “fells and think that can only develop his virtualities – his original being – in society and through it, in communion with all other members of the social group, with all men, or even with all other human beings of the world: God, animal, tree or stone.” (Senghor 1971: 307). It is about two men whose lives resemble Boubou Hama’s, as wells as the epoch, the experience in FWA’s territories – the first in Soudan and the second in Senegal -, and study trajectories and similar works, which allow us tot think about the circulation of ideas among African intellectuals.

In the sense of what’s been debated, Hampâté Bâ also suggests that “inside the oral tradition, in fact, the spiritual and the material are not dissociated” (Hampâté Bâ 1980: 169), and the African culture itself “involves a particular vision of the world, or, in better words, a particular *presence* in the world – a world conceived as Everything where all things reconnect and interact” (Hampâté Bâ 1980: 169), both notions shared by Boubou Hama. In this perspective, we can conclude that elements such as knowledge, wisdom, experience and technique are integrated. In his *Essai d’analyse de l’éducation Africaine* [Analitical Essay on African education], Boubou Hama aims to provide a framework under which the Songhay’s and Zarma’s mental universe lies, studying its spiritual life and its daily

6 “L’animisme base la direction de la société sur sa conception de la vie et du monde, sur l’unité de l’individu imbriqué dans celle de l’ensemble, sur le ‘partiel’ qui prend corps avec le tout qui l’a fourni et dont il ne se sépare pas. Si ‘J’ai ton cheveu ou le vêtement qui a touché ton corps, j’ai ce dernier dans son entier’. [...] Pour l’animisme, il n’y a pas de rémission des péchés, car chaque faute affecte l’ensemble de la création dont, à la fois, est responsable l’individu et la société qui l’assiste”.

practical existence. In this rich study, permeated by diverse stories, myths, beliefs and the characters of the spiritual world (gods, *holés*,⁷ spirits, etc.) show in relation to the concrete world. As he alerts, it is not about a fiction; such questions were lived in reality: “but, I know that for the western world all this sounds like a fiction. However, this does not changes the fact that this was *the only reality in the Black Africa back then*, the primordial base from which we extract our spiritual and material acquisition, practical and pacific...”⁸ (Hama 1968: 140-141).

In this context, education is the other present element. It was also carried out in the material as well as in the spiritual level, reiterating the argument that, for Boubou Hama, these fields were inseparable in that context. A significant example in this sense comes in relation to the Sorkos’ caste – fishermen who inhabited the margins of the Niger river and were the only permitted to hunt great animals from it, the alligator [*caïman*], the hippo and manatee [*lamantin*]⁹ –, by the stories collected by Alfa Mossi and Maïguizo Naïmo along with the Sorko people of Koutougou, Liboré (Niamey) and Gaweï regions:

All Sorkos interrogated about themselves said that it [the alligator] is mean and it became dangerous because of the djinns that protect them. It must be made enchantments to keep away these alligator’s *djinns*¹⁰ when you want to kill them.

The alligators hunting consists in two ways. The first consists in “calling” the alligator reciting “prayers”. As soon as it appears, he is spiked with a harpoon and, then, killed. [...] The second way [...] consists in serving a bait (fish, small animal). In the place where the alligator is, the fish hook is positioned with a bait, that captures it. [...] When it leaves the water, it is beaten with the harpoon or a heavy object. [...]

[...] the Sorko fishermen consider this animal [the hippo] as their ox; they do not fear it. [...] the hippo hunting is always preceded by invocations,

7 In general terms, it refers to spiritual entities that can make contact with humans through rituals of possession, in which the *Holé-Tam* (Holé’s slave) or *Holé-Bari* (Holé’s horse) receives one of them. An example of this connection, one possessed by Dongo, the *Holé* of lightnings, rains and storms, becomes *Dongo-Bari* (Dongo’s horse) and it is recognized by particular powerful shoutings that emanate among others *Holé-Tam*. This issue is approached in some of Boubou Hama’s work, for example his first book, published in 1954 along with Jean Boulnois and called *L’Empire de Gao: histoire, coutumes et magie des Sonrai* [The Gaos’s Empire: history, costumes e the Songhay’s magic].

8 “Mais, je sais que tout cela apparaît à l’occidental comme une fiction. Il n’en demeure pas moins *qu’il fut l’unique réalité d’hier en Afrique Noire*, le fond primordial où nous avons puisé notre acquit spirituel et matériel pratique et pacifique...” Original griffins

9 I will not go into taxonomic merit, given the immense variety and subdivisions related not only to “alligator” as well as “manatee”; I use these words in a generic form, being this way that they are also used, in French, in Boubou Hama’s book.

10 Geniuses. I opted for keeping the term as in the original.

by 'prayers'. [...] From this moment that it is spiked by the harpoon, the animal becomes mean and threatens the fishermen and the *pirogas*. [...] In this critical moment, the Sorko *griot*¹¹ recites the hippo's praises [...] After this invocations, the hippo calms and, following, it is attacked and killed. [...]

As soon as the manatee enters between two stakes, it is caught. The Sorko spikes it with the harpoon and kills it. The prey is taken out of the water; it is washed, then, with water and herbs. Without this washing, the manatee's meat can be dangerous for consuming. [...] This happens because the manatee has a protector genius that can be expelled only in the moment of washing the dead animal¹² (Hama 1968: 86-91).

I would like to call attention for the following: on one side, we can isolate practical actions of strategic, technical and material features, such as the observation and localization of the animals, the use of the baits, harpoons and traps, and the sanitizing washing of the meat; on the other hand, it is possible to discriminate other actions, also practical, directed to the spiritual world, such as enchantments, prayers and invocations, whose basis lies in the belief of the presence of protecting geniuses and in the possibility of direct contact with these animals, which react in a humanized way to men. The text, however, does not separates this two fields; the hunting practice of alligators, hippos and manatee, as described by fishing professionals belonging to the Sorko's caste, it is composed equally, and in the same measure, by 'scientific' techniques and by 'magical' practices. In

11 "Griot is the name given by the French to the diéli which among the bambara means 'storyteller. In time: diéli is the one that has the vital force.'" (Hernandez 2008: 29). And still: "But after all, who are the *griots*? They are troubadours, minstrels, storytellers and public animators for whom the discipline of truth loses rigidity, giving a freer language. Still, it stands out the commitment with the truth, without which they would lose the capacity to act in order to maintain harmony and group cohesion, based on a genealogical function of fixing familiar mythologies in the traditional societies scope." (Hernandez 2008: 30).

12 "Tous les Sorko interrogés à son sujet disent qu'il [le caïman] est méchant et qu'il est rendu dangereux à cause des djinis [sic] qui le protègent. Il faut procéder à des incantations pour éloigner ces djinns du caïman quand on veut le mettre à mort. La chasse aux caïmans se fait de deux façons. La première consiste à 'appeler' le caïman en récitant des 'prières'. Dès qu'il paraît, on le harponne et on le tue. [...] La deuxième façon [...] consiste à se servir d'un appât (poisson, petit animal). Sur l'emplacement repéré, on place le hameçon qui l'attrape. [...] Il sort alors de l'eau. Là, il est abattu à coup de harpon ou de masse lourde. [...] ...les pêcheurs sorko considèrent cet animal [l'hippopotame] comme leur bœuf. Ils n'ont pas peur de l'hippopotame. [...] la chasse à l'hippopotame est toujours précédée d'invocations, de 'prières'. [...] Dès qu'il est harponné, l'animal devient méchant et menace pêcheurs et pirogues. [...] A ce moment critique, le Sorko griot dit les louanges de l'hippopotame [...] Après ces invocations l'hippopotame se calme. Il est attaqué ensuite et tué. [...] Dès que le lamantin s'engage entre deux piquets il est pris. Le Sorko le harponne et le tue. On sort le gibier de l'eau. On le lave avec de l'eau et des herbes. Sans ce lavage la viande du lamantin peut être dangereuse pour la nourriture. [...] Ceci parce que le lamantin a un génie protecteur qu'on ne peut chasser qu'au moment du lavage de l'animal tué." Our griffins.

addition, it is exactly this kind of knowledge that Boubou Hama, in another work, dedicated substantially to that caste, refers when he searches to clarify the reasons of the hunting monopoly of those animals by the Sorkos:

The Sorko has a recognized monopoly of manatee, hippo and crocodile hunting. Even if he can only attack them with the harpoon, it does not mean that the other fishermen, the Hausa of Kebbi, for example, are not capable of doing it also (once they come to Niger to learn the fishing art with the Sorkos), but it is, above all, because manatee, hippo and crocodile harpoon hunting – aquatic animals, river geniuses, as we shall see – it is preceded, accompanied and followed by magical practices, which secrets the Sorkos hold, from father to son, since immemorial times. All the foreigners respect this monopoly, not only mystical but also craft, which makes the Sorkos the river’s masters. Once a not-Sorko fishermen comes to face these animals in the Niger [river], he requires the presence of the Sorko, his magic and his art; and pays him a indemnity¹³ (Boulnois and Hama 1954: 22).

Boubou Hama did not make part of any specific Songhay caste; he was a profoundly interested intellectual for what he considered traditional knowledge, found in the Nigerian territory in his epoch. Thus, the reason of the revival and compilation of these knowledge, professional techniques, forms of education and initiation – which appear in many of his works – is related to Hama’s own plans and projects for Niger and Africa as a whole. Furthermore, I would like to argue that, from the perception of Boubou Hama, a common aspect to what was related to the field of the ‘traditional’ was the contact with the ‘invisible world’ and, more deeply, an understanding of the world that is closely intertwined to the spiritual level. For this man, this was a fundamental trait of the ‘black man’, being this idea the very essence that will be maintained in his ideas and projects throughout his entire career.

Although the castes about which the book *Essai d’analyse de l’éducation Africaine* [Essay of African Education Analysis] is about still exists after the investitures and colonial establishment, this brought many impacts,

¹³ “Le Sorko a le monopole reconnu de la chasse au lamentein, à l’hippopotame et au crocodile. Si lui seul peut l’attaquer au harpon, ce n’est pas que les autres pêcheurs, les Haoussa du Kebbi par exemple, n’en seraient pas capables, eux aussi (puisqu’ils viennent au Niger apprendre des Sorko l’art de la pêche), c’est surtout parce que la chasse au harpon du lamentein, de l’hippopotame et du crocodile, animaux aquatiques, génies du fleuve comme nous le verrons, est précédée, accompagnée et suivie de pratiques magiques dont les Sorkos détiennent les secrets de père en fils, depuis en temps immémorial. Tous les étrangers respectent ce monopole aussi mystique qu’artisanal qui fait des Sorko les ‘maîtres du fleuve’ et lorsqu’un pêcheur non sorko veut s’attaquer aux animaux du Niger, il sollicite la présence du Sorko, sa magie et son art ; on lui paie une indemnité.”

affecting the most different fields of action and thought in the West-African territory. In this perspective, and referring to the characteristics of the pre-colonial period, Boubou Hama, beautiful and sadly, exposes: “at least that was how our African societies were built before the foreigners came to dispose them as they pleased, in an atmosphere of dissolution which they did not contribute, but destroyed what, after millennia, we have built for the purpose of challenge death and time”¹⁴ (Hama 1968: 194-195).

Impacts of colonization on knowledge and its circulation

If by one side, it is difficult to make affirmations about the actual reach that the colonial establishment conquered in different parts of what came to be the colony of Niger, as well as its inhabitants, on the other side, it is undeniable that the colonial investiture generated impacts. These were more or less profound, more or less felt, according to the people location, however, the French presence caused some degree of repercussion and disorder, for better or for worst. In relation to the FWA, Benoist observes that a lesser reach in the rural areas, where, we can add, the distances as well as the severe weather contributed for more difficulties of access by the colonial administration and, consequently, a less effective contact with the people. According to the author,

It was only before the First World War that French domination was, still not completely, established under the territories of FWA. During a quarter of century that followed, the administration extended its net on the region, without, however, modifying profoundly the traditional society. [...]

The peasants continued to live in a sacralized world and to take from the family's land, and thanks from a collective work, the resources for their sustenance and for the celebration of the community celebrations that rhythm the year¹⁵ (Benoist 1982: 17-18).

In this interpretation, social practices related to work with the

14 “C’était du moins ainsi que nos sociétés africaines étaient construites avant que les étrangers ne vinssent en disposer à leur guise dans un climat dissolvant qui n’a pas apporté mais qui a détruit ce que, depuis de millénaires, nous avons construit dans le but de défier la mort et le temps”.

15 “Ce n’est qu’à la veille de la première guerre mondiale que la domination française fut à peu près établie sur l’ensemble des territoires constituant l’A.O.F. Pendant le quart de siècle qui a suivi, l’administration a étendu son réseau à l’ensemble du pays, sans pour autant modifier en profondeur la société traditionnelle. [...] Les paysans continuaient à vivre dans un monde sacralisé et à tirer de la terre familiale, et grâce à un travail collectif, de quoi vivre et de quoi célébrer les fêtes communautaires qui rythmaient l’année”.

land and the different stages that govern the cycles of agriculture would have remained practically intact. In this sense, the comprehension of the world based in spiritual perspective had also been preserve or, more or less, little affected. On the other hand, Boubou Hama understood the colonial settlement and subsequent relations established in the territory as deeply disturbing. In the following excerpt, he seeks to trace a parallel allusive to the contacts established between Africa and different locations. Focusing specifically on the religious perspective and what it refers to traditions, Boubou Hama contrasts the established coexistence between Africans and other people to that established in the impacting colonial relation. Therefore, referring to the established bonds between other populations and different African zones (Maghrebian, Saharan, Sudanese¹⁶), he comments:

In this whole, there was no “duality” between animism and Mediterranean “gods”, between Sudan’s spiritualities and Christianity. Between this and Islamism, but a neighborhood, sometimes intimate, that ended up changing the social tissue and human relations on which animist society rested.

In turn, there was no fusion, assimilation between pre-colonial Africa and colonization, but in fact conflicting contacts that profoundly disrupted African traditions.

Today, there is no congruence of the conception of life and world between the traditional Africa and the ideologies and its dissolving systems, that try to divide our world among stagnant or security influence zones¹⁷ (Hama 1978: 8-9)

On his point of view, the established exchanges – and here we can think of knowledge circulation in general – between different societies contributed to modify them, but we can interpret that they did it in unequal ways: enriching in the case of the contacts maintained by Africa in the pre-

16 Following the steps of Gregory Mann (2015), I opted to maintain this spelling to allude to that region of the African continent. *Sudan* derives from the Arabic expression *bīlad al-sudan*, referring to the Southern part of Sahara that must not be confused with *Soudan*, the French colony later called Mali.

17 “Dans cet ensemble, il n’y avait pas ‘dualité’ entre l’animisme et les ‘dieux’ méditerranéens, les spiritualités du Soudan et le Christianisme, entre celles-ci et l’Islamisme, mais voisinage parfois intime qui changea le tissu social et les rapports humains sur lesquels reposait la société animiste. Il n’y eut pas, *non plus*, fusion, assimilation entre l’Afrique précoloniale et la colonisation, mais des contacts heurtés qui dérangèrent profondément les traditions africaines. Il n’y a pas, aujourd’hui, communauté de conception de la vie et du monde entre l’Afrique traditionnelle et les idéologies et leurs systèmes dissolvants qui tentent de partager notre globe en zones d’influence étanches ou de sécurité”. In the second paragraph, I chose to use the adversative expression “in turn”, even though the original has the additive expression *non plus* [either], because I understand that the ideas presented there do not corroborate to those in the first paragraph, but rather counterpose them.

colonial period, and disturbing in the case of relations established during the colonial stage. Regarding this last excerpt analyzed, in the moment that Boubou Hama wrote this text (1970s), the world was divided into two divergent ideologies and subsequent influences zones, characteristic of the Cold War period. The observation that he makes of the distance between those two poles (capitalist and socialist) and Africa – with its own conceptions of the world and peculiarities - it is fundamental for understanding what he elaborated on the role to be played by that continent and, consequently, for his plans for it.

Still considering the colonization impacts, Boubou Hama judges, in the following excerpt, the economic scope as responsible for allowing an opening. This would have, according to him, permitted the introduction of different values from those previously known and established in Africa. One example that we can trace is polygamy – fully practiced in the core of the local costumes, but criticized for being incompatible with the French civil code -, which became one theme of discussion about the status conferred to the FWA's inhabitants in relation to the metropolis (Cooper 2014: 158-164). In Boubou Hama's vision, the disorder was the rule in the colonial process in Africa, to which, however, was able to remain strongly rooted in its own values and conceptions:

In the interior of the colonial system, there was nothing pointed to allow the African civilization to hold itself to a material support. The introduction of the colonial economy in our continent destroyed our own economy structures that started to revolve itself, in vacuum, under its own disturbing and impoverished content.

The western economic, social, political and cultural values then rushed on these open vacuum of our conception of life and world.

However, the proposed assimilation for this continent was never sincere. If such assimilation transformed African society, it was not capable of destroying it; if profound changes were introduced, it did not act sufficiently on it in the sense of an reciprocal economic interest to give a radical reason that would, even more, contribute to make Africa renounce its fundamental values. Of all that, our continent saved a lot of itself, even if, some times, it has stood strongly influenced by the colonial ferment, particularly in the Africa's modern development scope and that of philosophic and scientific language; this is a universal fact that we should study in order to better understand "our humanism", that distinguishes us from others and in which context they want to contest us.

The pre-colonial Africa technique was dominated, in its material as well as spiritual terrain, by castes. They were the economic backbone of African society, controlled by nobles and generous notables. Today, these castes appear within the modern development of our continent (in the savanna) as a phenomenon, above all, social and cultural. (Hama 1968: 368-369).

The colonization influences and the Western knowledge brought and established along with it between the inhabitants of the African continent is undeniable. However, Boubou Hama evokes the strength of the roots in which were anchored values, ways of comprehending the world and knowledge, remembering the importance maintained by the castes in different domains, since the economic to technical from spiritual to cultural. I would like to suggest that this rescue points to where Boubou Hama considered that Africans should return to and what they should hold on in a manner to, therefore, stand not only against the colonial world, but also to what had become western and established in Africa after colonization. My argument, however, is not that this man proposes that return to pre-colonial times, in which castes dominated different scopes of society, but in fact that he preconizes an apprehension of what there was of knowledge in the African continent before the impacts generated by European establishment affected its nature and its dissemination.

Conclusion

The colonial occupation established many modifications concerning the features that the territory that came to be “Niger” had on the eve of colonization. Despite some aspects were maintained or were less affected by the French presence, at the same time there were other elements, such as the FWA organization, the violence in the occupation investitures and resistance fights, the tax implementation, forced labor and the *indigénat*¹⁸, and the installation of educational institutions, that highly affected these populations lives. This is the general context on which Boubou Hama, from the Songhay ethnic group, was born.

A specific type of knowledge, designated as “traditional”, was at the center of this man’s concerns, throughout his works as well as in his intellectual and political trajectory. In the interior of that “African wisdom”, that Boubou Hama understood to permeate all elements of life and society, two spheres, spiritual and technical, were inextricably interchangeable. For him, despite all impacts caused by colonization, values and conceptions of the world present in the African continent were still available and needed to be accessed by all. Boubou Hama had a development project for Niger and for Africa, whose basis was the rescue of the culture of people who lived

¹⁸ The *Code de l'indigénat* (or just *l'indigénat*, for not referring to an unique textual code) was a justice system conducted by French administration in relation to, exclusively, the *indigènes* [autochthonous]. Understood as a legislative regime of exception, the *indigénat* empowered local administration, giving margins to all sorts of arbitrariness.

there and its widespread. In a way to find answers to questions – essentially post-colonial – in his own time, such as what was the role to be played by its continent in the world context, Boubou Hama came back to what he considered fundamentally “African”: the integration of technique and spirituality.

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ABSTRACT

In Niger of the 1900s, the intellectual Boubou Hama worked for the preservation and promotion of a cultural framework. From a specific understanding about “traditional knowledge”, he sought to offer answers in his own time. Under the impacts of colonization, Hama wished Africa to know its own values and conceptions of the world.

KEYWORDS

Niger; Boubou Hama; Traditional Knowledge.

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BOOK REVIEW

“REIMAGINING PAN-AFRICANISM: DISTINGUISHED MWALIMU NYERERE LECTURE SERIES 2009-2013”

by Wole Soyinka, Samir Amin¹

Ermelinda Liberato²

Any researches or studies related to the African continent are incomplete if they don't approach the pan-Africanism subject, political, philosophical, and social movement, which advocates for the union and the liberation of all Africans that find themselves both in the continent and in the diaspora, against the foreign domination policy, either in the physical point of view (slavery, forced labour, and exploitation), or in the emotional or intellectual, having constituted, for that reason, the ideological basis for different African nationalist movements. Names as Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), Haile Selassie (Ethiopia), Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Amílcar Cabral (Guinea-Bissau), Marcelino dos Santos (Mozambique) among others, represent some of the most distinguished pan-Africanists of the continent.

Among them, it is important to note Julius Nyerere, the first president of the United Republic of Tanzania, between 1962 (date of its independence from the United Kingdom) and 1985 (date of his retirement), and recognized by his support to various African nationalist movements. “Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan” (172), are some examples of countries whose nationalist movements operated from Tanzania. Nyerere authored

¹ Soyinka, W. & Amin, S. (org.). 2015. *Reimagining Pan-Africanism: distinguished Mwalimu Nyerere lecture series 2009-2013*. Oxford: African Books Collective.

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the *Arusha Declaration* (1967), document which portrays the *Ujamaa* policy (unity or family), that became known as the african socialism, based upon principles of equality between individuals and the defence of a humane society. He was also one of the founders of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established on May 25th of 1963 (dubbed Africa Day) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and SADC (Southern African Development Community), created in 1992, with the main aim of promoting regional integration and poverty eradication at the southern part of the continent through economic development, while ensuring peace and safety.

In honor to one of the most charismatic leaders of "Africa and its diaspora" (170), the Dar es Salaam University created the *Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Research Program in Pan African Studies*, whose interventions on the first discussion cycle are published in this work. Issa Shivji, one of the continent's most respected academics and intellectuals, professor at that institution, as well as a pan-africanist, was indicated as the first chair of the program, position that he has occupied until his retirement, in January 2014, being replaced by his colleague, Penina Mlama. The responsibility of introducing each lecturer before their talk was then Issa Shivji's, reminding the presents not only of their professional trajectory, but, mostly, their role as Africans, citizens, intellectuals, in the production of knowledge in and about the continent.

In the introduction of the book, *Resurrecting Radical Pan-Africanism*, Issa Shivji presents the main objectives of the project, that is, the creation of a discussion space free of political connotation, based on Nyerere's political philosophy ideal of "liberation, African unity, equality between human beings based on equity (socialism)" (XII). Shivji also reminds us that the program is based on self confidence, independence (mainly in the lecturers annual choice) and uses means of its own, that is, no external funding from international donors, conditions that were not always easy to follow, because, as Shivji himself states, all sorts of pressures were present, coming both from the university itself and from donors interested in sponsoring the cause (XII), being the aims only achievable when based on "moderate budgets and voluntary service" (XI).

For five uninterrupted years, five African intellectuals, coming from different parts of the continent (Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi), with distinct professional trajectories and perspectives, and having Julius Nyerere's character and pan-Africanism as the starting point, reflected on the situation and the position of the continent in relation to the rest of the world. The diversity of the presentations, based on economic, sociological, anthropological, political, philosophical, cultural, historical analysis, among others, allowed the establishment of a multidisciplinary dialogue, proving

the importance of crossing sources in the production of knowledge. The lecturers of this first debate cycle were: Wole Soyinka (2009), Samir Amin (2010), Bereket Habte Selassie (2011), Micere Githae Mugo (2012) and Thandika Mkandawire (2013).

Wole Soyinka, a Nigerian writer and the only African to receive the Nobel Prize in literature, in 1986, was the first lecturer to contribute. This renowned character of the African intellectuality remains faithful to his principles and show his “face in the fight against tyranny” (3), as said by Issa Shivji in his introduction to the writer. Wole Soyinka’s presentation is divided in two moments: the first - Whose empire is it anyway? - defines, using empirical examples, as the Roman Empire and most recently United States, what is understood as imperialism and its characteristics’ evolution through the centuries, in other words, the creation of New Empires. In the second moment - Anything to do with slavery? - he analyzes the colonialist imperial policy, such as submission and slavery, to explain the continuous condition of submission of the continent in relation to the rest of the world.

During his presentation, Soyinka identifies the United States as one of the biggest contemporary imperialists, being Wall Street the modern center of imperialism because “when Wall Street sneezes, the world catches cold” (9). “The evil Empire” (36), as Soyinka calls it, establishes some “imperial relations” (35) based upon a relationship of subordination of the rest of the world face its power, be it economic, military, political, cultural, intellectual. Soyinka goes further in his analysis and identifies globalization, calling it a “borderless empire” (24), as the new and most dreadful mechanism of global imperialism; as is the cultural imperialism, with music being its main instrument for consolidation. The writer finishes his presentation criticizing the main institutional organizations of the continent, namely the African Union and the Arab League, as responsible for the continuity of the subordination relationships between the continent and the rest of the world, as “they have abandoned all protests’ moral bases” (49), as well as the ideals on which its foundational bases lie, namely, pan-Africanism.

Following Wole Soyinka reflections, Samir Amin brings to discussion one of the hardest fights that the continent has been facing, its *long road to socialism*. For this Egyptian who became “socialist when he was six years old” (58) and whose dream was to change society, the analysis of the African situation must be even deeper. Samir Amin begins his lecture with a brief historical presentation on the emergence, evolution and different crisis capitalism has faced from its genesis until that moment. The author claims that “historically, the ‘real’ capitalism is associated with a sequence of ways of accumulation and expropriation” (60) and that, contemporary

capitalism is above all an 'oligopolist' capitalism (65), leading to the decline of democracy (65), the "destruction of the planet's environment and life" (95), the expropriation and the subordination of those called "people of the south", encouraging conflicts between north and south, which can be understood as a conflict between capitalism and socialism. The decline of democracy means, after all, the decline of socialism because, according to Samir Amin "there can be no socialism without democracy in the same manner as there can be no democratic progress outside of the socialist point of view" (87), which is why the author prefers to use the word "democratization" (92), as it is a process in constant formation and update.

In regards to Africa, the author defends that the continent is not "marginalized" (97) from the process as it has been claimed. According to him, "Africa dove into the colonization darkness" (108), from which it has to break free, and this liberation process must also be seen and analysed in light of the processes of democratization and building of socialism. Like Soyinka, Amim too points to globalization, led by the United States as the main contemporary imperialist, responsible for the implantation of an "Apartheid in global scale" (66) and, consequently, for the chaos found throughout the globe. He also criticizes the African intellectuals, who allow themselves to be influenced by foreign ideas and that present the great project of African renaissance as "grandiloquent, nacionalist and unrealistic" (108), and defends that the continent needs an "authentic renaissance of its thinking, in an audacious, independent way, being up to the challenges" (108).

Bekeret Habte Selassie, the third guest to the "Julius Nyerere's intellectual festival" (115), focuses his presentation on the historical origins of pan-Africanism, *from the colonial borders to African unity*. Selassie goes back in time and remembers the role and work carried out by the "fathers" of pan-Africanism: DuBois, Marcus Garvey, George Padmore, Aimé Césaire, Leopold Sedar Senghor and Leon Damas. The last ones, later in time, started the negritude movement, seen as a "weapon of resistance" (124) in the defense black culture. This point is used by Selassie to get to Frantz Fanon (Aimé Césaire's student) and his role in the fight for the rights of black peoples. His presentation would have been incomplete if he failed to mention the creation of *Presence Africaine - Ruve Culturel du monde noir* (African Presence - The Black World Cultural Magazine) in 1941, by the Senegalese Alioune Diop, which, as represented by its subtitle, aimed above all the conscience and affirmation of the black peoples, giving their political and cultural fight a voice, already expressed in the pan-Africanism and the negritude movements.

Selassie stresses the role of African pan-Africanists who, inspired and influenced by those movements, continued the fight for equality in

the continent, highlighting the figure of Kwame Nkrumah, “a prophet of African liberation and unity” (135), who saw socialism as “the system that would best serve the African needs in accommodating the changes brought by capitalism” (130) and led Ghana to its independence, the first country in the continent to do so. The author dedicates the last part of its lecture to African women, remembering their contributions to “the African fight for unity and progress” (134). Although he did not mention names, he stressed the creation of the “Pan-African women’s liberation organization (PAWLO)” (134), which aims to give voice and recognition to women that fight for the rights of African women.

He finished his lecture by pointing the fragility of African institutions as the primary cause of democratic deficit and constraints faced by the continent, which is the reason why he tells all Africans “we need a new generation with more Wole Soyinkas and Samir Amins to help in breaking the intellectual barrier which is blocking our way to the so needed unity” (153). Selassie recognizes that “pan-Africanism still is a distant objective, but the founding principles have been established and instilled in the African mind” (135), needing only be allowed to grow and the reflections be made beyond the appearances.

Micere Githae Mugo, the only female guest in the first cycle, brings a reflection on the role of *art, artists and the blooming of pan-africanism in the liberated zones*, meeting her characteristics as a professor, artist, activist and pan-Africanist. Her presentation distinguishes itself from the previous ones by the use of the word “orature” as the main instrument, defined by her as “the art of the spoken word” (167), “*engaging the audience as active participants, inviting their response and soliciting their affirmation*” (167).

The author, then, paid tribute to the figure of Julius Nyerere, to his project of union and African unity, and support to nationalists movements, and his interventions in the liberation fight, highlighting his role in promoting education and African culture, because to him “culture is the nation’s soul” (174). She then talks about its importance in the liberation fight, above all in the creation of liberated zones. Among the examples offered by her, she highlights the role of culture in the liberation of the mind, “the first zone to be freed” (187), and the importance of memory, because “if we ignore the roles of culture and arts, my friends, we will have lost an important weapon to complete this obligatory mission” (194).

The author also praises the initiative of the Der es Salaam University in creating the Pan-African Studies program, seen by her as the continuation of the tradition of opening of new spaces to the intellectual evolution of the liberated African zones. However, joining Samir Amin, she

criticizes African intellectuals and researchers affirming that they are "too busy perfecting, in a modernist jargon, outdated and worn out, occidental theories, instead of becoming inventors" (187), as in creating their own theories, adapted to their reality.

As a conclusion of sorts, Thandika Mkandawie analyses what were the *50 years of independency* of most African countries. Although the author has as subtitle "personal reflexions", these gather a deeper reflexion on the previously discussed themes, and get Africans in general to think about them, getting him to tread among different fields of knowledge, from politics, economics, development issues, and others.

In a simple and structured way, Thandika presents us events that made took the post-independence project towards results different than those expected. The elusive development in the post-independence period, the debt crisis that began in Mexico, but rapidly spread throughout the world, hitting above all the African continent, the general decline of African quality of life during the 80's, also known as the continent's lost decade, characterized by the application of structural adjustment programs, the rise of poverty, hunger and armed conflicts. The 90's began to offer hope due to the economic growth registered from 1995, allowing for a resurgence of nationalist feelings. The optimism, however, was short lived, because the curse of the resources, the lack of transparency in privatization processes, the fragility of the continent in terms of trading, rapidly gave place to disappointment, for as the author himself states, "you can't eat democracy" (224).

Thandika seizes the opportunity to show his disappointment and frustration with the ignorance among younger generations about the colonial past and liberation fight, for "a people who forgets its past is condemned to repeat it" (249). On the other hand, he admits that up until then not only did the "pan-Africanism project did not go very well" (249) but also, quoting Nyerere, "OAU had been transformed into a committee of dictators" (249). However, he presents himself as an optimist in relation to the future, placing his "hope in the next generation" (251). But, for the situation to change and be successful, it is necessary that "pan-Africanism goes back to being the ideology of a social movement, more compromised with the democratic process and based upon collective solidarity and self sufficiency notions this time" (249). To accomplish it, we must continue this "sublime fight" (252) of union and audacity.

In general, the work shows us that we still have a lot to explore about pan-Africanism, therefore there's a necessity of a continued debate on the subject. It also proves that the movement's ideology and essence remain

alive, adapting to the dynamics and changes societies undergo, hence we subscribe to Samir Amin's position when he defends that the continent is not marginalized in relation to the rest of the world, just creating its own path. We agree that the current scenario is different from the one in which the pan-Africanism ideal was created, but the concerns that first plagued its founders are still present: the exploitation, predation, dependence, psychic and intellectual subordination, to mention just a few, which has been leading, in a micro perspective, to the continuous degradation of the life conditions of the African peoples and, in a meso and macro perspectives, to the peripheralization of the continent and its people.

It is obviously a book destined to the general public, but especially to the academics dedicated to the study of the continent, given the maturity with which the subjects were approached. It is clear that this work enriches the research about Africa. Yet, there are some aspects that can and should be improved in the future. In the first place, translating the work to other official languages of the continent, so that non-English speakers can access it, once pan-Africanism is meant for all Africans, not only those that master the English language. If we defend African union and unity, and above all, that Africa speaks through a single voice, it is necessary to be informed and updated on the facts. On the other hand, although we consider that the choice of lecturers was right, we would like to see a more balanced gender representation, with more women participating in this kind of initiative, given that, of the five lecturers, only one was female. This does not represent the African reality because, as Selassie recognized, women also played an important role in the defence of pan-Africanism and in the fight for independence and african unity, as well as in the production of knowledge.

Initiatives as this one are, obviously, applause and praise worthy. First, to the Dar es Salam University for the creation of program with the previously mentioned characteristics, in a scenario in which the financial element is more and more determinant to the development of any activity, above all intellectual and cultural ones, affirming Mwalimu Julius Nyerere's legacy. The lecturer's availability is also praiseworthy, for them, despite having their own professional obligations, didn't fail to answer to the call and gave their contribution to the initiative, thus enriching the debate.

We should also applaud the initiative of the MUSE Project to make the work freely available on their platform, so that all users from associated institutions can have access and download it freely. We hope that this network can be expanded, especially with African institutions, so that all Africans can enjoy the diversity of the published material.

Finally, but not less important, the highlight goes to the Professor

Issa Shivji for, as himself states, "initiatives like this one are, thus, hard to maintain and may not be maintained. However, they must be taken - to sustain the hope and offer a glimpse of what can be done, even if it is not being done" (Shivji: XIV).

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Translated by Gabriela Ribeiro

BOOK REVIEW

“GEOMETRIAS DA MEMÓRIA: CONFIGURAÇÕES PÓS-COLONIAIS”

by António Sousa Ribeiro, Margarida Calafate
Ribeiro¹

Fernanda Salomão Vilar²

The book *“Geometrias da Memória: configurações pós-coloniais”* is the first volume of the series “Memoirs – Filhos de Império”, from the research group also called “*MEMOIRS – Filhos de Império e Pós-memórias Europeias*” (<http://memoirs.ces.uc.pt>) funded by the European Research Council (ERC). Organized by António Sousa Ribeiro and Margarida Calafate Ribeiro, the book examines the place of memory and post-colonial memory in the narrative of European history.

The preface to the book evokes the creation of the European Community and arrives at the current debates to question the discourses on unity and peace in Europe. In these discourses, however, the Other is always omitted, the one that comes from the extraterritorial history of Europe and that was decisive for its construction.

The organizers of the book call for an exercise of memory, where articulation with a postcolonial reflection would allow justice and eventually reconstruct the narrative of the relationship of Europe with its various Others. The project encompasses Portugal, France and Belgium in their articulation with the colonial memory, and the process of decolonization of the next generation (the post-memory holders).

As an extension of the preface, the article by Margarida Calafate

¹ António Sousa Ribeiro e Margarida Calafate Ribeiro (org.). 2016. *Geometrias da Memória: configurações pós-coloniais*. Publisher Afrontamento: Portugal, 348p

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Ribeiro puts forward very interesting historical data on the Great Wars and on the reconstruction of Europe. She explains the utopia of a united Europe due the existence of a hardly understandable diversity. With the support of present-day texts from various countries' scholars, she first addresses the issue of Islam to explain the fear of this Other about whom we talk nonstop and to whom we have never given a chance to express itself. In a second moment, Ribeiro touches on the subject of the literature of the returnees, which were Portuguese forced to leave Africa (sometimes their homeland) and to return to a hostile, foreign territory. In this aspect, the testimony literature is used as a pact of responsibility with history: the next generation seeks answers to the questions of their parents, a synthesis work due to the excess of personal memory and to the lack of a divided public memory. At last, the author seeks the common point of these stories, which would be located in what she calls a "colonial fracture" and which can only be repaired by the exercise of memory. The author concludes that only in this way it will be possible to negotiate European multiculturalism through a plural history, of a community the size of the world.

Antônio Sousa Ribeiro addresses the question of the reverse of modernity, which is absolute violence itself: the holocaust – directly communicated with colonial violence. The author elaborates a course of analysis where he shows how the creation of the concept of race and the inferiorization of the other, colonialism, are intrinsically linked to the anti-Semitic ideology. Antônio Ribeiro quotes the pacifist writer Romain Rolland to explain that the experience of the violence of the colonial wars is at the root of the process of dehumanization that generated the dramas of World War II. Following Paul Gilroy's studies, Ribeiro proposes a comparative study between Jean Améry, a specialist in the post-Holocaust *esobrevivante*, and Franz Fanon, a key author of postcolonial thought. Thus Colonization and Holocaust would be superimposed and not separated in history. Redemptive violence is revolutionary violence, where the human being affirms himself despite all negative discourse that withdraws his humanity - a transforming utopia.

The article by Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo revisits the unfinished mourners of the Empire. Alike Antônio Ribeiro, he questions the links amongst the various genocides, from the racial politics of the colonial period to the barbarism of the Holocaust. He criticizes the laws and celebrations that want to regulate and govern the collective memory in order to justify the past. He points out several past histories to interpret various present-day events: he takes up the German case in Namibia - and the creation of an abstract code of evil - which will also appear in the Holocaust. The author also addresses the situation in the Netherlands and the reconstruction

of a memory linked to the crimes committed in Indonesia by individual narratives and specific groups. Italy faces its past when it offers reparation to Libya, after thirty years of colonial violence, and to Ethiopia for the use of chemical weapons. The idea that the colony was a laboratory in connection with fascism is increasingly explored. The Belgian Congo and the role of Belgium in the racial politics that engendered the Rwandan genocide, or the blame of the United Kingdom in what happened in Kenya, as well as the war of memories that France is living for the establishment of its historiography, especially in the case of Algeria. These are some examples given by the author, who ends by saying that Portugal still faces many obstacles to demystify its colonial history.

In the continuation, António Pinto Ribeiro provokes saying that decolonizing the museums is the only option for their survival. As an European institution, the museum is born to materialize colonial occupation and neutralize culture. Thus, if the appreciation of a work of art changes over time – once, the frontal nude of Olympia in Manet's frame shocked –, what is surprising today is the black woman in the background in situation of slavery. The birth of some museums in America are evoked as symbols of resistance by minorities to impart knowledge and fight for rights. A battle so that the Other does not have to be just a commodity, as it happens even to African art. Countries that were colonized and had dictatorial regimes, such as Brazil, Chile and Argentina, created museums with archives of ex-colonized. In this way, he proposes a decolonization of museums, with the voices of who makes the object and the history.

Helder Macedo inaugurates the second Book Threshold, dedicated to alterity. With ingenious text and full of humor and wisdom, he discusses how we could “recognize the unknown.” An exercise that the old explorers had to do to be able to understand and stand before the new world discovered. The author cites several letters, epics and historical facts that illustrate the problems of intercultural communication - and how we can recognize difference today and conceive it as part of our singularities.

In the same vein, Isabel Castro Henriques explains the construction of negative otherness: the way in which the Self consolidates at the same time as it excludes the Other from history. With the help of historiography and science, the author analyzes the evolution of concepts and notions used to disqualify the other (primitive or civilized). It pays particular attention to the word resistance and its evolution in African societies, to finally attack the concept of postcolonial. The author reckons this would be an ideological trap that guarantees the consolidation of hierarchies of globalization - once the past is constructed by the present, which, by its turn, selects what will go down in history or not.

Ana Paula Ferreira makes a reading of the work of Boaventura Sousa Santos to defend the articulation of a post-colonialism of the south. The Lusophony space must participate in the debate of Hispanophony, Francophony and Anglophony in order to decolonize thought. Ferreira uses the relationship between Prospero and Caliban to mobilize anti-colonial solidarities and mobilizes the concept of "intertranslatability" to reach a mutual understanding of subaltern movements. A text full of energy that paves the way to the analysis of poets made by Laura Cavalcante Padilha. The author relates the influences between Africa and the Americas by the written voice of writers little known by Portuguese-speaking readers on the way to the Black Atlantic.

In this line of thought, we have Roberto Vecchi's article, which presents the subalternities of the South Atlantic. From an analysis of the slave trade (which could hardly resist and emit murmurs to tell non-hegemonic counter-histories), it retraces the history of Brazil and critically explains how Brazilian society failed to make the transition from colony to nation and give full citizenship to all its inhabitants. An article engaged and necessary to discuss contemporary Brazil.

Paulo de Medeiros discusses the relations of Lusophone literatures and world literature systems. It begins with a critical reading of what he calls three fetishes of postcolonial critique: the periphery, national identity, and language. Using Immanuel Wallerstein's "semi-periphery" concept, he discusses Lusophony and talks about the importance of African literature in promoting the Portuguese language in the world. In this way, the author thinks that the intraphysical comparability and extra lusophony may be one of the keys to inscribe the literatures written in Portuguese in the various global systems of literature.

Francisco Noa, by its turn, analyzes a particular case of Lusophone and describes the relationship between literature and power in Mozambique. It begins by showing how racism and repression against authors existed in a clear manner in the colonial period. In independence the paradigm changes, and utopia and nationalism are highlighted: literature becomes a territory of individual and collective affirmation: a territory of resistance. Currently, the author assesses, in Mozambique, literature is transnational and continues to act as a counter-power.

The third part of the book begins with an article by Fabrice Schurmans. The author problematizes the discourses of coloniality. The North is the producer of the "Text", the great simplifying narrative, accessible and widely diffused. The "Text" contaminates not only specialized texts, such as those analyzed by the author (Albert Memmi, Hélène Béji and Stephen Smith), but also the media (he explains the symmetries that the media can

make in portraying the earthquake drama in Haiti with the representations we have of Africa - they are locus interchangeable). According to the author, the writings of these three authors would make it possible to transform a single discourse into a reality and to reinforce “the Text” by the systematic repetition and resumption of an always available device. Thus, combating these easy ideas and arguing against “the Text”, deconstructing and fabricating new narratives, is still a challenge: we have, as Schaurmans says, intellectuals who do this (Mabeko-Tali, Mamdani, M’Bokolo, Ki-Zerbo), but the complexity of their texts does not allow them to confront them directly with “the Text”.

Catarina Martins examines feminisms between the North and Africa. She criticizes the imperialist feminism of the West and analyzes the work of three African feminists and their contributions to the current debate. Amina Mama, IfiAmadiume and Oyèrónké Oyewùmides contradict the concepts of feminism from the north to combat the process of culturalization of the “Women of Others”. The author also criticizes the Women in Development (WID) program, which practices “state and imperialist feminism,” erasing the places of legitimate struggles of African women. She also criticizes ethnographic feminism, which can idealize a pre-colonial period and extinguish important issues. Finally, Martins presents a feminism made in Africa and of transnational dimension: critical, political and activist, producer of knowledge that the countries of the North should pay more attention.

Júlia Garraio addresses an exhibition of photographs that took place in Lisbon in late 2015 and early 2016: *Return: Traces of memory*. She analyzes the goal of presenting photos without recourse to the text: in this way, we are forced to construct a meaning, a narrative to understand what happened in the colonial period, we cannot take an uncritical approach to the exhibition. The black woman’s body exists as a place of remembrance of colonialism, it is one of the places of colonial penetration and violation (beyond geographical and cultural space). The purpose of the exhibition was to question the “non-history” of the returnees and offer a critical view of Portuguese colonialism among the suffering of the returnees, but without forgetting the violence that gave support to colonial domination.

In the following article, Bruno Sena Martins tries to reestablish the memories of the colonial wars, a “public secret”, from the testimony of several Deficients of the Armed Forces. The silence that weighs on the colonial wars leaves the witnesses in a solitude from where it becomes impossible to communicate the past. Nor is there the public’s empathy to listen to their stories. In this article, Martins seeks to make the body a place of memory.

João Paulo Borges Coelho, renowned Mozambican writer and historian, reworked the memories of the Mozambican wars. He explains how it was not yet possible to tell the experience of the two wars that lasted from 1964-1992, the first for independence, ending in 1975. And the second by power, which ends in a UN peace agreement in 1992. The author begins by discussing what is a memory: a socialization of memories. He then explains the political use of memory - a simple, non-contradictory management that eliminates all competing discourse. He criticizes the narrative goal created by Frelimo to elaborate the history of independence and questions the limits of silence over civil war. This silence, in search of consolidating the bonds of peace, is according to the author a "reversible silence" (Paul Ricoeur). The task of telling these stories falls today into two ongoing projects (Mbita et Aluka). The author ends by wondering if these projects exist to retrieve a narrative goal and legitimize the power of those who control the country.

In the course of the reading we are forced to rethink everything we know or thought we knew about memory and colonization. Anchored in the present and informed by the past, each article contributes in a particular way to deconstructing the story and shows us how it is possible to tell another story from different points of view. A book necessary not only for Portugal, but for all countries that should confront their colonial past fairly and honestly.

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PARTNERS

NERINT

The Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT) was the first center dedicated to the study and research in International Relations in Southern Brazil. It was established in August 1999 at the ILEA/UFRGS aiming the argumentative and innovative study of the main transformations within the post-Cold War international system. Since 2014, it is located at the Faculty of Economics of UFRGS (FCE-UFRGS). In parallel, NERINT has sought ways to contribute to the debate on a national project for Brazil through the understanding of the available strategic options to consolidate an autonomous international presence for the country, from the perspective of the developing world. Brazil's choice of an "active, affirmative, and proactive diplomacy" at the beginning of the 21st century has converged with projections and studies put forward over numerous seminars and publications organized by NERINT.

An outcome of its activity was the creation of an undergraduate degree on International Relations (2004), ranked the best in Brazil according to the Ministry of Education (2012), and a graduate level program, the International Strategic Studies Doctoral Program (2010). Two journals were also created: the bimonthly *Conjuntura Austral* and the biannual and bilingual *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*. Thus, besides ongoing research on developing countries, NERINT is also the birthplace of undergraduate and graduate programs, not to mention its intense editorial activities.

CEBRAFRICA

The Brazilian Centre for African Studies (CEBRAFRICA) has its origins in Brazil-South Africa Studies Centre (CESUL), a program established in 2005 through an association between the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG), of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its research activities are developed in cooperation with the Brazilian Centre for Strategy and International Relations (NERINT).

In March 2012, CESUL was expanded into CEBRAFRICA in order to cover the whole of Africa. At the same time, the South Africa series, which published five books, was transformed into the African Series, with new titles. The centre's main objectives remain the same as before:

to conduct research, to support the development of memoirs, thesis and undergraduate works, to congregate research groups on Africa, to organize seminars, to promote student and professor exchanges with other institutions, to establish research networks and joint projects with African and Africanist institutions, to publish national and translated works on the field, and to expand the specialized library made available by FUNAG.

The numerous research themes seek to increase knowledge of the African continent and its relations to Brazil on the following topics: International Relations, Organizations and Integration, Security and Defense, Political Systems, History, Geography, Economic Development, Social Structures and their Transformations, and Schools of Thought. CEBRAFRICA counts among its partners renowned institutions from Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Senegal, Cape Verde, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, Portugal, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, India, and China. Current researches focus on “Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian Presence in Africa”, “Africa in South-South Cooperation”, “African Conflicts”, “Integration and Development in Africa”, “African Relations with Great Powers”, and “Inter-African Relations”.

SUBMISSION STANDARDS

1. The Brazilian Journal of African Studies publishes articles and book reviews;
2. The journal is divided in two sections: Articles (Artigos) and Book Review (Resenhas);
3. The research articles must contain a maximum of 50 thousand characters (including spaces and footnotes). Use only the standard format; the book reviews must contain a maximum of 4,5 thousand characters (spaces and footnotes included);
4. The footnotes should be of a substantive and complementary nature;
5. The bibliography must follow the rules of the Chicago system (Author-date or note-bibliography), specifying the used literature at the end of the text;
6. Contributions must be original and unpublished and can be submitted in Portuguese, English or Spanish;
7. Contributions must contain the full name of the author, their titles, institutional affiliation (the full name of the institution) and an email address for contact;
8. The complete filling of the submission form by the authors is mandatory.
9. Publications of undergraduate students are accepted, as long as in partnership with an advisor professor, which will appear as the main author of the work;
10. Book reviews must contain the complete data and the ISBN of the analyzed work;
11. Contributions must be accompanied of: 3 keywords in Portuguese or Spanish and 3 keywords in English; Title in English and in Portuguese or Spanish; Abstract in English and in Portuguese or Spanish, both with up to 50 words.
12. Submissions must be made by the journal website: www.seer.ufgrs.br/rbea

SUBMISSION PREPARATION CHECKLIST

As part of the submission process, authors are required to check off their submission's compliance with all of the following items, and submissions may be returned to authors that do not adhere to these guidelines.

1. Contributions must be original, and shall not have been submitted for publication in another journal; otherwise, it must be justified in "Comments to the Editor".
2. Submitted files must be in Microsoft Word, OpenOffice or RTF (as long as their size is up to 2MB) format.
3. URLs must be informed in the references when necessary.
4. The text must be single-spaced; Times New Roman typeface 12 pt must be used for the body of the text; italic is to be used instead of underline (except in URL addresses); Figures and Tables must be embedded in the text.
5. The text must follow patterns of style and bibliographical requirements described in Author Guidelines, in the section "About the Journal".
6. The identification of authorship of the work must be removed from the file and the Properties option in Word, thus ensuring the confidentiality criteria of the journal, if it is to be subjected to peer review (i.e. articles), accordingly with available instructions in the website.